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1.0 The need for the research

While there is a real need to focus on the local when it comes to Late Iron Age and Roman Archaeological study there is also a real need to place any studies firmly within their historical, cultural, social and economic contexts. Attempting to understand the development of Roman provinces and the peoples within them without any real recourse to the Empire that conquered and created them runs a real risk of placing any results and evaluations from excavation and study outside of their real context and somewhat in isolation. I don’t perceive of myself as a Romanist, perhaps living on the western fringe of Europe and having sat through one too many presentations about over focused aspects of Late Iron Age societal developments with barely a reference to the influence and impact of Rome may mean that I can see a need for a more balanced comparative approach to the study of provincial development whilst clearly recognising that a one size top down approach to Acculturation and Romanization does not fit all and fails to recognise the real diversity of provincial life within the context of the Roman empire.

1.1 Abstract: Aims and Objectives

My research will investigate the processes or stages of social, political and cultural change, and the evidence for continuity of indigenous cultures that were a result of the creation of new Roman imperial territories and provinces within three distinct regions. My work focuses on an examination of the role of the military in the processes that accompanied the transition from newly conquered territories into developed Roman provinces. This will require an understanding of the extent of elite and not so elite participation in provincial societies, and the development of semi-autonomous civitas governments.

Evidence from the archaeological record from three regions conquered between the end of the 1st century BC and the early 2nd century AD will be considered. The regions I have chosen are: Galicia and western Asturias (North West Hispania Tarraconenis between 39BC and AD68); South Wales and the Marches between AD47 and AD138; and Highland Romania (central Dacia) between AD80 and
AD161. These were chosen for the following reasons:

All three regions were conquered by Augustus / Octavian, Vespasian and Trajan who had had relatively recently secured power and the prestige of a successful military conquest may have provided a motive to help secure their hold on power. The periodic expansion of the Empire, under Augustus and his successors, may relate to a combination of circumstances with availability of resources, a readiness of supplies and a matter of simple opportunity / political necessity on the part of the Emperor. Each geographical area had a distinct history; each region lay on the edge of Empire and all had distinct and rugged terrain, which played a key role on their subsequent conquest. All three regions underwent a period of prolonged confrontation and interaction with the Roman army and all three regions were rich in mineral resources, which were heavily exploited by Rome after their conquest.

All three regions contained relatively complex indigenous pre-conquest societies being ‘Celtic’ in Spain and South and South Western Wales; and ‘Dacian’ in Romania. The three regions have significant highland / mountainous areas and are mineral rich – these minerals were exploited either directly by the military or under military supervision post-conquest, something that had a direct impact on the post-conquest societies that emerged. Additionally the three areas were also on the periphery or literal edge of the Roman Empire, they were some distance from the Mediterranean cultural centre of the Roman world.

The conquest of the regions involved the deployment of significant resources on the part of the Roman army. After the conquest of the three regions was completed the army continued to play a key role in administering and developing the conquered territories. Unlike most other provinces within the Empire where, once they were secure, the military moved on, there was prolonged contact with units of the Roman Army in the post conquest period in the three study regions as a result of the establishment of military garrisons (including legionary fortresses, auxiliary forts), military involvement in mineral exploitation and the procurement of supplies for the military. This prolonged contact had a distinct impact on the development of provincial society within the three regions.
An understanding of the processes of acculturation (including Romanization) whether direct or indirect (combined with potentially dire military consequences for conquered peoples) may provide the real key to understanding how and why the Roman Empire managed to expand so far to sustain its territorial integrity even during later periods of instability. The study will also make a contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of communication and cultural dominance in the Imperial period, when there was no mass media comparable to the modern era and the development of provincial identity.

The military conquest and subsequent administration and development of the newly conquered territories took place at different times during a fundamentally important period of the development of the Empire between the late first century BC and the early second century AD. Study of the three regions will give the opportunity for comparisons to be made concerning the impact of the military and associated settlements on post-conquest society within the study areas as Asturias, Southern Wales and Dacia also retained a significant military presence (including at least one Legionary garrison) for most of their existence as provinces, which also had an impact on the post-conquest settlement patterns.

1.2 Research Themes and Questions

This research project is concerned with understanding conquest, consolidation and colonisation of the three areas in the early Roman period. Key research themes include:

- **Province-building in the Roman Empire:** an investigation of the evidence of Roman strategies for the creation of provinces, involving the pacification and subjugation of their native populations.

- **Military involvement in provincial development:** the role and influence of the Roman army in creating new provinces from recently conquered territories. Interaction with the civilian population was a key factor in early provincial development and there is a need to explore the nature of the relationship
between military posts, civilian vicus and the indigenous population in their vicinities.

- Landscape and Economic Integration: the evidence for change and continuity in settlement patterns and land ownership in the three areas after their conquest. Analysis of distinctive settlement types in the study areas: defended Castros in north-western Spain, hillforts and settlements in western Britain, Dacian settlements in Romania.

- Acculturation and ‘Romanization’: The term ‘Romanization’ has been overused and is far too simple a concept to describe the processes of ‘selective acculturation’ that took place to different degrees across the Empire as occupied territories developed into provinces. The three distinct but similar areas provide the opportunity to examine the development of the complex role of multiple (level) identities (clan, tribal, provincial and Imperial) of former subject peoples within the Empire. This will involve investigating the fortunes of native societies and the degree of elite participation (and acculturation) during the first few generations after the conquest of these territories.

1.3 Research Methodology

My research will focus on the recent work and surveys of the three regions’ archaeological evidence (settlement and artefact analysis) for continuity and change.

The three regions were selected for detailed study for the following reasons:

- The relatively complex nature of their pre-conquest societies (‘Celtic’ in Spain and South and South Western Wales; and ‘Dacian’ in Romania);
- All three regions have significant highland / mountainous areas;
- All were conquered during the early Roman imperial period (between 29BC and AD 106);
- All three regions retained a significant military presence (including at least one Legionary garrison) for most of their existence as provinces;
• All were on the periphery or literal edge of the Empire, being some distance from the Mediterranean Roman cultural world;
• All three regions were particularly rich in mineral reserves (Gold, Silver, Lead, Iron, etc), which were exploited either directly by the military or under military supervision.

The subtle differences in the processes of provincial development and Romanization / acculturation between the three areas will shed light on the similar and different experiences of these regions as the provinces developed and underwent the process of so-called ‘Romanization’/ acculturation.

The comparative study of three different geographical regions is an efficient way to develop an understanding of the Roman experience. This work focuses on three smaller regions, rather than looking at entire provinces. In the process of this study a variety of different factors were examined including primary sources, secondary sources, settlement patterns, commercial and industrial activity (including mining), social structures (both before, and after the conquest). The experience of Rome in North West Spain, South Wales and Central Dacia has revealed the consequences of the military conquest and occupation and the subsequent development of the three regions as part of provinces within the Roman Empire. Theories of acculturation / Romanization have been examined along with the discrepant experience of three distinct indigenous societies as part of the Empire. The study of indigenous experience should demonstrate the value of comparative study of diverse geographical regions of the Roman Empire across the north western and central Europe.
2.0 Introduction: Romanization and Imperialism

In the ancient world, as in the modern world, culture and identity, how they are expressed and how they change directly relate to power (and it’s use). Power, culture and identity are expressed in different ways by similar peoples at different levels in complex societies. In the post imperial age we live in, we are surrounded by the remnants of past Empires. In South Wales and elsewhere, we literally live amongst both the physical, cultural and the psychological remnants of the British Empire. Our modern understanding of Empire, Imperialism and acculturation is tempered by our collective inheritance and observation of and indirect experience of the recent demise of the European colonial empires. More recent and older, European empires, whilst sharing some common themes, emphasized their power and ruled their territories in different ways.

Figure 1: Stalinist Border arch (Chinese – Kyrgyz border) June 1996 (Author’s collection)
The Roman Empire, like many more modern Empires, may have had a largely unified political culture, but, a diverse provincial culture. In the eastern half the largely dominant theme of local governance was modelled on the Greek polis or city state, in the western half, governance was largely based upon the civitas government, based upon a Roman model (with magistrates, an *ordo* (council) and a local senate. This whole process enabled the successful combination of local / regional identities and interests with an empire wide identity, which with the army, bound the empire together. Modern Empires made use (to varying degrees) of language, imagery and symbolism to express their form of imperialism and imperial rule. Similarly, the later Roman Republic and the early Roman Empire also made use of language, imagery and symbols to express their own power and Empire. Our understanding of the Roman Empire and Roman imperialism remains clouded by our own understanding of the way European Empires worked and our understanding of modern Imperialism (Freeman 1996, Richardson 2004, Hingley 2005, Mattingly 2006 et al).

Figure 2: The Arch of Constantine, Rome, March 2015 (Author's collection)
The concept of Romanization is a relatively modern one, the classical sources did not use it. It was developed to account for the processes of social change that took place across Italy and the provinces of the Western half of the Empire and parts of the East. The modern or at least late 19th century concept of Romanization may be directly related to material and imperial ideologies and at the core of these ideologies was the perception that the Roman Empire had at its heart a mission to civilize the Barbarians and expose them to Roman culture (Hingley, 2005, 15).

Figure 3: Napoleonic Triumphal Arch – commemorating Napoleon's victory over England in 1804 - outside the Louvre, Paris, February 2013 (Author's collection)

Certainly in the nineteenth century the spread of Roman culture was seen in a positive light as a positive development (Terrenato, 2008, 235). This perception played an important supportive role in the emergence of nation states with official unified / unitary cultures (e.g. British, German, Italian, etc), which replaced older
richer regional diversity (and minority languages) in unifying states like Germany and Italy, and perhaps to a lesser degree in Britain, Russia and Spain. This trend had been fostered and developed in France after (and during) the revolutionary and the Napoleonic period (1789 until 1814). The French Republic and the First Empire (initially) made full use of Roman republican and imperial political titles within their political structures with Roman style political titles (e.g. consuls, first consuls, and eventually emperors), and later statuary and paintings, legionary eagles and triumphal arches (Chandler, 1993, 307 and Horne, 1997, 27).

The theory of ‘Romanization’ emerged as a product of historians who drew on contemporary concepts of nationhood and empire and the concepts of ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarians’ from the classical sources. These accounts suggested that ‘Roman culture’ spread through the Empire as a result of a process of ‘Romanization. Hingley (2005, 16) suggested that the process of Romanization was argued to have encouraged the adoption of Roman culture (and civilisation) by various different status groups across the Empire. The process was perceived to involve a positive moral quality. It developed within the nineteenth and early twentieth century ideas of classical civilisation, which were current within much of Europe at the time. The positive take on Romanization continued into the early years of the twentieth century, in Britain, Francis Haverfield formalized the concept of Romanization to explain what had happened to native culture and society in Roman Britain. Haverfield suggested that what he described as “the long peace” established by the Roman Empire (in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD) led to a transformation of those provincial lands that lay within the protective embrace of Rome.

“They were also given a civilization and that civilization had time to take strong root. Roman speech and manners were diffused; the political franchise was extended; city life was established; the provincial populations were assimilated in an orderly and coherent culture. A large part of the world came to become Romanized.”

Haverfield (1915, 11)

Haverfield (1915, 75 – 76) suggested that Romanization had begun at Verulam (Verulamium) before the Claudian conquest and that most progress took place under the Flavians between AD 70 and AD 95 AD. He also suggested that while Tacitus
suggested that Agricola successfully encouraged what we recognize as Romanization, Haverfield suggested that Agricola was merely carrying out the policy of his age.

“The following winter was spent on schemes of social betterment. Agricola had to deal with people living in isolation and ignorance and therefore prone to fight; and his object was to accustom them to a life of peace and quiet by the provision of amenities. He therefore gave private encouragement and official assistance to the building of temples, public squares and good houses. He pressed the energetic and scolded the slack; and competition for honour proved as effective as compulsion. Furthermore he educated the sons of the chiefs in the liberal arts, and expressed a preference for British ability as compared with the trained skills of the Gaul’s. The result was that instead of loathing the Latin language they became eager to speak effectively. In the same way, our national dress came into favour and the toga was everywhere to be seen.”

Tacitus, Agricola, 21

Agricola (who was Tacitus’s father in law) while exercising a provincial military command (in Britannia) also appeared to be assisting and encouraging the native tribal elites to develop their civitas capitals and encouraging the adoption of Roman culture. From a Roman point of view, this would have been an eminently practical way of stabilizing the rear areas of a province, which while containing an active military garrison in Wales and the West midlands also contained an active war front in the north.

The classical sources (Hingley, 2005, 24 - 27) explained in their own way the way in which barbarian peoples could become civilized by a combination of contact with and the adoption of Roman culture (e.g. Tacitus, Agricola 21). Hingley suggested that this element of the Roman civilising mission was readily absorbed by the 19th and early 20th century imperialists in France and Britain; providing the argument that imperial absorption gave martial races of barbarians an opportunity to progress and develop under Imperial protection. Western Imperial domination was justified because the peoples of the West had adopted the ideas of Rome’s inheritance of humanitas from the Greeks, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The peoples of the West drew heavily on the classical sources and imperial imaginary to define their own imperial purpose and how they dealt with other peoples.
It would be easy from the perspective of someone living in a largely post-imperial era in the second decade of the twenty-first century to dismiss Haverfield’s vision of Romanization. Yet Haverfield acknowledged that Romanization was a complex process with complex issues and that the process occurred to varying degrees in different places within provinces and across the provinces of the Empire (Millet, 2002, 1).

*It does not mean simply that all the subjects of Rome became wholly and uniformly Roman. The world is not so monotonous as that. In it two tendencies were blended with over varying results. First, Romanization extinguished the difference between Roman and provincial, through all parts of the Empire but the east, alike in speech, in material culture, in political feeling and religion. When the provincials called themselves Roman or when we call them Romans, the epithet is correct. Secondly, the process worked with different degrees of speed and success in different land. It did not everywhere and at once destroy all traces of tribal and national sentiments or fashions.*

Haverfield (1915, 22)

Collingwood identified key issues as being what happened when peoples became Romanized and that there was the possibility of native resistance to the Romanization and its associated processes of urban development. He also suggested that in some areas of the province, particularly rural areas, villa and villages sites displayed very different levels of Roman material culture (Collingwood and Myres, 1937, 193-194).

In the 1940s the arrival of Rome was still being perceived in positive terms, with Roman civilization and town life being accepted by the British tribal elite although admittedly as a compromise, with a periodic urban existence for government being balanced by estate-based country life (Richardson, 1947, 21). Wealthy indigenous landowners became the guardians for the payment of taxation, in both kind and money, and oversaw its collection. The adoption of Roman ways, after an initial reluctance, became paramount, owing to the attractions of Roman material culture e.g. Roman buildings which offered luxury and comfort, and luxury articles (long favoured by the indigenous elite) continued to be favoured. The emperor’s peace brought social intercourse, the interchange of ideas and time for its enjoyment, and
freedom from fear, accompanied by wealth, which opened new fields of emulation and ambition.

Romano-British acculturation was portrayed as a synthesis of Roman and British cultures and suggested that the process was entirely beneficial and positive.

“Outwardly it was Roman, inwardly it remained Celtic, yet, it would be wrong to suppose an inner conflict between the two aspects. The result was synthesis, intended by Rome, and welcomed by the British people as they came to realise the advantages of peace and wealth offered by membership of the empire”.

Frere, 1967, 303

There was an acceptance that ‘Rome’ directed the processes of Romanization and that the whole process was positive. There was also an acceptance that the spread (largely) of Roman material culture (and Roman culture) was uneven and the processes were influenced by status, social class and proximity to (or from) the new urban centres, which remained the focus for progress. Frere was also dismissive of the Celtic input into the Romanization processes and supported the hypothesis that Romanization was a top down process which worked from the elite downwards to varying degrees with little involvement or participation from non-elite groups.

The people of Roman Britain, after the conquest, were by and large the descendants of pre Roman Iron Age families, who lived in rural areas in a relatively unchanged manner (Potter and Jolas, 1992, 68 – 69). They carried on paying some form of taxes as they had before the conquest and carried on speaking a Celtic language, making little or no concession to the official language of their conquerors – Latin. Potter and Jolas noted that even in heavily urbanised areas of the empire like North Africa, the local languages e.g. Punic, Berber and Libyan survived the period of Roman rule. They suggested that the survival of local languages implied that Romanization was focused on the elite members of society, who would have needed Latin and a familiarity with Roman culture to carry out the duties of administration and patronage that went with established civitas governance, Latin, the toga and baths as promoted by Agricola.
The emergence of civitas governments in Roman Britain was an indirect consequence of the impact of Roman conquest, rather than a being a direct consequence of deliberate Roman policy (Millett, 1990, 101). Millett argued that the civitas governments that emerged did so in areas where Iron Age tribal units had displayed many of the key elements of the later civitas governments before the Roman conquest. Millett also suggested that the indigenous elite was able to consolidate their hold on power and their influence by co-operating with the Roman authorities, which meant that the devolution of power to the local elites meant that Rome was able to rule and collect taxation with a relatively minimal amount of coercion and expense. A key component in Imperial expansion can be considered in terms of as to how far the expansion and consolidation of Empire and political control were related to regional circumstances and opportunities and how far they were driven by the Empire’s organizational ability, with moving and supplying troops, building up stockpiling of resources for campaigns (Fulford, 1992, 294).

2.1 The evolution of the concept of Romanization

Romanization itself has a relatively long history within the field of Roman studies, dating back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Mattingly, 2006, 14). Benign aspects of Roman rule and the cultural purpose of the Roman Empire with its gifts of urbanization, villas, art, language and culture to the provincial population were emphasized at the expense of any previous civilizations which were implied as being inferior. Early excavations focused on forts, towns and villas rather than other more indigenous sites and this developed a research agenda, which supported the assumptions that ‘Roman civilization’ was superior and beneficial. The focus on elite elements of Romano-British society, which were the most closely aligned to ‘Roman identity’, also backed the assumptions of Roman cultural superiority. The emphasis on the cultural similarities meant that those elements of pre Roman British culture that may have influenced cultural development tended to be downplayed or ignored. Mattingly (2006, 14 - 15) argued that because of the involvement of European scholars in their own world of colonization and empire they thus were conditioned to see the civilizing elements of Empire in a positive light. He also noted that one consequence of this was to simplify the ideas of what it was to be Roman, which
overlooked the Italian and Mediterranean contributions to the notion of Roman identity.

The idea of Romanization was developed on the European mainland by Theodor Mommsen and developed in Britain by Francis Haverfield. Haverfield suggested a basic model for social change within the Roman Empire, dated back to the early years of the twentieth century. Haverfield suggested a process (overtime) for indigenous native cultures to become more Roman. He argued that this process of Romanization involved the adoption of a whole range of different patterns of behaviour (social, economic, cultural and political) as recorded in the archaeological record.

Collingwood, Richardson and Frere who were all active between the 1920’s and 1960’s (and beyond) brought their own take to the theory of Romanization. Collingwood who was initially seen as a successor to Haverfield (who had died in 1919) suggested that the Roman Empire was different to the then existing other Empires because the gap between the rulers and the ruled was less distinct.

‘The Britons, then became Romans; Romans in civilization, in speech, in patriotism and sentiment. At the same time, they did not cease to be Britons; their participation in the cosmopolitan life of the Empire was not of such a kind as to swamp or obliterate their original character and peculiarities.’

Collingwood (1934) Roman Britain, 12

Historically the adoption of elements of Roman culture by indigenous peoples had been interpreted with little degree of criticism as signs of progress and the development of a civilised or Romanised society. The emergence of urban centres, small towns, villages and villas across south and south eastern Britannia was also interpreted as evidence for varying degrees of social change (Clarke, 1996, 71). This view made the assumption that only the landed elites were of any consequence and that with the use of Roman material culture, as found in the archaeological record, was interpreted to suggest the development of Roman social constructs. Romanization may also have enabled some elements of indigenous society to move away from subsistence agriculture and to develop surpluses which could be sold for
profit and access to the benefits of the moneyed economy. Clarke argued that the traditional view of Romanization was that aside from the development of a whole series of urban settlements there was enough economic wealth to fund the development and growth of rich rural Roman villas.

Romanization was a deliberate policy, and that this policy manifested itself in a variety of different ways (Hanson, 1997, 76-78). As well as state promotion of urbanisation and urban development, the Rome also targeted individuals, who bought into the Roman way of doing things, gained places in the new structures and undertook public office in the new towns established across the Empire.

“The advance of this Romanization followed manifold lines. Much was due to official encouragement by statesmen who cherished the ideal of assimilating the provinces or who recognized more cynically that civilized men are easier ruled than savage.”

Haverfield (1915, 14)

Hanson noted that there is epigraphic evidence for this process from across the Empire, although he also notes that while there were marked differences between the provinces in the level of participation, the principle was near universal. With a local elite buying into or being tied to the system of government on both an individual and communal level then stable provincial local government within a Roman political context would be established.

“The Britons readily submitted to military service, payment of tribute and other obligations imposed by government, provided that there is no abuse. That they bitterly resent…”

Tacitus Agricola 13

The Romano centric approach to Roman studies (and the empire), Hanson (1997, 78) argued has benefitted from the new focus on the conquest and occupation from the point of the indigenous inhabitants. Empires are not created by accident or maintained by the principles of laissez faire and Rome regularly and consistently intervened when it came to the administration of the provinces. These polices may have varied under different rulers, been subject to logistical realties and ad hoc decisions but there was enough consistency of approach to indicate that the Empire was pro active rather than reactive (Hanson, 1997, 78),
The model established by Mommsen and Haverfield stressed directional change from primitive to civilised, this was partially derived from the Greek and Roman classical sources and the enlightenment concept of progress (Hingley, 2000, 145). Hingley argued that this concept of progress became a powerful image in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries especially during the era of the European empires. The theory of ‘progress’ was perceived to give the ‘the West’ a moral right and moral duty to lead other more ‘primitive’ elements (e.g. Kipling’s ‘lesser breeds without the Law’) of humanity on the path to civilization. In the Western mind-set of the time and for a long time afterwards, the history, culture and civilizations and contributions of other non-European peoples were devalued.

The background to the process of expansion during the period of the late Roman republic (during the mid to late first century BC) and the principiate under the Julio-Claudian’s (in the early to mid first century AD) was a process of experimentation which took place in newly acquired territory as late Republican administrative practices (including making use of co-operative elements of indigenous elites) were put in place in the newly acquired provincial territories (Egri, 2014, 173). The application of these administrative models was part of an on-going process that saw the transformation of the Republic into an Empire. Key to the development of Roman provinces was the emergence of urban centres, which were central to the economic development and political administration of newly acquired territory.

Since the early years of the twentieth century, when the term (and the process) was established successive generations of archaeologists have focused on the issue of Romanization (Woolf, 2003, 5). Thousands of pieces of research have used the concept of Romanization to organise accounts of the culture of Rome’s western provinces. Woolf suggested that the ancient historians have made use of epigraphic and literary evidence to identify the spread of Roman style institutions, literacy, language, citizenship, architecture, pottery and metalwork. Woolf suggested that archaeologists have identified Roman sites from pre-Roman sites and Romanized from non-Romanized sites in the former provinces. Differing levels of Romanization identified as a result of these activities have then been quantified by studying the nature of pre-conquest society, the presence of the Roman army, veteran settlement
and colonisation, the proximity to road and river systems and the political history of the region under investigation.

In those areas where the Roman army retained a strong presence after the conquest there was a perceived negative impact on Romanization and the development of civitas governance. Millett (1990, 100) suggested that the impact of military garrisons actually undermined the development of civitas government amongst the native tribal elite. Thus the rapid move forward of the military from southern Britannia was a key factor in the successful emergence of civitas governance. An imperial power structure in the form of garrison commanders and other military officers was imposed with its own power structure and its own urban centres, which played a key role in local administration, economic activity and tax collection. The permanent military presence may have undercut the indigenous elite power structure or even replaced any local indigenous elites (James, 2001, 197). The military population (which would have included dependents, merchants and traders over time) was both substantial, self contained and relatively well paid. While this development did not stop or halt ‘Romanization’ it instituted a different form of ‘Romanization’ by way of comparison with what occurred in southern Britannia and Gaul, etc as a result of prolonged contact with a different type of ‘Romans’ or ‘Roman-ness’. The adoption of elements of Roman material culture by both ‘Roman’ and indigenous communities in Spain may be cited as evidence of acculturation (Keay, 2001, 134). Yet while Roman citizen used them to recreate a recognizable ‘Roman way of life’ in the provinces, indigenous elites used them to sustain their patron-client relationships with Rome, something that would have ensured that they remained the conduit for new ideas and access to material goods under the Empire as they had been under the republic.

In the 1960’s the emergence of towns had been identified as being the result of official (Roman) policy and part of a process by which former military sites were released form the development of the new urban centres and the military moved forward. The weakness of this model of development revolved around the importance of the loss of economic focus provided by the military garrison and its vici and the implication that the indigenous inhabitants were lacking in any form of developed (or developing) urbanism (Millett, 1990, 74). The evidence of both the continuation of taxation and indigenous social organisation through the conquest and
beyond into the period of the civitates directly contradicted this model. Forts also appeared to have been positioned on a number of occasions to observe existing pre-conquest centres, two good examples in Britannia are Cirencester, which lay close to Bagendon and Dorchester, which was sited, in close to Maiden Castle. The drift of population from the earlier pre-conquest Iron Age centres to settlements that developed on the former fortress sites mirrors similar developments in Roman Gaul.

Figure 4: Webster's model of the relationship of forts to town origins in early Roman Britain (After Millett 1990 p 75)

In those areas where there was a less developed indigenous tradition of centralised authority (in south-west Britain and north-west Spain) different solutions were found in relation to the establishment of post-conquest urban administrative centres.
(Millett, 1990, 49-50). In those areas where successful acculturation took place it was a direct result of a beneficial relationship between the indigenous elite and Rome, and that it was either entirely indigenous or stimulated by passive ('Roman') encouragement. In areas where acculturation failed it was the result of warfare or armed military occupation, where the presence of Rome was socially disruptive (c.f. with James). In those regions where acculturation was less pronounced urbanisation was stunted, something that may reflect pre-conquest problems of decentralization and a lack of state driven or encouraged ‘acculturation’ (Millett, 1990, 101).

**MODEL 2**

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5: Millet’s model of the relationship of forts to town origins in early Roman Britain (After Millett 1990 p 75)**

Millett’s models illustrate two possible extremes; within the Roman provincial structures that were developed after the conquest, the three study areas display a degree of variation with elite groups in two out of the three areas (North West Spain and Wales) being able to participate within the provincial political structures. In Dacia, without a surviving indigenous elite to base self-governance upon, Rome chose to use a different option (to effectively achieve the same ends) by making use of newly established urban centres and vici communities that were developed around military posts, rather than basing it on pre-conquest tribal groupings. Rome’s success in acquiring, developing, exploiting and retaining conquered territories, whether by alliance, by negotiation or simply by conquest is no simple process – the
deployment of (or threat of) overwhelming force (while effective) would not have been sustainable or effective enough to retain control of provinces after the military had moved onto fresh conquests or other duties elsewhere. Rome’s military power was enough to secure and subdue new territories but was only part of whole series of interlinked processes of change which included (in many cases) monetization, land redistribution, systematic surveying (which aided the assessment of taxation) and the imposition of new boundaries, new communication routes and new urban centres. All this was accompanied by the arrival and development of a non-indigenous element of the population – with different values, cultures and tastes. Additionally Rome made full use of new provinces’ resources for its own benefit, regardless of how the previous indigenous inhabitants may have previously used them. In the immediate post conquest period, Roman soldiers, Roman citizens and Roman allies were always going to be a minority (admittedly sometimes geographically a significant one in certain areas) within the new provinces.

Local loyalties across the Empire were never entirely subsumed under a ‘Roman’ identity (or nationality) but that this did not necessarily mean that people felt no loyalty to the Roman state (Alston, 2006, 305 - 306). Indigenous elites across the Empire bought into a class identity rather than into a concept of Roman nationalism in the modern sense. Loyalty to Rome did not prevent people from taking up arms to

Figure 6: Alternative responses of the Roman army to centralized and decentralized native societies (After Millett 1990), p 49)
defend their own communities in revolt when threatened by Rome (revolts took place throughout Roman history). Overlying identities and loyalties developed through the first and second centuries AD via ‘acculturation’, something that left the relationship between cultural identity and political affiliation uncertain. The process of cultural change within the Empire was very complex and cultural changes took place throughout the Empire as the processes worked in different areas in different ways and affected different social groups at different rates and local cultures may have continued to remain distinct.

By making use of an indigenous hierarchy within a ‘Roman’ structure, Rome was able to devolve the collection of taxes to the lower levels of the provincial administration. This essentially conservative arrangement cemented the relationship between the indigenous local elite and Rome and ensured that the indigenous local elite retained their social position in the post-conquest social., even in North-West Spain extending to indigenous involvement in the provision of recruits for auxiliary units structures (Millet, 1990, 66). Hypothesized administrative arrangement in north-west Spain appear particularly complex (Orejas and Sánchez-Palencia, 2002, 593)

![Diagram of the territorial organization of the Hispanic north-west](After A.Orejas 2002 p 593)
Despite similarities different models of development and political control appeared to have been used in North West Spain, Wales and Dacia. The difference in Dacia, was the absence of an indigenous elite in post-conquest Roman Dacia perhaps an indirect consequence of pre-Roman political, cultural and religious developments before the conquest (Diaconescu (2004, 122 – 123). Dacian society, before the final conquest in AD 106 contained a defined hierarchy with elite groups in a settled political structure, similar to those used elsewhere in the Empire by being adapted to Roman administrative needs (Bennett, 2006, 170).

The political and economic infrastructure that was created by Rome in the new province of Dacia was focused on new urban foundations and military related settlements, which played a vitally important role in developing and exploiting the new process. This process of urbanisation was quite different to what occurred in Dacia’s neighbouring provinces south of the Danube. By way of contrast the processes and stages of the development in the integration of native and non-native communities displayed a degree of variation, but there was still a recognizable pattern to this development of local communities as they were integrated into the provincial structures (political, economic and social) as well as into the wider Empire. These communities were integrated into the Roman Administrative system; with a combination of civitas governance units and military-associated settlements whose status was changed over time.
By the millennium some argued that the older approach to Romanization was too monolithic and too simple coming down to whether or not people (or objects) were more or less Roman (Hill, 2001, 12). Romanization was a complex process and would have been a discrepant and diverse experience with people participating in different ways and to different degrees, often in opposition to dominant political and cultural forms. Hill suggested that Roman culture itself, despite common themes, was quite diverse in itself, as there was no single Roman way of life to be adopted, transferred or resisted. Others argued that there was too much emphasis on the role of the elites (indigenous and Roman) when it comes to the incorporation of peoples into the Empire and reluctance to understand the role of coercion and violence in some aspects of the incorporation process (James, 2001, 198 – 199). James noted that within the context of Britannia (and elsewhere) the process of incorporation involved a combination of negotiation and violence.

At different times, under different rulers there may have been more or less emphasis on Romanization whether under the Republic, or under the rule of successive Emperors. The transition from Republic to Empire saw a process whereby hitherto relatively informal Roman rule was replaced with something different and more systematic (Woolf, 2003, ix). Woolf noted that under the Empire provincial cultures were transformed with significant changes to the fabric of provincial society taking place politically, economically and socially. He suggested that while changes in provincial culture have been recorded across the Empire, the end result was not a unitary Roman culture or Imperial uniformity but a situation that saw the creation of a new yet distinct provincial civilization that could be perceived as being ‘Roman’.

Even when detached from the idea of Romanization being a civilizing process, there is a danger that the study of Romanization can end up as appraisals of provincial culture as measured against pure Roman culture (Woolf, 2003, 6 - 7). There was no single standard Roman civilization or culture (or a single standard Roman for that matter) against which provincial culture might be measured. Even in Italy, in the city of Rome, a cultural melting pot, changes took place, which were similar to those that took place in more distant provinces, which can be noted in the material culture. Woolf stated that there was more than one type of Roman and that any studies of provincial culture need to take into the account cultural diversity as well as the unit of
the Empire. A series of cultural changes, recorded to varying degrees in provincial material cultures led to the development and growth of Roman civilisation (Empire), it is this process that is described as Romanization or acculturation. Woolf (2003, 13) also noted that significant energy had been expended endeavouring to explain cultural change. It is worth noting that peoples selectively adopt or adapt elements of a particular culture and that different cultures can coexist in parallel in the same geographical area for relatively long time periods.

The debate on Romanization in Britain continued when Mattingly (2006, 5) suggested that in Britain, there was a nostalgic association with the colonizers (Rome) and that the best possible motives were assigned to them. Thus, Rome brought towns, roads, stable government, the villa economy, art and culture, literacy, togs, baths and high culture, etc and the ‘Britons’ were raised up to enjoy the benefits of civilisation. It was important to note that the late Victorian and Edwardian high empire was the background to the period when the theory of Romanization was developed. And that only some fifty years after the demise of the British Empire did post colonial perspectives begin to affect the theories of Romanization.

Much of the archaeological approach to the provinces of the Roman Empire has been through a discussion on Romanization and the mechanisms which enabled the cultural change that transformed native polities into Romanized polities (Revell, 2007, ix). Revel suggested that the debate on Romanization has been focused on the transformation of Romanized native polities and ‘Romanitas’ and that there has been too much focus on the transitional period and less on the variations (specifically the divergent urban experience) within and between Romanized communities. Much of the terminology that litters the archaeological debate and discussion is loaded and value laden with problematic meaning.

‘Romanitas’ despite being a Latin term was little used during the Roman period, it is an all-pervasive term used to define Roman culture, Revell recommended using ‘Roman-ness’ instead. Revell (2007, xi) suggested that another important feature of the debate is the relationship between Rome and the provinces. The ‘buying into’ Roman culture by the provincial communities was important, as it was one of the ways in which the Roman Empire was maintained. The structures of Roman society
conditioned the activities of the communities that lived within the Empire and were reproduced through the activities of social agents (including the urban environment, the imperial cult and religious activity) and reinforced through day-to-day activities. Revel (2007, xii) argued that Roman identity was not a given, but something that was negotiated on day-to-day basis as a result of interaction with similar or different identities.

It is important to remember the long history of interaction and contact between the native communities of the north and north west and the societies of the Mediterranean world prior to the Roman conquest with the Etruscan and Greek civilizations (Wells, 2008, 30 – 31). Before their conquest, it is important to note that even those Iron Age peoples, who were relatively distant from the Mediterranean world, did not necessarily live in isolation. The Asturii, the Cantabri, the Silures, the Demetae and Dacians were all connected to the Roman world via trade routes, exchange mechanisms at networks. The presence of Greek and Etruscan goods and significant quantities of Roman goods at oppida and other Iron age sites provides clear evidence of long term contact and commercial links between the north and north western Europe and the Mediterranean basin to the south (Cunliffe, 2011, 315 – 316).

The arrival of Roman power and Imperial rule exaggerated regional differences (in Britannia) still further. Mattingly (2006, 17) noted that there were discrepant identities within the province and people had discrepant experiences of the Roman Empire in Britannia with their experiences being tempered by gender, social class, economic status’ location and religious practice. The one key factor that overrode all others was that of loyalty to the Imperial state which more closely affected those who were closest to the power and the governance structures of the province (Mattingly, 2006, 18 – 19). A key part of identity was that it can be used to differentiate between groups as well as being used to construct and assert shared characteristics. The Roman occupation of Britain unleashed a period of significant social and cultural changes, which are open to interpretation. Mattingly (2006, 19 – 20) argued was that for every winner under Roman rule, there were a hundred losers with the gaps between the richest and the poorest members of society widened as never before.
2.2 Conquest, Pacification and Occupation

The Roman conquest of the Spanish North-West, Britain and Dacia caused much disruption to the indigenous population; with large numbers of men, women and children being killed or maimed, crops and animals were destroyed or requisitioned and house and settlements destroyed or burned (Hingley, 1997, 81). The pacification process and occupation process saw the establishment of forts, roads, camps and mines constructed on agricultural lands that had formerly been in the possession of the indigenous inhabitants. New taxes (and tribute) were taken by force and new power structures were imposed and enforced on the conquered population. In a newly conquered or frontier province, where Roman reverses could encourage further resistance, indigenous resistance to Roman conquest, occupation and rule, as noted by Tacitus, Agricola 18, could be costly.

“Shortly before his (Agricola’s) arrival the tribe of the Ordovicii had almost wiped out a squadron of cavalry stationed in their territory, and this initial stroke had excited the province. Those who wanted war welcomed the lead thus given, and only waited to test the temper of the new governor. The summer was far spent, the auxiliary units were scattered all over the province, and the soldiers assumed that there would be no more fighting that year... As the Ordovicii did not venture to descend into the plain, he led his men up into the hills, marching in front himself so as to import his own courage to the rest by sharing their danger, and cut to pieces almost the whole fighting force of the tribe.”

Tacitus, Agricola, 18

Some of the pre Roman Iron Age tribal polities may have paid a high price for their resistance to Roman rule, something that was reflected in the size of their later civitas capitals and their development (Richardson, 1963, 78 – 79). The Iceni, who rose in revolt in AD 60, paid a harsh price during the Roman suppression of the revolt [as noted by Tacitus]. Their later civitas capital at Venta Icenorum (Caister-by-Norwich) never grew beyond its planned 35-acre site. Likewise the Silures, who resisted Rome for the best part of 30 years may have paid less of a price, as their civitas capital did not grow beyond or fill its planned 45 acre site. The civitas governance units, which were established following the conquest of southern Britain, were in essence Roman constitutional creations, some of which did not necessarily reflect pre Roman Iron Age tribal polities they replaced. The Durotriges, who had fiercely resisted Vespasian, were divided into two administrative units with one
administrative capital being based at Durnovaria (Dorchester) and Lindinis (Ilchester) as were the Vocontii (from the Vaucluse) in Gaul. In the case of the Durotriges, this early administrative division may have been intended to break the unity of a historically troublesome tribe and perhaps to facilitate its inclusion into the pro Roman client Kingdom of Cogidubnus.

Tacitus, admittedly in a contrived exercise in rhetoric (in the Agricola) aimed at a Roman audience, did not mince the words he placed in the mouth of Calgacus, the Caledonian leader when it came to the violent nature of Rome’s expansion and the contested nature of the imposition of Rome’s rule onto reluctant subjects, something which often seems to be overlooked in Roman studies.

‘Robbers of the world, having by their universal plunder exhausted the land, they rifle the deep. If the enemy be rich, they are rapacious; if he be poor, they lust for dominion; neither the east nor the west has been able to satisfy them. Alone among men they covet with equal eagerness poverty and riches. To robbery, slaughter, plunder, they give the lying name of empire; they make a solitude and call it peace.’

Tacitus, Agricola 30. 4

It has been calculated that more than 300 triumphs were recorded between 509 BC and 19 BC and that a triumph was only awarded for a victory that ended a declared war and inflicted a minimum of 5,000 enemy casualties (Mattingly, 2006, 6). With Roman victory, for the defeated also went slavery and the loss of lands to Roman colonists. Mattingly estimated that between 334 BC and 263 BC, in central Italy some 7,000 square kilometres were taken to provide land for some 70,000 colonists. Mattingly noted that the Roman historian, Livy recorded that after the conclusion of the third Samnite War (297 – 293 BC) some 66,000 captives were enslaved. Caesar conquering and subduing Gaul has been estimated to have conquered over 800 settlements and sold over one million people into slavery (Morley, 2010, 42). Roman conquests were not uncontested and often fiercely resisted as noted by the classical sources such as the Agricola and Annals which refer to significant indigenous resistance, to Roman victories and defeats and also to the presence of Roman allies.

If it came to a pitched battle on good open ground between rival armies, the Roman army was unmatched, able to use a combination of better training, better equipment
and superior command and control systems to systematically defeat and overwhelm its military opponents initially in and around the Mediterranean and then beyond it. The Empire was acquired as a result of self-interested desire for glory and profit, rather than simply to organize and administer neighbouring peoples (Goldsworthy, 2000, 25 – 26). By avoiding pitched battles and by making good use of more rugged or wooded terrain indigenous opponents in the north and the west could prolong conflict with guerrilla warfare, e.g. the Cantabri and Asturii (in north west Spain), the Silures (in South Wales) and Germanic tribes (beyond the Rhine and middle Danube), but they proved unable in the end to defeat the Roman army. Faced with Dacia, a powerful and wealthy embryonic state, the nature of the struggle was different and it took a serious concentration of Roman military resources to secure military victory.

Even with the classical sources it is impossible to estimate the proportion of Roman soldiers lost in battle in relation to enemy killed, but it is worth noting that the Romans could be entirely ruthless in achieving their objectives (Campbell, 2002, 70 - 72). Military campaigns were conducted to achieve the complete destruction of the enemies’ ability to resist, and this included anyone who got in their way. Defeat in battle against the Romans did not necessarily end the carnage, as military victory was often followed up by the extermination like that perpetrated by Tiberius and Drusus in Raetia in 15 BC or the deportation of the men of military age. Similarly in Pannonia, after the revolt, Tiberius enslaved and deported all men of military age and ravaged the land. In AD 16, also under Germanicus, Rome crushed a German tribe (the Cherusci) in battle and the follow up was equally as brutal, as noted by Tacitus:

*The rest were indiscriminately massacred. Many tried to swim the Weser. They were bombarded with javelins, or swept away by the current, or finally overwhelmed by the press of fugitives and the collapse of the river banks. Some shamefully tried to escape by climbing up trees. As they concealed themselves among the branches, bowmen had fun by shooting them down. Others were brought down by felling the trees. It was a great victory and we had few casualties. The massacre of the enemy continued from midday until dusk, and their bodies and weapons were scattered for ten miles around.*

Tacitus Annals 2.17–18
In Roman Spain, on a number of occasions defeated (and also surrendered) opponents had been deliberately massacred by Roman commanders e.g. Servius Sulpicius Galba massacred the defeated Lusitanians (in 150 BC) and the praetor Lucullus launched an unprovoked attack on a Spanish tribe and after their surrender massacred them a few years later (Goldsworthy, 2000, 100 – 101). Tacitus noted in the Agricola, that the follow up to the Roman defeat of the Boudican revolt was indiscriminate slaughter and excessive reprisal something that resulted in the replacement of the serving Governor Suetonius Pauliaus and the subsequent adoption of a more conciliatory policy towards the Britons. Tacitus suggested that the prolonged guerrilla conflict that dragged on between Rome and the Silures turned into a war of brutality, atrocity, counter atrocity and dire threats of extermination on the part of Senior Roman military personnel.

“Now began a series of skirmishes, for the most part like raids, in woods and morasses, with encounters due to chance or to courage, to mere heedlessness or to calculation, to fury or to lust of plunder, under directions from the officers, or sometimes even without their knowledge. Conspicuous above all in stubborn resistance were the Silures, whose rage was fired by words rumoured to have been spoken by the Roman general, to the effect, that as the Sugambri had been formerly destroyed or transplanted into Gaul, so the name of the Silures ought to be blotted out.”

Tacitus, Annals, 12.39

At a very basic level ‘Empire’ can be defined as being the rule over other territories and peoples without their consent. Ancient societies were not modern states and may have lacked the modern sense of self-determination, but, their subjugation was often fiercely contested militarily, something that is symptomatic of the fundamentally non-consensual nature of imperialism (Mattingly, 2006, 130). Imperialism is about power and the operation of power in situations that reinforced or created significant inequalities within territories that were subject to exterior rule for the benefit of the rulers. Roman military power forced people to submit to imperial authority and to deliver up resources. This is the crucial power differential, which defines the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. ‘Roman imperialism’ has been defined as being focused on an inherent accommodation between Rome and local cultures, and while this may well be true the danger is that the underlying violent side of the Roman empire ends up being overlooked (Mattingly, 2006, 13).
As part of the process of military conquest, consolidation and subjugation of new territories, according to Tacitus, went the process of establishing coloniae settlements. This freed up military units for service elsewhere and established a body of settled military veterans who could serve as a military reserve if circumstances demanded it.

“The Brigantes indeed, when a few who were beginning hostilities had been slain and the rest pardoned, settled down quietly; but on the Silures neither terror nor mercy had the least effect; they persisted in war and could be quelled only by legions encamped in their country. That this might be the more promptly effected, a colony of a strong body of veterans was established at Camulodunum on the conquered lands, as a defence against the rebels, and as a means of imbuing the allies with respect for our laws.”

Tacitus, Annals, 12.32

Military occupation was a key stage in the process by which Rome retained control of newly acquired territory across many of the provinces across significant parts of north western and central Europe. The construction of new roads was a key component of Rome’s superior command and control system, as the creation of a dense network of all weather roads, would have enabled a relatively smooth movement of troops and supplies. Post conquest occupation would have brought further disruption as the new imposed road network would have linked the forts and imposed a new communication system, not to mention new destinations across the pre conquest communication system (Burnham and Davies, 2010, 136 – 137).
Aside from a very visible intrusion into the landscape, new roads would also have crossed previous native land holdings. Existing water resources would have been used to supply the military garrisons, settlements and mining operations e.g. the leat system at Dolaucothi. The Romans would have made use of existing pre conquest water resources in new and different ways disrupting and changing patterns of previous land tenure and resource use and dividing up the landscape to suit their own uses and own needs on their terms rather than those of the indigenous inhabitants (Burnham and Davies, 2004, 323 – 327).

2.3 Military Provincial Administration

A key step in the emergence of the developed provinces was the transition of the provinces from military commands to largely non-military commands. This transition was no overnight event, but an evolutionary process that took place between the end of the late republic, the emergence of the Principate and the end of the Julio-Claudian era (Purcell 2001, 186 -187). This went hand in hand with the process of provincial development and imperial expansion and was the responsibility of each duly appointed Governor in each particular province in the early Empire (See
Appendix 7.01 – Pliny as Governor of Bithynia and Pontus – Page 224). The historical background to the emergence of the Republic and the Empire was the basic structure of the Mediterranean City State – complete with magistrates, city council and popular assembly. Such structures existed in the historic past (in Rome and Greece) and as the Roman city-state expanded (acquiring territories and ‘diplomatic relationships’ well beyond the city boundaries and Italy) and as Rome evolved into the Republic, so the magisterial and consular institutions expanded and developed with it. The Roman city-state duly passed the power of command (and sanctions for disobedience) to its magistrates and consuls, initially within Italy and overseas.

The early provinciae were military commands with armies commanded by consuls or praetors, with limited powers and responsibilities, often in relation to specific events and situations. By the end of the Republic, military commands had ceased to be handed out as and when necessity demanded it (Purcell 2001, 186 -187). The presence of permanent garrisons in Roman controlled territories changed the scope of command responsibility as proconsuls and propraetors became increasingly involved (whatever their original brief or motives) in dispensing justice, financial management, (revenue management, taxation and tribute), the settling of disputes and diplomacy (dealing with native elites and the not so elite) and Rome’s Allies. The establishment of local government was a simple practical step to establish stable local government which relieved Rome of the responsibilities for establishing and collecting taxation, tribute and would also have reduced (to a degree) the need to maintain public order in rear areas, freeing up troops for use elsewhere (Woolf, 2003, 71). The provincial taxation system that emerged in the Republican period appears to have largely been left to the devices of the Roman generals who had secured control of new territories, rather than to any centralized plan for provincial taxation that had been developed in Rome. Local tax collection systems appear to have been incorporated into the system of Roman provincial administration.

After conquest was completed the army was directly involved in the ordering and administration of new occupied territories; epigraphic evidence from several provinces (Pannonia and Dalmatia amongst them) shows Legionary or Auxiliary unit commanders with a direct responsibility for the administration of tribal organisation
units (Hanson 2002 in Braund, 63). There was no epigraphic evidence in Britannia for the military praefecti civitatis, as there was in the Dalmatian provinces (Frere, 1998, 193). The praefecti civitatis were serving military officers who dealt with local native peoples, who lacked the tribal administrative infrastructure to move speedily towards full civitas government, but Frere acknowledged that less well-developed British tribes certainly existed.

What could also precede ‘Romanization’ and ‘acculturation’ was absorption into the Empire, either by negotiation, conquest or a combination of both processes. Different tribal peoples became part of the empire in different ways, some were conquered and others found themselves part of the Empire, because their pro Roman client rulers like Tiberius Claudius Togidubnus, a pro-Roman client King (or friendly king) who ruled Atrebatic territories in southern Britannia and Prasutagus of the Iceni, were Allies of Rome. The Iceni initially successfully negotiated with Rome, resisted forced disarmament by Rome (in AD 47) and then apparently preserved their autonomy within the province as a Roman ally. Any agreement between a friendly king and Rome was a personal agreement, which could be renewed between Rome and his successor or terminated by Rome (Southern, 2007, 69). For the Iceni, the situation changed following the death of Prasutagus (in AD 60) when Roman officials provoked a violent revolt against Rome, followed by its subsequent brutal suppression. For the subjects of Togidubnus things were different; after his death his kingdom was divided and absorbed as three autonomous civitas territories were established within the province.

Despite inauspicious and violent beginnings the Romans were over time able to successfully incorporate both the Silures and the Iceni into the provincial structure with grants of civitas status (James, 2001, 78 – 79). This may imply the presence and active cooperation of some of the tribes’ surviving elite, something that delivered stable civil government for the tribal communities within the province (and the Empire). The local unit of civitas government was usually based around an existing tribal area but new units were created where there was no pre-Roman tribe of sufficient size (Frere 1998, 193). In Roman Gaul (and elsewhere) there may be some evidence for the survival of local political structures into the Imperial period. Indigenous tribal magistrates (known locally as ‘vergobretts’) were still functioning
within the civitas of the Santones in Western Gaul (Hassall, 1990, 688). The survival of similar indigenous local leadership posts has also been noted in North Africa, where Punic magistrates (or ‘sufles’) appear to have survived into the Roman period. In relation to the Santones, whether this is a tribal chief in the guise of a magistrate or a magistrate in the guise of a tribal chief is a matter of interpretation. The Roman imposition of an adaptation of city state political structures upon peoples with no significant urban or municipal tradition (as it was recognised by the Romans at least) must have provided a post-conquest platform for tribal politics within a stable or at least non-militarized environment that was acceptable to the Roman state.

The transition of a new (or surviving old) political generation into ‘magistrates’ within a recognisably Roman political environment within a relatively short time across large areas of the north and west of Europe, was a real and substantial achievement on the part of the Roman authorities. This process was not risk free; the Frisian revolt which followed the grafting of Roman institutions, complete with magistrates, a senate and laws, is a case in point as to how potentially risky the process could be. A tribal civitas (or civitas peregrinae) consisted of a city or primary urban centre within a tribal territory, with the magistrates being based on the tribal capital. Annually elected magistrates were selected from a tribal council (or Ordo) possibly with one hundred members, similar to existing municipia and coloniae, (Hassall, 1990, 689) noted that this understanding of civitas government and its structure is largely a matter of conjecture because of a lack of evidence). In the interior of Gaul, Spain, and Britain and in the Danubian provinces, civitas governance units were often artificial creations, particularly where the Roman provincial governor had amalgamated various peoples to form a new civic community. In the more remote regions, like northern Lusitania or the interior of Dalmatia, Rome allowed native leaders (principes) to retain authority over their own populus for 50 years or more, as the process of creating the civitas could not be completed overnight (Edmondson, 2010, 256).

Strabo noted the local adoption of Roman customs and the role of the Army within local administration in the lands between the Mediterranean and the Spanish North West:
“The Third legate oversees the interior, and also conserves the interests of those people who are already called ‘Togati’ (or as you might say ‘peacefully inclined’), and who have become transformed, clad in their toga-robe, to their present gentleness of disposition and their Italian mode of life, these latter are the Celtiberians and the peoples on both sides of the Iberus as far as the regions by the sea.”

Strabo, Geography, 3.4.20-5.1

In the Spanish North West, in the rural areas away from the newly established urban centres, there were a number of smaller semi urban sites e.g. Bergidum, Flavium Baedunia, Brigaescum and the Castro of Avelas, which were situated in areas that were suitable for agricultural production. The presence of wealthy villas, funerary monuments and inscriptions shows the presence of the army, and the use of Italian style décor suggested a degree of acculturation and the presence of a rurally based aristocracy with all its implied forms of clientage dependency (Orejas and Sachez-Palencia, 2002, 594 – 595). The new aristocracy’s role fulfilled the Roman view of a ruling class of a civitas peregrina and held a privileged position and their existence may provide a key to understanding how the agricultural areas related and interacted with the mining areas.

The presence of a military garrison largely supplied from the locality would have had a significant impact on the local economy and the local environment. In Wales prior to the Roman conquest, upland Wales would not have been noted for the production of agricultural surpluses, especially when it came to grain production (Davies, 2004, 109). It has been estimated that the Flavian-Trajanic military garrison would have necessitated the use of between 9,830 hectares / 21,000 acres of land which would (naturally) have had considerable impact upon local land use (and ownership), apart from the possible introduction of hitherto unused land into cultivation, the supply of fuel from managed woodlands, and new types of crops (e.g., bread wheat), there may well have been changes in agricultural production methods. The presence, in the early years after the conquest, of a sizeable military garrison would (or could) have brought in sweeping changes in the way the local agricultural economy was structured with changes in traditional distribution patterns and the emergence of concentrated wheat production to supply the new military market.
The Roman military played both a direct and an indirect key role in the processes of acculturation as the exercise of administrative functions in newly acquired territory laid the groundwork for later acculturation. The Roman Army was adept at dealing with native populations and had developed a number of specific posts related to aspects of civilian administration, including census officers recorded at Colchester and in the north during Trajan’s reign. Following military occupation the organisation of *civitates peregrinae* followed as soon as the opportunity arose and local fitness for the step to civitas government became apparent (Frere, 1998, 192 – 193). There were *Praefectus Civitatis* who seem to have ruled specific territorial areas during the initial period of occupation as efforts to establish a civilian administration from the remnants of the previous tribal order were undertaken (Salway, 2001, 384 and Ruscu, 2004, 80).

The process of establishing Civitas government would have been a complicated process involving land ownership transfer - which not surprisingly would have generated legal dispute and would have required a measure of legal definition - this would probably have been no small task in itself (Frere 1998, 185). The post of ‘*Centurio Regionarius*’, appears to have been normally held by a centurion appointed to the military administrative structure for the express purpose of supervision of civilians and natives in a particular geographical area within a military administered area. This appears to have been a fairly transitory post in Britannia as areas would pass, in due time from military to civilian administration and eventually to ‘civitas status’. An absence of epigraphic evidence from much of Britannia and Gaul may well reflect this temporary administrative expediency and the relatively swift transition to civitas authority. There is evidence from Ribchester in the north of England with references to a centurion as *praepostus numeri et regionis* (RIB 583, RIB 587) (Hanson 2002, in Braund, 64).

In Egypt, our understanding of the everyday involvement of Regional District Centurions in many parts of daily life is based upon an examination of surviving papyrus correspondence. The presence of centurions at village level (and other soldiers) on a regular basis can be interpreted to suggest interaction between the military and civilian populations was a near constant feature of daily life. The centurions appeared to have fulfilled a key role in daily relations between the army
and the native civilian population, certainly surviving parchment petitions suggest that was the case. They also provided a means of two-way communication between the provincial authorities and the population at large. They would have provided invaluable ‘from the ground up’ intelligence on what was going on amongst the native civilian population by a combination of observation and interaction. The relationship between ordinary soldiers and the civilian population was complex in Egypt (and no doubt equally complex elsewhere in the Empire). Military involvement in security (and policing) issues and tax collection, which also involved the civilian administration, ensured a high degree of interaction between the civil administration, the military and the civilian population.

If the rest of the Empire was similar to Roman Egypt then it is possible to envisage a significant military presence within the civilian community in Roman Egypt engaged in a wide variety of administrative and work tasks, including tax collection, policing, etc. Allston (2004, 74) noted military involvement in state run manufacturing (i.e. quarrying) and the maintenance of order with military policing with centurions and other soldiers disarming members of the Jewish community in Egypt as a result of clashes between the Greek and Jewish communities in Alexandria and many other activities. The Emperor Augustus is known to have used military labour to restore parts of the infrastructure of the canal system in Egypt, Alston (2004, 79 – 80) suggested that this was a regular occurrence in Egypt. There are references to soldiers assisting the civil power, supplying escorts for tax collectors supervising grain shipments down the Nile, etc. In Egypt (in the Eastern Deserts) as elsewhere in the Empire soldiers directly managed, supervised and protected the Empire’s economic assets. Soldiers were involved in the maintenance and construction of more military assets (i.e. forts, bridges and roads) and were also involved in civil projects such as public buildings, temples, etc.

2.4 Differential Treatment and the Discrepant Experience of Empire

A fundamental component of Roman government (in the provinces) was the differential treatment of conquered peoples and their lands (Mattingly, 2006, 253 – 354). The processes that accomplished this began (post conquest) with the army who supplied the surveyors (agrimenscres), the provincial authorities and the
Imperial government (in the shape of provincial governors, judicial legates and procurators). From the start the lands of defeated or surrendered peoples (dedicitii) were considered to be the property of Rome, to be dealt with as Rome saw fit (Boon 1972, Faulkner 2000, Mattingly 2006 et al). Lands were seized and reassigned to Roman colonists (including veterans); lands were retained as ager publicus (state lands) some of which became part of the imperial estates. Other lands were returned to the subject peoples in proportion to their merit (ager assignati) usually after a period of military control. As far as Rome was concerned military conquest was expected to pay for itself and to yield a bounty to the expanding Roman Empire (Mattingly, 2006, 491). The spoils of war were expected to underwrite the costs of subsequent military campaigns and to pay for triumphal celebrations. Exploitation of land, minerals and people followed the conquest as conquered regions’ resources were assessed and exploited initially by the army.

Military conquest brought about significant degrees of change in land ownership and to a lesser degree land occupancy. The Roman state would have allocated land to the army as military territorium, at the expense of former owners and occupiers of the land. The allocation could also have brought about significant disruption in traditional indigenous agricultural practices [i.e. in South Wales traditional transhumance agricultural practices with use of upland and coastal lands would have been blocked by the allocation of a sizeable block of territory to Legio II Augusta based at Caerleon]. Rome would have confiscated lands which had important mineral deposits from their original owners or occupiers. Mattingly (2006, 354 – 355) suggested that an indigenous community could end up losing out more than once, as aside from lands confiscated after the conquest, lands could be later allocated for Roman coloniae (i.e. Colchester and Gloucester). Such confiscations could feed tensions between Roman colonists and the indigenous inhabitants e.g. the behaviour of colonists at Colchester, as noted by Tacitus, angered the indigenous Trinovantes and played a part in the spread of the Boudiccan revolt.

'It was against the veterans that their hatred was most intense. For these new settlers in the colony of Camulodunum drove people out of their houses, ejected them from their farms, called them captives and slaves, and the lawlessness of the veterans was encouraged by the soldiers, who lived a similar life and hoped for similar licence.'
The Roman military and other settlers played a significant role in different areas of the province, aside from lands lost to formal coloniae established at Colchester, Lincoln and Gloucester, as discharged veterans settled across the province as well (Mattingly, 2006, 354 – 355). Regardless of the consequences to the former indigenous inhabitants the exploitation of a province’s land and resources was fundamental to the success of the province within the Empire.

Administrative conditions for a newly acquired province were contained within a charter (lex provinciae) that would have been written by a higher magistrate and ten senators. These charters appear to have varied to suit the conditions on the ground, setting out the differing statuses of communities, laying down regulations regarding jurisdiction and tribute. Much of the detail appears to have been left to provincial governors to define via edicts (many of which contained a measure of standardisation. Generally most provinces tended to contain two groups of particularly favoured communities, with the civitates foederatae (whose status was guaranteed by permanent treaty) and the civitates liberae (whose status was granted via lex provinciae or lex rogata, and was thus capable of revision by Rome). Differences in status within the Roman world were important; they were a key element in the way Rome governed its Empire and over time the status of communities could (and did) change.

In some provinces, the variations could be considerable, civitates liberae were more numerous than civitates foederatae e.g. in Sicily there were only three examples of civitates foederatae out of sixty-five recorded communities (Scullard, 1982, 182). There were common privileges, including use of their own laws, they were normally outside the governor’s jurisdiction and occasionally exempted from obligations to quarter troops. All of the civitates foederatae were exempt from payment of taxation, something which also occasionally applied to civitates liberae. In Gaul, under Caesar there was considerable variation in tribal status; with the Remi and the Ligones held the status of civitates federate, while the Lecui, the Nervii, the Treveri and the Suessiones held civitates liberae and the Morini, the Menapii and the Ambiani all held civitates stipendiariae status. Other communities, civitates stipendiaviae, were
allowed a considerable degree of self-government, subject to Roman property qualifications to hold municipal office. Imperial intervention appeared to have been infrequent, save when Roman interests were threatened (Hanson, 2002, 55).

Colonization took place in most of the new provinces to varying degrees with the establishment of settlements but not necessarily Roman settlers in new urban foundations. This model was developed in most of Spain, Gaul, parts of Germany and Britannia with the newly established administrative structure being focused upon urban centres; sometimes these were older indigenous centres (or oppida) e.g. Silchester, Verulamium, Colchester, recently developed civilian settlements (which had developed in close proximity to military posts) e.g. Cirencester, Exeter and Wroxeter or newly established urban centres e.g. Caerwent. Aside from new urban administrative centre’s there would be other urban foundations, including Coloniae e.g. Apulum, Colchester, Glevum, Cologne, Orange and Vienne, etc and municipium e.g. Verulamium. Colonization was an expensive business and was multi layered, with different types of Romans in different types of settlements across the provinces. Aside from official manifestations of Roman-ness in formal colonies there existed other forms of Roman-ness (Purcell, 2008, 96 – 97). Alongside whole cites of Roman citizens in peregrine provinces there existed whole groups of Romans with different statuses in peregrine cities. The establishment of coloniae should not be looked upon as part of a colonizing process, but as a literal rearrangement of rights and privileges of Romans living in the provinces and may have been focused on rearranging the Romans of the diaspora and changing their status. The perception that coloniae were entirely associated with the settlement of veterans may be flawed, as fragmentary records of land registers from the coloniae of Ilici, in southern Spain record the presence of some Italians, Romans from elsewhere in Spain, men from the north African coast and an individual from the Balearic islands.

Each newly conquered province had its own individual background of indigenous agricultural traditions and [landholding] practices that may have continued with little disturbance after the occupation (Greene, 1990, 98). The major form of disturbance to indigenous agricultural practices [and landholding] came in the form of colonies of Roman settlers who were allocated substantial tracts of land for their settlers in close proximity to the [new] urban centres. Most of the changes in indigenous agricultural
practices came about as a result of a combination of military taxes, the establishment of the monetized economy and urban markets for agricultural produce, rather than any imperial efforts to boost agricultural output. That said it was wrong to look for major technical improvements unless it could be demonstrated that agricultural output was nearing its maximum and that there was no capacity for increased production (Greene, 1990, 98).

Even those peoples living outside the boundaries of Empire, could receive a different treatment in their dealings with Rome, Tacitus recorded the preferential status of the Hermunduri, Roman allies, who lived north of the Danube, and noted how Rome treated other peoples from the region, in his Germania:

‘The state of the Hermunduri, which is loyal to Romans. For this reason, they are the only Germans who trade not on the river-bank but deep inside the frontier and in the province of Raetia’s splendid colonia [present day Augsburg]. They cross over at all points and without a guard. To other peoples we only show our arms and our forts; to them we open our town houses and country mansions.’

Tacitus, Germania 41

Tacitus, also recorded in his Histories, how the Tencteri, who lived on the German side of the Rhine, near Colonia Agrippinensis (present day Cologne), complained about their treatment to the Romans, in AD 70 (Breeze, 2011, 32). He noted:

‘The Romans have closed rivers and lands, and in a fashion heaven itself, to keep us from meeting and conferring together. Or else – and this is a severer insult to men born to arms – to make us meet unarmed and almost naked, under guard and paying a price for the privilege.’

Tacitus, Histories, Book 4, 64

2.5 The Army: a ‘Romanised’ community with arms

The army existed as a ‘Romanised’ community (Campbell 2002, James 2001, Goldsworthy 2000, Haynes 2013 et al) with the soldiers being ideologically linked to the Imperial house and largely but not entirely based within the frontier provinces. These military communities played a key role within the processes of acculturation that took place in the provinces where they were stationed. The army maintained a ‘Roman military identity’ which shaped the identities, lives and cultural choices of its
soldiers and these ‘Romanised’ soldiers interacted in turn with the civilian population, something which was of enormous significance (James, 2001, 78 – 79). The military community was far larger than previously believed as it contained not just soldiers, but servants, slaves and grooms and a larger than anticipated number of dependants (including probably parents, siblings and / or unmarried female relatives). Military units formed the focus for fully-fledged social communities, which included other Roman citizens, provincials, freedmen and freedwomen, slaves, children, adults and the elderly (James, 2001, 80). These communities did not necessarily represent a community with the cultural norms and values of the Roman Mediterranean world, they had their own values, codes of behaviour and their social, cultural and economic impact on nearby native communities would have been considerable (Davies, 2004, 108).

Rather than developing over time, these communities accompanied military units of the Roman provincial army when they arrived in a new province from the start. Some of these dependent communities had achieved a degree of formal identity in the regions where they settled e.g. the vicani of Vindolanda (Birley, 1979, 108). The field of military civilian interaction was a complex one, not just being confined to the immediate proximity of their military posts and their dependent communities (James, 2001, 82). The Vindolanda tablets duty rolls suggested that many soldiers were frequently off base for a whole range of official and unofficial reasons. Military personnel actively participated in provincial life being involved in administration, policing and surveillance and various procurement processes to arrange supply for their units as attested by evidence from Egypt and the Vindolanda tablets. In the frontier zones and in the more peripheral upland areas of the Empire the military did not live for the most part in remote encampments, but out and about amongst the civilian population. Inscription evidence (and surviving records and documents) from Egypt and elsewhere suggest that soldiers spent a significant degree of their on and off-duty time in continual contact with and interacting with the civilian population at large. In the early years of a province soldiers they would have been more common, they were often gradually redeployed elsewhere as the civitas governance network developed. The military garrison of Britannia was around seven times larger than that of Roman Egypt (and based on the evidence from Egypt) there is no reason to think that the military did not play equally a significant role within the province
(James, 2001, 82). This has implications for the processes of ‘Romanization’ and provincial development.

After the military conquest was completed and during the occupation, the military footprint would have been significant. A settled province would have contained formally established civitas governance structures, (particularly in the north and western provinciae). As a result the relationship between the native communities and the military would have been replaced by something more formal (Hurst, 1988, 69). The creation of the civitas Dobunni (in the Flavian period) would have meant that the boundary between the military and the civilian territory would have needed to be formally delineated (Hurst, 1988, 69). Hurst suggested that control of a relatively modest stretch of territory could have supplied most, if not all of what was needed to feed the legionary garrison at Gloucester and its dependents, if at the expense of the original indigenous inhabitants.

The arrival of a military garrison would have had a significant environmental, economic and social impact upon the local environment and local resources (Reece, 2002, 187 – 188). Napoleon might have noted that an army marched upon its stomach, when stationary or based in a locality for any period of time it also needed to be fed. How the Roman army was fed, where its supplies came from and how they were procured was equally important when it came to more lasting impact than the supply of provisions for a campaign. If every legionary needed at least the harvest from one acres worth of grain per year, then 5,000 legionaries would have needed the produce from some 5,000 acres (2,000 hectares); factor in the necessary forage for supply animals and livestock not to mention the presence of auxiliaries, civilian dependents, traders and the natives then Reece’s calculation that at least 10,000 acres (4,000 hectares) of land would have been involved in garrison-related food production becomes more than reasonable. If this land formed part of the legionary territory then the military becomes not only a major focus for economic and agricultural activity but also the probable defacto major landowner in its locality, with all the environmental, economic and social implications that goes with it. Apart from foodstuffs and other provisions, a legionary fortress (and its inhabitants and dependents) would also have made a significant demand on fuel supplies (i.e. wood) for cooking and heating. The presence of Bath Houses (in Caerleon and its environs)
would have required a considerable amount of timber for fuel; based upon Tony Rook’s estimates for a small Bath House in Welwyn (Hertfordshire), this would have necessitated the best part of 14,000 acres (5,600 hectares) of coppiced woodland i.e. 280 times the area of the Fortress. Unless, as Reece (2002, 188) speculated some use was made of coal, which may have been sourced from the Forest of Dean, an estimated 140 adults would have provided a sufficient labour force for the coppicing necessary to supply the main Legionary Fortress Baths.

Unless the indigenous inhabitants had been driven away or resettled, none of the military and resource related operations to supply and fuel the Legionary Fortress (at Caerleon) took place in landscape that was entirely devoid of its indigenous inhabitants. Surviving texts from Vindolanda (on Hadrian’s Wall), Egypt and elsewhere suggest that the somewhat artificial boundaries between the military and civilian spheres (even in a frontier zone) were largely non-existent as the army was entirely involved with the local economy and society. The arrival of the military would have imposed an entirely new political, economic and administrative structure over the top of whatever older indigenous political, social and economic structures had existed prior to the military conquest and subsequent pacification.

Save for those areas where specific sites were taken over by the military for garrisons or cleared, native settlements would have continued to be inhabited admittedly within a transformed political environment and sharing the post conquest province with the military. The Roman fort at Cirencester was some three miles from that of the native oppidium at nearby Bagendon (Wacher, 2001, 67 – 68). The fort would have provided the focus for contact between the natives (elite and otherwise) and the Roman army (and indirectly the Governor). A trading centre grew up in the proximity of the fort, and appears to have had a significant impact on the population of Bagendon. Wacher noted that from the AD 50’s onwards Bagendon markedly declined until the former native settlement faded away entirely. By the time the military garrison moved on, the vicus settlement, which had been encouraged and regulated by the Roman Army, become the new civitas capital for the Dobunni (Civitas Dobunnorum).

Military veterans, despite their visibility in provincial life in the field of work, may have only played a very limited part in the political events (Wesch-Klein (2011, 447 – 448).
The reasons for this lack of participation in civic life might include the age of veterans and their financial status. Wesch-Klein noted that it appeared that former legionaries, who were either born citizens or had received citizenship, simply found municipal institutions and associated administration less foreign than auxiliary veterans with peregrine origins. She also noted that even from amongst former legionaries those who had held higher ranks tended to participate more in civic life. Many lower rank veterans may have avoided the associated financial costs and loss of exemptions (including tax \textit{immunitas}) that were associated with the obligations of civic and municipal duties. With civic responsibilities also went administrative responsibilities, which may have appeared complex and burdensome to veterans of lower rank (Wesch-Klein, 2011, 447 – 448).

Research from the Rhine and Danube covering the 1\textsuperscript{st} to 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries AD has suggested that approximately 5.8\% of known veterans participated in municipal civic life (Wesch-Klein, 2011, 448). The majority were former legionaries, with half being ordinary soldiers with the remainder having held higher ranks. Inscription evidence suggested that the evidence for civic participation of veterans overwhelmingly belonged to the period between Antoninius Pius and Severus Alexander. Wesch-Klein noted that this matched the period of increasing urbanization, social dynamism and inscription production. In Egypt military veterans were also rarely seen amongst the municipal élite and in North Africa they appeared hesitantly to take municipal office. The study of the Egyptian village of Karanis (in the Fayum) in Egypt made by Alston (1995, 117 – 142) suggested that settled military veterans were an integrated part of local society. They did not appear to exist as a distinct military / veteran entity in the life (political, economic and social) of the village, nor did they appear to monopolize leadership roles in the community. The veterans were ‘substantially integrated’ in the local community and appeared not to have had a significant impact on the culture of the village. Veterans maintained friendships with the local inhabitants, did business with them and some of their children married Egyptians.

\textbf{2.6 Migration, Settlement and Roman citizenship}

An important element through the late Republican and early to mid Imperial periods (until AD 212 when the universal grant of citizenship to all free born was made) was
the gradual spread and expansion of citizenship to non Roman peoples across the
provinces of the Empire. The expansion of citizenship between the late 1st Century
BC and the Second Century AD to some of the provincial population was not a new
phenomenon, in Italy in the 80s BC and previously, citizenship had been extended to
many of the non Roman Italian population, if begrudgingly following the Social War
of 91 – 88 BC. The expansion of citizenship to indigenous tribal elites that was one
of the key factors in the process by which the Roman state consolidated its hold over
the newly conquered peoples and acquired territories. Rome was able to combine a
measure of cultural assimilation with practical assimilation, or perhaps ‘Political
assimilation corresponded to a cultural assimilation” (Brunt, 1976, 169).

The Empire’s willingness to extend citizenship to the local elite should be seen as
part of the process of encouraging the Roman model of urbanization and urban
development. The promotion of citizenship via service in the Auxiliaries, after
completion of military service effectively promoted Roman culture and values outside
the local elites. Citizenship would have been seen as a reward for service to Rome, it
opened doors to political, social and economic contacts with Rome (and Roman
citizens) and would have promoted competition for citizenship privileges (Hanson,
1997, 77). What the indigenous elite may have gained from becoming Roman was
by accepting and adopting the Roman defined worldview, the reinforcement of their
privileged position within the new order within their own communities. Emperors in
the First and Second centuries followed the example of Julius Caesar’s ‘Lex Julia’,
which offered citizenship to whole communities and not just to individuals.
Citizenship was also offered as a result of or reward for distinguished military service
to individuals and entire military auxiliary units e.g. as recorded in ILS 8888 after the
capture of Asculum in 89 BC.

On the seventeenth of November, in
According to the lex Lulia, the
Imperator Gneus Pompeius, son of
Sextus in the camps at Asculum made
The Spanish cavalry Roman citizens
On account of their excellence.

Figure 10: Citizenship one of the rewards of Empire (ILS 8888)
The subsequent attitude of Roman Emperors towards extending the citizenship varied considerably, with some Emperors notably Augustus and Claudius in the early years of the Principiate favouring the extension of Roman citizenship to Italian and provincial groups. In parallel to military conquest and in its aftermath some of the inhabitants of these new Provinces gained access to Roman citizenship and participated to varying degrees in the political, economic and social life of the new provinces and the wider Empire.

The benefits of becoming Roman and adopting Roman customs and culture did not just apply to the elite group, they applied to everyone, and this included the social and economic distinctions that applied within the Roman world. James (2001, 199) stated that the provision of public buildings, public amenities and public events (in urban centres) enabled the local elite to create (and to control) the physical environments and to display the idealized Roman order. The cultural capital thus created meant that the elite could construct and control a new political and ideological system that both preserved and revalidated their privileges within the ruling group of the Greco-Roman world, as it existed within the Roman Empire. The elite, as cultivated insiders set themselves apart from the ordinary people, acquiring the trappings of Roman culture and the qualities of ‘Humanitas’ (a knowledge of Greek Arts, Latin, Roman law, letters, etc) which James (2001, 199) suggested further reinforced pre-conquest social divides with an array of new symbols of social exclusion.

The possession of Roman citizenship had never been static; it had actually been expanding for much of the late Republic (Woolf, 1996, 34 - 35). There had been successive expansion of the franchise; the Augustan social reforms were linked to an expansion of Latin rights to formerly subject peoples and settlers. Woolf suggested that the expansion of Roman citizenship and society had its own dynamic, something that contributed to the spread of Roman culture in Italy and the provinces. The expansion of Roman society galvanized and energized the Italian and provincial communities it expanded into, bringing an epigraphic habit with it and new identities.

One factor that helped to develop the new provinces (in the later Republican period) that was to pay dividends in the later Empire was Italian emigration to Spain and
Southern Gaul amongst other places. Civilians and veterans settled in the new provinces; some of their descendants appeared amongst the expanding Roman ruling class in the mid first century AD. Some of the new Senators, writers and poets (and later Emperors) who emerged were descended from the families of Italian emigrants, others were the descendants of native families - all had prospered in the new provinces, something which encouraged acculturation in the provinces. The Senate expressed its reservations about admitting non-Roman foreigners to the Senate. The Emperor Claudius (a keen student of history) had noted that the Republican ruling elite in the past had been open to new families from the provinces (Tacitus, Annals 11, 23).

Claudius pointed out that Rome had fought many wars against her neighbours and in a short time former enemies had assimilated Roman culture and customs and married into noble and long established Roman families including his own (Tacitus, Annals, 11, 24). On this occasion, Tacitus recorded that the Senate approved the Emperors’ motion and the first Gauls (the Aedui) duly obtained the right to become Roman Senators. The emperor made a conscious effort to expand the Roman Senatorial elite, where some Celts and Iberians went; later some African and Greeks were to follow (Cornell and Matthews 1982, 83). While Senators continued to be appointed from the equestrian class, Claudius and Nero did not hesitate to appoint professional ‘civil servants’ with much lower class origins such as freedmen and ex-slaves in the imperial bureaucracy. Both Claudius (and Nero) also encouraged the advance of Gauls to positions within the bureaucracy in the West – neither Emperor would hesitate to play the ‘Celtic card’ when it was convenient in Roman Britain. For example, Julius Classicianus (a Gaul by ancestry from Trier) was appointed as Procurator in the aftermath of the Boudiccan Revolt, playing a significant part in helping to restore confidence and to temper Rome’s vengeance.

The spread of citizenship is also important when it comes to gaining an understanding of how Rome ruled its provinces. Caesar, Augustus and their successors transformed citizenship, or at least the acquisition of it from merely being the gift of Republican generals into something of a more formalized process. Under the emperors any individual who had held office as a magistrate in a community with Latin rights gained citizenship, as did anyone who had completed their service in the auxiliary units. This change enabled Rome to take advantage of local elites who ran
the civitas governments on behalf of Rome. Woolf (2003, 40) suggested that since the Emperors did not rule the Empire through an expatriate civil service (like more modern empires) they were able to use local native elites to rule their own communities. There was also the spread of urbanization (Tacitus, Agricola 21) which led to an extension of the franchise as Emperors extended Latin Rights (‘ius Latini’) to towns, something that was used by Vespasian in Spain in the first century AD. This process expanded the citizenship enabling natives to serve as magistrates (this brought the local elite into the system of governance and gave them a stake in the Empire) and also extended citizenship (and its privileges) to their families.

Roman governors and generals, before Caesar’s time, played a key role in fostering the development of citizenship with the spreading of ‘ius Latini’ (or Latin Rights) amongst the provincial population. Woolf (2003, 75) suggested that as Roman power and territorial control expanded there was a significant change in the nature of what ‘Latin Rights’ actually involved. Initially ‘ius Latini’ covered the membership of communities relatively close to Rome (in central Italy) who may have shared the same language, some of the same gods and religious cults or even those who could claim kinship with the Romans. Latin rights tended to be transferred usually in recognition that a group enjoyed some of the rights enjoyed by Roman citizens. This enabled groups within provincial societies to accrue some real benefits from collaborating with the Roman authorities, as they ran their own Roman style political institutions (with their own magistrates, ordo (council) and town councillors, etc). Woolf (2003, 67) suggested that provincial Latin communities were self-regulating and were able to assist provincial and local elites when it came to acquiring Roman citizenship. Additionally Roman subjects with Latin rights were able to access the right of commercium and were able to enter commercial trading agreements with full Roman citizens.

Military service in the Auxilia (Auxiliaries) also led to the granting of automatic citizenship upon discharge. Under Augustus, citizens were scattered in relatively small concentrations in towns, cities, colonies and military encampments and were organized as distinctly separate associations (or conventus). By the time of Marcus Aulerius the situation had been transformed with a significant percentage of the urban population being in possession of Roman citizenship. The acquisition of Roman citizenship was part of the process of elite reinforcement as citizenship
enabled elite members (and their descendants) to hold office within the new civitas governance structures. James (2001, 200) suggested that alongside the elite others also gained citizenship (in some numbers) and they were members of non-elite groups, which included former slaves and former soldiers from both Italy and the provinces. By AD 100 any former auxiliary soldier (from a whole variety of different ethnic groups) could (and did) acquire Roman citizenship upon completion of their military service with potentially only a relatively brief exposure to ‘Roman-ness’.

2.7 The Imperial Cult

The imperial cult was actively promoted through the Western provinces and should be seen as a direct attempt to develop and focus loyalty for the Emperor and the Roman state amongst the native elite, who would have been active participants serving as priests (Hanson (1997, 77). The adoption of the Imperial cult was patchy across northern and western provinces of the Empire, it appears to have been more strongly adopted in those areas which had a pre-Roman urban tradition and acculturation was already underway prior to Augustus’s reign. This was particularly true in Spain, were in those areas with pre-Roman urban tradition the cult appears to have been adopted spontaneously and more enthusiastically than in the other western provinces (Wells, 1992, 146 – 147).

The imperial cult was established in Iberia during the reign of Augustus, with permission for a temple to the divine (divus) Augustus (at Tarraco) being granted in AD 15. Municipal and cult centres were established at each of the provincial capitals Tarraco, Emerita Augustus and Cordoba. Hand in hand with these developments went a gradual transformation of urban areas. The new imperial architecture was rapidly adopted in the provincial capitals along with the coloniae, municipiae and other towns across the provinces. Between the late 1st century BC and the latter half of the 1st century AD (Keay, 2001, 133). The process began under Augustus with new buildings appearing at towns across the Iberian peninsula, with many of the buildings at the heart of the new urban centres being involved in some way with the public rituals that related to emperor worship (Keay (2001, 134) noted that similar urban transformations took place at this time in Asia Minor).
Establishing the imperial cult was not without its risks; the process had to be handed carefully. In Britannia, the imperial cult centre in the temple of Claudius at Colchester, became a focus for indigenous resentment prior to the Boudiccan revolt.

‘For these new settlers in the colony of Camulodunum drove people out of their houses, ejected them from their farms, called them captives and slaves, and the lawlessness of the veterans was encouraged by the soldiers, who lived a similar life and hoped for similar licence. A temple also erected to the Divine Claudius was ever before their eyes, a citadel, as it seemed, of perpetual tyranny. Men chosen as priests had to squander their whole fortunes under the pretence of a religious ceremonial.’

(Tacitus, Annals, 14.31)

The presence of the Imperial Cult in Britannia was originally officially focused on the Temple of Divius Claudius at Camulodunum (Colchester) and is archeologically relatively well attested, aside from the references in the classical sources (e.g. Tacitus, Annals, 14.31) (Henig, 2007, 222). The cult had been authorised by the Senate upon the death of the Emperor in AD 54. Henig suggested that prior to the dedication of the temple at Camulodunum, leading members of the British Tribes would have been able to serve as priests and would have been able to pledge their loyalty to Rome. As members of the provincial council [of Britannia], they may have made use of altars dedicated to Rome and Augustus at Lyons in Gaul and at Cologne in Germany. Hanson (2007, 222) also noted that there was active promotion of imperial ideology through other means, alongside the imperial cult, with honorific statues, official inscriptions, coinage and monumental architecture. All these factors were a result of direct stimulation of the locale elites (and the not so elite) into reaffirmation of loyalty to the Roman state.

After the Boudiccan rebellion was crushed, Henig (2007, 222) suggested that while the temple may have been rebuilt there is evidence (RIB 5 - an inscription to the Numen Caesaris Augusti, and RIB 21 - a tomb monument to a slave in the service of the cult) to suggest that the centre for the Imperial cult may have moved elsewhere, possibly to Londinium, which assumed the role of provincial capital. He noted that while Imperial statuary would have been found in a variety of locations across the province, there might be enough evidence to imply the presence of the Imperial cult.
at Bath and at Chichester. Frere (1998, 311 – 315) suggested that in Britannia, the imperial cult was initially established at Colchester and (by implication of fragments of statuary and inscriptions elsewhere) at Chichester, and played a key role in acculturation, tying the elite in with the ideology of Empire. Religious guilds of the imperial cult were attested at both York and Lincoln by AD 237.

The establishment of the Imperial cult played its part in the process of transforming newly acquired territory into a new Roman province. In Roman Dacia, at the veteran’s colony, which took the name of the former Dacian capital of Sarmizegetusa amongst its titles, was a temple to the Imperial cult (Hassall, 1999, 693). The process of construction of the cult buildings may have been assisted by the military because the building that housed the Imperial cult priests appeared to have been modelled on that of a headquarters building normally found in a legionary fortress (Millar, 2001, 277).

2.8 Revenue, Taxation and Empire

The imposition of Taxation on non-monetized peoples (along with the development of urban centres) has been recognized as playing an important role in the transformation of societies, breaking down pre-monetized economies as people are forced to move from barter-type exchange economies to monetized ones (Sichome 1995, 291 – 292). This has been noted in relation to the impact of more modern Empires on tribal societies; and similarly would have impacted on non-monetized peoples within provinces of the Roman Empire as well. The Roman Empire in the first century AD had revenue of between 800 and 1000 million sesterces, and the Roman state expended up to 40% of its disposable income on the army (Campbell, 2002, 85 – 86). Campbell suggested that much of this expenditure was sustained by regular taxes, the *tributum capitis* (poll tax) and the *tributum soli* (land tax) that were levied on the provincial population but not in Italy.

While it was taxation that resulted in the greatest degree of interference by the Imperial Government in provincial life, as Rome attempted to raise and sustain a revenue stream, largely to finance and sustain its army and to pay for its wars (when they were not sustained by plunder and tribute). Most of the important features of
‘Roman life and culture’ such as the Imperial cult, games public feasts, religious events, competitions and festivals were funded by rich individuals rather than the state, demonstrating their status, power, position and privileges (Ando, 2010, 185).

Tax collection was a sensitive matter, and was selective, for example Roman citizens in Italy paid no tax between 167 BC and AD 6/7 when Augustus brought in the *aerarium militare* (military tax) to cover veterans’ discharge payments. The death duty (levied at 5% save for near relatives and the very poor) and the 1% auctions tax were not popular; Augustus asked the Senate for suggestions and made a personal contribution of 170 million sesterces to the fund to diffuse tensions. Caracalla, as noted by Cassius Dio (71.3.3) increased the death duty to 10% and eliminated all exceptions (Campbell, 2002, 85 – 86). Provincial communities faced not just direct taxation, they also had to supply the army as it lived and moved around the provinces. The provision of supplies e.g. grain, weapons, clothing, etc could also be part of a provincial communities’ tax requirements.

Whether the military or civilian authorities handled provincial taxation, if handled badly it could cause resentment amongst the population; high-handed action by military (or civilian) officials provided the final straw in provoking the Illyrians (in AD 6), the Frisians (in AD 28), and the Iceni (in AD 60) to revolt (Mattingly, 2011, 137). It was, amongst other things a combination of taxation and misrule that played a part in the Jewish revolt of AD 66 (Rowe, 2010, 122 – 123). Tacitus, in relation to the Frisians, noted the insensitivities of military administration of civilians and tax collection.

*In this year, across the Rhine, the Frisian tribe broke the peace. The cause was Roman rapacity rather than Frisian insubordination. Bearing their poverty in mind, Nero Drusus had assessed their taxation leniently: ox-hides were requested for military purposes. No one had stipulated their dimensions or quality until Olennius a senior staff officer who was then in charge of them, interpreted the requirements as buffalo hides……….Distressful complaints produced no relief. So they resorted to war.*

Tacitus, Annals 4.72

Taxation was the main financial burden; it was set by Rome, rather than by the provincial governors (Scullard, 1982, 183). Prior to Julius Caesar the taxpaying
provinces were divided into two types, with the majority of provincials paying the *vectigal certum*, a fixed tax (which was universal by the time of Caesar). Some provinces paid particular types of taxes; Sicily, Asia, parts of Sardinia, Syria, Bithynia-Pontus, Cilicia and Cyprus paid the *decuma* (or tithe) agricultural land and the *scriptura* (a grazing tax). Whitby (2005, 196) argued that taxation was the lifeblood of the empire, it being dependant upon the regular flow of wealth (in the form of tax) from those areas which generated a surplus to those areas with the highest demand e.g. Rome and the armies of the frontier provinces. Most of the frontier provinces could not support the full costs of their resident Legions and auxiliary units. These costs were covered in the early empire by the tax income generated by interior provinces, such as Gaul and Asia Minor, where residents generated cash to pay tax demands by selling produce, with the resultant tax revenue being transferred by the Roman state to other areas. The system of taxation that was imposed on the new provinces of Gaul, Britannia, Germania, Raetia, Pannonia and Moesia in the early Imperial period was little different from that which existed in the days of the Republic (Kehne, 2011, 326). Across the Empire taxation was regulated and collected by the bureaucracy (which was developed by Augustus and later Emperors).

All provincials, including Roman citizens and those provincials who may have been periodically freed from some types of taxes (this was an imperial prerogative) had to pay the land tax (Scullard 1982, 260 -261). There was the *portoria* (tolls), which came in at a rate of 2% to 3% on goods entering or leaving a province. There was considerable variation in the way levied taxation was collected and paid and tax farming, which involved local and central auctioning of tax collection concessions, was widespread. The land tax, set at a fixed cash sum (in silver) based upon a percentage of the value of the average harvest, would be collected by the local authorities (sometimes helped by contractors) and then handed over to the quaestor. Tithes were paid in grain (in Sicily and Sardinia) or in cash (in Asia). Tax collection in both cases was put up for auction to the highest bidder. In some provinces local tax collection systems which existed prior to the Roman conquest were adopted by Rome i.e. in Sicily, the city of Syracuse, was able to bid for the right to collect its own tithes (as it had under King Hiero), collection was regulated with six per cent being allocated for the collector. Some of these pre-Roman tax collection system, as
devised by Hiero of Syracuse and the Kings of Pergamum continued to function long into the Imperial period (Woolf, 2012, 195). The bureaucracy of the former Egyptian state (as revealed by surviving papyri) inherited by Rome was corrupt and deeply involved with many aspects of Egyptian society and had a whole raft of different taxes some of which specifically applied to different groups in Egyptian society. Literary evidence in Egypt also associates soldiers with tax collectors and or having a degree of involvement in the tax collection process (Alston, 1995, 79 – 80). At a higher level Roman officials periodically tried to curb the corruption; the Prefect Tiberius Julius Alexander (in AD 68) set up a decree condemning the abuses of officials against the general population (Wells, 1992, 144 – 145). In those provinces with no functioning indigenous tax systems for local people to administer, Rome imposed its own revenue collection system, which could include contracts for revenue collection sold to Roman citizens and consortia. The late republic made use of publicani to gather tax, while under the Principate tax collection became over time the responsibility of local administrative authorities and Imperial Financial Officials (Mattingly, 2011, 143).

Roman taxation was not uniform across the Empire e.g. the property tax and the capitation (poll) tax applied to both citizens and non-citizens, but was not levied in Italy (and possibly not on Senators) and on some select coloniae and privileged communities in the provinces across the Empire (Wells, 1992, 143). In the provinces, cities were normally held responsible for collecting tax and passing it to state officials. Those lands that were not administered by cities were areas where publicani (organised commercial organisations which farmed tax) or state officials operated. Regular censuses took place in the provinces from the time of Augustus onwards to keep the tax rolls up-to-date – they were part of the process by which new territories were transformed into new provinces. Varus and his legions were taken by surprise by Arminius’s revolt while they were in the process of establishing the administration of justice and taxation (Wells, 1992, 75 – 76) (See Appendix 7:02: Waldgirmes an Augustan city east of the Rhine, page 230). The Roman tax collection system was not necessarily that efficient, it was corrupt, it was bureaucratic and people attempted to evade tax payments in the ancient world (as some do now). Taxation was a burden on the poor who, unlike the rich, would have been less able and less successful at deferring tax payments and benefitted less from remissions of
tax. Arrears of uncollected tax appeared to have built up regularly and were periodically remitted by Roman Emperors e.g. Hadrian remitted 900 million sesterces worth of tax arrears (Mattingly, 2011, 143). At one level successful avoidance or delaying of tax payments may go some way towards explaining the discrepancies in material wealth between different provinces.

The three regions I have chose as my study areas: Galicia and western Asturias (North West Hispania Tarraconenis) between 39BC and AD68; South Wales and the Marches between AD47 and AD138; and Highland Romania (central Dacia) between AD80 and AD161, were all directly and indirectly affected by these diverse factors to varying degrees, as were the other provinces of the wider Empire themselves. Traces of the impact of the Roman army, particularly in those provinces that were developed away from the Mediterranean core and heartland of the Empire are extensive in the three study areas. Our understanding of the process of acculturation as reflected in the archaeological record in the three study areas remains understandably limited and patchy at best as a result of the limited scale of modern archaeological excavations and our understanding of the culture and society of the indigenous pre-Roman inhabitants before, during and after the conquest.
3.0 Asturias and Galicia (North West Hispania Tarraconenis)

3.1 The late Iron Age Background: The Austures and the Cantabri

The combination of Spain’s geography and a history of political centralism have meant that Galicia and Asturias have long been (and still are particularly form the perspective of Madrid) considered to be isolated from the Mediterranean coastal regions.

![Figure 11: Location of Galicia and Asturias (After Xurxo and Ayán 2008) (p 904)](image)

Before the arrival of Rome, north-west Europe (and north-west Spain) was not predominately an urban society at least from the perspective of Rome. The majority of people lived in hamlets and small settlements and worked neighbouring lands.
From the beginning of the second century BC large fortified centres had begun to develop (Alvarez-Sanchis, 2005, 255 - 257). These settlements have become known as oppida, because of a Latin term popularised by Julius Caesar to describe large multi activity fortified settlements in Gaul. These sites are found across Iron Age Europe from Iberia, Central Europe, the Balkans and beyond. Oppida, some with resident populations of several hundred or thousands, had zoned work areas; markets, public areas and public buildings, often they had relatively well-developed street plans. Alvarez - Sanchis noted that archaeologists have assumed that the oppida were key centres of political organisation, industry and trade.

Figure 12: Aerial view of the oppidum of Sanfins (Paços de Ferreira) (After Lorrio and Zapatero 2005) (p 224)

Across Spain before the arrival of Rome changes were taking place. Woodland was being cleared for grazing land and cultivation, and this enabled people to develop a more settled form of living, remaining in the same areas for longer periods. One consequence of this was that longer-lasting larger settlements became possible; an increase in population along with increased social stratification. Alvarez-Sanchis suggested that it was during this period that the inhabitants began to systematically
protect themselves by building walls, towers and ditches and other fortifications, which became increasingly common in many regions of pre-Roman Iberia.

In the north-west, things were different, here the landscape was populated with smaller defended settlements known as ‘Castros’. At a very basic level these were small hillforts situated in prominent locations protected by ramparts and ditches (Oubina, 2003, 273). These small permanently occupied sites mostly covered less than 2 hectares with a densely occupied central space. Larger Castros, some up to 20 hectares in size only appeared after the military conquest and occupation of the Spanish north-west. The culture that emerged passed through a numbers of phases between the 9th century BC and the 3rd century AD (Oubiña, 2003, 273 - 274). There was a formative phase (which relates to the early Iron Age), between the 9th and 5th centuries BC. A pre Roman phase lasted from the 5th century BC until the 1st century BC (which relates to the late Iron Age) and a final phase, which developed under Roman occupation between the 1st century BC and the 2nd century AD. Across the region, these phases varied, with some phases starting earlier particularly in the south and on the coastal regions, lasting longer in the more remote mountainous regions, where Castros remained in occupation through into the 6th century AD. Save for the settlements that were founded during the Roman period, Castros were the only indigenous settlement type in the northwest.

A key feature of Castros are the thick stone walls, these fulfilled a defensive function and clearly defined the perimeter of the defended settlement. The Castro walls, while impressive, may not necessarily have taken as much manpower to construct as was once assumed? Recent reconstructive work on a Castro wall at Borrenes (a Castro from the Bierzo region) has allowed a reasonably accurate estimation of the amount of man-hours required for wall construction. The Castro wall with a perimeter of 600 metres, a width of 3–4 metres, and a height of 2.5 metres, contained at maximum some 5250 cubic metres of material. The wall, made from two facings of stone blocks, was filled with rubble with easily quarried tabular quartzite stone extracted from the ditch that surrounded the wall. It has been calculated that an individual could extract and construct about 1.75 square metres each day. Thus if the local community had between 35 to 40 fully able-bodied individuals then the building of the wall could take between 2.2 and 3.3 months (Sastre, 2002, 239).
The indigenous inhabitants of the northwest, despite the stereotypical derogatory references in the classical sources to primitive barbarians living in remote regions, lived in a complex, primarily but not exclusively, agrarian society. The complexity emerges in the interdependence between mixed farming and specialized metallurgical production (Sastre, 2002, 220). Metallurgical specialization played an important role as part of the agrarian households found in the Castro settlements. Analysis of pollen, seeds and animal remains has suggested that there was a complex agricultural system in the Iron Age. Millet, a summer cereal, appeared to have been introduced and this made possible two annual harvests. Livestock played an important part in the Castro inhabitants' diets, along with a wide variety of pulses. It has suggested that there was also an increase in forest clearance, which may imply a more intensive exploitation of the land and agricultural resources (Oubina, 2003, 276).
Figure 14: The Corona of Corporales (León). The site (1) and its resources: (2) agricultural lands; (3) lowlands and (4) uplands (After Sastre 2002) (p 220).

In the north west, early Iron Age hillforts / castros were positioned on points where the landscape changed from valleys to low lying hills, with preferential access to the low lying hills and richer agricultural lands being of some importance. It has been suggested that as the soils were unsuitable for permanent agricultural production an agricultural system that revolved around a fallow system over a long cycle was used by the indigenous inhabitants (Oubina, 2003, 276). Oubina noted that if this were the case then there would have been an increase in the scale of production, which would tie in with the emergence of permanent settlements.

The more unified centralised tribal structures found elsewhere in the Iberian peninsula appear less relevant in the north-west (Leneiz-de-Wilde, 1996, 547). This may be reflected in the lack of clan names and the many votive inscriptions, which reveal the names of indigenous divinities. If native tribal structures were more devolved or decentralised, in the rugged mountainous north-west, then perhaps so was the degree of acculturation. Acculturation may have been relatively limited in form and function, as suggested by the fact that the only proper cities to emerge and develop were Augustan foundations (Macmullen, 2000, 54).
The development of Roman and Romanised settlements in the coastal regions of the south and east of Spain had been ongoing since the 2nd century BC, with farms, villas and recognisable municipia and coloniae being established (Richardson, 1998, 311 - 312). The northwest remained hostile for longer and the conquest was not completed until much later with pre Roman settlement types remaining in existence for longer. Strabo’s picture of Spain suggested that in the south the natives abandoned their native speech and customs, adopted Latin speech, and gained Latin rights (Millar, 2001, 156 – 157). Baetica in the south was a senatorial province with rich trading cites like Gades (with a history of Italian settlement). The other Spanish provinces (Lusitania and Tarraconenis) with their imperial legates contained veteran colonies, which sometimes incorporated the native population and the native elites. These colonia were islands of ‘Roman-ish’ urban life in a sea of native non-Latin speakers, the only exception being in the Mediterranean coastal regions, while in north-west (and in central Spain) native speech, customs and tribal structures persisted through into the second centuries AD.

The survival of native institutions and social structures in the north-west may relate to the recruitment of auxiliaries, something which would have reduced the pool of young men of military age, and resulted in a gradual change to settlement patterns (Millett, 2001, 157). The maintenance of Legio VII Gemina and its associated auxiliary units in the region may then have had little to do with maintaining order and more to do with overseeing and controlling the valuable gold extractive industries. There was a military (or martial) element within Castro centred society and it appears that military display was an important part of the regional society. The classical sources (Strabo III, 3 -7 and Siculus V, 34) made reference to the warlike and nomadic character of the indigenous inhabitants of the North West (Millet, 2001, 160). The classical sources should be taken with a dash of caution as they may be repeating a stereotypical tale about the inhabitants of mountainous and remote regions, typical of the genre.

In the North West, it had been believed that as part of the post-war settlement and reorganisation natives were resettled to lower lying ground away from their hilltop hillforts and Castros to new towns on the plain. This was based upon references in Florus interpreted to suggest that this was a specific policy on the part of Augustus.
“After this we were able to rely on the loyalty of the Spaniards, and uninterrupted peace ensured as result both of their natural disposition for the arts of peace and also for the wise measures taken by Caesar [Augustus], who, dreading the confidence inspired by the mountains into which they were wont to retire, ordered them to occupy and cultivate the district in the plain where his campo had been; he urged that the council of the nation should be held there and the place regarded as their capital.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

This assumption that the Roman Authorities [represented on the ground by the Roman Army] were actively involved in some form of formal programme to establish new urban foundations, removing native populations, who had previously resided in hillforts, to the new towns, has been challenged, as archaeological evidence shows that hilltop sites in the north west (and elsewhere) continued to be inhabited into the first and second centuries AD (Hanson, 2002, 53 – 57).

The archaeological record in pre-Augustan Spain was interpreted on the basis of an assumption that archaeological traces suggested that people either lived like the Romans or lived like natives. Modern interpretation suggests that the reality was more complicated as are current interpretations of the archaeological record (Monterio (2007, 54 – 56). The Roman system worked because it was able to absorb new populations into the Empire and these populations were able to participate to varying degrees (socially, economically and politically) in the daily life of the Empire. Monterio noted that as time passed the nature of identifying degrees of ethnicity from the archaeological record becomes more difficult to prove over time with the adoption of elements of Roman culture, changes to burial practice, the use of Latinised Roman names, architectural influences on building practice, coinage, etc. All of this leaves traces in the archaeological record and make it increasingly difficult to differentiate between acculturated natives and settlers as time passes.

After the Roman conquest the basic structure of the Castros appeared to remain unchanged at least until the middle of the 1st century AD save for some improvements to the construction methods. Sculpted elements appeared including doorposts, lintels and reliefs, which were carved in the walls (Oubina, 2003, 281). From the late 1st century onwards there was a blend of local traditions with elements
of Roman urban principles as in the larger sized castros buildings were now beginning to be arranged with an agreed system of squares and streets along with the first appearance of public or communal buildings. At the same time, the smaller castros and hillforts appeared not to follow these innovations but adopted internal partitions for their houses which created more private internal space.

Post-conquest the presence of centralised settlements across the region might have been expected to have contributed to rapid assimilation and acculturation; similar processes had occurred elsewhere in parts of north and western Europe after their conquest and occupation by the Roman army during the Principate and afterwards. Yet, in the North West to the north of the Douro River the settlement pattern contained less Roman style settlements (Millet, 2001, 162). Millett suggested that the archaeological record showed only a small number of Roman towns developing after the conquest in the region. Bracara Augusta (Braga), an Augustan foundation, emerged as a regional administrative and communications centre, and acquired all the facilities that would be found in other Roman towns in this period. Castro sites continued to develop and remained occupied after the period of the conquest. A number of Castro sites that have been excavated are rich with imported Roman goods and show evidence of local imitation of Roman goods. Millett suggested that some of the larger castro sites showed elements of re-planning along Roman lines and that Latin inscriptions (with indigenous personal names) began to appear on door lintels on native style houses. This may show the process of development was far more complex and went beyond that of simple cultural resistance to Roman rule. Detailed survey work remains scarce across the region, but where detailed work has been undertaken (e.g. the Ave Valley Survey) there was a high density of valley bottom settlement prior to the conquest in both the late Iron Age and the Roman period.
There are modest Roman settlements, which are only identifiable from tegula, and ceramic finds. In those areas were there have been more intensive focused archaeological surveys (e.g. in the Ave valley and Braga areas) there are indications that there is a complex pattern of settlement change with elements of Iron Age continuity alongside new patterns of valley floor Roman-period settlement with a combination of farmsteads and very small villas. Millett noted that this mixture of valley bottom and hilltop settlement is reminiscent of the settlement patterns in the
early Bronze Age and it may reflect a longer term process of de-nucleated settlements rather than any significant change brought on during the Roman period.

Figure 16: Roman period sites surveyed in the Ave valley and Braga areas After Millett 2001)(p 165)

Direct imperial involvement in the process of settlement in Spain is attested to by ILS 6092, referring to a community from Sabora, in Baetica, where Vespasian responded to a petition granting the inhabitants permission to move from the hill fort where they reside to set up a new town on the plain, with the grant of municipium status and the Emperor's title (Curchin 1998, 64). The document dated to AD 77, indicated that in the interior people were still living in hill forts, even in areas where the conquest was
a distant memory. This suggested a degree of incentive and participation in the process of resettlement rather than coercion along with an unsuccessful appeal for financial assistance from Vespasian (which was not forthcoming).

The process by which communities of the north-west came under Roman rule and into the wider Mediterranean world can be traced within the material culture with the adoption of elements of Roman urbanisation within the Castro settlements (Cunliffe, 2001, 338 – 339). Those areas that were less urbanised and more remote from the new urban centres were slower to acculturise in comparison with the more urbanised areas and their immediate surround which more readily acquired the epigraphic habit (Macmullen, 2000, 64 – 68).

Figure 17: The interior view of the castro of Citania de Briteiros. This shows the stone-built roundhouses found on Castro sites (After Millett 2001)(p159)

These castro settlements represent a significant period of continuous occupation from the late bronze age through the Roman period including the conquest period (Cunliffe (2001, 338). There are problems with absolute and relative dating the occupation of Castros (particularly in relation to burial evidence) across North West Spain and northern Portugal (Leneiz-de-Wilde, 1996, 533 – 541). Many of the
settlements were incorrectly believed to have flourished between the fifth and first centuries BC. Leneiz-de-Wilde suggested that many of the settlements remained occupied throughout the Roman period and beyond. Outside of the North West many of the Castro settlements seem to have been deserted or abandoned around 400 BC, with barely one third remaining inhabited.

Figure 18: Oppida and hillforts of the Late Iron Age in northwest Iberia (After González Ruibal 2003) (p 223)

In the North West, the native Castros displayed no discernable drop in either population or economic activity through the Roman period (Green, 1990, 114). Green also noted that the late development of a limited number of villas in the late first century and the early second century AD, and villa-related farming activity, continued alongside native farming practices. Villa based exploitation of agricultural resources appears to have been based upon more favourable and costal locations. There are some sites within the mining areas that have enough Roman characteristics to suggest that they may be villas. Alan Trannoy (1981, 240-241) noted that villas started relatively late in Galicia (when compared to other parts of
Roman Spain). Green noted that only 11 out of the 75 identified villas originated in the first and second centuries AD. The villas were based in those areas where they could make the most out of the more favourable locations in the valleys and along the coast.

The Roman conquest disrupted or destroyed old economic patterns and relationships. Under Roman administration local farmers would have been (initially) obliged to divert a percentage of their produce to pay the new taxes, probably at local forts (as elsewhere in the Empire). The military garrisons were focal points for the payment of taxes and may have supervised markets and trade. This tax, known as the ‘annona militaris’, and calculated as percentage of the crops harvested, may have provided a direct incentive to grow more crops for the new and ready military market. In addition to new taxes, and a loss of political and economic autonomy, the Austures, Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia (2002, 105) noted, paid tribute or operaes, which took the form of labour service in the state run, mines (although, as yet, no one is sure how this was organised).

Post-conquest settlement patterns were, however, directly affected by the presence of the mines. Direct Imperial control goes some way to explaining the permanent presence of the military and its role within the region. The gold mines did not bring any direct benefits or enrichment to the native population; but they played an important if not key role in the reorganisation of post-conquest society (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002, 596). The emergence of communities directly and indirectly involved in the mining operations and associated processes impacted on the native population. Native communities were tied in with the mining activity by a new system of tribute in the form of labour service. Mining was not a marginal activity; it was directly tied into the management and development of the resources in the new territories. Post-conquest there may have been a great deal of territorial and social dislocation amongst the native communities (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002, 589-590). After the conquest Rome established Civitates with peregrine status across the north-west. These territorial units consolidated the local elite, extracted tribute and taxes and brought new forms of land holding and land acquisition. The new rural Civitates were directly linked to and dependent upon the new Augustan
foundations (or civitas capitals) of Asturica Augusta, Lucas Augusti and Bracara Augusta.

3.2 Conquest, Pacification and Occupation

The two hundred years of the Spanish wars transformed Rome from an Italian city-state with nearby colonies into a Mediterranean super power with a growing Empire and also changed the Roman army from a seasonal campaigning force into a professional regular salaried army – the consequences of these changes transformed Rome and the Romans. Spain is key to our understanding how Rome was transformed into a Mediterranean based Empire and also as to how new territories were conquered, occupied and transformed into provinces.

The Roman province of Hispania Tarraconensis (established by Augustus in 29 BC) was the largest of the three provinces in Spain (and the largest province in the Empire); covering some 350,000 square kilometres, it incorporated a wide and diverse variety of landscapes and local cultures. The province stretched from the Mediterranean coast to the Atlantic, and the Bay of Biscay to the Pyrenean foothills and included the valleys of the Ebro and the Douro / Duero. This included coastal plains, mountains and the dry plateau of La Mancha (southern Meseta) and the Atlantic parts of Asturias, Galicia and Cantabria and parts of modern northern Portugal.

After the civil war between Augustus and Antony and Cleopatra ended, these regions were the last parts of the peninsula to be finally conquered by Rome, between 29 BC and 16 BC. Florus noted that:

“In the West almost all Spain had been subjugated, except that part which adjoins the cliffs where the Pyrenees end and is washed by the nearer waters of Ocean [the Atlantic]. Here two powerful nations, the Cantabrians and the Astures, lived in freedom from the rule of Rome.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii
Military campaigns in the area had taken place as early as 39 BC, but it was not until 29 BC that M. Statilius Taurus is recorded as fighting the Cantabri, Vaccaei and the Astures (Jones, 1976, 46). The outbreak of hostilities between Rome and the tribes of the Spanish North West may have disrupted Augustus’s plans for further expansion into areas bordering onto the Empire, which may have also included a return to Britain, as was recorded by Cassius Dio:

“Augustus was planning an expedition to invade Britain, since the inhabitants were unwilling to come to terms; but his scheme was checked by the revolt of the Salassi (a tribe living in the Alps) and by the outbreak of hostilities in the territories of the Cantabri and the Astures.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

The conflict with the Salassi was relatively short, but the conflict in the Spanish North West was more prolonged. Florus suggested that the revolt was not necessarily a matter of resistance to Rome and that expansion on the part of the Cantabri and the Astures at the expense of neighbouring indigenous groups, played a part as a contributory factor for the revolt:
“The Cantabrians rose first and were more energetic and obstinate in their rebellion; not content with defending their liberty, they tried also to dominate their neighbours and harassed the Vaccei, the Turnogii and the Autrigones by frequent raids.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

Augustus travelled from Gaul to Spain to campaign against the Austures and the Cantabri, who had been strongly resisting Roman domination (Eck 2003, 53 – 54). Dio also recorded that Augustus took personal command (in 26 BC) when the Roman army suffered reverses at the hands of the rebel tribes and their guerrilla tactics:

“Augustus opened hostilities against the Austures and the Cantabri simultaneously and led the campaign himself.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

The news of the Cantabri and Astures revolt and “their unusual activity”, Florus suggested, led to Augustus undertaking an expedition rather than entrusting it to others and also suggested that the campaign may have involved considerable numbers of troops and military effort.

“He [ Augustus ] came personally to Segisama, where he pitched his camp and then dividing his army into three parts, enveloped the whole of Cantabria and enclosed its fierce people like wild beats in a net. Nor did he give them any peace on the side of Ocean; for they were also assailed in the rear by attacks of his fleet.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

The concentration of forces, may suggest that Augustus, was clearly determined to end the Spanish war once and for all, for at least seven legions were assembled for the campaign (by comparison four were considered sufficient for an invasion of Britannia in AD 43) (Eck, 2003, 97). The presence of the I and II Augustan, III Macedonica, V Alaudae and the VI, VIII and X Gemina Legions for the campaign in the North West had been noted (Keppie, 1987, 157). Clearly Rome had learned the
basic strategic lesson that when dealing with mobile indigenous peoples in an upland area, you need to have significant numbers on your side from the start.

The conflict appeared to have been brutal from the start with neither side appearing willing to compromise. Dio recorded that the Cantabri and the Austures appeared to be committed to unconventional prolonged guerrilla warfare, which the Roman army even with numbers and organisation struggled with (Goldsworthy, 2003, 100) – Dio noted.

“However, these tribes [the Cantabri and the Austures] would neither surrender, because they felt confidence in the strength of their mountain fastnesses, nor would they come to close quarters, since they were outnumbered by the Romans and most of their troops were javelin-throwers.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

The Cantabri and the Astures operating from within their own mountainous terrain, avoiding pitched battles, where superior Roman command and control systems would put them at a disadvantage, meant that the conflict did not favour Rome. The hill tribes’ successes forced Rome to commit more troops to counter the difficult guerrilla actions, which put the Roman army at a disadvantage, as Dio recorded:

“Their tactics caused Augustus many difficulties, since whenever he moved in their direction, they continually forestalled him by occupying the higher ground in advance and ambushing his troops in the valleys and woods, and in this way, they reduced the campaign to an impasse.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

The campaign took its toll on the Romans, not least on Augustus, as Dio recorded:

“Augustus fell ill from the fatigue and anxiety caused by these conditions and retired to Tarraco, where he remained in weak health.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

Augustus’s illness and retirement may have covered a change in strategy and a reorganisation of the Roman army, as hinted at by Dio (Jones, 1976, 46). It was also a politically convenient way of keeping Augustus in Tarraco in 25 BC, while leaving
the military campaigns to his generals, chiefly Antistius. In the Epitome, Florus went into much more detail about the first war than Cassius Dio, recording battles, skirmishes, sieges and the fall of well if fatally defended indigenous strongholds to the Roman army:

“The last incident was the siege of Mount Medullus. When it had been surrounded by a continuous earthwork extending over eighteen miles and the Romans closing in upon it on every side, the barbarians, seeing that their last hour had come, vied with one another in hastening on their own deaths in the midst of a banquet by fire and sword and a poison which is there commonly extracted from a yew tree.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

Florus recorded that Augustus wintered in Tarraco, while operations continued under Antistius, Furnius and Agrippa. He also noted that Augustus supervised the concluding operations of the opening phase of the conflict with the Cantabri:

“He himself arriving quickly on the scene, he brought some of the inhabitants down from the mountains, secured the fidelity of others by taking hostages, and sold others, by right of conquest, into slavery.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

Florus went into more detail about the second phase of the conflict and the campaign with the Astures than Dio, he recorded:

“The Asturians meanwhile had come down from the snow-clad mountains in a vast host. This attack seems not to have been undertaken without consideration by the barbarians; but, they pitched their camp at the river Astura, and dividing their forces into three parts, prepared a simultaneous attack on the three camps of the Romans. With such brave enemies attacking suddenly and with so well-conceived a plan the struggle would have been doubtful and bloody.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

He also recorded that the Romans themselves were not without indigenous allies in the conflict:
“...the loses on both sides would have been equal – had not the Brigaecini acted as traitors and had not Carisius arrived with his army as a result of their warnings.”

Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii

Dio suggested that there was an increase in Roman troop numbers, along with a change of commanders; something, which he suggested, may have contributed to a change of fortune and Roman military successes.

“Gaius Augustus took charge of the operations and scored many successes. This was not because he was a better general than Augustus, but, because the barbarians despised him, and so engaged in pitched battles with the Romans and were defeated. In this way Augustus captured a number of places, and later Titus Carisius occupied Lancia, the principal fortress of the Astures, after it had been abandoned, and captured may others.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 25

The change of tactics implied by Dio may suggest that the Romans put the Cantabri and the Astures in a situation where to protect their key fortresses and central places they had little option but to confront the Roman army in formal battles, to their cost. It was after these successes that Augustus, once back in Rome, famously closed the temple of Janus to demonstrate that the Cantabrian war was over and peace had been re-established. Despite these published military successes there was only a short temporary peace. Dio, unlike Florus, goes into more detail about the later phases of the wars with the Cantabri and the Astures. The military success was not to last, as Cassius Dio noted that (in 24BC) the conflict was renewed.

“As soon as Augustus had quitted Spain, where he had left behind Lucius Aemilius, as governor, the Cantabri and the Astures rose in revolt.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 29

Cassius Dio suggested treachery on the part of the Astures and the Cantabri, but, reading between the lines, there is an implication of a Roman failure to establish firm
control of newly occupied territory, or to successfully disarm the indigenous population. Dio recorded:

“They [the Astures and the Cantabri] sent a message to Aemilius declaring that they wished to make a present of grain and other commodities, before the least sign of their intention had become apparent.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 29

The Astures and Cantabri’s revolt is implied by Dio to have been well organised and co-ordinated. This suggested or implied a degree of tribal unity, co-operation, organisation and leadership:

“Then after they had brought together a large number of Roman soldiers, supposedly to transport they led them to places they had chosen for the plot and massacred them.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 29

Faced by a revolt and what Dio hinted as being serious reverses and Roman casualties at the hands of the Astures and the Cantabri, the Romans reacted typically aggressively.

“However, they [the Astures and Cantabri] did not rejoice for long, for their country was ravaged, some of their forts were burned and worse still, the hands of all who were taken prisoner were cut off, and so they were quickly subdued.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 53, 29

The renewed Roman conquest and occupation of the Spanish North West, did not go well, as in 22BC, the conflict was renewed yet again. Dio himself suggested that Rome’s treatment of the Cantabri and the Astures after their most recent conquest may have been a major factor in reigniting hostilities.

“The Astures rose in revolt because of the luxurious habits and the cruelty practised by Carisius and the Cantabri because they found that their neighbours had rebelled and because they despised their own Governor, Galus Furnius.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 5
The presence of a newly appointed governor, who Dio suggested had only recently arrived, led the insurgents to mistakenly believe that he would be unfamiliar with local conditions.

“However, he [Gaius Furnius] made a different impression on them [the Cantabri] in action, for he defeated them and reduced them to slavery; then coming to the aid of Carisius, he did the same to the Astures.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 5

The consequences of brutal Roman reprisals and what Dio suggested was indigenous fatalism, but may have been increasingly desperate and costly resistance on the part of the indigenous inhabitants, was heavy casualties:

“Not many of the Cantabri were taken prisoner, for they saw they had lost all hope of freedom, they lost all desire to preserve their lives either. Some set fire to their forts, and cut their own throats, others willingly remained with their companions and died in the flames, while others took poison in the sight of all.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 5

Cassius Dio noted that indigenous casualties might have been significant:

“In this way the great majority and the fiercest among the tribe’s men were wiped out. In the case of the Astures, once they had been driven off from the siege of a stronghold and had later been conquered in battle, they abandoned resistance and were quietly overcome.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 5

A year later in 19 BC the Cantabri rose in revolt (Jones 1976, 46):

“In that province [Spain] it appears that the Cantabri, who had been captured in the recent campaign and sold into slavery, had in every instance killed their masters, returned home and persuaded many of their compatriots to join their uprising. With the help of these they had seized a number of positions and fortified them, and were making plans to attack the Roman garrisons.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11
Putting aside the rhetoric about implied treacherous and conspiring slaves, which may have been standard after-dinner reading material for the Roman élite, the size and scale of the revolt is implied by the dispatch of Agrippa, to restore order. He had to take command and reorganise the demoralised Roman military units, who Dio suggested were reluctant to confront the Cantabri.

“Agrippa took the field against these rebels, but, he also had to overcome some difficulties with his own troops. Not a few were well on in years and had been worn out by continuous active service; they feared that the Cantabri would prove a difficult enemy to subdue and were willing to follow Agrippa’s orders.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11

Once Agrippa had restored order within the ranks, Dio, noted that he set about confronting the rebel Cantabri. He also implied that this campaign was difficult and native resistance particularly fierce:

“He [Agrippa] suffered many reverses in his operations against the Cantabri. Not only had his opponents gained much practical experience through having been enslaved by the Romans, but, they had also abandoned any hope that their lives would be spared if they were captured.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11

Dio recorded that this phase of the Cantabrian war was particularly hard fought, one in which the Cantabri were able to inflict a number of significant defeats on the Roman army.

“However, in the end Agrippa prevailed, He lost many men and degraded many more because of the defeats they suffered; for example he gave orders that the entire Legion which had been known as the Augustan should be deprived of its name.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11

The legion, formerly known as Augustan, may have lost its standard in battle with the Cantabri. Augustus himself, in the Res Gestae, refers to the recovery of lost military standards (Takács, 2003, 145). The war continued, becoming more intense, as the
natives having gained military experience of conflict with the Romans, continued to resist.

“But he [Agrippa] killed almost all of the enemy who were of military age, disarmed the others, and compelled them to come down from their fortresses and live on the plains.”

Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11

Florus recorded that after the conclusion of Augustus’s wars in North West Spain there was permanent peace in Spain. Yet this was not necessarily the end of the problems in the North West, Dio makes reference to yet another (admittedly rapidly suppressed) revolt in Spain in 15 BC. Only after returning from another tour of Gaul and Spain in 13 BC did Augustus order the construction of the Ara Pacis (Altar of Peace). Victory was tied in with a provincial reorganisation, which may parallel similar events in Dacia under Hadrian (Res Gestae 12 as also noted by Pliny in his Natural History 4. 118).

Aside from the mention of a campaign against the Austures in the AD 50’s there were no more major revolts against Rome after the end of Augustus’s Cantabrian war, save for passing reference to some disturbances which were recorded under Nero (ILS 2648 (= XI 395) and possibly later under Commodus (Curchin, 1991, 69). The former is hinted at by one sentence of Herodian which linked Spain with the revolt of Maternus in Gaul (Herodian, i87.12) The latter is related to an inscription from Ariminum (A.D. 66), which recorded the career of M. Vettius Valens. A few years earlier, possibly in the late fifties AD, Valens was decorated with torques, ‘phalerae et armillae’ while serving as primus pilus of Legio VI Victrix, ‘ob res prosper(e) gest(as) contra Astures.’ The decorations awarded do not suggest that the fighting in which Vettius Valens distinguished himself was of any great seriousness (Jones, 1976, 46).

Seven or eight legions saw service (under Augustus and Agrippa) during the wars in North West Spain (Le Bohec, 1994, 176). A sizeable garrison was retained because the indigenous Asturii and Cantabri had gained a reputation for being warlike and to control of the valuable minerals (Millett, 2001, 157). The region’s military garrison
was reduced over time to between four and five legions (plus auxiliaries). Even this reduction left between one tenth and one fifth of the Empire’s legionaries permanently stationed in a province with no external threat or open frontier (Mattern, 2002, 100). The Roman conquest, occupation and administration of Iberia is central to our understanding of the changes and development of Roman imperialism, and Roman Spain remains the focus of much academic enquiry, and historically-based studies of the makeup of the Roman army (Keay, 2003, 156). The prolonged Roman military presence in the northwest is key to understanding how the region developed post conquest and the context within which changes to material culture and society took place.

Hispania Tarraconenis, despite having no military zone, no frontier fortifications or limes as in Britannia, Dacia, the German Provinces and along the Danube, retained a military garrison until the end of the Empire (Le Bohec, 1994, 176). The main legionary garrison was permanently based at Leon and in scattered military posts across the north-west. Legio VII Gemina’s headquarters was based in a large camp (570m x 350m). A cavalry Ala was based at nearby Rosinos De Vidrales (in a smaller 5 hectare/12 acre fort), Additionally it has been estimated that between one and seven auxiliary cavalry units were positioned to guard the ora maritime on the Mediterranean coast and its hinterland. The whole military garrison for the province may have amounted to something less than ten thousand men.
By AD 14 the garrison had been reduced to three Legions, two legions controlled the North West (X Gemina and VI Victrix) based at or near Asturica Augusta (modern Astorga) and another legion (IV Macedonica) was based further to the east until AD 42 (Richardson, 1998, 156 – 157). By AD 63, the military garrison consisted of one legion (Legio VI Victrix) based at Legio (Leon) and 2 Alae and 3 cohortes to conveniently maintain a watchful eye on the potential trouble spots (Curchin 1991, 70 and Morillo and Garcia-Marcos, 2003, 275 -276). Once the Julio-Claudian period had ended, there was another rapid reduction in the size of the military garrison (Millett, 2001, 157). The civil wars of AD 68 – 70 brought a period of rapid change in the military garrison, as Galba’s bid for Empire was assisted by the presence of Legio VI Victrix; he raised a fresh legion, which was recruited in Spain (VI Galbiana or VII Hispana) and also recruited (potentially) several auxiliary units, which hints at the potential manpower available in the north-west (Curchin 1991, 70 and Millett, 2001, 157 – 168). After Galba’s defeat the legion was dispatched by Vitellius, to Pannonia and became involved in the civil war on Vespasian’s side. Vitellius made changes to the military garrison in Spain, Legio X Gemina was dispatched to Baetica, where it was later joined by Legio I Adiutrix, where its presence was attested to at Emerita (Curchin, 1991, 70).

All three legions were dispatched in AD 70 to deal with Civilis’s revolt (Tacitus, Histories 4.69, 4.76, 5.19) leaving Roman Spain without a Legionary garrison for the first time in two hundred years. After the civil war ended, Vespasian reconstituted the remnants of Legio VII Galbiana, which had suffered heavily during the battle of Cremona, as Legio VII Gemina. The new legion was dispatched to Leon possibly arriving by AD 74 (and certainly by AD 79, as attested by CIL II 2552 and 2554) to occupy the former fortress of Legio VI Victrix – thus ended the absence of a regular legionary garrison in the Spanish North West (Jones, 1976, 60 and Morillo M and Garcia-Marcos, 2003, 1). In areas where the army was involved in direct or indirect supervision of non-military personal and civilians (both citizens and non citizens) there would have been a need to more formalised liaison between the army and the civilian population. This may be one of the reasons why Vespasian created the post of ‘Legatus iuridicus’ to relieve the administrative burden from the Governor, with the post holder acting as his legal deputy. They have been recorded in Spain, Cappadocia, Britannia and elsewhere (Frere 1998, 182 - 183).
Figure 21: Fortresses and Forts in North West Spain (from AD 74/75 – mid 3rd century AD (After Morillo and Garcia-Marcos 2003) (p 277)

The prolonged stay of *Legio VII Gemina* at Leon (and it’s associated Auxiliary units), from the mid to late AD 70’s until at least AD 395 would have produced a steady number of discharged veterans, some (but not necessarily all) of whom would have settled locally. The long-term presence of large numbers of military personal (and their dependents) has been recognised a direct contributory factor in the process of acculturation which was an uneven process because of varying degrees of direct contact with Romans e.g. the Roman army (Wolf, 1998, 19). An inscription on a bridge at Aquae Flavae (ILS 254), recorded the involvement of *leg(io) VII Gem(ina) Fel(ix)* and ten Civitas communities in a civic project (Richardson, 1998, 89). (See Appendix – Inscription from Aquae Flavae).

Peace brought stability, economic prosperity and a degree of urbanisation something actively encouraged by Augustus and his successors. North western Iberia, a region long perceived as being remote from the Mediterranean coast, was rapidly integrated and connected by an extensive all weather road network; this linked the Legionary fortress at Leon with the other forts and developing towns of the newly secured territory. Augustus’s victory brought a territorial reorganisation that profoundly changed way the North West was organised and administered and created new and complex relations between the military and civilian population.

The new Roman administrative boundaries, applied after the conquest, made no provision for recognition of the pre-conquest boundaries (Hanson, 2002, 55). The Roman authorities adjusted and imposed administrative boundaries for their own
convenience as well as the practicalities of post conquest administration. This reorganisation was deeply effected by the Imperial retention of control of areas of mineral rich territory in what is now modern day Asturias and by the scale of the exploitation of the mineral resources. The exploitation and development of the gold mines represents a prime example of early Imperial control of mineral resources (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002. The mines were retained as part of the Imperial domains for over 200 years and were directly managed by the state. The mining activity had a profound and direct impact on the economic and social relationships that developed between the native peoples and their Roman neighbours (and administrators).

The basic administrative unit in North West Spain (and elsewhere in Roman North West Europe) was the Civitas, which formed the basis of the new relationship with Rome administratively linked to the three new conventus capitals of Asturica Augusta, Lurcus Augusti and Bracara Augusta. The surviving local aristocracy or elite were directly involved in running local government, collecting taxes, holding civic office and dealing with other matters of local administration, etc. This new model of administration was defined and surveyed by the Roman authorities; surviving boundary stones mark out the boundaries between the different civitas communities, boundaries between civilian and military administered areas (e.g. between the civitas Beduniesium, the civitas Luggonum and the cohors IV Gallorum) and also between different military prata.

The boundary markers are epigraphic evidence of Imperial involvement in the process, placed upon the termini Augustales between Mirobriga (Ciudad Rodrigo) and Salmantica (Salamanca). The collection of boundary marker stones for Legio III Macedoniarum have been dated to between 23 BC and AD 14, and clearly delineated the land that formed the legionary ‘prata’ from those lands that belong to the neighbouring towns of Iuliobriga and Segisamo (Mason, 1988, 164). This boundary has been traced for some 56 kilometres and lies at a 10-kilometre distance from Herrera del Pisuerga, the site of the legionary fortress, which may suggest that the total area administered by the legion may well have totalled some 560 square kilometres.
The new administrative structures were linked to the new urban foundations and the rural areas were ordered into ‘conventus’, with small town or village centres. Some of the older tribal boundaries were absorbed into the new administrative structure, acquiring stone boundary markers. As part of the process of reorganisation and settlement after the conquest, centuriation took place with a regular division (and no doubt a record) being made of landholdings (something that would have assisted with the assessment of taxation). This process would have been greatly assisted by the presence of military engineers and surveyors who would have been part of the military garrison (Macmullen, 2000, 54).

As well as military and civilian administered areas in the northwest, there were areas that remained under direct Imperial control, which were directly ruled on behalf of the Emperor by the Procurator Metallorum. The Procurator Metallorum administered the Imperial estates, with local laws (examples of which have been found elsewhere in the Empire at the Imperial mines at Vispasca (Aljustrel) in Portugal and in North Africa. The post holder also held the equivalent office to that of a local magistrate.
dispensing justice, collecting taxes, regulating trade and economic activity and exercising control of local policing functions (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002, 593). The mining region was administered by Rome from newly established administrative centres, both regionally from Asturica Augusta (Astorga, Leon) and locally from smaller centres, such as Bergidum Flavium (in Beirza) which lay close to the gold field at Las Medulas. Roman administrative centres have produced archaeological evidence to suggest social hierarchization and settlement specialization (Lopez-Merino, Pena-Chocarro, et al, 2010, 911).

3.3 Post conquest consolidation, colonization and provincial development.

Rome reorganised the northwest, like most of its acquired territories, to suit its own needs and own interests by establishing civitates with peregrine status as the basic administrative unit. The civitas, a territorial unit, consolidated the local elite under Roman control, extracted tribute, introduced a new form of landholding and land acquisition (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002, 589). The rural civitates were directly linked to and dependent on the three Augustan conventus capitals of Asturica Augusta, Lucus Augusti and Bracara Augusta (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 200, 590) the three sites played a key role in the administrative and judicial structures in the north west (Richardson, 1998, 145). Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia (2002, 590) suggested that the civitas territories in the north west with their peregrine status allowed the minimum of direct involvement by Roman land surveyors and administrators, yet made sure that the local aristocracies played a key role in tribute collection and administration. The new administrative landscape enveloped the old native structures and bound them to the Roman state with a combination of obligations, taxes and new relationships ultimately backed up by the threat of military force.
There were distinct regional differences within the provinciae as reflected by different levels of urbanisation. Much of Spain had gone through a period of rapid change and then the period of the rule of the Julio-Claudian emperors was a period of consolidation, reflected in the growth and development of urban sites, while many native communities continued to inhabit pre-Roman hilltop sites (Richardson, 1998, 150 – 157). By way of comparison, albeit an imperfect comparison, the process by which Roman Gaul was transformed from a landscape studded with hill-top oppida into a landscape studded with towns and cities based upon the Roman model, was not a simple one, with more than two or three parallel processes of urbanisation simultaneously (Wolf, 2003, 112 – 126). The whole process (this may apply equally to Roman Spain or Britannia) can best be summed up not as a process of resettlement, but rather as a series of processes by which settlement patterns were...
reorganised with a wide degree of local variation and anchored within a Roman political structure.

There was a change from a relatively mobile pattern of pre-Roman settlement to a less mobile Roman settlement pattern, within which the coexistence of native communities inside occupied hill forts ran parallel with the new lowland urban foundations. Some hill forts remained occupied well into the first century AD, while others were already becoming abandoned prior to the start of the first century AD. Some of the new urban foundations prospered and developed rapidly, while others appear to have taken many years to develop. Some of the new foundations acquired all the monumental trappings of Roman urban lives (e.g. Lugdumum Covenarum) while others did not, retaining empty undeveloped insulae (e.g. Carhaix). A similar complex pattern of social, political and economic change, with different rates of urbanisation and development may well be applied within Roman Spain, especially when those areas of Hispania Tarraconenis along the Mediterranean coast that had long been under firm Roman rule are compared with those areas in the North West that were conquered at a later date.

The adoption of elements of Roman material culture (e.g. public buildings, inscriptions and laws in the name of the Emperor and the Roman state) would have been a very public way of displaying an elites loyalty to the Emperor (and the state). Yet not all communities reacted to the power and culture of Rome in the same way. The adoption and use of Roman cultural, social and religious values did not mean that the indigenous communities shared the same values. The adoption and use of Roman values and symbols by communities of ‘Roman citizens’ and indigenous inhabitants took place within a broader cultural context especially away from the Mediterranean coast and the south of Hispania and rather than simply being a time of acculturation the period was characterised by the development of an overlapping and interlocking Hispano-Roman cultures (Keay, 2001, 134 – 135).

The new Augustan towns and cities provided a controlled ‘acculturised’ context for the local elite for ‘safe display’ of status within a specific tribal territory firmly established within the bounds of the Roman state. The new urban foundations had an economic and social impact beyond their bounds, as the process of urbanisation
also affected the rural hinterland (Reynolds, 2002, 46). The establishment of a permanent (if Roman) peace, admittedly at a pretty high price on the part of the native population, brought about the transformation of the Spanish provinces. Hand in hand with urbanisation went administrative change, as areas of territory under direct military rule became a complex patchwork of territory under Imperial, military and civilian administrative control. This was a process that had begun much earlier in the more pacified areas, and was formalised by the Emperor Augustus after his successful military campaigns in the north-west (Richardson, 1998, 177).

Elsewhere in the Empire the process of urbanisation was lengthy and a degree of financial, political and military assistance (and expertise) from the Imperial government was necessary (Richardson 1998, 158 – 159). The construction and maintenance of strategic roads was a long-term project, as various inscriptions from a variety of Emperors from the early first to later centuries AD suggest. The construction of roads tied in the once distant North West to the rest of Iberia and the Mediterranean world. Infrastructure development on this scale was financed (initially) by the Roman state for purely military purposes. The new roads facilitated the movement of troops, information and supplies, and also made it easier to move goods (and traders) around the Empires provinces (Morley, 2010, 82).

Two significant factors may have impacted on post-conquest development were the character and nature of the post-conquest administration and the contribution that the area made to the Roman Army (Millett, (2001, 166). Millett suggested that the administration of the North West was not based upon the civitas system that had evolved and developed elsewhere within the Empire. The development of the post-conquest administrative structure was focused upon the three Roman towns, which were founded under Augustus. Asturica Augusta, Bracara Augusta and Lucus Augusta (which has been suggested as a former fort site) were all new foundations, which went through a period of rapid development through the 1st Century AD when they acquired a range of Roman-style structures. The towns were situated at focal points within the Roman communications system and by the time of the Flavian dynasty had become conventus (judicial) and administrative centres which (according to epigraphic evidence) contained natives and Roman citizens.
Strabo, who died in AD 25, recorded the unsettled nature of the post-conquest northwest, particularly in Cantabria and recorded the fact that the Cantabri who remained unsettled were being actively being recruited for military service:

“But now, as I have said, they have wholly ceased carrying on war; for both the Cantabrians (who still today more than the rest keep together their bands of robbers) and their neighbours have been subdued by Augustus Caesar; and instead of plundering the Allies of the Romans, both like the Coniarans [since suggested to be the Coniscans – a sub clan of the Cantabri] and the Plentuisians, who live near the source of the Iberus, now take the field for the Romans.”

Strabo, Geography, 3.3. 8-4.1

Pliny (Natural History, 4.3) also referred to possibly significant local population groups as ‘populi’ whom Augustus had permitted to retain a degree of local autonomy (with their own rulers or ‘principes’) and that the town of Bracara Augusta was a focus for the administrative needs for some 22 to 24-‘populi’.

“Next upon these touch the twenty-two nations of the Astures, who are divided into the Augustani and the Transmontani, with the magnificent city of Asturica. Among these we have the Cigurri, the Pæsici, the Lancienses, and the Zoëlæ. The total number of the free population amounts to 240,000 persons.

The jurisdiction of Lucus embraces, besides the Celtici and the Lebuni, sixteen different nations, but little known and with barbarous names. The number however of the free population amounts to nearly 166,000.”

Pliny, Natural History, 4.3

The military potential of the north-east was an established fact; it enabled Galba to raise a new legion and auxiliary units to assist him with his bid for the Empire in AD 68, something that may hint at the higher population numbers (Curchin 1991, 70 and Millet, 2001, 157 – 168). Even with the questionably high population numbers (a common feature of ancient Greek and Roman classical sources) Pliny noted the relationship between the native groups and the newly established towns and that the towns played a key role in the administrative framework that tied the ‘populi’ into the Roman provincial administrative structure (Millet, 2001, 166). Millet suggested that the implication was that some of the pre-Roman Castro centres continued to play an
important administrative role well into the early Principate admittedly within the Roman provincial administrative structure. This administrative system described by Pliny (and Trannoy 1981, 150 – 151) would have provided a stable administrative system with indigenous local leaders responsible to a praefecti, directly appointed by and responsible to the provincial governor (Millett, 2001, 167). This local administrative system could be the precursor to the local administrative system that became the civitas system later used in Britannia and elsewhere in the Empire. There was no process of administrative evolution; a distinct choice had been made to use this particular arrangement in the North West. This may have happened because of attempts to manage the perceived warlike nature of the indigenous inhabitants and the fragmented nature of the indigenous inhabitant’s social structures.

The economic and social impact of prolonged recruitment in the region may explain the relative underdevelopment of the North West, being caused by the recruitment and removal of a portion of economically and socially active young men (Millett, 2001, 168). The removal of a proportion of the society’s young men may have effectively perpetuated the indigenous social structures and their social ethos for several generations. Local social structures remained focused on the indigenous Castro settlements and were in turn associated with the new Augustan urban centres. Millett, argued that the scale and impact of military recruitment for the auxiliaries may have declined during the first century AD but its impact through the formative period of the provincial society that emerged in the western portion of the Empire could have resulted in a different pattern of social development, settlement and society that developed in north western Spain though the Roman period.

The local elite, rather than those acculturised Spaniards or descendants of Italian settlers, who made their way in a wider Roman world (and Rome itself) have been identified as being crucial to exerting continuing influence on their communities (Curchin, 1990, 121). Acculturised magistrates fulfilled important local leadership functions at the local level. A provincial governor, like Agricola (in Britannia) might encourage and promote assimilation, but, without willing local leaders, he could have little lasting influence on the ground. Military garrisons could impose Roman law by force, but, not cultural or class affinity. Acculturation may have been encouraged and
driven by official Imperial policy, but, local co-operation and the willingness of individuals to adopt elements of Roman culture at lower local levels, for whatever reasons, spearheaded the adoption of Roman culture in some parts of the Spanish provinces. The traditional notion of coercion of native elites, after the military conquest is flawed, the system of provincial administration was more dynamic and enabled the indigenous elite to participate and to adopt aspects of Roman culture and identity (or not) as well as retaining their own distinct ethnic identity (and authority) for some years after the conquest. The process of establishing a province appeared flexible enough to allow a degree of variation according to local circumstances when it came to establishing government (Southern, 2006, 45).

One driving factor behind this may have been practicality as experience would have informed indigenous leaders that armed revolt against Rome was an exercise in futility, for which indigenous peoples paid a harsh price (Curchin, 1990, 122). Rome was a permanent feature of the landscape, which when combined with the visually impressive and successful ‘Roman civilisation’ may have tempted local leaders to adopt Roman ways. Co-operation could bring rewards and privileges to members of the local elite, including Roman citizenship, which under Vespasian became even more achievable with the ‘ius Latii’. This process was assisted by the presence of already visible urban centres (in the south and the east) that predated the arrival of Rome. Away from the coast local leaders (chiefs and tribal / clan nobles) formed the focus of a proto-urban aristocracy.

The elite within much of the Roman world was primarily urban (or urban focused) with towns and urban foundations providing a safe stage for competition and display of political, social and economic authority (Lowe, 2009, 5). The generation and control of a surplus raised revenue (and income), which could be invested within the urban townscape. Profits from the extraction of selenite (referred to as ‘lapis sepcularis’ by Pliny, Natural History, 36, 160) were used to produce monumental architecture for senatorial and equestrian families in Segobriga (Curchin, 2004, 148). The creation of towns led to a growth in trade, even where urban settlements (and their hinterlands) were barely self-sufficient (Lowe, 2009. 5). While self-sufficiency may have been a primary objective, opportunities for profit as a result of better communication links and those farmers and those landowners who had best access
to resources to do so exploited new demands for produce. Lowe suggested that those areas that possessed good communications, resources, available capital and also demand benefited the most, and those areas of the peninsula that were more distant, lacking in resources, communications and demand remained relatively remote from the Mediterranean market economy that developed. An individual’s ability to become involved in trading activities was also subject to status, as during the Republic, the ability to enter into legally binding contracts was linked to those Romans who possessed Roman or Latin citizenship and to those who had been specifically granted commercial privileges or ‘ius commercii’ (Morley, 2007, 69).

After the conquest there was a rapid large-scale exploitation of the alluvial gold deposits by using techniques that were imported from northern Italy (Wilson, 2002, 176 – 177). The local population was compelled to work the mines and to construct the necessary infrastructure, under military supervision. Gold production and its impact on the region is the key to understanding the subsequent development of the north west after the conquest. Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia (2002, 595) suggest that the reorganisation of the native peoples that followed the conquest impacted on every aspect of post-conquest society. They further suggest that the new administrative landscape enveloped the old native structure and bound them to the Roman state. The intensive gold mining in the north-west was an early imperial venture (the ager publicus), which was carried out for the best part of two hundred years. The Asturian and Galician gold mines were the most important in the Empire, providing the gold and silver that guaranteed the Augustan monetary system. Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia (2002, 589) noted that the working of the mines was part of the tribute policy imposed by Rome on the native communities after the conquest.

There are parallels with military involvement in mineral extraction (or at least control of mineral extraction) elsewhere within the Empire in Britannia, Val d’Aosta, Arabia Felix and Dacia. In Britannia, the Gold mining complex at Dolaucothi, the lead mining complex at Charterhouse (in the Mendips), and the lead mining complex at Machen were all closely linked to nearby military sites. Similar methods were used for mining at both Dolaucothi and mining sites in Spain and Portugal, particularly when it comes to the use of water power for milling operations (Burnham, 1997, 333). In some areas of the expanding Empire, the Romans took over existing pre-Roman mines.
Florus suggested that this was not necessarily the case in the Spanish North West, he noted:

“Thus the Austures, digging deep into the ground in search of riches for others, gained their first knowledge of their own resources and wealth.”

Florus, The Epitome of Rome, Book II, 33

Pliny the Elder, who may have served as Procurator of Hispania Tarraconenis (in AD 72 – 74) which included the area with the gold mining operations in North West Spain, provided a reportage-like description of the gold mining techniques that were used in the Spanish North West (Natural History, Book XXXIII, 70 – 75) which ties in with the archaeological record on the ground at the Las Medulas mining site and elsewhere. Gold production was significant in the region specifically and in Spain more generally. There was a strong possibility of military involvement in mining operations in north-west Spain, especially at Las Meduas (the biggest of the gold mines in the Spanish North West) where the mines remained under Imperial control (Jones, 1976, 333). The Spanish mines produced some 36 million sesterces per year by the second century BC, as noted by Strabo (Geography 3.2.10) and Polybius (Histories 34.9.9). By the First Century AD the substantial gold fields of the Spanish North West were producing over 6 metric tonnes (close to the 20,000 pounds figure) of gold per year, as noted by Pliny (Natural History 33.4.78).

Behind the raw statistics there was a human element within the Roman mining process based on the common assumption that labour in the mines was built around a combination of waged free labour and forced labour (Mattingly, 2011, 169 – 174). The reality appears to be more complicated; there was a forced labour element involved with the mining operations that may have been made up of a combination of condemned criminals and slaves who worked alongside native peoples fulfilling required duties or obligations (as munera or tribute) to the Roman state. Mattingly suggested that in some of the main mining areas of the Roman Empire, native peoples may have been required to provide labour service as part of the peace settlement made between them and the Roman state after their conquest or absorption into the Roman Empire. The indigenous settlement pattern around the
mining areas in the Spanish North West was reorganised to provide support for mining activities, with different groups appearing to have been able to cut better deals with Rome depending on their levels of resistance or acquiescence during and after the conquest. This would fit in with the openly differential nature of the way Rome’s Empire operated.

A recovered Augustan edict from El Bieizo contained the details of favourable terms and conditions awarded to the *Castellani Paemeio-brigenses* of the Susari (part of the Asturii) who were rewarded for not joining a rebellion against Roman rule (See Appendix 7.03 – the Augustan edict from El Bieizo, page 237). Privileges and rewards for loyalty were also linked to indigenous Castro settlements and tribal / clan structures. This edict suggested that some sections of the native population may have had more favourable treatment, and implies that other sections of the population may have received less than favourable treatment for being more rebellious. This edict may be a clear example of Rome’s exploitation of both human and mineral resources in newly acquired territory. The edict also lends weight to the theory that it was possible for indigenous inhabitants to have experienced a markedly discrepant experience of the benefits and privileges of Roman rule, within the same geographical region.

At the same time, concessions appear to have been extended to free miners to encourage them to work in the more remote regions of the Empire. The discovery of the Vipasca tablets (the *Lex Vipasca*) in 1876 and 1906 close to Aljustrel (Portugal) revealed a great deal of information about the terms and conditions that lessees had to work under during the Roman era. The Lex Vipasca consists of two tablets, the Aljustrel tablet and the *Lex Metallis Dicta*. While possibly specific to the Vipasca mine archaeologists and historians have been able to work out from these how Roman mining laws managed the mining industry throughout the Roman Empire. Greene (1990, 146) suggested that the Vipasca tablets suggested a mining community with all the essential facilities needed to attract leaseholders, miners and labourers to a particularly remote part of the Empire.
After the conquest Roman rule fundamentally changed the way that indigenous communities, hitherto distant from the Mediterranean world, operated politically, economically and administratively. The new civitas communities lost their political autonomy and economic independence, and were now compelled to supply the Roman state with food supplies, tax and gold via labour service (operae) (Orejas and Sanchez-Palencia, 2002, 593) and young men for service in the auxiliaries (Millet, 2001, 157 – 168). Hispania, including the North West, along with the other provinces across the Western Empire, between the mid first century BC and the late 1st century AD saw more and sustained cultural change than in the previous 150 years. Key to these changes was that the power of Rome, rather than being simply based on military power alone, became rooted within an integrated system of Roman political control. Central to this process was the transformation of subject peoples into autonomous communities (with differing statuses) within the context of city states (or civitates).
Language change was also important, as the communities of North West Tarraconenis used Latin quite quickly after their conquest; Keay (2001, 135) noted that it was rare outside the recently established towns of Asturia, Lucus and Bracara Augusta. The indigenous communities of the North West, did, however, use Latin to advertise the continuity of pre-conquest pre-Roman social groupings e.g. gentilitates and castella. A degree of passive resistance, a simply preferred choice, the local cultural background of the indigenous community and even a degree of competition with nearby urban centres (e.g. as exited between the Roman coloniae of Clunia and the Celto-Iberian town of Termes) all may have influenced local perceptions of what was considered most typically Roman when it came to the construction of ‘Roman’ buildings.

The transformation begun by Caesar and continued by Augustus was the result of a complex mixture of political expediency and regional geo-political considerations; it manifested itself by way of an uneven process of gradual municipalisation, which took place across the Iberian peninsula (Keay, 2001, 131 – 132). This process saw the establishment of a limited number of Roman coloniae with settled communities of Roman citizens and the granting of differing levels of status to a number of pre-existing indigenous communities. This process was continued to a lesser degree under Tiberius, Claudius and Galba before Vespasian who extended ius latii to all free communities within the Iberian Peninsula. All these changes created a Romanised geo-political landscape, focused in and around Roman towns, which were bound together by a series of Roman roads. Only a minority of these towns held municipium status, Roman coloniae were rare and the density of autonomous communities varied from province to province across the Iberian Peninsula. Roman interests predominated and Roman control was backed up either by the threat of force or as was the case in the North West the presence of the army which remained a permanent feature of the North West until the very end of the Empire. In Spain, today, Galicia and Asturias are still considered to be peripheral to much of Spain, and our understanding of how indigenous communities developed during the early centuries of Roman rule deeply affected by modern political economic and social considerations (See Appendix 7.04 Autonomy, Politics, and Archaeology in Spain, page 239).
4.0 De Cymru / Southern Wales (Britannia)

4.1 The Late Iron Age Background: The Silures and the Demetae

Trying to create a coherent picture of Silurian or Demetae tribal society before or after the conquest and how it would have interacted with and related to the Roman army (and any civilian dependents) is always going to be a difficult process. Tribal society in Wales appears to have been structured differently from that recorded by Caesar and Tacitus in Gaul, Germany, and South East England where there appear to have been much more centralized tribal entities with politically powerful individuals described as kings, magistrates and hierarchical power structures. In relation to the classical interpretations or observations, which still influence our perceptions of Iron Age society, we need to remember that Caesar and Tacitus were not trained cultural anthropologists and wrote for a specific audience and brought their own cultural baggage (as do all of us) to their writings. There is also a world of difference between observation and interpretation and understanding especially as one author observed first hand in Gaul and Germany and one did not (See Appendix 7.35 The Welsh Tribes, Britain and Rome: the historical background).

The Silures appear have inhabited territory stretching from the Gower to the Wye, covering the coastal plains and Glamorgan and Gwent valleys and stretching up to the Brecon Beacons. The territory of the Demetae may have covered much of south west Wales beyond the Gower peninsula and covered the Twyi and Teifi river valleys and into the foothills of the Cambrian Mountains (Cunliffe (2010, 208). More fertile hospitable parts appear to be densely populated with small enclosed settlements and along the coast around fifty-five identified cliff castles (Crane, 2001). There was some continuity of occupation in some sites, but a comprehensive picture of the number of occupied native sites does not exist because of the limited nature and number of excavated sites. Social structure and organisation are difficult enough to interpret and recognise though actual material evidence as revealed through archaeological excavations (Dunham 1991, 110 – 111). Far too few non-urban pre-Roman settlements have been excavated (and recorded) to suggest any detailed structures for pre-Roman society beyond that simple speculation. The few settlements that have been interpreted suggest phased occupation by kin groups,
some of which expanded during the Roman period e.g. Whitton, Glamorgan and Cefn Graenog, Caernarfonshire (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 44).

Figure 25: Defended settlements in Wales (After Cunliffe 2010) (p 291)

The relative proliferation of hill forts has been interpreted to suggest a lack of political cohesion amongst the tribes within the Welsh peninsula; although this could also be
said of the territory of the Cornovii in the Marches (Frere, 1998, 40 – 41). It has been suggested that the Silures lacked a centralised political structure. Yet the proximity of the hill fort at Llanmelin to the site of the later civitas capital of Caerwent may suggest a possible central place (Brewer, 1993, 7). The lack of an identifiable tribal centre has been interpreted to suggest that clan and family loyalties would have been more important than larger tribal loyalties (Aldhouse-Green, 2004, 173). Another school of thought noted that despite the implied decentralised nature of tribal society in the Welsh peninsula; the distribution of pottery with a chevron-eyebrow decoration (known as Llanmelin-Lydney ware) could suggest a possible heartland for the Silures (Davies, 1995, 695). The indigenous local aristocracy may have been materially poorer by way of comparison with the tribal elites in the south and south east of Britannia, too poor perhaps to evolve into the type of acculturised country gentry necessary to provide the officialdom for civitas style government as found elsewhere in other parts of Britannia, Gaul and Spain (Faulkner, 2000, 40).

Pre-invasion and conquest tribal groupings may have been fairly flexible with relatively small-scale, possibly clan based territorial units with their own aristocratic elite, and these clans periodically formed larger units and groups under single leaders at times of crisis (Millett, 1990, 20). This model would work well for the Silures and the other tribes in the Welsh peninsula. Along the southern coastal region from the Gower to the Wye Valley the native settlement pattern was different from that further west (Cunliffe, 1989, 397). Some larger hill forts appeared to dominate a landscape that was liberally sprinkled with small enclosed, protected farmsteads further to the West. The wide variation in the size of undefended settlements, multiple-enclosure forts and the small hill forts may represent the homesteads of aristocrats who expressed their status and wealth in terms of cattle (Cunliffe, 2010, 594). While hill forts dominated a landscape that was populated with small-enclosed farmsteads, in an environment that was conducive to mixed farming, quantifiable data for any economic relationships is conspicuous by its absence (Cunliffe, 2005, 436).
Our understanding of the tribal peoples resident in the Welsh peninsula may need to be revised, as it may have been more complicated than assumed with the addition of the Octapitae to the list of tribes in Wales (Burnham and Davies, 2010, 21 – 22). In the Gwent area (Howell and Pollard, 2004, 148 – 157) other than limited survey work in a few locations, only five hillforts have been excavated; Llanmelin (Nash-Williams, 1933), Sudbrook Camp (Nash-Williams, 1939), Twyn-y-Gaer (Probert, 1976), Coed-y-Bwynydd (Babbidge, 1977) and Lodge Hill Camp (Howell and Pollard,
2000), out of forty-three identified hillforts and fifteen settlements and enclosures (Children and Nash, 1996, 87).

The Silures may have had a mixed agrarian economy and reared stock is suggested by the recovery of quern stones, cattle, sheep and pig bones during Nash-Williams’
1939 excavations of Sudbrook Camp (Howell and Pollard, 2004, 151). Metallurgy was important with iron and copper artefacts at Twyn-y-gaer (Probert, 1976) and iron slag and hammer scale being recorded at Lodge Hill Camp (Howell and Pollard, 2000). The limited number of excavations hints at a Silurian society engaged in metalworking and potentially significant stock rearing activity on the Gwent levels (Howell and Pollard, 2004, 146 and Cunliffe, 2010, 434 – 439).

Figure 28: Llanmelin, Sudbrook, Twyn y Gaer, Coed y brynydd and Lodge Hill Camp (After Howell and Pollard 2004) (p 149)

The hillfort excavations revealed evidence of metal working in the La Tene tradition, with recovered iron, copper and bronze artefacts at Llanmelin (Nash-Williams, 1939).
Archaeological evidence, although limited, suggests that Silurian society was not aceramic, as the limited pottery evidence suggested that there were trading and exchange links with the neighbouring Dobunni (with Malvern Ware and local pottery production) and links across the Severn Estuary. Native occupation of sites appears to have continued into the period of Roman occupation (Cunliffe, 2010, 207). The Silures were in close contact with the frontier of the developing province and later in close contact with the Roman army, so some of the pottery excavated (particularly the south eastern style ceramics) may have been introduced from nearby Dobunnic territory during and after the conflict.

The Silures may well have had a coastal / riverine maritime trading tradition, with possible trading entrepoits at Merthyr Mawr and Sudbrook (c.f. Hengistbury Head but on a smaller scale). The Silures may have had the ability to carry out maritime raids (in hide boats of the curragh type) something that would have necessitated a Roman response. *Legio II Augusta* (under Vespasian) faced by a Silurian maritime (or riverine) threat would have developed a response, possibly with flat bottomed river and coastal craft as had been employed elsewhere in Gaul and Britannia, potentially supported from possible small ports at Comwich, Crandon Bridge and Ilchester. The discovery of the Barlands Farm boat, with oak planks and iron nails belonging to the Romano-Celtic tradition of boat building, and its disposal (by being placed in a palaeochannel) suggests that the inhabitants of southern Gwent made use of waterways to trade and travel (Aldhouse-Green, 2004, 161) and hints at the continuity of a Silurian maritime tradition (Brewer, 2004, 217) which may have lasted until Flavian times (Howell, 2004, 68).

Rivers and estuaries are important as pre-historic communication routes and these areas were attractive areas for settlement (Bell and Neumann, 1997, 105 – 106). Wooden planks have been recovered that had been used as part of wooden track ways and dated from 1017 BC and 1780 – 1680 BC, they had originally been used in sewn boats, examples of which have been noted from the Barlands Farm (Romano-Celtic) boat and a later medieval example from Magor Pill. A Silurian maritime tradition may explain the construction and maintenance (until after the conflict was over) of two small forts at Old Burrow and Martinhoe on the north Devon coast. Fox and Ravenhill (1972, 56) noted that the fortlet at Old Burrow was Claudian and was
replaced by Martinhoe (which was less prone to mist) during the reign of Nero. The small forts high on the north Devon coast would have enabled observation of the south Wales coast and liaison with Roman naval units operating in the Severn Estuary (Mason, 2003, 88) suggesting a degree of supervisory control by the Romans over the Severn estuary (Peddie, 1987, 157 – 160). The fortlet at Old Burrow may have served as potential eyes for the Roman fleet, until replaced by a small fort at Martinhoe (Breeze, 2012, 147). Small garrisons (between 65 and 80 men) appear to have been maintained to provide the best possible views of the estuary.

Pre-Roman and Roman roads leave an identifiable imprint on the land and the archaeological record but maritime trade and communication routes (save for quays, shipwrecks and lost anchors) leave next to no trace of their existence. Roman naval forces would have been active in the Bristol Channel within a short time of the AD 43 invasion, later perhaps undertaking patrol duties to prevent Silurian infiltration, ferrying troops and supplies to the Welsh coastal plain from a possible naval base at Sea Mills. From the native side, boats and river craft constructed in the Celtic tradition (as existed in the far west of Ireland) would not have needed wharfs and docks, as with modest draft and keel-less flat bottoms they could use beaches and river banks for off-loading of cargo and passengers (Evans, Hopewell et al, 2010, 99).

Excavations of Walesland Rath, Pembrokeshire revealed the existence of an indigenous community living in round huts from the First Century BC until the First Century AD. The site was, it appears, then abandoned, and then reoccupied with the inhabitants living in a rectangular building and using Roman-style pottery (Wainwright, 1971, 78). Archaeologists had reasoned, largely based on the assumption of an absence of Roman forts and roads, that the Demetae had offered limited or even no resistance to the Romans. The perceived lack of the forts and military installations necessary to house a substantial military garrison after the conquest was completed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was used to support this theory (Cunliffe, 2010, 208).
Figure 29: Settlements in West Wales (After Cunliffe 2010) (p 209)

The importance of extended family and kin groups within native society through the pre-Roman and the Roman period has been noted (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 43 – 44). The presence of horse trappings and fittings (cheek pieces for bridle bits, discs used to decorate wheeled vehicles and harness links) recovered from votive deposits at Llyn Fawr (Glamorgan) and Seven Sisters (Glamorgan) (Green and Howell, 2000, 21) and Horse bones found at defended sites, at Llanmelin, Twyn-y-gaer and Sudbrook and smaller sites such as Thornwell Farm (near Chepstow) indicate the important role of horses in Silurian society, something that Tacitus noted elsewhere in Britannia (Annals, XIV, 34). Harness and horse fittings have also been found in artefact assemblages in south east Wales recorded by the Portable Antiquities Scheme, from excavated sites (at Lesser Garth, Pentyrch (Glamorgan),
Castle Ditches, Penlyn and Black Pill (Swansea Bay) and other sites in Glamorgan and Gwent (Howell, 2006, 63 – 64). The Silures, like the Romans, appear to have made use of the Gwent levels, accessing them with what appears to be series of brushwood trackways to cross the particularly wet areas. Excavations in the Goldcliff area, west of Goldcliff Point have revealed eighteen trackways and eight timber rectangular Iron Age buildings, which appear to have been associated with cattle rearing, as demonstrated by excavated hoof prints (Howell, 2006, 45).

While the nature of Silurian rural society and settlement is limited and poorly understood, especially in the upland areas, even in the more rich agricultural areas such as the Vale of Glamorgan and lowland Gwent many of the native farms showed only limited Roman influence (Howell, 2006, 82 – 83). Roundhouse architecture appears to have persisted in some areas right through the period of Roman rule as typified by the Thornwell Farm site, near Chepstow (Hughes, 1996). This persistence of native settlement types and native agricultural practices along with the partial adoption of some aspects of ‘Roman’ culture may be a combination of the resilience of native society and a lack of interest on the part of Roman authorities (Manning, 2001, 76). In the south-west, perhaps as a result of being further away from established Roman markets, native settlements appear to have been less influenced by Roman lifestyles and material culture. While some Iron Age homesteads do demonstrate a thin veneer of acculturation, pre-Iron Age society appears to have continued with little apparent change with a number of sites continuing to be occupied through the Roman period (Green and Howell, 2000, 60 - 61).

One feature that differentiates the Welsh tribes is that unlike most of the Iron Age tribes in south-east Britain, before the Roman conquest, the Welsh tribes did not produce their own coinage. However society and the economy functioned pre-conquest in all of Wales, it did so without an indigenous coinage and the lack of pre-Roman coinage indicates that the monetary system of neighbouring Iron Age tribes was either not shared or excluded (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 114). This means that all the of the 35 Iron Age coins (mostly gold) found in Wales were imported from other coin producing areas, either from the south east of Britain or from the European mainland. The few Iron Age coins that have been found in Wales are concentrated in the south-east (despite the significant numbers of coins found in
neighbouring tribal lands in Gloucestershire, Somerset and across the River Severn)
and over half of them originated from the Dubonni (Guest, 2008, 40 – 43).

4.2 Conquest, Pacification and Occupation

By AD 47, to the west of the embryonic province of Britannia lay the Welsh hills, 
hostile tribes and Caratacus, who had escaped to the Welsh peninsula (Wacher, 
2001, 26 and Howell, 2006, 65- 68). The defeat of Caratacus in 51 AD, did not, 
perhaps to the surprise of Rome, end the conflict, as noted by Tacitus:

Triumphal distinctions [for the defeat of Caratacus] were voted to Ostorius, who thus far had been successful, but soon afterwards met with reverses; either because, when Caractacus was out of the way, our discipline was relaxed under an impression that the war was ended, or because the enemy, out of compassion for so great a king, was more ardent in his thirst for vengeance. Instantly they rushed from all parts on the camp-prefect, and legionary cohorts left to establish fortified positions among the Silures, and had not speedy succour arrived from towns and fortresses in the neighbourhood, our forces would then have been totally destroyed. Even as it was, the camp-prefect, with eight centurions, and the bravest of the soldiers, were slain; and shortly afterwards, a foraging party of our men, with some cavalry squadrons sent to their support, was utterly routed.

Tacitus, Annals XII. 38

Despite Roman military successes and the capture of Caratacus, the war with the Silures showed few signs of coming to a conclusion (Manning 2002, 38 – 39 and Mattingly, 2006, 103 – 104). The lack of cohesion amongst the tribes within the Welsh peninsula causing problems may have caused problems when it came to resisting Rome; active resistance to Rome may have benefitted from a combination of difficult terrain and physical remoteness (De la Bedoyere, 2006, 333 – 34). The apparent inaction on the war front in Wales (in the mid 50’s AD) combined with a series of acknowledged defeats at the hands of the Silures may be better understood if combined with an acknowledgment of the indecision that gripped the Imperial Palace between AD 54 and AD 57; a period which saw the death of Claudius, the accession and the minority of Nero. The situation changed with the appointment of Quintus Verianius (in AD 57) and his successor Suetonius Paullinus who oversaw the partial defeat or temporary suppression of the Silures and the Ordovicii by AD
60. The end of the Welsh tribes’ ability to resist was clearly in sight when the outbreak of the Boudiccan revolt brought a reprieve, postponing the final conquest for fifteen years. The decision to halt and consolidate rather than to finish the conquest, despite the distances involved, would have emanated from the Imperial Palace in Rome (Mattingly, 2006, 104).

Figure 30: Roman military sites southwest Britain (After Manning 2002)(p 31)

Vexillation Fortresses: (1) Chichester (2) Lake Farm (3) Kingsholm
Forts and Fortlets: (4) Cirencester (5) Hod Hill (6) Fishbourne (7) Shapwick
(8) Waddon Hill (9) Ilchester (10) Axminster (11) Charterhouse
(12) South Cadbury (13) Gittisham (14) Hembury (15) Cullompton
(16) Killerton (17) Tiverton (18) Clayhanger (19) Wiveliscombe
(20) Bury Barton (21) North Tawton (22) Okehampton (23) Martinoe
(29) Cardiff (30) Sudbrook Camp (31) Abergavenny (32) Kencchurch
(33) Abbey Dore (34) Walton
Possible forts or military sites: (35) Winchester (36) Silchester
(37) Mildenhall (38) Wanborough (39) Old Sarum (40) Hamworthy
(41) Dorchester (42) Maiden Castle (43) Bath (44) Camerton (45) Ham Hill
(46) Topsham (47) Sea Mills (48) Weston under Penyard (49) Coed-y-caerau
(50) Chepstow (51) Caerwent
There has been much discussion about the movements of the Roman legions and where they were based in Britannia during the conquest amongst archaeologists’ since the 1880’s through to the present day with ideas about Legionary disposition changing as more archaeological evidence was amassed (Richmond 1947, Webster 1974, Millett 1990, Frere 1998, Hassall 2000, Manning 2001, Mattingly 2006 et al). The legionary movements that directly impacted on the late Iron Age tribes of the Welsh peninsula during and after the conquest involved 3 out of the 4 Legions that were initially committed to the conquest of Britain. The initial moves involved Legio XX and Legio XIV, with Legio XX moving from Colchester (in AD 48) to Kingsholm (Gloucestershire), where it was based between AD 48 and AD 57.

Fortresses at Kingsholm and Weston-under-Penyard (in the Wye Valley) effectively masked the key routes in and out of South Wales and (with additional forts) would have protected the portion of the Dobunni who were probably Roman Allies (Manning, 2000, 38). Legio XIV moved from Leicester (in AD 55) to Wroxeter, where it was based between AD 55 and AD 67/69. As the advance into Wales progressed, Legio XX moved forward to Usk, where it was based between AD 55 and AD 67. The fortress site at Usk was poorly situated, hemmed in by hills, too far (up river) from the sea for seaborne communication and supply and was prone to flooding, being situated between the river Usk and the Olway Brook. Following the Boudiccan revolt and its aftermath the policy of conquest was put on hold and Legio XX moved to occupy the site of the later Colonia at Gloucester, were it was based between AD 67 and AD 75.

The stabilization of a province with a potential active war front, with reduced troop numbers, would have been more than an interesting exercise in logistics, as any perceived withdrawal (strategic or otherwise) would have been a difficult undertaking in the face of the partially subdued but still hostile Silures. What followed was a period of consolidation within the new province, something the political crisis of AD 68 – AD 70 did little to change (Howell, 2006, 68). Legio XIV was withdrawn from Britannia for other service sometime between AD 67 and AD 69. The civil war also meant that the policy of conquest remained on hold until after the Flavians emerged in AD 70 as ruling dynasty of the Empire.
The conquest of the Welsh peninsula was resumed early in the AD 70’s and as it came to a conclusion the legions were once again moved around to secure the new territories. Legio II Augusta now moved from Exeter, where it has been based since AD 55, directly to the site of a new Legionary fortress at Caerleon in the lower Usk Valley in AD 75. Agricola succeeded Frontinus as governor; he arrived in the late summer of AD 78 to face active resistance from the Ordovicii who Tacitus (Agricola, 18) credited with annihilating an auxiliary cavalry detachment stationed on their
territory, which suggested that they had been partially subdued before Agricola’s arrival (Manning, 2007, 71).

‘Shortly before his arrival the tribe of Ordovicii had almost wiped out a squadron of cavalry stationed in their territory, and this initial stroke had excited the province. Those who wanted war welcomed the lead thus given, and only waited to test the temper of the new governor.’

Tacitus, Agricola 18

Tacitus’s account (Agricola 18) offers the insight that although Rome had achieved military success over the tribes in Wales, there was still a degree of dissent on the part of the indigenous inhabitants inside and outside of the province. Agricola acted quickly even though it was late in the year for a military campaign.

‘The summer was now far spent, the auxiliary units were scattered all over the province, and the soldiers assumed that there would be no more fighting that year. Everything, in fact, combined to hinder or delay a new campaign, and many were in favour of simply watching the points where danger threatened.’

Tacitus, Agricola 18

The resistance of the Ordovicii was brutally suppressed:

‘As the Ordovicii did not venture to descend into the plain, he [Agricola] led his men up into the hills, marching in front himself so as to impart his own courage to the rest by sharing their danger, and cut to pieces almost the whole fighting force of the tribe.’

Tacitus, Agricola 18

The governor then launched an attack on Anglesey (Ynys Mon) and forced the surrender of its inhabitants (Levick, 2005, 158). With the Welsh peninsula finally conquered and securely garrisoned, the army moved north to conquer the north of England and southern Scotland. Just prior to the final Agricolan conquest, Legio XX was moved from Gloucester to Wroxeter where it was based from AD 75 until AD 83/84, before moving to Chester in AD 83/84. Latterly, towards the end of the conquest period, Legio II Adiutrix, while seeing service in the north of Britannia appears to have retained a presence at Chester, between AD 78 and AD 83/84 (Hassall, 2000, 63).
Figure 32: Flavian military installations c AD 70 – 80 (After Davies 2010) (p 44)

To the south-west of the heavily garrisoned Silures lay the Demetae (Jarrett 2002, 48 – 49 and Burnham and Davies, 2010, 21). Assumptions have been made that this tribe was not necessarily hostile to Rome, due to a perception that the region had a relatively short-term light military presence and had barely felt the touch of Rome. Recent archaeological discoveries suggest a more prolonged degree of contact and interaction between the Roman Army and the indigenous population. A geophysical survey (in 2003) of Dinefwr Park, Llandeilo confirmed the presence of two Roman forts, previously only hypothesized and hinted at by stray finds of pottery.
A limited excavation of the two phases, Dinefwr A and Dinefwr B took place in 2005 (Hughes 2007). This new information when compared with the previous discovery of a stretch of Roman road from Carmarthen and westward past Whitland (Page, Murphy and James, 2002) suggests that the situation in the southwest may have been more complex and protracted than had been previously hypothesized.

The pre-Flavian forts appear to have been positioned to prevent movements from the upland areas (Davies, (2007, 93). Following the completion of the conquest, under the Flavians, few of the earlier forts in south Wales were retained or reoccupied (Mattingly, 2006, 144 – 145). Legio II Augusta moved to Caerleon, a depot replaced the fortress at Usk and the only pre-Flavian sites to show continuity of occupation were Abergavenny and Cardiff. Post-conquest military deployment was based along a line of forts up the Usk Valley and linking through to Llandovery. The coast road linked a series of forts at key river crossings (e.g. Cardiff, Neath and Loughor). Lines of forts also lay along the Neath Valley and on the eastern side of the Taff Valley. To the west, a line of forts stretched northeast from Llandovery into central Wales. The forts that lay along the routes through Silurian territory may suggest a decentralised tribal society, one that perhaps plagued the Romans with
guerrilla war and could only be held down with a large garrison situated to oversee blocks of territory rather than to control any political centre. Conflict had been replaced by occupation; the territory of the Silures held a military garrison based around one legionary fortress and fifteen auxiliary forts (Mattingly, 2006, 144). Potentially close to a quarter of the garrison of Britannia (13,000 men), if all the units and forts were at full strength, was based in the Wales. This garrison may not have been substantially reduced until the early second century AD with only a few forts and the Legionary fortress remaining in a state of occupation by the mid 2nd century.

4.3 Consolidation and Pacification AD 85 – AD 120

For almost every army throughout recorded history, the moment of victory brings new challenges and responsibilities. Conflict and confrontation would have been replaced with a combination of policing, occupation duties and administration; this change in role would have begun the process of changing the nature of the relationship between the Roman Army, its dependant civilian population and the native population. By AD 78 / 79 following Agricola’s short campaign against the Ordovicii the tribes in the Welsh peninsula had been subdued and their territories brought under Roman control. Military dispositions, with some minor adjustments, were effectively solidified between AD 80 and AD 90 and there was little major change until AD 110 – 120, although several smaller forts were abandoned (Lucas, 2002, 57).

The final conquest of Wales was followed by a complete reorganisation of the military system; the forts constructed after the Romans had secured control of the Welsh peninsula may reflect arrangements made to hold subdued territory rather than to conquer it (Manning, 2007, 70 – 73). Pre-Flavian forts had masked the upland areas and prevented movement from them, the majority of Flavian forts were positioned to supervise upland populations in key valley sites and to maintain control of important communication routes from and through the interior to the coastal areas. The upland distribution of some camps, forts, fortlets and watchtowers linked by all weather roads enhanced the ability of the garrison to control and police large mountainous tracts of territory which suggested that after organised resistance collapsed there may have been problems with guerrillas.
Much of the early Flavian garrison was housed in bases which lay in estuarine or valley bottom positions which facilitated relative ease of supply and control of the native population, while some fortlets appear to have been built to secure control of ford points and to supervise movement e.g. Brithdir, Pen-min cae and Erglodd (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 15). There is little to suggest that the construction of the forts actually displaced any of the native communities despite the presence of elements of three legions and around thirty-five auxiliary units being deployed across the whole of the Welsh peninsula (Davies, 2007, 95). There is evidence that the forts at Caernarfon and Pen Llysyn and the Brithdir fortlet were constructed on prehistoric settlement sites but it is unclear as to whether the sites were occupied (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 15).
From the AD 80’s onwards, Davies (2007, 100 – 101) suggested that with on-going military commitments in the north there was a gradual reduction in the garrison. The process accelerated (amongst the auxiliary garrisons) in response to the demands of Trajan’s Dacian wars (101–102 and 105–106 AD) and later wars and wall building operations under Hadrian. Lucas (2002, 57) argued that there was little change in military deployments until AD 120 after which some sites were run down. Arnold and Davies (2000, 21 – 24) suggested an on-going demand for troops in the north of
Britannia and on the European mainland led (after AD 78 – 83) which led to selective troop withdrawals from Wales. The closing down of the war front in Scotland (after AD 87) and reorganisation of the garrison led to a rebuilding of some forts in stone (in some areas forts were reduced in size) or the construction of new stone forts e.g. Gelligaer II or new stone defences e.g. Loughour. The South West may have lost its military garrison by the AD 120’s with only Brecon Gaer and Gelligaer being occupied into the Antonine period, for administrative, policing and tax gathering purposes.

![Figure 35: Later Flavian-Trajanic military installations c AD 110-130 (After Davies 2010) (p 50)](image-url)
The rise, reduction and demise of many of the forts in Wales (and the Marches) impacted on their associated civilian settlements (or vici). Many of the smaller vicus settlements appear not to have survived the demise of their principal economic and social stimulus. The forts should not be interpreted as standing alone in the landscape; they should be seen as being centres of widespread military and civilian activities. Yet where forts continued in existence into the second century there were few signs that vici were still occupied (Hopewell et al, 2005, 225 – 269). The fluctuating size of the military garrison at Caerleon appears to have had implications for economic activity that were reflected in the archaeological record of the civilian settlement at New Farm, Bulmore (Monmouthshire). Ceramic evidence shows periods of uneven occupation and a noticeable reduction of activity at Caerleon, as much of the legion was on active service in the north of Britannia (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 25 – 26). This appears to be paralleled by similar periods of activity (AD 125 – AD 140) and inactivity (AD 140 to AD 160), followed by periods of activity (up to AD 200) and inactivity (AD 200 to AD 260) which match the periods of occupation in the nearby Legionary Fortress, even though the settlement is noted as a Veteran settlement (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 59 – 60). Yet there are possible examples of the civilian vici surviving the closures of the fort, with Usk, Monmouth and Abergavenny developing as small towns (Manning, 2001, 73).

Few vici (in mid Wales) show any signs of activity after 140 AD even in those forts that were occupied into the second century AD, something that hinders our understanding of the link between garrison activity and size and the recorded life of associated vicus settlements (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 62). Bath houses, mansiones and other buildings outside of military posts may well been fairly central to the lives of the military personnel fulfilling important functions socially and economically, and many of these buildings would also have been fairly central to the lives of any civilian dependents, whether immediate family, traders and hangers on or natives, for similar social and economic reasons (Sommer, (2006, 123). These buildings would have provided the basic focal point for the development of any military post’s emerging vicus. The discovery of courtyard buildings at Cold Knap, Canovium, Brecon Gaer and Segontium, have been interpreted as possible higher status ‘official’ buildings or mansiones (Hopewell et al, 2005, 266 – 267) and might be a residual archaeological trace of the military’s peacetime administrative roles.
According to Tacitus (Agricola, 22, 2-3) every Roman fort in Britannia, when Agricola was governor (between AD 78 and AD 84) were required to have enough stored supplies for a year (Davies, 1971, 122 – 123). Using evidence from Egypt, it was possible to calculate that each Roman soldier consumed around one third of a tonne of corn each year. In peacetime the army would have used a wide variety of sources to obtain its food, whether via a purchase requisition or growing it themselves (Davies, 1971, 124) See Appendix 7.05 Feeding and Sustaining the Roman Army in Wales and the marches, page 243). In the Rhineland contracts for bulk supplies
were used, along with individual soldiers augmenting their own supply of food from other sources (including hunting, private purchase and extortion). Villagers from Scaptopara (in Thrace) complained of soldiers descending upon their village (which was situated next to hot springs) and extorting hospitality without payment. The villagers asked the Emperor Gordian to intervene on their behalf as the soldiers were defying an existing prohibition from the Provincial Governor. Such activities would do little to further good military-civilian relations (Webster, 1974, 261). The establishment of a new legionary fortress at Caerleon in AD 74 / 75 need not have resulted in the abandonment of the old Legionary fortress ‘prata’ around the old fortress site at Usk which may have been retained and administered as part of the new ‘prata’ of the 2nd Augustan legion (See Appendix 7.06 The size of the Legionary Prata, page 240).

There are other settlements, which appear to contain both soldiers and civilians, related to specific functions (i.e. specialist supply bases), such as that at Holt (Cheshire), which appears to have developed after the initial military garrison moved on (Mattingly, 2006, 172). Archaeological evidence for iron working at Usk, Monmouth and possibly Chepstow, and agricultural activity at Cowbridge (Glamorgan) has suggested their continued existence and development as small towns after the withdrawal of their military garrisons. (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 63 – 64). Current evidence suggests that the vici associated with the forts in Wales were dependent on the income from the garrison and that most appear not to have survived beyond the withdrawal of the garrisons and the abandonment of the forts (Hopwell et al, 2005). It remains unclear as to whether the army actively encouraged people to settle near to the Legionary fortress at Wroxeter, something that applies to pretty much every vici and canabae settlement (White and Barker, 1998, 49).

The military communities themselves embraced not just the solders (with their own military identity), but their dependents, the merchants (and their dependents some with their own non Roman identities) who serviced the solders needs, and also the local indigenous population, some of whom would have been involved with the supply or delivery of foodstuffs (Burnham and Davies, 2010, 135). Distinct features of the military posts and their civilian settlements survived the Trajanic – Hadrianic era (in those places that survived) despite the fact that local recruitment had become
normal practice. The canabae settlement situated some 2.5 kilometres up the Usk valley from Caerleon at Bulmore, seems to have undergone periods of relative prosperity, redevelopment and economic activity and also periods of stagnation and decline throughout its life, which may be reflected in coin evidence.

![Figure 37: Chart showing chronologies of Roman coins from Caerleon (After Guest 2010, pg. 26)](image)

Evidence from Caerleon where shops and houses were cleared from the immediate proximity of the Legionary fortress to create a parade ground in the mid 2\textsuperscript{nd} century suggests that sometimes the military would put their foot down to prevent encroachment on to their territory at the expense of nearby civilians (Poulter, 1990, 390). Evidence from elsewhere in the Empire suggests that sporadic efforts were made to consciously develop civilian settlements outside the immediate environs of fortresses (Poulter, 1990, 393). Civilians helped to supply the army's needs, and civilians would no doubt have gravitated towards the ready market (and the protection) that a garrison of a fort or fortresses would have supplied. There is no simple link between the presence of the troops and the development and growth of the civilian settlement, since troop numbers at military posts would have fluctuated widely and as the military presence varied from time to time due to operational
commitments. These fluctuations may well be linked to the presence, absence and reduction in numbers of soldiers from *Legio II Augusta* (Arnold and Davies, Boon et al).

Figure 38: Chart showing chronologies of Roman coins from auxiliary forts and fortresses (After Guest 2010, pg. 30)

These speculative calculations do not take into account the supply of food and fuel for non-military dependents, the civilian (citizen and non-citizen) population living and working in and around the fortress and associated settlements. The food and fuel needs of the non-military population would also have had to be supplied; it is logical to assume that these needs would have been sourced from local markets and local suppliers rather than more distant suppliers and markets, on the basis of simple economics. Operations to supply and fuel the legionary fortress (at Caerleon) impacted on a landscape that was not entirely devoid of people, whether Roman settlers, dependents, other civilians or natives – interaction (on a daily basis) with the non-military population could have been unavoidable if not practically impossible. Surviving texts from Vindolanda (on Hadrian’s Wall), Egypt and elsewhere suggests that the somewhat artificial boundaries between the military and civilian spheres (even in a frontier zone) were largely nominal as the army was entirely involved with
the local economy and society (See Appendix 7.07 Legio II Augusta and the Gwent Levels, page 252).

Recent excavations at Caerleon (between 2008 and 2011) revealed the existence of one of the largest buildings in Roman Britain. The large extramural building with three courtyards, to the west of the amphitheatre and outside of the fortress walls has been interpreted to suggest that the complex may have been part of an administrative structure. The building, with potentially two peristyle courtyards was found in zone 3 of the Southern canabae with the southern end being beside the river, measures approximately 140 metres (from east to west) by 120 metres (from north to south). This may have been part of a wider plan to develop the fortress at Caerleon during the period of the conquest and occupation of the Silures. Other large extramural courtyard structure buildings have also been noted at other legionary sites at Carnuntum, Nijmegen, Mirabeau and Vindonissa on the European mainland, and urban examples of courtyard have been found and dated to the late

Figure 39: Interpretation of the geophysical results showing the Southern Canabae complex and the three ‘zones’ of buildings that comprise it (After Guest, Luke and Pudney 2011, p 88)
republican and early imperial eras in both Rome and Pompeii. If this is the case then the complex of buildings pre-dated the existence of the amphitheatre, but need not have predated the development of the fortress.

Figure 40: Reconstruction of Isca and the Southern canabae (After Guest, Luke and Pudney 2011, p 110)

At Caerleon, the presence of recovered legionary tiles, which were used in the construction of the walls, on site may help with dating. Inscribed legionary tiles (‘LEG II AVG’) were introduced from around AD 80 / 90, although more precise dating is dependent on the outcome of formal analysis and identification of recovered artefacts (Guest, Luke and Pudney, 2011, 91 - 92). Preliminary studies of recovered coins and pottery may suggest that the complex of buildings fell out of use some 75 – 100 years before the legionary garrison was withdrawn from the fortress cAD 300 as some parts of the site while remaining standing appear to have been used to dump rubbish (including some 3rd and 4th century pottery) which may indicate that the site was no longer in use.
The layout of the monumental buildings (which displayed opus signinum floors and the plain interior décor features of Roman public military and urban architecture) has been interpreted to suggest that they were constructed by the state during the period of the conquest and pacification of the Silures. Large rectangular courtyard buildings outside legionary fortresses have been found before across the Empire; and interpreted as mansiones, macella, fora and even as a wagon yard. As yet, with relatively limited excavation the buildings and rooms appeared to be non-domestic spaces – possibly offices, shops or stalls. The southern Canabae may have formed the centre of the canabae legionis – the official settlement around the legionary fortress. That the site did not develop into a major town or city may relate to the development of the civitas capital at Venta Silurum, which lay only 9 miles away. The site appears to have been abandoned and to have fallen into disuse in the early 3rd century AD – this may confirm that Legio II Augusta was no longer responsible for administering the Silures by then or that the military authorities still needed to support the civilian administrative structures of Roman Britain (Guest, Luke and Pudney, 2011, 91 - 94).
4.4 Post Conquest Consolidation, Colonization and the developed province

The Roman military garrison (in Wales) between AD 98 and AD 105 (including the Legionary Fortresses at Caerleon and Chester, and potentially some 31 auxiliary forts) has been estimated to be between 25,000 and 30,000 soldiers (Burnham and Davies, 2010, 135). This figure does not include dependents, grooms, slaves, merchants and others who would have arrived to boost numbers in and around the military posts. Millet (1990, 181 – 186) estimated the population of England and Wales (excluding the military) in the 4th century to be some 3.3 million people. Burnham and Davies (2010, 135 – 136) suggested that the proportion of this figure living in Wales could have been between 10% and 20% of the total. They estimated that a median figure of 15% would suggest a rural population of almost half a million, with a 10% estimate resulting in a population of 330,000.

If this median figure is accepted, adding some 30,000 soldiers (+ dependents) would result in a ratio of 1 soldier to every 11 indigenous inhabitants (at least in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD). This military community would have been very visible in the landscape, maintaining the peace, policing the territory, gathering resources and supplies, gathering taxes and being involved in local government administration (James, 2001, 82). The military would have been based in and operated from heavily acculturised enclaves sat within a landscape populated by Iron Age indigenous inhabitants, literally islands of Roman-ness in a sea of natives, linked together by a new all weather network of roads.
The transformation would have been most visible in the newly established civitas capitals in southern Wales, one at Caerwent (Venta Silurium) and one at Carmarthen (Moridunum) for the Demetae. Both civitas capitals are relatively small (Caerwent measured some 18 hectares (44 acres) within its defences and Carmarthen measured some 13.2 hectares (32.6 acres within its defences), by way of comparison with some of the larger ones southern and south-eastern England (e.g. Exeter measured 37 hectares (92 acres), Wroxeter measured 70 hectares (173 acres) within their defences). It has been argued that the combination of military
occupation, population reduction and loss of territory resulted in the late development of civil and rural development of Silurian territory (Mattingly, 2006, 144). But this does not explain why the Demetiae also gained civitas status at a similar time. The foundation of the civitas capital of Caerwent (one of the smallest in Britannia) in such relative proximity to the legionary fortress at Caerleon may be a consequence of the prolonged Silurian resistance to Rome. The Silures may have progressed to civitas status on much less advantageous terms than some of the other urbanised Romano-British communities (Mattingly, 2006, 412). The presence of elements of the *Legio II Augusta* may have heavily influenced settlement patterns with the settlement at Bulmore, near Caerleon, the civitas capital at Caerwent and a scattering of small garrison settlements at Abergavenny, Usk, Monmouth, Cowbridge and Cardiff, all of which would have impacted to varying degrees on rural settlement and the local economy.

By way of contrast, neither the Ordovicii nor the Decangli achieved civitas status and appeared to remain under military supervision and administration (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 44 – 46). The lack of urban centres outside of the south (Caerwent and Cowbridge) and south west (Carmarthen and Pumpsaint) and the marches (Kenchester and Wroxeter) has been argued to suggest an inability of the agricultural base to produce the surplus produce, aggravated by the confines of geography, to support and develop centralised tribal structures within a Roman civic setting. Evidence for the existence of two tribal groupings is based on a combination of the classical sources (including Tacitus’s Annals, the Histories and the Agricola; Cassius Dio’s Roman History, Ptolemy’s Geography and the Ravenna Cosmography) and inscription evidence (e.g. RIB 1311 and RIB 412) and interpreted to suggest a degree of civic consciousness.

Aside from the civitas capitals at Caerwent and Carmarthen, which may have received a measure of military (Imperial) assistance, there were a number of smaller towns, including Cowbridge in the Vale of Glamorgan, which developed to service the needs of military posts. Caerwent lay close to a road intersection to the Severn ferry terminus at Sudbrook and the main road from Gloucester to Caerleon. During the second century AD the site acquired a smattering of public buildings including a stone built forum-basilica and baths alongside timber built domestic buildings,
workshops and domestic dwellings (Brewer 1993, 58 – 59). The civitas capital built on a grid pattern, was dominated by the forum, which occupied a central insula and fronted onto the decumanus maximus. The forum with its basilica and courtyard with porticoes and shops fulfilled the idea that a public building should be more ornately decorated than domestic ones. It would have been the political heart of the Silurian urban experience, yet it appeared to lack the associated inscriptions and political statues that have been found to adorn other towns elsewhere in Britannia and the Empire (Revell 2007, 73-74). The only other public building within the town was the Bath House complex, demolished and rebuilt during the reign of Hadrian, which also fronted the decumanus maximus with nine columns to the front leading to a triple naved hall (possibly a basilica or a palaestra) as noted by Nash-Williams (1930: 232 – 233).

Figure 43: Caerwent [Venta Silurum] (After Arnold and Davies 2000) (p 47)

Those settlements associated with the Legionary fortresses had a more significant and prolonged regional impact. The canabae at Caerleon (9 miles from Caerwent), at 35 hectares, was significantly larger than the civitas capital, which was 18 hectares in size. Chester’s canabae, possessing a larger proportion of sophisticated private and public buildings, was of similar size to Caerleon (Davies, 2004, 110).
This suggested that the urban experience of the Silures might have been limited, at least in scale when compared to elsewhere in Britannia. There may be a clearly articulated rejection of the urban setting as being a place for religious activities (Revell, 2007, 76) as the urban space certainly in the second century AD does not appear to have public buildings set aside for religious activities. This may imply that the urban space formed part of the local population’s mental landscape as a place for political, social and economic activity but not for religious purposes. The limited number of town houses could imply that the majority of the population who formed the urban community resided outside the town’s perimeter and formal defences. Thus Caerwent, as a smaller urban centre with a lower resident urban residing population, functioned as a focal point for the organisation of the community’s lives, but in a different way from those towns with a higher density of elite and non elite housing. Caerwent, while working within the same way with public architecture and political functions may have tested the limit of ideology of urbanism (Revell, 2007, 76).

Figure 44: Projected streets Moridunum and proposed fort location and known Roman town defences [Carmarthen] (After James 2003) (p 17)

If Caerwent (like the Silures themselves) was peripheral to the historic core of pre-Roman Britain and remained on the edge of the rich heartland of the Roman province, then more distant Carmarthen was perhaps the literal last stop on the line,
despite the Roman road stretching westwards through Whitland (Arnold and Davies, 2002, 37). The Roman town was eventually established to the east of the site of the Roman fort, yet sparse Flavian finds, and little archaeological evidence to determine the site of the vicus indicate that an orderly demolition and clearance of the site may have taken place (James, 1991, 87 – 88). There was no casual link between occupation continuing in the vicus (after the abandonment of the fort which had passed through two phases of occupation) and the establishment of the civitas, but is difficult to avoid the possibilities of military input in relation to infrastructure when it came to choosing the site for the tribal civitas capital in the AD 130’s (Davies, 2004, 111). For Carmarthen (Moridunum), the civitas capital of the Demetae, the process of development may have been more ordered, as unlike Caerwent there is little archaeological evidence for the site of the town being occupied by a vicus and a lack of evidence of any linear development along the road leading from the fort (James, 2003, 15 - 16). The town gained a theatre-amphitheatre (the only known and excavated public building) and a partially excavated large building was suggested as a mansio, which indicates that the new town had acquired a smattering of public buildings (James, 2003, 18 – 21).

Figure 45: RIB1, 395. Inscribed stone found at Goldcliff (Gwent) in 1878 reads:

_The century of Statorius Maximus of the first cohort constructed 33 and half paces_

The stone may have acted as a marker between legionary pastures and the land allocated to the self-governing Silures.

(After Brewer 2002, National Museum of Wales) (p 86)
Boundaries may also be one of the keys to understanding the full impact of the conquest, occupation and development of the province under Rome. The new provincial landscape would have had far more clearly and formally delineated boundaries than at any time previously in its history (at least in Roman eyes). Just exactly how the indigenous inhabitants would have reacted to the grafting on of new boundaries across their lands is unknown, but peasant communities in the 1600’s in England and Wales and also in many ‘frontier lands’ in the modern developing world have often resisted the enclosure of perceived common lands and the infringement of ‘long held rights’ by engaging in acts of popular protest and sometimes with violent defiance and resistance. There were grim consequences in the 1600’s such behaviour in a land heavily garrisoned by Roman military units and could have led to serious consequence as noted by Tacitus (Annals of Imperial Rome, 14.31). The surviving indigenous elite may have reacted to the division of the landscape using it to reinforce their position of social dominance.

The urban experience of the Silures and the Demetae appeared somewhat limited, when compared with other towns and cities elsewhere in Britannia. Yet the Silures and the Demetae appeared to have acknowledged the civitas capitals as political centres of their communities, something supported by the limited epigraphic record. In Caerwent the existence (and the regular use) of the forum, basilica and the presence of the tabernae (the political focus of the civitas in the forum) and the baths complex (both invested in by the community over time, with rebuilds) suggested that local people incorporated the town into their daily lives and activities. There was an articulated rejection of the urban setting as a place for religious activities in the second century AD as specific public buildings set aside for religious activities only appear in Caerwent in the late 3rd century AD. The urban space formed part of the local population’s mental landscape as a place for political, social and economic activity but not for religious purposes (Revell, 2007, 76). The smaller urban centres with a lower urban residual population functioned as a focal point for the organization of the indigenous communities, but in a different way from those towns with a much higher density of elite and non-elite housing.
The military also existed as a landholding entity in its own right within the post-conquest developing and developed province, with its own settlements, its own culture, rituals and ways of behaving. The boundaries of military occupied or controlled territories are also largely unknown, although there is evidence in the archaeological record to show a military presence e.g., tile stamps, inscriptions, and military posts and associated activities. Military posts, associated canabae, vici, civitas capitals and both larger and smaller urban foundations would all have gained clearly defined boundaries and been assigned lands. The military, based on evidence from elsewhere in the Empire, would have clearly delineated its own territory from that territory (and resources) that was administered by the civil authorities. The new ‘Roman’ boundary stones were visible markers which would have been evident in the landscape, whereas to ‘Roman’ eyes previous divisions of the landscape, which could have clearly delineated it to indigenous eyes, would have been invisible. The recovered marker (Fig 39, RIB1 395 – see page 133) may relate to the construction of a boundary, delineating the territorium of Legio II Augusta from the Civitas of the Silures, rather than embankments to reclaim the land from the sea.
Civilians, dependent and otherwise would have formed a substantial presence within and around military posts and would have had a significant impact in their immediate vicinity.
vicinity. Within the military posts and associated settlements themselves boundaries may have been more fluid, Allison (2015, 132) noted the archaeological difficulties in identifying whether inhabitants were military or civilian personnel, noting that the exact balance between military and civilian personnel was likely to remain unknown because the boundaries between serving military personnel and civilian were not clearly defined within Roman military posts in the Roman world.

By the time of Hadrian, new civitas communities were added to those that had developed under the Flavians, and this was the change reflected in Wales. It remains unclear as to whether civitas territories in Britannia were simple unified blocks of territory within a province or more of a complicated patchwork of territories administered by civilian, military and imperial authorities (Mattingly, 2006, 414). At a very basic level a local elite bought into or was tied into the system of government on both an individual and communal level (Tacitus 14.31); this was fundamental to stabilizing provincial local government. Fiscal autonomy appeared also to have been a fundamental principle of the Roman Empire; new provinces were expected to pay for themselves (and pay taxes) as soon as practicably possible. During the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, the Provincial administration in Britannia was very small and tightly controlled and native peoples were allowed to, and expected, to run their own affairs as elsewhere within the Empire (Wacher, 1978, 30).

There is epigraphic evidence, in the form of the Paulinus stone, from the civitas capital of Venta Silurum (Caerwent) to show that the Civitas of the Silures had been established and was behaving in a recognisably Roman way by dedicating a statue (the base of which survived) to a patron, something which may hint at the developed relationship between the local elite and senior military officers in the locality. The inscription was erected shortly before AD 220, as Paulinus served as Governor between AD 219 and AD 221 (Jones, 1998, 149) (See Appendix 7.08 The Paulinus Stone and the Silures, page 255).
Figure 48: Hypothesised civitas boundaries from the Julio-Claudian era to Hadrian (After Jones and Mattingly 2002) (p 154)
Figure 49: A hypothetical map of Britannia’s Military and Civitas zones (After Mattingly 2006) (p 263)

In relation to indigenous occupation of sites, some excavated native settlements appeared to have been occupied through much of the Roman period, showing different phases of occupation and development. A good, but not necessarily typical,
example is that of Whitton (in Glamorgan) which may provide a useful example of the development of an existing native site / settlement through the period of conquest and occupation (Jarrett and Wrathmell, 1981, 250 – 254). The site also clearly demonstrates economic activity (Arnold and Jones, 2000, 87). Whitton is a good example of a defended enclosure that shows continued activity though into the Roman period as early first century roundhouses were superseded in stone, from the second century onwards, with several phases of stone rectangular buildings as the site evolved into a villa (Mattingly, 2006, 413).

**Figure 50: Whitton site reconstruction cAD 55 – 70 (After Jarrett and Wrathmell 1981) (p 86)**

The farmstead demonstrated evidence of a largely unbroken sequence of occupation that ran through the period of transition from the pre-conquest period through incorporation into the period of Roman control, with little to demonstrate any changes in status for the inhabitants (Cunliffe, 1989, 264 - 265). A rectangular ditched
enclosure was built c 30 AD to protect a series of circular timber built round houses. These were replaced by a series of rectangular timber buildings by the end of the 1\textsuperscript{st} century AD, and these were in turn replaced by a series of simple masonry based buildings in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Century AD. The sites extended development has been interpreted to suggest the long-term residence of a single family or kin group, who embraced aspects of Roman architecture and lifestyle, through a number of rebuilds of the site.

![Figure 51: Whitton site reconstruction cAD 300 – 340 (After Jarrett and Wrathmell 1981) (p 101)](image)

At Whitton, a site engaged in predominately pastoral farming during the First century AD, there was a change to grain production during the Second Century AD, as recognised by the presence of the remains of timber granaries and corn driers. The presence of wooden granaries, possibly deriving from Roman military models, and later stone buildings in various phase on the site has been interpreted to suggest expanded agricultural production (Manning, 2001, 85).
Figure 52: Phases of occupation Whitton, Glamorgan (After Arnold and Davies 2000) (p 83)

**KEY:**
- A: cAD 55 – 70
- B: cAd 115-135
- C: cAD 135-160
- D: cAD 230-280
- E: AD 280-300
- F: c AD 300-340
Large-scale flour production has been implied, which makes economic sense, considering the presence of the army and an expanding civilian population. The presence of Emmer wheat, which grows better in a colder climate (also identified in Germany (Kreuz 1999, 89 – 90) with higher yields has been interpreted to suggest the affect of climatic conditions which were changing in the British isles and North West Europe from the late Roman period (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 93).

In the first and early second centuries the presence of traces of imported ceramics, grain and other items can be interpreted to show that the military garrison within the Welsh peninsula was firmly linked into an empire wide economic network. In the early years after the conquest much of the grain held in store at Caerleon would have been imported from the south east of Britannia and some of it appeared to have been brought in from the Mediterranean (Brewer, 2000, 37). The evidence for cereals grown in the south-east is associated with the later Roman period rather than the early Roman period and locally produced querns were supplemented with querns imported from Germany, which if true should be reflected in deposition at native sites.

Along with the trauma and upheaval of the military conquest came a rapid transition to a whole new political, social and economic system that arrived with the Roman Army. Of the tribes in the Welsh peninsulas only the Demetae and the Silures appear to have fulfilled the requirements necessary to reach civitas status (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 44) or perhaps their elites were sufficiently wealthy to fund and sustain an urban focus, to develop rural based villas and civitas governance. Villas in Wales (with a few minor exceptions) appear to be primarily based in the rich agricultural regions (close to the coast) in the southeast and the south (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 81 – 82). A number of sites in Glamorgan and Gwent may qualify as villas, some developing from native farmsteads (Howell, 2004, 80 – 81). Similar developments appear to have occurred in the territory of the Demetae, where the emergence of a small group of villas suggests that relatively few families or individuals were in possession of enough landholdings and capital to invest in developing their properties into villas. A group of (as yet unexcavated) villas developed in south-east Pembrokeshire and south-west Carmarthenshire (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 82 – 86).
Villa development (in the early years) appears to have been dependent on agricultural production, the ability to produce a surplus of crops beyond that necessary to merely supply the army’s demands and needs (De la Bedoyere, 2006, 185 – 186). The development of villas in this context in Silurian and Demetian territories has been interpreted to suggest the concentration of relative wealth in the hands of some of the tribal elite, food suppliers and leaders (Carrington, 2006, 25). Some sites in the west (in Dyfed) appeared to make the transition from defended settlements to ‘Roman’ style farms, along with an isolated (and a mid/late 3rd to mid 4th century) villa at Llys Brychan, in the Tywi valley (Meek, 2011, 19), which may suggest that some adopted elements of Roman lifestyles. Two acculturised settlements at Cwmbrywn, which contained a small bath (and sat within a rectangular enclosure) and Trelisey, which had a hypocaust (and sat within a circular enclosure), both near Moridunum, contained buildings of a mortared stone construction. These sites were occupied from the 2nd to the 4th centuries and the most westerly Romano-British corn drier was found at Cwmbrywn (Arnold and Jones, 2000, 86 – 87 and Mattingly, 2006, 410).

To the east, in Glamorgan, Biglis, which began its existence as an unenclosed group of huts at the end of the 1st century BC, by the early 1st century AD, represents something different. The site was abandoned, reoccupied and enclosed with a palisade in the second half of the 2nd century AD; this was replaced with a bank and ditch in around AD 270. The huts remained round throughout the period of occupation and only the evidence showing the use of Roman-period pottery revealed that the site was not a pre-Roman Iron Age site (Manning, 2001, 78). Evidence for the production of bread wheat, a staple of the Roman army in the early years of the occupation, has been dated to the late 2nd / early 3rd centuries AD. Coin evidence (from AD 367 – 378) revealed that the site remained occupied unto the Valentinianic period (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 114 – 116).

For the Silures the establishment of responsible devolved government did not take place at least until the reign of Hadrian (the Forum and Basilica complex at Caerwent has been dated by coin evidence to c AD 112 – AD 114), and Moridunum where the grid of streets has been dated to AD 130 – AD 150 appears to have been developed even later (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 48). Local tribal elites (securing their status,
prestige and authority) would have been in a position to manipulate the tax collection system to their advantage and it has been suggested that they may have done this by imposing a disproportionate share of the tax assessment onto the dependent peasantry and other subordinate groups in society (Burton, 1990, 429). The Roman state’s demands for tax whether satisfied by compulsory requisition, taxation, and tribute collection or even as a result of military contract (Thomas and Stallibrass, 2008, 3 – 5) would have had consequences for the natives. One of the potentially unforeseen consequences could have been the loading of extra demands for produce, which could result in unsustainable pressures being placed on local production and local resources. Some indigenous landowners benefitted from the changed circumstances in southeast Pembrokeshire, southwest Carmarthenshire, the Vale of Glamorgan and parts of the Gwent Levels (Howell, 2006, 80 – 81).

The presence of military posts in the native landscape provided the principle means of solidifying Roman imperial control and this would have been where Romans and Britons initially directly or indirectly interacted. The forts would have been the primary environments for acculturation (Dark and Dark, 1998, 76 – 78), particularly the immediate environs of the Legionary Fortress, its canabae and the network of forts and military posts. The fortresses and forts did not appear overnight in an untouched uninhabited landscape but one already populated with indigenous inhabitants. Interaction between peoples works on a whole variety of different levels and change save occasionally via the archaeological record is difficult to detect. One result of a period of more prolonged post-conquest contact and social and economic interaction between native and non-native populations both economically and socially could have been greater exposure to a monetary economy and acculturised material culture. The Roman army, a key instrument in the introduction of the indigenous inhabitants to a ‘Roman’ style culture (post-conquest) played a key role in introducing the natives to the moneyed economy (Guest, 2012, 38).

The impact of the army is important as pre-conquest there is a lack of pre-conquest coins beyond the Wye and in the Welsh highlands, there was however a concentration, largely of gold coins, between the Rivers Usk and Wye which may hint at either a political or cultural rejection of coinage and very different exchange systems on either side of the coin-using / non-coin-using boundary in the later Iron
Age (Guest, 2008, 42-43). This process of monetization would it has been argued have taken place relatively quickly (possibly within two generations at least in lowland areas), this theory may be supported by the fact that recovered pre-Roman Iron Age coins in Wales numbered 34, whereas 4,565 Roman coins up to AD 192 (the death of Commodus) have been found, out of a total of 52,000 coins (in some 1,172 separate finds) found in Wales.

![Figure 53: Proportions of first and second century coins on sites in Wales (After Guest 2012) (p 49)](image)

The army would mostly, but not always at least in peacetime have paid its way as it acquired its supplies locally (Webster, 1974, 261). This introduction to the moneyed economy could also have been spread by a combination of retiring veterans (settling locally) and also military recruitment with coinage entering the economy locally as soldiers pay (Krropff, 2011, 14). The sudden arrival of a cash economy would have had a destabilising effect on the indigenous local economy, which it is hypothesized would have been under the control of the local elite. One consequence at a very basic level of the sudden impact of large quantities of hard cash would mean that there would not have been the amount of goods or surplus available for simple sale.
One implication was the long distance shipment of goods to new but distant new markets from more established neighbouring areas or neighbouring provinces, which could be sold for high prices (Millett, 1990, 78 – 79). The surviving indigenous elite, who may have had more disposable resources or the ability to acquire them, might have had the least traumatic transition to the new money economy, by way of comparison with the poorer members of a newly conquered indigenous society. Millett suggested that the economy of Roman Britain may have been heavily influenced by degrees of social control e.g. more localised economic activity possibly a mixture of day-to-day barter type trading activity and money exchange for some
time after the conquest and that not all Britons who had access to cash, post conquest, would have used it for every transaction all of the time.

Figure 55: Distribution of known canabae and vici (After Burnham 2010) (p 103)

The indigenous inhabitants also came into contact with coinage via the growth in vici and other settlements (e.g. civitas capitals and other towns), which would have also played an important part. In those areas more remote from the military posts, dependent settlements and other centres, the day-to-day use of coinage in economic activity may have been limited. Within the developed province, a consequence of permanently settled Legions and Auxiliary units (in the late first and early second centuries AD) was the growth of civilian canabae or extramural civilian settlements to
service the needs of the military population. This would have also resulted in the growth of a dependent civilian population, which also needed supplying with basic foodstuffs. The link between monetization and urbanisation (or at least urban development) is important, in the early years after the conquest. At the beginning a frontier province is unlikely to have paid for itself. This would have given the injections of money via soldiers' pay, veterans' and dependents' expenditure a degree of significance in relation to the development of towns, canabae, vici and villages. Significant numbers of coins have been recovered from military sites (on the northern frontier and elsewhere). The Vindolanda tablets reveal the regular use of coin for payment, within and without of the military setting (Bowman, Thomas and Adams (1990), 44 – 45) (See Appendix 7.09 Vindolanda Tablet 88/946, page 258).

Figure 56: Romano-British settlement in the south-east Wales (After Arnold and Davies 2000) (p 77)

As canabae developed and prospered elsewhere in the Empire they acquired sets of officials, guilds and corporations and administrative autonomy as settled ‘Roman’ style communities and landholdings within the military zone (Mason, 1988, 165 – 166). Those canabae and vici that managed to survive the demise of their primary economic focus were probably well placed to emerge as local markets or new
political centres (e.g. Cirencester, Exeter, Wroxeter, etc) as civitas government was extended to new areas in the south and west of Britannia as the military redeployed to other theatres of operations (Millet, 1990). Post conquest settlement patterns were heavily influenced by the long term presence of elements of Legio II Augusta which may have impacted on the development of Caerwent, Caerleon and several small towns and garrison settlements that developed at Abergavenny, Bulmore, Usk, Monmouth, Cardiff and Cowbridge (James, 2001, 197 and Mattingly, 2006, 411 – 412). Of the civilian settlements beyond Carmarthen, only the extensive civil settlement at Dolaucothi / Pumpsaint perhaps survived the removal of its garrison (in the 2nd Century AD) and continued until the 4th Century AD. The army retained a more enduring presence around the permanent legionary fortresses and those posts that retained their military garrisons and attached civilian communities. In these areas there would have been a much longer near permanent process of interaction and a potentially more complex inter-relationship between the military and Roman civilians and indigenous civilian communities.

One interpretation of the impact of large well-paid military communities is that they generated opportunities, economic and otherwise, which did not exist prior to the conquest and occupation. Yet the very same military communities would have heaped an additional burden on the indigenous inhabitants in the shape of demands for supplies e.g. grain, cattle, etc, not to mention taxation (which had not existed prior to the conquest) and potentially the loss of good land to the military territoria. Once inter-marriage, local recruitment (one of the consequences of more settled military garrisons in the late first and second centuries AD), veteran settlement, etc began to develop then economic and social interaction, and change would have been considerable at least in those areas favoured for settlement or close to vici. The military and military-associated communities would have appeared ‘Roman’ to the indigenous inhabitants but did not necessarily represent a community with the cultural norms and values of the Mediterranean world (Davies, 2004, 108). They had their own values and codes of behaviour, their social, cultural and economic impact on nearby native communities would also have been considerable for some time after the conquest. They would have been ‘Roman’ islands sat in a sea of the mostly indigenous inhabitants on the periphery of a province on the north-western edge of the Empire.
5.0 Highland Romania / Central Transylvania (Dacia)

5.1 The Late Iron Age Background: The Dacians

Geographically ancient Dacia (modern Transylvania) lies within the boundaries of modern Romania. Dacia lay to the north of the Danube and the Balkan Peninsula, west of the Black sea and the plains of Wallachia, east of modern Hungary’s Pannonian plain and south and south east of modern Ukraine and Moldova. The southern reaches of the Carpathian Mountains, reaching as high as 2,500 metres, with average heights being on average some 1,000 metres, bordered ancient Dacia. The southern reaches of the Carpathians surround an area of hills and higher ground intersected with deep, steep sided river valleys and steep sided valleys with rich alluvial plains.

Figure 57: Modern Romania showing Carpathian Mountains and Transylvania (After Haynes and Hanson 2004) (p 12)

The central Transylvanian Basin (the heart of ancient Dacia) is separated from the Moldavian Plateau on the east by the Eastern Carpathian
Mountains and separated from the Wallachian Plain on the south by the Transylvanian Alps. Transylvania itself consists mostly of tableland with smooth sloped hills, regular watercourses and river terraces and valleys (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 4 – 5). Access to Transylvania in both ancient and modern times was either via the high mountain passes or along three river routes, the Somes from the north west, the Mures from the west, and the Olt from the south.

As far as the classical writers were concerned to the east of the Celtic tribes of the middle Danube lay the Thracians (south of the Danube) and, to the north of them (the Dacians) lay German tribes. The Dacians appear in Herodotus (IV, 93) in 514 BC (Ellis, 1998, 221), their settlements flourished through the latter half of the Iron Age (La Tene period), from the fifth century BC to 70 BC. In modern and classical works there is still some confusion caused by the naming of the early indigenous inhabitants, who were known as Geto-Dacians, the Getae, Thracians, Thraco-Dacians and also Dacians. Strabo (Geography, VII, 3.13) noted they spoke the same language and Dio (Roman History, LXVII, 6.2) said they were the same people simply named Dacians by Rome and Getae by the Greeks (Davidescu, 2013, 15).

Figure 58: Dacian expansion and the Roman provinces along the middle and lower Danube (after Gudea (1979) (p 64)
The period between the 1st century BC and the 1st century AD is described as the 'classical period' of Dacian socio-political development, with the appearance of monumental architecture (with stone sanctuaries and hill top citadels). The Dacian tribes were periodically unified under the leadership of various kings including Rubobostes in the 170’s BC and Burebista in the first half of the 1st century BC (Strabo VII, 3, 11-12). The Dacian’s absorbed established Celtic and other long standing settled communities in Transylvania and the Carpathians into the growing Dacian state (Cunliffe, 1999, 222 – 223). By the first century BC, the Dacians were firmly established in Transylvania, under the leadership of their King Burebista (c 82 BC to 44 BC), who created an extensive powerful state from amongst the different tribes in the Danubian lands and threatened the frontiers of Macedonia (Scullard, 1982, 126). Caesar considered a campaign against them, as the Dacians had emerged as a powerful regional player in the Balkans during the first and second centuries BC.

Figure 59: Hypothesised extent of Burebista’s Kingdom mid-first century BC (After Wanner 2010) (p 17)
The Dacian tribal confederation (according to Strabo) was able to field an army of 200,000 warriors and, even accounting for literary exaggeration, the Dacians were a significant regional power. Under the leadership of Burebista, neighbouring lands (in what is now Hungary) were annexed in 60 – 59 BC, the destruction of a Celtic oppida at Bratislava and the establishment of a Dacian stronghold at Devin being interpreted to mark expansion into these areas (Cunliffe, 1999, 247).

Roman interest in the actions of native tribes around and across the lower Danube initially peaked when Burebista brought all the barbarian tribes between Slovakia, the Carpathians, the Black Sea and the Balkan Mountains under his control (Oltean, 2010, 43 – 46). The Dacians participated in Roman politics and interacted with key Roman political figures and saw themselves as active players in Roman politics (Oltean, 2010, 51 – 52 and Cunliffe 1999, 233). Dacian involvement in Roman affairs continued after Caesar’s death, with diplomatic contacts with both Mark Antony and Octavian’s factions in the renewed civil war, until Burebista’s death (Grumeza, 2009, 145 – 146 and Cunliffe, 2011, 384).

The Dacians made good use of the rugged natural topography to strengthen their hill forts, the preferred location being on hills and promontories, to minimise the effort spent on building defences. Defences were maximised by the choice of remote inaccessible hilltops in the mountains (Oltean, 2010, 94). The Dacians strengthened their traditional hilltop fortresses with strong walls and defences, with knowledge acquired from contacts with the Greeks from the Black Sea coast (Lockyear, 2004, 36) and the Romans, blended with indigenous skills and the topography. The Dacians open-ness to innovation added to the already formidable and unique Dacian walls (or Murus Dacicus) which were resilient against battering rams, and were now further strengthened by the addition of towers for archers and engines capable of firing projectiles and missiles (Bennett, 2006, 85). A key feature of Trajan’s later campaigns of conquest against the Dacians was to be intensive siege warfare, which features prominently on Trajan’s column.
Studies of late Iron Age Dacian settlements classified them on a simple level into two basic types, those with defences and those without defences (Oltean, 2006, 60). This broad classification has resulted in all the Dacian hill fort settlements being labelled as elite (which includes religious sites) or military sites. Settlements without defences have been subdivided into basic settlement types; open settlements (villages or hamlets), which are found along the river valleys, on the fringes of upland areas and also scattered across upland areas.

Dacian fortified settlements were divided into two basic types, those with Murus Dacicus (Dacian walls) and those with non-Murus Dacicus style defences (Lockyear, 2004, 36 – 37). Excavations at Grădiștea Muncelluli found evidence for significant iron working and the remains of a water management system, with a cistern, ceramic water pipes and drainage channels (Lockyear, 2004, 44-45). Those sites with Murus Dacicus appeared to be high status, the walls being an expression of social status and social emulation within the Dacian elite (Oltean, 2010, 116). These settlement types have been further sub-divided into defended settlements on promontories and
on upland terraces, which have been loosely identified as being of economic and commercial importance e.g. centres of manufacture, commercial production, craft and trade.

![Comparative Dacian hill fort plans](image)

**Figure 61: Comparative Dacian hill fort plans (After Oltean 2010)(p 85)**

Other settlements have also been found on islands and dispersed settlements have been identified in the more mountainous areas, some of which may be related to access to and processing of mineral resources. Surveys of settlements from the classical Dacian period, defined as comprising of the last two centuries BC and the first century AD, are still limited in nature and extent. Since the collapse of the communist dictatorship in Romania and the fall of the iron curtain attempts to survey potential Dacian settlements with aerial photography and field walking have been undertaken. More settlements have been discovered or identified by excavation and
have been identified as result of finds of scattered pottery shards discovered in field surveys. Aerial surveys in central Transylvania, impossible during the Cold War and the Communist dictatorship, have added to the number of sites discovered, though not excavated. For example of 146 settlements identified in the Mures Valley, only 32 have any identified size, 10 – 12 of them may be isolated farms, with 19 being potentially larger settlements and some 44 – 46 could fit into any of the categories (Oltean, 20910, 63 – 64).

Figure 62: Pre-Roman settlements in central Dacia (detail shows density of occupation along the Orastie Valley (After Oltean 2010) (p 64)

The most numerous settlement type in the Mures Valley have been categorised as villages, one site at Vintu de Jos, had scattered ceramic finds from the Bronze Age
though to the Roman period. The ceramic finds were scattered over some 14,800 square metres and were adjacent to a Roman Villa (Hanson and Oltean, 2003, 101 – 117). Within the study area only 6 individual farmsteads have been identified, but there are potentially 13 – 15 settlements, which may be farmsteads. Scattered possibly seasonal buildings (15 have been identified in the study area) may indicate the agricultural practice of transhumance (Oltean, 2010, 74 – 75). Tower Houses, when found at larger fortified sites and hill forts, have been associated with the Dacian elite e.g. the tower houses found at Costesti-Cetatue hillfort measured 17.5 x 13.2 and 13.6 x 13 metres and were two stories high. Access to the upper stories of the tower houses was achieved either by external stone or interior wooden stairs. The tower houses were often surrounded by associated buildings (at a number of different sites), which suggested that their function was not purely defensive (Oltean, 2010, 76 - 80).

Six of the nine sites examined by Lockyear (2004, 42 – 49) contained some kind of tower house (See Appendix 7.10 – Characteristics of main excavated sites with Murus Dacicus, page 154). The site at Piatra Roşie contained 5 towers incorporated into the stronghold and an additional 4 free standing towers (2 of which were later included in the wall of a later enclosure) may be an elite residence (Lockyear, 2004, 47). The larger fortified sites had associated settlements, in relatively close proximity, which varied in size, complexity and function. Our understanding of them (and other Dacian settlement types) remains limited due to the limited amount of excavation and fieldwork that has taken place (Oltean, 2010, 88).
Burebista’s royal centre (or basilicon) of Sarmizegetusa Regia, a fortified complex set high in the southern Carpathians (at an altitude of 1,200 metres), was the largest industrial, political and religious centre in prehistoric Eastern Europe, covering some 9 hectares (or 22 acres). The pre-Roman Dacian capital lay on a narrow ridge, which peaks at Muncel (at a height of 1,563 meters) with sheer slopes dropping into the Alb and Godeannul Rivers to the north and to the south. Decabalus’s capital was constructed on 14 man-made terraces with additional residential areas spreading along the ridge 2 kilometres to the west and nearly 1 kilometre to the north, with the site maximising every possible topographical benefit from its position (Wheeler, 2010, 1187). The Dacian leader Burebista made his kingdom the centre of a viable
politically north of the Danube, and from his capital unified the various Dacian tribes and clans (Bennett, 2006, 85). The concept of a divinely sanctioned royalty, a warlike elite, active diplomacy and an embryonic centralised state appears to have embedded itself into their society and the Dacians emerged in the later part of the 1st century AD and early 2nd century AD as a coherent threat to Roman interests (Oltean, 2010, 53). Rome, with a habit of obliterating all traces of its more stubborn opponents e.g. Hellenistic Corinth, Carthage, Herodian Jerusalem, etc, systematically destroyed much of Decabalus former capital, and of what remains only half of the site has been excavated. The Dacian capital was a centre for metallurgical work with evidence for intensive iron working being discovered, along with the only known example of a Dacian mint, and recovered coin dies have shown that both Roman republican and imperial coins were produced on-site along with evidence for gold and glass production (Oltean, 2010, 106 - 107).

Transylvania (the Dacian heartland) was agriculturally rich and contained rich mineral ores (gold, silver, copper not to mention stone, salt and iron ore) some of which were exploited by the native Dacians. While the archaeological focus has been on the Roman exploitation of the Dacian gold, silver and lead, proof that the Dacians were actively exploiting these resources comes after the conquest with the transportation of some 165,500 kilograms of gold and twice as much silver to Rome as recorded on Trajan’s column (Oltean, 2010, 38 – 39).
Pre-monetary specie found along the Black Sea coast was replaced by Greek coinages from the mid 4th century BC onwards and local copies of Greek coins soon appeared (Lockyear, 2004, 65). The Dacians began to acquire significant quantities of Greek and then Roman Republican coinage. The issue of Roman coinage (Republican and Imperial) found in coin hoards in Dacia still causes disagreements in modern Romania. By 1966 over 100 coin hoards (111 + by 2004) had been dated to the Roman occupation; 34 hoards contained pre-conquest coinage, and 11 of these contained many pre-Trajanic period coins, as well as Republican coinage. Some coin hoards appeared to have been started after the conquest and after Trajan, and others contain a range of coin from Augustus onwards (Protase, 1966, 91). By the first century BC, the lower Danube region was accustomed to the presence of large amounts of silver coinage, whether didrachms (from Philip II, Macedonia Prima and Thasos), tetradrachms (from Philip III, Lysimachus and of
Geto-Dacian origin) and other coins from Dyrrachium and Apollonia. Most of these coins originated from outside of the region. In addition a significant number of coins were copied and circulated. The lack of small denominations suggested that the coinage had not been used as currency in any market exchange system but rather in a gift / display system similar to that which existed in pre-conquest Gaul; one which continued to exist after Republican denarii replaced Hellenistic coinage.

The sheer quantity of the Republican denarii precluded linking their arrival to economic exchange and eliminated the possibility that they were brought into the region as mercenary pay, instead suggested that the coinage related to the development of an alternative supply of slaves necessitated by the destruction of Mediterranean based piracy (c 67 BC) and the slaves produced as a result of Caesar’s wars in Gaul. In Gaul, the aristocracy lived well by selling slaves to Rome; a Dacian aristocracy could also have lived well with a similar trading relationship. The surviving denarii found in Dacia (all 25,000 of them) were a remnant of the original amount of coinage that had circulated. The assumption that one coin has survived for every thousand in circulation suggested that a hypothetical figure of 25,000,000 denarii had originally been in circulation in ancient Dacia (Crawford, 1977, 118 - 123).

Detailed statistical analysis has suggested that denarii arrived in Dacia in two significant waves, firstly between 75 BC and 65 BC followed by the supply rapidly drying up, and then another smaller influx in the 40’s and 30’s BC during Rome’s civil wars, although during this later period Roman coin production was very high. The situation remains complicated as the Dacians were producing some good quality imitations of Roman coins (Lockyear, 2004, 65). Cunliffe (2011, 387) suggested that Roman traders played an important role in pre-conquest Dacia and that the number of coins circulating may hint at the scale of the trading exchanges that took place between the Romans and the Dacians. Economic factors were an important contributory factor in the relationship between Dacia and Rome, as Dacian campaigns (under Burebista) may have led to diminishing Roman commercial control over trade on the lower Danube and beyond around the Back Sea (Grumeza, 2009, 144).
The source for pre-conquest imports had been the Roman world, which had replaced the Hellenistic world as a source for luxury goods for the Dacian elite. Greek, and Roman (both Republican and Imperial) coinage and local copies were found in the Mures valley often as hoards. Hoards were largely confined to the Orastie Mountains and the Deva-Cozia region and may have been accumulated by trade, industry and making use of agricultural surpluses (Oltean, 2010, 113 – 114). Despite the centuries of probable economic contact between Rome and the Dacians the relationship remained fractious and Dacian raids on Roman territory and clashes with the Roman army were regular occurrence.

The Dacians before the Roman conquest appear to have stood out amongst the tribes to the north of the Danube with their warlike behaviour and their elite led religion, which encompassed rituals that were believed to imbue immortality turning warriors into fanatics (Oltean, 2009, 92). While not immune to internal disputes as were other tribes and confederations beyond the Roman-dominated Mediterranean world (and its hinterland), the Dacians periodically overcame internal disagreements and forged a united Dacian state. The Dacians divided appear to have retained the possibility of being a powerful regional player under the right leadership, with all the potential dangers that implied to neighbouring Roman territory (Oltean, 2010. 53). The region appears to have been a cradle for a series of coherent and lasting civilisations, which emerged in the region from the Bronze Age onwards. The emergence and development of the Geto-Dacian civilisation and the Dacian state prior to the Roman conquest could be seen as the climax of a process (Gudea, 1979, 63).

5.2 Conquest, Pacification and Occupation

When the war came, the Roman army was heavily engaged in a war with the Marcomanni and the Quadi, in what is now modern Bohemia. The Dacians invaded Moesia in AD 85, crossed the Danube and inflicted a significant defeat and killing the provincial Governor. In 86 AD Domitian gave Cornelius Fuscus (the Praetorian Prefect) the Dacian command, but the Dacians defeated the Roman army and killed Fuscus in battle.
“One after another, armies were lost in Moesia and Dacia, in Germany and Pannonia through rash folly or cowardice of their generals; one after another, experienced officers were defeated in fortified positions and captured with all their troops. It was no longer the frontier and the Danube line that were threatened, but, the permanent quarters of the Legions and the maintenance of the Empire.”

Tacitus, Agricola 41

The Romans faced a crisis and after some preparation (which included withdrawing a legion from Britannia), they invaded Dacia in AD 88 and despite defeating Decabalus (at Tapae) they failed to successfully conclude the war. The following year (AD 89) confronted by a revolt in Lower Germany, Domitian brought the war to a conclusion, making peace with Decabalus. The nature of the Roman armies’ difficult campaigns against the Dacians can be deduced from Suetonius’s hostile account of the life of Domitian.

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“The war against the Chatti, was uncalled for; but, not so the war against the Sarmatian’s, who had massacred a legion and killed its commander. And when the Dacian’s defeated first the ex-consul Oppius Sabinus and then the Commander of the Guards Cornelius Fuscus, Domitian led two punitive expeditions in person. After several indecisive engagements he celebrated a double triumph over the Chatti and the Dacians; but, did not insist on recognition for his Sarmatian campaign contenting himself with the offer of a laurel crown to Capitoline Jupiter.”

Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars (XII, 303)

The subsequent peace treaty meant that the Dacian King received a subsidy from Rome and technical assistance to help to strengthen Dacia’s fortresses. The Romans also gained, as some of their military units were able to cross Dacian territory to attack Macomannian lands. Domitian’s Roman enemies portrayed the treaty as weakness on the emperor’s part, but from a purely military point of view the treaty ensured that the Dacians did not make common cause with the Marcomanni and the Quadi and bought time to stabilise the military situation along the Danube. The peace was unstable, as the Dacian king appears to have been encroaching on the territory of neighbouring tribes and making efforts to form alliances with the enemies of Rome and may have been fermenting unrest south of the Danube in Roman territory (Wells, 1992, 171 – 172). Yet there must have been a sizeable
Roman presence in Dacia, with merchants, craftsmen, deserters (from the Roman army) and runaway slaves and freemen (Oltean, 2010, 52).

Despite the malice heaped upon Domitian by classical writers, his war against the Dacians ended in victory with a successful battle at Tapae in AD 88. Roman honour was redeemed (Syme, 1959, 31) but any lasting benefits were lost by the defection of Rome’s vassals on the Middle Danube, the Marcomanni, Quadi, Sarmatae and lazyges. Domitian, facing instability from Bohemia to the Black Sea, recognized the Dacian ruler as a 'King and friend of the Roman People'. He used Dacia as a means to separate the tribes on either side of its important strategic position. Decabalus appears to have offered no open aggression and may have been content to honour the existing treaty arrangements (Bennett, 2006, 87). So the war against the Dacians was ended because of the other conflicts with the Germans and the Sarmatians (and internal political difficulties) which prevented Domitian from concentrating resources for a decisive war against Decabalus.

The failure to secure permanent peace and real stability had left a powerful centralised embryonic Dacian state, led by an able and powerful ruler (Dio, Roman History, XLVII, 6), with a history of hostility to Rome, on the borders of the Empire. The Dacian king was able to field an army of 40,000 and was well connected diplomatically (Pliny, 74.1) with distant hostile powers such as Parthia (Oltean, 2010, 54). By the time Trajan came to the throne the peace may well have been unravelling, the Dacians may have been on Trajan’s mind as he travelled to Rome from Germany via the Danube provinces (not directly to Rome) after Nerva’s death, to examine the situation in the vulnerable Danubian provinces (Bennett, (2006, 87). Trajan may have ordered the rebuilding of auxiliary forts in stone and the reconstruction of existing transport links across Moesia and Thrace suggests that the decision to invade or attack Dacia had already been made and Rome was strengthening the defences and improving logistical support.

The military and economic potential and the strategic threat that a unified Dacia posed to Roman interests and the provinces in the Balkans may have provided the root causes of the conflict. These were important because the military interests of Empire were closely related to the Empire’s economic interests (Gudea, (1979, 63).
After the end of the war with Domitian, the Dacians renewed their diplomatic relationships with Sarmatian and German tribes (Grumeza, 2000, 161). Decabalus’s attempts to gain the active support of some of the key players north of the Danube, some of whom had previously clashed with Rome, were unsuccessful. The Quadi, the Marcomanni and the Iazyges all remained uncommitted to any Dacian anti-Roman alliance (Bennett, 2006, 87).

“After spending some time in Rome he [Trajan] made a campaign against the Dacians; for he took into account their past deeds and was grieved at the amount of money they [the Dacians] were receiving annually, and he also observed their power and their pride were increasing.”

Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book 68. 6

Both sides may have expected a renewal of hostilities as both sides made use of the peace to make their preparations for war. Trajan spent the best part of a year preparing the ground before the war; the better part of nine legions and auxiliary units were concentrated on the lower Danube front. Decabalus used the intervening years to build up a powerful army and build well-fortified strongholds. Neighbouring tribes had been subjugated and efforts made to recruit deserters from the Roman army (Goldsworthy, 2003, 322 – 324). The Dacians were well-led and well organised and opened hostilities with Rome by attacking Moesia in AD 101 (Luttwak, 1976, 53 – 54).
The first campaign saw heavy fighting in Lower Moesia and in Dacia, and also involved warriors from neighbouring Sarmatian and Germanic tribes. Trajan’s counter attack in AD 101 was inconclusive; the Dacians fought skilfully and avoided open battle, which would have put them at a disadvantage. The Dacians withdrew into the Orastie Mountains, which were well defended by a series of mountain strongholds, before launching a counter attack in Moesia in AD 101 – 102. Trajan campaigned in the winter to restore the situation in Moesia (Schmitz, 2005, 2 – 3).
The second campaign saw the Romans besiege the Dacian strongholds and break though the mountains to advance upon Sarmizegetusa Regia. Decabalus, with his capital threatened, sued for peace, bringing the first Dacian war to a conclusion. Rome established several Roman garrisons on Dacian territory. Archaeological surveys have identified a series of campaign bases that have been associated with the first Dacian war, in the hill country to the south east of the Dacian capital of Sarmizegetusa Regia (Wilkes, 2005, 139)

Figure 67: Detail from Trajan’s column Scene 76, Dacians destroy and dismantle their own fortifications and other Dacians prepare to leave under the surrender terms (After National Geographic 2015)

Figure 68: Detail from Trajan’s column Scene 133, Dacians surrender to Trajan (who is seated and highlighted) at the end of the First Dacian war (After National Geographic, 2015)
The peace settlement imposed upon Decabalus included the dismantling of Dacian fortifications of the capital at Sarmizegetusa Regia. Dacian military equipment (e.g. siege engines) was surrendered and Roman deserters who had served with the Dacians were to be returned (Dio, Roman History, Book 68,4 – 7). Despite this the Dacians were able to rebuild the defences prior to the second Dacian war a few years later (Mackendrick, 2000, 66). Trajan may have hoped to convert Dacia into a compliant client kingdom (as before the conquest the Dacians had been in receipt of Roman subsidies) with Decabalus as a client or friendly king, rather than absorb it directly into the Empire. This was not to be as Decabalus refused to be compliant and the relatively short period of diplomatic truce ended with renewed conflict.

After the conclusion of the first Dacian War (in AD 102) Roman military commands in Moesia were extended to the north to administer those parts of Dacia under Roman occupation. These areas included Dacian territories around Sarmizegetusa, which was added to Moesia Superior and eastern Transylvania and the plains of Wallachia and the Oltenia, which were added to Moesia Inferior (Wilkes, 2005, 152). Lines of forts were also placed across the Banat (between Viminacum and the area around Sarmizegetusa) along the main invasion route, along with screens of forts along the Mures and lower Tisamvers, which marked out the limits of Roman controlled territory.

Trajan in AD 102 sent ambassadors from the Dacian King Decabalus to speak in the Senate and to have the peace-treaty confirmed. Yet by AD 103 the Dacians had annexed some of the territory of the neighbouring Iazyges, began to acquire weapons, harbour deserters, refortify key points and engage in diplomacy with Rome’s enemies (Bennett, 2006, 97). Both sides were making preparations for a renewal of hostilities; Trajan ordered the construction of a permanent bridge across the river, and gathered military units and supplies. The Dacians turned to diplomacy attempting to build a tribal coalition from amongst other tribes who also felt threatened by Rome.

“All Decabalus was reported to him to be doing many things in breach of the peace – and indeed, he was preparing arms, receiving deserters, restoring the forts, sending embassies to neighbouring peoples, maltreating his political opponents without provocation, and he even deprived the
In AD 105, after mounting tensions, and evidence of violations of Dacia’s status as Rome’s ally and the treaty, the conflict was renewed. Decabalus broke the peace terms, rebuilt his army, he re-conquered previously surrendered territories and former subject peoples (Goldsworthy, (2003, 329 – 330). A state of war was resumed with Dacian attacks on Roman garrisons and attempts to assassinate Trajan with Roman deserters. When the Dacian king was reported to have broken the terms of the treaty, the Senate declared him a *hostis* or an enemy of the Roman state (Millar, 1982, 4). The second Dacian war began with Dacian attempts to expel Roman garrisons from the strategically important Orastie Mountains.

The Romans returned to their strategy of systematically capturing and destroying the Dacian’s fortifications. Decabalus and the Dacians were in a much weaker position at the start of the second war and were on the defensive as the Romans advanced on the Dacian capital. A Roman diplomatic offensive had preceded the military one, with negotiations with tribal groups opposed to the Dacians. Efforts were made to further divide the fragmented Dacians and the surrender of some Dacian leaders were accepted as the war progressed. The actual fighting was less severe than in the previous war and culminated in the siege and capture of Sarmizegetusa Regia, the Dacian capital (Goldsworthy 2003, 329 – 330). Previous wars with Dacia had ended in compromise, this war ended with Decabalus committing suicide and central Dacia absorbed into the Empire (Luttwak, 1976, 53 – 54).
The above map illustrates the fluid nature of the conflict and the different campaigns. Trajan had spent the winter of AD 105 – 6 with military and diplomatic preparations for the renewal of hostilities, marching into Dacia in the early summer of AD 106 and concluding the war by the autumn of AD 106. A clue to the intensity of the conflict in the second Dacian war can be gained by the fact that some twenty scenes on Trajan’s column relate to the final siege of Sarmizegetusa Regia which was sacked and destroyed after its capture (Grumeza, 2009, 182 – 183). The second war saw Trajan deploy significant numbers of troops to invade and occupy the Dacian heartland. This time Dacian unity was more fragmented and groups of Dacians made peace with Rome as the war wound down.
The war booty from the victory over the Dacians may have been spectacular. Trajan’s doctor, Titus Statilius Crito, recorded that Trajan brought back five million pounds (weight) of gold and ten million pounds (weight) of silver, not to mention other plunder and half a million prisoners. The exploitation of Dacia’s gold mines took place rapidly with workers moved in from Dalmatia (Wells, 1992, 172 – 173). Even with the exaggeration of numbers found in the classical sources, the war booty may have extensive enough to finance Trajan’s later expenditure including public
works in Rome and financial donatives. Grumeza (2009, 187-188) suggested that the gold looted from Dacia exceeded the annual income of the Roman treasury threefold. The plunder paid for a victory celebration games for 123 days, a donative of 650 denarii apiece for three hundred thousand Romans and Trajan’s forum, basilica, libraries and column.

Figure 72: Roman Dacia c AD 106 under Trajan (After Gudea, 1979) (p 67)

The exact external boundaries of Trajan’s new province have never been established. The heart of Decabalus’s old kingdom (the Transylvanian plateau) was now the centre of the new province, firmly controlling the key trade and communication routes between the Danube, the plateau and beyond. The new provincial boundaries were not static and were redrawn a number of times during the province’s existence (Oltean, 2010, 55 – 56). Archaeological evidence for the destruction of Dacian fortresses outside the heartland does not suggest or prove any desire by Rome to bring more peripheral or distant Dacian territory under Roman
control (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 19). The plotted distribution of Roman forts dated to this period may indicate Trajan’s territorial aspirations.

Dacia was established in AD 106 as a unitary province, commanded by a governor (formerly a consul) supported by two legionary legates (*legati legonis*), with the finances being administered by a financial procurator, who handled the payments to the military and taxation (Oltean, 2010, 57). Hadrian, who had served as a soldier, perhaps concerned that the Empire was militarily overextended, after the wars of conquest under Trajan, considered abandoning Dacia, along with Trajan’s other conquests in the Middle East in Armenia and Mesopotamia.

"Envying Trajan's glory, he immediately gave up three of the provinces which Trajan had added to the empire, withdrawing the armies from Assyria, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and deciding that the Euphrates should be the boundary of the empire. When he was proceeding to act similarly with regard to Dacia, his friends dissuaded him, lest many Roman citizens should be left in the hands of the barbarians, because Trajan, after he had subdued Dacia, had transplanted thither an infinite number of men from the whole Roman world, to people the country and the cities; as the land had been exhausted of inhabitants in the long war maintained by Decabalus."

Eutropius, Breviary, Book 8, 6

Instead Hadrian kept part of the province, he reorganised it, territorially and administratively, retaining the mineral rich and fertile heart of the former Dacian kingdom (Wilkes, 2005, 133). The Banat and much of the Wallachian plains were abandoned and Rome retained control of modern Transylvania, and the western part of Wallachia. Eastern Wallachia, under Roman military control, was not part of the Roman province of Dacia (Ellis, 1998, 221). Dacia was split into two provinces following the reorganisation; the new provinces were more compact, less exposed and easier to control and defend. There is disagreement as to when Hadrian’s administrative reorganisation took place, possibly by AD 120 (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 19) or by AD 124 / 126 (Luttwak, 1999, 101). The main province of Upper Dacia was held by a governor with senatorial rank (previously a praetor) and a legion based at Apulum, assisted by a financial procurator, and two praesidal procurators (of ducenary rank) administered Lower Dacia and Dacia Porolissensis.
Dacian territory to the west, the north and the east of the new province remained unoccupied, and appears to have fulfilled the role of a buffer zone to protect the province against the movement of barbarian populations through the 2\textsuperscript{nd} and the 3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries AD. Under the Antonines, in AD 167, Dacia was subdivided into three provinces. Dacia Superior included the main area of settlement in Transylvania. Dacia Inferior to the south-east, with two security cordons, stretched from the Carpathian Mountains to the Danube across the plains Wallachia; Dacia Porolissensis lay to the north-west, a small province with a powerful concentration of auxiliary cavalry and infantry units, administered from Porollissum. The reorganisation combined military and judicial administration under the command of one governor (a former consul), with two subordinate senators (\textit{legati legonis}) with the provinces being known as Dacia or \textit{Tres Dacieae} (Oltean, 2010, 57 – 58). Previous divisions were only significant as territories run by financial \textit{procuratores}, were now named Dacia Porolissensis, Dacia Apulensis and Dacia Malvensis.
A garrison of two to three legions and auxiliary units had initially controlled Dacia; this was later reduced to one legion based at Apulum (Wells, 1992, 173). The main
Legionary fortress of Apulum sat at the centre of a network of forts that controlled the mountain passes (Wilkes, 2005, 152 - 153). Military control was exercised by a Moesian legion, from Sarmizegetusa and then from Berzovia, while *Legio XI Claudia* from Durostorum supervised the territory to the east (Wilkes, 2005, 152). *Legio V Macedonica* moved from Troemis (in northern Dobruja) its base on the lower Danube to Potaisa, in AD167 during the Marcomannic wars of Marcus Aurelius, to secure the north and north-east from potential threats to the province’s security (Wanner, 2010, 287).

![Figure 75: Roman Dacia - after AD 167 (After Gudea 1979) (p 69)](image)

One aspect of the post-conquest settlement was the development of military vici, which related to the considerable military presence in the area of the lower Danube, specifically in the mining areas and along the main communication routes through the Haemus (Stara Planina), although much of the area remains unexplored (Wilkes, 2005, 154 – 155). Scholars have made much of classical references to the scale of the colonisation and settlement of non-native Roman colonists in Dacia. Dio, *(Roman
History, 68.14.14) referred to large scale Roman settlement in Dacia, under Trajan and Hadrian. Eutropius (Breviary, Book 8, 6) suggested that the scale of the settlement was one of the reasons why Hadrian did not abandon Dacia as he had done with some of Trajan’s other conquests e.g. Mesopotamia and Babylonia. The scale of colonisation and settlement that had taken place under Trajan has been suggested as being a factor in his decision to retain the core of Trajan’s province.

Modern archaeological theory about the post-conquest society in Dacia was based on a number of assumptions. The first was that the native Dacian population was moved from the hill-forts and settled on lower lying areas which would have been more easily supervised by the Roman army. Historically the Roman state was thought to have followed a similar practice in Hispania and Britannia because of references in the classical sources (Dio, The Roman History, Book 54, 11 and Florus, Epitome of Roman History, Book II, xxxiii). The only area in the uplands where the archaeological evidence matches the literary and artistic depiction of settlement destruction (which occurred within the chronological context of the Dacian conquest) and forced population movement is the Orastie Mountains, which appear to have remained unoccupied, if not actually later avoided in relation to settlement and exploitation of resources (Oltean 2010, 223). At the same time another theory held that the Roman colonists took the fertile lowlands for themselves and forced the natives to work as cheap labour on the settlers lands. This theory suggested that the Dacian population was annihilated or perhaps much reduced by the wars, leaving an effectively empty land to be settled by Roman colonists (Ellis, 1998, 228 – 229). There are problems with this; it would have been difficult even for the highly efficient Roman Army to exterminate every individual or small group of Dacians across 250,000 – 300,000 square kilometres. Such behaviour was contrary to reasonably well-established practice where the co-option and maintenance of local elite or a fragment of an elite enabled the stabilisation and absorption of newly acquired territories.

Roman Dacia was possibly the exception to normal Roman practice, whereby elite elements of indigenous communities in the Danubian provinces (and elsewhere in the Empire) were formally integrated as civitates into the administrative and political structures of provinces (Ruscu, 2004, 78 - 83). Ruscu argued that those
communities in Roman Dacia that continued to exist into the Roman period did not become civitates, which indicated that they lacked an indigenous elite that would have been able to fulfill a devolved administrative and political role within the Roman province. Wanner (2010, 24) suggested that there was not a single piece of epigraphic evidence that referred to indigenous civitates in all of Roman Dacia.

This may suggest that at least within the new Roman province there was no surviving Dacian elite to fulfill that role (Ruscu, 2004, 84). The destruction of the Dacian hill-forts and their depopulation was taken as read, considering the significant efforts made by the Romans to conquer them during the Dacian wars. This does not necessarily mean that the Dacians as a indigenous population were entirely obliterated, but perhaps rather that those who remained formed a relatively small percentage of society in the new province or expressed themselves in ways which rendered them non conspicuous in the archaeological record. The remaining natives were thought to have lived alongside the new colonists and acquired elements of ‘Roman’ culture themselves during the two centuries (or so) of Roman occupation; they constituted the population that continued to settle the Dacian lands after the retreat of the Roman army and withdrawal of the administration at the end of the 3rd Century AD. Urban and military sites have produced epigraphic evidence, funeral monuments and other evidence which suggest a significant percentage of the population was of non indigenous origin, but, current archaeological evidence from the more rural areas makes it impossible to make similar claims for a similar degree of any colonised elements of the rural population (Oltean, 2000, 161 – 162).

Archaeology (and archaeologists) in Romania after the Second World War pursued their research interests with a narrative shaped by a murderous ideologically driven Communist dictatorship (See Appendix 7.11 – Politics, Ideology and Archaeology in Romania, page 260). Now in less dangerous, less ideologically driven times, new archaeological theories, research interests and ideas have emerged and developed; old ideas, the old orthodoxies and old theories have been challenged and revisited. One more current theory is that Trajan’s Second Dacian War did not annihilate the indigenous Dacian population but during the conquest the pre-conquest major Late Iron Age urban political and religious centres were destroyed along with the pre-conquest local elite (Pundt, 2012, 141). Post-conquest new urban colonies e.g.
Sarmizegetusa, Napoca and Apulum and other settlements were established as the focus of civic life in the new province. The colonisation effort, as suggested by the classical sources and epigraphic evidence, brought in settlers from across the Empire. This effort resulted in the marginalization rather than the destruction of the indigenous inhabitants and the provincial culture that developed focused on the new colonies, the new settlements, fortresses and forts and the veterans and colonists. This theory puts the Dacian hill-forts in their proper context, in pre-Roman Dacia, suggesting that they were elite sites, so normal arrangements for the siting of a settlement i.e. access to agricultural resources, minerals, opportunities for trade, etc did not apply (Oltean, 2000, 162). The hill-forts’ design, architecture and layout and location would have reflected the social status of pre-conquest Dacia and the perceived needs of the Dacian elite, and post-conquest with no surviving elite, there would have literally been no need for their continued existence.

If this is pushed to its logical conclusion and the original Dacian settlement pattern is eradicated by the arrival of new Roman colonists, then relations between the natives, the colonists and the Roman army (post-conquest) could have remained particularly fractious. This would not have laid the groundwork for what appears to have been a rapid and durable acculturation that followed a long, close and apparently peaceful relationship between the new immigrant settler population and the surviving natives in the province (Wilkes, 2005, 166). The lack of excavation and fieldwork hits home, there is a need to develop a more sophisticated method of interpreting settlement sites from the point of view of their function and size on the basis of archaeological evidence and more efforts needs to be made to identify more farmstead and village settlements (Oltean, 2000, 162).

5.3 Post Conquest Consolidation, Colonization and the developed Province

The conquest of Dacia took place when the Roman Empire was at its most powerful with ten legions and auxiliary units being deployed for the conquest. Rome’s efforts to colonise and settle the newly acquired territories and the part played by the remaining Dacian population suggest that the conquest, occupation and administration of Roman Dacia was different to any other previous acquisition of new territories. The classical sources and the archaeological record can be interpreted to
suggest that the classical literary tradition of a sizeable scale of the colonisation effort and a significant impact of the military conquest on the native Dacian population, especially the elite, can be borne out (Ruscu, 2004, 75). Interpretation of the classical sources suggested that the population might have been decimated during the wars and the subsequent pacification and occupation by Rome.

“Dacia being defeated, Trajan brought from the whole Roman world countless masses of people to live in the fields, and in the cities, since Dacia was exhausted of men after the war with Decabalus.”

Eutropius, Breviary 8.6.2

Other sources than Eutropius make reference to the scale of settlement in Roman Dacia, and the archaeological record was interpreted to suggest the non-participation of the native Dacian population post-conquest (Ruscu, 2004, 75). The scale of the post-conquest settlement was used to persuade Hadrian not to abandon Dacia and suggests that the scale of settlement took place to provide the newly acquired province with a settled population after significant losses on the part of the Dacians. A number of sources referred to the extermination or near extermination of the indigenous Dacian population (i.e. Eutropius, Julian and Lucian of Samosata), which may be a historical 4th century literary tradition. The problem is that a number of the primary sources have been lost and secondary sources may be questionable. Two of the sources (Eutropius and Crito) refer to the losses the Dacian’s suffered during Trajan’s wars. Literary evidence aside, there does appear to be an absence of Dacian names in excavated inscriptions recovered from archaeological sites in Dacia (Ruscu, 2004, 78). There is however, a problem with the differentiation between names of Thraco-Dacian origin and Dacian names, which makes things difficult when working out whether names from inscriptions belong to native Dacians from within the former kingdom and those who settled within the province from lands to the south of the Danube.

Epigraphic evidence suggests that barely 3% of identifiable names are of Thraco-Dacian origin and most of those originated south of the Danube. In the urban areas the numbers of Thraco-Dacian names are relatively small: 0.4% in Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, 1.8% in Apulum and 3.6% of the recorded names at Potaissa were
of Thraco-Dacian origin (Ruscu, 2004, 78). The epigraphic evidence (or lack of it) may not reflect anything like an accurate percentage of the surviving Dacian population, merely the ethnic origins of the social class of the people who set up recovered inscriptions. Or inscription evidence may reflect the absence of a surviving Dacian elite and their lack of participation in the administrative systems of post-conquest Roman Dacia (Ruscu, 2004, 78). Comparisons with the situation as it is understood in the provinces south of the Danube in Pannonia and Moesia Superior, where native elite participation is attested by inscription evidence, suggests a marked difference within Roman Dacia where there is a visible absence of an indigenous participating elite post-conquest. References to pre-conquest Dacian communities in Ptolemy’s Geography (3.8) have been interpreted to suggest the disappearance of the semi-urban Dacian settlements after the conquest (Ruscu, 2004, 80).

This traditional view of the population of Roman Dacia, based on epigraphic studies, which showed that only 2% of identifiable inhabits had Thraco-Dacian names, was that the indigenous inhabitants had been decimated in the wars with Rome and the conquest. These theories have been challenged as more modern theories suggest the visible expression of ethnicity, via inscriptions (related to memorials, social and religious affiliations) should be considered exceptional; and more favoured by diasporic groups than indigenous inhabitants (Oltean, 2010, 225-226). Despite the perceived epigraphic absence of Dacians from Roman Dacia, there is epigraphic evidence to show that Dacians survived the conquest and were active elsewhere in the Empire (See Appendix 7.12 – The Recruitment of Dacian Auxiliary units, page 263).
Figure 76: Post Conquest Dacians epigraphically attested in the Roman Empire (After Oltean 2009) (p 97)

KEY: The size of the dots is equal to the number of epigraphic attestations of Dacians. The largest e.g. is Rome with 8 epigraphic attestations, the next with 8 – 4 is Durostorum, then 2 in Novae, and a single attestation in Nola.

Despite references in the classical sources, Dacians survived the conquest in some numbers, including the 50,000 Dacian prisoners were removed after the conquest and the Dacians who were recruited into auxiliary units. There is some dispute over the number of Dacians recruited; it has been suggested that only a relatively small number of Dacian auxiliaries may have been recruited (Ruscu, 2004, 83). Gàzdac also noted that the discharge certificates (*honesta missio*) of 4 of 21 Legionaries (who mustered out in AD 144 at Lambaesis (in modern Algeria) originally recruited from Napoca had Thraco-Dacian names (CIL V111 18205).
Haynes and Hanson (2004, 22) suggested that these “legionaries may be ‘Dacians’ recruited and granted citizenship during a time of crisis”. Diaconescu (2004, 117) noted that there had been some expectation that a late Iron Age Dacian settlement might have been found at Napoca, as there was some belief that the ‘Napocenses’ referenced in a veterans list from Lambaesis (CIL V 111 18205) might have been from a tribe that had co-operated with Rome after the first Dacian war and subsequently received differential treatment from Rome, having non dediticii status. This was not the case as, Napoca appeared on the basis of archaeological excavations to be yet another green field Roman foundation.

As for the surviving Dacians, modern analysis of the settlement pattern within the Mures study area, has revealed that despite the significant post-conquest changes to the numbers of settlements, the development of urban centres and changes to landscape use, there are more elements of continuity than had previously been estimated. The settlements at Olreja and Noslac, which displayed indigenous traditional architecture, were established at the beginning of the second century AD alongside newly established Roman settlement types. A continuity of population and a continuity of settlement occupation in a number of settlements across the Mures study area have been identified (Oltean, 2010, 211 – 212).

While the end of the occupation of Dacian fortifications can be put down to military necessity, the apparent abandonment of non-military settlements is more difficult to explain, when compared to what happened in a number of other provinces within the Empire. Whether due to a deliberate decision on the part of the Romans, or as a mere indicator of the tenacity of Dacian resistance (and the severity of the conflict), is indeterminable. Elsewhere the Roman military machine had previously targeted the native elite (e.g. Judea) and occupied and made use of native sites, but, post conquest there is epigraphic evidence to suggest the active participation of elements of the surviving native elite in the governing process – this appears not to have been the case in post-conquest Dacia. The Roman cities of Sarmizegetusa, Apulum and Napoca all have names that suggest Dacian origins, yet archaeological excavations have revealed that all three sites were actually ‘green field’ sites (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 18).
Pre-Roman Dacia had a centralised elite-centred religion run by the Dacian elite, but after the conquest pre-conquest Dacian divinities appear to have no place in the new Roman province. The systematic destruction of Dacian temples (Lockyear, 2004, 57) and lack of any evidence of religious continuity suggests that the Dacian religious leadership who were closely associated with the Dacian military elite also perished during the conquest. Another reason why pre-conquest Dacian religion never survived beyond the conquest was that with its warlike nature and its concept of ‘immortality’, it would have powerfully contradicted or clashed with the Imperial cult, something that may have ensured the destruction of Dacian religious centres (Oltean, 2009, 92). Wanner (2010, 25) argued that while the destruction of the sanctuaries at Sarmizegetusa Regia was part of the policy of obliteration of the capital of the Dacians, no religious structures in any part of Dacia appear to have been spared. Wanner noted that no epigraphic inscriptions to indicate indigenous pre-Roman divinities after the conquest exist, and very few votive inscriptions bear Dacian names in general. If the Dacian elite failed to survive the war, then simple expediency would have dictated that the organisation and governance of the new province would have been dependent upon an imported ‘colonial elite’ and by implication any surviving native communities would be marginalised to the edge of the newly settled areas of the province and excluded from any participation in any political structures of the new province.

One of the more prominent pieces of evidence to suggest that Dacia had suffered a massive population loss due to the two wars and possible post-conquest deportations was the scale of the colonisation effort post-conquest (Ruscu (2004, 83). It appears to have been organised by the Roman authorities (with the implied direct involvement of the Emperor Trajan). The classical sources refer to the size and scale of the colonisation and settlement effort and the Imperial government’s direct involvement in it. Dio Cassius (Roman History, 68.14) refers to the settling of Roman communities, which may have been primarily civilian in composition, as well as veteran colonia settlements in post-conquest Dacia.

“In this way Dacia became subject to the Romans, and Trajan founded cities there.”

Dio Cassius, Roman History, 68.14.14
The peculiar circumstances of the strategic situation in Dacia, when combined with the implied reduction of the Dacian native population and the need for a loyal pro-Roman provincial population would, along with the establishment of a Latin literate population in a relatively short period of time, imply a significant, if not massive colonisation effort on the part of the Roman authorities post-conquest. In the face of the colonisation effort and losses suffered by the native Dacians, then their subsequent contribution to Roman Dacia and its provincial life would have been significantly less than that made by native populations (and elites) elsewhere in the Empire.

As the wars with Rome began in the early 2nd century AD, Dacia had an effective political structure that was over one hundred years old and the older Dacian tribal communities (a key component of post-conquest civitas government) may have already broken down and become territorial units within a Dacian state, as none formed the basis for civitas governance units in Roman Dacia (Diaconescu, 2004, 123-126). Local Dacian elites participated on a centralised Dacian stage within a centralised Dacian polity. The pre-Roman Dacian state, embryonic or otherwise had gone through periods of strong centralised government; it had a unifying religion, a centrally minted coinage and had displayed and retained a degree of cultural and political coherence even when periodically divided. Economically the independent Dacian Kingdom exploited gold and silver mines and was far from being of marginal economic significance and was not dependent on donatives from Rome.
The establishment of military posts secured strategic locations and fulfilled an important role in the provincial administrative structure throughout the existence of the Roman province. As a result of the conquest the new province lacked any useful indigenous structures of civil governance, so the military had to fulfil an administrative role and supervise people and resources. Diaconescu (2004, 127-128) argued that Roman auxiliary forts fulfilled the old administrative functions of the Dacian hill forts, and incorporated their territorial units into the new provincial structure. Military officers retained jurisdiction over their posts’ vici and their commands’ territoria, including local communities of *civitas stipendiariae* who were not self-governing. The Roman military played a key role in the development of acculturised settlements, with the canabae at Apulum and Potaissa and five or six military vici acquiring *municipium* status, mostly during the reign of Septimius Severus (Oltean, 2010, 218 – 219).

**Figure 77: Roman Dacia and neighbouring provinces (After Oltean 2010) (p 2)**
Military vici and canabae were involved in local administration and taxation, and vicus sites contributed to the rapid acculturation of the new province following the conquest. The new Roman urban colonies and settlements became the focus of civic life and the focus of one of the largest colonization efforts of the Roman Empire (Pundt, 2012, 141). Beyond this the Roman army itself affected and influenced the development of the provinces rural landscape and hinterland, outside of the urban areas, with the construction and maintenance of the network of roads, which became the new province’s communication main system. Settlers (not necessarily all Roman citizens (Pundt, 2010, 94)) came into the province from the already acculturised lands south of the Danube and as far afield as Italy (Millar, 2001, 227 – 228). Some of them would have been attracted to the new province by opportunities to make
money, gain new land and also to acquire status by settling at new settlements that offered them the opportunity e.g. *coloniae, municipia*, etc.

Imperial policy was mostly focused on urbanisation, supported by grants of tax exemptions and improved status. This would have been similar to how previous Emperors had practised the development of provincial administration elsewhere (e.g. in Hispania) in the Empire (Oltean, 2010, 220). The establishment of the Roman colony at Sarmizegetusa was a combination of political settlement (on Trajan’s part) and the implementation of a traditionalist Roman view of what followed the conclusion of a successful conquest. Dacia’s rich mineral resources (and significant quantities of booty), combined with practical rewards for veterans, provided a ready solution to the Emperor’s profound financial problems (at least in the short to medium term). One of the reasons why the settlement policy was so extensive in newly Roman Dacia was because of the degree of momentum (e.g. the new provincial capital was established in AD 106 / 107) that followed the conclusion of Trajan’s second Dacian war. Particularly in relation to the exploitation of mineral resources, Trajan had followed a similar policy in the neighbouring province of Moesia Superior.

Aside from veteran settlement at the new colonia, other settlers were encouraged to settle the new province, alongside representatives of the new administration and the legal system. Some 2,950 names have been epigraphically attested in Roman Dacia, 74% are Roman, 14% Greek and the remainder Thracian, Celtic, Semitic or Egyptian. In most cases the colonist’s home origins (or domus) is rarely recorded. At Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa, Italian colonists from the Varenii or the Cominii have been recorded. Ethnicity and origins are difficult to plot but the process is aided by religious affiliation, as some deities are specific to ethnic groups and identifiable geographic regions (Gàzdac, 2010, 58 – 59).

The arenas for acculturation in Dacia were primarily urban, with at least eleven cities developing from Trajanic military camps (MacKendrick, 1975, 108-109). The part played by military veterans who took part in the colonisation of the new territories as landowners, as inhabitants of the towns and participants in local municipal administration, has been well attested elsewhere in the Empire. While the legionary
camps, established by Trajan, at Berzovia and Ulpia Traiana Sarmizgetusa have been clearly located there are problems in understanding the different phases of occupation by Legio III Flavia and there is much on-going debate. Apulum and Potaissa, which were both permanent legionary fortresses, have also been clearly defined but only partially excavated (Wilkes, 2005, 154).

The earliest evidence of post-conquest urbanisation in Roman Dacia is that of Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacia, which was founded for Legionary veterans. The colonia was founded as early as AD 106 (according to inscription evidence) by D.Terentius Scaurianus, who was probably the first Governor of Dacia (Diaconescu, 2004, 89 – 103), with citizenship being granted to troops from Cohors I Brittonum, before the end of their service for valour in battle. Hadrian visited the colonia in AD 116-117 and funded the aqueduct in AD 132-133 (MacKendrick, 1975, 113-114). The odds are against Colonia Dacia being the only settlement of its type within the new province; the number of Coloniae settlements would have matched the number of Legions in each province (Bennett, 2006, 169).

Tile stamps from Legio III Flavia Felix (stationed at Bersobis) suggested direct military involvement in the process. Archaeological evidence suggested that vexillations from Legio II Adiutrix and Legio VI Ferrata worked at the site after the conclusion of the first Dacian war (AD 101) and after the second Dacian war Legio III Felix and Legio I Adiutrix worked on the site. The presence of a Legionary fortress between the two Dacian wars, on the site of the later colonia, garrisoned by Legio III Flavia Felix has been suggested (Diaconescu, 2004, 97). Excavations suggested that the fortress was formally cleared before being handed over to the civilian authorities.
IN HONOREM DOMVS DIVIANAE
L OPHONIVS PAP DOMITIVS
PRISCVS
IIVIR COL DACIC PECVNIA SVA
FECIT L D D D

In honorem domus divinae
L(ucius) Ophonius Pap(iri)
Domitius Priscus Ilvir col(oniae)
Dacic(ae) pecunia sua fecit l(ocus)
d(atus) d(ecreto) d(ecurionum)

Figure 79: Dedicationary building inscription from the Forum at Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacica Sarmizegetusa (After Heidelberger Akademie Der Wissenschaften)

The former legionary headquarters building was re-used for civilian purposes and additional buildings were taken over by settlers. The lack of traces of a permanent legionary fortress (between AD 102 and AD 105) on the site suggested that the future colony site began its life as a fortress after the end of the Second Dacian War (in AD 106) with the colony being established in AD 109 (Diaconescu, 2004, 97). Sarmizegetusa was the site of the consular governor’s headquarters, which suggested that the site of the future colony was of great strategic significance or importance. The military presence, when not directly linked to the conflicts of the Dacian wars, was in support of the civilian authorities, as part of practical support to the construction programme and, save for practical help, the military had little real influence on the development of Sarmizegetusa. From the beginning of the colonia, some 750 – 1,000 families were settled on the site (Diaconescu, 2004, 103). Work on the main civic buildings begun in timber during the reign of Trajan, it continued to develop under Hadrian and the Antonines. After the Sarmatian incursions (c AD 168) and the provincial reorganisation of AD 167 – 170, a number of older public buildings and new constructions were completed within (and without) the defences. There
was dense extra mural settlement, which stretched for some 500 to 600 metres outside the fixed defences covering some 100 hectares, this being in addition to the 22.5 hectares of land within the defences (Oltean, 2010, 165).

The new provincial capital was founded on fertile land, at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, rather than higher in the mountains on a more defensive site (Goldsworthy, 2003, 331). The veteran’s colony, which took the name of, the former Dacian capital of Sarmizegetusa amongst its titles (Hassall, 1999, 693) contained the usual features that one would expect with forum, amphitheatre and temple to the Imperial cult. Military assistance was suggested because the building that housed the Imperial cult priests appeared to have been modelled on that of a headquarters building normally found in a legionary fortress (Millar, 2001, 277).

Modern large-scale archaeological excavations at Ulpia Traiana Sarmizgetusa, have fundamentally changed the interpretation of its public buildings (Wilkes, 2005, 163). From the Antonines to the Severan period, the town’s defences were expanded to incorporate the development of new insulae outside the earlier existing defences – they were extended by 170 metres to the west raising the area of settlement win the defences to 32 hectares. If nothing else, this clearly suggested that the colonia underwent significant and sustained urban expansion and development.
During the early Severan period the colonia covered 75 hectares and was constructed, with colonnaded streets and a collection of public buildings, which included two fora, bath houses, temples, etc. The colonia was also of some political and administrative significance being home to the *Concilium Trium Daciarum* (or Provincial Council) as well as the residence of the financial procurator of Dacia.
Superior/Apuleius, whose headquarters have been partially excavated, throughout the existence of Roman Dacia (Oltean, 2010, 197). The colonia was well situated to exploit both the gold mines (in the western Apuseni mountains), the iron ore deposits at Teliuc (in the Poina Rusca mountains) and to controlled part of the historic salt route from the north to Pannonia and Upper Moesia. The colonia was able to exploit fertile farmland and had good communications (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 18).

![Site plan of Ulpia Traiana Augusta Dacia Sarmizegetusa](p 166)

The cumulative impact of the Roman military on parts of Dacia can perhaps be best illustrated by studying the effect of the arrival of *Legio V Macedonica*, which was transferred from Troemis (in northern Dobruja) to establish and occupy a new legionary fortress at Potaissa in the province of Dacia Porolissensis (now Turda, Romania) by Marcus Aurelius in AD 167 (See Appendix 13 – The impact of *Legio V Macedonica* on Potaissa and its hinterland, page 266). This site in the Arieș River Valley developed into an important town and was the key to development of the surrounding landscape. The establishment of the legionary fortress changed the
settlement dynamic, with settlements now appearing to the west and north of the fortress site, along the Roman road and in the Arieș River Valley as it entered the uplands to the southwest (Wanner, 2010, 289).

![Plan of Potaissa (After Barbulescu 1994)](image)

Figure 82: Plan of Potaissa (After Barbulescu 1994)

Roman Dacia saw the systematic exploitation and development of gold, iron ore, stone and salt resources in the new province (Oltean, 2010, 181). New settlements
grew up linked to the exploitation of mineral resources, which attracted traders, freedmen, slaves and miners from Dalmatia, Moesia, Noricum, Pannonia, Greece, Syria, Bithynia, and Italy, as well as indigenous Dacians, and legionaries from *Legio XIII Gemina* e.g. the mining settlement of *Alburnus Maior* (Pundt, 2012, 128). Imperial mining districts appeared to exist as autonomous territories, administered by procuratores, within the provinces, with procuratores fulfilling the role of magistrate with an oversight over the mining communities in their charge (See Chapter 3: 3.3 Post Conquest Consolidation, Colonization and the developed Province). Mining communities held a different status to that of surrounding rural communities within the province where they were situated. Miners lived within an acculturised community yet retained their own ethnic identities in relation to religion, burial rites, etc (Pundt, 2012, 142 - 145).

![Figure 83: Plan of Roman fort / vicus at Vetel-Micia (After Oltean 2010)](p 157)

The fort at Micia was situated to control a significant trading route. The civil settlement grew rapidly in the Second Century AD, surrounding the fort on all sides. The site had its own port, substantial store buildings, workshops and was a centre
for stone manufacture (there was a guild) and salt production. The settlement, like many frontier military settlements contained civilians from distant parts of the Empire, from as far away as North Africa and Syria, the presence of *Cohors II Flavia Commagenorum* may explain some of the civilian links to the East.

Even before the death of Decabalus and the effective end of hostilities the process of transformation of much of the former Kingdom of Dacia into a province was underway as *D. Terentius Scaurianus* was sworn in as propraetorian governor (Bennett, 2006, 164 – 165). Provincial boundaries were determined by AD 108 (CIL III 1627) and military dispositions made, construction of the provincial road network to link military garrisons and provincial centres followed. The presence of large military garrison, in the Danube Provinces led to the development of a market for agricultural and other produce. Small towns (vici) grew up alongside Auxiliary Forts, which administered and exploited the resources of their own territorium (Poulter, 1990, 394 – 395). Outside the environs of the *territoria* administered by the cities and towns, forts such as *Caesi* (in North Dacia), aside from administering its vicus (*Samum*), also appear to have held authority over the surrounding *regio Ansamensium* and its population (Haynes and Hanson, 2000, 18 - 19). The Auxiliary fort at Vetel (Micia) in Dacia had a large township of veterans (*veterani et cives Romani*), a sizeable territorium and was the focus for civil government (*pagus Miciensis*) (Gàzdac, 2010, 56 -57).

Key to an understanding of how the Roman colonisation of Dacia worked is the active use of the principle of differential status and deliberate changes in settlement status to drive colonization and settlement by the Roman authorities (and the Emperor). Employment of those mechanisms to develop the newly acquired province may be more visible in Roman Dacia than anywhere else in the Roman world. Status is key to understanding Roman Dacia’s development as a province. There a number of examples of status change in Dacia, a good example being that of Sarmizegetusa, which began its life as a *colonia* with *ius italicum* (Italian or Latin rights) and by the 3rd century AD it had gained the title of Metropolis. Under Hadrian, Durobriva became *municipium Hadrianum Drobetensum* and Naucratis became *municipium Aelium Hadrianum Napocensium* as a result of both settlements gaining *municipium* status (See Appendix 7.14 – Severan Apulum, page 273).
Studies of coin loss, on both sides of the frontier in Dacia, suggested a steady increase of lost coins, which suggested a rise in coin circulation (Oltean, 2000, 162). This concords with evidence for trading links between the new province and other provinces in the Empire present in the archaeological record, along with evidence for a continuation of native pottery styles in the civil settlements associated with Roman forts in Dacia (Wilkes, 2005, 171 – 172). This suggested the continued survival of an indigenous population, culture and society (at Gherla) and at the town of Napoca, where pottery in the La Tene style of the earlier Dacian settlements continued to be produced. Fragmentary archaeological evidence suggested the growth of a monetary or money based economy with fragments of sales contracts being recovered from the fort settlement at Teregova (in Dacia) and inscriptions evidence for sums of sestertii and denarii (Wilkes, 2005, 174 – 175).
6.0 Conclusion: A Strategy for Provincial Development

The three study areas have much in common; all were inhabited by complex indigenous Iron Age peoples being ‘Celtic’ in Spain and South and South Western Wales; and ‘Dacian’ in Romania. All three study areas contained difficult highland / hilly terrain and rich mineral deposits, and from a Roman perspective troublesome indigenous inhabitants with whom Rome had a prolonged period of confrontation and conflict prior to their conquest. All were conquered by Rome and absorbed into the Empire between the late 1st century BC and the early 2nd century AD. The conquest of the Spanish North West took began in 29 BC and ended in 16 BC, Wales was conquered between AD 47 and AD 78, while the conflict and heightened confrontation between Rome and Dacia began in AD 86 and ended with Dacia’s final absorption into the Empire in AD 106. The regions minerals were exploited either directly by the military or under military supervision post-conquest, something that had a direct impact on the post-conquest societies that developed. Additionally the three areas were on the periphery or literal edge of the Roman Empire, they were some distance from the Mediterranean heartland. The conquest of the regions saw the deployment of significant military resources on the part of the Roman army. After the conquest of the three regions was completed the army continued to play a key role in administering and developing the conquered territories. Once secured, there was a prolonged military presence in all three regions (including legionary fortresses, auxiliary forts), which had a significant impact on the character of the provincial society that emerged after the conquest was completed. Yet, while the three regions underwent broadly similar experiences and broadly similar processes the outcomes of their respective conquests produced subtly (and in the case of Dacia not so subtly) different results.

The role played by and the impact of the Roman army (and its dependent canabae and vici communities) is crucial to our understanding of what happened to the indigenous inhabitants as their homelands were conquered, occupied and administered by Rome. The outcome in two out of the three regions, despite similar experiences, was subtly different in regard to the changes that took place in the socio-economic, political and administrative structures, which were replaced by a structure that, in the end, served Rome’s needs and aspirations. An understanding of
the roles played by the long-term residence of the Roman legions at Leon, Caerleon (and Chester), Apulum and Potaissa and other military posts across the three study areas is key to understanding how the new lands were developed. The experience of Rome in the three study areas is different from other areas in north-western Europe and the Danubian provinces (to the south), in that the military never left, but, continued to varying degrees to play a key role in the life of the new territories. The administration, development and exploitation of three study areas was shaped, guided and influenced by the Roman army, which makes the three regions different from that experienced elsewhere in the Empire, save for the frontier provinces.

In Asturias and Galicia, indigenous social structures appear to have survived beyond the first century AD, by being linked politically and economically to newly established Roman administrative centres within an entirely rewritten Roman political landscape. Behind the Roman administrative façade stood the threat of military force, with the Roman legion (at Leon) along with its associated auxiliary units. Roman control changed much in the Spanish north-west, with tribute in the early years after the conquest being replaced by tax and in some established cases labour service (in the mines) and other civic projects. In the Welsh peninsula within the civitas governance areas and the non-autonomous areas the military, either in Caerleon or Chester (and the other still-occupied forts) was never far away. Within the new post conquest provincial political landscape that developed post AD 120, a key element of the new structures was the deliberate differential treatment of the Silures and the Demetae, who were awarded civitas status, as compared with the other Welsh tribes. The Ordovicii, despite inhabiting a number of sizeable hill fort communities throughout much of the Roman period, appeared not to gain civitas status and remained under military administration. The Decangli, also for whom no civitas capital has been found in north-east Wales appeared to have remained under military administration. They may also have been involved with mining and mining related activities and provided labour for the mines as happened in north-west Spain (Mattingly, 2006, 415). In Dacia our understanding of settlement status and how and why it could and did change and the impact that could have on settlement development is a vital clue to our understanding of how the province developed, after the conquest.
In the Spanish North-West, the new Roman Administrative centres were deliberately set out to be showcases of ‘Roman life’ and were also new foundations as no former indigenous oppida appeared to have been developed by Rome to fulfil an administrative function. In Wales, of the two civitas capitals that were developed in the AD 120’s (Caerwent) and the AD 130’s (Carmarthen) neither were indigenous in their origins; one (Carmarthen) was the site of a former fort and associated civilian settlement and the other (Caerwent) origins are as yet unattested, although it has been hinted that its origins may have been as a road side Roman period settlement. In Dacia, while Dacian names may have been adopted by Roman period settlements, no firm evidence of any former indigenous settlements being used as the basis for larger, more formal Roman period urban foundations has been discovered. This was not the case elsewhere; a number of former oppida sites e.g. Colchester, St Albans, Silchester and Chichester made the transition from Iron Age oppida to Roman period urban centres as did other pre-Roman centres in Spain and Gaul. In Dacia, at least in the Dacian homeland of the Orastie Mountains, the archaeological record showed that indigenous Dacian elite centres were systematically destroyed during the conquest period, something that matches the fate suggested by the classical sources (Lockyear, 2004, 46; Oltean, 2010, 223).

In North West Spain (See Appendix 7.14 - Inscription from Aquae Flavia, page 275) and southern Wales (See Appendix 7.08 - The Paulinus Stone and the Silures, page 255) there is epigraphic evidence to show the political survival of, at least of some of the pre-conquest indigenous elite and also the continued occupation of pre-conquest settlement sites. This is not the case in Dacia, where any epigraphic evidence to show the survival of elements of the pre-conquest indigenous elite remains conspicuous by its absence, and our understanding of pre- and post-conquest settlement patterns remains incomplete. In Dacia, this absence of pre conquest indigenous political, economic and social structures, the lack of a surviving indigenous elite and the lack of oppida type settlements to use as the basis for post-conquest settlement development helps to explain the important function fulfilled by fresh urban foundations, the military-associated vici settlements and the role of the military itself when it came to developing the new province.
One interpretation of the establishment of civitas self governance across much of the north western and middle European provinces of the Roman Empire in the first and second centuries AD could be that of a mutually beneficial conspiracy between a locally dominant landed elite and the imperial regime (Darwin, 2012, 4 – 5). The developed Gramscian model of subaltern history focuses on the imposition of systematic repression on a whole variety of groups - the application of social and economic repression across the board does not sit well with the Roman model of imperialism, which makes much use of negotiated status. There were certainly losers under Roman rule, especially during and after the conquest process, including peasant communities, women, former warrior groups, nomads and other more marginal groups. These groups, while excluded from direct involvement in the new Roman political structure, were not necessarily without influence.

For Rome’s subjects and citizens the issue of status within the post-conquest society (as it developed) was important. Status for the conquered could and did change, as it could for the citizen, as a direct result of actions on the part of the Imperial household. Status, for some (Allies and collaborators) could be negotiated during (and after) the process of conquest, while for others status was something imposed by Rome e.g. indigenous landholders could be deprived of their holdings, defeated indigenous warriors could be killed, enslaved or conscripted into the auxiliaries (for service away from their homelands), thousands could be killed, enslaved, dispossessed or deported. Caesar’s conquest of Gaul, largely undertaken to further his political ambitions and sense of self-importance, has been estimated to have resulted in at least a million deaths (Mattingly, 2011, 22), which would be genocide by any modern or not so modern definition. Any changes to status that followed the conquest were imposed from above by Rome for Rome’s convenience. That said, changes to status for individuals e.g. the receipt of citizenship, or for groups e.g. changes that involved the granting of collective rights or exemption from taxation (for a time) to encourage urbanisation and settlement, could be beneficial to whole communities and boost urbanisation. An understanding of how status within the provinces and within the Empire could change and the reasons why the Imperial household made changes to status is crucial to understanding how Rome’s empire retained its newly acquired provinces and was able to develop them.
There are similarities between the stages of development of the urban centres within the new provincial structures in the three study areas, with new urban foundations being developed as administrative, socio-economic and political centres. That said there is a much greater degree of variation than I would have initially expected both within the study areas and between them. In the Spanish North West, the civitates that emerged appeared to have reflected the pre conquest clan / tribe units, rather than those of the larger tribal confederations which appeared to have been deliberately ignored by the Romans when they constructed the new province’s administrative and political infrastructure. The civitas units, however, appear to have displayed a degree of durability through into the Second century AD. In Wales, the three main pre-conquest tribal polities were treated differently, with the Demetae being perhaps administered and occupied by the military until the AD 130’s when their civitas capital was established. The Silures, while gaining a civitas capital in the AD 120’s were never free from a permanent military presence from the early days of the conquest until the end of Roman Britain. The Ordovicii and other Welsh tribes appeared never to reach the point where a grant of civitas status took place and to have been permanently occupied and administered by the Roman military. During the military administrative and occupation phase, local communities were administered by local military officers (praefecti civitates); later on local indigenous leaders, no doubt carefully selected from the acculturated local elite, would have served as principles civitatis. It is an oversimplification to view the process of acculturation as an implied top down process; the speed, duration and selective nature of the process would have been affected by a wide range and variety of factors including economic (and social) factors and the proximity to military garrisons and markets.

In two out of the three study areas, there appeared to be only limited development of Roman villas when compared with other parts of the Empire – much work needs to be done to develop a fuller picture of the impact of villa development in all three study areas. In north-west Spain, Millett (2001, 162) suggested that the substantial Roman period villas found in other parts of Hispania were absent. Those villas that developed in the north-west were confined to the coastal regions. In Wales, villas also appeared (for the most part) to be confined to the more fertile coastal regions. The Romanian authorities (in Dacia) have registered 30 villa sites but there could be
111 possible villa sites (Oltean, 2010, 122). Roman Dacia was abandoned before the development of the larger rich villas found in parts of the Empire in the late 3rd and 4th centuries AD.

Roman historians often tend to fail to convey any sense of change coming to the indigenous people they described. The texts written about native, non-literate peoples are frequently portrayed as static, unchanging and largely socially passive participants, even if they fight and migrate (Wells, 2004, 107). Caesar’s portrayal of the Gauls is essentially static, despite the fact that the last century BC was a period of near permanent and profound change in Gaul. For the indigenous inhabitants who were not elite members of their communities, lacked disposable wealth, or simply carried on living and farming in the same ways that they had for generations or lived some distance from the most acculturised parts of their province in the hinterland the traditional ways of displaying their identity and social status may have stayed relevant for generations and Rome (save for tax collection and the occasional loss of young men for auxiliary service) may have simply been irrelevant. For the archaeologist, are the occasional Roman finds at what for all intents and purposes appear to be Iron Age settlements examples of resistance or a lack of Rome’s relevance to day-to-day existence?

The smaller civitas capitals e.g. Caerwent, Caistor-by-Norwich and Carmarthen in Britannia, have tended historically been written off by archaeologists as either too materially poor to develop to their full potential or having suffered severely during the conquest. These civitas capitals were perhaps too materially poor (Wacher, 1995, 245) in later years to fund their larger scale civic buildings that have been found in the larger wealthier civitas capitals. The lack of large-scale public buildings has been put down to the meagre resources of their territories or a poor local elite who lacked the funds for public works. There is another alternative, in that the local elites were not too poor to fund public buildings merely that they were not particularly interested in them (Mattingly, 2006, 384). Indigenous peoples, while embracing autonomy under Roman rule, may simply lived and worked as they had always done with their traditional lifestyles.
In the case of Caerwent, the indigenous elite (and perhaps the not so elite) appeared to have acknowledged that the town was the political centre of the community with an emphasis on political activities carried out within the town’s basilica, as hinted at by the limited epigraphic record (Revell, 2007, 76). Aside from the political focus the presence of the *tabernae* (in the forum) and the baths complex can be interpreted to suggest that local people also incorporated the town into their daily lives and activities, as hinted at by the investment in decoration. The urban experience of the Silures may however be limited, as appeared to occur at Londinium (and elsewhere in Britannia). There may even be a clearly articulated rejection of the urban setting as being a place for religious activities (Revell, 2007, 76) as the urban space certainly in the second century AD does not appear to have public buildings set aside for religious activities. The Romano-Celtic temple in Caerwent was not constructed until c AD 330 (Brewer, 1997, 46); the plot where the temple was later constructed was originally an open yard related to a nearby workshop.

This may imply that while the urban space formed part of the indigenous inhabitants personal landscape as a place for political, social and economic activity it did not do so for religious purposes. Additionally, Revell (2005, 76) noted the relatively limited number of town houses, which can be interpreted to suggest that the majority of the population who formed the urban community resided outside the town’s perimeter and formal defences. Caerwent, as a smaller urban centre with a lower resident population, may well have functioned as a focal point for the organisation of the community’s lives, but in a different way to larger towns which had a significantly higher density of elite and non-elite housing. Revell (2007, 76) argued that Caerwent, while working within the same way with public architecture and political activity, tested the limit of ideology the ideology of urbanism. Certainly in the case of Roman Dacia, those towns and cities that were developed were far larger than anything that developed in North West Spain and Wales (if not Britannia with only a few exceptions). Certainly by way of comparison with Caerwent, Carmarthen and the military settlement around the Legionary Fortresses at Caerleon or Leon, urban centres like Apulum and Ulpia Traiana Sarmizegetusa were enormous cities.

After military conquest, at least in the western provinces, the tribal or clan hierarchy (originally based on tribute networks, self imagined status, family groups and
prowess in war) that existed before the conquest was often given a new political focus within the Roman administrative structure. The new political entity would have been centred on a new urban centre (the civitas capital) and gained (or had imposed) a degree of centralisation where one may never have existed previously. In the Spanish North West, the larger tribal confederations are consigned to history; they play no part in the new Roman political, social and legal infrastructure that was developed in the late 1st century BC and first century AD. It appeared that the imposition of a new money-based economy would have enabled the few to prosper by feeding the new military / urban economy (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 43) perhaps at the expense of the many. How the political and economic system would have functioned in a landscape hitherto dominated by many small hillforts and defended enclosures, and marked by steep wooded valleys and narrow plains and boggy uplands (in Wales) after the conquest is open to question (Faulkner, 2001, 37).

Upon incorporation into the empire, the political class that monopolized the leadership roles of the civitas would have been drawn from the politically and socially dominant groups within a tribal polity (Woolf, 2007, 117) - 118. There would have been implications from the presence of the previous indigenous social structure within the civitas, not the least because in the early years, the burden of tax and tribute (as calculated by the official census, but collected by local leaders) may have fallen on those members of the less privileged or less prominent social groups. Some of the tribal allies that were friends of Rome (and who subsequently became client kingdoms during the first century AD) may have included subject peoples, who later gained civitas status in their own right, when they established an independent relationship with Rome. Other peoples may not have achieved civitas status but would have continued to hold lesser status within the province. It has been suggested that the emergence of civitas governments in Roman Britain was an indirect consequence of the impact of Roman conquest, rather than a being a direct consequence of Roman policy (Millett, 2002, 100 - 101). Where civitas governments were created was in those areas where Iron Age tribal units had displayed many of the key elements of the later civitas governments before the conquest. The indigenous elite was able to consolidate their hold on power and their influence by co-operating with the Roman authorities, which meant that the devolution of power to
the local elites meant that Rome was able to rule and collect taxation with a relatively minimal amount of coercion and expense.

The Roman military operated as a literate entity with graded rank and promotional structures through which soldiers could progress and was in effect a more disciplined version of the more dynamic urban society. Membership of the army led to systematic enfranchisement of its auxiliary members and social promotion for legionaries (both before and after completion of their military service) and also financial enrichment upon discharge. Both the urban and military societies contained high-ranking individuals, whose behaviour could serve as a working model to follow for aspirants to social advancement. Urban (towns and cities) and military (forts and camps) societies were also part of a linked Empire wide communication system through which individuals, ideas, fashion, economic opportunities and cultural change could move far more rapidly than in the less well connected outside world. Thus military and urban communities were amongst the more dynamic or at least more socially fluid environments within Roman society. They were places in the Empire were social mobility and socialization were more common and more rapid. Military encampments, towns and cities had more social fluidity by way of comparison with the rural areas within which the forts, towns and cities sat (Woolf, 1996, 37).

In Dacia, the role played by newly established urban foundations and military-associated settlements in the development of Roman Dacia was enhanced because of the absence of pre-Roman proto-urban settlements and the lack of an indigenous elite. This is key to understanding the process of urbanization and acculturation in Roman Dacia (Oltean, 2004, 162). The late date of acquisition of the Dacian territories, by a resource-rich Rome at the height of its political and military power directly impacted on the organisation of the new province. With no indigenous elite, Roman military associated settlements by default had a much higher status within the new province. These settlements were promoted to the higher status of municipium and coloniae under later Emperors, fulfilling the role of pre-Roman oppida, city states or former Greek colonies used as the basis for civil government, elsewhere in the Empire.
Within the developed province there would have been settled veterans, sometimes concentrated in specific regions around coloniae and other settlements (some associated with the medium to long term maintenance of military garrisons). These veterans (and serving soldiers) may have had an impact on local culture, although research from Egypt and the Rhine and Danube provinces may suggest that any impact may not have been as extensive as previously thought. Wesch-Klein (2011, 447) suggested that military veterans were an important agent of acculturation, especially in the provinces along the borders of the Empire. Veterans even as a minority within a provincial population differentiated themselves from ordinary civilians via their privileges and their citizenship (at least prior to AD 212). They had more disposable wealth than many of the surrounding civilian population and tended to cultivate (and maintain) friendships with fellow veterans and other soldiers to the point that it could be said that distinct military societies existed in some provinces (Wesch-Klein, 2011, 447). Their status in provincial society may have been reinforced by marriage to the siblings and daughters of other veterans who would have been citizens and thus lawful wives.

In all three regions the conquest changed the nature of the settlement hierarchy. In the Spanish North West, there appeared to be the least disruption, as while the pre-conquest tribal confederations were ignored the new civitates (which mostly tied in with the smaller tribal units) were plugged into a network of newly established and developed acculturised towns. In Wales, with the perceived lack of anything more than localized central places (as nothing as yet found that resembles the oppida settlements of south east Britain save for some of the larger hillforts) the change in settlement hierarchy may have had less impact, as the two civitas capitals at Carmarthen and Caerwent were added (admittedly at a higher level) to a landscape already populated with military posts and associated vici settlements. In Roman Dacia, the military conquest resulted in significant change to the settlement hierarchy, after the conquest high status Dacian sites (hill forts and tower houses) simply disappeared (apparently targeted during the conquest) - the archaeological record (in the Orastie Mountains) showed evidence of destruction (Oltean, 2010, 210). After the conquest was completed, the absence of a participating Dacian elite meant that newly Roman settlements (cities, towns and vici) simply replaced them,
fulfilling political, administrative, economic and social functions and having their status adjusted accordingly.

In the Spanish North West, many pre-conquest Castro settlements appear to have remained occupied and new Castro settlements were established, along with new lower level Roman settlements. In Wales, it appeared that many pre-conquest settlements remained occupied (as yet the true picture remains unclear due to a lack of systematic excavation and study of pre-conquest settlement sites). Some of the larger hillforts in some areas appeared to have been abandoned e.g. Llanmelin (near to the site of Caerwent) but other sizeable hillforts in the north and north west of Wales appeared to have remained occupied with sizeable resident populations through the Roman period. In Dacia, much of the focus for Roman settlement was in lowland areas, whereas pre-conquest the focus appears to have been in the upland areas particularly for elite settlements. The only area in the uplands where the archaeological evidence matches the literary and artistic depiction of settlement destruction and forced population movement is the Orastie Mountains, which after the conquest appear to have remained unoccupied, if not actually later avoided in relation to settlement and exploitation of resources (Oltean 2010, 223). In Dacia, vici settlements played a more significant role in the life of the Roman province of Dacia, than had previously been considered. The relative scarcity of proto-urban settlements, combined with the relative late date of the conquest and the organisation of the province, may explain the absence of developed civitates. Urban development within the province was focused upon settlements with a military origin which were promoted to the level of municipia and colonia, rather than basing urban expansion upon pre-Roman tribal oppida, pre-Roman city states and former Greek colonies as elsewhere in the Empire.

Two of the three regions appeared to undergo a period of heavy recruitment of males into the auxiliary units (after the conquest), something which could have removed a potentially troublesome pool of discontented, makes from the region. In the case of the Spanish north-west, potentially some 15,000 Spaniards may have been recruited for auxiliary service in the first half of the first century AD (Millett, 2001, 167). The administrative structure imposed by Rome on North West Spain appears to have allowed or tolerated the continued existence of the pre-conquest
localized (if fragmented) indigenous tribal social structure. Millet (1990, 167) suggested that considering the implied warlike character of the indigenous tribes that this administrative solution was a matter of policy and a deliberate decision on the part of Rome. This administrative model appeared to have provided few opportunities for the indigenous elite to develop a regional social order and to accumulate wealth for public display within a ‘Roman’ context. The indigenous pattern of settlement and society did make use of some elements of ‘Roman’ culture and symbols, but they were used within an indigenous social structure. The administrative system appeared to be built around patterns of military recruitment making productive use (from Rome’s point of view) of the regions noted military potential – which may have raised almost 40% of all those recruited from the province of Hispania Tarraconensis (some 6% of all Auxilia recruited during the Augustan and Julio-Claudian period). Recruitment from the Spanish North-West enabled Rome to safely reduce the young male population after the conquest was concluded (Millet, 1990, 167).

If the recruitment of soldiers for the auxiliaries took place of taxation, particularly in the period immediately following the conquest, then it would make administrative sense to link the process to local administrative divisions e.g. civitates, who would supply the recruits. This hypothetical model has been suggested for the Rhine delta area, where the indigenous inhabitants were spit into civitates (Roymans, 1996, 9 – 126). This model would explain the use of both ethnic and administrative centre (town) names in the naming culture of auxiliary units from both North West Spain and the lower Rhine area. Some 12,500 Britons were recruited into the auxiliary units up to the reign of Hadrian, with the peak of recruitment being estimated to be around AD 80 (Millet, 1990, 75). That date of AD 80 may be particularly important to Wales, especially if auxiliary recruitment relates to the closeness to the end of a period of active conflict. Perhaps the ethnic origins of those Britons recruited is worthy of further study, as the conquest of Wales was completed in 77/78 AD. While the figures (15,000 for the Spanish North West and 12,000 for Britannia) appear not particularly high, they could have had a serious impact on targeted communities e.g. the Silures and the Ordovicii in Wales. Auxiliary units recruited in Britannia were dispatched to the Danube or the Rhine, although Millett noted that one unit was attested in Mauretania (modern Morocco).
Interestingly enough a similar process is suggested in Dacia in the early part of the second century AD, with Dacian units being recruited and dispatched out of their province of origin. (See Appendix 7.15 The Recruitment of Dacian Auxiliary Units, page 263) One of the reasons why auxiliary recruitment may have been particularly targeted at North-West Spain and Dacia is their war-like history, which opens up the intriguing possibility (due to the perception of a similar temperament at least from a Roman perspective of the natives) of a process of auxiliary recruitment which may have targeted the Silures and the Ordovicii after their formal conquest was completed – as it would have similarly drawn males from that potential local pool of unrest and discontent for auxiliary service away from their homelands. The process of military recruitment and military service could and did change over time; the Roman experience of the Batavian revolt (in AD 69) led to changes in the way auxiliaries were recruited and also where they ended up being stationed.

The hypothesized relationship between area A (where recruitment to the Batavian auxiliaries took place) and area B (where there was demilitarization) was not static. After the failure of the AD 69 Rhineland revolt social changes became stronger, with an accelerated breakdown of tribal structures and a weakening of the position previously held by the military elites, who owed their position to historic relationships with the Roman authorities that dated back to pre-Augustan times (Roymans, 1996, 40 – 41). From the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty, new elites arose, consisting of landowners, traders and industrial entrepreneurs. This social change was reflected in

Figure 85: Social relations between indigenous elites and Roman authorities in the pre-Flavian period in civitates in the Rhineland (A) and in demilitarized civitates in south-western part of Belgic Gaul (B) (After Roymans 1996) (p 40)
changes in ritual deposition of weapons and a decline in burials with weapons towards the end of the 1st century AD. This change could reflect the decline of importance of the old tribal warrior-focused ideology, which had been previously harnessed by Rome via the Batavian auxiliaries, which lost its social base, partially because the old warrior elite found new methods of competitive display in a changed cultural context via their new wealth. The region continued to supply military recruits on a significant scale, but the difference was that the link between the former warrior elite and military service was broken and recruits were now permanently stationed away from their homeland and lacked the close ties of the previous era.

The pattern of service in 'national / ethnic' units reinforced by drafts from the home region faded out (in most cases) being replaced with a significant element of local recruitment. A study of military diplomas from auxiliary units raised in North West Iberia shows that the integration of non-Iberian recruits began early and was intensified through the Flavian period. Additionally epigraphic evidence, which identifies the names of 20 soldiers who served in units recruited in this region originally, revealed that 12 were from the North West and 8 could be traced to other parts of the Empire or their origins were unknown (Meyer, 2013, 41). It is worth noting that Iberian cohorts were concentrated on the Rhineland and Danube frontiers, and that 11 North Western Iberian cohorts were attested on 18 inscriptions in these areas. That said, recruitment of Iberians from the North West appeared to have persisted for some time into the Flavian period, while acceptance of recruits from other areas had been taking place with some cavalry units since Julio-Claudian times (Meyer, 2013, 51). Veterans, while not necessarily returning to their homelands after service, did not necessarily settle where they had served. While nearly half of veterans attested from North Western Iberian units settled within 25 miles of their former posts, some 35% of 41 attested veterans settled more than 100 miles away from their former units (Meyer, 2013, 115). There remains a need for more comparative work in the study of auxiliary recruitment across the Empire.

Under the Empire there was nothing haphazard about the process of military conquest - the days of commanders or Governors embarking on wars for personal glory and prestige were over, victory was a matter of imperial prestige and an imperial triumph rather than generals and provincial governors. A provincial
governor, when appointed would receive his official guidelines, which were specific to his province - this was his *manda*ta (or mandate). Trajan commissioned Pliny to serve as Governor of Bithynia and Pontus; he served as ‘legate pro praetore’ of the Emperor and was on a mission to sort out the finances of his province (See Appendix 7.01 - Pliny as Governor of Bithynia and Pontus, page 224). Pliny was to ‘set proper bounds by shaping the habits of the province, and to establish guidelines which would be useful to its stability in perpetuity’ (CIL5 5262 – ILS 2927). The *manda*ta is referenced in five exchanges of letters between Pliny and Trajan, in relation to soldiers (Book 10.22), slaves amongst the recruits (Book 10, 30), the restoration of banished men (Book 10, 56), in relation to clubs and associations (Book 10. 96) and in relation to Christians and the passing of public funds to individuals (Book 10. 110 – 111). So rather than reflecting Pliny’s indecisiveness, the correspondence reflects the hands on nature of the Emperor’s involvement with matters of day-to-day provincial governance which may shed a new light on the process of provincial development.

The fringes of the Empire to Roman eyes may have appeared uncivilized yet aspects of daily life and daily ritual would have appeared very familiar and civilized. Just how ‘Roman’ or ‘civilized’ the more distant provinces were a matter of perspective, Tacitus (Annals IV, 45) noted that the Spanish North West (in AD 25) was not that civilized a place as a legatus Iurdicus was assassinated in one of the Latin towns, Termes (the civitas capital of the Termestine).

‘... An audacious crime was committed in Hither Spain by a rustic of the Termestine tribe. Making a surprise attack on the governor of the province, Lucius Piso, who was travelling with carelessness due to the peaceful conditions, he struck him dead with one blow. Carried clear by the speed of his horse, he turned it loose on reaching wooded country, and eluded the hue and cry in the rugged and trackless wilds. But detection was not long deferred: the horse was caught and led round the villages in the neighbourhood till the ownership was ascertained. After discovery, when the torture was applied in order to force him to disclose his confederates, he cried aloud in his native tongue that "questions were useless: his partners might stand by and watch — for pain would have no terrors capable of extracting the truth." Next day, as he was being dragged again to the torture, he threw himself clear of the warders and dashed his head against a rock, with such an exertion of strength that he expired on the spot. It is believed nevertheless, that Piso fell a victim to a Termestine conspiracy: for public monies had gone astray, and he was exacting restitution with vigour
too much for barbarian patience.’

Tacitus, Annals of Imperial Rome, Book 4, 45

A brief comparison of the three study areas reveals the common threads of Empire that bound the diverse regions together into a whole; yet, it also reveals an almost surprising degree of variety and flexibility of the Roman approach, were you to take a hypothetical average Roman (or perhaps ‘acculturised’) citizen and were to literally drop them outside or inside Leon, Caerleon or Apulum or perhaps Astorga Augustus, Venta Silurum or Colonia Ulpia Traiana Samrizegetusa then they would recognize the similarities between the different locations, with forums, basilicas, bath houses, patterns of behaviour and ritual, etc even if there was a noticeable difference in scale, and some patterns of behaviour.
Figure 86: Schematic representation of the distribution of a Roman regimental community during the middle imperial period (After James 2001) (p 81)
It has been argued (James, 2001, Woolf, 2003 et al) that in those areas where the Roman army retained a strong presence after the conquest there was to varying degrees a positive impact on acculturation and a negative impact on the development of civitas governance. The long-term impact of military garrisons undermined the development of civitas government amongst the indigenous tribal elite. In a few locations in the military zone in North and central Wales a handful of military posts remained occupied through into the late 3rd century, elsewhere in Wales, in a few locations civilian settlements continued to exist after their military garrisons were withdrawn e.g. Abergavenny, Monmouth, etc.

Figure 87: Brecon Gaer plan of fort and vicus (After White 2010) (p 202)
Where forts remained, even with reduced garrisons across Wales, particularly in those areas which never gained civitas status, the long-term presence of vici could have fulfilled the role of the small towns in the south and the south-west; certainly regular contact would have occurred between the military garrisons and the indigenous population. By contrast in Dacia, the network of linked permanent garrisons was the focus for varying degrees of urban development. The military across the Empire, mostly did not live in remote encampments, but out and about amongst the civilian population. Inscription evidence (and surviving records and documents) from Egypt and elsewhere suggest that soldiers spent a significant degree of their on and off-duty time in continual contact with and interacting with the civilian population at large.

The relationship between ordinary soldiers and the civilian population would have been complex (it was in Egypt which supplies most of our contemporary literary evidence of how soldiers and civilians lived together and interacted). The military were involved in security (and policing) issues and tax collection, and also involved with aspects of the administration of civilians (Alston, 1995, Speidel, et al), which would have ensured a degree of interaction between the civilian administration, the military and the civilian population. Certainly the implication of the presence of courtyard buildings in a number of different forts (e.g. Caernarfon, Brecon Gaer, etc) may imply the presence of higher-ranking officials involved in administrative, judicial and industrial activities within the military zone. The implied presence of courtyard buildings whether mansio or the residences of senior figures involved in aspects of administration, whether political or economic at different military sites across North and Mid Wales needs to be thoroughly investigated. Some of these military posts that continued to exist, even with reduced garrisons where they retained their vici (or retained an associated civilian population living within the ramparts) could, when combined with associated military administrative role, have fulfilled all the requirements and functions of small towns within the military administered zone.
In North and Mid Wales, for example Brecon Gaer, Forden Gaer, Segontium, Caerhun remained occupied from the AD 100’s through until the AD 370’s (and in some cases beyond). Our understanding of how the Forts and any associated civilian communities interacted with indigenous communities remains patchy. Until a full survey of vici settlements accompanied by selective excavation is undertaken we shall never know whether or not any vici survived the removal of their associated garrisons or for how long. Within the developed provinces there would have been settled veterans, sometimes concentrated in specific regions around coloniae and other settlements (some associated with the medium to long term maintenance of military garrisons).
In Dacia, military posts and associated settlements became the focus for limited urban development and the local administration. Along the Mures River, the auxiliary fort at Cigmau-Germisara developed a sizable vicus, which grew to cover some 17.3 hectares (Oltean, 2010, 158). Even limited numbers of locally settled veterans and their dependents would have had an impact on local culture. Research from Egypt and the Rhine and Danube provinces may suggest that any impact may not have been as extensive as previously assumed.
Our picture of pre-conquest society remains patchy in all three-study regions, with our understanding being dependent on the (as yet limited) archaeological record. There is one major difference between our understanding of pre-conquest society and Roman society and that is because pre-conquest societies have left no written record. All the accounts of their conquests and absorption into the Roman Empire were written by and written for Romans. We never hear or read any late Iron Age perspectives from the Asturii, the Cantabri, the Silures, the Demetae, the Ordovicii or the Dacians and any observations on their society and social organization are written by Romans – none of who were trained anthropologists.

All the epigraphic monuments date from after the conquest and while they are useful conform to Roman social and epigraphic norms laid down by the conquerors. The written word in an epigraphic context was an important element of imperial power and it helped to define the acculturised indigenous elite. Epigraphy served an important ritual and symbolic purpose and helped construct and project power,
culture and identity. The impact of an inscription in its monumental context goes far beyond the meaning of the message, the inscription itself was part of elite display and the context within which an inscription physically sat related to a definition of physical space – often for both religious, social (including the definition of status and identity) and political purposes. This acculturised definition of space would have been fundamentally different from anything that the indigenous inhabitants had previously experienced.

It is the definition and reinforcement of status that is important in a Roman context; this was also about exclusion as, by and large, status as defined in the Roman period would have excluded women, non-Roman foreigners, the poor, the servile and the non-literate. Linguistically, the difference between pre- and post-conquest would have been striking, with the addition of a whole section of the new provincial population who spoke (and administered the region through) a different language i.e. Latin which would have differentiated them from the surviving indigenous population in North West Spain, Wales and Dacia, Another thing to consider is that indigenous social structures in north-west Spain (and possibly in similar rugged regions) may have proved more resilient than hitherto suspected. Even in more geographically accessible regions the imposition of Roman order and a market / monetary economy, something which would have impacted on the indigenous social structures and the traditional pre-Roman gift and communal exchange tradition, may have had a more gradual impact. Those indigenous leaders who profited and benefited from selling agricultural produce and acquired Roman luxury products may then have exchanged them within their traditional social networks via traditional gift exchange mechanisms (Roymans, 1996, 60).

Archaeological research has historically tended to over focus on prestigious sites e.g. fortresses, forts, cities, towns, villas, etc (for a variety of interrelated reasons) – these certainly in the case of Roman period sites will reflect significant evidence of Roman artefacts. Coin finds, which are based on coin loss, are logically heavily influenced (with the exception of coin hoards) by coin circulation, which tends to focus on heavily acculturised areas, particularly in the early years of the conquest period to military installations and associated settlements. There is a need, particularly in Wales to look at the immediate environs of the forts, to build on the
good work begun by the Gwynedd Archaeological Trust, Clwyd-Powys Archaeological Trust and Dyfed Archaeological Trust (RCAHMW) with their Report on Roman Military Forts, Vici and Roads (CADW) in 1996 and by the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Wales with Roman Frontiers in Wales and the Marches, (Burnham and Davies, 2010). In all three study areas, while there has in recent years (even since this study began in 2006) been much improvement when it comes to studying and excavating indigenous settlements, we are still too focused on prestigious sites and still have an unbalanced view of the provinces during the Roman period when it comes to occupation. I believe much can be gained by the comparative study of indigenous experience in diverse geographical regions of the Roman Empire across north-western and central Europe. It is important to remain focused on the fact that there was a ‘Roman Empire’, and consider the danger of focusing on the minutiae of specific settlements and specific sites at the expense of forgetting the context within which peoples and sites existed, locally, provincially and globally (in the Empire). All this needs to be combined with a more balanced study of Roman period sites, both prestigious (elite) and not so prestigious (not so elite) sites to encompass a broader section of the Roman-period population both Roman, acculturised and indigenous.

When I began this study, I will freely admit that I was perhaps a slightly in awe of Rome and its Imperial achievement, but that view has over time been tempered perhaps with a more balanced, more even-handed approach to the ancient past. There are a few dangers in relation to the study of Rome and its interactions with late Iron Age peoples of Europe (and around the Mediterranean) aside from trench related arthritis; failing to maintain a degree of objectivity is one of them. It is important to retain a sense of balanced detachment and enthusiasm for the study, something that should not be outweighed by a failure to recognize the grim realities of conquest and its consequences. That said blinding oneself to the (grim at times) realities of the ancient world should also be avoided. One further consequence of this study is that I have developed a much deeper understanding of the darker side of imperialism, ancient, more modern and more current varieties and I will admit to having developed and strengthened a deep and thorough distaste of it, which in all honesty is no bad thing.
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Appendix 7.01 – Pliny as Governor in Bithynia and Pontus

The classical sources including Pliny, Tacitus and Cassius Dio make direct reference to the practicalities of province building and the involvement of military commanders and provincial governors in the process. Pliny’s official correspondence with the Emperor Trajan reveals a wealth of information about the complex of the administration of the long established Roman province of Bithynia in the early 2nd century AD. Radice (1978, 201 – 206) noted that his correspondence shed light on the differences of status between different towns and cities, the political charged and disturbed nature of life in some of the older cities and the fact that the province had a still functioning constitution (lex Pompeia) that dated back to the time of Pompey’s reorganisation of the province during the days of the old republic (Book X, 79, 80, 112, 114). The official correspondence sheds light on what appeared to be regular problems that required official notification to Rome; from the potentially unsettling political tensions in some of the more established old Greek cities, which led in the case of Nicomedia that Pliny (Book X, 32) asked Trajan about whether or not the inhabitants Nicomedia could form an official fire brigade. Trajan (IX, 34) in his reply expressed concerns about the project.

“You may well have had the idea it should be possible to form a company of firemen at Nicomedia on the model of those existing elsewhere, but, we must remember that it is societies like these which have been responsible for the political disturbances in your province, particularly in its towns. If people assemble for a common purpose, whatever name we give them and for whatever reason, they soon turn into a political club. It is a better policy to provide the equipment necessary for dealing with fires, and to instruct property owners to make use of it, calling on the help of the crowds which collect if they find it necessary.”

Trajan to Pliny (Book 10, Letter 34)

The letters reveal a record of poor financial management of civic projects and ongoing problems with local government administration are also revealed which may have implications for other provinces elsewhere in the Empire. Investigating financial mismanagement on the part of provincial city administrations took up much of Pliny’s time;

“The inhabitants of Nicomedia, Sir, have spent 3,318,000 sesterces on an
aqueduct, which was abandoned before it was finished, and eventually pulled down. They then made a grant of 200,000 sesterces towards another. This has also been abandoned, so that if they are to have water, they must spend still more, even after having wasted such a vast sum.”

Pliny to Trajan (Book 10, Letter 37)

Other issues that appear to have required regular input from Rome included issue of banishment (X 56 and 57), judicial matters (X58) and the status of civilians e.g. free or unfree, citizen or not citizen (X 72, 73, 104 and 105). They also suggested that a provincial governor would be directly involved, one-way or another with in civic projects (X 61, 62, 90 and 91) in his province. The governor’s office also appeared to have been involved in dealing with the matter of bequests to the Emperor (X75).

The letters also shed light on the degree of the Roman state’s involvement in practical projects in the provinces, Pliny, as governor of Bithynia (in the early 2nd century AD) wrote to Trajan seeking a surveyor / architect to assess on-going building projects in his province. Pliny was directed to seek assistance from the Governor of Moesia Inferior, the recent practice with a legionary garrison (Pliny X, 41 and 42). Edith Evans (1994, 146) suggested that the implication is that only the presence of a legionary garrison ensured that a governor had a ready source (with Imperial approval) of specialist architects and surveyors, and that such specialist roles were not to be regularly found on a governor’s staff. Evans noted the suggestion that such specialists were military roles. This exchange of letters may also imply that provincial governors were, subject to imperial approval, able to access skilled military professionals when necessary. The military certainly contained such professionals, as architects and Surveyors are listed amongst the immunes in the legions, and inscriptions were set up on the northern frontier by the three known within Britannia (RIB: 1542, 2091 and 209) at Carrawburgh and Birens).

In a period of less than two years, Pliny wrote more than 40 letters to Trajan seeking guidance on a wide range of matters and passing information to the Emperor. Radice, noted that the majority of the correspondence was dated to the first year of Pliny’s governorship and that there was less correspondence in the second year of his governorship. She suggested that this might be explained by the fact that Pliny would have had more experience of his office and may have been relying on his own
The letters also suggested that a provincial governor would have had access to a provincial archive (X 58) which may also suggest that a governor was able to make use of a degree of secretarial and office support when in post. Those letters (Pliny X, 41 and 42) that relate to a request for surveyors and architects suggest that the Emperor (and the Roman state) had an interest in the successful construction of regional infrastructure projects and that a provincial governor (subject to the availability of sufficient finance) would be expected to improve the infrastructure of his province during his tenure without any financial disasters.

Fiscal mismanagement at a local level was a reality in the provinces, overspending by local elites could cause significant problems for local and provincial finances. Edmondson (2010, 278) noted that it was a Roman governor’s duty to step in when local finances were being badly administered by city magistrates. A provincial governor, even with relatively limited administrative staff and who quite possibly held a responsibility for a number of cities often meant that this financial oversight function was difficult to exercise. Pliny’s letters reveal a picture of chaotic maladministration (X23, X24, X37, X39, X44) made worse by extravagant public building projects aggravated by inter-city rivalry (Radice, 2010, 205). Managing inter-city tensions also came under a governors remit, an example recorded by Tacitus (Histories, Book IV, 50) revealed that rivalries between two cities (Oca and Lepcis Magna) in North Africa became so bad that one city (Oca) persuaded the Garmantes nomads to raid the territory of their rival, it required the deployment of auxiliary troops to restore order and expel the nomads from the Empire.

Any developing relationship between the military and the new civitas government and or with any dependent civilian vicus communities would have stretched to the practical as well as the political and the personal. When not on campaign or away on active service a large garrison would have been able to provide a ready pool of highly skilled labour, which would have been exceptionally useful when it came to breaking ground on significant civic projects. Birley (1964, 63) suggested that legionary masons, once their military duties were completed, could have been leant to assist the new and revitalised civitas authorities, along with military surveyors and architects. Such actions might well explain the presence of the ‘military type grid’
style street plans that were developed at Caerwent, Caistor-by-Norwich and elsewhere within Roman Britannia.

Any Imperial assistance with the construction of public buildings in the early civitas capitals of Britannia appeared not to extend to the supply of stone masons who worked on military and state projects be they military or civilian personnel (Blagg, 1980, 40). Blagg also noted that the use of military labour due to military commitments elsewhere was also unlikely. He also suggested that the financial costs of large non military projects would have been carried by the native provincials, and even if tax cuts or tax breaks were put in place, there is no evidence that this happened, safe for elsewhere in the Empire (e.g. in Spain under Vespasian). Blagg also stated that the colonia and the legionary fortresses did not necessarily provide the model for the development of the early civitas capitals which may have lain with the leaders of the civitas territories rather than the Roman military or the Greco-Roman idea of a city.

The development and exploitation of newly acquired territories went hand in hand with military activities. The Roman General Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, who served in Germania Inferior, in AD 47, grafted a set a Roman civitas institutions onto the Frisian people and his soldiers constructed a twenty-three miles long canal between the Meuse and Rhine (Tacitus, Annals 11. 18 – 19). This project may also have assisted with developing better riverine communications and helped to alleviate flooding [Cf. with suggested work of Legio II Augusta on the / Wentlooge and Caldicot levels].

“The Frisians, hostile or disloyal since the revolt they had launched by defeating Luscius Apronius, gave hostages and settled on lands delineated by Corbulo. He also allocated to them a senate, officials and laws and constructed a fort to ensure obedience.”

Tacitus, Annals, 18

Military resources could be used to develop newly acquired territories, Curtius Rufus, used military resources to open and develop a silver mine in the district of Mattium, modern Wiesbaden and Homburg (Tacitus, Annals 11. 18 – 19). Even Publius Quintus Varus, Governor of Germania, who lost three legions in AD 9, aside from his
military duties was also simultaneously overseeing the transformation of Roman occupied Germany, building roads and towns.

“Meanwhile bodies of troops were in the habit of wintering there [between the Rhine and the Elbe in Germania], and cites were being founded; the barbarians were gradually reshaping their habits in conformity with the Roman pattern, were becoming accustomed to hold markets and were meeting in peaceful assemblies. But they had not forgotten their ancestral customs, their native manners, their independent way of life, nor the power they had enjoyed through their strength of arms. So long as they were unlearning their customs little by little, by indirect means, so to speak and were under careful surveillance, they did not object to the change in their manner of life, and were unconsciously altering their disposition. ... But when Quintilius Varus became governor of the province of Germany, and in the exercise of his powers also came to handle the affairs of the peoples, he tried both to hasten and to widen the process of change.”

Cassius Dio, 58. 18. 1 - 3

There is archaeological evidence for Varus’s attempts to construct a formal province in Germany. Archaeological evidence from number of sites initially identified from aerial surveys, some of which have been subsequently excavated including Haltern, Anreppen and Waldgirmes may point to active military involvement in relation to the establishment and development of new territories (Schnurbein, 2003, 105 – 106). The Roman town of Lahnau-Waldgirmes or Waldgirmes has been suggested as being the remains of one of a series of planned towns and market places founded by the Romans east of the Rhine and north of the Danube, with the aim of long-term growth into population centres (See Appendix 7:02: Waldgirmes an Augustan city east of the Rhine, page 231). The complex was never completed and in the absence of any historical reference or local inscriptions, remains as yet unnamed. Waldgirmes provides evidence that on the eve of the Varian disaster (in AD 9) Rome was working to organise and develop a province in Germania and key to this process was the development of towns (Roymans, 2004,199).

The process of urbanisation (or municipalisation) was based on archaeological evidence from Haltern (where the shards of some 850 amphorae for transporting fish sauce, wine and olive oil along with evidence for sizeable quantities of gain shipment and storage have been noted (Wells 2004, 97)) and Anreppen proceeded at different rates. The presence of buildings with Mediterranean style civic rather than military
features, may hint at the presence of a non-military indigenous elite. These individuals played a key role within the process of provincial development, urbanisation and the development of Roman political institutions. The presence of a pro-Roman native aristocracy certainly appears to have been the case in relation to the Urbi, the Batavians and the Cherusci along the Rhine frontier. Haynes (2013, 46) argues that it is the archaeological evidence from Waldgirmes (literally a new city for a new province) that makes it clear that the process of transforming the lands east of the Rhine into a province were well underway (See Appendix 7.02 – Waldgirmes – an Augustan city east of the Rhine, page 230).

These local leaders receive citizenship during the time of Augustus and some held military commands of locally recruited auxiliary units (Roymans, 2004, 200). These local leaders would have advocated and supported Roman style civic government, not to mention holding the new positions of power within their own communities. Within the developing German province, there may have been considerable regional variations, with the development of Romanised institutions only taking place in those areas where the local elite was willing to adopt the civitas model of Roman governance. The behaviour of indigenous inhabitants (or at least some of their leaders) might have been reflected in the speed with which new post conquest settlements developed. In Britannia, Canterbury, Chelmsford and Verulamium appear to have rapidly developed after the conquest. While the Catuvelauni actively led the resistance to Rome, they may not have been that unified as the rapid growth of Verulamium may have reflected the differential treatment of different (in this case a pro-Roman) faction within the tribal community (Wacher, 1974, 203).

Pliny, as governor of Bithynia and Pontus wrote to Trajan seeking a surveyor / architect to assess on-going building projects in his province. He was directed to seek assistance from the Governor of Moesia Inferior, the recent practice with a legionary garrison (Pliny X, 41 and 42). The implication in that only the presence of a legionary garrison ensured that a governor had a ready source (with Imperial approval) of specialist architects and surveyors, as such specialist roles were not to be found on a governor's staff (Evans, 1994, 146). Such specialists appeared to be military roles as both architects and surveyors are listed amongst the immunes in the
legions, and inscriptions were set up on the northern frontier by the three known within Britannia (RIB: 1542, 2091 and 209) at Carrawburgh and Birens).
Appendix 7.02 – Waldgirmes, an Augustan city east of the Rhine

The Roman emperor Augustus, far from attempting to delineate firm boundaries for the empire, actively pursued a policy of expansion, particularly to the east of the Rhine. The German campaigns by Drusus (from 12 BC), Tiberius (from 9BC) and Varus (after AD 4) sought to bring the territories (and their inhabitants, some of whom were Rome’s Allies) between the Rhine and the Elbe into the empire (von Schnurbein, 2003, 93). This process was actively resisted by some of the Germanic tribes, and delayed because of the death of Drusus (in 9 BC), and campaigns in Bohemia and Moravia against Maroboduus, King of the Marcomanni. The process was also slowed by large-scale revolts in Dalmatia and Pannonia and then ended with the destruction of three Roman legions (Legio XVII, Legio XVIII, Legio XIX and associated auxiliary units) under Varus (Augustus’s son-in-law) by the German leader Arminius (in AD 9) in the Teutoburger Wald.

The moment of transition from occupied territory into developing province, something back up by archaeological evidence. Surveys and excavations have revealed the presence of Roman forts and defended settlements within the Lippe, and Lahn valleys and the presence of indigenous oppida, which related to references by Cassius Dio (Roman History, 58. 18. 1 - 3). A number of crucial linked issues are recorded in this passage, urban development, trade and cultural integration all importantly within a military context. Rather than being displayed as propaganda the developments appear to be related as simple fact (Jones, 1997, 186).

“Meanwhile bodies of troops were in the habit of wintering there [between the Rhine and the Elbe in Germania], and cities were being founded; the barbarians were gradually reshaping their habits in conformity with the Roman pattern, were becoming accustomed to hold markets and were meeting in peaceful assemblies. But they had not forgotten their ancestral customs, their native manners, their independent way of life, nor the power they had enjoyed through their strength of arms. So long as they were unlearning their customs little by little, by indirect means, so to speak and were under careful surveillance, they did not object to the change in their manner of life, and were unconsciously altering their disposition. … But when Quintilius Varus became governor of the province of Germany, and in the exercise of his powers also came to handle the affairs of the peoples, he tried both to hasten and to widen the process of change. ”

Cassius Dio, Roman Histories, Book 58. 18. 1 - 3
As part of the process of ordering the new territories, Drusus, who established military bases at Obergaden, Rodgen and Dangestetten and maintained treaties with allied tribes, followed a similar policy to that which had been pursued by Caesar (in Gaul). Recent archaeological research has revealed, at three key sites; Haltern (on the lower reaches of the River Lippe), Anreppen (on the upper reaches of the River Lippe) and at Waldrimes (near to the River Lahn) has revealed that rather than...
simply being military installations, other developments within these may have tied them in directly with the processes of colonization and Romanization of the newly acquired territories to the east of the Rhine.

he fort, identified at Anreppen, which was contemporary with the late phase of occupation at Haltern, while its end remains as yet undated. The presence of significant quantities of Germanic pottery found in relation to a nearby Germanic settlement may indicate that the site functioned as market site and / or a place for ‘peaceful assemblies’ (as referenced by Cassius Dio, 58.18.1). The buildings (which compare with praetoria at Oberaden and Haltern but are larger) at the centre of the fort site are sizeable (the central feature of the complex being 70 m x 47m). A southern courtyard measured 70m (long) by 17m (wide) and was furnished by a portico (to the north). There is little doubt that Anreppen was a military base but it contains ‘luxury architecture’ one implication of which been made was that the site may have been the occasional residence of Tiberius during the campaigns of AD 4 – 5 (von Schnurbein, 2003, 97 - 98).

The Roman site at Waldgirmes was found as a result of aerial photography, not far from Dorlar (an marching camp, discovered in 1986) a large Augustan enclosure (measuring some 7.7 hectares) and protected by a double ditch and earth and timber rampart was discovered (and dated to be contemporary to Haltern). The subsequent discovery of the street grid (which appeared go contain a via principalis and a via praetoria) led to the identification of the site as a fort. Further study revealed that both sides of the main street were lined with half-timber wattle and daub buildings with street facing porticoes which more closely resembled Roman urban rather than Augustan military architecture (von Schnurbein, 2003, 99). The site also contained a group of Mediterranean style buildings of the type used for high or higher ranked individuals simular to those found at Haltern. No barrack blocks were found on the site. There were also clear or undeveloped areas within the defences towards the north and towards the southeast, which may suggest that the site remained unfinished when it was abandoned (when the existing timber buildings and the earth and timber ramparts were burnt down).
Figure 92: Plan of Roman town of Waldgirmes near Wetzlar (as of AD 2000) (after von Schnurbein, 2003) [NB: the ditch with a right angled corner outside the East defences belongs to a construction or marching camp (T1 and T2 are pottery kilns) (p 99)

The settlement at Waldgirmes may have been designed to simultaneously trade with the local Germanic population and also to supply Roman troops in the newly acquired territory. The site resembles a town rather than a military installation, a place of ‘peaceful assemblies’ complete with an forum like agora and an assemblage of Roman and indigenous pottery – which taken together with evidence from other contemporary sites suggests that the processes of transforming the lands east of the Rhine were well advanced by the time of Varus’s defeat in AD 9 (von Schnurbein, 2003, 104).
At the centre of the site, one of the buildings, which had both front and back porticoes, was systematically dismantled to create a space some 45 x 43 metres in size. A building was with stone foundations (partially set in mortar) upon which appear to have been set walls of clay and timber, this new construction has been interpreted as suggesting that the Romans planned the settlement to be permanent (von Schnurbein, 2003, 100). The central courtyard (some 32 x 24 metres) had lateral rooms and a great hall (which lay across the north end of the building and resembled principia found within Augustan forts. This building had apses built onto the rear of the building which were typical of forum buildings, the building at Waldgirmes had some resemblance to the forum at Forum Segusiavorum (Feurs) in Gaul which was laid out under Augustus (MacMullen, 2000, 106). Architecturally this type of feature was only adopted by military architects later something that suggested that the features fulfilled a specific function that the army did not serve during the Augustan period (von Schnurbein, 2003, 102).

Waldgirmes appears to have been established on brand new site and analysis of the Dendrochronological evidence has suggested that timber used to line a well on the site was felled in 4 BC. One of the reasons for the existence of the site at Waldgirmes may relate the existence of an oppidum site, the Dunsberg, which lies some 8 kilometres from Waldgirmes. The presence of this sizeable oppidum, which has yielded as a result of illegal metal detector activity a mix of Celtic and Roman artefacts and a coins (mostly Celtic but with a handful of Roman ones), dominated the region barely two generations before the establishment of Waldgirmes (von Schnurbein, 2003, 104 - 105). The site may also have filled a potential power vacuum, which had been created when Augustus (in 19 – 18 BC) resettled the Ubii tribe from lands along the River Lahn (east of the Rhine) to lands along the Rhine near Cologne (Eck, 1999, 97 – 99). The Roman new town, under construction during the period of Varus’s authority contained the stone foundations of a sizeable monumental Roman building, which also may have contained (based on recovered fragments) a sizeable equestrian statue of Augustus, fragments of which have been recovered. The site can be interpreted as a clear statement of Rome’s intention to fully incorporate the region formally into the empire, something that was only prevented by the Varian disaster in AD 9.
The discovery of Waldgirmes has triggered some discussion amongst archaeologists as to its origins and who could have constructed it. Millett (1990, 88 – 91) suggested the process of urbanisation (in Britannia and perhaps elsewhere) may have been entirely under the control of an indigenous elite or driven by the presence of foreigners (where no indigenous elite existed) e.g. in Londinium. Creighton (2006, 91) has argued that the site, rather than being constructed by the Roman army, the site was developed by members of the German elite, who had seen auxiliary service.
and were perhaps inspired by the military foundations along the Rhine rather than somewhat distant Mediterranean urban centres. The town may strengthen the case that the military were directly involved involvement in supporting the development of urban centres particularly in those regions with no pre-existing tradition of developing Mediterranean style urban foundations existed (Wilson, 2006, 23). Wilson argued that there was no reason why that such a situation, particularly when the indigenous population (elite or not) lacked technical or specialist knowledge, which could have been provided by the Roman army could not have occurred in the early years of Roman Britain (2006, 24 – 25).
Figure 94: Recovered Augustan edit from El Bieizo
The Emperor Augustus Caesar, son of the divine (Caesar), in its ninth power tribune and proconsul, said: I met with all my legates that governed the province of castro Transduriana that Paemeiobrigense, the gens of Susarros, had remained loyal, while others were dissenters. Therefore, I grant them all perpetual immunity and ordered unquestionably possess the land, and possessed the same limits as my legate Lucio Quirinal Sestio ruled this province.

At Paemeiobrigense castro, of the gens of Susarros, which I granted full immunity, reinstatement to their settlement to Alobrigiaecino castro, of the gens of Gigurros, with settlement in the same city, and ordered these from Alobrigiaecino castro fulfill all their obligations along with Susarros. Since Narbonne Martia on days 16 and 15 before the Kalends of March, being consuls M. Drusus Libo and Lucius Calpurnius Piso (15 a.)

Figure 95: Original Latin and English translation of El Bieizo edict
Appendix 7.04: Autonomy, Politics, and Archaeology in Spain

Since the death of Franco and the collapse of the dictatorship Spain has been transformed into a stable democracy with a well-developed system of powerful regional governments. This process of political and social transformation has introduced a new way of looking at the Spanish past both ancient and more recent. As is the case in modern Romania, politics and archaeology are also in important factor in modern Spain, particularly when it comes to the perception of Romanisation. Historically most, but not all Spanish scholars tended to view the impact of Rome, urbanisation and the process of cultural change in Roman Spain in a positive light (as did Mommsen) and tended to view the ancient past from a traditional centralist position. Things have change since the death of Franco and the end of the dictatorship with the on-going publication of significant quantities of local and regional publications (of varying accessibility and quality) by archaeologists and historians who view the historic past from a regional perspective (unlike many foreign archaeologists who view Spain as whole geographical unit). Modern regional divisions provide the framework for archaeologists who perceive the ancient past through a regional political perspective. Thus the degree or ‘Romaness’ or ‘un-Romaness’ of the different (17) autonomous regions of modern Spain is often interpreted as a sign of national / regional distinctiveness, by way of comparison with other parts of Spain (Keay, 2001, 118 – 122).
Appendix 7.05 – The size of the Legionary Prata

The presence of several *Legio II Augusta* stamped tiles found at Usk suggest that a military interest in the former fortress site was retained into the 2nd Century AD (Manning, 2010, 192). This means that if some of the Gwent levels were included and also the mining sites at Machen and Risca, then the prata might be a sizeable block of territory. If the Legionary prata of *Legio II Augusta* was potentially some 200 square kilometres then it would have enclosed many acres of prime farmland, pasture, minerals and other resources and directly impacted upon exactly how much good land in South Wales was later included in the Silurian Civitas territory (Mattingly 2006, 414).

![Figure 96: Distribution map showing stone inscriptions of Legio II Augusta from west and south of Britain (After Fulford 2002) (p 91)](image-url)
There are problems when it comes to identifying the scale of the territorium, research at nearby Glevum (Gloucester), a former Legionary fortress that became a colonia, illustrates the problem particularly well. There are few clues, there is a lack of any readable and identifiable traces of any centuriation, as per the Italian / Po Valley model on the landscape (Hurst, 1988, 68). The territorium of the Legionary fortress may or may not have matched or at least been incorporated into that of the later colonia. It is probable that the Roman army (based at Gloucester) would have had a substantial land holding and controlled farming and other activities, which may have been transferred across to the colonia as going concerns.

The heart of the military territorium would have been the land necessary to produce and supply the food necessary for the legionary garrison, plus basic building materials and equipment (such as could be produced locally). In the case of Glevum, the signs of increased Iron working in the Forest of Dean and the presence of stamped roof tiles close to the Cotswold edge, have suggested that the military territorium may have extended that far. Timber for building and fuel could have been supplied from the Forest of Dean. Military control of a relatively modest stretch of territory could have supplied most, if not all of what was needed to feed the legionary garrison and its dependents (Hurst, 1988, 69).

One thing is inescapable; the establishment of the 2nd Augustan Legion at Caerleon would have turned it into probably the largest landowner in the southeast. A sizeable legionary prata might have imposed a real barrier to Silurian access to the rich farmland of south Glamorgan and from eastern and central Gwent and to the civitas capital at Caerwent. Elsewhere in the empire, an inscribed boundary marker [ILS 5968] found close to the site of legionary fortress of Burnum (in Dalmatia) dated from c AD 100 may be one of a series delineating the lands of Legio III Flavia and a neighbouring forest, some 18 kilometres to the south east of the fortress site. This marker demonstrated that former legionary lands were not necessarily abandoned or transferred to civilian authorities once the military had relocated (the former fortress site ceased to be a regular legionary fortress in AD 86 (Mason, 1988, 184).
Epigraphic evidence from boundary markers [ILS 254, ILS 255, ILS 5969 and ILS 5970] from north western Spain are some of the earliest found, dating to between 23 BC and AD 14, they define the boundaries of Legio III Macedonica’s territory from that of the neighbouring towns of Iuliobriga and Segisamo (Mason, 1988, 164). The specific phraseology that is used is consistent from marker to marker e.g. ‘ter(minus) August(alis) dividit prata leg(ionis) III et agrum Iuliobriga’. The marker stones that have been discovered delineate the eastern side of Legio III’s territories from some 56 kilometres at a distance of 10 kilometres from the fortress site, potentially this gives the Legion control of some 560 square kilometres around its fortress.

The boundary markers from both Hispania Tarraconensis and Dalmatia, in these areas that remained under military governance are consistently referred to as ‘prata’, which relates or denotes ‘pasture’ rather than arable lands. This may be interpreted to suggest that the legionary lands primary purpose may, initially at least, have been the provision of grazing for the Legion’s associated animals e.g. horses, mules, oxen and sacrificial animals, etc). This theory may be supported by references in Tacitus, (Annals XVIII, 54 – 55) to the Frisians moving into lands that were only periodically used by the flocks and herds of soldiers. The large size of early ‘prata’ in the western half of the Empire, may suggest that the provision of grazing lands was only part of their function as other resources, including water resources, timber, stone and clay would have been accessed by the army. Once the military garrisons became more settled in the first century AD then the functions and nature of the use of prata would have changed as the military dependent civilian population grew in numbers, settled in the canabae legionis and nearby villages and farm settlements (Mason, 1988, 165).

Despite the general assumption that Legio II Augusta might have controlled a prata (or territorium) around the Legionary fortress; with pasture lands and other resources the exact boundaries of the prata remain undefined, save for the presence of two villas (and one potential villa), which may help to define some of the boundaries (Evans, 2010, 171 – 172). Villas at Croes-Carn-Enion, some 3 kilometres SSE of Machen and another a Ford Farm, Langstone, some 3 kilometres SE of the canabae settlement at Bulmore, may be interpreted to suggest possible administrative boundaries for the Legionary lands. Evans, noted that an indistinct crop mark some 8
kilometres NE of Caerleon, at Llangybi Walks (in the Usk Valley) may represent another villa and the northern limit of the Legionary prata.
Appendix 7.06: Feeding and sustaining the Roman Army in Wales and the marches

The new Legionary Fortress at Caerleon may have inherited the former territorium from Usk, which may go some way to explaining why Usk was not developed as either as a Colonia (e.g. Gloucester and Lincoln being two examples) or as a tribal civitas capital e.g. Exeter and Wroxeter (Manning, 2004, 190). Such a development would not have added any fresh grievances or provocations to the surviving native population as they had already lost this prime land once before and would not have faced the loss of more of their lands. In the case of Caerleon, even if a legion had carved out a large prata from lands previously held by the Silures, there could well have been further implications for native land holdings, especially with the settlement of Veterans close to the legionary fortress who would have required extra land (Mattingly, 2006, 414). The lands controlled by the legion and the veterans may have extended up the Usk Valley, down to the sea at Goldcliff, east to Bulmore and west to the important lead mining site at Machen and the Draethen, potentially amounting to over 200 square kilometres of prime farmland and other resources, all confiscated from the Silures.

At the heart of a military territorium would have been prime agricultural land, much of which would have been used to feed the military garrison (Hurst, 1988, 69). A soldier in a garrison would have needed the corn from at least one acre (0.4 hectares) of land to supply him with the basic rations for a year (Reece, 1997, 18). So to feed a full strength garrison (5,000 men) of a legionary fortress, the grain from a minimum of 5,000 acres (2,000 hectares) would have been needed. So if a Roman soldier received a basic ration of 1.36 kg of corn per day, a full legionary garrison of 6,000 soldiers and a 500 strong auxiliary cohort would have required some 3,000 tonnes of grain per year (Davies, 1971, 123). This would have been produced from around 1,500 hectares (3,700 acres) (Reynolds, 1979, 61), or taking into account variable yields, poor corps and also the need for seed corn (Millett, 1984, 71 – 72) with a doubling of the figure for land needed this would have meant that some 3,000 hectares or 7,400 acres of land in use. This in the local area would have been a sizeable amount of land, something like around 5 x 6 kilometres (or 3 x 4 miles). Even factoring in food for the military garrison’s dependents (the inhabitants of the
canabae) and food for the cultivators (if not the Roman army itself), and allowing grazing for livestock (cattle for leather, meat and armour, sheep for clothing and meat and horses and pig-farming), not to mention vegetables and fruit, the maximum amount of territory required may have been some ninety square kilometres (or thirty five square miles).

To grow grain for the legionary garrison e.g. Legio II Augusta (at Caerleon) and the native population could have required over 10,000 acres (4,000 hectares) of agricultural land. In terms of the local area close to the garrison this would have been substantial piece of land to set aside, removed from pre-conquest production. While it is possible to calculate the amount of food and land needed to feed a military garrison, it is impossible to argue the case for identifying a particular piece of land needed to supply the food. Grain can be shipped for hundreds of miles without any ill effects; but other foodstuffs i.e. fresh vegetables (e.g. lettuce) would have probably come from within a circle of a day’s journey by ox-cart from the fortress site (Reece, 1997, 18). Thus a local garrison would have been supplied by a combination of local production, purchase and requisition as well as gaining access to foodstuffs by way of the taxes paid by locals at their local fort. Specialist and luxury foodstuffs came from further afield. At Vindolanda beer, meat and wool were locally produced and vintage wines and stylus tablets were imported (Bowman, 1994, 47). Military garrisons on the periphery were able to order and receive produce and supplies from across the width of the empire via trading networks stretched from the edge of the Empire to its Mediterranean heartland. If the army contributed nothing to growing the corn there has to be some serious consideration given to the impact of the army’s need for foodstuffs upon the native producers, who would be required to grow the extra grain on top of their own needs.

The Roman Army appeared to have been dependent upon locally produced foodstuffs and other manufactured goods, based upon archaeological evidence from the Rhineland. This dependency would have led to the development of a highly complex inter-relationship between the natives and the Roman Army (Wells 1999, 143). Elsewhere in Britannia, the Vindolanda tablets make reference to the purchase of unthreshed wheat or grain by direct purchase or via an intermediary who arranged for threshing prior to delivery (Casey, Davies and Jones 1993, 75 - 78).
The Imperial administration was sufficiently well organised to facilitate the long distance transport of food stuffs and other goods, aside from feeding the population of Rome, supplies (including food) were shipped between provinces. Military units suppressing a revolt in Mauretania (during the reign of Claudius) were supplied with grain by cities in the province of Baetica in Spain (Edmondson, 2010, 255). There is archaeological evidence for the supply of imported grain in the north-western provinces of the Empire; in Britannia it has been identified in pre-Boudiccan London, at Caerleon (in a Flavian context), at York (dated to AD 70 – 120) and at South Shields (dated to a third century context). Imported grain has also been identified in the Netherlands and rice has been recovered from Neuss on the German limes (Stallibrass and Thomas, 2008, 5 – 7). There has been significant debate amongst archaeologists as to whether or not the Roman army made use of long distance (by sea for bulk shipments) or local supply in relation to its subsistence. The Roman army was not self-sufficient, shortfalls could have been made up via local supplies, whether purchased, in lieu of taxation or local production.

Aside from political, economic and social change the process of absorption into the Roman Empire and subsequent provincial development, also brought in new crops and agricultural practices. Spelt wheat at Caerleon, may have been the dominant crop in the hundred years or so after the conquest. There appears to no evidence for the cultivation of bread wheat in the early Roman period in south east Wales (Arnold and Davies, 2000, 93). Grain excavated at the site of the Roman fort at Leucarum (Loughor) had been fully processed before storage (it was mostly spelt) and had been double threshed, which suggested local supply rather than longer distance transport of grain. At Leucarum, a sequence of small granaries was associated at the site from around AD 115, by when much of the military garrison had been removed elsewhere (Marvell and Owen John, 1997, 224). Excavations at Caerleon in the late 1950’s revealed, in store huts dated to the Flavian period, the carbonised remains of various grains and other vegetable matter (Davies, 1971, 133). Analysis revealed the presence of cultivated and wild barley, spelt, rye and wheat, not to mention wild and cultivated oats, lentils, beans and various weeds. The weeds were not native to Britannia, which suggests that they had been imported with the cereals. At Segontium (Caernarfon), various cereal grains have been found from the earliest phases of occupation through until the end of occupation some of which was locally
supplied e.g. the barley found from the late Flavian / early Trajanic period onwards, was threshed outside of the Fort as attested by a lack of chaff (Casey PJ, Davies JL and Evans, J, 1993, 75 – 76). An analysis small weed assemblage associated with the cleaned grain suggested local supply (Nye S, 1993, 82 - 84).

Evidence from across the Empire shows the involvement of civilians in the military supply chain, fulfilling both local and more distant military requirements. In Egypt villagers from Fayum were supplying spear shafts and getting payments in advance. Weavers made tunics and cloaks for local units and also for units much further afield in Cappadocia. Receipts show that grain was both requisitioned and also paid for by the military and texts show that civilians also complained about the low prices they received for military contracts (Alton, 1995, 110 – 112). Local supply of food in recently conquered regions, rather than well-settled regions, may have resulted in new lands being brought into cultivation and new crops (e.g. bread wheat was unknown prior to the conquest) at least until the shrinkage of the garrison in the mid to late second century AD. The presence of a sizeable garrison in this period would have had a significant impact on the local agricultural system, even in areas with prime agricultural land. Tacitus (Annals XIII, 54) makes reference to the military maintaining herds of cattle and flocks of sheep along the lower Rhine. Cattle production played a key role in the economy, as did sheep production in the more mountainous / hilly areas, as well as elsewhere (Cunliffe, 2010, 434). Cereal production also played a key part, although it would have been limited by a combination of nature and geography.

Food is vital part of the equation, but a legion has also been estimated, to have required the hides from some 54,000 calves to produce material for the tents needed on active campaign (Wells 1999, 145). This may seem a significant amount of hide (the carcasses could have been used as well) but a rolling programme of replacement would have meant that steady supply of cattle would have satisfied a Legion’s requirements rather than the delivery of vast herds. Agricultural production and patterns of distribution will also have been affected, to the point where local suppliers may have been supplying foodstuffs to the now ready market in and around Caerleon. The army’s requirements for grain, fodder, meat, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, leather, wood for fuel and construction, drink and pottery, etc
would have been constant although the precise quantities would have varied according to the season and the numbers of soldiers stationed in the forts and fortresses across the locality (White and Baker 1998, 51). In the early years of a new province’s existence, military posts and vici settlements would have received significant quantities of imported supplies, including pottery until the new lands were able to supply requirements locally (Millett, 1990, 79).

In the early years of the occupation local food supplies could have provided the army with a portion of its short-term needs but it may not have been enough and supplies could be gathered from different areas of a province and also from neighbouring provinces. A provincial governor would also have been involved in the purchasing or securing of supplies for the military, estimating the amount of food required and setting a fixed price for foodstuffs. Collection would be carried out by the military, the procurators office, local townspeople or by local tribal leaders. There is evidence from duty rosters from forts on Hadrian’s Wall, from the Danube limes and papyri from Egypt to show that soldiers were dispatched to fetch supplies and fuel (Southern, 2007, 112 – 114).

The demand for supplies may have outstripped local supply. Pollen sequences from several areas of Britain may suggest more land clearance during the early Roman period possibly to create extra agricultural land (Dark and Dark 1998, 113). The military garrison based in the upland areas of Wales (not now noted for its production of food surpluses) may have required 7,300 tonnes of wheat for basic sustenance, which would have required the produce of 9,830 hectares or 21,000 acres of farmland (Davies, 2007, 108 – 109). The Vindolanda tablets make reference to supplies arriving in relatively small quantities, something that may have favoured relatively local suppliers, with the large scale movement of large quantities of supplies most likely have been a state enterprise (Faulkner, 2001, 57 – 58).

During the early days of the conquest and occupation many supplies were transported long distances to military garrisons. Analysis of the clay fabric of pottery recovered from the Roman Fort at Kingsholm (Gloucester) and dated to between AD 50 and AD 60 can be traced to its point of origin. Trade within the early Empire has been plotted because of the large amounts of pottery involved, e.g. transporting in
wine, olive oil, sauce, etc. Millett (1990, 78 – 79) observed that as a new province stabilised and became more self-sufficient then the amount of long distance supply would fall, something that would be reflected in recovered pottery.

![Figure 97: Origins of supplied pottery to Roman Fort at Kingsholm, Gloucester – AD 50 – AD 60 (After Millett 2005) (p 95)](image)

The army’s needs would have been met by petty traders who would have formed the interface between military and civil society and the natives, procuring supplies from small local farmers or trader arriving at a fort or vicus settlement with a few bushels of wheat, some hides and a couple of barrels of beer. Such a system would have ensured regular interaction between the Roman military and civilians and the native population. Some of surviving correspondence from Vindolanda suggests that Britons were involved in some aspect of the supply process but whether as delivery-man or suppliers is open to debate, "You will receive out of the Britons’ wagons…..from Ricariomaucus, 381 modii (8.75 litres) of bracis" (See Appendix - Vindolanda Tablet 88/946). However, soldiers from the garrison, whether as supply officers or simply unloading the goods would have been intimately involved in the process (Birley 2002, 90). Local negotiation and local purchase was essential to any garrison, Vindolanda (and no doubt every other garrison) existed with a degree of financial independence when it came to the provision of supplies (Bowman 1994, 48).
One of the consequences of the legions becoming permanent garrisons would have been a change in use of the legionary ‘prata’ from overwhelmingly providing pasture and fuel to a more managed provision of foodstuffs and fuel. The provision of pasture was necessary fact of life because of the sizeable footprint of the legionary pack train and the need to provision mounts and remounts for officers and the 120 equities legionis or mounted Legionaries (Southern, 2007, 101). During the early Imperial period, when the legions were regularly moved about the Empire, there would have been a pressing need to retain a sizeable number of pack animals (including horses, mules and oxen). At bare minimum this works out at
approximately 60 mules per cohort and 640 mules per legion, not to mention the oxen, which were needed to move the heavier wagons in the baggage train (Mason, 1988, 163 – 164). Once you factor in the herds of cattle and flocks of sheep, under Legionary care then you begin to build up a picture of the sizeable impact and footprint of a legion within the local landscape. The permanent presence of the Legionary base would have had significant economic and social impact on local settlement patterns of both the canabae and other local settlements (Mattingly, 2006, 414 – 415). A sizeable Legionary landholding would also have a direct impact on relations between the Army, the non-native population and the surviving Silures for some time after hostilities had ceased. Excavations some 150 metres from the military defences of the Usk Legionary Fortress revealed plough furrows that were contemporary with the military occupation of the Fortress and this may well suggest that the military garrison (or their dependents) were active tenants of the agricultural land within their prata (Manning, 1989, 153).

The control of resources could have played an important role in deciding where the boundary would have been positioned e.g. in the case of the Legionary fortress at Gloucester it may have been the iron ore (in the Forest of Dean) and the limestone (from the Cotswold edge), which the army may have exploited that impacted on where any boundaries were established. Increased signs of Iron working in the Forest of Dean and the presence of roof tiles close to the Cotswold edge suggest that the military territorium extended far enough to include these mineral resources within it’s territorial boundaries. The military territorium (for the Legionary fortress at Gloucester) would have also contained prime agricultural land, much of which would have been used to feed the military garrison (Hurst, 1988, 69). Even factoring in food for the military garrison’s dependents (the inhabitants of the canabae) and food for the cultivators (if not the Roman army itself), and allowing grazing for livestock (cattle for leather, meat and armour, sheep for clothing and meat and horses and pig-farming), not to mention vegetables and fruit, Hurst (1988, 69) suggested that the maximum amount of territory required would have been some ninety square kilometres (or thirty five square miles). Timber, he notes could have been supplied from the Forest of Dean.
Appendix 7.07 - Legio II Augusta and the Gwent Levels

The Second Augustan Legion may itself have been involved in land reclamation on the Wentlooge level between the Usk and the Rhymney rivers and to the east of the River Usk. These reclaimed wetlands would have provided excellent easily controllable grazing for horses and cattle. Archaeological evidence has suggested that the Silures used the area around Goldcliff to raise cattle before the conquest as excavation has revealed large numbers of cattle hoof-prints (and associated human footprints in the peat surrounding buildings at Goldcliff Point which may have been used as Byres (Fulford, 1996, 8, Howell, 2006, 45). The initial reclamation of the Gwent levels during the Roman era took place in the late first and early second centuries AD, perhaps as a direct result of Roman military initiatives (as opposed to communal initiatives on the eastern side of the estuary) and as a result of the development of the Roman town at Caerwent (King, 2007, 354).

Figure 99: The Gwent Levels: the estuarine alluvium and Romano-British find spots in the Severn Estuary (After Allen and Fulford 1986) (p 92)
The biggest change was that human activity on the levels ceased to be opportunistic in the Roman period; large-scale drainage took place with the apparent involvement of the military from the nearby legionary fortress at Caerleon. There was a greater scale of social organisation and economic demand, as the processes concurrent with a period of acculturation replaced opportunistic pre-historic activity with a period of human dominance over the wetland areas. The earliest recorded Romano-British pottery recovered on the Wentlooge has been dated to the later second century AD. Roman measurements persist into the modern era in relation to land division by use of drainage ditches, which may have first been dug during the Roman period (Allen and Fulford, 1986, 113 – 114).

![Figure 100: The Wentlooge Level, south Wales. A reclaimed saltmarsh, where the present day field ditches follow a Roman layout (After Fulford 2002) (p 94)](image)

On the Caldicot level, Roman kilns have been dated to the late 3rd and early 4th century, although there is evidence for Roman-British occupation from sites at Uskmouth, Cold Harbour Pill and Magor. Pottery recovered from the Rumney Great Wharf area ranged from the late Iron Age through to the third or fourth century AD (Fulford, Allen and Rippon, 1994, 177). As the Silures had used the levels to raise stock, any Roman use of the same area for a similar purpose may have led to tensions between the natives and the Roman Army. The coastal margins or levels on both sides of the River Usk were important in pre-Roman times, with pre-historic settlement and exploitation taking place when the environmental conditions permitted it, with periods of human activity interspersed with periods of marine inundation (Bell, 1997, 109).
The sizeable military presence and the increasing population probably created a demand for agricultural land, which would have had a direct impact on the landscape beyond that of woodland clearance (Brown, 2013, 253). This may have manifested itself in the widespread embanking on the Gwent levels, which began in the first century AD. With ditches cut to enclose fields, which were mostly used for pasture, suggested by pollen evidence, macro-botanical remains and cattle bones from the settlements at Nash and Wentlooge supported by the dominance of cattle bones recovered at Caerleon. The scale of the project not only suggested that the military were involved, that there was a need for all available land and that the military and civilian centres had a significant hinterland. The predominance of butchered cattle bones recovered at the nearby Legionary fortress at Caerleon revealed by excavations that the ratio of cattle, pig and sheep fragments was a constant 3:2:1 save for where small samples exaggerated slight differences. It was also noted that much of the cattle material had been butchered with cleavers showing with very little signs of ageing (Hamilton-Dyer, 1993, 135).
Appendix 7.08 – The Paulinus Stone (RIB 2312) and the Silures

TI[berio] CLAVDIO PAVLINO
LEG[atvs] LEG[ionis] II
AVG[vsta] PROCONSVL
PROVINC[iae] NAR
RBONENSIS
LEG[ato] AVG[usti]
PR[o]PR[raetore] PROVIN[ciae]
LVGVDVNEN[sis]
EX DECRETO
ORDINIS RES
PVBL[cae] CIVIT[atis]
SILVRVM

For Tiberius Claudius Paulinus,
legate of the Second Augustan
Legion, proconsul of (Gallia)
Narbonensis, imperial propraetorian
legate of (Gallia) Lugdunensis. By
decree of the ordines for public
works on the tribal council of the
republic of the Silures
(Trans After Manning 2001)(p 56)

Figure 101: The Paulinus Stone (RIB 2312), Caerwent (After Craster 1981)(p 9)
The Paulinus Stone (RIB 2312) dated to just before AD 220 may provide a literal clue as to how the provincial administration worked in 3rd century Britannia and Gaul. The stone provides proof of the existence of a relationship between the Silurian elite as represented by the reference to the tribal council or Ordo (Manning 2001, 56-7) and Tiberius Claudius Paulinus, one time Legionary legate of Legio II Augusta (which was based nine miles away at nearby Caerleon) and at the time Imperial Governor of the Senatorial province of Narbonensis (in southern Gaul). Despite the damage to the inscription, the implication may be that the Silures Ordo was aware that he was about to return as a Governor of one of the two provinces of Britannia and that perhaps they were hoping that he would act as their patron and also gain favour from the Imperial authorities (Salway, 2002, 206). They may have missed out, as the Silures civitas territory lay in Upper Britain, when the promotion occurred Paulinus got Lower Britain instead.

The reference on the statue base to the degree of the tribal ordo is particularly significant as it emphasises both the town as a setting for what are specifically Roman political institutions and also suggested that there was some degree of communal participation (Revell, 2007, 74–75). The hinted relationship with Tiberius Claudius Paulinus, who was the former legionary legate at Caerleon, (and later a provincial official at Narbonne and Lugdunensis and a Governor of Britannia Inferior (Birley, 2003, 342–4) and the Silures is also important. It implied that there were links of hospitality and patronage and it also demonstrated that the local ordo had some knowledge of political structures, the correct social forms of address, and an awareness of the importance of maintaining political links with imperial officials.

By strange coincidence there is a surviving inscription (CIL XIII 3162) from Gaul, which records that Paulinus had been cleared of misconduct following accusations made to the council of the Gallic provinces. Titus Sennius Solleminis, who refers to himself as both amicus (friend) and cliens (client) in his relationship with Tiberius Claudius Paulinus. Solleminis used a procedural motion to stop the motion and spoke against it successfully. The statue dedication may suggest that the Silures Ordo may have dedicated the statue to show support and also (hopefully) to receive favours when Paulinus took up his new post (Salway, 2002, 218). The Paulinus stone also provides confirmation that the tribal identity of the Silures, as personified
by the Tribal Ordo, had been retained as late as AD 220 after a long military campaign and occupation (Aldhouse-Green, 2004, 161).
'Octavius to his brother Candidus, greetings. The hundred pounds of sinew from Marinus - I will settle up. From the time when you wrote to me about this matter, he has not even mentioned it to me. I have several times written to you that I have bought about five thousand modii of ears of grain, on account of which I need cash. Unless you send me some cash, at least five hundred denarii, the result will be that I shall lose what I have laid out as a deposit, about three hundred denarii, and I shall be embarrassed. So, I ask you, send me some cash as soon as possible. The hides which you write are at Cataractonium - write that they be given to me and the waggon about which you write. And write to me what is with that waggon. I would have already collected them except that I did not care to injure the animals while the roads are bad. See with Tertius about the 81/2 denarii which he received from Fatalis. He has not credited them to my account. Know that I have completed the 170 hides and I have i i (?) modii of threshed bracis. Make sure that you send me some cash so that I may have ears of grain on the threshing-floor. Moreover, I have already finished threshing all that I have. A messmate of our friend Frontius has been here. He was wanting me to allocate (?) him hides and that being so, was ready to give cash. I told him I would give him the hides by the Kalends of March. He decided that he would come on the Ides of January. He did not turn up nor did he take any trouble to obtain them since he had hides. If he had given the cash, I would have given him them. I hear that Frontinius Julius has for sale at a high price the leather ware (?) which he bought here for five denarii apiece. Greet Spectatus and . . . and Firmus. I have received letters from Gleuco. Farewell. (Back) Vindolanda.'

Vindolanda Tablet 88/946
Appendix 7.10 - Characteristics of main excavated sites with Murcus Dacicus (After Lockyear 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Primary Feature</th>
<th>MLD Lower</th>
<th>Other Excavation</th>
<th>Excavation</th>
<th>MLD Excavation</th>
<th>Other Excavation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site 1</td>
<td>Region 1</td>
<td>Feature 1</td>
<td>Feature 2</td>
<td>Feature 3</td>
<td>Feature 4</td>
<td>Feature 5</td>
<td>Feature 6</td>
<td>Feature 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Further details and specific characteristics are provided in the referenced source.
Appendix 7.11 – Politics, Ideology and Archaeology in Romania

In the Western Europe during the Cold War West the relationship between archaeology, ideology and politics mostly related to a need to find more funding and time for excavations in a time of severe fiscal austerity. In the dark days of the Cold War in communist Romania this was not the case, politics, ideology and archaeology had always been intrinsically linked.

Politics, ideology and archaeology did make, sometimes particularly dangerous bedfellows - the underlying historic argument between Latinists and Dacianists took on a dangerous edge during the former Cold war. Archaeologists during the Stalinist period had little choice but to focus on documenting the Slavic nature of the archaeological record. Romanian linguists were required to confirm that Romanian was not a Romance language but a Slavic one.

According to The Institute for the Investigation of Communist Crimes in Romania (Institutul de Investigare a Crimelor Comunismului în România) as many as one million Romanians were murdered by the communists between 1945 and 1989. Dissent was not advisable and forced labour or worse a direct result of it on Stalinist construction projects, many dissenters never returned (Ellis, 1998, 225).

During the post-war period political pressure from the communist authorities led to a focus on rural settlement (the homes of the ‘working masses’) at the expense of more ‘Roman’ sites (the homes of the (imperialist robbers’) this led to a wave of simultaneous unfinished publications (Oltean, 2004, 143). Following the demise of Stalinism (in the decade after Stalin’s death) archaeological debate and discussion began again, with significant debate about the late Iron Age period.

The Dacianist vision of the past peaked during the brutal rule of the Ceausescu dictatorship in 1970s-1980s (Oltean, 2007, 6). After Ceausescu came to power archaeology remained directly affected and manipulated by Romanian communist politicians.

Under Ceausescu, Romanian archaeologists were forced to claim that the Romanians were the direct descendants of the historic Dacians and any Roman contribution was minimised, as imperialism (Roman or otherwise, but not Soviet) was
rejected being replaced with a pro-Romanian nationalist slant. The increasingly repressive dictatorship ensured that any rational discussion or interpretation of the archaeological record did not take place with both Romanian and non-Romanian archaeologists in the county suffered accordingly if their expressed views did not echo those of the dictator.

There was a focus from the Communist authorities on the Dacian ruler Burebista, who by the 1970’s was credited with creating a Dacian state; in 1980 Communist Romania celebrated the 2050th anniversary of his state (Lockyear, 2004, 33 – 34). There was criticism of the Romanization theory encouraged by the Communist authorities in the mid and late 1980’s with potentially career terminating consequences for advocates of Romanization, yet the Romanization theory would not go away (Haynes and Hanson, 2004, 28)

Thus historically, at least until fairly recently, the understanding of the impact of Roman occupation on Dacia and an understanding of the development of the Roman province of Dacia has largely been dependent on the written historical record rather than the archaeological record. Romanian and most of non-Romanian archaeologists had little choice but to accept a particular politically and ideologically driven narrative, that stated that the conquest of Dacia by Rome was a massively dramatic event followed by large-scale state driven colonisation that was directly related to the development of Roman urban foundations.

Our understanding of the history of Roman Dacia had suffered; the official line was that there was significant depopulation as a result of the two wars fought Decebalus. Hill forts had been deliberately abandoned and the surviving population had been resettled from the hill regions to lowland areas. The remaining surviving natives suffered the loss of their land holdings which were redistributed to colonist and veteran settlers, used to establish new colonies, towns and villa estates, to fulfil the occupying Roman army’s supply needs and as part of the imperial estates.

All this came with an inherent contradiction as the surviving native population (who had remained in possession of their lands) were then Romanized, they lived alongside and with those Roman colonists, who remained in Dacia after the Roman
administration and military forces withdrew (under Aurelian) in the 3rd century AD. This population thus became the ancestors of the modern Romanians.

Since the revolution and the turn of the millennium things have changed for the better. Archaeological research focused on Roman towns (in Romania) has been re-launched. There have been a number of multinational projects and research teams who have undertaken large-scale research work into sites at Sarmizegetusa Ulpia, Apulum, Napoca and Tibiscum – and major efforts have been made to publish results internationally.
Appendix 7.12 – The Recruitment of Dacian Auxiliary units

Late Republican and Imperial authorities both regularly recruited auxiliary units from amongst their defeated enemies and also made use of contingents sent for service by Friendly Kings (Kehne, 2011, 331). Caesar himself used Gaulish and German cavalry in his campaigns to conquer Gaul (Goldsworthy, 2003, 126). Batavian Auxiliary units (recruited from the lower Rhine) served (possibly alongside Brutish Auxiliaries) at Mons Graupius with Agricola’s army, back in AD 43, Batavian units had also participated in the conquest of southern Britain.

Particularly during the first century AD, the Roman army regularly recruited defeated enemies and also barbarians from beyond the Empires borders (Southern, 2007, 144) into its auxiliary units. After Civilis’s revolt was crushed (in AD 69 – 70), some of the Lingones who surrendered may well have been recruited into the 5 cohorts of coh. Lingonum who served in Britannia, including Cohors Secundae Lingonum, who are attested at Ilkley (RIB 635) and Moresby (RIB 800) in Yorkshire, some distance from their Gaulish homeland.

"In the war waged under the auspices of the Emperor Caesar Domitianus Augustus Germanicus and begun by Julius Civilis in Gaul, the very wealthy city of the Lingones, which had revolted to Civilis, feared that it would be plundered by the approaching army of Caesar. But when, contrary to expectation, the inhabitants remained unharmed and lost none of their property, they returned to their loyalty, and handed over to me seventy thousand armed men.”

Frontinus, Strategemata, Book 4. 3.14

The Roman authorities appeared to have made no exception when it came to recruiting Dacians for Imperial service after the conquest. The Dacians may well have been able to carry arms, as some auxiliary units carried their own weapons and equipment e.g. Cretan and Syrian archers, Balearic slingers and camel riders, etc. The recruitment of Dacians into auxiliary units suggested that despite the war, enslavement and deportations suggested by the 4th century AD classical tradition; that there was a residual surviving Dacian population to recruit from within Dacia as the conquest was completed or afterwards. The identification of auxiliary units recruited from amongst the Dacian’s remains difficult because of the problems of
spotting the ethnographic / epigraphic differences between similar nationalities i.e. Dacians and Thraco-Dacians.

Figure 102: RIB 1881

\[
\text{I(ovi) O(ptimo) M(aximo) / c(o)ho(rs)} \\
\text{I A[el(ia)] / Dac(orum) cui p[rae]/est} \\
\text{Iuliu[s] / Saturnin[us] / tribun[us]} \\
\text{‘For Iupiter Best and Greatest, the} \\
\text{First Cohort of Aelian Dacians under} \\
\text{the command of Iulius Saturninus,} \\
\text{tribune, (set this up)}'.
\]

Whatever the actual scale of auxiliary recruitment from amongst the residual Dacian population (of weapon bearing age) it would have contributed to a net reduction of the native population post conquest. Dacians were recruited into auxiliary units for service outside of Dacia, they served in \textit{ala I Ulpio Dacorum} (in Cappadocia), \textit{cohors I Aelii Dacorum} (in Britannia), \textit{cohors II Aurelia Dacorum} (in Pannonia) and \textit{cohors II Augusta Dacorum} (in Moesia inferior) (Gàzdac, 2010, 59). A unit of Getic cavalry (Arrian, Tact 44.1) has also been identified as \textit{Ala I Ulbia Dacorum}. A number of inscriptions have been found referring to \textit{Cohors I Aelia Dacorum Miliara}, who were stationed in Britannia at Birdoswald (CIL VII 1881).

Dacia, which was conquered and absorbed into the Roman Empire in the early 2nd century AD, and Dacian auxiliary units were dispatched to a wide variety of military posts across the Empire. Romans with a visible (epigraphically at least) Dacian identity have been discovered in provinces as far apart as Egypt and Britannia (Saddington, 2009, 88). In Britannia, \textit{cohors I Aelii Dacorum}, was deployed at
Banna (Birdoswald) in the 3rd century AD – their continued ‘Dacian ethnicity’ (over one hundred years after the original conquest of Dacia) has been demonstrated by epigraphic evidence (RIB 1914 and RIB 1909) including building inscriptions and the presence of a carved *falx* (the Dacian curved sword) on an altar. Additionally a ‘Dacian’ soldier gave his son the name of Decabalus (the late first and early second century AD Dacian king) whose defeat led to the conquest and absorption of Dacia into the Roman Empire.
Appendix 7.13 – The impact of Legio V Macedonica on Potaissa and its hinterland

Potaissa, became an important town in the Roman period, and became the focus of development for its hinterland. West of the Aries River the landscape starts to change, becoming the foothills of the Apuseni Mountains. The establishment of the legionary fortress changed the dynamic in relation to settlements, with settlements now appearing to the west and north of the fortress site, along the Roman road and in the Arieş River Valley as it entered the uplands to the southwest (Wanner, 2010, 289).

Figure 103: Late Iron Age activity in the Aries River/Potaissa area (After Wanner 2010) (p 289)
The establishment of the fortress appears to have changed the dynamic in relation to settlements. Wanner (2010, 289) noted that settlements now appeared to the west and north of the fortress, along the Roman road and in the Arieș River Valley as it entered the uplands to the southwest. Some settlements with villa-type architecture (with military brick stamps) were identified some distance away from the fortress and the road. At Aiton, there was now a substantial Roman period settlement with one building with stone foundations (a mansio?), which contained a single Dacian fructiera (pedestal bowl) and a stamped amphora and the discovery of four Roman period stone structures in the area of the modern village (Wanner, 2010, 289).

Figure 104: Roman period activity in Potaissa area (After Wanner 2010) (p 290)
Some settlements with villa-type architecture (with military brick stamps) were identified some distance away from the legionary base and the road. At Aiton, where traces of late La Tène occupation had been discovered, there was now a substantial Roman period settlement with one building with stone foundations (a mansio?) which contained a single Dacian fructiera (pedestal bowl) and a stamped amphora and the discovery of four Roman period stone structures in the area of the modern village (Wanner, 2010, 289). The site at Aiton now appeared to become one of the larger more important settlements in the region, perhaps benefitting from its important position on the Roman road network, 14 km from the centre of Napoca and 12 km from Potaisa.

Figure 105: Legionary stamps at Roman settlements in the Potaisa area (After Wanner 2010) (p 291)
Settlements appeared to cluster on the western side of the mountains, near Cheile Turzii, possibly to make use of available building stone. Wanner (2010, 290 - 291) suggested that few other general patterns in settlement location were identifiable. He noted that settlements appeared in equal proportions at both middle and upper altitudes. All of the settlements were located close to streams, although there was some variation between major rivers, minor rivers and lower order tributaries.

![Figure 106: Roman period settlement types in the Potaissa area (After Wanner 2010) (p 292)](image)

Legionary brick stamps have been found in six locations to the north of Potaissa and to the east of the road to Napoca. Aside from a few rural locations north of the Roman fort of Gilău-Avicola, these were the only areas where legionary stamps were found outside of towns and military bases. Wanner (2010, 292) suggested that this
fact was particularly important, as in other areas in the countryside, there was little evidence to suggest that the army took any role in the construction of non-urban civilian settlements. Aside from the possible mansion site at Aiton, the settlements were all found at least a kilometre from the main roads, and in many cases much further from the road. The territory between Napoca and Potaissa may have been an area with which the military from Potaissa were particularly active on a daily basis (as argued by James 2001) performing their duties and tasks in the landscape surrounding the fortress site. Wanner (2010, 293) noted that aside from being stationed at the main legionary fortress, significant number of soldiers saw periodical service in small detachments away from the forts along the Meseș Mountains (at fortlets and watch towers), he also suggested that their work outside the fortress at Potaissa was related to non-combatants.

Villa-type architecture was found dispersed over a large area west of Potaissa, at altitudes of between 400 and 600 m. Although few in number, a number of these sites were found relatively far away from the main road in the upland areas. Wanner (2010, 293-294) suggested that this suggested that some pathways to the west are simply not archaeologically visible. He noted that Roman brooches and coins were also discovered at two of the settlements (Bădeni-Movila Dâmb and Moldovenești), and there was evidence for iron working at another settlement (Pestreștii de Sus-Cermei). The discovery of *Tegulae mammatae* (at Iara) to the west indicated a hypocaust system and strongly indicated the presence of a villa or even a bathhouse, all of which may suggest the presence of a mining settlement (Crișan et al. 1992: 236).

Around the hills of Turda comprising Cetate, Zâne, and Şuia, the low lying floodplain with fine soil texture would have run a risk of flooding, but this was a risk worth taking to secure an important strategic location. Aside from the fortress site at Potaissa, very few settlements in this area were established within the area of immediate flood risk. Further north, several homesteads were established within the area of moderate flood risk on account of slope grade and the very fine texture of the soil. In the region, it has been noted that settlement in all periods has tended to remain on the edges of the forested areas to the west; but archaeological remains on the agriculturally chernozem which lies to the northeast of the town remain rare. While
acknowledging that salt remained an important resource in all historical periods. Wanner (2010, 295-296) noted that settlement actually thinned out away from the Roman road and the town.

Figure 107: Land-use in Roman period Potaissa area (After Wanner 2010) (p 294)

Substantial concentrations of settlements have been found within the rich alluvium soils of the river valley of the Arieş and to the west along the edge of the river valley on the mixed brown podzols between the edge of the forests and the mixed brown soils of the foothills of the Apuseni Mountains. Wanner suggested that there might have been a gradual upslope movement driven by forest exploitation for fuel, the
creation of new arable land and new pasture (this trend continued after the end of the Roman period).
Appendix 7.14 – Severan Apulum

Figure 108: Severan Apulum (After Diaconescu 2004) (p 107)
A municipium (municipium Aurelium Apulense) was created at Apulum near to the Legionary fortress just after AD 168-169. This settlement became a colonia under Commodus (colonia Aurelia Apulensis), as did the municipium at Napoca (colonia Aurelia Napoca). Under Septimius Severus several other settlements were also raised to the rank of municipium status (Gàzdac, 2010, 55-56) as a reward to the soldiers for their support in winning the civil wars.

The case of the legionary fortress at Apulum shows the continuing importance of urban centres in Roman Dacia to the imperial household and how changes in status could encourage and reward settlers. The fortress which was situated to control the access routes in central Dacia; it also oversaw the gold mines at Albumus Major (now Rosia Montana) and at Ampelum (now Zlatna) and controlled the rich agricultural lands of Transylvania and the Mures valley.

The civilian canabae legionis, which grew up close to the fortress (Legio XIII Gemina), was not the only civilian settlement as traces of a civil settlement (extra leugam) grew up some 1.5 kilometres from the canabae, it was inhabited by both veterans and settlers and it can be dated to the early years of the life of the new province.

Following the Marcomannic wars of Marcus Aurelius and the subsequent provincial reorganization the settlement, possibly founded by Trajan, gained it’s own identity and autonomy something further which was further boosted by the Severan emperors which left Apulum with two important urban foundations rather than one. Apulum became the most important urban centre in Dacia in the late Antonnine / Severan period. (Diaconescu, 2004, 103 – 117). The tombstone of C. Sentius Flaccus (CIL III 1196), who was buried at Apulum, reveals that he served as a decurio coloniae Daciae Sarmizgetusae, which demonstrates that the settlement began life administratively at least as a pagus of colonia Ulpia Traiana Samrizegetusa in the first half of the 2nd century AD (Gàzdac C, Suciu V and Alföldy-Gàzdac A, 2009, 2-3).
Appendix 7.15 – Inscription from Aquae Flavae

An inscription on a bridge at Aquae Flavae (ILS 254), listed the involvement of *leg(io) VII Gem(ina) Fel(ix)* and some ten Civitates, which Richardson noted were without Roman status (Richardson, 1998, 89). This inscription has been dated to AD 79 only a few years after the Legion arrived at Leon. This is a good example of the kind of interactions between the military and the local population, something that would over the long-term take place at many different levels. The Inscription showed that different communities could work together and that they could count on the assistance of the Army with key building projects. The inscribed column (dated to the reign of Vespasian) listed local civitas involved in bridge construction (and who were dependent on the municipium of Aquae Flaviae): as well as noting the involvement of Legio VII Gemina Felix (Goffaux, 2001, 265).

\[...\]

IMP(eratori) CAES(ari) VESP(asiano) AVG(usto) PONT(ifici)/ MAX(imo) TRIB(unicia) POT(estate) X IMP(eratori) XX P(atri) P(atriae) CO(n)S(uli) IX/ IMP(eratori) VESP(asiano) CAES(ari) AVG(usto) F(ilio) PONT(ifici) TRIB(unicia)/ POT(estate) VIII IMP(eratori) XII IMP(eratori) CAES(ari) AVG(usto) VESP(asiano) CAES(ari) AVG(usto) F(ilio) PONT(ifici) TRIB(unicia)/ POT(estate) VIII IMP(eratori) XII CO(n)S(uli) V[I] [I]/ (...) CAIO CALPETANO RANTIO QUIRINALI/ VAL(erio) FESTO LEG(ato) AVG(usto) PL(etrius)/ CORNELIO MAECIANO LEG(ato) AVG(usto)/ LUCIO ARRVNTIO MAX(imo) PROC(urator) AVG(usto)/ LEG(io) VII GEM(ina) FEL(ix)/ CIVITATES X/ AQUIFLAVIENSES AVOBRIGENS (es)/ BIBALI COELERNI EQVAESI/ INTERAMICI LIMICI NAEBISOCI/ QUERQVERN TAMAGANI

Figure 109: Bridge inscription from Aquae Flavae (ILS 254) showing participating civitas and Legio VII Gemina

- Aquiflavienses;
- Avobrigenses;
- Bibali;
- Coelerni;
- Equaesi;
- Interamici;
- Limici;
- Nebisoci;
- Querquerni; and Tamagani
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Abbreviations

ILS: Inscriptiones Latinae Selectate

RIB: Roman Inscriptions of Britain

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