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Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: a definition

Ray, Indrajit 1996. Coalition-proof correlated equilibrium: a definition. Games and Economic Behavior 17 (1) , pp. 56-79. 10.1006/game.1996.0094

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Abstract

A coalition-proof correlated equilibrium of a game is a pair consisting of a correlation device and a coalition proof Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the device. A direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium is a canonical device such that the obedient strategy is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of the canonical extended game. The revelation principle may not hold even for two person games. Direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium may fail to exist for games with more than two-players. For any game, a pure) coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is a direct coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Additional Information: This is a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation.
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 08998256
Funders: Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 08:50
URI: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/86077

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