Re-creating conflict: An examination of Somali diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict

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This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2015
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This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is it being submitted concurrently in candidature for any other degree or award.

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Abstract

Re-creating conflict; Somali diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict

Somalia has for more than two decades been in a perpetual state of conflict and more than a million Somalis have fled the initial civil war. Approximately 400,000 of them reside here in the UK. They have formed a large diasporic community and have set up their own websites and TV stations to remain engaged with the happenings of their homeland. Diasporic media is often hailed as a medium that allows immigrants to maintain their identity in their host country as well as providing a platform to sustain ties with their homeland. However, if these ties are being maintained with a homeland that is in a state of conflict, the potential to transport the dynamics of the conflict and re-create it amongst the diaspora audiences is very much a possibility. This thesis illustrates how diasporic media can re-create conflict through a theoretically developed and empirically informed argument that provides three analytically distinct approaches referred to as the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. This thesis in essence, argues that diasporic media is more complex than what current scholars have demonstrated and that there is a need to broaden the scope of current academic debates concerning the interplay between diasporic media, transnationalism and conflict.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

During the summer of 2013, I spent some months in Mogadishu producing TV programmes as part of a UN-sponsored anti-piracy media campaign. Whilst there, my aunt was killed in a suicide bomb attack targeted at a restaurant where she was a shareholder. She came from London, along with five of her six children, to oversee the restaurant and to have her children spend some time with their relatives in their country of origin. The explosion occurred around midday and caused the deaths of more than 15 people and scores more were injured. My aunt was rushed to the hospital by distant relatives who happened to be nearby and she died of severe blood loss in hospital. In less than an hour, a mass funeral was organised for all the deceased. They dug the graves for my aunt and the others that had died and final prayers were said over them. She left behind 6 children between 6 and 19 years of age. Two of her teenage children, aged 15 and 17, were forced to dig their mother’s grave whilst everyone around them kept shouting for them to stop crying. “Everyone dies”, they said, “and soon you will too.” Of course, there is a religious element to this as it is the way of Muslims to bury the dead as soon as possible. Still, the agony and shock on those children’s faces was indescribable. What struck me among all the mayhem that was happening was how mechanical the proceedings felt. People had become so accustomed to death and killings that the compassion one feels towards the deceased and the loved ones they left behind had disappeared. Back at the hotel, I went online to see the reports of the explosion on the Somali websites. Almost all of them had mentioned the explosion in passing, dedicating only a few column inches to describe how and where the explosion occurred and the number of casualties. The restaurant where the explosion occurred was back up and running the following day with makeshift plastic coverings hung over the areas where the damage was done. People were eating, drinking and making conversations as if nothing had happened less than 24 hours ago.

It is professional and personal experiences like these that I have amassed over the span of 10 years working as a journalist covering the Somali conflict that has piqued my interest to undertake this research.
It aims to examine the role of the Somali media in the Somali conflict. The thesis takes a socio-historic approach since examining the historical development of a society informs much of contemporary societal as well as communicative patterns. The socio-historic approach assumes that social processes containing structures are self-contained entities with lives of their own which to a large extent determine both the behaviour and consciousness of individual human beings in their orbit (Schwartz 1955). Many conflict scholars focus on the political and structural processes at play with some shedding light on the economic issues such as poverty, corruption and social inequality which indeed are all major issues that play a determining role. But tracking the historical developments of a society in conflict can illuminate these as well as other processes that have cumulatively led to the contemporary complexity of a conflict. This thesis seeks to re-focus on the importance of examining the social history of a society in conflict in order to reach deeper and more meaningful understanding.

I began reading relevant literature with a broad interest in media, conflict and globalisation and a special interest in the Somali media in relation to the Somali conflict. Early on I noticed the lack of studies done in this specific area. There were some studies on Somali websites, general mapping of Somali media, role of the media in Somali peace building efforts that were often region specific and studies that were briefly conducted for training purposes. My study would therefore potentially fill a big gap in alternative media studies as well as the role they play in conflict zones.

The gap of up to date existing literature of Somali media meant I had to begin with a mapping exercise of all the existing Somali media to get a broad understanding of the different conflict dynamics that were at play. I explored the patterns of ownership, stakeholders, target audience and types of rhetoric. This mapping exercise as well as the literature I read highlighted the hegemonic position that Somali diasporic media occupied within the Somali media landscape which refined my research to examining diasporic media and its involvement in the Somali conflict.
The predominant reasons for this seemed to be that the diaspora communities, particularly those living in the West, had access to more financial means, peaceful democratic environments and better technological infrastructure. Diasporic media is often lauded for its capabilities to help immigrants preserve their identities, maintain ties of kinship and remain connected to the happenings of their homeland (Harindranath 2007 et al). But when these connections are being maintained with a homeland in a state of conflict, what can the repercussions of that connection amount to and is it possible that the conflict can be transported, manifested and re-created among the diaspora audiences? This question became the central focus of my research with the key aim being to broaden the scope of academic debate surrounding diasporic media. In order to answer this central question of the possibility of conflict re-creation, I have developed a conceptual framework which stipulates that there are three analytically distinct ways in which conflict can be re-created. I call these the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. These were informed by the relevant literature and the mapping exercise, which highlighted the prominent conflict themes that I could then categorise into those three overarching politics. To examine how these politics can be reproduced by the Somali diasporic media, four research aims were formulated and these are pursued across the course of the thesis. The four research aims are:

1) To map the Somali diasporic media available to re-create conflict
2) To examine and determine to what extent diasporic media exhibit the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation
3) To examine how the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation are generated among diaspora Somalis in the UK by diasporic media
4) Examine how Somali journalists through their coverage of the conflict engage in the production of the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation
The Somali media operates within the Somali conflict. It is therefore imperative to theoretically examine the root causes and underlying complexities that also fuel its continuity. Chapter 2 fulfils this examination. In here I present my theoretical approaches to the root causes of the Somali conflict which I identify as poverty and unequal access to resources, clannism and international community engagement. I argue that the Somali conflict is a result of a complex set of historically developing causes, which can be broadly categorised into these three root causes. Most scholars of the Somali conflict tend to focus on one or two of these causes, usually clannism and/or poverty and unequal access to resources but adopting a socio-historic approach allows for an all-encompassing analysis, which brings forth the depth of how much international community engagement is a root cause that is often sidelined as a fuelling factor at most.

Cumulatively these root causes sparked the 1991 Somali civil war leading to a steady flow of migration. The initial outbreak is estimated to have uprooted over a million people (UNDP2002) with most of them fleeing to the Middle East, Northern America and Europe. Many Somalis also fled to Australia and New Zealand. Somalis in the diaspora have come to form a substantial group that have become adept at using technological infrastructure to their advantage since the need to stay aware of their homeland became a necessity. Chapter 3 puts the Somali diaspora and the diasporic media they have established into perspective. The thesis focuses on the Somali diaspora in the UK. The reason for focusing on Somalis in the UK is due to their demographic diversity, which would make for a richer and more representative data. Unlike most other diaspora hostlands, the UK due to its colonial ties with Somalia has historically been favoured as a settlement destination for many Somalis and chapter 3 relates the diversity of the Somalis in the UK and the history of their migration. This research reconfirms what previous scholars have already identified, which are the capabilities of diasporic media to help diaspora groups to maintain ties of kinship, stay aware of and engage with the happenings in their homeland. But as mentioned before, it seeks to gauge deeper and examine what else diasporic media is facilitating, particularly in relation to the transnational connection they enable between Somalis in the diaspora and their conflict-ridden homeland.
Somalis are traditionally close-knit and often live communally occupying one or more neighbourhoods in any given city where they have settled. This helps them to be a support network for each other, which is a prominent custom in their culture. Their close-knitness resonates with the Eliasian argument that Homo sapiens have been social from the beginning, that the species evolved biologically as such. As soon as a baby is born, Elias states that its bodily processes undergo a process of social moulding which varies, of course, between societies, their constituent groupings and historical periods (Elias 1991). This thesis is theoretically underpinned by Elias’ theory of civilising processes, elaborated and applied to the Somali conflict in chapter 4. The theoretical framework also borrows from Pinker’s conceptualisation of processes behind the relative longevity of peace in developed nations in the 20th and 21st centuries, also influenced by Elias’ civilising processes. Though he is widely acknowledged as making significant contributions to the study of societies, Eliasian theory has garnered much critique and the chapter pays attention to that critique. It is important to critically engage with adopted theories to ensure they aren’t blindly applied but rather an informed justification has been reached. Chapter 4 also introduces my conceptualisation of contemporary conflicts where the diaspora communities play a pivotal role. I suggest the concept of diasporated conflicts, which can be applied to conflicts where diaspora communities occupy hegemonic positions because they exercise social, political, human and financial capital and this is principally enabled by diasporic media. The same chapter also introduces and expands on my conceptual framework of the three politics mentioned earlier. Here it is noteworthy to mention that the three politics are analytically distinct but there is scope for transformation and the chapter elaborates on this possibility.

To be able to operationalise this conceptual framework, I employ a methodology consisting of a content analysis, discourse analysis, focus groups and interviews. Together, they produce the findings that answer my four principal research aims. The mapping exercise mentioned previously produced an overview which has highlighted that the predominant diasporic media are Somali websites and television stations. This has allowed me to select a representative sample from the
Somali websites and TV stations. The chosen methods as well as the overview are further elaborated on in chapter 5.

The findings of the data collected are presented in chapter 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 presents the findings from the content and discourse analysis conducted on the websites and television stations’ content. The findings confirm that diasporic media is variously reproducing the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation and is most acutely visible in the context of clannism. There is a certain persistency on the elevation of clan over the nation and solidaristic invocation is being produced to generate these solidarities amongst most of the clans. The internet in particular seems to serve as proto-tool to reconstruct and harness clan identity and representation.

Chapter 7 builds upon the preceding chapter and presents how diasporic media’s reproduction of the three politics manifests itself among the Somali diaspora in the UK. It presents the findings from the focus groups and elucidates the various ways diaspora Somalis are engaging with diasporic media in the context of the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. In this chapter, it is the politics of solidarity within clannism that is most apparently manifested among Somali diaspora communities.

Chapter 8 highlights the last part of my argument presenting the often complex ways Somali journalists are engaging with the Somali conflict and in the process reproduce the three politics. The key findings in this chapter illustrate that Somali journalists are affected by insufficient financial income and suffer from lack of education and training in journalism practices, ethics and regulatory frameworks. These issues together with complexities stemming from ownership interests create an intricate environment that leads Somali journalists to report the conflict in manners that reproduce its dynamics.
The final chapter of this thesis is chapter 9 and serves as my conclusion, where I sum up the key points of the thesis, present the limits of the research, provide recommendations for further study and reemphasize on the need to broaden the scope of academic debate concerning diasporic media.
2:1 Introduction

Somalia has been the site of one of the longest-running humanitarian crises in the world. In January 1991, President Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown by clan-based opposition militias, which led to the collapse of the central state and an outbreak of a civil war. The fighting took place at a time of serious drought. That combination proved disastrous for the population at large. By 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases (UNOSOM report 1992). The magnitude of suffering was immense. According to the UN, an estimated 300,000 people died. Some 2 million people, violently displaced from their home areas, fled either to neighbouring countries or elsewhere within Somalia. All institutions of governance and at least 60 per cent of the country’s basic infrastructure disintegrated.

Those fleeing to Middle Eastern and western countries were over a million (Human Rights Watch 1993). The humanitarian catastrophe led to the Somali conflict becoming home to some of the most ambitious, precedent-setting external stabilisation operations in the post-Cold War period. The UN, then headed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, proposed a resolution (733) that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat to international peace and security, a resolution that was unanimously adopted by the Security Council in January 1992. The resolution stipulated that the internal situation in Somalia warranted enforcement action given the international threat that this was ‘perceived to pose’. This led to the presence of US forces as well as a UN-led military presence in 1993. Although both these missions failed miserably, it did not stop routine international intervention such as the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 supported by the US and the African Union mission to Somalia (known as AMISOM), which has been on Somali soil since 2007 (UNSC resolution 1744).
The security and political stakes have been and continue to be very high, thanks to the increasingly globalised dimensions of the Somali civil war and the growing prominence of Al-Qaeda and US security interests in the country (Menkhaus 2003).

In addition to the international community’s involvement and the conflict’s impact on grounds far beyond its borders, the internal clan-based feuds have had and continue to have a devastating impact on Somalis inside Somalia. Scholars differ on what constituted the civil war and identifying contributing elements has been the source of much debate. From I M Lewis who identifies clannism as the key root cause to more contemporary scholars like Duffield and Kaldor, who view the involvement of international agencies as a fuelling factor, the causes are indeed complex and varied. This chapter will outline current debates regarding the root causes of the conflict as well as factors that continue to fuel it.

I argue that there are three key debates in which the cause of the conflict has its roots at varying degrees; impact of clannism, international community engagement and poverty and unequal access to resources with the latter being the current fuelling cause that exacerbates the other two. This is further illustrated in the below table:

Table 2.1: Somali conflict root causes.
This chapter will examine and relate each of these root causes beginning with the impact of clannism.

### 2: 2 Impact of Clannism

The impact clannism has had on the way Somalis live and, ultimately, the way they fight, is multifaceted and can perhaps not be captured in a sub-section of a chapter alone. It is however imperative that the complex causes that led to the Somali civil war receive a diachronic and synchronic contextualisation, meaning that the historical background as well as the contemporary circumstances are brought to light. This will provide a more critical and comprehensive understanding of how the Somali conflict came to be and set the foundation for a deeper understanding of the involvement of the Somali media. Clannism is tightly intertwined with international community engagement, which I trace back to colonialism and this intertwinement will form the basis for my argument that clannism and international community engagement serve as two out of the three root causes to the Somali conflict.

Firstly, it is important to distinguish between clan and tribe as, from an anthropological perspective, Somalis are for the most part considered to be culturally, linguistically, religiously and ethnically homogenous belonging to a common ancestry or tribe but divided into clans (Lewis 1961, 1988, 1994). Somalis have as far back as history depicts lived together as communities structured around their clan system leading primarily pastoral and agricultural lifestyles without any type of centralised hierarchical rule. The British novelist Gerald Hanley, who served as a soldier in the British military in the 1930s when they were occupying Somalia, depicts this rather acutely in his novel ‘Warriors: life and death amongst the Somalis’ (1993) and goes on to explain how this setting of communal governance was the norm amongst Somalis, which agrees with what Lewis refers to as a ‘pastoral democracy’ (1961:1).
The ancestors of the present-day Somalis are considered to have moved from the Omo and Tana rivers region, stretching between southern Ethiopia and the Lamu coast into the Horn of Africa and absorbed or drove away earlier populations that inhabited the region (Cortinois 1994). The primary cleavage that Somalis descend from lie in the genealogical construct of the Samaale tribe, which is where the name ‘Somali’ is derived from. There are four clans that descend from Samaale; Sab, Dir, Daarood and Hawiye. The Sab are southern agriculturalists and are considered to be mixtures of indigenous populations residing in the interriverine area (Laitin 1977: 23). The two sub-clans that trace their origin to the Sab are the Digil and the Rahanweyn (also known as Mirifle). The Dir clan are in the north and mid regions, the Hawiye in the south and the Daarood reside in the northern, mid and southern regions. These three clans all lead primarily pastoral existence making their livelihood from camel, cow and sheep herding. Each of these clans has many sub-clans preserved along the father’s name forming a basis for a lineage that each Somali can trace his or her origin to. The below table illustrates this clan hierarchy further. The table is not intended to provide a complete picture of the entire Somali clan structure but rather to illustrate how the structuration works:

Table 2.2: Somali clan structure.
The traditional clan governance stipulates social contracts amongst clans and their ties are strengthened through inter-clan marriages. Each clan has a number of well-respected elders who serve as the wise negotiators, intellectuals, peace-makers and peace-keepers. Agreements such as a well-defined blood paying group for the transgressions of one of their sub-clan members ensured responsibility as well as discipline were communally shared. The institution of the ‘heer’, which is a legal social contract, mediates between the demands of the Islamic law and the dictates of native common law (Cortinois 1994: 26). In other words, clan governance provided a systemised balance that helped members to navigate social relations along their ethnic lines whilst adhering to their Muslim faith, as Somalis were devout Muslims. Somali citizenship is defined not by borders but rather by the Somali language and customs, the Somali language being the most powerful symbol of their nationality (Laitin 1977: 42). The clan is answerable for all its members and at the same time, held liable for their settlements (Issa-Salwe 2001). Every male and female in the clan lineage is identified through his father and is thereby linked to the line of descent (Lewis 1994). Somali culture is oral rather than written. Through the practice of memorising and reciting the names of one’s forefathers, when a man dies he remains in the consciousness of the lineage members because his place in the clan lineage is fixed. If the cause of the death was a feud killing, this too will live on in the memory of his clan. The resort to force is the standard procedure expected to be used in the case of a feud killing. The bereaved kin will feel offended and lacking in respect and dignity. In order to restore their status they have to retaliate. The sooner a reckoning takes place the stronger and more confident the wronged family feels. Sometimes a poet of the lineage might compose a poem which incites his lineage to retaliate for the killed kin and thus regain its status. The victim may become immortalised through the words of the poet. In the case of external threat such as another clan, feuding lineages of the same clan will set aside their antagonism and unite in common defence (Issa-Salwe 2011). If the ‘eye for an eye’ system doesn’t work, clan elders intervene and find a resolution.
This type of existence was rudely disturbed when colonisation reared its head. The Portuguese were the first perpetrators in 1506 when they ransacked the southern coastal town of Baraawe with an army of 6000 spearmen and since then the Somali lands have been the scene of an unusual amount of foreign contact (Laitin 1977: 43). Clan-based governance was properly disturbed when colonisation took firm root in Somalia in 1880’s. The colonising forces took advantage of the disunited nature of the Somali clan structure, signed treaties with some of the clans and pitted those residing within the same areas against each other using existing hostilities as the gunpowder for war.

The clan became the instrument of a government technology of power by which the rulers coerced and co-opted, in a classic divide and rule fashion, the ruled and by which the ruled competed with each other to pry benefits or just gain security from the colonial state (Kapteijns 2013: 75). Herein lies the beginning of the shifting nature of Somalis’ amicable co-existence under clan-based governance and clannism becoming an inevitable root cause. From 1885 onward, all the Somali territories were under colonial rule and centralised administrations became necessary. Italy, France and Britain each set up a locally based administration with a central command. This was the second disturbance to the decentralised nature of Somali governance and further cemented the unending clash between clan and governance (Lewis 1994; Notten 2006). Echoing the words of Lee Cassanelli in his book ‘The Shaping of the Somali Society’ (1982), Somali society ought to be regarded as the product of interactions amongst herdsmen, farmers and townsmen who came together under diverse circumstances in the past. Somalis were never a nationally united people but rather lived amongst each other consensually in their respective clan communities, which unfortunately worked against them when colonisation came knocking. The notion of nationalism was only introduced during the struggle for independence and was later taken on by the subsequently formed Somali governments. However, in a clan-divided society like Somalia, a focused relation between clans and any incoming state is inevitable, which is the ‘pre-eminent theatre for social intercourse and collective conflict’ (Horowitz 1989:453).
Since independence, which was gained in 1960, Somalia has had three successive governments, two civilian and one military. All three of them were based on the centralised governance but the two civilian administrations which existed between 1960 and 1969 tried without much success, to integrate the clan structure with the state. This attempt could be attributed to the new leaders being unfamiliar with centralised ruling and thus fell back to the clan-based governance they were familiar with. Members depended on loyalty from their clans and kinsmen to generate public support (Lewis 1994: 29).

Ties of kinship bounded elected members of the National Assembly to their rural areas and subsequently made clan-related corruption a re-occurring event (Lewis 1994:29). Many members of the government used political parties to engage their subjects just like the colonial powers did, namely as clans. They mobilised their clan constituencies to obtain votes and influence whilst the constituencies looked to them for access to government jobs, scholarships and other benefits (Kapteijns 2013: 76). Lineage solidarity became for political entrepreneurs not only an axis of political mobilisation but also of a masking of personal ambitions (Compagnon 1995: 458).

The military regime, whose leader Siyad Barre came to power in a bloodless coup in 1969, enjoyed a more organised way of governing and were able, to a certain extent, to unite the people. However, clan balancing in the major institutions of the government remained an important dimension of government policy whilst also shaping the overall discourse of clan in Somalia (Samatar 1987: 70). Siyad Barre aligned his government with the Soviet Union and adopted scientific socialism, the social-political-economic theory modelled on the ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Whilst high-level positions were held by individuals from all clan backgrounds, this regime governed as an autocrat in which no group had democratic representation. Its officials, regardless of their clan background, were loyal solely to their leader (Compagnon 1995: 468). The implementation of scientific socialism allowed Barre a number of successes during his reign, a key milestone being the banning of clan as the traditional basis of socio-political identity and replacing it with nationalistic
rhetoric based on ideas of socialism. The new government won the hearts and minds of the people by promoting a new self-reliance and self-supporting mentality (Frankel 1992: 306). This helped to encourage a national rather than clan consciousness, for it lessened dependence on traditional clan lineage for survival. The main dream for every Somali was to be unified, including those living under Ethiopian and Kenyan rule. Their regions had been given to Kenya and Ethiopia by the colonial powers when independence came. People were mobilised to participate in the development of their country together building schools, hospitals, community centres and mosques in the name of nationalism and unity and eradicating clan association in the process (Laitin 1977).

The Barre regime achieved another milestone in writing the Somali language, which was previously merely a spoken language. The official languages of the Somali republic were still English and Italian long after the British north and Italian south were united and independence was gained and this created issues on multiple levels. Firstly, it inhibited most people from receiving education as the country’s education was provided in either Italian or English and therefore only an elite number of people who spoke those languages could afford to educate themselves and their children. Secondly, it created communication hindrances within government institutions as those based in the north functioned in English and government officials in the south operated in Italian, which made the integration and effective working relations between the north and the south extremely difficult.

When the Somali language was officially introduced in 1972, it became the national language of the country replacing Italian and English, progressively eradicating the administrative obstacles and further enhancing the notion of Somali nationalism. The education in the country was provided in Somali from 1972 onward allowing many people to gain access. Alongside this, a literacy campaign was initiated throughout the whole country to lift the literacy levels of all Somalis both in the towns and the rural areas. By 1975, the literacy levels of the Somali people grew from less than 5% to 50-60% (Mohamed 2009: 40).
At the height of Barre’s reign between 1970 and 1980, his mission to unite the people under the banner of nationalism was successful and he turned his attention to seek the missing Somali territories that were, during the colonial evacuation, given to Kenya and Ethiopia whilst the French colonial territory was turned into a separate country; Djibouti. Throughout the beginning of the 1970s, Barre had been supporting the opposition guerrilla group Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) who were fighting against the Ethiopian government to liberate the Somali inhabited Ogaden region. By 1977, Barre intensified that support and waged a full-fledged war against Ethiopia, seizing the Ogaden region. Barre had a superior army in comparison to Ethiopia as his nation, in addition to receiving Russian military aid, received millions of dollars in arms and military training from Egypt whose key interest was to secure the Nile river flow by destabilising Ethiopia (Tareke 200: 638). The Ethiopian government in return pleaded for the help of its allies the USSR, Yemen and Cuba. The USSR had been supporting both Somalia and Ethiopia but chose to side with Ethiopia in this particular war, to the detriment of the Somali government. Russia along with Yemen and Cuba sent military support to aid the Ethiopian military resulting in the counter-defeat of the Somali army.

This defeat set into motion some devastating chain of events. Soon after the withdrawal of the Somali troops from Ethiopia in 1978, army chiefs ordered the killing of more than 80 soldiers for their opposition to the way the war was handled (Kapteijns 2013: 81). Some army officials reacted to this and other punishments by committing an unsuccessful coup d’état. The Barre government responded by stating that most of these army officials belonged to the Majeerteen sub-clan (of the Daarood) and put to death 17 men who were part of the coup organisers and all but one were Majeerteen (Kapteijns 2013: 81). This led to the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the first armed opposition group, which was established across the border in Ethiopia in 1978. The SSDF’s majority members were from the Majeerteen sub-clan and were aided by Ethiopia and Libya. The formation of this first clan-based armed opposition was also the beginning of clannism growing to play a weighty role in the collapse of the Somali state.
The defeat also resulted in a huge refugee influx fleeing from the now-war torn Somali-inhabited Ogaden region in Ethiopia. As many as 50,000 refugees were accommodated in 26 camps, which were later extended to 40 with the help of UNHCR as the number of refugees increased from 600,000 to 1.5 million by 1980 (Daahir, 1987; Simons, 1995). The UNHCR shipped more than $100 million worth of food (Tucker 1982). These predicaments coincided with a devastating drought in 1977, wreaking havoc across most of the northern Somali regions. However, since economic assistance wasn’t coming from the Soviets anymore, the refugee influx and environmental disaster created a huge strain on Somalia’s economy. Additionally, government health and social services were largely confined to urban areas making this emergency coincide with an infrastructure that wasn’t prepared to handle it. Government resources became stretched.

By the early 80s, cracks in the country began to appear and open up. Armed opposition based on clan loyalties was spreading across the country. It should be noted that Ethiopia played some role in these clan alignments since partition of Somalia could only have been in the interest of Addis Ababa with the possibility of a non-Eritrean access to the Red Sea (Metz 1993). The second noteworthy armed opposition group was formed in London in 1981 by the Isaaq clan and took the name the Somali National Movement (SNM). Their military branch also established itself in Ethiopia. The formation of SNM was a reaction to the large-scale government abuse and an economic warfare that seemed to solely target Somalis in the northwest, of whom most were of the Isaaq clan (Kapteijns 2013: 84). SNM along with SSDF were armed and supported by the Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam until 1988, when Barre and Haile Mariam reached an official agreement to stop supporting each other’s opposition groups. SNM responded to this change in fortune by crossing into the Somali border (with some Ethiopian support still) attacking two major towns in the northwest regions, several refugee camps in the same region and distributing fighters without uniform or distinctive markings amongst the civilian population.
The Somali government responded with the full power of its military to quash the SNM and the cities of Hargeysa and Bur’o that were attacked by the SNM were indiscriminately bombarded. What wasn’t destroyed from the air was battered in the artillery battles between the Somali national army and the SNM (Kapteijns 2013: 86). The number of civilian casualties is estimated at 30,000 (Simons 1995). Some 330,000 civilians from the northwest made it to Ethiopia as refugees (Gersony Report 1989). This incident fortified the armed opposition of the SNM and became the precursor for the northwest to secede from the rest of Somalia in 1991. Today that region is present-day Somaliland.

During this period of the late 80s, an upsurge of opposition media was established. Radio stations set up by armed groups like SSDF and SNM operated from Ethiopia broadcasting anti-government programmes to rally oppositional support. Naturally, the Somali government banned these radio stations but the public still had unofficial access to them. Clan opposition groups grew abundantly across the country and all of them wanted to overthrow the Barre government. By January 1991, more than a dozen of them succeeded in this mission but it was particularly brought home by the Hawiye clan armed opposition group the United Somali Congress (USC). Law and order were replaced with political disintegration, anarchy and human rights abuses beyond count (Samatar and Lyons 1995). A British journalist reporting from Mogadishu, following the overthrow of the president, observed a queue of civilians waiting to pass through a roadblock manned by rebels:

“As each person was waved through, another came forward and began uttering a litany of names. My guide with the flaming red hair said the people were reciting their clan family trees. The genealogies tumbled back generation after generation to a founding ancestor. It was like a DNA helix, or a fingerprint, or an encyclopaedia of peace treaties and blood debts left to fester down the torrid centuries. I was thinking how poetic this idea was, when bang!, a gunman shot one of the civilians, who fell with blood gushing from his head and was pushed aside onto a heap of corpses. “Wrong clan,” said my flaming-haired friend. “He should have borrowed the ancestors of a friend”. “(Hartley 2004: 184)
An organised and purposeful clan-cleansing campaign specifically targeting the Daarood clan, which the president belonged to, was set in motion. Many victims were selected, rounded up and killed on the basis of their Daarood clan background in ways that constitute recurring patterns. The violence was ordered, directed, organised and supervised by USC leaders (Kapteijns 2013: 136-137). USC Rebel leaders consistently denied killing unarmed civilians, saying there were people who took the law into their own hands by settling old scores. This rhetoric disguises the fact that the violence was communally organised and ordinary civilians were participating in the clan-cleansing as part of an organised campaign (Kapteijns 2013: 138). Early on there was a resentment-driven explicit focus on exterminating middle class men of distinction that belonged to the Daarood clan such as intellectuals, professionals, politicians and established businessmen. Large scale rape was part of the clan-cleansing campaign with thousands of women and girls purposely gang-raped in front of or within earshot of relatives and friends (Kapteijns 2013: 144). Beyond those belonging to the Daarood clan, other Somalis who genealogically fell outside the clan structure, were othered and abused by the USC because they were constructed as being foreign. Greed, lust, deprivation, intoxication and resentment are some of the rationale scholars provide for the abuse these groups have endured. However, this clan-cleansing campaign appears to be largely ignored, overlooked or all together denied. Ignored mostly by the international reporters who initially set foot in Mogadishu at the height of the war, because they were hosted by USC handlers and much of their own security depended on ignoring the campaign.

Scholarly work tends to often overlook the campaign and instead either focuses solely on the atrocities committed by the Barre government and therefore frames the conflict as a people’s uprising against a terrible dictator or it presents a context of ensuing chaos and clan fighting following the overthrow of the government (Kapteijns 2013: 154). The majority of the USC leaders deny the occurrence of the campaign for obvious reasons. According to Cohen’s conceptual framework in his book ‘States of denial: Knowing about atrocities and suffering’, these kinds of denials and overlooking constitute what he calls “interpretive denials”, which is a failure to
acknowledge that what happened was the purposeful brutalisation of uninvolved civilians constructed as clan enemy (Cohen 2001: 7, 8, 61). It is therefore imperative to bring to the forefront omissions of this scale as it fills a vital scholarly gap with regards to reaching a comprehensive understanding of the Somali conflict.

New politics, which is based on identity, draw on memory and history and societies where cultural traditions are more entrenched (Kaldor 1999: 85). The fragmentation of the Somali society and their subsequent retrieval to their respective clans indicates how entrenched cultural traditions are in the context of Somali politics and existence. Some scholars, such as Abdalla Omar Mansur in his essay ‘Contrary to a nation: the cancer of the Somali state’ (1995) argue that Somalis need to be educated on how to free themselves from the dependency of clan and a cultural re-invention ought to take place for a viable state to be rebuilt. I agree with Mansur in the sense that Somalis need to move beyond clan loyalty at the expense of the nation-state. However what Mansur and others with similar arguments fail to realise is that the clan itself isn’t the problem but rather the corrupt way that some Somalis mobilize and deploy clan loyalty. The fact that Somalis have a preceding history prior to the arrival of colonialism, of living consensually amongst one another in pastoral clan-centred communities (Kenrick 1855: 199) is a key indication of this point.

An attempt was made to officially incorporate the clan into the Somali government during the peace talks in Djibouti in 2000 where rival parties were convened by the UN and other international bodies to establish a transitional government. The government that was declared as a result of those talks was based on a formula dubbed the ‘4.5’, which essentially meant government positions and parliament members were equally divided amongst the 3 major clans of the Samaale lineage and 1 clan of the Sab lineage and the minority groups got a ‘half’. This introduced a host of issues to the already devastated political scene of Somalia, not the least being that leadership as well as other key positions were being distributed according to which clan had the ‘right’ to it, rather than someone’s merit and ability.
A small sub-section of a chapter will not pay dividend this debate, but it is imperative to point out that the efforts made thus far to reconcile Somali clan and state have yet to bear fruit, and perhaps the return of a functioning state can’t be achieved until this balance is met.

The international community has made much effort to assist in the rebuilding of the Somali state and nation paying attention to the centrality of clan construction but there is cause for concern with regards to the longevity of their engagement and to what extent their own ends are being served at the expense of resolving the Somali conflict. The next section unpacks the complexity of the international community’s engagement with Somalia.

2:3 Globalised contemporary conflicts and colonial roots

From the offset of the ‘scramble for Africa’ from the 1880s onwards, Somalia attracted significant colonial attention. Although European expansion into Africa had been taking place for 450 years by then, it is this period that officiated European control over the African lands (Schraeder 2000: 88). I specifically want to focus on this era as the engagement of external powers as a root cause to the Somali conflict stems from this time. There are two components to this root cause. Firstly, the imposition of the European nation-state system created a number of artificially produced states with little concern for local socio-economic or political conditions (Schraeder 2000: 99). Somalia’s case in this context was rather unique in comparison to the other created African states. Most African states constructed by the colonial powers brought together diverse tribal and ethnic groups who did not ordinarily live together. The Somali people faced the opposite action; their lands were distributed amongst the four imperial powers of France, Italy, Great Britain and Ethiopia. This forcibly separated a people who ordinarily lived with each other but more importantly, it brought to an end the traditional clan governance that facilitated consensual coexistence. The colonial powers took advantage of the lack of centralised authority in clan-based co-existence and ruled them separately in a classic ‘divide and conquer’ fashion (Kapteijns 2013).
They signed dubious treaties disguised as treaties of mutual friendship and respect with local clan leaders but in reality meant European domination and ownership of local lands and this intention was often difficult to decipher by the local leaders as the treaties were written in foreign languages (Schraeder 2000: 95). European colonisation delegitimised traditional clan leaders with the European administration replacing them as the source of power. Only those who pledged unswerving allegiance to the colonial powers were appointed to positions (Schraeder 2000: 103). This set off an unprecedented level of clan tension as colonial demands often ran counter against the interests of the local people and locally appointed clan leaders had to choose between siding with their clan or risk removal from office. The struggle for independence temporarily halted these tensions. The second component is closely connected to first; the imposition of centralised ruling at the expense of decentralised clan governance. The disregard for reconciling clan governance with centralised ruling sowed the seeds for the perpetuation of hostility between clans and clans against the state into present-day Somali politics. This is not to disregard the fact that clans have been in conflict with each other prior to the arrival of colonial powers since shared territories and scarce water supply in the Somali deserts have been causes for conflict within the context of a nomadic lifestyle. But colonisation has set a new precedence of warfare that was previously unbeknownst to the Somali people.

The division of the Somali people amongst the different colonial powers eventually led to the emergence of irredentism (Schraeder 2000: 99) during the struggle for independence. Somalis unified their effort to form a national society in their quest to form their own nation-state, which brought together all the Somalis that had been separated. When independence came in 1960, only British Somaliland in the north and Italian Somaliland in the south were united to form the Somali republic. French Somaliland was turned into an independent nation called Djibouti, the Somali territories under Ethiopian rule became a province part of Ethiopia and the south-eastern territories that were under British rule became part of Kenya, which was also a British colony. This gave birth to un-ending hostile and often violent relations between Somalia and its neighbours. The Somali
leaders opted to seek reunification by funding guerrilla insurgencies in Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia throughout the 1960s (Schraeder 2000: 100). Somalia and Ethiopia fought again in 1977 and both governments continued to fund and arm oppositional groups. All of these conflicts are partially the result of illogically drawn European colonial boundaries (Schraeder 2000).

The 1977 war against Ethiopia particularly became internationalised because of the involvement of the two Cold War superpowers of the US and the USSR and their respective allies, namely Saudi Arabia and Cuba. As mentioned in the preceding section, the USSR was a key ally to the Somali military government and suffered tremendously when the former Soviet Union decided to switch its allegiance to Ethiopia during this war.

At the end of the war, Somalia became increasingly more reliant on the US and international organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF to keep its economy from collapsing. They in turn required policies to be put in place that were more in line with a free market economy. The defeat in the war and the subsequent dwindling of government resources coupled with drought, famine and a huge refugee influx imminently produced public dissatisfaction. Political dissatisfaction during this period also led to the formation of clan-based opposition groups who found a supportive ally in Ethiopia. The establishment of these armed groups signalled the beginning of the end.

The Somali civil war broke out in 1991, which coincided with a post-cold war transformation in the form of a convergence between liberal and left-wing themes and many international policy developments (Newman 2009: 48); one of the key perceived developments being the construction of a post-cold war order. Indications of this development were the apparent moves towards international co-operation, an emphasis on democratisation and human rights and an increased prominence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society movements. The notion of ‘international responsibility’ rather than interference, which was what international intervention was seen as in the Cold War era, to address legitimate involvement in the protection of lives and rights of people across the world, was becoming increasingly influential (Newman 2009: 42).
influence of this notion was characterised by two elements; the strengthening of international institutions such as the UN, particularly in relation to peacekeeping, and the general shift towards democratization as a policy goal by major institutions with the simultaneous development of a strengthened international human rights regime (Newman 2009: 42). It was in the early 90’s, in fact in 1992, when the then secretary general of the UN Boutros Boutros-Ghali published the peacekeeping document that would bolster the institution’s peacekeeping missions from simply managing conflicts to participating in the rebuilding of societies, creating viable institutions, facilitating reconciliation and reconstructing economies. In short, the 1990’s introduced an era of ethical frameworks where the international community regarded humanitarian intervention a moral imperative in crises where massive violations of human rights were occurring. The international community channelled much of its humanitarian support through international NGO’s (Slim 1997: 4 citing Duffield 1994) and with the collapse of the state, they filled a big part of the ensuing power vacuum. International NGO’s developed programmes and agendas that went beyond the distribution of emergency relief and they incorporated resettlement and relocation, macro-economic reconstruction, income-generating activities, sanitation and health, education, demobilisation, peace-building, human rights protection and democracy and state-building into their work (Newman 2009: 97). As they received major grants from Western donors, they also became implicated in the in the multiple policies that Western governments were promoting (Newman 2009: 97) and this further adds to the polarisation that the conflicting policies of the international community is contributing to the Somali conflict. As reliance upon international NGO’s grows, so too does their authority, particularly when there isn’t a strong alternative in the form of a government in control of its own affairs.

Much less publicised was the underlying insecurity Western leaders felt with regards to the dangers these ‘new wars’ as Kaldor terms them, would pose as they were operating in a networked, globalised world. There was a prime concern to defend the interests of the North and as part of the post-Cold War developed world order for the North to control the South through ‘global
governance’ (Duffield 2001: 13-16). Radical critics may dismiss the whole notion of humanitarian intervention as a new way of disguising imperialism (Chandler 2006) but even those sympathetic to the practice would conclude that it seeks to impose Western standards of democracy and political and economic liberalism (Zaum 2007: 229-232). It is the disconnect between these standards and interests and understanding locally prevailing issues and political and economic customs that lead to international community’s engagement with the Somali conflict to exacerbate rather than tame the conflict.

Somalia since its state collapse has had international intervention in both a humanitarian and military capacity. It was the issue of humanitarian access, and the question of whether the price of access to famine victims was complicity in a war economy, that raised broader policy concerns and eventually to the fateful decision on the part of the outgoing administration of US President George H.W. Bush to send an unprecedented, 28,000-strong peace-enforcement operation into Somalia in December 1992 (Newman 2009). The prolonged civil war and drought resulted in mass starvation in the country, particularly in southern Somalia. The most common argument put forward to intervene in Somalia, as Piers Robinson (2002) states, is the demands from the media that pressurised the US to intervene in the situation before it got out of hand, dubbed the ‘CNN effect’.

But the key pressure for US intervention seemed to have been lobbed for by senior policy makers and media coverage of the Somali crisis didn’t become prominent until after the intervention decision (Robinson 2002: 54).

The Somali crisis also coincided with the US election period and it became an election issue (Hirsch and Oakley 1995: 35). Bill Clinton replaced George H.W. Bush in office in 1993. He continued, and in fact expanded, his predecessor’s involvement in Somalia.

Now the humanitarian mission started to turn into a political and nation-building effort. However, in pursuit of the best government, U.N. and U.S. officials actually helped to exacerbate strife by pitting
one warlord against another. One prime example was when Belgian peacekeepers enabled warlord Mohamed Said Morgan to capture the southern Somali town of Kismayo from General Mohamed Farah Aideed's ally, Mohamed Omar Jess (Peterson 2000: 65). This action infuriated Aideed and his followers. Many violent protests ensued against U.N. humanitarian efforts, involving road bombs and skirmishes with Pakistani peacekeepers. Consequently, the U.S. changed its policy from a humanitarian to military mission and ordered the arrest of General Aideed. This was a mistaken move and showed the extent to which the United States failed to understand the culture and the clan politics of this nomadic nation. Aideed was undoubtedly a warlord but when U.S. and U.N coalition started to hunt him down, he became an automatic hero for Somalis because of his willingness to stand up to the world's superpower. There has always been conflict among clans but as soon as a foreign threat manifests itself, old clan rivalries give way to unity against the common threat. Aideed mobilized Somalia's clans, including rivals, against the foreigners (Mohamed 2009). In response, the United States and United Nations escalated the conflict. This led to eighteen American servicemen losing their lives and the infamous shooting down of two Black Hawk helicopters. The nation-building effort never succeeded because of misunderstanding of Somali culture and misguided foreign policy. The war became an embarrassment to the Clinton administration, particularly when images surfaced of an American serviceman being dragged through the street of Mogadishu in 1993. President Clinton admitted the failed U.S. policy toward Somalia and announced that he was bringing forces home.

Their mission was replaced by the UN-led intervention, which lasted until 1994. It is noteworthy to mention that this intervention precipitated a new dimension of UN engagement in the core political and security functions of a failed state, which appeared to be in line with developments of the new world order. Their mandate stipulated three aims:
1. To provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and reconciliation

2. To assist the Somali people to promote and advance political reconciliation, through broad participation by all sectors of Somali society, and the re-establishment of national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country

3. To re-establish the Somali police at the national and local level, to ‘assist in the restoration and maintenance of peace, stability, and law and order’

In addition to military intervention, the UN held several conferences aimed at reconciling the warring factions. In January 1993, the first UN sponsored conference on peace in Somalia was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and another in March of the same year. The conferences were attended by 15 warlords including the most powerful ones, General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi of Mogadishu. They all reached an agreement to disarm their militias but this was not implemented. Some of the warlords, in particular Aideed and Mahdi, suspected one another of taking advantage of the disarmament. Instead Aideed rejected the UN’s involvement and declared himself president claiming he was the legitimate ruler. Another reason that contributed to the failure of the UN peace building efforts was the type of engagement neighbouring countries Kenya and Ethiopia were practicing. In theory they stated they were supporting the warring factions to reach a peaceful agreement but in reality, they were arming the warlords (Woodward 2006: 67). The UN finally declared the end of their engagement with Somalia and left in 1994.

Little international interest was taken in Somalia until ‘the war on terror’ program began when the US started intervening again under suspicion that the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was widely regarded as the first force to unite the Somali people and bring some peace and stability to the ground, were funding terrorists.
The popularity of the ICU was counter-attacked by the transitional federal government, aided by the Ethiopian military partly as a proxy for the US’ ‘war on terror’. In 2007 ‘the US itself undertook military action and in 2008, was still launching sporadic attacks against alleged Islamic extremists’ (Newton 2009: 139). This engagement by the US and Ethiopia resulted in the defeat of the ICU but led to a far more lethal creation: Al-Shabab.

It is for these reasons that scholars like Bronwyn Bruton emphasize the need for the international community, particularly the US, to disengage from Somalia citing that their misguided policies are exacerbating the conflict.

“The U.S. government needs to change its Somalia policy—and fast. For the better part of two decades, instability and violence have confounded U.S. and international efforts to bring peace to Somalia. The international community’s repeated attempts to create a government have failed, even backfired. The United States’ efforts since 9/11 to prevent Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda have alienated large parts of the Somali population, polarized the country’s diverse Islamist reform movement into moderate and extremist camps, and propelled indigenous Salafi jihadist groups to power (Bruton 2009: 79).”

Bruton further argues that in order to ‘both protect its interest in Somalia and to help the country, Washington must abandon hope of building a viable state there’ (Bruton 2009: 81). Although I do agree with the notion that misguided policies from the US and the international community have played a significant role in fuelling the Somali conflict, a disengagement from the country altogether would be disastrous, given the fact that the country is incapable of addressing the dire humanitarian, political and social catastrophes that it is dealing with and needs the support from the international community. But this support needs to be tailored to the needs of Somalia and the Somali people and not based on the interest of the US and the international community. A comprehensive assessment and study of the cultural, religious and political needs of the Somali people should be carried out to create a better understanding by the international community.
A key concern seems to be the issue that Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorism and the threat groups like Al-shabab pose. But the international community's policies towards tackling terrorism in Somalia is merely dealing with the symptom and neglecting the root cause of it. The phenomenon of Al-Shabab and elements that led to their creation, had long been brewing in Somalia, contrary to common belief. Somalis have been amongst the early societies that had accepted Islam since the beginning but had always practiced it moderately. It is only as recently as the 1960s that some Somalis began to travel to places like Saudi Arabia, both for work and study purposes, and became exposed to the more conservative schools of thought (Ahmed 2007: 27). It was during this time that the encounter between Somalis and political Islam emerged. Influenced by Al Aqwan Al Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) and the Wahabi school of thought, they established their own Islamic movement in Somalia (Shay 2008: 4). The public execution of ten clerics by the Barre regime and imprisonment of other Muslim scholars led the movement to go underground and to continue their activities in a clandestine way. Saudi Arabia, fearful of the spread of communism, made everything possible to export their brand of Islamist conservatism to Somalia by pouring money into it through charitable organizations and providing many Somalis facilities to study at Islamic Universities in Saudi Arabia. Most of these students were given the option of going back to Somalia after graduation as paid preachers, an offer which the majority of them seized. This was mainly due to the lack of good governance and political participation that the Barre regime was grappling with, which presented very few viable alternative options for the younger Somali generation. As Professor Jeff Haynes argues:

“In recent years, the genesis of numerous Islamist groups is linked to governmental policy failures. This suggests that contemporary Islamist resurgence has its foundations in widespread popular Muslim disillusionment at slow or non-existent progress as well as growing disgust with corrupt and unrepresentative governments. Such perceptions are not helped when such regimes refuse to open up political systems to become more representative” (Hayness 2007: 6-7).
The years leading up to the demise of the Barre government, several Islamist movements had formed but Al-Itihad Al Islamiya (Unity of Islam) was arguably the most popular one. Its members were cross clan; from university educated classes and had ambitions to create a greater Somalia, which would be free from corruption and clan politics and established on Islamist ideologies. With the collapse of the state and the subsequent civil war, they faced many challenges from clan-based militias and they set up a military wing (Shay 2008: 43). However, the military confrontations created a debate within the group where the younger members argued for the continuation and intensification of their military operations and achieving the group’s goal for a unified Islamic Somalia through these means in the name of jihad. The elders and scholars of the group argued that this should be achieved through education and winning the hearts and minds of the people. The elders’ argument had prevailed and the military wing was disbanded, much to the disappointment of their youth members. This move eventually led to the movement’s dissolution in the late 1990s.

This period coincided with the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and, three years later 9/11, which re-ignited the US’s interest in the horn of Africa. They set up the Combined Task-Force Unit, based in Djibouti, whose job was to monitor the ‘Al-Qaeda cells in Somalia’ and to liaise with regional governments, Somali warlords and faction leaders (ICG 2005:9). This angered many Somalis, particularly the youth, who viewed the United States as engaging in the fragmentation of the Somali people and heightening the civil war. US foreign policy was seen only through the eyes of the ‘war on terror’ and didn’t include long-term plans to help the country to attain peace and stability (Menkhaus 2008).

This period also saw the resurfacing of Islamist movements. The ICU, mentioned previously, consisted of Mogadishu-based elders and youth who came together to provide social services to the city and set up local sharia courts to bring about some form of law and order in 2006. ‘For the first time since the collapse of Somalia in 1991, ordinary citizens found that it was safe to go about their business in the streets of Mogadishu, without fear of attack or molestation’ (Lewis, 2008: 87-88).
Muslim clerics once again rose to become prominent political figures with Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, Somalia’s president from 2008-2012, being one of the key leaders. Religious networks functioned as a site for an oppositional public sphere and religious thematics were reconstituted as political rhetoric (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1994: 35), which in the case of Somalia was an oppositional move against an already weak and unpopular transitional federal government. The movement gained popularity through the social services they carried out, which the local warlords and the transitional federal government saw as a threat. Additionally, the US began to view the ICU as supporting terrorists. Then US under-secretary of State for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, was reported to have said ‘that the Islamic Courts were now controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals and that the top layer of the Courts comprised of extremists and terrorists’ (Chatham House Report 2008:25). At the end of 2006, Somalia was invaded by Ethiopian armed forces with intelligence, money and diplomatic support provided by the United States and the ICU was dismantled. It was then that the Al-Shabab we know today, who were the youth wing of the ICU, came into existence.

Humanitarian actors still expressed the grave humanitarian calamities occurring in Somalia, particularly with the 2006 invasion creating an upsurge in humanitarian needs, which was a mix of drought resulting into a famine and a massive refugee influx into neighbouring countries as well large-scale displacement within Somalia. The need for international humanitarian intervention was a case aid agencies often pleaded for. But critics of the aid agencies also had a point when they claimed the humanitarian actors had grown too accustomed to being a law unto themselves and had turned into de facto local governments controlling almost all of the resources, jobs and contracts, accountable to no one (Menkhaus 2010: 7). Basic human development indicators were so low, food security so chronically poor, and malnutrition levels so high in some regions that the country still presented levels of need akin to that of a full-blown humanitarian crisis. Observers voiced alarm that international donors were ‘normalising the crisis’ in Somalia by redefining what constituted a bona fide humanitarian emergency, allowing international thresholds for what constituted unacceptable human misery in Somalia to rise to reach shocking levels (Bradbury 1998).
On the basis of the discussion above, I argue there are 5 key elements, which make the Somali conflict a global one that requires the involvement of the international community:

1. The dire humanitarian conditions that the country has endured for the past 21 years necessitating on-going aid from the international community.

2. A threat to global security dominated by terrorist groups like the Al-Qaeda linked Al Shabab, which has become a US led mission to focus on since ‘the war on terror’ was announced.

3. The Somali inhabited territories part of Kenya and Ethiopia.

4. The widespread corruption that plagues the political elite of the country whose prime finances are footed by Western and Arab donors.

5. The increasing number of refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries as well as the rest of the world.

To elaborate on each point further, the humanitarian conditions within the country and the complete collapse of the state has led to the aid community replacing the state institutions and the population has as a result become dependent on receiving regular aid. But due to the vulnerability to insecurity in many parts of the country for the past 21 years, assistance has not been proportionally executed, putting the country in a permanent state of emergency. According to WFP, 2.85 million Somalis are in need of emergency livelihood and life-saving assistance and malnutrition rates have reached 30 percent nationally (July 2011 report).

These figures along with the political instability necessitate aid organisations continuing to appeal for donor countries to help Somalia and donor countries continue to intensify their efforts to find a political solution for the conflict.

The second point that draws the attention of the international community is the perceived threat that terrorist groups inside Somalia such as Al-Shabab pose to the rest of the world. Al-shabab
officially became part of Al-Qaeda in February 2012 although it has aligned itself with the group some 2 years before. This incorporation of Al-Shabab into a global terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda make their activities and engagement reach much further than the borders of Somalia. The group has been able to recruit members from Somali communities in both Europe and the US as well as enlisting non-Somali men who then pursue suicide missions which are carried out inside Somalia and neighbouring countries. It is these actions and the greater potential of harm militant groups such as Al-Shabab can unleash on the rest of the world that requires the engagement of the international community. Al Shabab was responsible for the assassination of several international aid workers in Somaliland in 2003 as well as the killing of numerous Somali national officers of international NGOs in Mogadishu who were accused of collaborating with US intelligence. This led to the heightened external focus on security for aid agency personnel which reflected a global trend for the UN system, as security conditions worsened in areas in which it sought to operate (Menkhaus 2010:12). Al-Qa’ida’s publicly stated view of the UN as a tool of the US placed UN aid personnel under enormous risk in the post-9/11 environment.

Prior to the arrival of colonisation, Somalis inhabited the areas stretching between the current territories of Somalia and north-eastern Kenya as well as the Ogaden region in Eastern Ethiopia. The colonising administrators gave north-eastern region to Kenya and Ogaden to Ethiopia as they vacated the Somali territories and independence came in 1960.

Since then there have been re-occurring wars and conflicts between Kenya and Somalia and Ethiopia and Somalia with Somalia vying to regain the territories it considers to be missing from the country and Kenya and Ethiopia accusing Somalia of expansionism. The 1960 Somali constitution does not define the borders of the country explicitly, precisely for this reason. These issues have created on-going instability and tension within the horn of Africa region and Kenyan and Ethiopian military have repeatedly intervened since the collapse of the Somali state. They have also held numerous reconciliation conferences for the warring Somali factions and several transitional governments have
been built as both countries seek a Somali leadership that isn’t going to demand the Somali inhabited territories.

The rampant corruption that has handicapped the political elite of the Somali government and the continuation of mass influx of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing to neighbouring and other African countries as well as Western and Middle Eastern countries continue to have crippling consequences on both donor states and host countries. Corruption within the Somali government is particularly a problem because most of their income is donated by the international community (UN Monitoring Group Report June 2012). Since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, successive generations of Somali leaders have engaged in corrosive political and economic practices that have aggravated the conflict and helped thwart the restoration of peace and security in the country. The 2012 UN Monitoring group report, which was published in June, stated ‘the systematic misappropriation, embezzlement and outright theft of public resources have essentially become a system of governance’ (UN Monitoring Group 2012). Furthermore, a May 2012 report commissioned by the World Bank found US$131 million in government revenues unaccounted for between 2009 and 2010. That is 68 per cent of the total recorded income for that period.

The continued influx of refugees and asylum seekers becomes an on-going burden for host countries since they have to continue to find financial and logistical means to cater for them. This is particularly strenuous for neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia due to pre-existing poverty-related conditions that they were struggling to cope with. Dadaab refugee camp in North-eastern Kenya is arguably the largest refugee camp in the world housing close to half a million mostly Somali refugees in a camp that was designed for 90,000 people.

The international community plays a complex role, which often exacerbates the conflict but perhaps more pertinent to the average Somali person, it continues to provide a lifeline in an environment where poverty and unequal access to resources have become mainstays.
2:4 Poverty and unequal access to resources

Unequal economic opportunities, access to resources and vast differences in standards of living all have the potential to make disadvantaged members of society feel that their particular economic system is unfair and perhaps illegitimate (Brown 1998: 186). As Catherine Besteman argues, it was ‘the shifting of cultural constructions of class, occupation and status that structured much of the violence in in Somalia in 1991’ (Besteman 2009: 124). The lack of economic recovery and employment opportunities during the subsequent civil war is what further heightened the continuity of the war, according to Menkhaus (2004). It ‘impeded demobilisation and reinforced criminality and armed conflict’ (Menkhaus 2004: 150). Menkhaus continues to argue that ‘underdevelopment contributes to state failure by depriving governments of necessary tax revenues to be minimally effective’ (Menkhaus 2004: 150) and as a result, state failure produces economic collapse which perpetuates state failure.

Let me unpack both Besteman’s and Menkaus’ arguments because the shifting of class, occupation and status did have a great deal to do with the advent of the conflict and lack of economic recovery and employment opportunities does indeed in many cases lead to armed robbery and other criminal activities. But both scholars fail to articulate the role clannism and international actors have played both in the leading up to the Somali conflict as well as in its continuation.

After the 1977 Ethiopia-Somalia war, as mentioned above, the Somali people became demoralised and grew disheartened with their government, which led some members of society to form clan-based opposition groups. Part of his response to tackle this issue, was for president Barre to put more individuals of his own clan, whom he trusted, in charge of many key offices and filled the army with them too (Lewis 1993). As Lewis states, ‘the Marehan (Barre’s sub-clan) unquestionably and openly dominated the military and Barre’s son was put in charge of a special northern command unit’ (Lewis 1993: 68). This created a class division amongst society where those belonging to Barre’s clan or were somehow affiliated with the government formed an elite upper class and came
to have a status above the rest of society. It needs to be noted that due to the nature of the regime being military rather than civilian, belonging or being affiliated with the military had a level of prestige attached to it as well. Furthermore, because Somalis value kinship, if a member of the family belonged to the army, automatically, the whole family’s status is lifted and they are regarded with esteem by the rest of society. It is this event that created resentment amongst ordinary members of society who then responded by supporting their oppositional clan groups.

The external factors’ impact within the context of creating social inequality can also not go unmentioned, especially after the war with Ethiopia since Ethiopia had from then onward and even prior to the war started to support Somali dissident groups. Russia withdrawing its aid had a significant impact on the Somali economy and coupled with the impact of the war and the subsequent refugee influx, the Somali government started to weaken. The nearing of the end of the Cold War also had economic repercussion for Somalia, as the country received aid from both the US and Russia who were heavily engaged with lining up allies and building friendships (Simons 1995: 47). It is the influence of these external factors and the impact of clannism elaborated above that inevitably influenced the shifting of class and status that led to the conflict.

Menkhaus rightfully argues that lack of economic opportunities lead to armed robbery and criminal activities but so does clan loyalty and animosity, especially when vying for scarce resources in territories occupied by certain clans which other clans want to obtain. Warlordism, another act of criminality which fuelled the conflict, is formed based on precisely that, clan-loyalties and territorial claim over resources in the areas they controlled. External factors such as the UN and their engagement with some members of the warring sides and ignoring other factions, like they did in 1992 when their negotiations for a ceasefire were solely focused on certain clan leaders and warlord Aidid (Newman 2009:53), also leads to the perpetuation of the conflict. So whilst it is true that lack of economic opportunities and employment can fuel conflict, there are other contributing factors that make the Somali conflict far more complex.
Numerous occasions of re-occurring environmental disasters took place, sometimes leading to an outbreak of famine resulting in extortionate loss in livestock, which led to many people losing their means of livelihood (Newman 2009). This meant both Somalis in the rural areas and the city dwellers turned towards whatever economic opportunities that were available. A rise in piracy, terrorism recruitment, refugee influx towards neighbouring countries and an increase in human trafficking are all symptoms of the poverty and lack of economic opportunities within the country. Often women, children and members of minority clans bear the biggest brunt.

Agriculture, livestock and fisheries still constitute the backbone of the Somali economy and provide employment to more than two thirds of the workforce. Additionally, remittances from the Somali Diaspora have provided an essential income upon which about 40 per cent of the population in some areas wholly depend on (UNDP 2011), and from which 80 per cent of start-up capital is sourced. But the levels of human security continue to vary dramatically across Somalia. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, large parts of South and Central Somalia have been afflicted by chronic insecurity. This has a profound impact on the ability to tackle the poverty that exists within the country. Poverty is a ‘proximate cause, driver and result of the conflict’ (UNDP 2011).

According to UNDP’s 2011-14 report, of the total estimated population of 9 million who inhabit Somalia, over one third live in extreme poverty surviving on less than $1 a day, 3.2 million require emergency humanitarian assistance and about 1.4 million are internally displaced persons (IDPs), the majority of whom reside in South and Central Somalia and Puntland. Rates of acute malnourishment of children are 1 in 6 and 1 in 10 die before their 5th birthday.

From the late 90’s, the country has experienced an upsurge in the creation of media outlets, mostly for economic reasons (Issa-Salwe 2011). Owners tap into the advertising potential their outlets can offer business owners, politicians and prominent clan elders alike. But the practice of journalism in Somalia has in and of itself become a lucrative and dangerous industry as a result of this persistent poverty and lack of employment and economic opportunities. Journalist Jamal Osman wrote in his
article, published in the Guardian in October 2012, how fifteen Somali journalists have been killed in Somalia in 2012 alone (Guardian 11 October 2012). This is primarily due to bad journalism practice rooted in poverty, he states, where many journalists take bribes from sources to publish stories, a practice which can often lead to dire consequences. Osman says that journalists, especially those that work for established media outlets, can get paid up to $1000 for a story.

“If a politician wants to be interviewed, he or she will just negotiate the bribe money and journalists will publish what the sources demand. Sometimes political rivals take revenge through the media: when you become the mouthpiece for someone's enemy, you become a target. And in Somalia it's easier to kill someone than to complain (Jamal Osman, Guardian October 2012).”

This indicates how participatory media can be in the Somali conflict and the impact of poverty upon the practice itself, which is why it is imperative to examine how and to what extent the Somali media engages in the conflict.

2.5 Summary

Somalia’s conflict is indeed a complex case with multi-faceted factors contributing to it. The disastrous humanitarian conditions required the immediate help from the international community, whose assistance can be noted as a mixed blessing. It has provided life-saving support to millions of Somalis but it failed to tackle and possibly even exacerbated the man-made dimensions of the crisis.

The opaque governance environment in which it has been planned, allocated and delivered has benefited those very politicians, warlords and businessmen that have been the source of the problem. For instance, theft and diversion of food aid has been a longstanding issue in Somalia, directly fuelling a war economy vested in the status quo (World Bank February 2012). In addition, the military intervention has created the ability for humanitarian assistance to be delivered to a
greater area than before but it has also received the hatred of the Somali people who viewed their coming as an invasion of their land and transgression of their sovereignty.

Internally, clannism still poses to be a vital factor of the current conflict but it seems to be underpinned by persistent poverty, lack of employment and economic opportunities and frustrations of the youth who haven’t got avenues for their aspirations to be fulfilled. Both Elmi (2006) and Barise (2006) emphasize on the ‘root cause of the conflict stemming from competition for resources and power and politicised clan identity’ (Elmi and Barise 2006: 33) and they also echo the large numbers of unemployed youth who haven’t got viable alternative employment and economic opportunities. I lean towards this direction of a multi-causal concept when it comes to examining the Somali conflict and its origins. I would add the external factor, which is the international community, as they have had and continue to have a critical role in the conflict, a dimension not presented by both scholars. Similarly, Mohamed Haji Mukhtar argues for the conflict brewing from the ‘the struggle among clans for control of limited and increasingly scarce resources, especially land and water (1996: 543). But the involvement of the external factors is an element that cannot be neglected.

The media, as we have begun to hear, has been utilised by each section, its usage ranging from the UN and AU’s IRINnews and Bar-kulan radio, which provide programs in the Somali language, to regionally and locally-owned outlets often aligned with the inhabiting clan of that region or town. Additionally, many people in the Diaspora have set up privately owned media outlets which can be used for political, religious or ideological purposes in return for economic or other kind of gain. The practice of journalism has in itself become deeply embroiled in the conflict, leading to many journalists losing their lives. Therefore it is necessary to examine to what extent the Somali media has been involved in the conflict.
Chapter 3 Alternative media and diasporic hegemony

3.1 Introduction

The rapidly growing significance of web-based journalism and how the battle of the hearts and minds was being waged on the internet first became noticed during the coverage of the Kosovo war in 1999 (Allan 2009: 22). What drew particular attention was the way this new form of reporting afforded members of the public in distant places an unprecedented degree of access and immediacy to breaking news in war zones. The internet also empowered ordinary citizens to become amateur reporters. Stuart Allan draws on the emergence of the Drudge Report to illustrate this point:

“On January 17, 1998, Matt Drudge posted a ‘world exclusive’ on his fledgling website, the Drudge Report, alleging that President Clinton had conducted a sexual affair with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. The ensuing scandal engulfed the Clinton Administration while at the same time making Drudge a household name. His website had been set up years earlier whilst he worked at the gift shop of CBS Television sharing ‘little morsels of studio rumours’ (as Drudge put it). Working from his apartment in Los Angeles, he rapidly established an online following for his postings, despite making no pretence of being a journalist and instead abiding by a personal philosophy he dubbed as ‘任何人 can report anything’ (Allan 2009: 22).”

The internet along with the rise of new and social media has propagated alternative media as a significant alternative to mainstream media. With regards to defining alternative media, and diasporic media in particular, this thesis takes its cue chiefly from the works of Bailey. Her approaches allow room for the applicability of alternative media theories in relation to globalisation and homeland environments. Her work specifically on diasporic media engages with homeland politics which is a more befitting ground to start my examination from of diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict. Other relevant scholars include the works of Myria Geourgiou.
Her books exploring diasporic identity, transnationalism and the media have been particularly useful in understanding the mediated identity construction process but as her work primarily focuses on diaspora communities and their media in relation to the hostland, I have chosen to exclude the use of it. The same argument is extended to alternative media scholars with similar focus such as Chris Atton, although his theorisation of alternative media countering mainstream media bears some intellectual relevance and is incorporated in the following paragraphs.

There are four approaches that define and distinctify alternative media (Bailey et al 2008). The first approach is that alternative media is community centred with community defined as theorised by Tonies (1963) in the sense that it is the presence and concrete human ties and collective identity that constitutes it. Community in the contemporary context also includes virtual communities which Castells defines as ‘a self-defined electronic network of interactive communication organised around a shared interest or purpose’ (1996: 352). This new addition to what is traditionally considered communities have altered the fixed ideas of space and place (Casey 1997). Geographical proximity or location is no longer necessarily a condition or quality of community but what remains a defining feature is the direct and frequent contact between members and the feeling of belonging and sharing (Bailey et al 2008). With regards to their participation in alternative media, their relationship transcends the traditional one-way communication that is used by mainstream media where professional communicators target them as audiences to discuss a chosen topic. Alternative media gives communities the chance to participate in media decision-making, production and output as non-professionals allowing them to be active citizens (Bailey et al 2008). Whilst this is an imperative feature to sustaining democracy, this kind of participation brings to the forefront the unavoidable political differences and struggles and the media becomes a crucial site for the struggle of hegemony (Kellner 1992; Mouffe 1994). This struggle becomes particularly problematic in a globalised media ecology where the application of state regulation is near impossible. The internet presents a haven of ungoverned virtual spaces which can feed into existing offline conflicts.
A second approach focuses on the alternative introducing a distinction between alternative and mainstream media, where alternative media serves as a supplement to mainstream media or as a counter-hegemonic critique of the mainstream (Bailey et al. 2008: 15). In this context, alternative media is inseparable from domination, ideology and hegemony because it is viewed as representing challenges to hegemony. This could be on a political platform or the employment of indirect challenges through experimentation and transformation of existing roles, routines and signs (Atton 2002: 15). This approach however can only bare relevance in the presence of a viable mainstream media where there is often an underrepresentation of minority voices. When applied to a media environment where such media institutions barely exist, the ‘alternative’ becomes questionable and conflicting and can rise to a hegemonic alternative, replacing the spaces previously occupied by the mainstream.

A third approach links alternative media to civil society and positions it explicitly as independent from state and market. Defining alternative media as part of civil society, it can be considered as the third voice between state media and private commercial media (Servaes 1999: 260). This approach poses a similar problematic as approach two in the sense that it can only be applicable when there is a distinct existence of a state media and private commercial media. In the context of state collapse, these lines often become blurred and alternative media can very well be commercial and/or broadcasting state-sponsored programmes.

The final approach is alternative media as rhizome, which builds on Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) metaphor of the rhizome (cited in Bailey et al. 2008: 26). The rhizomatic is non-linear, anarchic and nomadic and connects any point to any other point. This approach therefore focuses on the role of alternative media at the crossroads of civil society, their elusiveness and their inter-connectedness and linkages with state and market. This approach bares perhaps the closest applicability to alternative media in the contemporary globalised context as it highlights how alternative media can remain grounded in local communities and become simultaneously engaged with translocal
networks. In this way, it opens up ways to theoretically analyse how the local and global touch and strengthen each other within alternative media (Carpentier 2007a). It however remains within the spheres of democracy and falls short of opening up the possibility of analysing how alternative media functions in an environment of state collapse.

With regards to Somali diasporic media, the community approach might be the most applicable in comparison to the other three approaches but given the fragmented nature of community in contemporary Somali society and the clear political interests of the diasporic media, this approach isn’t completely befitting. There is therefore a need to broaden the scope of alternative media approaches that incorporates alternative media that engage with homelands in tension or conflict. This chapter explores the viability of the internet as an alternative media, theorises diaspora in the 21st century, provides an outline of the current Somali media landscape and the hegemony of diasporic media and contextualises the Somali diaspora in the UK. It concludes with a summary of key discussions.

The potential of alternative media, particularly the internet and social media were probably best demonstrated in the first half of 2011 when revolutionary uprising swept North Africa and the Middle East, which quickly came to be known as the Arab Spring. These uprising saw the exits of two heads of states, Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, and a political shake-up across the Arab inhabited lands. The Arab Spring is an indication of the different ways media can be put to use, and indeed the role it can play in mobilisings for political and social change. The internet as well as other technologies such as the mobile phone and digital video ‘enable people to organise politics in ways that overcome limits of time, space, identity and ideology resulting in the expansion and coordination of activities that would not likely occur by other means (Lance Bennett 2003: 20). For activists in Egypt, the Internet served as a platform for ‘spheres of dissidence where collective critiques of the existing political and social order were articulated in the immediate pre-
revolutionary period’ (Aouragh and Alexander 2011: 1345). The internet, as a result, became a tool for revolution.

But just as the media can play a role to bring political and social change from the ‘inside out’, it can function in a similar capacity, from the ‘outside in’, for members of a particular country residing outside its nation borders, namely the diaspora communities who can be mobilised by diasporic media. When this functionality is exercised in connection with a homeland that is in conflict, it can serve as a tool to fuel or contribute to the conflict. The internet’s potential as a relatively open sphere where ideas and plans can be exchanged can serve as a haven where the ‘re-creation of conflict’ can gain spark.

3.2 Theorising diaspora

In the context of conflicts of the 21st century, which are no longer fought or confined within the territorial borders they escalated from, conflicts are becoming dispersed and delocalised (Demmers 2002:85). Examples of the Tamil Tigers in London helping their counterparts in Sri Lanka, American Jewish groups supporting right-wing extremists in Israel, and German Croats supporting the collapse of Yugoslavia are representative of such conflicts and communication technologies have played a role in all these instances (Demmers 2002). The influence of these Diaspora communities is often manifold and can take different political forms.

In some instances, diasporic voices can plead for reconciliation and demobilisation (Demmers 2002: 86) but in many instances, they can feed and prolong the conflict.

Diasporas have existed in one form or another since ancient times but according to Demmers (2002) there are reasons to believe that the political weight of diaspora communities has increased importantly throughout the late twentieth century. They play a crucial role in contemporary conflicts due to ‘the rise of a new pattern of conflict, the rapid rise of war refugees, the increased speed of communication and mobility and the increased production of cultural and political boundaries’
As Gillespie found in her studies of the South Asian diaspora in London’s Southall, the connection and relations of absence between the homeland and the various locations South Asian diasporas lives have been greatly strengthened by modern communication systems, which serve a range of social, cultural and political functions (Gillespie 1995: 7). Somali diaspora’s keenness to remain connected to their homeland is probably more intense compared to their South Asian counterparts since contrary to the South Asian diaspora, the Somali diaspora were forced to flee their homeland due to the civil war. Therefore means of communications such as diasporic media is likely to hold a greater weight amongst them.

The Somali Diaspora has utilised the improvements in communication technology as the internet in particular ‘presented an opportunity for them to communicate, regroup, share views, help their groups at home and organise activities’ (Issa-Salwe 2011: 54). But as these ‘products of transnational media dissolve distance and suspend time, they create new and unpredictable forms of connection, identification and cultural affinity’ (Gillespie 1995: 7). The internet is also an opportunity to promote political identity and their particular point of view through a new medium. The Somali web sites that have sprung up in various parts of the world depict a deeply divided society, one that is at the same time both integrated and fragmented. Political events that take place at home are analysed and argued about by diaspora members internationally (Issa-Salwe 2011).

As Lyons (2004) points out, Conflict-generated diaspora groups are social networks that link past conflict, the contemporary challenges of living in a host state and an aspiration of return to a particular piece of territory that is the symbolically important homeland. He relates the advantages that cheap Internet communication and inexpensive telephone calls have for diaspora members.

Somali diaspora integrated into the West and honed the opportunities of better infrastructure and technologies presented by their new environments. They have become part of what Appadurai refers to as the emerging new global cultural ecumene (Appadurai 1990:5). Using the metaphor of a landscape, Appadurai traces out five fluid scapes of global interaction; ‘the ethnoscape of mobile
populations including diaspora communities, refugees, migrant workers, students and business people, the technoscape of diffusion and adoption of mechanical and informational technologies, the financescape of global capital, the mediascape which includes not only the global spread of media channels but also the images these carry and finally the ideoscape of political discourses such as democracy and rights’. The Somalis in the diaspora created media outlets that were based outside the country but were accessible by both Somalis in Somalia and those in the Diaspora. This interconnectedness created by the diasporic media connecting a society that is essentially fragmented, can be a fertile ground to re-create the conflict.

In addition, many regional and locally based outlets were set up by Somalis inside the country and given the lack of regulation that has escalated from the state collapse, it could be argued that a new sense of freedom has been ‘found’ since all media entities were previously state-owned and controlled (Ismail 2006: 15). However, this new found freedom occurred at a time of conflict where the warring factions vie for the domination and control of the media. The media outlets in the diaspora had a privilege which their counterparts inside the country struggled to attain; namely access to credit cards and access to greater facilities and therefore soon occupied a hegemonic position within the Somali media landscape (Gaas, Hansen, Berry 2012). Scholars studying diasporic and transnational communication studies often argue favourably for its positive contributions to social relations citing reasons such as maintaining identity, creating bonds amongst members of the same community and ability to have a sense of belonging (Harindranath 2007 et al.). However when the target homeland is in a state of a civil war, the relation and impact between target homeland and its diasporic community can reflect dynamics present within the conflict.

The following sections provide an outline of the existing Somali media landscape and identify some of the ways diasporic media potentially engages with the Somali conflict. It will also elaborate on the Somali diaspora in the UK and illuminate some of the ways they engage with diasporic media.
3.3 The Somali media: an outline

The Somali society arguably ranks among the most media literate in Africa (BBC Trust report 2011: 2). A divided community torn by civil war finds temporary unity in their ancient love of poetry and common language when consuming their media. Obtaining information and assessing its trustworthiness has, in this traditionally pastoralist and nomadic society, always shaped not just politics, society and culture, but the odds of survival (BBC Trust 2011: 2). In Somalia, the media provides a platform through which people debate their future, discuss their differences and sometimes, settle them.

The course of the Somali media has gone from being primarily state-owned and controlled (Ismail 2006) during the Barre government from 1969-1991, to having free reign with regards to its establishment when the civil war broke in 1991. Somalia, in the Barre era, had one national TV station and two radio stations, one in Mogadishu and the other one in the second capital, Hargeysa.

With the collapse of the state, an upsurge in media outlets consisting primarily of radio stations, newspapers and websites, occurred (Gaas, Berry, Hansen 2012:1) but this was unfolding in the midst of conflict. Therefore they became vested in the outcome and the unfolding of the conflict (Gaas, Berry, Hansen 2012:1). McChesney points out how clan ties and ideological orientation of some of the media outlets stimulated further conflict and at times, they presented a particular view serving a particular interest in their reporting (McChesney 2008 cited in Gaas, Hansen, Berry 2012: 1).

Both functionalist and critical theories of mass communication have connected the media system with social order. Wright (1960), for example, argues that the media ‘functions’ to secure ‘continuity of a given order, maintaining control, establishing a broad consensus of values integrating activities and anchoring individuals and groups in society’ (McQuail 1992: 237). But with the collapse of the state, Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) propaganda model, which stipulates how the media favours elite access and Hall’s (1977) argument that the media is controlled by an elite class who impose
dominant meanings and ideas and use the media to delegitimise and marginalise others is likely to be more befitting.

The establishment of radio stations saw an instant rise after the collapse of the Barre regime, with six being opened shortly after the state collapse (Ismail 2006: 15). This popularity could be linked to Somalis retaining a strong oral culture as well as low levels of literacy. Radio also became popular with the warring factions with many warlords establishing their own radio programs, often promoting conflict (Gaas, Hansen, Berry 2012: 17). TV establishments excluding the ones established by the Barre regime, came at a much later time with some of the first stations appearing in 1999 (Gaas, Hansen, Berry 2012: 17).

As the Somali conflict went through different phases, from the era of warlords in the early nineties to the emergence of political Islam in the later years, the Somali media was incorporated on a regular basis. As outlined in the preceding chapter, these groups came into prominence at different stages of the conflict and each one set up media outlets varying from radio and TV stations to internet-based media. But the growth of the Somali media inside the country was quite fragile, since the warring factions could easily shut them down or a bomb explosion could put them out of business. It is still fragile as instability remains persistent which has given diaspora established Somali media hegemonic existence over the Somali media that exists within the country.

The current Somali media landscape based in Somalia can be divided into four types: local, regional, national and transnational media (see figure below). The local outlets often tend to be radio stations but there are an increasing number of websites that target a specific location and report on issues concerning the people of that particular location, though the creators of these sites are often diaspora-based. Regional media are usually set up or owned by the various regional administrations such as Puntland and Somaliland (though the latter has declared independence from the rest of Somalia and considers their regional media a national media. Their administration is not internationally recognised).
There are two national media belonging to the Somali government and Al-Shabab. The government-owned SN-TV also serves audiences abroad, which means they can be transnational media too. Somalis inside as well as in the Diaspora use satellite dishes and national stations such as SN-TV and Somaliland-TV transmit through these satellites. By and large, diasporic media has a hegemonic control over Somali media and the most nationally distributed, and widely listened to, media are the Somali services of the BBC and the VOA (BBC Trust Report 2011).

Table 3.1 the Somali media landscape.
With the exception of community radio, which focuses on addressing social issues within the local communities it is established in, all other three diasporic media report on happenings in Somalia to Somalis inside the country and those in the diaspora.

Additionally, Somali services such as the BBC’s and the Voice of America service are carried by local and regional affiliates, which is why these services are probably the most nationally received media in Somalia. The Somali services of the BBC and the Voice of America are included as part of the Somali diasporic media as they target the same homeland and hostland audiences as the other diasporic media outlets. The content they produce is often quite similar in topic and approach to other outlets and the producers of those contents, as in the reporters on the ground and the editors and journalists in the offices, usually have a similar lived experience as those that work for other Somali diasporic media outlets.

Having worked for both services before as a journalist, I can attest to the possibility of journalists and editors at times being driven by personal political interests that becomes reflected in their coverage. There is therefore much potential for the Somali services to be involved in the Somali conflict in similar ways as the other diasporic media and could cover the conflict in manners that can re-create it amongst diaspora audiences. But there is clearly a distinct institutional difference. These services are part of the BBC and the VOA and have editorial guidelines, policies and procedures in place. They also have access to regular training and therefore have the potential to produce content that is more in line with journalistic professional standard. What this thesis will examine is the extent of their content exhibiting representational similarities to the other diasporic media outlets and will highlight how much professional journalistic standard is adhered to.

Some of the websites also receive airtime from local and regional radio stations.
3.4 The hegemony of diasporic media

With the impact of globalisation in the 21st century coinciding with Somalis fleeing the civil war that broke in 1991, Issa-Salwe states the ‘World Wide Web in particular came to present an opportunity for the Somali diaspora to communicate, regroup, share views and help their groups at home’ (Issa-Salwe 2011: 54).

Somali media based in the diaspora has become pivotal, dominating the Somali media environment in Somalia as well as outside it since it cost them very little to set it up, have access to credit cards and the technical infrastructure in the west is at their disposal as well as having a stable and secure environment surrounding them. The majority of the Somali media is owned by diaspora based individuals or they are the majority stakeholders and investors (Integrity Report 2013).

The 21st century society has become, as Castells states ‘a society constructed around flows; flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of organisational interactions, flows of images, sounds and symbols’ (Castells 2000: 442). What was important for Somalis in the diaspora was to remain in touch with their families in Somalia and to be informed of what was happening with regards to the conflict. Traditionally, Somalis have been an oral society and received much of their information through this manner. Oral communication has played a particularly important role and many of the prominent figures such as Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920), who led the colonial resistance between 1900-1920, were in fact great poets and used this skill to galvanise the people.

Language, as Naficy indicates, is ‘one of the chief markers of nationality and national identity’ (Naficy 2003 cited in Somani 2008: 48) and part of the reason for the popularity of Somali diasporic media is because it is broadcasted and written in the Somali language. Somalis have had a longstanding tradition of deep appreciation for oral literature, which they used to teach moral lessons, record historical events, express sentiments and encourage warriors to avenge an insult (Abdulahi, 2001).
This oral tradition also no doubt informed the rise and continuing prevalent use of the radio in Somalia. However it is worth noting that since coming to the West, Somalis have been influenced by globalisation in the West where TV and internet consumption are more prominent than radio and, subsequently, the main diasporic forms of media have become internet-based or TV.

When the civil war erupted in 1991, a media boom, consisting predominantly of local and regional radio stations, occurred. Equally, a media boom took place in the diaspora where Somalis later took advantage of the internet but even web-based media outlets today make use of audio materials due to the oral tradition of the Somalis (Issa-Salwe 2011).

Issa-Salwe (2011) has classified Somali websites into seven categories:

- **Community/political**: these sites focus on political and community news from Somalia and present views, concerns and interests that are important to their audiences. This category makes up the largest type of websites.

- **Cultural/literacy**: these sites are devoted to the preservation and dissemination of Somali literature and culture. They are sometimes part of community/political websites but can also be found as a stand-alone creation.

- **Professional/business**: these are usually an online presence of existing businesses and professional bodies and engage themselves in promoting business or organisation related activities.

- **Online newspaper**: These sites are often in the form of an online newspaper or the online version of an existing newspaper.

- **Religious**: these sites are dedicated to Islamic teachings and information but they also represent and are connected to the
different affiliations to Islamic groups and ideologies that are present within the Somali community.

- **Personal**: these sites are very similar to political/community websites but material is presented in a personal format, i.e., in a blog run by an individual blogger.

- **Radio/TV**: these sites share similarities with the newspaper type. They too are often just based online but are also online branches of existing radio and TV stations.

As of 2011, there are 9 TV stations received by diaspora audiences via satellite. The key reason to include TV stations is due to its rise in consumption by the Somali people since the civil war and, in particular, in the last decade (Ismail 2006: 19). Diasporic media became a vehicle for direct participation in the mediated communications process as well as for the extension of the voices of Somali Diaspora groups. It gave them a platform to inform one another of Somalia, its changing political dynamics, humanitarian conditions and warring ideological affiliations. Diasporic media presented an opportunity for the Somali Diaspora to become what Fathi (1979) refers to as a ‘public coming into being’ and voicing its own opinion but this public also took multiple dimensions, often fragmented and mirroring the conflict. The Somali diaspora became adept at adapting technologies to their situational needs (Issa-Salwe 2011: 58).

3:5 Maintaining and re-inventing identities

In the contemporary world, group identities are no longer spatially or territorially bounded. People cling to territorially based identities even though many of them do not actually live in their original homeland territory. When the community in question is identifying with a territory in a state of conflict, this diaspora group ‘can actively be involved in violent conflicts at the other end of the world through electronic means and influence these conflicts by sending money, arms, and opinions’ (Demmers 2002: 89). The anthropologist Appadurai analyses the transformation of how locality is
produced in a delocalised world. He argues that locality is seen as a property of ‘social life and a structure of feeling as a complex phenomenological quality constituted by a series of links between the sense of social immediacy, the technologies of interactivity and the relativity of contexts’ (Appadurai 1995: 204). This analysis is befitting of the Somali diaspora and how they have been able to cling to their Somali identity through living in close-knit communities often consisting of extended relatives and clan members and the transportation of realities occurring back home in Somalia through their media. The media and cultural consumption play a key role in constructing and defining and reconstituting national, ethnic and other cultural identities (Gillespie 1995: 11).

Somalis identify themselves along clan lineages and display strong religious identity in relation to the Muslim faith. These two elements are both vividly evident in the conflict. One of the main components that led to the outbreak of the civil war was clan related. Opposition groups that had been formed along clan lines began to form throughout the 80s and led to the overthrow of the then president Siad Barre. The ensuing violence was initially directed at his clan before it became an all-out war where every clan was fighting one another. The clan animosity that has escalated from the war continued to brew amongst Somali diaspora. By long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, Somali diaspora became engaged in a sort of virtual conflict where they continued to live the conflict through internet-based diasporic media as well as email, television and telephone without direct (physical) suffering, risks or accountability. Therefore they are engaged in conflict processes and dynamics that differ importantly from their identity group members in Somalia. Somali diaspora live a different reality to their member groups in Somalia and diasporic media can help to sustain this engagement based on an imagined shared reality.

Clans remain important for the Somali diasporic media in the form of allegiances. A media outlet often reports only from their clan leaders and the killings of their clans as well as other issues touching the interests of their clan. Issa-Salwe (2011) examined 527 different Somali diasporic websites including personal homepages, and business firms and found that the sites had shared
several common factors. Site names are mainly tied to clan, geographical area or region and many are also named after specific geographical locations.

Hall (1993) argues that ethnicity is central to all forms of cultural identity but that there are important ‘axes of difference’, which tend to ‘locate only to dislocate one another and such failure to correspond on all axes of difference means identities are better viewed as a ‘field of antagonisms’ (cited in Gillespie 1995: 11). Although Hall is referring to ethnicity in this statement, it is quite befitting of the ‘antagonisms’ that clan identities create in the Somali context. It is befitting because antagonisms within their society is created through clans.

There has been an explosion of diaspora-generated media. Between 1998 and 2006, these establishments grew from a mere 20 to 527. Issa-Salwe (2011) interpreted this as a product of the decline of the Somali nation and the fragmentation of the Somali identity caused by the clan system, which is unfolding within the realm of the conflict. He points to how the various sites depict their clan in a proto nationalistic way, using idols and symbols, depicting historical people from the clan, inventing history and constructing imagined communities in the process. This is an indication of the role diasporic media can play in the disassembling and re-assembling of identity and therefore reproduce the changing dynamics of the conflict. Somali diaspora communities clearly dominate the online media environment (Gaas, Hansen, Berry 2011: 4) and clan divisions are present. Issa-Salwe states each internet site ‘corresponds to the political interests of a particular clan or sub-clan’ with the exception of very few (Issa-Salwe 2011:63).

This contributes to the creation of a Somali public sphere where there is space for debate and the contestation of key issues in the Somali society, which can prolong or hamper the progress of issues that require national consensus and in the process fuel the fragmentation of the conflict. According to Issa-Salwe, there appears to be two main reasons for the proliferation of Somali websites; ‘the loss of national identity following the collapse of the state institutions and the
characteristics of the internet that make it more accessible are participatory and conducive to oral expressiveness’ (Issa-Salwe 2011: 58) Somalis in the diaspora were in need of communication mediums that allowed them to remain in touch and involved with the happenings back home whilst giving them the means to create a sense of identity. Diasporic media facilitated these demands but by doing so, they came to play a role in the changing dynamics of governance in Somalia as ‘the establishment of media outlets has extended the capacity for political mobilisation’ (Kaldor 1999: 86).

Academics such as Aksoy and Robins argue that diasporic media provide new means to promote transnational bonding and thereby sustain ethnic, national or religious identities and cultures at a distance (Aksoy, Robins 2003: 93). Diasporic media allowed Somalis in the diaspora a platform where the continuity and historicity, to borrow Robins’ terms, of their identity could be preserved since this was challenged by their new and unfamiliar environments. But in a diaspora community who fled a civil war which remains on-going, identity can often become questionable and redefined. Transnational bonding can help ‘mediate connections amongst fellow diaspora members’ as Bailey (2007) and Harindranath (2007) argue, in addition to sustaining identities at a distance. But the dimension that is perhaps overlooked is that diasporic media negotiate the content as well as the context of imagination and they construct images, text and sounds that can mediate relations and bonds within specific communities and if these communities are in the midst of war, the creation of sub-identities that can further fragment the community and fuel the conflict, is easily possible. Diasporic media can enable Somalis to re-produce the conflict outside of the homeland as well as contribute to how it unfolds inside Somalia. Additionally, just as diasporic media can bring the reality in the homeland to diasporic communities, it can also disturb facts of those realities in the context of war. This can lead to the perpetuation of clan attitudes, intensifying the harsh and cruel realities of war which can have disturbing consequences. For example, a group of Somalis can create a virtual community based on specific group identity, one in turn backed by offline relationships, an activity that Cassanelli has called ‘the factionalism of the Diaspora’ (Cassanelli 1995).
Diasporic media also plays a role in the altering of the nature of political exile. Exiled political activists no longer need to wait for events to change in order to return home. Instead they can propagandise to change conditions from outside the country; a theory Shain (1987) and Sreberny-Mohammadi (1987) refer to as ‘the deterritorialisation of politics’. The son of former Somali president Mohamed Siad Barre, Maslah Mohamed, has been in exile since his father’s government was overthrown in 1991. He found refuge in neighbouring Kenya and ran for president in 2008 where he was beaten by former president Sharif Ahmed. He stood as a presidential candidate again in 2012. His campaigns were heavily propagated by diasporic media outlets such as Jaallesiyaad.com and gedoonline.com, both affiliated with his clan.

In the 2012 report *Mapping the Somali Media*, Gaas, Hansen and Berry state that the domestic media tends to ‘reuse material from diasporic media and can therefore act as an echo-chamber for views that originate from outside the country’ (2012: 6). This asserts diasporic media a certain level of influence and puts them in a hegemonic position within the Somali media landscape. Furthermore, diaspora Somalis have been going back and physically participating in the developing conditions of the country. Amongst those and especially within the political class, there is a large proportion of diaspora Somalis who will naturally be comfortable with the use of diasporic media forms and the online news environment.

3.7 Somali diaspora in the UK

Since the start of the civil war in 1991, Somalis fled from their country to seek safety and can today be found in all continents (Horst 2004: 5) and they form a considerable migrant group in the UK. More than 380,000 Somalis live in the UK (DFID 2008).

The clan system continues to influence the communal existence of Somalis in the UK, often acting as a pre-existing support network, with clan members feeling obliged to assist a newly arrived refugee from their own clan.
As a colonial ruler, the UK has historically been closely connected to Somalia, and because of this colonial linkage there has been a long tradition of Somalis settling in the country. The Somali migration to the UK can be divided into 3 different groups:

1. Somalis who arrived as seamen and steel workers during the colonial period and the industrial period who settled in the port and steel cities of Britain

2. Somalis who fled the Somali civil war in 1991

3. Somalis who had gained citizenship in other European countries and had moved to the UK seeking social tolerance and better opportunities to integrate

The first group of Somalis arrived around the turn of the 20th century to work in the British merchant navy as seamen, settling in port cities such as Cardiff, Liverpool and the dockland areas of London. These Somali seamen constituted a rather settled community in these main port cities. Most of the seamen considered working in the UK as temporary and many had left their families in Somalia. In 1953, about 600 Somalis lived in the UK (BBC Legacies 2004). When seafaring work began to decline in the 1950s, Somalis moved to work in the industrial cities of Birmingham, Sheffield, and Manchester (Kleist 2003). At this point, many of the seamen were joined by their families. The Somali community in Cardiff has the largest British-born Somali population in the UK (BBC legacies 2004).

Further, during the 1960s and 1970s, Somali students from the former British Protectorate came to study in the UK. Some of these students decided to settle in the UK, others returned to Somalia after finishing their studies.

The majority of Somalis currently living in the UK however arrived during the late 1980s and the early 1990s seeking asylum from the civil war in Somalia. The last phase of migration began around 2000 when Somalis who had obtained refugee status and later citizenship in other European countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark began secondary migrations to
the UK. Most of them would cite reasons such as lack of freedom to practice their culture and religion as well as hindrances to integrate into those host countries whilst maintaining their cultural and religious identities. Many of them also complained about the difficulties they faced to set up businesses or to find suitable employment opportunities and support.

According to an article in the Washington Times (5 January 2005), an estimated 20,000 Dutch Somalis left the Netherlands for Britain between 2000 and 2005. They expressed frustration with a system they say kept them trapped in welfare dependency and fostered ethnic tension. Denmark also has seen an exodus of Somalis, with as many as 4,000 leaving for Britain from Aarhus over two years. Esther W.A. van den Reek and Adan Igeh Hussein cited in their research (2003: 5) that the key reasons for Somalis to leave the Netherlands globally point in two directions: they sought ‘economical-social participation and cultural-religious opportunities’.

Furthermore, they experienced ‘high levels of coercion, limitation, and deprivation of liberty and they decided to migrate to Great Britain’ (2003:5).

In the UK, Somali communities are concentrated in various parts of London (33,000 in 2001 census) and other major cities including Bristol (20,000) and Manchester (10,000). The city of Leicester has gained a Somali community of 13-15,000 within the last ten years. The majority of them are Dutch, Danish and Swedish passport holders. Leicester is a major city of over 250,000 where Somalis now form some 5% of the population.

3.8 Connection to the homeland

Somalis have not left their Somali homes permanently to start a new life elsewhere. In an age of globalization, characterized by accessible transportation and rapid communication, the Somali Diaspora has remained very intimately connected with the homeland. Many members of the Somali Diaspora with right of abode elsewhere continue to live, work and invest in Somalia. There are estimated to be 15,000 Canadian citizens, for example, in Somaliland alone (Horst 2004).
Somalis based in Britain have a keen interest in the media. Many Somalis still do not see themselves as people who are in the UK on a permanent basis, and like other migrant communities before them, still retain the ‘myth of return’. Many therefore watch news and seek and follow diasporic media to stay up to date with the happenings in Somalia. They also have family members still living in the Somalia, which adds to the concern they have for what happens in their country. Somali diaspora maintains links with their family members back home primarily through economic support but they are also active in the general reconstruction of the country. The Somali Diaspora makes a major contribution to the Somali economy and livelihoods through remittances, humanitarian assistance and participation in recovery and reconstruction efforts (Menkhaus 2009). It is commonly acknowledged that the most successful migrant businesses arise in the crevices created by transnationalism. For example in shipping and cargo companies, import and export firms, labour contractors and money transfer houses (Glick, Schiller et al. 1995: 55). This is also true for the establishment of the ‘hawilad’ companies by Somalis. Hawil is a Somali word derived from Arabic, meaning transfer; usually of money or responsibilities. The hawilad is an informal system of value transfer that operates in almost every part of the world (Horst, Van Hear 2002). It is run by Somalis and mainly used by Somalis; both for remittance sending and business transactions. Since the system overwhelmingly relies on telecommunication, these companies have greatly invested in internet services, telephones, mobile radio systems, computer networks and even satellite telecommunication facilities (Montclos and Kagwanja 2000: 216; Gundel 2003: 9). The creations of these facilities greatly enhance the connection maintained with the homeland by the Somali diaspora.

Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries generally enjoy being one of the largest recipient countries of remittances bypassed only by South Asia and Latin America (Hammond 2011). The remittances that reached these countries in 2011 were estimated to be up to $22 billion. Somalia is the world’s largest per-capita recipient of remittances (Hammond 2011). For decades remittances have played a crucial part in the Somali economy, but the sheer size of the current diaspora combined with recent
technological developments in the field of telecommunication and the collapse of the Somali formal economy have added weight to their importance (Horst 2004: 5).

According to UNDP, migrant remittances exceed the value of exports as well as international humanitarian aid in Somalia and probably reach more people (UNDP 2001). On the level of individual households, UNDP estimates that most remittances fall in the range of 50 to 200 dollars per month. These monetary flows do increase in times of economic stress during droughts or in response to inter-clan warfare, indicating the financial support diaspora members potentially lend to the conflict. To what extent this support is sustained and how regular reporting of the unfolding of the conflict by diasporic media affects how diaspora members provide their support, is one of the key aims of this research. Data from a UNDP household survey indicate that on average, remittances make up 22 percent of per capita household income in Somalia (UNDP 2001).

There is also evidence that Somali Diaspora families who have the necessary means often return to Somalia. Many Somali families residing in UK opt to spend the summer holidays there, renewing their bonds with their families. Estimates of summer visitors to Somaliland from the UK, for example, are as high as 10,000 per annum, creating a seasonal economy that inject significant amounts of money into local service industry (Menkhaus 2008). Although Somaliland in comparison to the south is relatively peaceful, it is still located within a region of conflict. A sustained connection with a homeland in a region of conflict on this level can have two implications; adult visitors stay connected to the conflict and the repercussions of this connection to the conflict can be passed on to the children, carrying the sustainment of conflict through to the next generation. Diasporic media has the potential to play an enhancing role in both these implications since both the youth and the elderly of the Somali society are avid consumers.

The Somaliland Diaspora has always been an active element in the equation of state building and the restructuring of the political system of their region. Professor Abdi Kusow introduced the concept of “social remittances”, referring to the potential for skills and knowledge or human capital, to flow
from the Diaspora to Somalia. Somalis in the diaspora have exercised this notion and a clear illustration of this is the number of Somalis from the Diaspora holding leadership positions in the political institutions of the country. In the self-declared republic of Somaliland, two of the three political parties are led by returnees. The head of one of the two legislative chambers – the Guurti – is a Diaspora returnee, along with 30 members of the 82-member House of Representatives. In the Somali government, in January 2008, the Prime Minister and two-thirds of the cabinet (10 out of 15 Ministers) were Diaspora members. In the cabinet appointed in February 2009, the Prime Minister and half of the cabinet (18 out of 37 Ministers) are Diaspora returnees. In addition to the Ministerial positions, most of the senior civil servants were also from Diaspora (Menkhaus 2009).

This is indicative of the close ties and participation Somali diaspora members maintain with their homeland and thus, coupled with the use of remittances, there is likelihood to ‘re-create conflict’.

All the factors that divide the Somalis inside their country also divide the Diaspora. As a result, the Diaspora is organised neither in the host country nor in the home country and this is likely to be evident in the Somali diasporic media.

3.9 Summary

There is reason to believe that the political weight of diaspora communities in intra state conflict has increased in recent years. This is related to the rise of new patterns of conflict and the speed of mobility and communication. Group identities are much less territorially bounded.

The Somali civil war led to a large and dispersed diasporic community in need to remain in touch with their relatives and the happenings in their homeland. Diasporic media experienced a certain level of popularity amongst Somalis because of this need but also because the dispersal of the Somali people fleeing from war coincided with the 1990’s era of globalisation and has benefited from improved communication technology. Establishing media outlets has extended the capacity for
political mobilisation (Kaldor 1999: 86) as well as the maintenance of identity politics, a notion based on ties of culture, kinship and tradition.

It is for this reason that it is important to examine how participatory diasporic media is in a war-torn country surrounded by people who favour the creation and/or maintenance of fragmented identity groups over the formation of national identity, thus possibly hampering the rebuilding of the nation.

Thus far, most of the academic work on diasporic media has favoured its creation arguing for its usefulness. It is considered to be ‘responding to the specific needs and conditions of immigrant communities’ (Busch 1994) as well as allowing a transnational bond to be created with countries of origin and therefore sustain ethnic, national and religious identities and cultures (Aksoy, Robins 2003: 93). But it is equally worth pointing out that when a community affected by a perpetual conflict based on particularistic and fragmented identities becomes adept at adapting media technologies to their situational needs, it may lead to them becoming engaged in the fuelling and continuation of that conflict.

This research will bring an under-researched area of diasporic media to the forefront and explore in depth the extent of the involvement of the diasporic Somali media in the Somali conflict and also how it complexly intervenes within these processes.
Chapter 4 ‘Re-creating conflict: theoretical framework and conceptual elaboration

4.1 Introduction: theorising civilisation

Civilisation has often been associated with the sense of superiority of upper classes over lower classes in western societies and with the spread of colonisation, slavery and other methods of Western domination, it has also come to mean superiority of western societies over the rest of the world (Elias 1989). It is therefore a term used with caution especially in the social sciences, partly because we longer wish to admit explicitly to the opposition of 'barbarism'. It is far more common to speak of 'modern', Eastern, 'Western', 'industrial' or 'capitalist' societies. The German sociologist Norbert Elias conceptualises civilisation in a distinctly different manner. At the core of his theory of civilising processes is the exercising of individual self-constraint and the acceptance of the equality of other human beings. The theoretical framework of this thesis is very much influenced by Elias and this chapter will explore the applicability of the civilising processes to the Somali conflict. Elias has been recognised for developing a unique set of concepts for analysing social life that encompass the apparent oppositions between action and structure and individual and society (van Krieken 2001). Robert van Krieken captures this quite well in the following quote:

“His analysis of the historical development of emotions and psychological life is particularly important in relation to the connections he established with larger-scale processes such as state formation, urbanisation and economic development. Human individuals can only be understood in their interdependencies with each other, as part of networks of social relations, or what he often referred to as 'figurations'. Rather than seeing individuals as possessing an 'autonomous' identity with which they then interact with each other and relate to something we call a 'society', Elias argued that we are social to our very core, and only exist in and through our relations with others, developing a socially-constructed 'habitus' or 'second-nature'.” (van Krieken 2001: 353)
Elias relates that it is important to understand that the study of processes of social development and transformation, otherwise referred to by Elias as sociogenesis, is necessarily linked to analysis of psychogenesis, which re processes of psychological development and transformation, the changes in personality structures or habitus which accompany and underlie social changes (van Krieken 2001). The issue at the core of Elias’ civilising processes is concerned with how people can manage to satisfy their elementary animalistic needs in their life together without reciprocally destroying, frustrating, demeaning or in other ways harming each other time and time again in their search for this satisfaction. In other words, how fulfilment of the elementary needs of one person or group of people can be achieved without it being at the cost of those of another person or group (Elias 1989: 31). Central to the analysis of how this fulfilment can be achieved are the examination of four constraints:

1. The constraints imposed on people by the characteristics of their animal nature which range from hunger and sexual drive to ageing, longing for love and affection and the constraints of hatred and enmity.

2. The constraints arising from dependence on non-human natural circumstances especially those imposed by the need to seek food and protection from harsh weather.

3. The constraints which people exercise over each other because of their interdependence.

4. The constraints of acquiring self-control as biologically we are only endowed with the potential for acquisition. Without actualising it through learning and experience, self-control remains latent (Elias 1989: 32).

Civilising processes are concerned with the interplay between these four constraints. The first constraint is the same for all human beings but the others develop at different speeds and levels depending on different experiences. Civilising processes occur when a change in the relations between external social constraints and individual self-constraints takes place (Elias 1989:33).
This means as social structure changes, so does the individual personality structure and this then leads to further change in social structure. Humans are oriented by both nature and nurture to exist only in interdependent relationship with others. It is through these interdependencies that individuals define the self and the world, they satisfy their needs, and orient their thoughts and actions (Elwell 2013). A child who is often hit by his angry father whenever he considers the child to be naughty only partially develops self-constraint because it is dependent on the threat of others. If the child had been allowed to avoid the disapproved behaviour of his own accord through persuasion, reasoning and signs of caring, he would learn to restrain himself independently of an external constraint, in this instance paternal punishment. It is highly probable that the child will in turn become a beater, taking his father as a model without realising it.

This example can be extended to a societal level where members of absolutist states develop personality structures in which their ability to exercise self-constraint is dependent on external constraints; a strong military force that threatens them with punishment (Elias 1989: 34). Members of non-absolutist states where multi-party systems of governance exist require personality structures built on a strong and firm apparatus of self-constraint and societies governed by non-absolutist states have therefore been developed to consist of individuals who have been brought up with self-constraint independent from external constraint that can reach their own convictions through reasoning and persuasion as opposed to fearing the stick or threats of punishment (Elias 1989: 34). But developing such a society is a long and arduous progression. Elias examined the progression of civilising processes in Europe from the Middle Ages through to the 1930s and looked at changes in the habitus (personal habits such as eating, sleeping, sex, natural body functions and bathing) by examining etiquette books. His findings demonstrated a gradual change in what was prohibited and recommended gravitating towards stricter control of impulse and emotion, first in public and then in private. The change also included an advance in personal shame and embarrassment regarding our animal nature such as our bodies, waste elimination, sleep, and sexuality and putting such “animalic” activities behind the scenes of social life (Elwell 2013).
Elias relates these changes to changes of social structure and the growth and centralisation of authority with its monopoly on violence and taxation and the consequent growth of interdependence fostered by the increasing division of labour. In the Middle Ages, people ate from a common dish, taking meat from the dish with their fingers, drinking from a common goblet, and spooning their soup from the same pot. Medieval people largely lacked the instilled affective reaction against coming into contact with food that had touched someone else’s mouth and had little shame of embarrassment in observing others engaging in bodily functions such as waste elimination or bathing. The civilising processes relate how behaviours that were accepted as normal in medieval societies gradually became strictly controlled and prohibited. At first the prohibitions were given their force through appeals not to offend others, on purely social grounds.

Moving through the ages towards modernity, Elias observed that these prohibitions became a part of children’s upbringing and thus internalised, functioning whilst the individual is alone as well. These behaviours became invested with feelings of shame and embarrassment as individuals internalised what was socially acceptable. As societies in Europe approached modern times, these behaviours weren’t written about anymore and it was also no longer needed. But it is important to take stock of the longevity of reaching this level and the centuries it took to teach acceptable behaviours. A gradual process of tightening prohibitions regarding sexuality, control of emotions and violence is indicated by Elias as he demonstrates that emotional outbursts were much closer to the surface in the Middle Ages and prohibitions therefore had to be taught and discussed openly. Eliasian understanding of civilisation is therefore founded on particular habitus and psychic structures that have changed over time and are connected to the changes in the forms taken by broader by broader social relationship. The moulding of instinctual life, including its impulsive features, is a function of social interdependencies that persist throughout life and these change as the structure of society changes (van Krieken 2011). And it is this potential of change that can tip the balance from civilisation towards barbarism.
“The armour of civilized conduct would crumble very rapidly if, through a change in society, the degree of insecurity that existed earlier were to break in upon us again, and if danger became as incalculable as once it was. Corresponding fears would soon burst the limits set to them today “(Elias 1994: 253).

Through a thorough historical chronology, Elias explains how in this context Nazism gained popularity in Germany. Between the 16th and 19th century, Germany was marred with the break up of the medieval empire, decade long wars causing the death of a third of the German population and repeated foreign invasions. As a result, the Gemans became painfully conscious that they held a low status in the hierarchical ranking of European states and developed chronic doubts about their own self-worth (Dunning and Mennell 1998: 347). They yearned for a victory that would restore their worth. When the process of unification occurred in the second half of the 19th century through a series of wars under the leadership of the Prussian king and military caste, it made an impression on a majority of the middle class. At the same time, the balance between 'humanist' and 'anti-humanist' values among the dominant sections of the middle classes changed decisively in favour of the latter (Dunning and Mennell 1998: 348).

The military component was vividly apparent in the ethos of the Kaiserreich aristocracy-bourgeoisie. Discipline, honour and an unbending sense of duty was manifested among members of the ruling elite and strength of character was demonstrated by inflexibility and relentlessness (Dunning and Mennell 1998). Special emphasis was placed on typical military characteristics such as hierarchy, reserve and social distance and acts of violence and brutality had meaning bestowed upon them, its idealisation trickling down to the masses. Elias explains that this ethos played a significant part in the rise of Nazism:
“I have treated the expansion of military models into parts of the German middle class somewhat more precisely because I believe that National Socialism and the decivilizing spurt which it embodied cannot be completely understood without reference to this context. A simple example of the appropriation and then coarsening of aristocratic models is the requirement that every 'Aryan' had to prove himself or herself as such through a specific number of 'Aryan' ancestors. Above all, however, the unbridled resort to acts of violence as the only realistic and decisive vehicle of politics, which was at the centre of Hitler's doctrine and the strategy used already in his rise to power, can be explained only against this background” (Elias 1996: 15).

Nazism gave the Germans an ego-enhancing prestige boost by decreeing them to be members of the 'superior' 'Aryan race'. The Holocaust grew directly out of the Nazis' racial ideology (Elias 1996: 311) and the Breimar state lacked the power to oppose it. Elias explains that “the violence of the National Socialist movement, with the aid of privately organised defence associations brought about the almost complete dissolution of the monopoly of force - without which a state, in the long term, cannot function - and destroyed the Weimar Republic from within” (Elias 1996: 228).

Decivilising processes occur when civilising processes go into reverse. The processes are marked by:

“Breaking links and shorter chains of social interdependence, associated with higher levels of danger and incalculability in everyday life, the re-emergence of violence into the public sphere and a decline in mutual identification, reduced pressures on individuals to restrain the expression of impulses (including the freer expression of aggressiveness), changes in socialisation and personality formation as well as less interdependence between members of society and state and no vested collective interest in state monopoly over violence” (Dunning and Mennell 1998: 350).
An outbreak of a civil war is by definition decivilising and decivilising consequences are experienced by all involved (Dunning and Mennell 1998: 350). But just like how Elias related the gradual changes in the German social structure that culminated into the rise of Nazism, similar gradual changing structures occurred in Somalia and these can be traced between the colonisation era to the establishment of the military regime and the country’s descend into the 1991 civil war. The breakdown of the Somali state is elaborated and detailed in chapter 2 but for the purpose of relating it to Eliasian understanding of the processes of decivilisation that can be historically observed as gradual changes in social structure, the three root causes of the Somali conflict are used here as examples to demonstrate the occurrence of the processes of decivilisation. Let’s begin with the growth of clannism and international community engagement. The construct of clan as a collective identity was transformed under colonial rule as it became the only means by which the ‘natives’ could gain access to the state. Clan therefore became an instrument that can be used as a government technology of power to coerce and co-opt the ruled (Kapteijns 2013: 75). This created a previously unknown environment where the ruled competed with each other for various kinds of benefits from the state, an environment that was inherited with independence which continued to plague the Somali civilian governments as well as the subsequent military regime. The ripple effect of this change was a popularisation of the clan mindset (over nationhood) and the decline of social interdependence as people became more dependent on their clan rather than being interdependent as clans part of the same nation. The post civil war governments that have been established with the help of the international community have been distinctly based on clan representation, meaning that selected members and officials are chosen as representatives of their clan rather than representatives of national government. They therefore represent and look after the interests of their clan leaving a vacuum for centralised governance, which the international community has thus far been well positioned to fill. A related matter to that is the lack of interdependence between society and the state because the state has come to symbolise being a provider of clan benefits and
if certain clans don’t see themselves gaining benefits from that state’s existence, opposition would ensue, which was vividly evident in the form of armed clan-based groups overthrowing Barre’s government. The third key example is an accumulation of the effect of clannism on the state and the effect of colonially inherited governance on society with communism added into the mix when the military regime came into power.

The mix caused a multi-dimensional societal hierarchy over time where the rich and the ruling elite or those that were related to the ruling elite of any government or even of the same clan enjoyed a higher regard and status in society. The economic backlash of the Ethio-Somali war in 1977 and the Soviet’s withdrawal of aid added a spiralling blow to a society that was now marred with poverty and social inequality with women, youth and minority clans being the most at the receiving end.

Catherine Besteman explains this portion best when she contends that “the dissolution of the Somali nation-state can be understood only by recognising that over the past century and a half there emerged in Somalia a social order deeply stratified on the basis of race, status, class, region, and language” (Besteman 1999: ibid). Besteman does not pay much attention to the role of clannism as a political instrument nor to the international community’s engagement which makes the Somali conflict on the whole a much more complex situation than what she relates, but her work is nevertheless extremely poignant and relevant, especially in discussing how decivilising process came into existence in the Somali conflict. Gradually the above mentioned three examples mixed with a growing dissolution with the military government and the pursuit of power culminated into the formation of a plethora of armed clan-based opposition groups that used the dissolution of government amongst society to rally support. The result was the collapse of the state followed by an on-slaught of devastating bloodshed and the slaughtering of innocent civilians. There was no longer a collective vested interest in state monolopoly over violence.

The failure to recognise and address these decivilising processes has arguably been at the core of the continued failure of every attempt at forming a government since the outbreak of the civil. What has
continued to breed is the normalisation of violence as a means of attainment and asserting power and authority. A chilling reminder of this was evident in the 2014 Human Rights Watch Report on ‘the normalisation of rape’ in Somalia. The report relates how women and girls in Somalia suffer ‘double victimisation’ due to the pervasive nature of sexual violence. The perpetrators of the violence include security agents, armed gangs and well known neighbours to the victims, all with complete impunity (HRW 2014).

4.2 Critique of Elias

Whilst Elias has been widely recognised as bringing a new form of understanding society, his theory of civilising processes has not been without criticism. One of his most vocal critics is arguably the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, who considers the extermination of the Jews, and genocide in general, as the very core of modernity. He explains this in detail in his books ‘Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) and ‘Postmodern Ethics: The modern era has been founded on genocide, and has proceeded through more genocide’ (1993: 227 cited in De Swaan 2001: 267). Bauman considers genocide endemic in the modern world. He argues that modern societies have power-concentrations which aren’t under effective control and can be used for good or evil (Dunning and Mennell 1998). One of his examples is the moral responsibility of those that take part in mass extermination, which can be decreased through the division of functions employed to carry them out: none of the individual persons involved along the chain of tasks are - or see themselves as - individually responsible (Dunning and Mennell 1998: 352). Bauman's argument is underpinned by philosophical rather than sociological premises. He stipulates that moral behaviour is ‘natural’ rather than deriving from processes of socialisation and if people could see the outcome of their choices, they would act ‘morally’ towards each other (Dunning and Mennell 1998). Eliasian theory was designed to refute this argument and explicitly details how morality is socially produced, a key example being the connection Elias makes between state-formation processes and the changes in the habitus of individuals (Dunning and Mennell 1998):
“If in a particular region, the power of central authority grows, if over a larger or smaller area the people are forced to live in peace with each other, the moulding of their affects and the standard of their drive-economy (Trzebhaushalt) are very gradually changed as well. The habitus of people in Western Europe have changed as part of long-term processes in parallel with the monopolisation of violence by the state” (Elias 1994 cited in Dunning and Mennell 1998: 340).

Bauman had a particular bone to pick with state monopolisation of violence arguing that modern states have not eliminated violence but rather reshifted it:

“The non-violent character of modern civilisation is an illusion since what happened in the course of the civilising process is a redeployment of violence from public to invisible and segregated spaces. It was removed from everyday life to beaurocratic divisions of labour where knowledge of the final outcome is not necessary and each person is accountable only to their superior. The victims of this system are dehumanised and reduced to objects, which was epitomised by the uniforms and number tattooed on prisoners’ arms” (Bauman 1999: 96).

But the point that is missed by Bauman is that Elias does not claim that violence has been eliminated from European society. Rather what he relates is that the very fact that it has been pushed back and away from public view has produced an environment where violence is increasingly isolated to domestic settings and more associated with feelings of repugnance, guilt and shame. It is no longer paraded as a show of power by the ruling elites. With the exception of times of turbulence, emergencies or revolutions, states have managed to keep armies confined to barracks and rely on the police, who are less heavily armed and their right to use arms is more restricted, to keep public order (Dunning and Mennell 1998). Bauman takes issue with the pacification of daily life that the civilising processes have produced arguing that it has created a ‘defenseless and disarmed society allowing supremacy of political over social power’ (Bauman 1999: 107) and the concentration of
power actually ‘enabled mass extermination’ (Bauman 1999: 27). This argument however is too simplistic as it does not account for the fact that the concentration of power amongst those in central positions of authority and influence generates a mutual dependency culture. Elias states that the more people are made dependent by the monopoly mechanism, the greater becomes the power of the dependent, individually as well as collectively in relation to the monopolisers and this perhaps becomes most evident during elections. In other words, to obtain and maintain monopoly positions, those in central authority positions rely on the masses (van Krieken 2001). Van Krieken argues this point quite poignantly when he states “The greater monopolisation of power-chances is accompanied by a greater collective democratisation, at least, because a monopoly position is itself dependent on a larger and more complex network of social groups and units” (van Krieken 2001: 353).

This gradual civilising process is what has led to the 20th century becoming the most peaceful era with death by violence steadily declining globally to less than 1% according to the experimental psychologist Steven Pinker. It ‘allowed for the nationalisation of justice which has played a large part in the decline in violence in Europe’ (Pinker 2011: 89). Pinker illustrates with ample quantitative data how the presence of centralised government that gave people more of a stake in social stability contributed to the decline in violence in Europe and this process gradually spread across the world. My argument is not to laud the Leviathan, as governments can and certainly do participate in committing terrible actions and atrocities. What I am proposing is that by having a monopoly over violence as well as creating incentives for social stability, a state can provide a platform for violence to be reduced. A government can impose a cost on an aggressor that is large enough to cancel out his gains, making peace more appealing than war. Secondly, a state justice system plays a refereeing role which gives people less of an incentive to strike pre-emptively or in self-defence. This leads to the reduction of one’s own desire to maintain an aggressive stance and, in the long term, can generate a habit of self-control (Pinker 2011). In ‘The Better Angels of Our Nature’ (2011), Pinker argues that violence has decreased over multiple scales of time and magnitude, including tribal...
warfare, homicide, cruel punishments, child abuse, animal cruelty, domestic violence, lynching, massacres and international and civil wars. Pinker considers it unlikely that human nature has changed. In his view, it is more likely that human nature comprises inclinations toward violence and those that counteract them, the "better angels of our nature". He outlines six major historical declines of violence (Pinker 2011: 42):

1. The Pacification Process; the rise of organised systems of government has a correlative relationship with the decline in violent deaths. As states expand they prevent tribal feuding and societal violence.

2. The Civilising Processes; consolidation of centralised states and kingdoms throughout Europe resulted in the rise of criminal justice and commercial infrastructure, organising previously chaotic systems which often led to raiding and mass violence.

3. The Humanitarian Revolution; the 18th - 20th century abandonment of institutionalized violence by the state. Pinker suggests that this is likely because of the spike in literacy after the invention of the printing press thereby allowing the proletariat to question conventional wisdom.

4. The Long Peace; the 65 years after World War 1 World War 2 was largely peaceful and developed countries stopped warring against each other and colonially, adopted democracy and this has led to a massive decline (on average) of deaths.

5. The New Peace; the decline in organised conflicts of all kinds since the end of the Cold War.

6. The Rights Revolutions; the reduction of systemic violence at smaller scales against vulnerable populations (racial minorities, women, children, homosexuals, animals etc).
The possibility of these historical declines in violence is buttressed on the formations of modern nation-states with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force which can diffuse temptations of exploitative attacks and inhibit the impulse for revenge.

Pinker, like Elias, has been at the receiving end of much criticism with a number of them coming from the philosopher and retired professor of European thought at the LSE John Gray. Gray, like Bauman argues that violence has not declined but is simply outsourced:

“In much the same way that rich societies exported their pollution to developing countries, the societies of the highly-developed world exported their conflicts. They were at war with one another the entire time—not only in Indo-China but in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The Korean war, the Chinese invasion of Tibet, British counter-insurgency warfare in Malaya and Kenya, the abortive Franco-British invasion of Suez, the Angolan civil war, decades of civil war in the Congo and Guatemala, the Six Day War, the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet-Afghan war—these are only some of the armed conflicts through which the great powers pursued their rivalries while avoiding direct war with each other. When the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union from the scene, war did not end. It continued in the first Gulf war, the Balkan wars, Chechnya, the Iraq war and in Afghanistan and Kashmir, among other conflicts. Taken together these conflicts add up to a formidable sum of violence.” (Gray 2011: 1).

Pinker however does not claim that his ideas are the trumpet call for progress nor that there is an eventual end point for violence. What he establishes is a culmination of quantifiable research that proves certain habits and psychological functions have prevailed in certain environments and these have in turn led to a noticeable decline in violence. Pinker in his own words says:
“The forces of modernity -- reason, science, humanism, individual rights -- have not, of course, pushed steadily in one direction; nor will they ever bring about a utopia or end the frictions and hurts that come with being human. But on top of all the benefits that modernity has brought us in health, experience, and knowledge, we can add its role in the reduction of violence.” (2011: 14)

Pinker provides ample evidence towards the growth of technological progress which allowed the exchange of goods and services over long distances making people more valuable alive than dead and are less likely to become targets of dehumanisation. He further details the increasing respect for women and the rise of literacy, mobility and mass media which aid people to take the perspectives of people unlike them and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. Pinker does not dismiss the gross human rights violations that have been occurring over the 20th century and neither does Elias. In fact, Elias states that famine is a constantly recurring feature of human societies and large parts of entire societies do live their lives on the verge of starvation (Elias 1989: 26). What has changed is that it is no longer accepted as a God-given condition of human existence and many members of richer countries feel a sense of obligation to do something about the misery of other human beings often living very far away from them. This sense does not always lead to action but it is a shift in conscience-formation defining of our modern times (Elias 1989: 26). Feelings of obligation to contribute towards the betterment of the conditions of fellow human beings can also be linked to Pinker’s theory of the ‘escalator of reason’ which is an intensifying application of knowledge and rationality and speaks partly towards accepting the other as an equal worthy of existence. It is inclined towards the human condition and affairs and allows for people to reconsider violence as a problem to be resolved rather than a contest to be won. De Waal et al (2007) propose the development of culture in a similar context to the ‘escalator of reason’ which they deem has allowed aggression to cease to be a primary way of settling disputes, particularly with the development of laws, language and negotiation, morality and norms of fairness leading to the restraint of aggression and becoming the main means of conflict resolution.
However, Elias stresses that it is important to bear in mind that civilising processes are vulnerable and processes of growth and decay can go hand in hand with the potential of the the latter predominating the former (Elias 1989: 308). Human instincts of anger, hate, enmity and rivalry remain present. Therefore what needs to be established and guarded are the pacification of people as inter-dependent individuals.

Conflict generates a territory not governed by a state and this comes in handy for various illegal activities (Collier 2008: 31) as well as a territory to exert power and dominance. Political and economic actors in collapsed states fear a change in the operating environment which, though far from ideal, is one in which they have learned to survive and profit (Menkhaus 2003). Over time, civil war leaves a legacy of organised killing with violence and extortion becoming profitable means to reach all sorts of ends (Collier 2008: 33). This is not to say that a form of social order does not exist but rather that this order has regressed back to barbarism. Democratic proceedings only attract crooks and those that are most corrupt; what Collier refers to as the ‘the law of the political jungle where only the survival of the fattest’ matter (Collier 2008: 46). Most of the individuals attracted to participating in Somali politics, be they locals or from the diaspora, fall within this ecology. The political aspirants that have come back from abroad show characteristics very similar to the political leaders of the Nazi regime: half-educated individuals who are outsiders or failures in the societies they’ve settled in (Elias 1989: 315). Their hunger for power and ambition renders them unable to admit their inabilities to themselves, making them complicit in the lack of political progress that is being made in the country.

It is within this context, an environment where regression towards barbarism has been normalised and is need of well-thought out civilising processes planned for the long term, which the current Somali society should be examined. Only then can proper light be shed on problems such as continuous premeditated and deliberate acts of violence (Elias 1989: 176) and some semblance of peace can be hoped for.
4.3 Diasporated conflicts

Somalia’s civil war led to a substantial number of the population fleeing the country. As many as one million Somalis have fled to many parts of the world, forming a significant diaspora population and were appealed to by the warring factions in Somalia. Additionally, the fragmentation of society that civil war undoubtedly causes, brought up issues of identity and in this context, identity became as Paul Gilroy states ‘a question of power and authority when groups seek to realise themselves in political form’ (Gilroy 2000: 99). Communicative technology can be used to articulate placeless imaginings of identity (Gilroy 2000: 111) for which the Somali diaspora were in a good position to do. McLuhan famously alluded to the electric process making us all nobodies desperate for identity in his concept of the ‘global village’ (McLuhan and Zingrone 1995). It stimulates people to retrieve who they used to be as a protection of their fading identities and the old sensibility, values and enmity prevail over democratic awareness and commitment (McLuhan and Zingrone 1995: 4). The same communication technology provides platforms for dominance to those who have access to better technological infrastructure and democratic environments. Diasporic media in this context has become a powerful tool as it enables the diaspora communities to negotiate and exert a newly established authority that carry political, financial, human and social capital; a concept I refer to as diasporated conflicts. In other words, diasporated conflicts are conflicts where there is a hegemonic involvement of the diaspora enabled and empowered by diasporic media. Within this concept, diaspora communities can exercise their newly found authority in progressive and/or regressive manners depending on the identities they assume.

The ‘intensification of worldwide social relations linking distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many thousands of miles away and vice versa’ (Giddens 1991: 72) means that diasporic media is enabling diaspora members to reproduce local nationalisms as well as transatlantically maintain local identities. The central nervous system is in McLuhan’s terms ‘technologically extended’ (McLuhan and Zingrone 1995) but this does not necessarily create
involvement in the whole humankind by default as previously argued by McLuhan (McLuhan and Zingrone 1995: 150). Rather this extension very much depends on the civilising processes occurring within the societies involved. Technologically engaged diaspora communities can be seen as networks which constitute the new social morphology of our societies (Castells 1996) making it more likely for global clusters of groups to exist rather than a global whole of humankind.

Chandler along with theorists such as Kaldor and Keane speak of the key point of the globalised world being about how territory is no longer especially significant (Chandler 2009: 6). According to him as well as Ruggie (1993) and Scholte (2002), we no longer live in a territorialised world where we are mapped in terms of bounded political communities with clear points of connection between states and citizen-subjects and this is due to globalisation (Chandler 2009: 6). This may be true for developed societies but for societies that lag behind, the connection between citizen-subjects abroad and territorially based political communities that aren’t limited to just the state is very much alive. Globalisation has therefore created room for the possibility of global democratic progress as well as for the globalisation of regression towards symptoms of barbarism. It is through this prism of globalisation that diaspora communities are negotiating their identities amidst sentiments of placelessness. National belonging is often rediscovered through distance and feelings of difference (Trandafoiu 2013) which makes it highly likely for diaspora communities to re-embrace their homeland along with the symptoms of barbarism that may be prevailing. This sentiment can become especially prominent when diaspora communities don’t feel they are fully accepted members in their host country and engage in what Benedict Anderson refers to as ‘long distance nationalism’ (Anderson 1992). As Anderson puts it “mass communication has made long distance nationalism much easier than it once was. These people often want to participate in the politics of their countries of origin but don’t have to obey the laws or pay the taxes” (Anderson 1992). Diaspora communities also have the vantage point of living in technologically and democratically advanced environments which puts them in a position to take advantage of the pitfalls at home and vie for positions of power.
The most widespread tool for negotiating hegemonic position that Somali diaspora members use is financial support given to political actors at clan level (Horst and Gaas 2008). ‘Tensions and conflicts between sub-clans are faced by relatives and friends directly and the level of influence diaspora support can have on the outcome of these conflicts is much greater’ (Gaas and Horst 2008: 16). Gaas and Horst elaborate further and state ‘clan leaders can expect financial support from clan-members in the diaspora and manpower from clan members in Somalia and these disputes often lead to the two clans in question taking up arms against each other’ (Gaas and Horst 2008: 17). Often both clans would be mobilising each other in Somalia which will have great implications on both clans’ members in the diaspora and their local relationships with each other. Funds sent to support clan conflict have been estimated to be between $500,000 to $5 million over the past two decades. These funds were used for fighters to be paid and weaponry to be bought (Gaas and Horst 2008: 19). To put this in greater context, the Islamist group Al-Itihad (see chapter 2) who were militarily active between the 90’s and early 2000’s received much of their financial support from Somali Diaspora members in Europe and this support enabled them to capture and control several regions in the south central areas of Somalia (Le Sage 2001). Al-Itihad largely comprised of the Darod clan and the diaspora members who supported them were largely of the same clan. Over time, the recipient group develop skills only useful in conflict (Collier 2003: 4) hindering the potential for rule of law to be re-instated, a cycle part of the phenomenon Collier refers to as the ‘conflict trap’ (2003).

In addition to clan support, diaspora Somalis also sent remittances to Islamist groups that they ideologically support. The emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 (see chapter 2 for elaboration) was largely enabled by financial means that were sent by the diaspora members (Menkhaus 2007 et al). There is again a clan element as most members of the ICU belonged to the Hawiye clan and therefore the diaspora members that were sending money to them were of that clan. Diaspora support, in fact, enabled the fast expansion of the ICU as they took the control of the whole of Mogadishu in less than 6 months (Gaas and Horst 2008). In addition to financial support,
posting information about their movement and its development on Somali websites helped to recruit many Somalis from the diaspora to join the ICU (Gaas and Horst 2008).

4.4 Tackling media framing

These activities bring into question the issues that affect how the media frames its coverage and consequently, the responses this generates. Scholars have developed various theoretical concepts but some productive and influential theories are Bennett’s (1990) indexing theory, which states that the media incorporate government viewpoints until there is an elite dissensus and Entman’s (2007) theory, which shifts the power to the media themselves as elites find it more difficult with the absence of the Cold War to demonise enemies and invoke patriotism that once could be counted on to garner media support. Though each of these theories contribute to our understanding of media response to global conflicts like Somalia, their theories are largely based on media institutions in stable Western countries and thus do not cater much for media responses that can be generated by ties to a conflict. A theoretical model that might provide a more nuanced insight into media response is perhaps Wolfsfeld’s political contest model (1997) in which Wolfsfeld asserts ‘the best way to understand the role of news media in politics is to view the competition over the news media as part of larger contest among political antagonists for political control’ (Wolfsfeld 1997: 3). According to Wolfsfeld, the political process is more likely to have an influence on the media than the other way round indicating that the media is more likely to react rather than initiate unfolding events. But in a complex conflict like Somalia, media outlets can be owned by individuals with an interest in shaping the unfolding of events and thus can initiate events to unfold. This means political actors can be stakeholders in media entities and media stakeholders can also be political actors, making the influence they can have on one another much more complex than what Wolfsfeld’s political contest model seemingly imagines.

A more relevant theoretical model seems to be Herman and Chomsky’s (1988) manufacturing consent, which indicates that the media is influenced by the hegemonic elite. Although this model is
also largely based on media entities in stable western countries, the rationale of the media working in collusion with the political and economic elite holds much ground particularly in societies where there is a diasporated conflict and the homeland state is weak. In this climate, non-state dominant actors rise to hold hegemonic positions from where they can either own or control the media.

Journalists also play a vital role in shaping the media landscape though this role is often complex and multifaceted. Lilie Chouliaraki (2006) speaks of how journalists and the media in general can play a part in shaping an ethical sensibility among viewers in the West towards distant suffering and highlights as an example the global humanitarian response that the media coverage of the Asian tsunami in 2004 generated, which swept away more than 250,000 people. The BBC’s George Alagiah wrote how there is a certain moral significance that comes with being a journalist (1999: 5) and he enlists the defence of human rights as one example of such moral significance, which he states to have advocated for as part of his reporting during the Kosovo and Sudan conflicts. But when the journalist is personally affected by and/or embroiled in the conflict he or she is covering, these moral significances can have particularistic meanings that differ from journalist to journalist, which can potentially lead to them contributing to the re-creation of the conflict.

**4.5 Defining ‘politics’ and conceptual elaboration**

Politics as I understand it signifies conflict or contestation. This means the presence of contending interests and views towards a given issue or development. It is a process heavily influenced by the pursuit of power which determines ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell 1936) and ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Dahl 1961). This process incorporates the existence of rival opinions and competing needs as well as the likelihood of cooperation. It is therefore befitting to refer to my concept as the three politics as it signifies contending interests and power relations. I argue there are three situations where conflict can be re-created in and through the media which are the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation.
although I have read a vast number of relevant literature, there are a few that have distinctly shaped my conceptual thought process with regards to developing the concept of the three politics. The politics of non-recognition is primarily influenced by Charles Taylor’s ‘Politics of Recognition’ though I draw upon Simon Cottle’s chapter on identity politics and cultural difference in ‘Mediatised Conflicts’ (2006). The politics of solidarity is inspired by Michel Foucault and his theoretical understanding of power and Benedict Anderson’s imagined communities. The politics of mobilisation takes its cue from the works of Frances Stewart, particularly her work on religion and ethnicity as a source for mobilisation (Stewart 2009). Though these scholars come from differing schools of thought, what they do have in common is a shared focus on the importance of incorporating societal approaches in their studies and it is this aspect that the conceptual part of this thesis is inspired by. Taylor pays detailed attention to the relationship between the self, society and the nation and the role of social institutions and Cottle’s focus on the sociology of journalism provides complimentary insight to the theoretical inspiration gained from Taylor to conceptualise the politics of non-recognition.

Foucault’s understanding of ethics and power relations have in part helped shape my conceptual interpretation of power struggles in the Somali context. Ethics in Foucauldian terms concerns the kind of relation one has to oneself and the moral aspects that influence the actions of the individual, which suggests an evolving process that chimes well with Elias’ civilising processes. Foucault understands power to be a relation that is not localised to the state but exercised throughout the social body, an understanding that is complimentary again to the democratising properties of the monopolisation of violence distinctive of Elias’ civilising processes. Power relations are at the core of the politics of solidarity but very much exercised throughout the social body which becomes even more pronounced in the absence of a functioning state. It is this potential pronunciation of power relations within a society that shapes social identity formation which also makes Anderson’s work highly influential in conceptualising the politics of solidarity.
Frances Stewart’s leans more towards a political economic approach but where her work becomes relevant to the politics of mobilisation is the emphasis she places on sociological analysis in order to understand motivations and behaviour during conflict.

4.5.1 Politics of non-recognition

Following on from Rousseau’s conceptualisation of morality, Taylor relates Herder’s idea that each of us has an original way of being human. This idea of living life staying true to oneself has taken firm root in modern times. Inner contact is accorded moral importance because of the fear it might get lost due to external pressures to conform (Taylor 1994: 30). Being true to one’s own originality means being able to discover oneself and in the process, define oneself. The ideal of authenticity is coached in this realm; realising one’s potentiality and achieving self-fulfilment and actualisation (Taylor: 1994: 31). Taylor makes note of Herder’s two dimensional conception of originality: the individual person amongst other people and the culture-bearing people amongst other people.

Both should be true to oneself and their culture. But this process crucially depends on the dialogical relations with others. And whilst the need for recognition has always been part of society, our modern age has produced an environment where the attempt to be recognised can fail (Taylor 1994: 35). The need and importance for recognition is therefore now a universally acknowledged issue. It however remains a vulnerable matter since the granting or withholding of recognition does depend on others. Equal recognition is crucial for a healthy society since its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it and the projection of an inferior image can distort and lead to oppression (Taylor 1994: 36). Examples of this can widely be found in feminist discourse, postcolonialism and race relations. The politics of recognition is concerned with these contending themes: the ongoing need for recognition and the granting of it. Taylor stipulates that our identity is in part shaped by recognition or its absence (Taylor 1994: 25). The politics of non-recognition focuses and builds on the latter strand of absence. It emphasises on the media’s central role in contemporary times in silencing the most marginalised and powerless members of society. It is here that we begin to
borrow from Cottle, who relates how the prominence of a new politics of difference encompassing identity politics, social movements and struggles centred on gender, sexuality and religion have become defining features of modern times and all of them vie for recognition via the media stage (Cottle 2006: 167). The problem arises when media representations enter into ‘fields of conflict structured by deep-seated inequalities and entrenched identities, they can become deeply fused within them exacerbating intensities and contributing to destructive impacts’ (Cottle 2006: 168). In today’s mediatised societies, the media is arguably the principal means by which cultural differences and agendas can be acknowledged and recognised (Cottle 2006: 167) putting minorities in a position where they can be misrecognised or devalued or worse; not recognised at all. The media operates in fields structured by dominance (Cottle 2006: 168). The key issue with regards to the politics of non-recognition is the absence of a given content in the media, since what does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind (Castells 2007).

The mediatised silencing of discourses and issues relevant to minorities and marginalised sections of society inevitably reinforces the cognitive manifestation of existing marginalisation that is often prevalent in conflict environments.

4.5.2 Politics of solidarity

Solidarity in its broadest form has multiple meanings but minimally, it denotes a relation or unity between people. These relations can be based on a number of things but the key point the politics of solidarity is concerned with is the fellow feeling of a group that takes shape from a shared ideal (Scholz 2007) and how power is used as an organising force of difference. In this sense, power is used in Foucauldian terms and is meant as a capacity that is spread throughout the socio-political body rather than something that is held by the state (Dhamoon 2009: 10). As Foucault states ‘power is more complicated, dense and pervasive than a set of laws and state apparatus’ (Foucault 1980: 158). Power produces subjects that become vehicles of power and at the same time, these subjects exercise power to produce difference, which is historically generated and subject to change
In this context much can be learned from postcolonial thinkers such as Edward Said, Frantz Fanon and Gayatri Spivak who explicitly addressed the differential treatments of racialized peoples and how power was deployed in these treatments. The crux of the politics of solidarity is the production of an ‘us-vs-them’ environment and power is exercised towards the advancement of the generated common group ideal. Within this context, politics of solidarity derives much influence from Benedict Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ in relation to nationalism (Anderson 1991). Anderson noted that it is simply not possible for every individual to know and relate to everyone else, or to engage with one another on an everyday basis, even in the smallest of nations. Yet they feel themselves bound to one another, accept obligations to one another and expect solidarity from others in turn. The concept acquires new validity when applied to transnational movements based on faith, perceived ethnicity, generation or cultural affinity and especially amongst societies where ethnicity is more prevalent and home state has collapsed. Anderson points out that this is when people become territorial and defensive of what they consider belongs to them. This in turn reminds them that they are to unify with those within their territory and exclude all those who aren’t. In the context of state collapse, regional connections based on existing traditional structures such as the clan become more poignant and transatlantic solidarity is constructed around it, which is fortified by diasporic media. The Somali diaspora is dependent on the media for information (Issa-Salwe 20011: 56) but how the media decides to represent unfolding events can lead to mediated judgements and through them people are ‘being invited to establish a relationship of connection or disconnection to the other, to other human beings distant in time or space (Silverstone 2007: 57). This emphasis allows the practice of inclusion and exclusion and evokes emotional attachments among the people making use of clan culture and values, dignity, honour and pride, replacing nationalism with clannism. 4.5.3 Politics of mobilisation

Anderson details in his concept of long distance nationalism that it can reach toxic levels or assume corrosive forms in the modalities of money for certain political figures, ethnic propaganda and weapons, although it can be restricted to the more benign activities of lobbying and fundraising for
humanitarian undertakings. The politics of mobilisation is the operationalization of existing
dispositions in the form of providing human, financial and/or social capital. This could be a physical
engagement by offering oneself as manpower, sending and raising funds and goods, raising
awareness and rallying others to become involved. The media can produce the politics of
mobilisation by providing a platform to facilitate and operationalise these dispositions.

In the post-Cold War era, it has been widely acknowledged that cultural identities have become
more important as a source of mobilisation (Hechter 2004; Huntington 2002; 1996). Frances
Stewart’s work on ethnicity and religion as a source for mobilisation lays the foundation which
stipulates the importance of how ethnic categorisation varies sharply within a group as well as over
time, especially when this is unfolding in a conflict environment. Therefore, those who wish to
mobilise people may first need to increase the consciousness of group identities and of the identities
of others (Stewart 2009). Factors that help raise group identity consciousness are, as Stewart
highlights, the exclusion or perceived exclusion from political power, economic marginalisation and
inequality or the perception of it. Mobilisers often play on these issues to mobilise their group
members but there are often strong political motives rooted in gaining or maintaining power
(Stewart 2009). In the case of the ethno-religious wars in the former Yugoslavia for example,
Milosevic ‘cleverly appealed to the historical and cultural passions of his countrymen to further his
own political and regional ambitions’ (Daugherty 2004: 647). Milosevic sparked ethno-political
conflict by taking control of the most influential Serbian media including TV, radio and the largest
newspapers which ensured popular support and political legitimacy for his causes among the
Serbian public and led to the mobilisation of hatred towards Albanians and the spreading of
aggressive nationalism (Bozic-Robertson and Agneza 2004: 2). Stewart does not disregard that
material motives play an instrumental part and thus, supporters are often drawn from the
unemployed or those with very low income. They may not receive large wages but their basic needs
are met (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Stern 2003), an often overlooked but crucial aspect of what
keeps religious terrorist groups such as Al Shabab active.
Whether the principal undertone is ethnic or religious, the media time and time again proves to be indispensable. Stewart documents the Rwandan genocide and the instrumental role of the media. She highlights how one journalist in particular published articles dubbed the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’, which included the proposition that all Tutsi women were agents and anyone who married one was a traitor, every Tutsi was dishonest and ‘his only aim is the supremacy of the ethnic group’, Hutus should control all positions of power and unite against the common Tutsi enemy, spread Hutu ideology and avoid showing mercy to Tutsis (Gourevitch 1998; Hintjens 1999 cited in Stewart 2009). Similarly, Stremlau et al (2009) speak of the Kenyan 2008 post-election violence and how the media exasperated, mirrored and enabled violence in and after the course of elections. The authors outlined how grievance, suspicion and deep sense of vote rigging were the factors that were largely responsible for Kenyan post-election violence and the media was the key agent that instigated those sentiments and advocated for the public’s violent mobilisation.

The three politics aren’t mutually exclusive, in the sense that one politics can ‘progress’ onto another politics or in some cases into more than one. To help illustrate this further, the below diagram demonstrates how conflict can be re-created in a cyclical progression through the three politics but each politics can also in its own right re-create the conflict:

![Diagram 4.1](image_url)  
**Diagram 4.1** an illustration of how the three politics lead to conflict re-creation.
4.6 Summary

This chapter began with chronicling the civilising processes coined by Norbert Elias, which as a concept is concerned with the interplay between constraints of self-control, human interdependence, natural circumstances and animalistic urges. Human beings are oriented by nature and nurture to depend on one another which ultimately defines the self, society and the world at large. But civilising processes are long and arduous as Elias illustrates in his work that traces Europe’s civilisation from the Middle Ages onward. However it is this gradual progression of civilisation that has led to the 20th century being the most peaceable era in our history. The formation of nation-states, nationalisation of justice, monopoly over violence and giving individuals a stake in social stability are all contributing factors to the decline of violence to less than 1% (Pinker 2011). Pinker builds on Elias’ theory and provides concepts such as the ‘escalator of reason’ which he stipulates requires ardent application of knowledge and rationality and has at its centre the acceptance of the other human being as an equal worthy of existence. Civilisation is enhanced with the development of laws, language, negotiation, morality and norms of fairness which can help lead to restraint of aggression but it is endangered and in need of safeguarding and as Elias highlights, civilising processes can occur at the same time as decaying processes. Therefore a regression to barbarism is a constant possibility, particularly when state collapse occurs. Somalia’s state collapsed in 1991 and has since been entering different stages of an ongoing conflict. It has led to a massive influx of refugees seeking asylum mostly in Western nations although substantial numbers can be found in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. They have grown to form a significant diaspora community taking advantage of the advanced technological infrastructure the West has to offer in the form of setting up many diasporic media outlets. Diasporic media was set up to meet their informational need to remain connected to their homeland. It has taken a hegemonic position within the media landscape due to its access to advanced technological infrastructure. It has also enabled the diaspora community to attain and exert power and prominence in the homeland by providing a platform that demonstrates their financial, social and human capital: a concept I refer to as diasporated conflicts.
In the process of enabling this platform, diasporic media is reproducing dynamics of the conflict and re-creating it in three analytically distinct but potentially transformative ways, which are the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. Diasporic media is therefore likely playing a very complex and multifaceted role than what current scholarship warrants, which is to highlight the maintenance of ties of kinship and identity preservation for immigrants. But it is important to broaden the scope of diasporic media capability if we are to gain a more meaningful understanding.
Chapter 5 Methodology

5.1 Introduction

In the UK, there is a diaspora population of 380,000 according to the Department for International Development (DFID 2008) making the Somali population in the UK the largest in Europe. The Somali community in the UK is also the most diverse, with Somalis who are descendants of those who came in the late 19th century as seamen, Somalis who came as refugees fleeing the civil war and Somalis who came as citizens of other European countries seeking social tolerance. There are unfortunately no up to date statistics of current numbers because UK ethnicity classifications in the census are not detailed enough to include a Somali category. Additionally, 5 out of the 9 existing TV stations as well as the most widely received radio service, the BBC Somali Service, are all based in the UK. All of these elements combined make the UK an interesting research focus as a location.

In order to examine the various ways diasporic media can re-create conflict, the research will be guided by the 4 aims that the literature review chapters have brought forth and are guided by this research’s conceptual approach. The first research aim seeks to map out the current media landscape that is available to re-create conflict. The second research aim is to examine how diasporic media can produce politics of recognition, solidarity and mobilisation among diaspora Somalis in the UK. By this I mean exploring the meanings and understanding they derive from diasporic media’s coverage of the conflict and how this may influence their opinions, views and possible engagement with the Somali conflict within the framework of the three politics. The third research aim that came out of the literature review chapters is to examine and determine to what extent diasporic media’s production of the politics of recognition, solidarity and mobilisation manifests itself in the Somali diaspora communities. The fourth and final research aim is to examine how Somali journalists seek to intervene and/or respond to the conflict through their work and how that can lead to the production of the three politics. I will elaborate on each one below.
5.2 Statement of aims

Re-creating conflict; an examination of Somali diasporic media involvement in the Somali conflict

1) To map the Somali diasporic media available to re-create conflict

At present, there isn’t any comprehensive or even cumulative evidence available that adequately maps how many Somali media outlets that are available to the Somali diaspora in the UK. This mapping process is important because it will shed light on what is available to the diasporic Somali community in the UK that are in a position to re-create conflict. The mapping process will begin with revisiting existing sources of data to help compile an overview of the numbers and nature of Somali media outlets.

2) To examine and determine to what extent diasporic media outlets in the UK exhibit media politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation

This aim will help to highlight what interests are influencing and shaping diasporic media’s coverage of the conflict and what messages they are conveying in the framework of politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. This will be done through content analysis and discourse analysis of which detailed instruments can be found in the following section of this chapter.

3) To examine how politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation become manifested amongst diaspora Somalis in the UK by diasporic media

There are more than 380,000 Somalis in the UK (DFID 2008) and as the literature review has identified and considered, many of them are active viewers of the Somali media and they also have close ties with their family, relatives and clan members in Somalia. The literature review has also indicated that current discourse focusing on diasporic media (Harindranath 2007, Gillespie 1995)
identifies the impact of diasporic media in a positive light, indicating its use to help diaspora communities to sustain bonds with their homeland and maintain identities.

But when these ties are being sustained with a homeland in a civil conflict, diasporic media can play a role in nurturing the fragmented identities that the war has caused. This could be in the form of individuals feeling excluded or voiceless creating politics of non-recognition, it could generate allegiance and solidarity where individuals become convinced of what is being advocated for which is what I refer to as the politics of solidarity or it could mobilise individuals into taking a certain action, whether it be raising funds, providing human capital, collecting goods or raising awareness. Engaging with the Somali diaspora who make up Somali diasporic media’s audience will provide an understanding of how diasporic media is received, their thoughts and opinions towards it and how they respond to it in the framework of the three politics. This analysis will allow me to examine the various ways that conflict is ‘re-created’ by diasporic media. I will conduct focus groups with Somalis who attend Somali cafes where diasporic media is viewed. As there is a gender division within the Somali community, women are not likely to be at the cafes but rather watch and listen to Somali diasporic media from their homes. To get a comprehensive overview representing both genders, a focus groups comprising only of women will be carried out as well.

4) Examine how Somali journalists through their coverage of the conflict engage in the production of the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation

The proliferation of Somali diasporic media is related to the need of the Somali diaspora community for news from their homeland (Issa-Salwe 2011). But given the journalists’ close relationships with Somalis in Somalia and the country being in the midst of conflict, this relationship can have a complex and multi-dimensional nature. Speaking to Somali journalists can help to unpack and illuminate something of this complexity. It will also highlight how their chosen way of reporting the conflict can fall within the perimeters of the three politics.

5.3 Chosen methods
This research aims to examine the various ways diasporic media are able to ‘re-create conflict’ as platforms that can generate the three politics within the Somali diaspora in the UK. My four principal research aims have been developed from the literature review discussions above and provide four pillars underpinning this research into how Somali diasporic media can contribute to ‘re-creating conflict’.

5.3.1 Sampling

A research study conducted by the BBC World service Trust in July 2011 on Somali media stated in their section on Somali websites that ‘websites have emerged in recent years partly to meet the Diaspora’s demand for up-to-date news from the country and as such, the Diaspora is often the target audience’ (BBC World Service Trust 2011: 40-41). Their research does not indicate how many websites that existed in 2011 but referring back to Issa-Salwe’s findings (2008: 5), he identified that in 2004, there were over 400 Somali websites registered in Europe and the US. By 2007, that number had grown to 745 and although these numbers fluctuate and some websites cease to exist, he predicted that the growth of Somali websites is likely to continue. For the purpose of this study, I have conducted a preliminary mapping overview of existing websites and have found many of the websites Issa-Salwe had identified are no longer in operation. I will elaborate on the findings of this overview in the findings chapter but for the purpose of sampling, 508 active websites have been found. I have excluded company websites that solely focus on their products and services as during my overview, I have noticed their content would not fall within the categories of websites that have a potential of re-creating conflict. Following Issa-Salwe’s categories (see chapter 3), I will sample a third of each category. This would suffice as a sample because most websites in each category have content of similar nature and they often take content from one another as well. My sampling of each category will be as follows; 125 political, 27 religious, 7 entertainment, 6 TV/newspaper/radio and 2 personal websites, a total of 167 websites.
As of 2011, the BBC World Service Trust research on Somali media identified 9 Somali TV channels available on satellite to Somalis in the UK. The data collection of these TV stations will take place in stages using multistage sampling. Multistage sampling is particularly useful as this will allow for recording the changing content of TV programming. All 9 stations will be sampled over a five week period recording data from two TV stations per week. Each TV station will be viewed on alternate days with one station being viewed in the fifth week. Somali TV stations are usually on air between 12 noon and midnight. As such these will be the period when data is collected.

5.3.2 Research instruments

I have chosen a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct this research. This is because the nature of my research requires both an inquiry process of understanding a social problem (Cresswell 1994) in the context of diaspora Somalis and the response that diasporic media can generate, which necessitates the use of qualitative methods, and testing the theory of how diasporic media content can variously re-create conflict, which requires quantitative methods. The selected research methods are; content analysis, discourse analysis, focus groups and interviews. Content analysis is selected because it will help me to test how my pre-determined hypothesis of the three politics that can lead to conflict being re-created takes shape on Somali websites and TV. Discourse analysis, as an accompanying tool to content analysis, will help to illuminate the different facets of the structure of media texts and trace how language use can contribute to the production of the three politics within the framework of the three root causes of the Somali conflict. Focus groups will allow for participants to express their views and opinions of the content they viewed and see how this may fall within the realm of three politics as well as how they respond to each others’ experiences, which can bring forth how diasporic media can re-create conflict. Interviews will help to attain how the Somali journalists think and feel about the Somali conflict as well as explore the issues of the conflict that affect them which can potentially have an impact on the way they cover the conflict. Below is an elaboration on each chosen method.
5.3.2.1 Content analysis

To determine to what extent Somali websites and TV are producing the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation, I will employ content analysis as a research method. As Krippendorff (2004) states, content analysis is fundamentally empirically grounded and exploratory in process. Content analysis is unobtrusive and nonreactive, which can maximise the objectivity of the gathered findings. A breakdown of the content analysis categories that will be coded for can be found in the ‘operationalising methods’ section further below.

5.3.2.2 Discourse analysis

As an accompanying tool to content analysis, I will carry out a discourse analysis of the Somali websites and TVs to examine how their content can undermine certain groups, propagate solidarity for a particular clan or ideology or engage in mobilising audiences for a specific cause or clan. Discourse analysis is particularly helpful in illuminating the different facets of the structure of media texts as well as attempting to trace the means by which language use in the media contributes to the ongoing production of social conceptions, values, identities and relations (Deacon et al 2007: 150). In the context of my research, diasporic media has the potential to reproduce social conceptions that are intrinsic to the conflict as well as re-creating values, identities and relations that are orientated around clans, ideological factions involved in the conflict or exclude certain groups of society. All of these issues combined have the potential to re-create conflict and discourse analysis will help to examine them. Attention will also be paid to the central meaning and main narrative thread within the framework of the three root causes of clannism, international engagement and poverty and unequal access to resources.

5.3.2.3 Focus groups

Focus groups as a form of group interview allow us to take advantage of communication between research participants in order to generate data. Focus groups explicitly focus on group interaction as
part of the method, which means people are encouraged to talk to one another and comment on each others’ experiences and points of view (Kitzinger 1995: 299). The method is particularly useful for exploring people's knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way. This is imperative to capture the responses of the Somali diaspora with regards to diasporic media as these responses will indicate how and in which way conflict can potentially be re-created through analysing if these responses fall within the realm of the three politics.

I plan to carry out 6 focus groups of which 3 will be done in Somali cafes where diasporic media is viewed in London, Birmingham and Leicester. The Somali cafes offer an interesting social setting where many Somalis come to view diasporic media to stay up to date with the latest situations in Somalia but also to discuss these situations, especially after having viewed diasporic content. Carrying out focus groups in a setting where viewing diasporic content and discussions about the Somali conflict are already the norm can help me to obtain data on how diasporic media can generate responses among Somalis within the framework of the three politics in a relatively convenient manner. The cities that have been chosen as locations to do the focus groups have been selected because they have the largest concentrations of Somali people. Furthermore, there is a diverse range of Somalis belonging to many different clans and political allegiances in these cities, which will allow me to capture a variety of responses that are representative. The focus group participants in the cafes will be selected randomly and organised by café owners. They will inform customers of the research a week in advance and ensure 12-15 participants who’ve consented will be in attendance.

A fourth focus group will consist of only women as Somali women are unlikely to be viewing diasporic media in the cafes. The women’s focus group will be organised by local community organisation in Leicester. The remaining 2 will be done in London and Birmingham respectively as
these cities have the largest Somali populations but it will also allow for capturing responses of individuals that might not frequent Somali cafes. One focus group will be conducted in East London and the other in West London. Both of them will be organised with the help of local contacts. Each focus group will consist of 12-15 participants giving me a total of 72-90.

As mentioned before, Somali cafes are male-dominated and it is, generally speaking, not frequented by women, which might hinder my access as a woman. I intend to overcome this by having a local male contact inform the café attendees in advance, liaise with café management and have a male person familiar to them accompany me as well when carrying out the focus groups. There is also the issue of trust in the sense that because they don’t know me, they might not open up. Here I will again use local contacts to prepare and inform the café attendees of my objective in advance and I will explain my research and intentions as well once I arrive. I anticipate that most Somalis are familiar with my work as a journalist for the Voice of America, which many Somalis in the UK listen to and this will additionally help me to overcome some of the trust and access issues that may arise. There may be some apprehension from community members who may dislike some of the reporting styles of the VOA but I’m hoping to overcome this by representing myself as an academic researcher who’s no longer working with the VOA. I will also explicitly highlight that this is an independent research project that is not associated with any media outlet.

5.3.2.4 Interviews

Interviews allow for investigating issues in an in depth way and assist in discovering how individuals think and feel about certain issues. I will conduct 5 semi-structured face-to-face interviews with Somali journalists who work for diasporic media based in the UK to get an idea of how they seek to intervene and/or respond to the conflict.

There are 4 Somali TV stations based in the UK and one journalist will be interviewed from each. The fifth journalist to be interviewed will be from the BBC’s Somali service. Semi-structured interviews
are particularly useful here because they are better suited for exploring and understanding complex and sensitive social issues such as the Somali conflict, allowing for richer data to be generated (Deacon et al 2007: 72). Furthermore, semi-structured interviews allow for a conversational style to be adopted giving the chance for questions that arise from interviewees’ answers to be probed further. This is important particularly with regards to answers that come forth from how they choose to cover certain issues within the conflict, issues they give salience to and those they choose to exclude, because these answers can inform how in various ways Somali journalists are producing politics of non-recognition, solidarity and/or mobilisation through their coverage.

The challenges that can occur primarily lie in the transcription part and will possibly entail a level of judgment and interpretation. In some way, when data have been transcribed, they are not raw data anymore, they are “processed data” (Wengraf 2001: 7). The transcription part will therefore require careful execution on my part. As with all research methods, there are weaknesses and strengths but with regards to obtaining the data I need from the Somali journalists, semi-structured interviews still remain highly suitable.
5.4 Summary of methodology

- To map the Somali diasporic media that is available and received in the UK which are in a position to re-create conflict; existing reports will be consulted.

- To examine and determine to what extent diasporic media exhibit politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation; content and discourse analysis will be carried out on 167 Somali websites and 9 TV stations.

- To examine how responses of politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation are generated among diaspora Somalis in the UK by diasporic media; 6 focus groups will be carried out of which 3 will take place in Somali cafes situated in the cities of Leicester, London and Birmingham. A fourth one will consist of women only, fifth again in Birmingham and sixth in London.

- To examine how Somali journalists through their coverage of the conflict engage in the creation of politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation; 5 semi-structured interviews will be carried out with Somali journalists based in the UK who work for Somali diasporic media outlets.
5.5 Methods operationalised

5.5.1 Operationalising content analysis

The content analysis will focus on the sampled 167 websites and 9 TV stations. Below is a breakdown of categories that will be coded for:

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the individual website. The themes that will be looked for are based on the concepts identified in the literature review with regards to the root causes of the conflict, namely; international engagement, clannism and poverty and lack of access to resources within the framework of the three politics.

Nature of websites

The nature of each website will be determined based on Issa-Salwe’s categories (see chapter 3) which are:

- Political
- Religious
- Entertainment (includes sports, literature, art, music)
- Personal
- Radio/TV/Newspaper

Conflict themes

This is an exhaustive list of the themes that will be looked for when carrying out the content analysis of the Somali websites and TV. This list is constructed and derived from the three root causes of the conflict identified in the literature review, which are poverty and unequal access to resources, clannism and international engagement, and incorporates the three politics.
It is divided into four columns, three of which are the root causes of the conflict and the fourth one is themes that directly result from the ongoing war. All of these themes have the potential to be used by diasporic media to produce the three politics. For example, a website can write about the military and its latest victory over an Al-shabab controlled territory and glorify this conquest, which can implicitly call for a stance to support the Somali military. The discourse analysis will help to bring forth how the text created around these themes can aid the production of the three politics. Additionally, the exclusion of certain themes can also lead to the production of any of the three politics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence, armed conflict and themes relating to ongoing war</th>
<th>International engagement</th>
<th>Clannism</th>
<th>Poverty and unequal access to resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Regional administrations</td>
<td>Land resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>Clan poets/poetry</td>
<td>Maritime resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>Clan songs</td>
<td>Fishery industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>Clan disputes</td>
<td>Disability issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>G8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>Reconstruction of buildings, roads etc</td>
<td>Minority clan issues ie discourse of inclusion, recognition etc</td>
<td>Property issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery/looting/stealing</td>
<td>Nuclear and toxic waste dumping</td>
<td>Grievances among clans</td>
<td>Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness raising</td>
<td>Inter-governmental</td>
<td>Territorial issues</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali government disputes</td>
<td>Authority on Development (IGAD)</td>
<td>Formation of autonomous regions</td>
<td>Piracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons/arms</td>
<td>Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>Regions seceding rooted in clan</td>
<td>Agriculture issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Donor countries; UK, USA, Turkey, Norway, Italy etc</td>
<td>grievances</td>
<td>Farming issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing</td>
<td>African Mission to</td>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elderly issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court cases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Livestock issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary system building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hunger and starvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>Middle Eastern countries involved in mediation and capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fundraising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diseases/illnesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Homelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>Host countries; UK, USA, Holland, Sweden etc</td>
<td>Neighbouring countries; Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International meetings</td>
<td>Somalia conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali president</td>
<td>Somali prime minister</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali cabinet members</td>
<td>Diaspora issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Intl Somalia conferences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Building reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Road reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace concerts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mercenaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Child mortality</td>
<td>Addictions ie khat, drugs, cigarettes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Health issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conflict social actors

Below is another list comprising of social actors that will be looked for during the content analysis.

This is again within the framework of the three root causes which three of the columns are based on and the fourth column is for social actors engaged with the ongoing war. Diasporic media can produce the three politics through the use of these social actors by excluding some of them, positioning them in a manner to elicit solidarity or using them to mobilise audiences.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violence, armed conflict and social actors engaged directly with the war</th>
<th>International engagement</th>
<th>Clannism</th>
<th>Poverty and unequal access to resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td>UN officials</td>
<td>Local officials</td>
<td>Homeless people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias</td>
<td>Arab League officials</td>
<td>appointed by regional administrations</td>
<td>Beggars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child soldiers</td>
<td>EU officials</td>
<td>Regional officials</td>
<td>Street vendors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>AU officials</td>
<td>appointed by regional administrations</td>
<td>Street children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>IGAD officials</td>
<td>Clan poets</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons (IDPs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners’ families</td>
<td>AMISOM officials</td>
<td>Artists engaging in clan discourse</td>
<td>Fishermen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of violence</td>
<td>Donor country officials</td>
<td>Clan members</td>
<td>Disabled people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostages</td>
<td>Middle Eastern mediating or capacity building officials</td>
<td>Clan elders</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>Host country officials</td>
<td>Female members of clans</td>
<td>Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>Refugees and asylum seekers</td>
<td>Young members of clans</td>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirates</td>
<td>Neighbouring countries officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>Elderly people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-keepers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women’s rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen who sell goods that can be used in the conflict</td>
<td>Somali government members ie president, prime minister, cabinet members etc Diaspora members Investors NGO workers</td>
<td>Minority clans Minority clan members Minority clan elders</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Advertisements**

Advertising is one of the main sources of revenue for Somali websites. Company owners whose clan, business or ideological interests can be supported by a particular website, are likely to advertise with that website. It is therefore important to categorise the kinds of advertising found on the Somali websites.

1. Clan/regionally linked advertising
2. International community advertising
3. Somali NGO’s, women’s groups, youth groups advertising
4. Religious organisations and businesses advertising
5. Entertainment advertising (sports, concerts etc)
6. Other
Images

Images can communicate varied messages to the public who see them (Barthes 1977). Examining the images that websites and TV use, within the framework of the root causes, can help to identify if messages that can produce politics of non-recognition, solidarity and/or mobilisation are being portrayed.

1. Images depicting clannism
2. Images depicting international engagement
3. Images depicting poverty and unequal access to resources
4. Other

Videos

In this digital age, videos have established themselves as a form of media that can shape people’s comprehension and understanding of the world by constructing, conveying and iterating various representations (Sisler 2008). Exploring how Somali websites might represent politics of non-recognition, solidarity and/or mobilisation within the framework of clannism, poverty and unequal access to resources and international engagement is pertinent in order to identify how conflict might be re-created.

1. Videos exhibiting solidarity with clannism or mobilising for it
2. Videos exhibiting solidarity against poverty and unequal access to resources or mobilising for it
3. Videos exhibiting solidarity with international engagement or mobilising for it
4. Videos exhibiting solidarity with marginalised groups or mobilising on their behalf
5. Other videos
6. No videos
Social media sharing

Examining if there is a chance for site users to share website content through social media that they can pass on to members of their network will help to identify that a particular website wishes for its content to be spread. If this website has content that can produce politics of non-recognition, solidarity or mobilisation, sharing facilities mean these can be spread to a greater audience.

1. Site allows sharing through Facebook, Twitter, Digg, Google+, YouTube, Delicious etc
2. Site does not allow any sharing of content through social media

Comments

Examining if websites facilitate for audiences to respond and provide forums for discussion is important as this can depict directly how website content can lead to the three politics being generated among audiences, potentially leading to the re-creation of conflict.

1. Users can’t comment
2. Users can only comment on content
3. Users can comment on content and discuss opinions with each other
4. Users can discuss opinion about content with each other and website producer(s)
5. Website producer can only comment
6. Other
Call to participation

Identifying if there is an explicit call to some form of action is important as this potentially means politics of solidarity or mobilisation are being produced.

1. Sending funds to support clan, participate in clan meetings and solidarity for clan agenda

2. Participate in international community led meetings/events/conferences, support democracy and human rights, support intl community events

3. Fundraising appeals to tackle poverty and unequally shared resources, humanitarian catastrophes, stand in solidarity with humanitarian appeals and causes

4. Stand in solidarity with marginalised groups and minority clans or take action on their behalf

5. Other

Whose solidarity is being invoked?

1. Clan

2. International community

3. Poor people, minority clans, marginalised groups

4. No one

5. Other
5.5.2 Operationalising discourse analysis

According to Wetherell (2001), discourse analysis is used to investigate language in use and language in social context. It provides routes into the study of meaning and as Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) also illustrate, discourse analysis ‘contributes to the construction of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning’ (2002:67). Discourse analysis is therefore particularly useful to examine the second aim of this research; to determine to what extent diasporic media outlets in the UK exhibit the three politics. Words, as J L Austin notes, can serve a performative function when used in the right circumstances and by using them, ‘we are performing actions’ (Austin 1962: 21). The focus will be on how websites and TV use language to exclude certain sections of society, invoke solidarity with existing identities and social relations and how they call for acts of mobilisation. The analysis will be done by; looking at how, through the use of language, solidaristic identities are invoked and the types of actions that are called for. By determining the solidaristic identities that are invoked, it will be possible to highlight sections of the Somali community that are excluded as well as the solidarities that are being invoked. Identifying types of actions that are called for will help to pinpoint the politics of mobilisation that are called for.

Roger Fowler (1991) argues that news is in fact a practice, a product of the social and political world on which it reports and language is not neutral but rather helps to construct ideas (Fowler 1991: 1). In other words, because the institutions of news reporting are socially, politically and economically situated, all news is always reported from some particular angle (Fowler 1991: 10). On issues such as immigration, for example, minority groups are often portrayed as a threat and as ‘causing problems’ as studies of the British press carried out by Hartmann and Husband (1974) and Critcher et al (1977, 1981) found. Similarly, Hall et al (1978) found in their study of media reactions that young black Caribbean men tend to be associated with crimes.

On the other hand, actions of the neo-fascist group the National Front were typically portrayed as ‘incidental’, an act of extremist individuals and not as a structural manifestation of British racism.
The black perspective is seldom represented and the white dominant perspective is always given in press accounts (van Dijk 1987: 42-43). Studies like these highlight how the media serve a performative function in relation to excluding the representation of some members of society as well as invoking a certain position on how to perceive the different communities of Britain. Take for example, the Woolwich incident that occurred on the 22nd of May 2013. Two men attacked a man who was later identified as an off duty serving soldier in the British army and killed him. The media was quick to identify the incident as a ‘terrorist attack’ and the two men as Muslims. With regards to the victim, he was sympathetically identified as a family man and a serving soldier who wore a ‘help for heroes’ t-shirt when he was killed. Sky news wrote an article with the heading ‘Soldier dead after terror attack’ on the same day as the incident and prior to the police confirming that they were treating it as a terror attack. The Metropolitan police detective chief superintendent Simon Letchford issued a statement (Guardian 22 May 2013) on the same day where he only referred to the dead body, the two men that were found on the scene, the fact that firearms were used by the men as well as police officers and that they are investigating the incident. There was no mention of the incident being treated as a terrorist attack. But this didn’t stop Sky news to refer to the incident as one ‘that is being treated as a terror attack’. Their article continued to write that ‘as the victim lay motionless in the middle of the road, witnesses say they heard the pair chanting "Allahu akbar", a phrase Muslims use to revere their god. The Daily Telegraph published an article the next day with the heading ‘Woolwich attack; the terrorist’s rant’ where they wrote the apparent transcript of the ‘Islamist terrorists that were involved in yesterday’s brutal murder of a British soldier’. These articles make a clear causal relation between Muslims and terror attacks and refer to the Woolwich incident as one such attack. ITV, which was one of the first television stations to air the video footage of the incident, reported that they received an overwhelming 400 complaints from distressed viewers within 24 hours. The Guardian reported double that figure.

The incident was reported to have provoked a backlash of anti-Muslim anger across the UK including marches by the English Defence League (EDL), the attacking of mosques, racial abuse and comments
on social media. The framing of the incident by the media had undoubtedly a key role to play in this backlash. The media’s way of reporting elicited a collective response, in this case against the Muslim community in Britain. It is these types of solidaristic invocations that constitute elements that can lead to politics of mobilisation taking place.

To illustrate further how solidaristic identities are constructed in the news media, we’ll look at the study of Van Dijk and how foreigners are depicted. Van Dijk highlights how stories of foreigners are often shaped in a complaint format in which a storyteller is portrayed as a victim of the presence of foreigners in the neighbourhood (van Dijk 1987: 62). The narrations of these kinds of experiences serve as ‘factual evidence’ and form a foundation for arguments to conclude with what van Dijk calls a negative other-presentation and positive self-presentation (van Dijk 1987: 62). But the media can on rare occasions echo public sentiments and invoke a positive sense of collective response among society. Take the mediatised portrayal of the Stephen Lawrence case for example. The racist murder of this young student and the poor effort of the police to deal with his murder effectively quickly became a case that highlighted issues of institutionalised racism and partial justice that existed within Britain. The media, in this instance ‘appeared to embody and express powerful collective feelings and emotions and appealed to collective solidarities, identities and outlooks serving to vivify public sentiments around justice and civil society’ (Cottle 2004: 23).

Both Van Dijk and Cottle’s studies show the different roles the media can play and the reactions it invokes can be varied and often complex. This discourse analysis will shed some light on this complexity with regards to the Somali diasporic media and to what extent they exhibit the three politics.

To put this into practice, key questions to identify which solidaristic identities that are being invoked are (within the framework of the conflict root causes which are international engagement, clannism and poverty and unequal access to resources):
1. What existing relations are being invoked to generate solidaristic appeal?

2. How is the thematic structure enabling this appeal?

3. Are references being made to existing identities? Which ones?

4. How are sources used contributing to generate solidarity?

In order to examine how acts of mobilisation can be called for through the use of language, the following questions will be asked:

1. How is language being used to mobilise readers/viewers?

2. What are the emotional appeals, moral dispositions, familial ties that are being utilised to generate mobilisation?

3. How are sources used to generate mobilisation?

These questions are deployed to illicit how Somali diasporic media use language to create processes of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation.

5.5.3 Operationalising focus groups

As Kitzinger (1995) explains, focus groups as a method are particularly useful for exploring the knowledge and experiences of people and allows for the examination of what people think as well as how they think and the reasons behind that. Focus groups have historically been well positioned to explore the effects of communication texts (Kitzinger 1995: 299). It is therefore well suited for the third aim of this research, which is to examine how processes of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation are generated amongst Somalis in the UK by diasporic media. This is distinct from aim two, previously mentioned in the discourse analysis above, in that it focuses on responses from the Somali community in the UK who view diasporic media and how this viewing can generate the three media processes. The main purpose of a focus group is to draw upon the attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions of the respondents (Gibbs 1997). By gathering these attitudes, beliefs, feelings, reactions and experiences within the group, analysis of how the three processes have been
expressed and relayed can take place. Of course there will be some respondents who may not express particular emotions or sentiments. These respondents may require individual questioning to gauge their interest and issues that may elicit them to respond.

Prior to the focus group session, it is important to note key questions that Katz (1988) has identified, which will help lay a foundation for the outcome of the session. Questions such as what the immediate viewing context is and what the nature of the society is within which the respondent is decoding the message (Katz 1988: 367). The Somali diaspora is affected by deeply rooted clan ties, the poverty and humanitarian issues that their family members in Somalia are grappling with and the international community that both hosts them but is also engaged with their homeland. These issues can play a key role in how respondents decode diasporic media. The socio-political circumstances that an audience find themselves in and how this informs their responses have been illustrated in Morley’s (1980, 1981) study of how the current affairs magazine Nationwide was decoded.

The reading of bank managers, for example, was in line with the frameworks of the text whereas shop stewards took an oppositional position. Some respondents such as black further education students remained alienated from it as the text did not afford them a reading congruent with their own cultural position (Livingstone 1991: 5-6). There are, of course, more culturally nuanced reactions and readers can read the magazine for a variety of reasons and not necessarily agree with it, as Morley’s critics have pointed out. The complexity of audience reaction or indeed the lack thereof at times, needs to be born in mind.

Putting this into perspective in relation to this research, depending on the clan ties, political and religious ideologies and educational background of respondents, respondents can display loyalty towards their clan, religious or political affiliation, in which case the media outlet is addressing pre-existing solidarities. It could also have the adverse effect where respondents display a dislike towards a diasporic media, which could lead to a solidaristic stance against it and maybe a
mobilisation of some sort to be taken against it. The other possibility, like in the case of the black further education students in Morley’s study, is for respondents to feel excluded.

Each focus group session will occur in three phases: an introductory phase to establish respondents’ general attitudes towards Somali diasporic media; a second phase exploring the more entrenched and deep-seated beliefs and experiences; and a final phase which will highlight the current mindset/stance of respondents and how experiences, feelings and attitudes already expressed have come to shape this. As Hoijer (2004) states, some of the dispositions that people express towards something they’ve seen in the media become ingrained in their memory. Hoijer’s study of audience’s reception of the Kosovo War highlighted how years after reports and images of the war dwindled, people still expressed anger towards seeing the many innocent civilians who died and were stricken by the conflict (Hoijer 2004: 523). Another interesting point that came out of Hoijer’s study was how some audience members formed a distance from what they saw in the media and applied an ‘us-vs-them’ perspective in which the culture, mentality and way of living and behaving of the ‘others’ are dehumanized (Hoijer 2004: 525).

In order to explore how the three processes of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation are generated by diasporic media among diaspora Somalis, the following questions will be asked following the three phases noted above:

Phase 1

- When was the last time you viewed diasporic media?
- Which outlet did you access? Why that one?
- What are your feelings of the Somali media?

Phase 2

- Are there media outlets you prefer/are inclined to? Why?
- How often do you view them?
What are your priorities and key concerns when accessing Somali media?

Do the outlets you most frequently access meet these concerns and priorities? How?

Are there outlets that have disappointed you? In which way?

What reactions does Somali media content on the conflict invoke in you?

Phase 3

Has there been any media content that has led to you taking action? Explain

In your view, does the Somali media need to improve the way they cover the conflict?

These questions will reveal how diasporic media can generate processes of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation among the Somali diaspora community in the UK.

5.5.4 Operationalising interviews

As Fowler (1991) stated that the institutions of news reporting are socially, politically and economically situated, so too it seems for journalists covering conflicts around the world. The 2007 annual gathering of the Arab television executives, known as the Arab Broadcast Forum, centred on the Darfur conflict and the lack of media coverage it received from the Arab media. Pintak (2007) argues that Darfur became a hot-button issue in the Arab newsroom because the issue bore right to the heart of the mission of Arab journalism and the self-identity of those who practiced it (Pintak 2007: 1). The central issue was, according to an attendee by the name of Khaled Ewais, that “the Arabs saw the victims were not Arabs, and we therefore didn’t care” (Pintak 2007: 3). Another attendee, Saleik of the Al-Hayat Television, highlighted the core of Arab journalists’ choice to lack in covering Darfur; “Arab journalists are working within non-democratic systems, so you can’t expect them to talk about Darfur. The Arab media is ultimately very interconnected with the ruling system” (Pintak 2007: 3). Tahir el-Mardi, Khartoum correspondent for Al Jazeera said “We have 22 agendas on Darfur and the West has one. Arab journalists, to say the truth, are entangled in political issues”
These statements indicate how journalists can be affected by the political and social conditions in which they work in.

Another example that illustrates how journalists play a performative role in constructing discourses can be found in Australian country newspapers. A study conducted by Pretty (1993) showed due to the closeness of local journalists to their readers, they were in a better position, in comparison to city journalists, to know the readers’ wants, likes and dislikes and interests and communicate that (Pretty 1993: 108). Country journalists also had more of a sense of being answerable because they were more accessible than city journalists (Bowd 2003: 121). Bowd further points out that country newspapers often have helping the community develop and prosper as a core aim (Bowd 2003: 122). These elements come together to steer the country journalists to produce discourses that reflect them, much in line with development journalism practitioners.

The fourth aim of this research, through conducting interviews, wishes to highlight how Somali journalists, affected by the political and social circumstances in which they operate, can engage in the creation of politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. The Somali journalists cover an ongoing conflict that is rooted in clannism and clashing political and religious ideologies. It is also a conflict that has personal ramifications as many Somali journalists had to flee from it and still have close friends and relatives in Somalia. Additionally, the journalists’ loyalties to their clan, political and religious convictions can play a role in the way they cover the conflict. A study carried out by Pfau et al (2004) of embedded journalists during the Iraq invasion found that journalists knowing the troops they are covering led to bias in their news coverage of the military and its personnel (Pfau et al 2004: 45). Embedded print coverage was more favourable in overall tone toward the military and the depiction of the individual troops as the journalists form camaraderie with the soldiers and, to some degree, internalise the values of the military unit they are embedded in (Pfau et al 2004: 18). Embedding can also produce a narrow, decontextualized coverage of war, which fails to put the bigger picture in context (Pfau et al 2004: 20).
Pfau et al’s study indicate how the social and political circumstances can affect the way journalists report on conflicts. Similarly, pre-existing solidarities among Somali journalists can result in the conflict being covered in a way that serves a certain interest or play an exclusionary role and these can consequently lead to the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation occurring.

To capture how these politics can be produced by Somali journalists, the following questions have been devised:

1. Tell me about your day-to-day coverage of the Somali conflict
2. How do you evaluate your work? What purpose do you feel you are serving?
3. How do you select what issues/stories to cover?
4. Are there particular topics you give importance to? Why?
5. Give me examples of stories you would typically cover and ones you would leave out
6. Have you produced reports where some type of action was called for? When and why?
7. Have you had complaints about any of your reports from your audience? Explain
8. What role do you think Somali journalists can play in the conflict? Explain

These questions will highlight where the journalists situate themselves ideologically with regards to their work and the role they play, issues they choose to exclude and how they navigate dissent as well as situations when they consciously call for action. The collected data will illustrate how the journalists participate in the production of the three politics.
Chapter 6 The multiplexity of diasporic communications

6.1 Introduction

As discussed across earlier chapters, diasporic media has long been hailed as the means that allows migrant communities to remain connected with their homeland, maintain ties of kinship and be able to receive information in their mother-tongue. This thesis has also argued, however, that there can be a deeper complexity with regards to the various roles diasporic media can play, particularly when the migrant community in question hails from a homeland that is in a state of conflict. It has been suggested in chapter 4, which outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis, that the Somali diasporic media through its involvement with the Somali conflict has the potential of re-creating the Somali conflict among the Somali diasporic communities. Three principal theoretical approaches to the root causes were identified and elaborated on in chapter 1 and 2: poverty and unequal access to resources, the engagement of the international community and clannism. I have suggested that ideas about these three root causes can, in important respects, be propagated by the mediatising platform that diasporic media provides. The conceptual framework set out in chapter 4 has further provided an outline of how this mediatisation can involve three analytically and politically distinct politics which have the potential to re-create the conflict whether through the politics of non-recognition, solidarity or mobilisation. Below is a table that will illustrate the three principal theoretical approaches to the root causes and the three forms of communicative enactments of each:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical approaches to the root causes of the conflict</th>
<th>Politics of non-recognition</th>
<th>Politics of solidarity</th>
<th>Politics of mobilisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and unequal access to resources</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clannism</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community engagement</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.1: theoretical approaches to the root causes and the three politics through which they can be re-enacted.

In order to examine how these politics may variously be at work or contribute to the re-creation of conflict within and through diasporic media, a content analysis of 167 websites and 9 television stations and a discourse analysis of 15 websites have been carried out.

Content analysis was chosen because of its usefulness to test how my pre-determined hypothesis of the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation and how each may play a part in the recreation of conflict through Somali websites and TV.

Discourse analysis, as an accompanying tool to content analysis, helped to illuminate the different facets of the structure of media texts and trace how language use can contribute to the production of the three politics within the framework of the theoretical approaches to the three root causes of the Somali conflict identified in chapters 1 and 2. Critical discourse analysis was specifically used as this helped to identify the use of language to propagate or invite towards certain political stances, power and identity formation and struggles which can expose the production of the three politics. This chapter sets out the principal findings of the content and discourse analysis with regards to the three representational politics, their relative weighting in terms of diasporic media appearance and the extent to which diasporic media outlets exhibit these politics. In this way the chapter explicitly sets out to address and answer the thesis’ second research question: to what extent do diasporic media outlets exhibit politics of recognition, solidarity and mobilisation? The chapter is divided into five sections and the first three sections will follow the format of presenting the content analysis data first followed by findings of the discourse analysis. The first section presents findings on politics of non-recognition, the second presents the findings on solidarity and the third section looks at mobilisation.
The fourth highlights further evidence of the transformative nature of the three politics which, as we shall see and discuss need not always be seen as mutually exclusive. This may seem contradictory but the evidence presented and discussed in this section shall indicate that there are three distinct and fundamental representational politics at play but these can sometimes demonstrate more of a transformative nature. The chapter then concludes with a summary discussion based on the findings presented and which explores further how the three key politics can lead to the re-creation of the conflict.

6.2 politics of non-recognition

Both the content and discourse analysis were informed by the theoretical approaches to the three root causes of poverty and unequal access to resources, international community engagement and clannism which are outlined in chapter 1 and 2. The findings will therefore be presented under these approaches. But first it is useful to begin with some encompassing findings concerning the politics of non-recognition.

The content analysis began with a conflict themes analysis which outlined in an encompassing fashion all the potential conflict themes that occurred on Somali websites and television stations. This list is informed by both theoretically identified conflict themes and an overview of all the existing Somali websites and television stations that was done prior to the content analysis. Themes were coded multiply, as often as they occurred on each website and television station. I spent one day on each television station in September 2013 and coded for the themes, social actors and categories identified in the content analysis. The Somali TV channels are on air between 12 noon and midnight and data was captured during this entire period. Content analysis on the websites took two months between July and September 2013. The findings of the televisions and the websites have been merged since representationally, the themes occurred in the same manner. The findings are presented below in 4 sub-group tables. These sub-groups are war and violence related themes, poverty and unequal access to resources themes, international engagement themes and clannism
themes. Table 6.2 presents findings of war and violence related themes and how often these occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extremism</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery/looting/stealing</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness raising</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali government disputes</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons/arms/explosives</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death/injuries</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killing/assassination</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Court cases/supreme court</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary system building</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blame</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious issues</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>989</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: War and violence related themes.

As you can see from table 2, the most common themes within that sub-group were death and injuries which appeared 8.1% in total, killing and assassinations, safety and security each appearing 7.1%. This is indicative that although some progress has been made to bring peace and stability to the country, conflict still remains rife. The least appearing themes were robbery which occurred 0.9% in total, torture and kidnapping each occurring 0.7% in total. The lack of recognition given to these issues indicates normalisation of violence and habits of decivilisation and can begin to sow seeds of marginalisation, animosity and revenge on the part of the victims. The politics of non-recognition occurs when these kinds of issues are left unaddressed.
The following table, table 3, highlights findings from the poverty and unequal access to resources related themes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land resources/aviation aerospace</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime resources</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishery industry</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability issues</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth issues</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property issues</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitation</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piracy</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women issues</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly issues</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger and starvation</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental issues</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diseases/illnesses</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian relief/development</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homelessness</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child mortality</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addictions ie khat, drugs etc</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health issues</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights issues</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children issues</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>558</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Poverty and unequal access to resources related themes

Table 6.3 shows humanitarian relief had the highest number of appearances (10.4%) which sadly underlines the ongoing humanitarian need that the Somali people are grappling with. On a seemingly brighter note, women’s issues have had the second highest appearance (10%) and this is
probably illustrative of some of the progress that has been made by the efforts of the international community and Somali women’s organisations to get women to become more prominent in Somali politics. Efforts such as the women only ‘6th clan’ which responds to the traditional male-led 5 clans that dominate Somali politics and the 30% quota that have been designated to women in parliament in the 2012 draft constitution are all notable examples. However, that quota has not been implemented as only 5% of the Somali parliament is female (World Bank 2013). That means out of the 275 parliamentarians that were selected in 2012 when a permanent government was established, only 14 seats were given to women. Also, as we shall see later in the social actors categories, women’s rights activists are yet to become prominent stakeholders in the political discourses unfolding in Somalia and within the media. Additionally, the women who I spoke to in the focus groups, featured in more detail in the next chapter, have stated that women are merely represented in the context of motherhood and their engagement with humanitarian relief efforts. They therefore feel pigeonholed into one or two parts of the multifaceted role they play and certainly have not received political prominence.

The continuation of male dominance in Somali politics at the expense of the Somali women will perpetuate existing tensions of marginalisation and exclusion, which is where the politics of non-recognition can rise to the surface.

Table 6.4 shows international community engagement related themes and how often they occurred on Somali websites and television stations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Union</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of buildings, roads etc</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The theme with the highest number of appearances in this sub-group was neighbouring countries which appeared 12.8%. Neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia have played an ongoing and multidimensional role in Somali affairs from hosting some of the highest number of Somali refugees to the direct security threats they face and tackle within Somalia. They are staunchly engaged in the political dynamics in the border regions where they are key stakeholders in negotiations for formations of regional administrations as well as supporting rebel groups that can serve their interests. All of these issues combined cause tensions, hostilities and a plethora of political corners and wrangling which explains their prevalence on Somali websites and televisions.

One of the least featured themes was nuclear and chemical waste dumping appearing only 0.3% in total, which is one of the prime reasons that led to Somali piracy. This is probably due to the decline in pirate activities. Since international efforts collaborated to patrol the parts of the Indian Ocean most prone to Somali piracy and commercial ships increased their security, the number of successful
hijackings has significantly decreased. There were only two hijacking in 2013 in comparison to when piracy was at its height in 2010, when there were 50 successful hijackings (UNODC 2013).

But the issues that sparked piracy in the first place, illegal fishing and dumping of nuclear and chemical waste, has yet to be addressed. When the 2005 tsunami hit Somalia, hundreds of dumped and leaking barrels washed up on Somali shores and coastal people began to suffer from radiation sickness and more than 300 people died of it (Hari 2009). Coastal communities are still experiencing the birth of malformed babies and a decline in available fish. The disproportionate manner that the international community is tackling the part of piracy that affects them whilst neglecting to address the needs of the coastal communities as well as helping to prevent illegal fishing and dumping holds the potential to spark the politics of non-recognition.

Table 6.5 presents findings from the clannism related themes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional administrations</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan poetry</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan songs</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan disputes</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority clan issues</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grievances among clans</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial issues</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of autonomous regions</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions seceding</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5: Clannism related themes.

As table 6.5 illustrates, regional administrations (18.7%) and content on kinship (15.8%) appeared the most on Somali websites and televisions. These findings highlight the prevailing ties and loyalties the Somali media encourages Somali people to have with their clans. The least appearing contents were minority clan issues appearing only 0.9% in total. This is indicative of the inferior position
minority clans hold in the Somali society, which the Somali media fuel and re-creates given the lack of access they are given.

Their marginalisation, relative powerlessness and lack of voice is a down-played issue in Somali discourse and as a result of their exclusion from mainstream society, they have suffered from numerous forms of discrimination and live in poor conditions (UNOCHA 2002). It is issues like these, when left unaddressed, that can sow the seeds for politics of non-recognition.

The next sets of findings are related to the social actors that were coded for in the content analysis. These too have been grouped into relevant sub-groups informed by the theoretical framework identified in chapter 1 and 2. The sub-groups are again war and violence related social actors, poverty and unequal access to resources related social actors, international community engagement social actors and clannism social actors. Table 6 shows findings of war and violence related social actors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Actors</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers/police</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militias</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child soldiers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners families</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of violence</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostages</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirates</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen selling goods that can be used in conflict</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warlord</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>442</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.6: War and violence related social actors**

The table shows that the primary definers within this sub-group are soldiers and members of the police force (16.5%) who have had the highest number of appearances on Somali websites and television stations. These findings highlight that the news related to the conflict more often than not
is portrayed through the definitions of the Somali government soldiers and police. Voices of others that are also engulfed in the conflict such as child soldiers (0.7%) and families of prisoners (1.1%) rarely get heard. Religious leaders also get the chance to shape the realities of the conflict and how it is represented. They are the second most used sources with 16.3% and this gives them the opportunity to engage with the religious dimension of the conflict discourse. The religious dimension of the conflict is probably the most spoken of dimension given the link between Al-Shabab and the global discourse of the war on terror that seems to be the most prominent war the US and its western allies are engaging in. This can be related to the prevalence of terrorism content which was highlighted in table 2 with 6.7%. The table also shows that journalists rely on each other as sources of information since 13.8% of all sources used are journalists. This indicates that journalists have a dual role in shaping narrative surrounding the Somali conflict: they’re reporters as well as informers, making it quite important to unpack some of the ways they contribute to shaping the conflict narrative. This is further discussed in chapter 8. The main point that can be derived from the findings on this table is that there is a bias towards elite sources and those affected by and engaged with the conflict that lack power are often side-lined.

Chart 6.7 shows how often poverty and unequal access to resources related social actors appeared:
Chart 6.7: Poverty and unequal access to resources related social actors.

Chart 6.7 indicates that women are now getting greater opportunities to be represented within Somali media. Within this sub-group, they have had the highest appearance with 25.8%. However, women’s rights activists do not fare as well as they’ve only had 6.8%.

This indicates that the media has a preference for women used as sources to serve within the traditional roles they represent and the advocates that speak for the advancement of women’s rights rarely get represented. Human rights activists on the other hand are more likely to appear as media sources. They have had the second highest appearance with 18.9%. This is perhaps an example of the progress that has been made with regards to international community efforts to raise the awareness of human rights within Somali society. There seems to be more of an acceptance of advocates for human rights than those that advocate for women’s rights. This is most likely due to the patriarchal nature of the Somali society since human rights activists are often male.

Sections of society considered weak and powerless such as disabled people (5.8%) and the elderly (1.6%) are again marginalised within this category. Street vendors and beggars haven’t had a single
appearance at all. The marginalisation of these members of society constitutes the potential of the politics of non-recognition.

Table 6.8 highlights findings from the international community engagement related social actors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Actor</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace-keepers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN officials</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AL officials</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU officials</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU officials</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD officials</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM officials</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor country officials</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ME mediating officials</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country officials</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and asylum seekers</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbouring country officials</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora members</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO workers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host country tax payers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>710</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: International community related social actors.

Table 6.8 indicates similar findings to table 3 with regards to the predominance of neighbouring countries. The sources that appeared the most within this sub-group are those of neighbouring countries (14.6%) which highlights the level of concern the Somali media has for their engagement and the prominent attention it is willing to give. Officials from the United Nations have also had a significant number of appearances with 11.8% and this perhaps can be related to the prevailing western interest and involvement in Somali affairs which seems to be hegemonic and overshadows involvements from members of the Arab League, who just had 1.8%. This could simply be due to the UN making more engagement with the Somali media than the Arab League but it could also be that the Somali media gives the UN more esteem and prestige and the lack of mediatised recognition of
some of the efforts the Arab League is making, such as the humanitarian and developmental efforts, can become representative of politics of non-recognition amongst the Somalis that favour Arab engagement over UN and western engagement.

Table 6.9 presents clannism related social actors and how often they appeared on Somali websites and television stations. I’ve included the Somali president in this sub-group as he has been selected through the clan-based political system that the Somali government is established upon:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Actor</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali president</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local officials appointed by regional administrations</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional officials appointed by regional administrations</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan poets</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artists engaging in clan discourse</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan members</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan elders</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female clan members</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth clan members</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime minister</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet members</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentarians</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority clan members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority clan elders</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.9: Clannism related social actors.

The Somali president has had the highest appearance within this sub-group with 14.4% and this can be related to him being the head of a country in conflict and therefore there is a central focus on him. Clan members come in second (11.1%) followed closely by clan poets (10.6%). I have differentiated between these two in the sense that I have coded for clan poets as poets who are solely engaging in clan poetry and for clan members as members engaging in clan activities and discourse. The prevalence of both of them highlights the deep-rootedness of clannism within the Somali society and the important role they possess, especially when these sources are used more
often than the prime minister, cabinet members and parliamentarians. Minority clan members and elders are again side-lined with just 0.3% for each one, which is another example of potentialities that can bring the politics of non-recognition to the surface.

6.2.1 Politics of non-recognition within poverty and unequal access to resources

The content analysis examined how images are depicted on Somali websites and television stations focusing on photographic images and illustrations of prominent clan figures, international community members, the showing of poverty and marginalisation and here too we find some notable

![Chart 6.10: Images and the categories they depict.](chart)

Chart 6.10 illustrates, with 45.8% by far the images with most appearances were those depicting clannism, indicating how widely represented clannism is in and through diasporic media. The categories of images that made the fewest appearances on Somali websites and television stations were images depicting poverty and unequal access to resources appearing only once (0.6%). To
capture this category, what was looked for were images highlighting those that have access to resources, which seemed to be the wealthy and political elite. There was a lack of images depicting the vast majority of poor and average yet potentially qualified people who do not have access to the country’s resources and opportunities. To illustrate this further, below is an example of images that are often found in relation to stories of those who have access to resources.

The four men in the picture below found on the Somali national radio website are co-owners of one of the most lucrative shipping companies and the Somali government gave their company the rights to manage the incoming shipments into Mogadishu port:

Image 6.1: co-owners of Simatech, one of the largest Somali-owned shipping companies.

This picture was taken during the confirmation ceremony and was published on the Somali national radio’s website www.radiomuqdisho.net on 2nd of July 2013. One could argue that it is their experience that has facilitated this opportunity rather than their elite status as wealthy businessmen but on the other hand, there are many qualified professional companies and individuals that can
equally demonstrate similar or greater experience. They however do not have access to the
government elite who tend to give these kinds of jobs to those that hold an elite status rather than
making it available to the entire public. What this illustrates is that only those with powerful
connections have access to the resources of the country. This maintains a hierarchy of social and
economic inequality which further fuels marginalisation. It is this kind of unequal access to resources
and opportunities that can foster the politics of non-recognition.

The content analysis also examined the kinds of videos that appeared on Somali websites and
television stations and if the conceptual framework of the three politics as well as the theoretical
approaches to the root causes were represented. The content analysis found that they were
represented at varying degrees and below are the findings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Videos categories</th>
<th>Appearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Videos exhibiting solidarity with clannism</td>
<td>68 34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos mobilising for clannism</td>
<td>21 10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos exhibiting solidarity against poverty and unequal access to resources</td>
<td>1 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos mobilising against poverty and unequal access to resources</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos exhibiting solidarity for international engagement</td>
<td>38 19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos mobilising for international engagement</td>
<td>0 0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos exhibiting solidarity for marginalised groups</td>
<td>5 2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos mobilising on behalf of marginalised groups</td>
<td>3 1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other videos</td>
<td>48 24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No videos</td>
<td>12 6.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.11:Appearances of theoretical framework and concepts in videos in Somali diasporic media.

Table 6.11 shows how clannism again has the highest number of appearances with 34.7% of videos exhibiting solidarity for clannism whilst videos exhibiting solidarity against poverty and unequal access to resources appeared just once with 0.5%. This further underlines the lack of representation the Somali diasporic media grants to those affected by poverty and unequal access to resources, which can be a catalyst for the occurrence of the politics of non-recognition.

Another area that the content analysis examined was the types of advertising that occurred on Somali websites and television stations. The adverts were categorised based on the theoretical approaches to the root causes and the preliminary overview that was carried out prior to the content analysis:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advertising categories</th>
<th>Appearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan/regionally linked ads</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community ads</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali NGO’s, women’s groups, youth groups ads</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious organisations and businesses ads</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment ads ie concerts, sports etc</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Websites/TV without advertising</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>180</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.12: Advertising categories and number of appearances.

As table 6.12 highlights, advertisements for Somali non-governmental organisations, women and youth groups occurred only 2.8% in total in the 167 websites and 9 television stations analysed. In comparison, clan and regionally linked advertising had ten times more appearances with 28.3%. The
lack of opportunities for marginalised people to have access to Somali diasporic media is again reinforced in the advertising that it provides a platform for.

The next set of findings that I shall present is drawn from the discourse analysis I have conducted which fall within the politics of non-recognition within poverty and unequal access to resources. The potentiality of politics of non-recognition within poverty and unequal access to resources that the discourse analysis has brought to light are rooted in either lack of representation and grievances of injustice. An example of the latter was found on the website ilays.com which showed an illustration that speaks to this injustice. The title of the illustration is ‘Hadaan caddaalad la helin, dadku ma heshiin karo’ which means ‘if there is no justice, the people will not reconcile’:

Image 6.2: illustration depicting what is deemed to be the injustice of stolen properties.

The man on the top right corner is asking the man on the left with the rifle ‘you know you don’t own this house, why don’t you move out’? To which the man on the left responds ‘I’ve lived here and have been having my children here for the past 22 years, how can I move out’? The young boy on the bottom reflects on the dialogue above and concludes his thoughts metaphorically saying ‘a bucket
that witnesses such behaviour from another bucket will not hold water’. The English translation really does dilute the depth of the boy’s metaphor in Somali as his statement is quite poignant. In a simplified manner, he is pointing out that injustice breeds injustice. In other words, this behaviour of holding on to stolen properties replicates itself, especially when the victims feel the perpetrators aren’t being held accountable. Politics of recognition occurs when grievances like these remain unaddressed.

This same issue was one of several reasons the Puntland administration boycotted attending the ‘Transitioning towards Democracy’ conference held by the Somali government in September 2013. This conference was one of the milestones stipulated by the international community during the London 2012 Somalia conference and the subsequent Istanbul conference.

Below is a statement made by the information minister of Puntland Ahmed Sheikh Jama appearing in an article on the website raadraacnews.com. The article states that he held a press conference in Puntland detailing their perspective towards the conference as a regional administration:

‘Wasiirka Warfaafinta Maamulka Puntland Axmed Sheekh Jaamac ayaa ka hadlay aragtida Puntland ee Shirkii geedi socodka siyaasada ee lagu soo gabagabeyay muqdisho oo ay ka baaqdeen. Axmed waxa uu sheegay in shirkaasi aan lagu soo hadal qaadin hantida lakala haysto oo ku tilmaamay tan ugu muhiimsan ee gundhiga u ah dib u heshiisinta.’

(Translation; the information minister of the Puntland administration Ahmed Sheikh Jama spoke about the stance of Puntland with regards to the transitioning towards democracy conference held in Mogadishu, which they didn’t attend. Ahmed expressed that the conference did not address the stolen properties, which he described as the most important principle that has to be dealt with in order to move towards reconciliation.)

The article above highlights the unaddressed grievance of stolen properties that the Puntland administration clearly feel to be of great importance and relevant when it comes to reconciliation.
The boycotting of the conference is a symbolism for how future reconciliation and cooperation between the Somali government and the Puntland administration can face a downturn if this grievance remains unaddressed, which will lead to the occurrence of the politics of non-recognition.

6.2.2 Politics of non-recognition within clannism

In this section the findings of the content analysis with regards to politics of non-recognition within clannism will be addressed first. We begin with table 13, which highlights findings of the Somali clans and the levels of participation they exhibit through diasporic media. The clans in this table represent the five Somali clans which are Dir, Daarood, Hawiye and Rahanweyn and the minority clans. The participation list is informed by the theoretical approaches to the root causes and the conceptual framework of the three politics. Clan participation is represented in their form of engagement with the root causes and the three politics.

It is important to examine clan participation as this will provide a deeper insight into which clans that are more prominently engaged with the theoretical approaches and the conceptual frameworks as well as the levels of engagement, which combined can help provide an improved understanding of the complexity of clannism and how it re-creates conflict through the mediatisation of the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. The data has already indicated that clannism is entrenched in the Somali media. It is therefore important to unpack where some of the most clan-centred activities and engagement are coming from as this can help us understand some of the reasons why clannism is so enmeshed with the Somali media:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participation list</th>
<th>Hawiye</th>
<th>Dir (including Isaaq)</th>
<th>Minority and Rahanweyn</th>
<th>Daarood</th>
<th>No clan</th>
<th>Participation Total</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising to support clan activities</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising for clan projects/areas</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clan meetings</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity for clan agenda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in intl comm events</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support intl comm issues</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundraising to tackle poverty, humanitarian appeals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand in solidarity with humanitarian causes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand in solidarity with marginalised groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in events supporting marginalised groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan Total</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.13: Clan category participation.

Although table 6.13 shows findings that are relevant to several sub-sections of this chapter, I purposefully put it in this sub-section as the level of participation in fundraising to tackle poverty and humanitarian appeals (1%) is a stark contrast to fundraising to support clan projects and areas (15.3%). Similarly, participation in events supporting marginalised groups generated only 0.6% in comparison to participating in clan meetings, which produced 22.4%. These findings highlight how diasporic media gives a wider recognition to clan-centric participation and reinforces clan solidarity whilst undermining the marginalised sections of society and almost silencing humanitarian plights and issues of poverty. It is these kinds of biased representations that produce climates of politics of non-recognition.
We now move on to findings of the discourse analysis with regards to politics of non-recognition within clannism. As can be expected, non-recognition usually shows itself in silences and lack of representation. What the findings for this section have highlighted is how some marginalised people are responding to this non-recognition through their own communicative means. Some have created their own websites and often feature press conferences held by their clan elders. The website dulmane.com is one such example set up by the minority clan members of Somaliland. The thematic structure is centred around what they deem to be discrimination and the isolation which they endure from the Somali society. One of their clan elders Suldan Dakir speaks about how their contribution to the development and civilisation of the Somali society has led to their discrimination:

“Midginta haraga oo aan dher ay xirraan Soomaalida oga sameyn jirney. Dhiilaha ama agabka wax lagu qabsado oo dhan iyo waxaas oo xadaarad ah waxaas sameyn jirey Gabooyaha. Nasiib darro waxay noqotey in na lagu takooro xadaaradda iyo horumarkaaan u keenney Soomalida.”

(Translation; we, of the Gaboye clan, used to make clothes out of animal skin for Somalis to wear. We also made the traditional pots and pans and food containers. Unfortunately the civilisation and development we have contributed to the Somali society has become the source they use to belittle and discriminate against us.)

The same article details how Suldan Dakir, on behalf of the minority clans in Somaliland, held a press conference to complain about the lack of adequate housing and decent neighbourhoods that is available to them:

‘Suldan Dakir ayaa shir jaraa’d ku qabtey hotel City Plaza ee magaalada Burco halkaas oo uu kaga hadlay sidii beelaha la haybsooco ay u heli lahaayeen deegaan u gaar ah isagoo baaq u
Sultan Dakir held a press conference in hotel City Plaza in Bur’o where he spoke of the housing plight of the minority clans that are discriminated against. He sent a message to the president of the Somaliland administration as well as the parliament and the house of elders for them to address the need for the minority clans in Somaliland to have a place to live.

The mediatised discrimination and unequal access to resources that the minority clans complain of are again examples of how diasporic media can produce politics of non-recognition.

Some minority clans who feel humiliated as a result of the marginalisation they endure from society address this issue by representing themselves as a noble clan using the websites they have created and galvanising their own clan members to be proud of and familiar with their lineage as shown on the website waajid.wordpress.com, which represents the Rahanweyn clan (also knowns as Digil and Mirifle):

‘Waxa ay Soomaalidu inta badan is weydiisaa ayna isu sheegaan in Digil&Mirifle aan aheyn qowmiyad jirta oo iskeed u taagan, qaarkoodna waxa ayba aaminsan yihiin in qowmiyaddan Digil&Mirifle ay gasho Daarood, Hawiye iyo Isaaq, ee aan qeyb iskeed u taaganba laga heleynin ee seddexdaan qabiilood ee aan soo sheegnay laga wada helo, islamarkaana ay yihii uun dad isu wada yimid oo ka kala tirsan seddexdaas qabiilood oo aan soo sheegnay ee aysan aheyn Digil&Mirifle hal qowmiyad keliya. Kuwa fikirka noocaas ah qaba ayaan u sheegeynaa in ay xaqiiqdu ka fog yihii ayna heystaan qaladkii aabayaashood ka dhaadiciyey, ayagoo meel marinaaya fikraddoodii aheyd dhul balaarsi, islamarkaana ay ka dhigaan Digil&Mirifle waxaan jirin, ayna yiraahdaan waa uun dad isu tegey. Digil&Mirifle waa dad walaalo ah oo dhalay hal oday, ninkii yaqaan wuu yaqaan ee waxaan halkan ugu faa’ideyneynaa dadka aan aqoon ee si fiican u la soco sheekada. Qowmiyadaha ku nool dalka
Soomaaliya 60% waa dad isku luqad ah inkastoo ay leeyihiin lahjado kala duwan, waxaase jirta in 40% la heli karo luqado kale oo aan aheyn luqadda Soomaaliga sida ay taariikhdu tilmaantay.’

(Translation; Somalis often tell each other that Digil&mireifle aren’t a legitimately existing clan who have a lineage. They state that they are a group of people who live among other Somali clans like the Darod, Isaq and Hawiye. We want to tell those people that they are far from the truth. They are holding on to stories from their fathers and forefathers who concocted those stories so that they can delegitimise us in order to take our lands. Digil&Mirifle are blood brothers with one father. This article will detail the lineage of the Digil&mireifle people so that those of you who don’t know can benefit. Approximately 60% of the people that inhabit Somalia speak the same Somali language but there are around 40% of the Somali people, according to history, that do not speak the commonly spoken Somali but rather other languages, like us.)

The article is quite long and goes on to trace and explain the lineage of the Digil & Mirifle clan in elaborate details with what seems to be a purpose to position the clan as equal to the other Somali clans. The article indicates that there is a popular belief among Somalis that the Digil & Mirifle clan aren’t a legitimate clan and there is an inference that they do not get the same level of respect as the other clans. Feelings of social exclusion can sow the seeds for politics of non-recognition, as this website demonstrates, which, when left unaddressed, can lead to the re-creation of the conflict.

6.2.3 Politics of non-recognition within international community engagement

In order to examine the potentiality of the politics of non-recognition occurring within international community engagement on Somali diasporic media, items that were looked for were coverage of international community engagement with marginalised groups of people, those affected by poverty and unequal access to resources and people that are discriminated against or otherwise feel undermined and powerless within the Somali society. There weren’t any findings generated for this
section within the 167 websites and 9 television station I examined. This is not to say that this is a section not covered at all by diasporic media but if such coverage does occur, it is likely to be covered by media outlets that are either funded by international agencies or have been paid to cover a particular story at a certain time for public relations purposes. The silence itself on the whole is indicative of the lack of a prevalent and consistent connection between the international community and the marginalised and powerless groups of the Somali society.

6.3 Politics of solidarity

The most apparent of our three principal politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation that the findings have conveyed are those invoking forms of solidarity. The mediatised invitation and construction of solidaristic appeals that the findings of the content and discourse analysis generated appeared in three manners; representationally, discursively and performatively. The politics of solidarity was, as with the preceding politics of non-recognition, examined with the theoretical approaches to the root causes identified in chapter 1 and 2. These are poverty and unequal access to resources, international community engagement and clannism and the findings of both the content and discourse analysis will be presented as they occurred within each of the theoretical approaches to the root causes.

6.3.1 Politics of solidarity within poverty and unequal access to resources

Within this section, both the content and discourse analysis generated very little representational or collective appeals for solidarity against poverty and unequal access to resources. The little that was found is presented below in the next table. The lack of findings can be highlighted as another example for the mediatised silences within Somali diasporic media with regards to poverty and unequal access to resources.

Table 14 shows findings for solidaristic invocations in terms of clannism, international community engagement and poverty and unequal access to resources. What was identified as solidaristic
invocation was word connotations and lexical choices to propagate for or invite towards the engagement with clannism, international community and standing up against poverty and unequal access to resources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solidarity invocation categories</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International community</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor people, minority clans, marginalised groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>179</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.14: Solidaristic invocation and number of occurrences.

Table 6.14 highlights how poor people, minority clans and marginalised groups received the least solidaristic invocation with only 5.5% of solidaristic invocations inviting towards it or propagating for it.

In terms of the discourse analysis, only one website featured discourse that displayed solidarity against poverty and unequal access to resources. The following excerpt is from an article that appeared on that website, dulmane.com:

Kulan aad u balaadhan oo ay isugu yimaadeen qeybaha kala duwan ee Bulshada Gobolka Togdheer isla markaana lagu qaadaa dhigayey arimaha takoorka ayaa lagu qabtey magaalo madaxda gobolkaasi ee Burco. Kulankan oo ay iska kaashadeen labada haayadood ee kala ah Akademiga Horumarka iyo Waxbarashada Dadka laheyb-sooco iyo Haayada Xuquuqul Insanka Qaranka Somaliland ayaa waxaa lagu soo bandhigey Daraasad cilmiiyo la quseysa kaalmaha ay kaga jiraan Bulshada Laheyb-soocaa Waxbarashada, Dhaqaalaha, Siyaasada, Shaqada, iyo sidoo kale qeybaha aasaasiga ah ee nolosha Bulshada. Daraasadan ayaa daaha
ka rogtey inaaney dadka laheyb soocaa guud ahaan saami mugleh ku laheyn Shaqada
Haayadaha Dawlada marka laga reebo labad qof oo iyagu ah kuwa dhulka xaadha ama
jaadhwalayaasha, sidoo kalena aaney jirin qof ka soo jeeda bulshadaas oo shaqaale ka ah
shirkadaha gaarka loo leeyahay.

(Translation: A big meeting was held in the city of Bur’o in the Togdheer region (in Somaliland)
where members of the society that live in that region came together to discuss issues related to
marginalisation and discrimination. The meeting was organised by the Academy for the
Development and Education of Marginalised People and the Somaliland Human Rights Agency. The
findings of a research that examined the level of participation of marginalised people and those
belonging to minority clans in education, the economy, politics, employment and other basic areas
that fulfil the needs of the society was presented at the meeting. One of the findings highlighted was
that marginalised people and minority clan members are not visible at all in the workforce of the
Somaliland administration except for two workers that sweep the floors and deliver khat. There
were also no marginalised people or minority clan members employed by private companies in
Somaliland.)

This article highlights the entrenched level of exclusion of minority clans and marginalised people
from both public and private industries. The research that the article refers to exposes that there are
only two people employed by the Somaliland administration who belong to minority clans or a
marginalised group and both of them hold very menial jobs. According to the report, the private
sector doesn’t employ any at all. Articulating these dire circumstances brings to the forefront the
disadvantaged realities of minority clans and marginalised groups and this article might be helpful in
terms of creating awareness. However given the lack of these kinds of articles, there is an inevitable
silence that is produced, providing further ground for the politics of non-recognition.
6.3.2 Politics of solidarity within clannism

The politics of solidarity was perhaps most visible within clannism. I’ll begin with highlights from the content analysis within this section. As previous tables have shown, forms of clan solidarity came up most frequently on Somali websites and television stations. Table 5, for example, showed that clan-centred regional administrations drew the largest appearances as a conflict theme drawing 18% in total. Kinship and clan poetry followed closely with 15% and 14% each. In the social actors, as table 9 showed, clan members appeared 11% of the time with regional administration officials and clan poets coming in at 10%. These are quite high percentages in comparison to female and youth clan members, for example, that only received 3% each and minority clan members and elders got just 0.3% each. This is indicative of the male dominant form of clannism that the media gives prevalence to.

Further examples to illustrate the predominance of the politics of solidarity within clannism can be drawn from chart 6.10, which highlighted how 45% of all images that appeared on Somali websites and television stations depicted clannism. Table 6.11, which showed the types of videos that appeared on Somali websites and television stations, illustrated that 34% of these videos exhibited solidarity for clannism. Examination of all the advertising that appeared on Somali media, which was shown in table 6.12, brought forth how 34% of all advertising was linked to a particular clan. And lastly, what was perhaps the most poignant finding to exemplify the popularity of the politics of solidarity within clannism was presented in table 6.14, which showed that 46% of Somali websites and television stations invoked solidarity for clannism.

With regards to the discourse analysis, with the exception of 3, all the websites depicted and invoked solidarity for a specific clan. These solidaristic depictions and invocations appeared in either a historical context where past struggles and longevity of existence is called upon to generate solidarity for current clan agendas or in a political context dealing with current clan issues and their engagement with the conflict. I’ll begin with examples of the historical context.
The website allcayn.com exhibits solidarity with the Dhulbahante clan. Below is a sample article from the website:

‘Mujaahid Darwiish dhalay Indho Sheel

Wuxuu Siwayn uga Hadlay Duulaanka Qaawan ee Maamulka Puntland Kusoo Qaaday
Deeganada Khaatumo, Isagona Sheegay Inaysan Ahayn Wax Qarsoomaya, iyo Xubnaha Soo Gaadhay Taleex. Waxaaqaa Wax Laga Waydiiyey Hadiiba Ciidamo Maamulka Faroole Ay Soo gaadheen Duleedka Taleex Sida Masuuliiyintu Ay ugeeli Doonaan Magaalada, Wuxuuna Siwayn U Sheegay in Loo Toog Hayo.‘

(Translation; Muslim warrior named ‘IndhoSheel’ born to the Dhulbahante clan warriors knowns as ‘Darwiish’associated with freedom fighter Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan who fought the British. He spoke a great deal about the unjustified and obvious attack by the Puntland administration towards the Khatumo regions. He stated the reasons behind this attack are obvious and those behind the attack are known. He stated that the Puntland forces will meet the consequences of their actions and that the Khatumo administration is on standby and ready to defend.)

The title of the article projects the source in question as one who comes from a warrior background and descends from those who fought for the freedom of their people. His stating the attack was unjustified and that the clan forces are ready to defend exudes his willingness to stand up for his clan and protect them against those designated as enemies. He is the head of the administration and therefore projecting him as a hero, who has leadership qualities steeped in his blood, can serve as a reason for the other clan members to give solidarity to him and the clan administration he heads.

The website Ogaden.com, which supports the Ogaden clan, takes a similar approach when invoking solidarity as they too are engaged in various conflicts. The Ogaden clan is split into various political branches and this website specifically advocates support for the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation
Front) movement, which wants to secede from Ethiopia and form its own independent state. It targets Ogaden clan members from the Somali region in Ethiopia. Let's look at the below article:

‘Ethiopian Scorched-Earth Policy in Occupied Ogaden and the Liyu Police Militia’

‘Conceived and materialized exclusively for the prolongation of the Ethiopian Occupation of Ogaden, Liyu Police has recently played an active role in the implementation of the Ethiopian scorched-earth policy across the vast, Somali-speaking, Ogaden region. The role played by Liyu Police in the destruction of Ogaden and the Ogadeni society is revealed by a testimony paper composed by a number of recently defected former Liyu Police officers whereby are given details about atrocious incidents, dates and criminal perpetrators. Such is the extent of the horror and the evildoings that the perpetrators have to be persecuted…’

By detailing and focusing on alleged acts committed by the regional police in the Somali-speaking region of Ogaden, the article seeks to generate condemnation among the Ogaden clan members and for them to stand in solidarity with their ‘wronged’ clan members in the region and to possibly support the action that is being called for; to ‘persecute the perpetrators’.

The website also tries to garner solidarity through the invocation of the longevity of the struggle of their clan and the history behind it:

Ogadeniya iyo Qaybintii Afrika

Dadka soomaalida ah ee ku dhaqan ogaadeeniya oo ka mid ah ummadaha uu sida gaarka ah ugu xadgudbay sharciga kala qoqobka dadyowga isku isirka ahaa ayna gumeysato Itoobiya waxay soo galeen walina ku jiraan halgan ay ku doonayaan xaqooda oo ah in ay iyagu aayahooda maamulaan, halgankaas oo ay horseed ka ahaayeen ururraddii Nasrullaahi, Jabbaddii xoreynta ogaden (OLF) iyo xisbigii xoreynta Soomaali galbeed. Ururradaas oo dhammaantood ahaa kuwii sababay taariikh ahaan dagaalkii dhex maray dowladdii da’da

(Translation; the Ogaden and the division of Africa.

The people of Ogadenia have been at the receiving end of the brutal division that the colonial powers engaged in when they were leaving Africa. Ever since they have been fighting for and are continuing to fight for their right to manage their own affairs. At the forefront of this fight, we had revolutionary organisations such as Nasrullah, the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF) and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). These movements existed between 1948 till 1964. They have been the prime reason that led to the Somali government of Siyad Barre going to war with the Ethiopian government of Haile Selassie. Even though they were unsuccessful in their mission, their struggle left a remarkable imprint in the hearts of the Ogaden society. The youth wing of the freedom fighting organisations has always been part and parcel of the fight against the Ethiopian colonisation of the people of Ogaden ever since Britain handed the region over to Ethiopia. They have always been the most powerful force to ignite the people and have taken leadership in highlighting the objectives and aspirations of the Ogaden people.)
By depicting the longevity of the ‘struggle’, the article is attaching a history to it. Highlighting that their struggles were not won but the fighters have always been persistent and never gave up, the article is creating a sense of ‘mission unfinished’ and thus the struggle must continue in order to win the right to self-rule. Furthermore, the article is connecting current members of the Ogaden clan with clan fighters who have previously fought for their clan giving them a sense of belonging that traversed through the decades and possibly an ideology to hold on to.

The website galmudugnews.com also takes a historical angle when invoking solidarity for their clan, the Hawiye. The website looks to be particularly aligned with the semi-autonomous regional administration named Galmudug. The discourse in this website would often invoke historical accounts of the Hawiye clan’s long history and origins of existence in the Somali regions. The website represents Hawiye as authentically Somali and inhabiting many regions and towns of the country, although some of the towns they claim to reside in are disputed by other clans. The article below is a response to this dispute:

Waxaa beryahan dhegaha Soomaalida wareeriyey arrinta maamul u saameynta Jubbooyinka taasoo ay hormuud ka ahayd beeshaa Daarood doodo badanna laga qabtay, dadkii daawaday doodaha ama akhristay website-yada waxa si weyn uga muuqatay doodahaasi in beesha Daarood ay caro weyn muujineyso mar alle markii ay qabaal’ka kale ka hadlaan Kismayo gaar ahaan beesha Hawiye oo ay marar badan ku tilmaameen beel boob iyo dhul ballaarsi wadato oo Magaalalo (Kismaayo) uu Daarood leeyahay usoo hanqal taagaysa. Daaroodka magaalada Kismaayo un bay deggan yihiin ee baadiyaha ma deggana. Haddii aadan keeni Karin hal Tuulo oo ay Darod leedahay oo laga xukumo Kismaayo, haddaba magaalalo ma lagu milkiyaa gudaheeda ayaan dagganahay dadka deegaanka ah ee aad sheegtaanse sidey degaan Kismaayo ku noqdeen haddaysanba hal tuulo ku lahayn Kismaayo? haddiise Hawiye uu 28 tuulo oo Kismaayo laga xukumo leeyahay maxay u aflagaadeynayaan nabadoon Maxamed Xasan Xaad (Odayaasha Hawiye)- oo qabiliiska (Hawiye) wax ka dagaan Jubbada
Hoose iyo Jubbada Dhexe- haddii uu yiri waa in si caddaalad ah arrimaha Jubbooyinka loo qaybiyaa? Maxaase u diidaya in Hawiye in qayb libaax uu ka qaato talada Kismaayo, Yaase dulmiga wado?

(Translation; for the past few days, Somalis have become confused about the formation of a regional administration for the Jubba regions and this confusion has been caused by the Daarood clan. They have been active in participating in discussions related to this matter in the media and most people that have seen these discussions can testify that Darod has displayed anger at other clans joining the debate as they see themselves as the sole occupiers of those regions. Their anger is particularly addressed toward the Hawiye clan, whom they have described as being greedy and wanting to expand their territories.

Daarood only lives in the city of Kismayo and not in the rural areas of the region. If they can’t bring one rural village where their clansmen live that is administered by the local authorities of Kismayo, they can’t claim it as their region. People can’t become inhabitants that can claim rights to a city if their clan doesn’t live in its rural areas. Anyone can inhabit a city. The Hawiye clan live in 28 rural villages that come under Kismayo so why are the Daaroods speaking ill of our clan elder Mohamed Hassan Had, who is of the Hawiye clan and whose clansmen inhabit the rural areas of the region, when he says the matter of creating a regional administration for Jubba needs to be dealt with justly? Why are they so against Hawiye being part of the decision-making for Jubba and Kismayo city? Who is being unjust?).

The discourse in this article indicates that the Hawiye clan ought to be part of the formation of the regional administration for the Jubba regions for which Kismayo is the main city. This historical representation of their foothold in the region is encouraging solidarity among clan members to stand for their claim of being part of the decision-making process and in solidarity against the Darod.
The following examples are from the political context. Allidamaale.com is a website that supports the Majeerteen clan and the Puntland administration, which is established predominantly by the Majeerteen and is based in the north-eastern part of Somalia. This website seems to be mostly concerned with generating solidarity for the administration and against clans that are deemed to be unfriendly or considered to work against the interests of the Majeerteen people. Below is a sample article:

Hadal heynta ugu weyn ee maanta ee caasimada Puntland iyo fajaca ay ka muujiyeyen guud ahaan shacabka Puntland farsamada xirfadeysan ee Xamar ku dooneyso in ay isbaareysato Gar gaarka ku socda Puntland. Guddoomiyaha Gobolka Banaadir Maxamuud Nuur Tarsan iyo koxxdiisa Hawiye Action Group ayaa maanta shir ay xamar ku yeesheen isku soo qaaday sidii ay show ugu dhigi lahaayeeyn shacabka Puntland iyo beesha caalamka. koxxdaan oo ka koobnaa wax ay ugu yeeraan guddoomiyeyaasha gobolka Banaadir, balse magacooda dhabta ah uu yahay Hawiye Action Group ayaa sheegay in ay kulkanrooda maanta uga hadleen xaaladaha kasoo kordhay dhibaataada ka dhalataya Duufaantii xooganeyd ee ku dhufatay deeganaada Puntland oo ay ka dhasheen hhasaaro naf iyo maalba leh. koxxdaan dilaaaliinta ee 22-sano kadib laga la'ayahay xaqo iyo hantida xalaasha ah ee islaamka ee xooga aad ku heystaan iska celiya ayaa riwaayadooda ku sheegay in ay la qeybsanayaan shacabka walaalahooda ee ku waxyoolabay aafada ku dhufatay Puntland.

(Translation; the biggest news in the capital city of Puntland and among the people of Puntland is the clever and deceitful way that Mogadishu is trying to hijack the humanitarian aid that is being targeted towards Puntland after the recent storms and floods that occurred in some parts of Puntland. The mayor of Mogadishu Mohamed Nur Tarsan and his Hawiye clan alliance group held a meeting today to discuss how they can pretend to care about the natural catastrophe that has happened in Puntland to the international community and the people of Puntland. This group consisting of what they refer to as the district commissioners of the Banadir region but whom in
reality are called Hawiye Action Group, have stated that the purpose of their meeting today was to discuss the calamities that have escalated from the storms that have devastated large parts of Puntland which have caused loss of human lives and livelihood. These thieves who after 22 years are still holding on to the properties they stole when the civil war broke out and are refusing to give them back to their rightful owners are pretending as if they care about the calamities that has besieged their brothers in Puntland.)

This article is attempting to generate solidarity among clan members by inferring to the existing tensions between the Majeerteen in Puntland and the Hawiye in Mogadishu. The Puntland administration has had a strained relationship with the government in Mogadishu and this article reflects this by dismissing the official capacities of the mayor and the district commissioners and instead points out their clan. What is happening here seems to be what Fairclough (1989: 51) refers to as a ‘focus on causality’, which means in Fairclough’s definition of the phrase, crucial aspects are left unspecified. The Banadir region district commissioners have met to discuss the disaster but according to this article, it was a meeting to explore ways they can hijack the humanitarian aid that might be coming to Puntland from the international community. This is further backed up by alleging they have been operating as thieves already and possess properties they stole when the civil war broke out. The hostile tone of the language used is a further ignition to galvanise emotions of clan members for solidaristic purposes.

Some websites attempt to generate clan solidarity by highlighting potentially threatening issues which require collective clan awareness and unity. The website allgalguduud.com is one such website and advocates solidarity for the Marehan clan. Below is one of the website articles that speaks to this notion:

‘Xog ballaaran oo aan ka heleyno dadkii lagu Toogtey Puntland ayaa 13kii ruux labo kamid ah ayaa beesha Sade ahaa waxaana la cadeeyey in mid kamid ah uu ahaa aqoonyahan Daganaa mudo badan magaalada Boosaaso isla markaana ahaa ganacsade aad loo yaaan
waxaana udaganaa xaas iyo caruur inkastoo xaaskiisu ay aheyd reer Puntland, kadib markii ladhacay hantidiisa ayaa la abuurey qorshe lagu qaariyo waxaana dusha laga saarey in uu yahay Alshabaab waana mida maantey sababtey in la toogto.Waxaa kale oo jira in Xog hoose ay sheegeysa in shankale oo beesha Mareexaan ah ay xiran yihii kuwaas oo markii hore lagu soo xirey kuwo aan haysan sharci ay ku wadaan gaari oo qof ku jiirey Boosaaso iyo kuwo hanti doodii markii la dhacay ku dagaalamey oo ayagana la soo xirey hase ahaatee Dhamaantood ku eedeysan in ay yihiin Argo-gixiso.

Ugaar siga qarsoon ee ka socota Puntland iyo Mida ka socota Magaalada Garrisa ee Gobalka Bari ee Kenya waa mid hada ku wajahan xaalada Kismaanyo iyo jagada R/wasaare.’

(Translation; widespread reports that we are receiving from the people that were shot in Puntland indicate that out of the 13 that were shot, 2 were from the Marehan clan. One of them was a prominent businessman who lived in Bosaso for a very long time and was well-known in the city. He had a wife that belonged to the dominant clan of that region and they have several children. When his property was stolen, a plan was hatched to accuse him of terrorism and belonging to Al-Shabab which is what led to his death today. Reports also indicate that there are five more Marehan people imprisoned in Bosaso who were originally captured for not having driving licenses and then their properties were stolen. When they objected, they were convicted of terrorism charges. There is a hunt-down in Puntland and the North-Eastern province of Kenya that is being targeted at members of the Marehan clan and it is all to do with the bid to remove the prime minister from his opposition and the political engagement of the Marehan people with Kismayo.)

This article is invoking solidarity among clan members on two levels; to stand in solidarity with the political figures and positions of the clan and to unite against animosity from other clans. This is further heightened by the use of emotional appeals such as the humanising of the business man and the fact that he had a wife and children. By referencing that the wife belonged to the clan that shot him, it infers that the allegedly perpetrators clan have no respect for the wife, who belongs to their
clan, and the familial ties that the marriage had constituted between the two clans. In the last paragraph, the article is referring to the general hostility that exists between the Marehan clan and the Majeerteen clan of Puntland, which was fuelled when the prime minister seat, which the Majeerteen saw as theirs since the predecessor was of their clan, was given to a Marehan member, former prime minister Abdi Farah Shirdon.

6.3.3 Politics of solidarity within international community engagement

The findings from the content analysis have highlighted that the international community receives much portrayal. In most cases, they only came in second to clannism. Table 4, for example, showed that nearly 13% of conflict themes were related to neighbouring countries and 11% of the conflict themes were UN related. Similarly, the international community social actors have been given plenty of a platform. Table 8 illustrated that officials from neighbouring countries to Somalia made up 14% of the featured social actors and UN officials made up nearly 12% of the featured social actors. Findings also indicated that the second highest of videos exhibiting solidarity, making up 19%, were those exhibiting solidarity for international community engagement. This was shown in table 11. Table 14 presented how 25% of solidaristic invocations were invoked for international community engagement. In short, the international community enjoys a significant level of representation and solidarity from Somali diasporic media.

Moving on to the discourse analysis findings within this section, the solidarity that was generated for international community engagement was quite subtle. I will show how this subtlety manifests itself shortly but what the findings here highlight is that this subtlety is most likely related to the international community's lack of coherent overarching strategy with regards to their engagement with Somalia, which therefore doesn't produce a clear agenda to invoke solidarity for. But what is clear is that on the whole, there is a significant level of solidarity that the Somali media portrays for
international community engagement. To pick up on solidaristic invocation or invitation, careful attention needed to be paid to agency, as in who does what to whom, and action, i.e. what gets done. In short, a study of transitivity and verb processes needed to be carried out and then examine the stances of the featured international community members. Let’s look at the below article titled ‘Eritrea continues to support Somalia’s Al-Shabab’ from the website diirad.com:

‘In fresh allegations made by Ethiopia on Monday, the East African nation said that efforts to maintain peace and stability in Somalia is taking longer due to Eritrea’s continued support of the Islamist militia group, Al-Shabab. The Ethiopian government said despite ongoing efforts by regional governments and the African Union peace keeping force (AMISOM), Eritrea continues to undermine peace efforts in war-ravaged Somalia. Eritrea continues to violate UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and the country absolutely remains to be a regional security threat...’

The article iterates the position of neighbouring Ethiopia towards the alleged involvement of Eritrea in supporting Al-Shabab. It also reminds readers that the UN Security Council has sanctioned Eritrea because the UNSC determined that the country was undermining the peace efforts in Somalia. By including the UNSC resolution, the article is bolstering the position of Ethiopia but it is also making the concern raised one that not only troubles Ethiopia but the international community as well. The characterising of Eritrea as a country derailing peace efforts is mirrored by the efforts governments in the region and AMISOM are making to stabilise Somalia, which could be construed as legitimising their involvement but also raising it to a genuine concern to better the conditions of the country since it is a ‘regional security threat’. This is an example of how subtle solidarity is generated for the international community’s involvement in Somalia.
Here is another article from the website hiiraan.com, which represents the position of AMISOM as one that works towards bringing peace and stability to Somalia:

Afhayeenka AMISOM, Col. Cali Aadan Xumad ayaa sheegay in shaqaaqadii maanta ka dhacday Baydhabo ay aad ula yaabeen kana horjeedaan. “Shacabka Soomaaliyeed waxaan xusuusinayaa in howlgalka AMISOM ay u joogaan Soomaaliya uu yahay nabadeynta Soomaaliya, haddii nabadeyntii ay keeneen in ay dadka fursad u siisay inay shirar yeeshaan, taasi waa wax aad u wanaagsan. Dowladduna howsheeda iyada ayaa iska leh innaguna waan la shaqeynaynaa, balse wixii maanta dhacay ma ahan mid eedeeda aan innagu leennahay,” ayuu yiri Col. Xumad. Afhayeenka oo la weydiiyay su’aal ahayd inuu wax ka ogyahay amarka lagu joojiyay shirarka Baydhabo ka socda, maadaama ergooyinka sheegeen inay AMISOM ku amartay inay hoolka iska joogaan balse aysan shirka sii wadi karin ayaa ku jawaabay “Haddii amar ay soo saarto dowladda Somalia AMISOM waa la ogeysiiyaa; laakiin waxaan ku sheegayaa in ciidamada AMISOM aysan tallaabo iska qaadi karin, marka haddii amar la bixiyay dowladda federaalka ayaa iska leh, haddii ay ciidamadeeda amar siiso inaan la shaqeyno oo aan joojinno wixii halkaas ka dhaca waa mas’uuliyaddeenna, sidoo kale haddii aan la kulanno dad is-haysta waan dhexgalaynaa waana kala joojinaynaa.”

(Translation: the spokesman for AMISOM Col. Ali Aden has stated that they were quite taken aback by the confrontation that occurred in Baidoa today and condemned it. “We wish to remind the Somali people that AMISOM is here to bring peace and stability to Somalia. If these efforts have led to opportunities for the Somali people to hold meetings, this is a sign of good progress. The government is in charge of their efforts and we are here to work with them but we can’t be blamed for what happened today.” The spokesman was further asked if he knew of the orders to stop the elders from continuing their meetings in one of the halls in Baidoa, as these orders were conveyed to the local elders by AMISOM soldiers. He replied “If orders are given by the government, we are normally notified. We do not carry out orders on our own accord. Therefore if an order was issued
for this particular incident, it was done so by the Somali government. If orders were given by the Somali government to the Somali forces on the ground in Baidoa, it is our responsibility to work with them and stop what was happening there. Additionally, if we see people confronting each other, we will intervene and prevent it from escalating further.)

Here we find that the article doesn’t go into great details of the confrontation that occurred but rather relates the reasons for AMISOM’s involvement in Somalia and the opportunities that their efforts have borne fruit. What the article emphasises is that it is these efforts, to bring peace and stability to the country, that their actions are buttressed on and therein lies the message that the work of AMISOM is in the interest of the Somali people and this ‘should’ be given support. There is an overlexicalisation on authority and law and order, elements that the weak Somali government is missing and the connotations that could be derived is that the presence of AMISOM is filling this gap.

6.4 Politics of mobilisation

The politics of mobilisation that the content analysis has highlighted was through the mobilisation of opinions and views that the comments sections of Somali websites facilitated. Platforms for further mobilisation were also made available through social media sharing. We shall first look at the findings of social media platforms made available for the sharing and spreading of content:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social media sharing categories</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site allows sharing through social media sites such as Facebook, twitter etc</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site does not allow sharing through social media sites such as Facebook, twitter etc</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>157</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6.15:** findings of Somali websites that allowed social media sharing and those that didn’t.

Here we can see that 66% of the 167 websites that were sampled allowed for content to be shared across various social media platforms, potentially leading to the mobilisation of content.
With regards to user engagement, I have found that most websites allowed and encouraged users to engage with their content expressing their views and opinions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comments categories</th>
<th>Number of occurrences</th>
<th>Percentages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Users can’t comment</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users can only comment on content</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users can comment on content and discuss opinions with each other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Users can discuss opinions with each other and website producer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Website producer can only comment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>157</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.16: findings of levels of user engagements that are facilitated by Somali websites.

As table 6.16 shows, 65% of websites allowed users to comment on their content. This means that the majority of Somali websites offer and facilitate the possibility of users mobilising and spreading their opinions on the topics covered.

We shall now move on to the findings that the discourse analysis has generated within this section. One of the interesting findings that this study has highlighted within the politics of mobilisation that perhaps should be borne in mind is that most of the politics of mobilisation that are likely to occur are almost exclusively found within clannism. We shall discuss the impact this point can have on the possibility of conflict being re-created in the chapter summary.

6.4.1 Politics of mobilisation within poverty and unequal access to resources

Similar to the findings presented in the politics of solidarity within poverty and unequal access to resources, here too we find a notable silence. Table 11, which presented the findings of the video categories, showed that only 3 videos mobilised on behalf of marginalised people and no videos appeared to be mobilising against poverty and unequal access to resources.
Also within the discourse analysis, there was no discourse found that mobilised against poverty and unequal access to resources, providing further evidence of the silences of the Somali diasporic media with regards to poverty and unequal access to resources.

6.4.2 Politics of mobilisation within international community engagement

Here too, there was little content or discourse found that potentially mobilised for international community engagement, although a significant level of solidarity has been portrayed by the Somali media, as discussed previously. This is most likely due to the international community’s differing and at times conflicting policies, which fails to provide an overarching strategy with regards to their engagement with Somalia. This will be further discussed in the chapter summary at the end.

6.4.3 Politics of mobilisation within clannism

The findings generated for this section highlighted that most of the potential mobilisation was being done for clan causes and interests. The article below from the website Ogaden.com galvanises clan members to fight against what they classify as injustices from the Ethiopian government. It is based on a press release issued by the organisation Human Rights Advocacy Group:

‘We, the peoples of Benshangul, Gambella, Ogaden Somali, Oromo, Shakacho and Sidama nations unanimously agree to form Human Rights Advocacy Group (HRAG) in order to advocate for the Human Rights of the member communities and other oppressed peoples by the Ethiopian government. HRAG will tirelessly campaign harnessing the combined resources of the aforementioned communities and other support groups. It will expose the crimes the Ethiopian government is committing against the defenceless communities of
these peoples, including land grabbing and displacement, mass executions, extra-judicial killings, rampant rape, mass detentions and use of aid as a weapon to gain compliance to the regime marginalization policies….HRAG calls upon all people in Ethiopia to stand up together and confront the perpetrators.’

There is a clear appeal for emotional solidarity for the communities that this group portrays as defenceless and this is combined with the portrayal of the Ethiopian government as an oppressing tyrant exercising its power unjustly, invoking a ‘David-vs-Goliath’ kind of disposition. The article builds upon this emotional appeal and calls for the mobilisation of all Ethiopian people to ‘confront the perpetrators’. Here again we find evidence of the overlexicalisation of emotive language, presumably to appeal for emotional solidarity against what is being portrayed as oppression committed by the Ethiopian government.

What is also demonstrated within the same website is how sources are used to encourage clan members to actively engage in the struggle to ‘bring the Ethiopian government to justice’. The below article serves as an example, where the spokesman of the Ogaden Community UK calls for people to unite to bring those he refers to as committing genocide to justice:

‘We should all be united and bring to justice those who committed the genocide. We must be united and face the challenges waiting in front of us. As we all know, Genocide is a crime against humanity and that is why we all need to unite. Remember, not just ourselves but also we need to bring the world to our side.’

Here we find the spokesman galvanising clan members to seek justice for the ‘genocide’ they have suffered from in an emotive and reasoned delivery providing clan members with justifications to take action.

The following example is from the website allgalguduud.com. The website represents the Marehan clan which the former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon belongs to and the article below was
written during the time when his position was in question and a motion of a vote of confidence was brought in front of the Somali parliament:

Xildhbaanada sharafta leh waa inaad ogaataan in maanta masiirkii umada Soomaaliyeed uu gacmihiiina ku jiro, loona baahan yahay in aad samaysaan taariikh ka duwan kuwii dalka soomaray, xanta taala damul jadiid dhexdooda waxaa weeye awalba lacaga ayaan ku keenay xasan hadana saacid waxaan ku saaraynaa lacag, idinkoo taas ka dhidhiyaya waa inaad ilaalisaa sharciga iyo kitaabkii aad ku dhaaerateen, fadeexada uu madaxweynuhu sameeyey daraadeedna aad ku qasabtaan inuu is casilo, ama lagu qaado khiyaano Qaran(impeachment) ama la qabto doorasho ka soo hormartay xiligeeda mar hadii danta umada uu geed ugu xiray madaxweynuhu.

(Translation; respected parliamentarians, you must know that the interest of the Somali people is in your hands and you must take a different course to the ones that have preceded you. There is a rumour among the Damul Jadid religious group that the president belongs to and that is that they paid for Hassan to become president and they would also pay to get rid of the prime minister. Bear this in mind and don’t be attracted to their money. Instead respect the laws of the country and holy book you have been sworn on. You must push for the president to resign for the corruption and scandal he is causing or carry out an impeachment against him or bring the election date forward since he is no longer working in the interest of the people.)

The push for the prime minister to resign is presented as a matter of national concern using invigorating terms such as ‘must’ and public sentiments such as the ‘interest of the Somali people’. Parliamentarians are reminded that it is in the public interest to keep him and instead get rid of the president. In order to achieve the clan agenda, the clan cloak has been stripped to make the matter seem like a national issue that requires parliamentary action.
Politics of mobilisation are also likely to occur when the economic interest of the clan seems to be threatened. The website galmudugnews.com published the below article which is targeting the former Somali minister of state for the office of the president who is now the minister for constitutional and judicial affairs. The article was written before he assumed the latter office:

Farah Topaz oo ku dhaartay burburinta Shirkadaha Hawiye- Nin reer Aw Xasana oo Somtel South Somalia loo dhiibay. Wasiirka Madaxtooyadda oo ku dhaartay inuu burburin doono guud ahaan Shirkadaha Isgaarsiinta Ganacsatada beelweynta Hawiye ee ka jira Koofurta Somalia. Heshiiska dhexmaray Abdiraashiid Dhiigshiil iyo Farah Topaz wuxuu dhigayaa in farax laga doonayo in uu shirkadda siiyo furaha somaliya,shirkadaha kalena lagu cadaadiyo ogolaashaha laysinka iyo in canshuur badan la saaro furaha si adeegoodo qaali u noqdo oo ay la tartami waayaan shirkadaan cusub waana in laga hortagaa.

(Translation; FarahTopaz (nickname they've given him. His surname s Abdulqadir) has sworn he will destroy Hawiye-owned companies and will transfer the management of Somtel in South Africa to a fellow clansman from the Ow-Hassan clan. The minister of state has sworn he will destroy all telecommunication companies owned by the grand Hawiye clan who are based in South Africa. He has signed an agreement with the company Dhiigshiil (again another demonising nickname they have given to this company, which is called Dahabshiil) director Abdirashid and this agreement stipulates that Farah will give sole control of the Somali market to this company. He will also make it difficult for other companies to obtain license to operate and will place heavy taxation on other operating companies, making it likely for them to have to put their prices up and will therefore struggle to compete and this needs to be prevented.)

The article is inciting hostility against the former state minister for allegedly putting Hawiye owned businesses in threat of becoming out of businesses and favouring a rival company. What’s interesting is that the discourse represents the actors in question in the context of their clan in order
to make Hawiye look supreme and being unjustly on the receiving end of political malpractice by a minister of state who belongs to an inferior minority clan.

There were some instances where politics of mobilisation occurred for the purposes of fundraising to tackle a humanitarian issue affecting the clan. The below article from the allidamaale.com website sheds light on some of the fundraising activities that the Puntland administration has been engaged in and encourages clan members to also participate:

‘Magaalada Gaalkacyo waxaa maanta lagu qabtay kulan gargaar loogu uruurinayo dadkii Soomaaliyeed ee ku waxyeeloobay roobabkii dabaylaha watay ee ka da’ay deegaano ka mida Puntland. Kulankan waxaa ka soo qayb galay maamulka gobolka, kan degmada culimaa’udiin, haween iyo waxgarad kala duwan...Gudoomiyaha gobolka Mudug Maxamed Yuusuf Jaamac ayaa isaguna farriin u diray dhamaan shacabka degmooyinka gobolka, kuwaas oo uu ugu yeeray inay fadhigga ka kacaan oo ay ka qayb qaataan gargaarka walaalahood.’

(Translation; a fundraising event took place today in the city of Galka’yo to raise funds for those that have been affected by the windy storms that have destroyed many parts of Puntland. This event was attended by the governor, district commissioner, religious leaders, women and local intellectuals. The governor of the Mudug region in Puntland Mohamed Yusuf sent a message to the people of the region. “You have to get up and participate in the effort to help your brothers and sisters recover from this devastating calamity.”)

In this article the administration officials are portrayed as actively taking leadership in the effort to help clan members affected by the storm. The governor mobilises the people to help their fellow clan members, which strengthens solidarity with the clan but at the same time creates a sense of clan-reliance and distancing from the Somali government. The politics of mobilisation re-creates the
conflict when political agendas of the clan seem to be at odds with those of the central government and clan members are mobilised to support clan-led administrations.

6.5 The transformative nature of the three politics

As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the findings have shown that the three politics aren’t mutually exclusive, in the sense that one politics can be found to ‘progress’ onto another politics or in some cases into more than one. To illustrate how one politics can be found to ‘progress’ onto another, we’ll look at the article below from the website waajid.wordpress.com:

Dhamaan shacabka kasoo jeeda koonfur galbeed somaliya waxaa la ogeysinayaa in ey ka qeyb qaataan warqad petition ah looga soo horjeedo falka ey ciidamada amisom gaar ahaan Uganda iyo Burundi ey ka fuliyeen magalada beydhabo falkaas oo ahaa in ey hor istaag ku sameeyaan shacab ka wada tashanaayey mudo ka badan hal sano sidii ey ku sameysan lahaayeen maamul ka turjumaaya danahooda.

(Translation: The people of south-west Somalia are asked to sign a petition which stands against the actions of the AMISOM troops, particularly those from Uganda and Burundi, carried out in the city of Baidoa. These soldiers prevented the local people from their year-long efforts to establish a regional administration which serves their interests.)

The article is firstly encouraging the people of south-west Somalia to show solidarity against the actions of AMISOM, which the article highlights as preventing the people of south-west Somalia from managing their local affairs. This is where the politics of solidarity are possibly occurring. The article goes further to notify readers that a petition is being organised and explicitly calls for them to sign it, leading to the potential of the politics of mobilisation.

To illustrate how one politics can ‘progress’ onto more than one, we shall look at the below article from the same website:
Digilmirifle kaalinta uu ku lahaa dowladdii militeriga ahayd ee jirtey 21-ka sano ma ahayn kaalin u qalanta. Digilmirifle laga soo bilaabo 1991-da dagaaladii sokeeye markii ay dalka ka bilowdeen oo dhibaataada ugu badneyd ay ku dhacdey bulshada digilmirifle wuxuu muujiyey isku duubni, wada tashi iyo dadaal badan oo uu ku doonayey in uu ka tashado masiirkiisa aayihiisa uuna sameysto dowlad goboleed uu hogaanka u hayo waxaa dadaalaadaasi ka mid ah Shirweynihii MAAY NIING DANG EH oo dowladdii ka soo baxdey uu hogaaminayey AVV Xasan Sheekh Ibraahim. Hadana xalka wuxuu ku jiraa In la abaabulo shirweyne u gaar ah wax garadka digilmirifle oo lagu xalinayo loogana heshiiyo khalalkii iyo ismaan dhaafkii gogoshii la furay20/01/2013 ku yimid.

(Translation: the Digilmirifle clan did not get a worthy share in the military government that lasted 21 years. When the civil war broke out in 1991, the DigilMirifle people faced the biggest backlash but we stood together in unity and we engaged in dialogues with each other to find ways to manage our affairs. These efforts bore fruit and we held a big conference called Maay Niing Dang Eh and at the conclusion of that conference, we formed our own regional administration led by advocate Hassan Sheikh Ibrahim. The solution now lies in organising another big conference where the disagreements that came from the meeting we had on 20/01/2013 are resolved.)

The article begins with outlining that the clan didn’t feel they got a fair share of the political power sharing in the Siyad Barre regime. There is an allusion towards the political share they got being less than what they deserved, potentially producing politics of non-recognition. This is then followed by highlighting the brunt they felt they faced as a consequence of the civil war whilst also pointing out that it didn’t deter them from coming together as a clan, which has the potential of producing solidarity for the clan. Finally, the article points towards how these efforts resulted in a wide consultation-based conference that led to the formation of a regional administration and the solution for their problems now lie in organising another similar conference where previous disagreements can be resolved. This can be classified as potentially producing politics of
mobilisation. A point to take note of is that the ‘progression’ of the politics tends to occur in the direction from politics of non-recognition to solidarity and then mobilisation.

6.6 chapter summary

This chapter has demonstrated how the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation can be produced by the Somali diasporic media and through its production of those three politics, re-create the conflict. To help illustrate this further, diagram 17 below demonstrates how the Somali diasporic media can re-create the conflict in a cyclical progression through the three politics but each politics can also in its own right re-create the conflict:

Diagram 6.17: how conflict is re-created through the three politics.

When some sections of society are made to feel excluded, marginalised and/or discriminated against, these can indeed become instilled grievances that can re-create conflict. Similarly, when solidarity is being invoked with a particular side or issue and against something else within a conflict environment, this too can lead to the continuation of the dynamics of the conflict and re-create it.

Mobilising a section of society to address certain clan causes, as we saw with the Ogaden.com
website mobilising for clan members to support the local struggle, there is again a potential of the conflict being re-created. In this instance, the conflict can turn into a violent one.

6.6.1 Politics of non-recognition

The key point that the findings within this section has highlighted is that those that receive the least representation within the Somali diasporic media are the marginalised members of society, minority clans and sections of society affected by poverty and unequal access to resources. The diasporic media’s lack of representation of these groups is perhaps indicative of their powerlessness and lack of voice within the Somali society.

Conflicts are often marred with grievances rooted in marginalisation, discrimination and inequality and the Somali conflict isn’t different. When these issues are reproduced by the media, the potential for the conflict to be re-created comes into existence. The grievances that escalate from marginalisation, powerlessness and unequal access to resources can also take a more active turn.

The disputes over oil wells in the Nigerian Delta region, for example, began as environmental protests by people living in a region that were bearing the brunt of damage without seeing the benefits of oil revenues (Collier 2008: 31). Over the span of time this grievance evolved into greed and violent protests became an orchestrated part of the political landscape at that time (Collier 2008: 31) but it nevertheless serves as a testament to the issues that result out of unaddressed grievances.

Another interesting point that the study highlighted within politics of non-recognition is that although women’s issues were covered quite frequently within Somali media, this often occurred in association with the traditional roles of women. Women’s rights campaigners received very little access as sources and women in general appeared scarcely in the context of political and social
power. The broad level of coverage can perhaps be seen as a sign of progress, but there is still a long way to go for women to reach a level-playing field within male-dominated Somalia.

6.6.2 Politics of solidarity

Since the collapse of the state, there has been a collapse of nationhood within the society and clannism has appeared to fill the void. In the midst of an ever-changing conflict environment riddled by violence and rivalry, clannism seems to provide a sense of belonging as well as a safety net. These are most likely some of the reasons for clannism receiving the highest percentage of solidaristic invocation and invitation. However, given the significant portion of clan-centred dynamics that were a major part of the issues that sparked the conflict, invoking solidarity and allegiance with the clan at the expense of national unity will inevitably hamper unification efforts and continue to fuel the dynamics of the conflict, producing a tumultuous cycle of conflict re-creation.

International community engagement has also received a prominent level of solidarity but this was represented subtly and as the findings indicate, mobilisation for international community engagement did not take place. This is most likely due to the lack of a clear framework of engagement since members of the international community have different vested interests with regards to their need to engage with Somalia. There is also the possible approach to ‘manage affairs from the backdoor’ in the sense that the international community does not wish to display the deep-rootedness of their levels of engagement with Somalia in fear of possible international scrutiny and opposition from the Somali public. In this instance, it does not serve their interests to have obvious and aggressive media exposure.

Either way, the significant level of solidarity that the international community has attained poses the possibility of their engagement contributing to the fragmentation of the society and the re-creation of conflict since each member’s policies are inherently conflictual. As Sorensen (2006: 19) states, ‘so far as humanitarianism is part of a globalisation process with a liberal agenda, it can be argued to
contribute to local structures of economic marginalisation and inequality that may partly be responded to with resistance and violence’.

Furthermore, international donors and organisations tend to stress universal goals and concepts and favour organisational practices that reflect their own worldview and interests more than they reflect local political need and cultures, social structures and visions for development (Sorensen 2006: 19) and when solidarity is invoked for such practices, it inevitably leads to solidarity against existing local practices.

6.6.3 Politics of mobilisation

Mobilisation mostly occurred within clannism. Findings illustrated that diasporic media would mobilise audiences who belonged to the clans they represented to further clan causes and/or interests. There were also instances where audiences were galvanised to participate in fundraising activities to address humanitarian issues that the clan was facing.

The most troubling aspect is when clan members are mobilised to support on-going violent struggles as this can lead to the grimmest levels of conflict re-creation.

6.6.4 Transformative nature of the three politics

The politics were found to not be mutually exclusive. Whilst the three politics are distinctly representative, there are times when one can progress onto another. Politics of non-recognition can lead to those who feel voiceless to create their own media platform and seek solidarity through it. There is also the possibility of politics of non-recognition ‘progressing’ towards solidarity and then mobilisation. This occurs mostly within clannism where there is a perceived and persistent marginalisation and those that feel marginalised proceed to consolidate efforts and establish political platforms that can possibly propagate their political status within society.
Chapter 7 The manifestation of conflict re-creation

7.1 Introduction: white coffee, three sugars with politics on the side

The literature chapters of this thesis have elaborated on how diaspora communities have come to play a crucial role in contemporary conflicts due to the rise of a new pattern of conflict and the increased speed of communication and mobility (Demmers 2002: 86). The influence of these diaspora communities is often manifold and can take different political forms. In some instances, diasporic voices can plead for reconciliation and demobilisation (Demmers 2002: 86) but in many instances, they can feed and prolong the conflict. The Somali diaspora has utilised the improvements in communication technology which presented them with opportunity to communicate, regroup, share views, help their groups at home and organise activities (Issa-Salwe 2011: 54). But as these products of transnational media dissolve distance and suspend time, they create new and unpredictable forms of connection, identification and cultural affinity (Gillespie 1995: 7).

The previous chapter outlined the various ways that diasporic media can re-create conflict. This chapter will identify how the Somali diaspora community react to diasporic media and the various ways conflict is re-created amongst them. In this respect, the chapter sets out to answer the third research aim of this thesis, which is to examine how politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation are produced among diaspora Somalis in the UK by diasporic media.

The findings presented in this chapter are derived from 6 focus groups with each one consisting of 12-15 participants. The focus groups were strategically executed in cafes in three different cities. These cities were London, Birmingham and Leicester (for further details, see methodology chapter 5).

The chapter has five sections. Within the theoretical approaches to the root causes, the first section presents findings on the politics of non-recognition, the second on the politics of solidarity and the third section will present the findings on the politics of mobilisation. The fourth section highlights
the deliberative engagement of the Somali diaspora where findings indicating their reflections on media professionalism and contributions are presented. The chapter will conclude with a summary that further explores the manifestation of diasporic media’s potential to re-create conflict among diaspora communities.

7.2 Politics of non-recognition

The exclusion and silencing of marginalised groups of society by Somali diasporic media were issues that resonated with participants who fell into these groups such as women and youth. In respect of clannism, there was a common recognition of minority clans facing the brunt of exclusion. However, there was a sense of tolerance that the participants accorded the Somali media. The media representation of International community engagement confused a number of participants and many couldn’t express a clear opinion on how they felt about this representation. There was one issue that participants did have a clear view on and this was related to the Somali media representing the international community in a superior manner.

7.2.1 Politics of non-recognition within poverty and unequal access to resources

The politics of non-recognition within poverty and unequal access to resources proved to be a sensitive area that brought much emotion to the forefront and this made many participants reluctant to voice an opinion about it. There were only a few female and young participants that spoke about it. There was a common disposition of feeling powerless, marginalised and excluded. The lack of media access that marginalised groups such as women and the youth have was often linked to the business-oriented nature of the media:

Middle aged woman 1: “The media owners only think of their own pockets. They couldn’t care less about those of us that are marginalised because they would have to cover it for free.”
Middle aged woman 2: “These TV channels are a business. There is no money in covering women’s issues or children for that matter. A media outlet owner would rather cover a newly unveiled property development project and get paid a £1000 than care about covering our stories and issues.”

Some participants expressed a consciousness of the media providing a platform for those who are considered to uphold an elite position within society and women and the youth are almost always not within that bracket of society:

Middle aged woman 3: “The media only gives a platform to the elite, those that are already in the limelight. I am not a famous singer or a politician or a rich businessman. This is why we don’t get included. Same goes for other marginalised people in our society like the poor. This is despite the fact that the women have kept this country afloat while the men were engaged in its destruction. Most of us have raised our children as a single parent because the men have neglected their responsibilities and we participate in as many humanitarian causes and projects as possible. Yet we don’t get any recognition for that. But if I was famous, all the TV channels would want to speak to me. I’ll be of value then.”

Other participants linked the need for the media to recognise the role of women and the youth to the rebuilding of society:

Young woman 1: “The Somali media needs to engage in the rebuilding of society from its roots and give people a sense of equality. They need to create programmes that elevate and shed light on women’s role in the Somali society so that our position can be reinstated. A weekly programme here and there is not sufficient.”

Young woman 2: “It is exclusionary since we the youth, who are supposed to be the foundation for the future aren’t included. The elements that are necessary for the growth of the country are left out.”
There is a synonymous consensus amongst female and younger participants that the Somali diasporic media is engaging in a systematic silencing of Somali women and youth through poor media representation. This is a reproduction of their treatment within society indicating the manifestation of the politics of non-recognition.

7.2.2 Politics of non-recognition within clannism

The politics of non-recognition within clannism mostly occurred among the discussions related to minority clans and the existence of Somaliland. With findings related to the minority clans, most of the participants acknowledged that minority clans receive very little media access but there seemed to be a common culture of acceptance and sometimes a justification for the media’s silencing of minority clans:

Middle aged man 1: “Minority clans are politically weak so they won’t get fair coverage.”

Young man 1: “I don’t think there is such a thing as minority clans being treated unfairly. I think if they empower themselves and unify their efforts, they can get whatever they want and this goes to all clans. They have chosen to disempower themselves. They can set up their own media outlets, create their own voice and become influential but they chose to be weak and humiliated. They accepted to be labelled minority rather than fight it.”

Some participants gave the lack of media representation of minority clans an economic justification:

Middle aged man 2: “We have to bear in mind that the Somali media outlets are businesses and they have to focus on issues concerning political heavyweights. Minority clans simply aren’t relevant politically. The other clans are more dominant.”

Participants from Somaliland expressed almost unanimously a sense of deliberate exclusion on the part of the Somali media and that coverage is often centred around south Somalia.
This is related to the political tensions between Somaliland, which has chosen to secede from Somalia in 1991, and the rest of Somalia who has not accepted its secession. Chapter 2 elaborated on the grievances of Somalis who lived in the north, who now refer to themselves as Somaliland, and the subsequent clashes that occurred between the Somali government and armed clan-based opposition groups operating in the north. If there is coverage of Somaliland, participants felt that this was framed in an antagonistic manner:

Female Somalilander 1: “What I find infuriating is that progress and development stories are Mogadishu-centred. A road gets built in Mogadishu and that becomes the headline news but the building of roads has been a long-running development in Somaliland and it never gets covered by the Somali media. It seems as if the only development that is happening is occurring in Mogadishu. The success of the Somali people is determined by the fact that it occurred in the south.”

Male Somalilander 1: “The Somali media only cover bad issues. When the last elections were happening for example, the Somali media rarely covered them but when minor skirmishes occurred, they were quick to make it headline news, stating how the city of Hargeysa has become a warzone! They didn’t bother with any of the election campaigns and the democratic processes that were put in place, all of it happening peacefully. The BBC and the VOA particularly frustrate me because they never cover official state visits of the Somaliland president but they will make a leading news item out of a press conference held by a local city official based in Mogadishu. They will say the district commissioner of the Howlwadaag area or Bakaara area in Mogadishu held a press conference and a democratically elected president of an entire state doesn’t get a second look. They always cover Feysal Ali when he is speaking in an oppositional voice and they cover small local skirmishes as if they are major conflicts. Opposition parties will always criticise each other. It is part of having a democratic
society but the Somali media cover these dialogues between opposing political parties as if Somaliland politicians are at war with each other. To me they seem jealous.”

Some participants expressed frustration with the lack of neutrality amongst Somali journalists. To them, the journalists let their political beliefs affect their reporting:

Male Somalilander 2: “The Somali media has a large concentration of politically driven journalists who oppose the existence of Somaliland. I think it is particularly sad when you see Somali services part of an international corporation behaving like the amateur Somali media outlets and focusing on the south as if it is the lifeline of the Somali existence.”

There were participants who expressed that they were emotionally affected by the Somali media’s stance towards Somaliland. They felt they were being demeaned and were on the receiving end of unfair treatment. They also conveyed a sense of mediatised hypocrisy on the part of politicians from the south:

Female Somalilander 2: “I find the Somali media’s coverage patronising. For me Somaliland is my country and it is a country that exists even if it is not recognised by the West. But it is frustrating when the Somali journalists enact that non-recognition. The people of Somaliland are the same as them. Universal TV angers me quite a bit. They try to strip you off your identity as a Somalilander.”

Female Somalilander 3: “Politicians from the south are quick to claim Somaliland as the north-west territories when it comes to natural resources. That is not their country though so they should count on their own resources. It feels as if someone is telling me I’m not black. The Somali media does not acknowledge me as a Somalilander. How can we have a dialogue if they don’t even recognise me? Somaliland is denied and invisible to the Somali media.”
The focus groups have indicated that the media does reflect and represent and sometimes propagate existing social inequality and marginalisation. The mediatised reinforcement of these issues, as demonstrated by the participants, often cements the feelings of exclusion, powerlessness and humiliation which demonstrate how the media can produce the politics of non-recognition.

7.2.3 Politics of non-recognition within international community engagement

The politics of non-recognition in relation to international community engagement seemed to manifest itself in terms of loss of dignity. Participants felt that the media projected the international community as a ‘saviour’ that the Somali people should rely upon:

Middle aged man 3: “The Somali media covers issues of the international community in a superior way, as if the international community is a parent or guardian of the Somali people. I once listened to a broadcast where a nomadic man was interviewed and he was complaining about how they were running out of the fences they use to protect their sheep from wild animals. The fences are made out of tree branches and these were becoming scarce due to environmental degradation. He called out to the international community to bring fences and help protect their sheep. The Somali media teaches the Somali people to think in an inferior way and look up to the international community and I think the international community may have played a role in this with regards to the imperial approach they take when engaging with Somalis. However the international community stresses that the Somali people have the ultimate responsibility for the development and decision-making processes of their country but this is sadly represented by the Somali media as if the international community has that power.”
Older man 1: “Somalia is a rich country and the people are surrounded by masses of farmland and agriculture, fruits and vegetables and yet they are starving and seek aid from this international community. This is the fault of the Somali media because they represent the international community as the rescuer to appeal to who will lift you out of poverty.”

The international community’s western centric approach and its lack of regard for locally existing customs and social infrastructures have been highlighted in chapter 2. Chapter 6 further elaborates how the media has reproduced this approach and positioned the international community as the standard bearers with regards to humanitarian and developmental activities and this representation seems to have instilled the international community as a superior entity. The mediatised approach of the international community has manifested itself amongst the Somali people in the form of lack of dignity and recognition and therefore producing the politics of non-recognition.

7.3 Politics of solidarity

The politics of solidarity was mostly manifested within clannism. Participants were either professing solidarity for a mediatised issue concerning their clan or expressing solidarity against an issue that they deemed to be unfavourable to their clan. Politics of solidarity within poverty and unequal access to resources came across amongst the female participants where some expressed solidarity for the media’s portrayal of the country’s development and humanitarian issues. Others condemned the lack of balance in portraying the poverty as well as the development.

7.3.1 Politics of solidarity within poverty and unequal access to resources

Some of the female participants showed a sense of solidarity with those who were poor and suffered from unequal access to resources. They felt the media was not giving a fair and accurate picture of the levels of poverty that Somalia was experiencing and expressed how they found this to be misleading, which indicates diaspora members can at times critically engage with the media:
Middle aged woman 4: “The media do not portray the reality in Somalia. They keep feeding us messages of progress and how the Somali government is permanent, lots of help is coming from the international community and the security and stability is coming back. I went to Somalia last year at the height of this so called progress and I stayed with my mother.

The first night I noticed the next door neighbours had a child that wouldn’t stop crying. I visited them in the morning and the parents of that child told me he was too hungry to fall asleep and they were too poor to buy food. My mother told me there were hundreds of families like them in her neighbourhood alone. Across the street from my mother’s house, a massive 6-storey building was being built with lavish front gardens and backyards. The media is quick to cover those kinds of ‘developments’. Complete dishonesty.”

But participants were also able to note that the media does highlight some of the humanitarian issues that are happening in the country and diaspora Somalis are able to provide financial help to those they see on Somali media:

Older woman 1: “We are able to help the poor and destitute back home by fundraising for them here and that happens because it is shown on TV.”

Middle aged woman 5: “I am particularly fond of Moragabey programme which airs on Universal TV because its sole focus is to cover humanitarian issues and development related projects. When I donate to the projects on that programme, I know I have donated to a good cause.”

Some of the female participants indicated solidaristic inclinations towards their respective regions which demonstrates a sense of clan-centricity but was still confined within the notions of lauding media representation of development activities in Somalia:
Middle aged woman 6: “I am particularly moved by the progress that is occurring in my region Puntland whenever I see it on TV. The children and the youth are able to study from primary school all the way to university and I have participated in many fundraising occasions for the building of those institutions. The programme Socdaalka Cagmadhige is another commendable programme that encourages me to engage with business initiatives that are happening in Puntland. I plan to use my savings to set up a local business there and then give a portion of my first profit to some of the local women so that they can set up their own businesses and become self-sufficient. They can give a portion of their first profits as well to other local women and the cycle can continue.”

7.3.2 Politics of solidarity within clannism

Politics of solidarity was most vivid within the discussions that centred on clannism. Many participants had staunch convictions and were either critical or supportive of Somali media depending on where a particular media outlet was positioned with regards to the clans of the participants. This demonstrates that diaspora members engage deliberatively with the media, albeit from a clan-centered position, where the media can serve both as a motivational and antagonistic platform:

Middle aged man 4: “I don’t like hiiraan.com or somalitalk.com websites because I feel they both represent clans that are hostile to my clan. The material they publish and how ethical they are is not important to me. I know the clans they represent and where there support lies and that support is being aligned against my clan.”

Middle aged man 5: “I don’t watch Somali channels owned by Somalis from Somalia because they are always broadcasting destruction and miserable material. The only channel that I watch is from my region, the Somali region in Ethiopia and it is ESTV. They mostly focus on
the development that is happening in the region and the good work that the regional administration is carrying out towards the progress of the region.”

Some participants praised the transnational connection the media provided to their regions:

Older man 2: “I appreciate the Somali media, particularly the TV channels as they show the rural areas and small villages that were previously not accessible. I am from Dolow in the Gedo region and I recently saw a program on TV that was reporting on the local developments that were happening there. I hadn’t seen my hometown in over 15 years and I was very happy to see the progress the city was making on TV.”

Participants were also particularly aware of the technical errors within clan-related stories and voiced their concern for what they referred to as fabrications in both articles and images that appear on Somali media that can lead to offline commotion:

Middle aged man 6: “There are a lot of fabricated stories that create unnecessary tensions. For example, one website will write about a clan meeting happening in a particular village. A minute later another website will respond to it and say that the entire story is false and then a back and forth will ensue, sometimes bringing up old hostilities and conflicts that occurred between the two clans that the websites represent. Often this leads to the clans holding press conferences in reference to the articles written about the clan meeting. The website kismayo24.com is a good example of those kinds of websites that publish fabricated stories in the interests of their clan. They published a story during the time of the Jubba administration formation where they claimed that Ahmed Madobe, who is from my clan and has been selected as the governor of the Jubba administration, had a fight with Barre Hiiraale, who opposed his administration. They put up pictures of weapons that they claimed Barre Hiiraale took from Ahmed Madobe. Barre Hiiraale is from the clan that the
website represents so they wrote in support of him. Minutes later another website published an article dismissing kismayo24.com’s article stating that the pictures they used of the weapons were from years ago when a local warlord in Mogadishu joined the government and the weapons were retrieved from his house in Mogadishu.”

Middle aged man 7: “One article that I found quite disturbing was published on allgalguduud.com. They published a story saying that the deputy governor of Jubba was killed and they showed pictures of him covered in blood with bruises all over his face and body. This was disgusting and completely made up because I know the deputy governor. He is from my clan and if he was beaten or killed, it would be a big deal and not something that would get some minor coverage. Later on, we found out that they took a clean picture of him and edited it to make it look like he was killed.”

The issue of Somali journalists being politically driven, which was mentioned earlier with the Somaliland participants, has been recurring in the focus groups as well. The journalists were particularly condemned for letting their clans’ political disposition affect their reporting:

Older man 3: “The journalists that are against the progress that is being made in the city of Kismayo with the establishment of the Jubba administration are using their position to write all sorts of hate articles. It is these kinds of acts that keep us in conflict. I am a supporter of the Jubba administration and I would like to see the media to support peaceful initiatives because the administration came about peacefully and it is endorsed by the government.”

The focus groups have demonstrated how entrenched clannism is within the Somali diaspora. There is a clear display of diaspora engagement with the media informed by their existing clan dispositions. This leads to either a solidaristic acceptance of mediatized clan-related perceptions if it serves the existing disposition or a vocal objection against it, providing an example of how the media creates politics of solidarity within the Somali diaspora.
7.3.3 Politics of solidarity within international community engagement

The focus groups did not produce a clear presence of the politics of solidarity with respect to international community engagement. Many participants questioned the motives of the international community and had picked up on the media’s solidarity for their engagement. However, participants did not express any particular position that could fall within the realm of the politics of solidarity and this could be linked to a lack of understanding of what international community engagement entailed and the reasons for the media’s support. The confusion expressed by the participants can be linked to my earlier argument in chapter 6 where I elaborated on the lack of an overarching framework with regards to the international community’s engagement with Somalia and the conflicting nature of different members’ interests in the country.

7.4 Politics of mobilisation

The politics of mobilisation, as with the politics of solidarity, was mostly manifested within clannism. This either occurred as a form of active support lending towards clan interests or in the form of providing humanitarian support for clan regions. There was very little mobilisation within poverty and unequal access to resources, which corresponds with the media’s silence, as previously shown in chapter 6. Politics of mobilisation only occurred within international community engagement when participants felt the sovereignty of the country was being infringed upon.

7.4.1 Politics of mobilisation within poverty and unequal access to resources

A number of participants voiced their concern for the media’s financial motives in organising humanitarian appeals and the inequality in how those funds are distributed. But only one participant stated to have discontinued giving donations as a result of this perception:

Older man 4: “The media has become a business. Even the fundraising they do for humanitarian causes are rumoured to barely trickle down to the poor. I hear so many rumours of the religious clerks who host fundraising programmes splitting the funds with
channel owners and none of those funds actually reach the destination it is meant for. I have stopped giving charity to them because of this.”

On some occasions, a few participants expressed to have taken direct action to tackle a poverty related issue as a result of something they saw on TV without the action stemming from a clan disposition. This was much more common among female participants:

Middle aged woman 7: “I saw a Somali mother once with a severely disabled child in Saudi Arabia who needed urgent surgery that she couldn’t afford. I saw it on Somali Channel. I couldn’t bear to watch the programme in its entirety but I made sure I got up the next day and worked on getting in touch with that mother and raising the funds she needed.”

Middle aged woman 8: “There was a girl that was once shown on TV that had a severe medical condition where the passages of her private parts had become damaged. This meant she couldn’t separate her urine from her stool nor hold any of them in. We raised funds amongst ourselves and reached out to the girl’s family to get her to see a specialist doctor and we covered her expenses.”

The lack of manifestation of the politics of mobilisation amongst participants with regards to poverty and unequal access to resources seems to correspond with the media’s lack of comprehensive representation of this issue, which was elaborated on in chapter 6.

7.4.2 Politics of mobilisation within clannism

The media’s representation and approach of a clan related incident seemed to have a direct impact on participants taking action, indicating how entrenched clannism is among diaspora Somalis but also how the politics of mobilisation can be instantaneously produced:

Middle aged man 8: “I find the programme Doodwadaag (debate-sharing) which airs on Universal TV quite problematic. They intentionally bring guests that are members of
opposing clans who they know to have hostile feelings towards each other and they will make them debate those very issues that those clans have been conflicting about. The other day, they hosted a debate on an issue between my clan and one of our neighbouring clans and the host was actively siding with the other clan, giving them far more airtime. This is wrong. He is not meant to take sides. We were watching it in one of the local cafes and members of the opposing sides were also present. Our reactions to the discussion became quite heated and some of us engaged in a fistfight. The other clan praised the host and the clan member who was speaking on their behalf in the programme. We were livid.”

Middle aged man 9: “No one holds them accountable and they live in safety. I find the journalists in the diaspora and their lack of respect for other clans quite disturbing. I have stopped watching some Somali channels because they would regularly hold discussions disrespecting and bad-mouthing my clan.”

The humanitarian and development related activities that the participants expressed to have engaged in mostly occurred in the context of clannism. In other words, they would only engage with humanitarian causes or development projects that were occurring in their region or if it was benefiting members of their clan:

Older woman 3: “The 2011 famine caused many of us to raise funds and sent it regularly. Most of the fundraising activities that I participated in and those that I was aware of were regionally focused. Those of us from the same region whose people were affected by the famine got together regularly to raise funds but to also update each other on the progress in our region and others from the other regions did the same.”

Young male 1: “I have taken action towards the 2011 famine where I raised a lot of funds and travelled to my region to deliver the funds and provide manpower.”
A few participants praised the media for providing a platform where they can engage in the development of their regions and get to know their fellow clan members and be informed of clan issues that they can help to resolve:

Young male 2: “Quite often what would happen is that the media would broadcast a press conference that is held by our clan elders in Somalia and they would raise an issue or a local conflict that needs to be addressed. This will mobilise those of us that are members of the clan as we would call the elders on the ground, organise meetings and send finances to resolve the issue. I appreciate that the media has facilitated the opportunity for clan members to get to know each other. Without the media, those of us in the diaspora might have not known our elders and fellow clan members in Somalia. The concerns expressed in the press conference by our clan elders would not have reached us if the media didn’t broadcast it and that is how we become aware of what the thoughts and concerns were of the clan.”

Older male 5: “The Somali media keep us informed about the issues that are happening in our regions. They play a useful role for clan elders and politicians that are engaged in establishing regional administrations. I normally access gedoonline.com, gedonet.com and kismayo24.com because these are the websites that represent my clan and region. They keep me informed about the development of my region and the conflicts that are occurring. Everything we know about our country is because of the Somali media. I have been able to go back home to my region and partake in the local development projects because of the information I got from the Somali media.

Some of the mobilisation that participants related appeared in the context of defending clan reputation or disengaging from the media as a result of feeling that their clan was offended:
Middle aged man 10: “There were a lot of issues with some of the discussions on the Doodwadaag program of Universal TV. I was part of a group of elders that were sent on behalf of my clan to Universal to address an issue we felt was inappropriately targeted at us. They apologised and promised to be neutral. But still, because of this program, some of my friends have actually decided not to watch Universal anymore and have taken it out of their satellite receiver.”

Middle aged man 11: “An entertainment program covering a concert held in Bosaso, Puntland was meant to air on Universal TV. The concert was sponsored by my clan and it was a symbol of the peace the region had been experiencing so we were eagerly anticipating its broadcasting. It was meant to be covered in the news as well. When the time came, Universal did not air it. We were unhappy and we tracked down the mobile number of the owner of Universal, who didn’t know what had happened but we complained to him profusely. We passed his number around to as many clan members as possible and he was inundated with phone calls and voicemails. Some of us pretended to be government ministers, others pretended to be calling from Puntland. The owner apologised and made sure the program was aired for two consecutive days. We later found out that it was the editor on duty that night who took it out.”

The focus groups have brought to light that the media quite often positions itself in ways that would ignite or build upon existing clan tensions and this can lead to the eruption of violence within the diaspora communities. There is also a frequent reoccurrence of diaspora communities feeling that the media transgresses on the honour of their clans for which clan members take action to defend their reputation. Both these examples as well as other examples given above indicate the entrenchment of clannism within Somali diaspora communities, the loyalty clannism commands and how the media produces varying levels of the politics of mobilisation within the diaspora communities.
7.4.3 Politics of mobilisation within international community engagement

As mentioned in the politics of solidarity, participants did not express clear and concise positions with regards to how international community engagement is mediatised. Where there was occurrence of mobilisation was when participants felt international community members were transgressing against the sovereignty of the country and some media outlets were serving as enablers:

Middle aged man 12: “What really boiled my blood was when the VOA and other Somali media outlets produced celebratory programs and advertised for the African Union troops that have come to invade our country. They call them peacekeepers when most of us see them as invaders. It prompted me and some of the elders in my town to come together and we decided to help those in Somalia who were ready to fight these invaders with finance and equipment. The media has become part of the war machine and we therefore need to fight against them as well when they do not serve the interest of the people.”

Middle aged man 13: “The website somalitalk.com used to write a lot of articles about the Somali sea partition and oil drilling issues several years ago. Kenya was keen to move in on our territorial zones. I was quite upset about it and felt Kenya was very much out of line. I wrote several articles as a response to the greedy actions of Kenya and published them on the same website.”

The deep-rootedness of clannism has become a vehicle that instantaneously produces the politics of mobilisation, making its impact supersede the other two theoretical approaches to the root causes. This is more established amongst male members of the community although female members have indicated an entrenched inclination as well. But women were more likely to become mobilised by issues of a humanitarian or developmental nature.

7.5 Diasporic media’s incitement of antagonisms
In most focus groups there was a pattern of deliberative engagement that the participants demonstrated and would often begin their answers with it. These deliberations would generally be critical of the media and highlight how the outlets are clan-centred and favoured pitting opposing groups against each other:

Young man 3: “I believe the Somali media participates in the breakdown and fragmentation of the Somali society. They inform them of atrocities and remind them of past conflicts. They turn people and groups against each other. Those that work in the Somali media are not trained journalists. Rather they are employed to fulfil agendas of opposing factions.”

Middle aged man 14: “The media is a weapon for those engaged in the conflict. It is another form of warfare. Some people fight with the gun and others with words. It is the latter that the media is a facilitator for. Those who are actively engaged in on-going conflicts and those with no morals all get a great deal of airtime without any censorship. There isn’t a single media outlet that doesn’t have a clan tag these days so the Somali people can’t see any of them as serving the public interests.”

These answers highlight the critical role diaspora Somalis can assume with regards to their media even though the productions of the three politics do become manifested amongst them. This adds to the complexity of the nature of the relationship between the Somali diaspora and their media.

7.6 Chapter summary

This chapter has illustrated the different ways conflict can be re-created by diasporic media among the Somali diaspora communities, whether it is through the politics of non-recognition, solidarity or mobilisation. There is also an indication that diaspora Somalis can engage deliberatively, critiquing the role of the media. This section will recap some of the key points in each chapter heading.
7.6.1 Politics of non-recognition

The key finding that this section brought to light was how the media reinforced existing social inequality and marginalisation and the impact this has had on marginalised members of society. Female and young participants were particularly vocal about this impact relating the level of powerlessness and disregard they experienced.

Within clannism, much of the discussion centred around minority clans and Somaliland’s existence. Participants acknowledged the exclusion of minority clan discourse in the Somali media but they seemed surprisingly supportive. Many of them justified this exclusion relating it to their minority status and relative political weakness, which reinforces minority clans’ marginalisation within the media and the society. Participants from Somaliland were critical of how Somali media framed stories from Somaliland often stating that there is a negative slant. They felt that there was a level of political hostility aimed at them that the Somali media represented and this could be related to their secession from Somalia when the civil war broke out in 1991. The politics of non-recognition that leads to conflict re-creation takes place when sentiments of exclusion, marginalisation and inequality are felt by members of society, particularly when they remain unaddressed.

7.6.2 Politics of solidarity

The key point to derive from this section is the overwhelming sense of clan centricity that participants displayed. There was some solidaristic inclination expressed against poverty and unequal access to resources but much of the politics of solidarity was occurring within clannism. Many of the participants would be critical of particular media outlets because the outlets did not appear to be serving clan interest. Similarly, participants would voice support and allegiance with a media outlet that they deem to be serving the interests of their clan. With regards to international community engagement, participants did not express any particular position and this could be related to a lack of understanding of what international community engagement entailed and the
reasons for the media’s support. The confusion expressed by the participants can be linked to my earlier argument in chapter 6 where I elaborated on the lack of an overarching framework with regards to the international community’s engagement with Somalia and the conflicting nature of different members’ interests in the country.

7.6.3 Politics of mobilisation

Similar to the politics of solidarity, clannism appeared to be the root cause where most of the politics of mobilisation occurred. There was very little mobilisation against poverty and unequal access to resources and this again resonates with the media’s lack of representation, which I elaborated on in chapter 6.

Mobilisation would take place in the form of alleviating humanitarian issues that affects the clan and participating in development projects taking place in the clan’s region. More frequently, mobilisation occurred in defence of the clan’s reputation and against other clans where there is a conflict. It is the latter kind of mobilisation that seems to be the most problematic as this would often lead to violent conflicts ensuing between the warring clan members within the diaspora communities. These violent conflicts are usually preceded by a mediatisation of the issue that has caused the conflict, which sparks reaction from the clan members that are watching the discussion of the issue on television.

It is these kinds of violent outbreaks that serve as an example of how the media re-creates conflict amongst diaspora communities.

7.6.4 Diasporic media’s incitement of antagonisms

Many participants began their answers with a general critique of how diasporic media pursue a culture of propagating clannism and inciting antagonisms, indicating the possibility of deliberative engagement. This engagement would not deter them from letting the three politics become manifested, which further highlights the complex and multi-layered nature of relations between the Somali diaspora and diasporic media.
Chapter 8 Vested interests and the precariousness of working in the Somali media

8.1 Introduction

Since its invention around the 16th century (Raymond 1996), journalism has been required to do at least three things at the same time as outlined by McNair (2005). These are the provision of information required for people to monitor their social environments, a resource for the participation in public life and political debate (what Habermas has called the ‘public sphere’) and a medium of education, enlightenment and entertainment. Much has been added in the centuries that followed but the core principles have more or less remained those three. With the exception of public service media, much of today’s media has gradually been morphed into a business with journalism principally being about packaging information for sale directly to an audience ready to pay or indirectly by selling access to that audience on to other businesses who will pay for advertisements that can be run alongside journalistic material (McNair 2005). As a business, journalism needs to meet the requirements and expected standards of their audience. Standards such as aspiring for objectivity, impartiality and a willingness to tell the truth. These standards are of course highly contestable as each can be interpreted and delivered in a million and one ways. Any authored account of reality inevitably bears the imprint of the author’s subjectivity and biases, whether this is done intentionally or unintentionally, making journalism ideological and deeply political (McNair 2005). Journalism therefore becomes a mediatised reality and it is this mediatised reality that becomes highly problematic in light of how conflict can become re-created.

Somali diasporic media has grown to fill the informational void that the conflict had produced. However, it largely remains a collection of media outlets run by ordinary people transformed into ‘amateur newsies’, instant reporters and opinion columnists (Allan 2009: 24). Those that engage with this kind of journalism are more concerned with participatory ideals which does not mesh well with notions that journalists should keep their professional distance (Deuze et al 2007: 335).
Thurman’s 2008 study underscores this point further demonstrating that key concerns of amateur news content is newsworthiness, quality, balance and decency (cited in Singer and Ashman 2009: 235). Lack of professional skills and training, ethical values and responsibility can exacerbate the potential to re-create the conflict. Formal education and an adherence to a code of ethics foster a culture of social responsibility to the wider society amongst journalists and this is set as the benchmark against which professional practice can be measured (Weaver 2005). State collapse inevitably has a profound effect on media institutions and its professionalisation as well those who practice it. Accountability is a normative value related to journalistic credibility which needs to be strengthened and reinterpreted (Hayes et al 2007) but this becomes even more difficult to aim for in a state-collapse environment.

This chapter aims to shed some preliminary light on how the decline in professionalising media institutions as a result of state collapse has affected the industry and the journalists. As highlighted in the literature review and methodology chapters, the proliferation of Somali diasporic media is related to the need of the Somali diaspora community for news from their homeland (Issa-Salwe 2011). Those chapters further established that Somali journalists maintain close personal and professional relationships with Somalis in Somalia and by extension the Somali conflict. This relationship can therefore have a complex and multi-dimensional nature. Speaking to Somali journalists can help to unpack and illuminate something of this complexity. It will also highlight how their chosen way of reporting the conflict as well as the general milieu within which they work can fall within the perimeters of the three politics that can re-create conflict. Through the course of this research, the magnitude of the complexity with regards to this specific aim came to light and there is a need for a more in-depth research that is beyond the scope of this research. The core aim of this research is to present how diasporic media can re-create the conflict through the manifestation of the three politics in the diaspora communities and this has been extensively presented in the preceding chapters. Looking into the role of the journalists within this context would serve as a beginning debate on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ they re-create conflict with the goal of sparking further
research. What I have aimed for is to illustrate some preliminary answers that can begin to identify some of the key issues concerning Somali journalists and their role in reporting the conflict with a specific focus on the possible ways they can re-create it. I have therefore selected to do 5 interviews and this chapter presents the findings of those five interviews conducted with Somali journalists in the UK. It answers the fourth research aim; to examine how Somali journalists through their coverage of the conflict engage in the creation of the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation. The findings indicate that there are four overarching factors within which the Somali journalists work that can lead to conflict re-creation.

These factors are ownership privilege, journalistic professionalism and unaccountability, focus on elite sources and stories and embroilment as an advantage. The chapter shall unpack each factor as a sub-section and will conclude with a chapter summary which will sum up the key findings of how conflict is re-created by Somali journalists.

8.2 Ownership privilege

Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman (1988) illustrated the significant role of owners in their propaganda model and Bagdikian’s formulation further builds on their premise when he states that “It is within the necessary professional decision making that corporate values and the central aims of owners are imbedded” (1985: 104). The key issue that the Somali journalists have highlighted is that owners give salience to clan and politics related stories without due regard on how this can perpetuate existing conflict dynamics:

London journalist 1: “The importance of news items is determined by the owner. News is important if he states it is important. This means news items that relate to the selection or crowning of a new clan elder, stories covering a clan event or a particular business and political events like a politician hosting a meeting or an event get selected. Covering these
items bring financial income as those that are being covered are willing to pay so we don’t bother with background checks and balance.”

Receiving payments for covering stories is also an activity that the journalists themselves engage in:

London journalist 2: “We receive news stories from reporters in Somalia that are mostly politically focused. They send recordings of politicians that have held a meeting or have organised or attended some event because there is a financial incentive in that for them.”

The involvement of owners in story selection seems to be a professional burden for some of the journalists who wish to focus on covering stories that serve public interests:

London journalist 3: “The conflict between owners and investors and us is an ongoing battle and this is intensified when the owner does not come from a media background or have an understanding of how journalism works. My duties clash regularly with the owner’s demands because he wants to make editorial judgements that don’t necessarily serve the interests of our listeners. He also employs whoever he wants without them being qualified to do the jobs they’re being hired for, which creates clashes between us as colleagues.”

When certain stories that are directly connected to the dynamics of the conflict, such as clan activities, are given salient coverage, it excludes stories related to those who haven’t paid. This means some clans, those that pay, are given more prominence than others and can therefore lead to other clans feeling excluded and it necessarily reproduces existing antagonisms between the different clans. It also reinforces the prevailing fragmentation and maintains clan solidarity, which can lead to the politics of non-recognition and solidarity.

8.3 Journalistic professionalism and unaccountability

Lasswell noted in 1927 how one British observer commented after the first world war that ‘war not only creates a supply of news but a demand for it’ (Lasswell 1927: 192 cited in Carruthers 2000: 3). Nearly 90 years later, this comment still resonates with regards to the sociology of news production
in the context of war reporting. Mass media affords the public a more widely accessible way of witnessing conflict. What has come forth in the interviews is that this mass access to the public is enjoyed with an almost non-existent sense of accountability. Journalists relished in the ‘level of freedom’ this lack of accountability brought them which essentially translates as reporting without responsibility. This kind of reporting is exercised when feelings of non-representation start to surface:

Birmingham journalist 1: “The journalists in Somalia are limited by many issues including being killed so that prevents them from saying a lot of things. Those in the diaspora aren’t limited by anything and aren’t held accountable so they can say whatever they wish. There is more freedom to operate. One of the issues we struggle with is when some of us feel unrepresented by the Somali government where we don’t see someone in the government that we can relate to or are affiliated with. It is therefore very tempting to highlight the negative issues concerning the government. This sentiment can also be triggered by the clan of the journalist. If they feel unrepresented, they can approach the journalist and he can do programs and news items that are anti-governmental.”

The quote inidicates the precendence of clan representation and solidarity, which precedes national solidarity, reaffirming the theoretical discussions of civilising processes, especially on ‘clan over nation’ in chapter 4.

In addition to the lack of accountability, there is also a general sense of financial uncertainty where the journalists aren’t always guaranteed to get paid for their work. Those that come from the major clans use that as a safety net which most of the time ensures owners don’t leave them in the lurch. It is a different story for journalists from minority clans:

Birmingham journalist 2: “Reporters from marginalised clans suffer a great deal because we don’t come from powerful clans we can rely on. Employers will let us work and then refuse
to pay. These employers are relying on the fact that our clans are a minority and therefore their actions won’t have a great deal of consequences they ought to worry about.”

The issue of accountability is particularly problematic in the context of conflict reporting as it is very easy for journalists to take sides, become biased or even make stories up, all of which can very much fuel and/or re-create the conflict. Equally problematic is when owners withhold journalists’ salaries because they belong to clans that owners deem to be unchallenging, which reinforces existing social marginalisation and produces the politics of non-recognition. This is also rooted in accountability and it demonstrates that there is a need for diasporic media to have a regulatory body that can hold them accountable.

8.4 Focus on elite sources and stories

Hall et al (1978) highlighted the importance of how professional rules give rise to the practice of ensuring that the media is grounded in objective reporting and, where possible, authoritative statements are obtained from accredited sources. This culture sets a precedence of constantly turning to representatives of major social and political institutions because of the authority and institutional power their position grants them. The late Stuart Hall and his colleagues point out the irony of these very rules, which aim to preserve the impartiality of the media, and which grew out of desires for greater professional neutrality. In practice, these rules serve powerfully to orientate the media in the 'definitions of social reality' which their 'accredited sources'-the institutional spokesmen – provide (Hall et al 1978: 57). The practical pressure or working against the clock and the professional demands of impartiality and objectivity combine to create a systematically structured over-accessing granted to those in power and elite positions, thereby reproducing symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional order. The result of this structured preference given in the media to the opinions of the powerful is that these 'spokesmen' become the primary definers of topics (Hall et al 1978: 58). Lance Bennet (1990) builds on this premise and illustrates how mass media news professionals tend to “index” the range of voices and
viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic (Bennett 1990: 106). This working hypothesis implies that “other” (i.e., non-official) voices filling the potential universe of news sources are included in news stories and editorials when those voices express opinions already emerging in official circles. Thus, the media becomes what Bennett refers to as ‘keepers of official records’. In the context of Somalia, both Hall and Bennett’s hypotheses unfolds in the form of prominent members of the international community, major clans and central and regional administrations whilst incorporating voices of civil society members when these are in line with the discourses expressed by the elite.

The prominence that members of the international community in particular are given was initially highlighted in chapter 6, which presented the findings of the content and discourse analyses of diasporic media and the interviews with the Somali journalists reconfirms it:

London journalist 2: “Deaths, kidnappings and injuries of prominent members of the government and the international community will become prominent in our news coverage of the day. We also give preference to international conferences focusing on Somalia such as the 2012 London conference. Headlining news would also include work that the UN and its agencies are carrying out. During the famine period, related events and issues would often be the headlining news, especially if international countries and donors pledged large sums of money or aid. We would give the same prominence to meetings, events and conferences related to addressing the famine issues that international community members were organising.”

When asked who the most frequently featured newsmakers were, the journalists either stated international community members or Somali government officials or both:

London journalist 1: “Newsmakers are usually officials and prominent members of the international community, Somali government officials and international organisations.”
This hegemonic focus on elite figures creates a hierarchy of primary definers which side-lines the need for balance and multiple voices. It reinstates the existing social inequality where those who are already voiceless, continue to be voiceless and can therefore very easily produce the politics of non-recognition.

8.5 Embroilment in the conflict serving as an advantage

The demand to increase audiences creates the pressure of journalists having to frame stories or produce programmes that purposefully incite antagonisms:

London journalist 1: “The stories that feature two opposing clans generate audiences because members of those two clans would want to hear what their representative has to say and what the opposing clan member is accusing them of. Many programs are made at our station where these clan tensions are incited for purposes to increase audiences. These programmes are put on Youtube as well to diversify and further increase audiences.”

These programmes sometimes cause complaints but the journalists express that these complaints are misplaced and that they are not responsible for what the guests decide to say on air:

London journalist 3: “The live discussions, especially the ones with in-house guests often cause complaints because the guests will praise their clan and progress that has been made in their towns and regions and speak ill of other clans that they have hostilities with. The viewers whose clan has been disrespected think of us as being responsible for that and will log a complaint. We do make a disclaimer at the beginning of the programme where we state we are not responsible for what people say but at the same time we warn participants to be respectful but we can’t promise they will listen. This is mostly done for financial reasons as these types of reports generate large volumes of audiences and attract advertising.”
There is a clear misunderstanding of what journalists reckon they are responsible for which is rooted in most of them lacking professional training in journalism ethics and practice as well as a general educational background. Pitting two opposing clans against each other can at the very least produce the politics of solidarity but as seen in the previous chapter, it can lead to the politics of mobilisation where mobilisation often means violent outbreaks.

8.6 chapter summary

This chapter’s key aim was to present how journalists in their reporting can re-create conflict whether through producing politics of non-recognition, solidarity or mobilisation but the chapter has also highlighted how owners meddling with editorial decision making for financial purposes can contribute to the re-creation of conflict as well. This is chiefly done through giving importance to key conflict dynamics such as clan antagonisms and events which when transported to their audiences, becomes manifested and re-created.

There is also a general sense of lack of accountability both on the part of the owners as well as the journalists. The journalists tend to see this as a type of freedom effectively giving them free reign to air their political and ideological standpoints and this in and of itself can fuel certain aspects of the conflict and recreate it. This is particularly dangerous when journalists don’t feel politically represented. The owners take advantage of the fact that they are not held accountable in the form of avoiding salary payment.

This is particularly concerning for journalists from minority clans since owners feel these clans aren’t powerful enough to challenge them. This effectively takes away the right for the journalists to be paid for the work they do but more broadly speaking, it manifests in them feelings of powerlessness and marginalisation, which leads to the production of the politics of non-recognition.

The third highlighted factor was that of elite sourcing and tendency to prioritise elite stories. Journalists expressed a unanimous sentiment of international community members and Somali
government officials being priority news items as well as the primary definers. It creates unequal accessibility and a hierarchical mindset amongst the Somali public. It also reinforces the existing social inequality which further marginalises the voices of the voiceless and authorises the elite members as being more important than ordinary citizens.

The final factor that this chapter shed light on was a notion that is a top priority for most media outlets across the world and that is the need to generate audiences. However what the Somali journalists have illustrated is that their desire to generate audience results in the explicit re-creation of the politics of solidarity and mobilisation because of their keenness to pit opposing clans against each other. There is a tremendous appetite for conflict-driven topics, particularly when hostilities can become apparent. There seems to be a misunderstanding of what journalists think they are responsible for as complaints have been raised by audiences about these topics but the journalists shrug it off and place the responsibility on the guests of the shows.

Some of these factors particularly that of accountability and responsibility can be traced to the journalists’ lack of education and professional training. Furthermore, there isn’t a regulatory body that journalists and owners feel accountable to and this shows that whilst laws and regulatory frameworks exist in the UK, loopholes exist and are potentially taken advantage of.

The practice of journalism produced by diaspora-based Somali journalists is very similar to amateur journalism but has been catapulted to take a mainstream position given the absence of mainstream media since the collapse of the Somali state. The lack of accountability and regard for journalistic ethics and code of conduct necessitates the need for the professionalization of the industry. This would be a formidable task. Somali journalists and media outlets are dispersed across the world with union bodies such as the National Union of Somali Journalists and similar organisations having very little unifying impact. This is where academics and media development professionals as members of the international community can play a helpful role. The FOJO Media Institute part of Linnaeus University in Sweden is one example.
They’ve started a four-year programme in 2015 funded partly by the Swedish Development Cooperation Agency and the program seeks to strengthen the Somali media’s professionalism, freedom and independence with an emphasis on self-censorship. This is a good start but there is a need for a long-term approach as the rebuilding of an industry, especially in the absence of viable government institutions, would require much more than 4 years.
9 Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This research began earnestly from a broad interest in the interaction between media, globalisation and conflict. As a journalist mostly covering conflict zones, I was aware that there was an intricate complexity regarding the role media plays in conflict zones. I was particularly intrigued by the importance that was placed on the media by the Somali community and how media content affected target audience. I have been covering the Somali conflict for a number of years and its impact has become globalised. From the millions of refugee influx to the insurmountable humanitarian need, it is a conflict that is affecting grounds miles outside its borders.

The issues that have led to the Somali civil war have long been written about. The late anthropologist IM Lewis argued that clannism lies at the centre of most of Somalia’s woes whereas other experts like Catherine Besteman and Ken Menkhaus provide economic inequality and class struggles as the lynchpins that led to the country’s civil war. More contemporary scholars such as Mark Duffield and Mary Kaldor bring to the forefront the fuelling role of the international community. All of them provide ample evidence and make a great deal of sense but their honing in on one or two aspects of the conflict derails the complexity of it. There are a plethora of contributing factors and the conflict needs to be explored with an encompassing comprehensive approach. I argue for a multi-causal socio-historic approach and suggest that the contributing factors grow out of three root causes which are interlinked and playing out at the same time. My theoretical approach defines these root causes as clannism, poverty and unequal access to resources and international community engagement. Chapter 2 unpacks and elaborates on this theoretical approach in an attempt to illuminate some of the complexity that the Somali conflict is marred with.

It is a conflict that has led to a massive refugee influx and to this day. UNDP estimates that the global Somali population totals at least 1 million in numbers. The majority of them sought refuge in
western countries and have attained citizenship in various European and North American countries. They have come to form a significant diaspora community who have settled in their respective new homes in the West and have become adept at using communication technologies to meet their situational needs. A steady growth of Somali diasporic media establishments has been noted since 2000 (Issa-Salwe 2011) with one of the primary purposes they serve being keeping diaspora Somalis connected with their homeland. Chapter 3 elaborates on both the Somali media and the diaspora but also provides an insight into the possibility of transporting conflict dynamics and thereby re-creating the conflict amongst diaspora Somalis.

The central argument emphasized and illustrated throughout this thesis is the potential for diasporic media to re-create conflict. The theoretical framework and conceptual elaboration underpinning this potential is shown in chapter 4. There I adopt Norbert Elias’ civilising processes as a theoretical framework to analyse how regression to barbarism sustains conflict and its occurrence in a globalised media environment can lead to its transportation and re-creation elsewhere. Conceptually, I relate three analytically distinct approaches to how conflict can be re-created by the media and I call them the three politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation.

In this concluding chapter, I will reflect on key findings in relation to the theoretical frameworks and conceptual approaches, discuss the limitations the research has dealt with and possible areas for further research.

9.2 Reflections on key findings

The complexity of the Somali conflict has proven to be multifaceted and longstanding. The immediate issues that bring Somalia to the forefront of our television news bulletins are often either humanitarian or security related. The recurring humanitarian conditions in particular require engagement and assistance from the international community but this engagement is often fused and delivered with western vested interests and approaches, usually compounding existing issues
rather than resolving it. Whilst the delivery of humanitarian assistance has relieved thousands of Somalis, approach of engagement and delivery benefited those very politicians, warlords and businessmen that have been the source of the problem. Theft and diversion of food aid is one example that has been a longstanding issue in Somalia, directly fuelling a war economy vested in the status quo (World Bank February 2012). The top-down colonially rooted approach of international community engagement has shown to propel western liberalism and maintain western interests without due regard for existing norms and values and a genuine attempt towards recovery. In fact, international community’s engagement with the political balancing of governance in Somalia post 9/11 increasingly seems geared towards maintaining the governance vacuum they’ve been filling as evidenced by the focus on clan proportionality with regards to the division of government posts. This approach is coated as bringing some equality to the Somali political landscape, which has long been dominated by the major clans and minority clans and women have been sidelined, and therefore it should be duely addressed. What is perhaps less emphasized is the loyalty to the respective clans that this approach creates. The appointed politicians are selected by their clan elders to represent clan interests rather than serve national interests, opening up the governance vacuum that the international community can fill to serve their interests and pursuits. In sum, whilst international community engagement has had a longstanding track record of aiding the Somali people and state, their engagement, particularly the western block, have been utilising their engagement to serve their own political, economic and security interests at the expense of rebuilding a functioning centralised national government led by competent and nationally aligned (as opposed to clan aligned) leadership. It is this approach that is formidably contributing to the prolongation of the conflict, producing an environment where the re-creation of the conflict can occur in environments many thousands of miles away.

Clannism has been hypothesised as a root cause and a currently fuelling factor of the conflict whilst poverty and unequal access to resources may serve as an underpinning ignition. Mukhtar (1996), Elmi (2006) and Barise (2006) emphasize on the root cause of the conflict stemming from
competition for resources and power and politicised clan identity. Whilst I agree with this multi-causal approach to examine the conflict, this study has found that clannism and unequal access to resources do not have an equal footing with regards to their fuelling potential. In fact clannism is at the heart of current Somali conflict dynamics but it should be noted that this seems to be predominant within diaspora communities. Further studies would need to be conducted inside Somalia to examine how entrenched clannism is amongst the communities there. What this study has revealed is that there seems to be a hierarchy of root causes that are currently dominating the fuelling levels with clannism and international community engagement taking first and second place. This is likely due to opportunities presented by globalisation and within that framework, the new face of 21st century conflicts that is centred on identity politics on the part of conflict nations and their diaspora communities, and terrorism and assymmetric warfare concerns on the part of western nations.

The media, as we have seen, has been used to help further political and ideological agendas but the overarching predominant interests it serves is that of the clan. Diaspora communities have seen their political weight grow in the 20th and 21st centuries (Demmers 2011) and this is partially related to the changing patterns of conflict and the increase of speed in technology and transportation. In other words, globalisation has allowed for greater flexibility in movement and connections but the argument that is often brought forth by scholars of globalisation which stipulates that groups are much less territorially bounded, needs further scrutiny. The opportunities presented by globalisation in fact opens up more possibilities for territorially bounded connections facilitated by online platforms that translate to offline activities. In chapter 7 of this thesis, we have seen how online mediated events can be used to galvanise clan members in the diaspora to aid political and economic activities in homeland regions. In this regard, this thesis leans more towards Anderson’s understanding of imagined communities and has highlighted that in the case of the Somali diaspora, though physically far removed from their homeland, there is a deeply entrenched imagined connection to the homeland territories and this is reinforced and fortified by diasporic media.
Current academic discourse regarding diasporic media often centres around its capabilities to help immigrants preserve their identities and maintain ties with their homeland. It is considered to be responding to the specific needs and conditions of immigrant communities (Busch 1994) as well as allowing a transnational bond to be created with countries of origin and therefore sustain ethnic, national and religious identities and cultures (Aksoy and Robins 2003: 93). While these notions hold much truth, diasporic media is doing more than that. This study set out to explore the ‘darker sides’ to diasporic media, meaning its potential to transport tensions and conflict dynamics and thereby recreate it elsewhere, with the view of broadening the scope of academic debate concerning diasporic media in order to obtain a more meaningful understanding.

Theoretically, societal behaviour during conflict in this study is explored through the work of the German sociologist Norbert Elias (1989). This thesis utilises his theory of civilising processes, which is concerned with the interplay between constraints of self-control, human interdependence, natural circumstances and animalistic urges. Human beings are oriented by nature and nurture to depend on one another which ultimately defines the self, society and the world at large. Elias traces Europe’s civilisation from the Middle Ages onward and showcases the gradual progression that has led to the 20th century being the most peaceable era in our history. The formation of nation-states, nationalisation of justice, monopoly over violence and giving individuals a stake in social stability are the contributing factors to the decline of violence (Pinker 2011). Pinker further highlights how the application of knowledge and rationality and a focus on the acceptance of the other human bring as an equal worthy of existence has enhanced the relatively peaceful existence within contemporary societies. However these are endangered elements in need of constant maintenance and safeguarding and both civilising and decaying processes can occur simultaneously. Elias argues that state collapse in particular propels decaying processes making a regression to barbarism a stark possibility. This study argues for the Somali conflict to be viewed and examined through this conceptual lens.
Somalia’s state collapsed in 1991 and has since been entering different stages of an ongoing conflict. The conflict created a massive influx of asylum seekers predominantly seeking refuge in the West. They have grown to form a substantial diaspora community taking advantage of the advanced technological infrastructure in the West by setting up many diasporic media outlets. Diasporic media was set up to meet their informational needs to remain connected to their homeland verifying Busch, Aksoy, Robins et al’s argument. Diasporic media grew to assume a hegemonic position within the media landscape due to its access to advanced technological infrastructure. It has also enabled the diaspora community to attain power and prominence in the homeland by providing a platform where they are enabled to showcase their financial, social and human capital: a concept I refer to as diasporated conflicts. Additionally, diasporic media is providing platforms to bring existing conflict dynamics to the forefront, which manifests itself in the diaspora communities thereby re-creating the conflict. This therefore produces a cyclical progression of conflict re-creation whereby the media transports and manifests it in the diaspora communities giving them ammunition for potential conflict engagement.

9.2.1 The three politics recapped

I argue that diasporic media re-creates conflict through the politics of non-recognition, solidarity and mobilisation, with a transformative potential to progress on to each other. One of the key points this study has highlighted is that those that receive the least representation within the Somali diasporic media are the marginalised members of society, minority clans and sections of society affected by poverty and unequal access to resources, which means diasporic media is reinforcing existing marginalisation and exclusion.

In the focus groups, participants acknowledged the exclusion of minority clan discourse in the Somali media but they seemed surprisingly supportive. Many of them justified this exclusion relating it to their minority status and relative political weakness. This paints a cyclical picture of reinforcement and acceptance with regards to marginalisation. The representation of women proved to be a
particularly interesting issue as stories related to women had a relatively significant coverage. However, this coverage frequently occurred in the context of traditional roles that women occupied and women were often firstly portrayed as mothers. This deliberately contains women’s place in society to traditional perimeters and negates the other roles they have assumed. It reinforces male dominance even though it may seem at surface level that women are becoming more pronounced and represented.

The collapse of the state has led to a collapse of nationhood which seems to have created a void that clannism has filled. Solidarity for the clan overarches most of the discourses in diasporic media. Clannism is invoked as a safety net and a fixed sense of belonging. Diasporic media would mobilise audiences who belonged to the clan the media outlet represented to further clan causes and/or interests. There were also instances where audiences were galvanised to participate in fundraising activities to address humanitarian issues at clan level but what seemed most problematic is the mobilisation to support on-going violent struggles. Participants in the focus group discussions began with a critical observation of diasporic media’s culture of inciting antagonisms, indicating there is a possibility of deliberative engagement. But this critique was soon followed up with clan-centred solidaristic affirmation. Most participants would be critical or supportive of particular media outlets depending on the outlet’s stance on their respective clans. Participants related instances where they mobilised themselves and other clan members to defend the honour of their clan, often leading to violent outbreaks at the worst level or disengaging from members of clans with whom their clan is now feuding with at the least level.

The transformative nature of the three politics was most evident within clannism. Whilst the three politics are distinctly representative, the possibility of progression is present. Politics of non-recognition transforms those who feel voiceless to create their own media platforms and invoke solidarity for it and through that same platform mobilise for particular clan causes. It is mostly evident in clannism because there is a perceived and persistent marginalisation and those that feel
marginalised proceed to consolidate efforts and establish political platforms that can possibly propagate their political status within society. Diasporic media is therefore an enabler of reinvention and political constructs, playing a very complex and multifaceted role than what current scholarship brings forth.

9.2.2 Somali journalists on the hot seat

It has been widely documented that Somali journalists inside Somalia work in one of the most hostile environments in the world. Many are the number of journalists that have lost their lives on the line of duty and doing their work carries a very real and present danger. This is not the case for journalists in the diaspora. This thesis has already established the hegemonic position that diasporic media occupies in the Somali media landscape. There are 748 Somali websites currently in existence out of which 508 were sampled for the data collection of this thesis and all of them were established outside Somalia. This indicates that in both quantity and quality, diasporic media far supersedes its counterpart inside Somalia, giving diasporic media a real power leverage, which can be used to exert influence. This power leverage is coupled with the lack of accountability for their work as they operate in a deregulated European environment which gives them many loopholes to evade regulation. It is this environment, which leaves them to operate freely and say almost anything they likes with impunity, that this thesis argues can recreate conflict. Diasporic media journalists can enact their personal, communal and/or commercial agendas whether they are benign or otherwise and do so in the absence of constraints. The impact of this practice can have a domino effect as the content they produce is often reproduced and broadcasted in Somalia based media outlets.

This point was succinctly made in a 2013 report by Integrity Research and Consulting, conducted among the UK Somali Diaspora about a draft media law proposed by the Somali Federal Government in Mogadishu:
“While many held the view that Diaspora media content and journalism are largely more impartial than media in Somalia, and therefore less likely to fuel conflict, the consultation highlighted that this was not always the case. In particular, although Diaspora media actors are now living within countries with strong legal systems, rights, stability and structures, in terms of their media activity many perceive their activities to be operating outside any jurisdiction” (Integrity Report 2013).

Within the context of how diasporic media content can re-create conflict and relating how this is manifested in the diaspora, it is important to illuminate the role of journalists. This research does not set out to provide a detailed account of how journalists play a role in conflict re-creation, which could be a thesis on its own. Rather the aim is to showcase and emphasize that they do play a role. By demonstrating some of the issues that lead journalists to cover the conflict in ways that can re-create it, the hope is to spark debate, interest and enquiry to examine this further in order for the field to attain a more informed understanding.

The interviews with the journalists underlined four cultural practices within Somali news production that structurally lead to potential conflict recreation. These are audience generation, unaccountability, pressures from ownership interests and elite sourcing. These preliminary findings demonstrate the validity of the hypothesised assumption in the literature review chapters that Somali news production is possibly in line with Hall and Herman and Chomsky.

The need to generate audiences is much sought after by most media outlets. But the Somali journalists illustrate that their desire to generate audience results in the explicit production of the politics of solidarity and mobilisation because of their keenness to pit opposing clans against each other. Conflict-driven topics marred with hostilities are most popular to cover amongst journalists, intentionally framing it in ways that ignite those hostilities amongst programme guests. The interviews with Somali journalists has highlighted that they do not necessarily carry out their work
with the intention to cause conflict, but, because the dynamics are in place, it's almost inevitable for that to happen.

When asked about the possibility of their choice of frame reproducing conflict dynamics, the journalists distanced themselves from being responsible for the physical and verbal outbreaks their choice of framing caused and felt that responsibility lied with the guests. This highlights a general lack of understanding of journalism practices and accountability in particular. A potential bolstering of this habit is created by the perceived inapplicability of UK regulation. Many of Somali diasporic media broadcast to the UK but are headquartered elsewhere, effectively protecting them from Ofcom regulation due to the limitations that EU deregulation seemingly poses. Somali journalists therefore feel UK media regulation can’t hold them accountable giving them the freedom to air content without regard for ethical values and legal frameworks. They feel that they are neither held accountable by regulation in Somalia nor in the UK and this inevitably provides unconstrained content where journalists’ interests and opinions can potentially be aired freely with widespread implications on their role in the conflict and its recreation.

But there are some journalists who expressed feelings of pressure and being conflicted with regards to adhering to ownership interests. The tug of war between owners insisting on the broadcasting and publishing of particular stories and journalists deeming them un-newsworthy seems to be a staple part of some of the journalists’ daily news production routine. The key issue that these journalists point as making owner-journalist relationship problematic is the fact that owners are alleged to have been paid by clan elders or political figures for stories to be published/broadcasted. This issue is quite complex however as owners could be facing uncertain financial sustainability since the practice of advertisement as a source of investment is a fairly new phenomenon in Somalia and amongst the somali diaspora and public service broadcasting has not been properly re-established since the Somali state collapsed. It would require further study to evaluate to what extent the
political economy of the media in the context of state collapse affects the professional relationships between owners and journalists.

This thesis has highlighted that elite sourcing reinforces dominant structures and maintains a hierarchy of accessibility, a point elaborately illustrated by Chomsky and Herman’s propaganda model as well as Hall et al. The journalists spoken to unanimously expressed international community members and Somali government officials taking up positions of primary definers. It also reinforces structures of social inequality as it silences certain sections of society producing the politics of non-recognition.

Out of those highlighted practices, it is perhaps elite sourcing and audience generation that are most directly relevant to the discussion of how Somali journalists re-create the conflict. The pressures of ownership interests and lack of accountability speaks to the ‘why’ behind their practice of elite sourcing and audience generation. The need to generate widespread audiences seems to necessitate the re-enactment of clan hostility on air, which directly reproduces the politics of solidarity and mobilisation as illustrated in the chapter 7. The practice of elite sourcing effectively excludes less powerful and dominant sections of society and this reproduces dynamics of marginalisation that the conflict is riddled with. In this regard, elite sourcing can lead to the production of the politics of non-recognition and these are some of the ways diaspora based Somali journalists can participate in re-creating the conflict.

9.3 research limitations

There were three distinct limitations this study endured and these can be broadly characterised as technological, geographical and safety limitations. Within a year of researching the Somali media, diasporic media’s significant positioning within the media landscape became apparent. The mapping exercise of existing diasporic media quickly showed the prominence of television and websites. This study therefore focused on those two media but there is a growing number of community radio
stations that are being established in various UK and other western cities. It would be interesting to examine how the three politics might be unfolding at the micro-level of community radio or if they are even significantly present given the local focus of most of these radio stations.

The geographical limitation is linked to the calculated choice that was made to collect offline data within the UK. This is largely because the majority of Somali diasporic media are based in the UK and there is a bigger scope of diaspora group representation. The UK also has the largest number of diaspora Somalis in Europe but the largest number of Somalis outside of Somalia are based in the US. It would therefore have been illuminating to explore how concept of conflict re-creation potentially manifests itself in the Somali diaspora of the US. The same reasoning can be extended to Somalis in other parts of Europe, especially in countries with significant concentrations of Somali diaspora.

As an extension of geographical limitation is the safety limitation with regards to physically traveling to Somalia and exploring the extent of diasporic media impact. The ongoing instability and entrenched conflict dynamics that were related in chapter 2 also make it physically impossible to travel across the country and obtain representative samples of data. It would be particularly interesting to observe how diasporic media content that is rebroadcasted inside Somalia affects local audiences.

9.4 recommendations and suggestions for further research

This study has been able to fulfil the research objectives it aimed to examine and broader conclusions can be drawn that could be applied to diasporic communities from homelands in conflict, tension or a post-conflict stages. However the study was limited to Somali diaspora communities and therefore a more nuanced and refined understanding may be gained by examining other diasporic media and their communities.
Related to that is the fact that this study focused on diaspora communities in relation to homeland connections as the key aim was to explore how conflict dynamics can be transported by diasporic media and become manifested in the diaspora who can then engage with the conflict. But it would help to gain a broader understanding of Somali diaspora with regards to identity formation and maintenance if research was carried out on host-land conditions that inform and contribute to their experiences.

As alluded to in the preceding section, the role of journalists in potential conflict re-creation is vast and extensive. There seems to be a conflict between owners and journalists’ desired approach towards professional practices, which is occurring in parallel with what seems to be a misunderstanding of what constitutes professional journalism practices. The findings from the interviews have provided a preliminary understanding that can form the building blocks of future research. This would be particularly useful in order to attain further insight into the professional, political, financial and identity struggles the journalists are battling with, which feed into reporting practices.

During the course of this study, what has also become apparent is the media engagement of young diaspora Somalis. It seems that they are systematically excluded due to older male dominance but there is also exclusion by default which is related to their lack of comprehension of the Somali language. Most of these youngsters are either born in European countries or arrived at a very young age, making the language that is spoken in the host country their ‘native’ language. They seem to have responded to this exclusion by utilising new media creating online platforms where their shared sense of a ‘hybridited’ culture can be displayed to each other. These platforms appear to be serving as places where they can find new forms of belonging. Examining how young Somalis use new media to construct new identities can serve well to inform our understanding of a potentially new kind of diaspora: one that has the potential to comfortably balance identities of origin, religion and western culture beyond banal nationalism.
This research purposefully took a socio-historic approach as it set out to illustrate some of the complexity of how the Somali conflict occurred and how those historically changing social practices have fed into current conflict dynamics. It has been able to conceptualise how state collapse can lead to regression to barbarism of which the prominence of clannism is a key example. This becomes normalised in the absence of established state institutions. When these dynamics are unfolding in a globalised media environment, their transportation to and manifestation within transnationally linked communities is a real possibility. This study therefore encourages further research into diasporic media and its potential to re-create hostilities and tensions transported from home countries. The discipline could also benefit from a political economy focused examination of the relationship between investors’ and owners’ interest, content production and journalists’ roles and ambitions in the context of working inside and outside of a collapsed state.

In its conclusion, this thesis re-emphasizes the argument for a broader critical engagement with the role(s) of diasporic media and for future studies to adopt a multidimensional approach that takes prevailing historical social changes into account and can enhance and allow for a more encompassing understanding. It has been my aim to illustrate the usefulness of adopting such approach in the hope that it will illuminate a more nuanced and encompassing understanding.
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