Neither Here Nor There:

The Discursive Construction of Identity by Kosovo Albanians

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This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Declaration

This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is it being submitted concurrently in candidature for any other degree or award.

Statement 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of PhD.

Statement 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

Statement 3

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be used for inter-library loan, photocopying and to be made available for public use and to external organisations.
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Abstract

This thesis, through critical discourse analysis and thirty-eight in-depth interviews, examines the discursive construction of UK Kosovo Albanian Diaspora identity by Kosovo Albanians in both the UK and Kosovo. Simultaneously, I explore how identity and national and cultural belonging are multidirectional and shaped by both a diasporic host society and a homeland context. Although scholarship on migration and diasporas is prolific, this thesis argues that due to previous predominant scholarly focus on host contexts over homeland contexts, current scholarship is limited and limiting. The analysis highlights the ‘Neither Here Nor There’ phenomenon, which suggests that Kosovo Albanians in the UK do not passively identify with a homeland identity or necessarily with a host society identity, and that this identity is multiple and context bound. The empirical chapters demonstrate that homelands are not passive distant and ‘imagined’ places but politically active agents who seek to tap into their diasporas through opaque power and what I term distance based biopolitics to construct and benefit from the diaspora. My analyses also demonstrate that ‘othering’ discourses are not exclusive to host societies but are also present in the discourses of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo and within the diaspora communities. I explore homeland stereotypes such as the ‘Schatzi’ phenomenon, which are embedded discursively and ideologically in Kosovo and function to construct and ‘other’ the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in Germany and Switzerland. Whilst, the UK-based diaspora is often attributed with a cultural sophistication and ‘mentality’ that makes them more accepted in Kosovo. Therefore this research suggests that to understand diaspora complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its relationship(s) with the homeland. This thesis also provides an original contribution by extending current debates and theories about migration, diaspora and identity and by highlighting how Kosovo Albanians already settled in the UK view and discursively construct their position and identities with the UK. Coupled with all these elements, my work contributes to migration, diaspora and identity studies as well as to studies about Kosovo Albanians in the UK, which are still lacking.
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This thesis would have not been possible without all the interviewees that participated in the study. All you Kosovan Albanians in Kosovo and the UK who were happy to narrate your stories and talk to me, I would like to thank you and say that I am forever grateful to you all.

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INTRODUCTION

It was 1992. I was eleven years old. My mother, brother, sisters and I had escaped to the UK and had arrived at Heathrow airport. My father wept at the sight of us, he had arrived the month before to escape the threats on his life. This was my first time in the UK.

Our story began in 1989, when my father was one of eight members of Kosovo’s Yugoslav government dismissed from their posts due to their objections to Slobodan Milosevic. At the time I remember my mother asking my father why this was happening to him. My father’s reply was that this was going to happen to all ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. No later than 1990, all ethnic Albanians were dismissed from state institutions in Kosovo, and a deep crisis began, which not only engulfed all of Yugoslavia but also eventually led to its demise.

We arrived in October 1992. My parents kept saying we would remain in the UK for a few months until the situation and the crisis in Kosovo resolved, that we would go back to our normal lives within six months. However, twenty-three years later, we are still living in the UK and we are now British citizens.

Although difficult at first, my life in the UK has always been interesting. By learning English quickly, I was always very involved with helping, not only my family, but also other Kosovo Albanians in the UK. While at school, I spoke much about Kosovo and the political situation that was ensuing in the region during the 1990s. Nonetheless, I also felt passionate about the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. When I was thirteen, the Spiro Institute in London invited me to speak about being a refugee and an asylum seeker in London. My presentation brought tears to all in the room and the Multicultural Teaching magazine subsequently published it together with a short biography of my life. I continued my work and during the ensuing conflict in Kosovo, I was a spokesperson for the Kosovo Albanian
community in the UK. UK based TV news channels often called on me to give TV interviews about the ongoing conflict in Kosovo. In 1999, the World Peace Foundation awarded me with the Flame of Peace at my secondary school. However, some staff objected to this, and kept the decorative plate stored in an office at the school, suggesting that it was a political award that had no place in a secondary school.

Despite my good progress and excellent grades as well as my extra-curricular activities, throughout secondary school, there were teachers who wrote to my parents suggesting that I should not be encouraged to go to university, that I would be better suited in a vocational profession such as hairdressing. This was extremely upsetting, especially since for my parents and my family for me not to attend university, would be a first in almost half a century. Especially since so many members of my family, like my maternal grandfather, were pioneers of education in Kosovo. During my A-levels, I experienced a great deal of emotional suffering and felt that despite my hard work and my grades, there was a system in place that did not empower me. I saw so many other Kosovo Albanians placed in special needs and held back despite being highly capable students. The system was used to hold us back and prevent us from achieving our goals. Nonetheless, I continued my work, trying to prove that although some students were not able to speak English well, they possessed good knowledge of mathematics and I helped many of them gain recognition of their previous exam results from Kosovo by personally taking them to the British council offices in central London where their grades were certified. Many of them went to study at university. Despite the efforts of my teachers, I did gain a place at university and I did get my degree, a BA in English of all subjects. After my degree, I went to volunteer and work for NGOs in Kosovo. I spent a year there before returning to the UK to pursue a Masters in Research in Renaissance Studies. My year in Kosovo was incredibly eye opening. I had gone with the notion that I would be going to the place I had come from and I would feel more accepted, however this
was not the case. At my interview for a job - I had applied for a job to support my NGO work - I was informed that the advertised wage would not be applicable to me as I was originally from Kosovo and not ethnically English. Therefore, I made the decision to work for only a few months and quickly returned to the UK. I was determined to gain more qualifications and do so in an area, which would show the world that ‘being an ethnic Albanian was not as bad as they thought it was’. So I chose to study the renaissance and the Albanian national figure of Scanderbeg, by examining a sixteenth century English publication of the History of Scanderbeg, published in 1596. It also contained a sonnet dedication by the laureate Edmund Spencer and therefore I saw this as my aid in brining an end to the way the world saw the Albanians, as here was an Albanian that Spencer had said was ‘The greatest of the great’. My thesis entitled ‘In Search of Scanderbeg: reception, interpretation and influence in Early Modern England’, was a desperate attempt to demonstrate that Albanians had a profound influence in Europe and England and therefore I hoped it would show that we were being discriminated against unnecessarily, that media representations were wrong. Although, I am happy with the work I completed, I wish someone had taken me aside and said, ‘don’t worry, you don’t have to prove anything, we accept you as a person regardless’. Unfortunately, this did not happen. I continued in vain, trying to show the UK that we were not all bad, and trying to show those in Kosovo that we were just as good, that we had achieved things and come a long way. I returned to Kosovo after my Masters work, and once again, I felt I did not belong there. I encountered discriminating discourses such as ‘Schatzi’, which was used to describe diaspora who returned to Kosovo (this is treated in depth in Part 3 of the thesis). This led to my desire to pursue my PhD research in this area. I felt ‘neither here, nor there’, and I wanted to explore this phenomenon amongst other Kosovo Albanians in the UK. It is my personal experiences as well as my interests in constructions of identity, belonging and exclusion that have led me to pursue research in this area.
Aims and Objectives

When I began my research it was common for far-right groups and politicians as well as right leaning newspapers to demand the exclusion of migrants and those deemed ‘other’ from the UK. What is surprising is that despite ample scholarly work in this area - and attempts to change public opinion - there has not been a positive turn on this issue. This is poignantly made clear with the Prime Minister’s choice of words on July 30, 2015 after migrants tried to cross through the Eurotunnel to Britain. David Cameron described the migrants who were desperate, having come from the world’s most dangerous places, and risking their lives in the process to come to the safety of the UK as a ‘swarm’. The choice of language, coupled with political experiments, such as the one launched by the government in 2013 in the form of mobile vans circling six London boroughs telling immigrants to ‘go home’, add to the discourse that migrants and those of immigrant background are not welcome in the UK.

Dominant discourses on migration and immigration continue to influence discourses of identity, belonging, exclusion, multiculturalism, cultural difference and personal and national narratives of citizenship. Furthermore, within academia these are topics that continue to hold currency. Diaspora theory and scholarship has also increased, although within diaspora scholarship focus has shifted towards ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, and ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ (Clifford 1997; Gilroy 1996). My work contributes to these discussions, by examining narratives and discourses of identity and belonging by Kosovo Albanians in the UK (living in London) as well as Kosovo discourses about the diaspora respectively and in light of current debates on migration, identity, globalization and multiculturalism that stretch globally. Moreover, my work by focusing on Kosovo Albanians in the UK, which are relatively unexplored community, not only contributes to scholarship and literature about Kosovo Albanian Diaspora but also extends the above mentioned discussions in an original
and valuable direction, thus working towards filling a much-needed gap in current scholarship.

The politics and on-going migration crises in Europe but also in contemporary identity politics, suggest the need to extend scholarship and theoretical analysis, which has predominantly focused on host society context to include homelands. Extending well established identity and race theory to diaspora theory, as well as multiculturalist and transnationalism paradigms by problematizing not just the tension concerning "where you're from" and "where you're at" (Fanon 1963, Said 1978, Gilroy 1991, Hall 1996, Safran 1991, Cohen 1996-2008, Malkki (in Gupta & Ferguson 1997) can broaden our knowledge on how diaspora and homeland relations and identities are mutually discursively constructed through language (Foucault 1972, Fairclough 1992, Wodak 2009). This not only entails the analysis of the diasporic subject-in-process caught up in multicultural and transnational flows, but an investigation of the politics of identity within and between those socio-political, symbolic, and cultural landscapes identified as home, homeland, and host country. Therefore, in this study, I examine the language used to construct dialogic narratives of belonging and/or exclusion between British and Kosovan dominant hegemonic identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

I also examine identity discourses constructed through diaspora-homeland relations and the individual’s discursive positioning within these contexts and what I also refer to as ‘the neither here nor there’ phenomenon. More specifically, this delves into the tensions and ambiguities of Kosovans’ efforts to (re)define being and belonging. Through this, I also want to problematize the imagined homogeneous singularity of national identity in both Kosovo and Britain. Therefore, the notion of ‘neither here nor there’, which I am suggesting is less a ‘both/and’ and more a ‘neither just this/nor just that’. Borrowing the imagery drawn by W.E.
B. Du Bois in what he calls ‘double consciousness … this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’ (Du Bois 2007: 14-15) is also intended with ‘neither here nor there.

Furthermore, this thesis argues that there is interplay of discourses and power struggles within ethnic and diasporic groups, as Renée Green states (in Bhabha 2004 edition):

Even then, it's still a struggle for power between various groups within ethnic groups about what's being said and who's saying what, who's representing who? What is a community anyway? What is a black community? What is a Latino community? I have trouble with thinking of all these things as monolithic fixed categories (in Bhabha 2004: 4).

Taken together, all these elements are discussed in the context of Kosovo Albanians in the UK and an emerging set of relations between Kosovan diaspora in the UK and Kosovans in Kosovo.

Through thirty-eight in-depth informal and semi-structured interviews, my thesis analyses the discursive construction of Kosovo Albanian UK identity by both Kosovo Albanians in the UK and Kosovo. This thesis simultaneously explores how identity and national and cultural belonging are shaped by both a diasporic, and a homeland context.¹

This thesis also identifies and explores linguistic tropes and metaphors used to describe the diaspora such as the ‘Schatzi’ phenomenon. I argue that such labels are embedded discursively and ideologically in the homeland culture of Kosovo. Therefore, I highlight, through empirical evidence, that particular tropes and lexical choices which are used to refer

¹ The anglicised Kosovo rather than Kosova/ë is used throughout.
to diaspora Kosovo Albanians by those in Kosovo function as stereotypes, which discursively
construct and ‘other’ the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK, but especially the diaspora in
Germany and Switzerland. Whilst the UK-based diaspora are often attributed with a cultural
sophistication and ‘mentality’ that is linked with a framework of understanding that accepts
their integration overseas and role in the ‘international’ labour market when returning to
Kosovo, the ‘Schatzi’ more generally are represented as lacking cultural advancement and
social capital, failing to climb the social ladder in their western host countries.

Through analysis of interview data, I argue that the meaning of diaspora is not merely
dependent upon how a migrant community closely identifies with an imagined homeland. To
understand diaspora’s complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its
relationship(s) with the imagined homeland. My analyses demonstrate that such dominant
othering discourses are also present in the discourses of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo who
represent, categorise and differentiate their diaspora, as well as within the diaspora
communities themselves.

The inherent heterogeneity and hybridity of diaspora are not captured in these discourses, but
instead, rather broad generalisations depending on factors such as time of migration, place of
migration and emigration and socio-economic factors, are applied to classify and construct
diaspora through stereotypes. Furthermore, this study explores and highlights the opaque
power and distance based biopolitics exercised by Kosovo through the creation of Ministries
of Diaspora, Diaspora Law and institutional discourses which act to control and discipline the
diasporic body as well as construct a homogenized diaspora. Therefore, this thesis contributes
to knowledge by extending current debates about diaspora and migration and by highlighting
how those already settled in the UK, are both discursively constructed by the homeland and
how they construct themselves in the UK.
Through critical discourse analysis of interviews with Kosovo Albanians in the UK\(^2\) and how they discursively construct, process and perform identity/s, I explore how Kosovo Albanians construct belonging within a British and/or Kosovan context and why. Consequently, I ask if they consider themselves transcultural and/or in-between cultures. Through discourse analysis I examine to what extent discursive constructions, negotiations, transformations, contestations and appropriations of British and Kosovo Albanian dominant hegemonic identities help constitute, influence, de-stabilise and enable any cross-cultural and transcultural positioning within or outside the two dominant cultures. Through this exploration, issues of belonging, integration, assimilation and acculturation naturally arise, therefore in addition, several questions relating to inclusion and/or exclusion are considered, such as, to what extent do Kosovo Albanians living in the UK encounter discrimination by British and/or Kosovan societies? To what extent is there inclusion/exclusion within the Kosovo Albanian community in London? Is there a homogeneous or hybrid identification and cultural identity within the community? Finally, by using a discourse analytical approach, my aim is not to search out what people ‘truly’ mean or feel, on the contrary the premise of my research is a social constructivist one (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009: 21, Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, Wodak, 2009) and my aim is to explore discursive actions and practices. Coupled with all these elements, my work makes a valuable contribution to diaspora and identity studies as well as to studies about Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

Nonetheless, discourse also enables the creation of knowledge in society (Weedon 1987). Furthermore, it constitutes identities and social groups (Hall 1996, Wodak et al 2009).

\(^2\) The majority of Kosovo Albanians live in London, due to perhaps the concentration of opportunities and jobs, therefore I have narrowed my research to interviewing only those that live in London. There may very well be differences in identification depending on where Kosovo Albanians live around the UK; however this is beyond the scope of this study.
Therefore, I adopt a critical discourse analysis (henceforth referred to as CDA) approach, as CDA, consist not only of a theoretical framework or methodological guideline but particularly important to my research - is the principle that CDA is ‘critical' in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power whether in the host society of the homeland (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009).

Therefore, through CDA this thesis systematically investigate relationships between diaspora, homeland and host society, as well as discursive practices, events and texts, and wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes. My aim is to investigate how such practices events and texts develop through discourses across transnational space and to uncover how they are ideologically shaped by power struggles (Fairclough 1995: 132).

Traditionally, CDA studies the discourses of those in positions of power in order to expose unequal relations of power and manipulation (Fairclough 1995, 2002; van Dijk 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009). CDA scholars have predominantly focused on the powerful imposing their views and discourse to perpetuate and ‘normalize’ dominant ideologies. Although this is also my focus, I also include minority perspectives and the ways they construct and articulate their identities through their own discourses, by analyzing the interview accounts and narratives (Mellor 2003, 2004; Merino 2006, Merino et al., 2009, Rojas-Lizana 2014). In the last two chapters, the CDA analysis of interviews aims to explore identities and attitudes expressed by the interviewees, thus contributing to CDA studies of minority discourses. The following section will provide an outline of the thesis and details of the chapters that follow.
Overview of Thesis

The previous section outlined my personal narrative and the scope of my research as well as the motivations and rational that underpins this research. The following is a brief outline of the structure of this thesis and of the chapters that follow.

This thesis is divided into four parts. Part 1 includes Chapters 1 and 2, which outline the historical background, literature review and theoretical frameworks. Chapter 1 provides a brief historical context of Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians in the UK. This chapter provides a synopsis of Kosovo’s geopolitical position and historical background, in order to contextualise the past and present and highlight events that have led to its current borders and migration from the area. Within chapter 1, contains a section on the Kosovo Albanians in the UK, this contextualizes the Kosovo Albanian migration to the UK.

Chapter 2 considers and discusses the concepts of multiculturalism and diversity in the UK, with particular focus on debates about asylum seekers, immigrants and refugees. This chapter is divided into subsections. The first section explores the Orientalist discourse inherent in the multiculturalism argument, whereas the following section entitled Orientalism, Balkanism and Albanianism, follows on from this to explore the wider discussion on the literature and theoretical frameworks that underpin the theories of Orientalism and Balkanism, but also Albanianism, in order highlight the ideologically based discrimination of Albanians in Europe and throughout the Balkan region. This chapter also outlines the social constructivist epistemological and ontological identity theory that underpins this research, combined with current scholarly debates and issues on Diasporas and diaspora theory. Furthermore, these sections also function as theoretical frameworks for my understanding and my arguments in relation to the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in general and in the UK more specifically. Finally, this leads on to a general mapping of research about Albanians and Kosovo Albanians in the
UK, while simultaneously highlighting and analysing the available literature to date that has focused on identity construction amongst Kosovo Albanians in the UK. This chapter argues that although a body of research about Kosovo Albanians has steadily emerged since 1999, the number of studies is still low and limited, therefore highlighting the importance and much needed research in this area, which my thesis fulfills.

Part 2 includes the methodological frameworks of the thesis and is comprised of Chapter 3. Chapter 3 outlines the methodological and analytical approaches to this research, including work from a pilot study, which was conducted in 2011. Chapter 3 has a bilateral purpose, firstly, to underpin the epistemological theoretical framework for both my chosen analytical and methodological approaches, and secondly to outline and substantiate my data collection method. Thus, in this chapter, I outline and summaries the theoretical and methodological underpinning of my data collection and data analysis approaches. Furthermore, this chapter contains details of methodological difficulties and limitations that were identified by conducting a pilot study. This pilot study helped both test my methodological approach as well as generate rich data about Kosovo Albanian immigrants seeking work in the UK, which I felt was relevant to my overall research project and is presented in Chapter 7.

Chapters 4 to 6, form Part 3 of this thesis, which presents empirical findings from analysis of thirteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. By conducting these interviews I was able to explore how diasporic identity is shaped, not only by focusing on relationships between the individual or community and the host country, but also the relationship between individuals in the homeland and the way the diaspora is constructed. Through critical discourse analysis, I highlight the rhetorical and discursive strategies used to construct the diaspora Kosovo Albanians. Thus I argue that diaspora
identity construction is not only by looking back to the homeland but also by how the homeland constructs the diaspora.

Chapters 7 and 8 are in Part 4 of the thesis. Chapter 7, entitled ‘Porters without Borders’, is based on interviews with Kosovo Albanian journalists from Kosovo who had at different points lived in the UK and tried to work as journalists in the UK. This chapter presents empirical data that suggests that journalists from Kosovo, who had work experience working for different UK based broadcasters in Kosovo, were not employable as journalists once in the UK. This study generated rich data and was also presented as a conference paper, at the conference held at Cardiff University on Black and Ethnic Minorities in UK media.

Chapter 8, the penultimate chapter of this thesis, analyses the narratives of UK diaspora Kosovo Albanians and their discursive construction of the diaspora, Kosovo, the UK and their own identities within the UK and Kosovo. Implicit in notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ are issues around settlement and integration within a host society. However, this chapter challenges this well established scholarly and theoretical approach to explore notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in countries of origin and imagined ‘homelands’ while simultaneously exploring discourses of integration, discrimination and identity in the host society, taken together, the CDA analysis of interviews in this chapter aims to highlight that both the homeland and host society are mutually constitutive in diasporic identity and that neither is fixed and immobile. Based on twenty interviews with Kosovo Albanians from the UK, this chapter highlights the ‘neither here nor there’ phenomenon, and the socially and discursively constructed identity of Kosovo Albanians in the UK vis-à-vis a dominant British and Kosovo Albanian as well as diasporic identity discourse.

The final chapter, the conclusion, presents the main findings of the thesis and outlines the central contributions that this research makes to the literature on diaspora and identity
studies, CDA studies and to the literature on Kosovo Albanians in the UK. This chapter also deals with the limitations of this research. The chapter concludes by looking at the potential scope that this study may have towards improving and developing future research.
Part ONE

Part 1 provides the contextual, historical and theoretical foundations of the thesis. Chapter 1 outlines a brief history of Kosovo and a brief history of the migration of Kosovo Albanians to the UK. Chapters 2 discusses the relevant literature, summarises scholarly and media arguments around the concept of multiculturalism and diversity in the UK, with particular focus on debates around asylum seekers, immigrants and refugees, while, outlining some important arguments in recent scholarly works that have explored identities in discourse and mapping the research about Albanians and Kosovo Albanians in the UK in general, and more specifically, focuses and analyses the available literature exploring identity construction amongst Kosovo Albanians in the UK. Chapters 3, discuss the conceptual tools and theories employed in the thesis, the key theoretical frameworks that underpin this study.
Chapter 1

Introduction

That borders are vacillating is a matter of experience: first and foremost, that they are no longer at the border, an institutional site that can be materialized on the ground and inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another begins [...] I will not discuss here the question of whether this institutional form of border is ancient or recent, universal or particular. I shall recall rather that it is the result of a long gestation, of a series of choices no one of which was necessary, but that led to one another, and that coincide with the universalization of a very particular form of state, originating in Europe: the nation state. And I shall content to note that this institution today is irreversibly coming undone (Balibar, 1998: 217).

Balibar notes that European borders are vacillating and are currently ‘irreversibly coming undone’. Nowhere can this phenomenon be best observed in recent history, than in Europe, and specifically in the simultaneous disintegration of former Yugoslavia and the integration of the European Union. Caught up in these two processes, like many former Yugoslav republics is the former Autonomous Yugoslav Province of Kosovo.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted in the largest forced migration of people in Europe since the WWII. However, throughout the twentieth century migration from Kosovo was a common occurrence. Since the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, people migrated from Kosovo to various locations around Europe but also to places such as Turkey. Furthermore, migration for economic reasons was well established through the guest-worker ‘gastarbeiter’ agreements between Yugoslavia and Western Europe. Kosovo was one of the poorest provinces in the former Yugoslavia and despite some development since the conflict in 1999 and subsequent independence it is still one of the poorest regions in the Balkans (UNDP
Persecution of Kosovo Albanians during the Milosevic regime in the 1990s, led many to migrate seeking political asylum around the world including many seeking asylum in the UK. Implicit in any study about Kosovo Albanians in the UK is the historical, political and geopolitical background of Kosovo as well as a brief history of Kosovo Albanian migration to the UK.

Therefore, this chapter - divided into two sections - provides historical, political and geopolitical background of Kosovo and information on the migration of Kosovo Albanians to the UK, in order to outline the foundations that underpin the context of this diasporic community in the UK. The first section provides the historical and geopolitical background to Kosovo in order to introduce the historical and political events that led to people migrating from this area. The second section outlines the recent history of Kosovo Albanians migrating to the UK.

1.1. A Brief History of Kosovo

Inhospitality to those ‘others’ or those deemed lower or lesser, is a phenomenon that is not exclusive to the UK, and by no means to North-Western European states (Wingfield 2003). In the late twentieth century, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia’s extreme measures to secure homogeneity and national and cultural ‘purity’ have been well documented by many scholars and the international media, so much so that ‘Balkanization’ is frequently used to denote backward separatist desires.
The images of genocide in Bosnia, ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, as well as displacement and fleeing of people from the whole region, are still within recent history and memory. It is estimate that some two million people left Yugoslavia and resettled in Western Europe (Ziemer & Roberts 2013). However, in spite of this, in the after-math of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the newly emerged nation-states (although not by any means in a similar fashion) have faced challenges of constructing and sustaining national and cultural identities, citizenship and belonging. In these recent endeavors to create nation states, history has been rewritten and identity fiercely debated.

A newly independent and relatively small country, which lies in the South Western Balkans, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. However, Kosovo has drawn much international attention as well as international military intervention. As Tim Judah states:

Kosovo is a tiny place with a tiny population, yet it was the reason that NATO fought its first war. Recently it has been a major subject of international discord, especially between European and American leaders on the one side and a resurgent Russia on the other. If Kosovo were in central Asia, or Africa, or in the Caucasus, this would not have been the case. Kosovo counts because it is in the middle of Europe. On February 17, 2008, it declared independence, becoming the world’s newest and most controversial of states (Judah 2008: xii).

Like Judah (2008), many authors have described Kosovo’s locality and strategic position, history and culture as the axis where ‘East’ meets ‘West’ (Goldsworthy 1998, Malcolm 1998, Beiber & Daskalovski 2003, Wingfield 2003, Di Lellio 2006; 2009). Its history, language and traditions are similarly indicative of a multiplicity of peoples that have set foot, lived and
departed from the region. Kosovo was throughout history - and especially since the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the formal Ottoman conquest, which lasted over five hundred years - the battleground of contesting ‘East’ and ‘West’ powers and struggles between occupying empires and forces and its inhabitants’ desires for freedom and self-determination.

The people of Kosovo have lived under many different governments and empires such as the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbia before finally establishing the Republic of Kosovo in 2008. There are individuals still living in Kosovo who have lived under more than one empire and country within their lifetimes. I, personally, was born in a country that no longer exists. Furthermore, since the 1999 NATO led war against the Serbian Milosevic regime, which removed the Serbian military forces from Kosovo, and before the aforementioned declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo was under liminal undefined statehood which was characterised by international administration and protection by the United Nations (UNMIK) and NATO military forces (KFOR), which left it without a final solution to its status for over a decade.4

The history of Kosovo, through all the different internal and external colonialism is embroiled with exclusions and subjugations of the Kosovo Albanians. For example, by the end of the Second World War, although Kosovo Albanians demographically dominated the

3 This thesis argues that such accounts of Kosovo are also embroiled in Orientalist discourse and more specifically in Albanianism, which continues to position Albanians as others in Europe and the Balkans. This is discussed further in Chapter 2 of the thesis, which outlines (in more depth) the interplay of discourses between Europe, the Balkans and Albanians that have impacted the constructions and representations of Albanian and Kosovo Albanian migrants including the personal narratives and constructions of identity by Kosovo Albanians and Albanians themselves.

4Currently, the international involvement is reduce to the EU presence especially EULEX which is the EU rule of law mission that became fully operational in April 2009. For further information on EULEX in Kosovo, the mission, its structure, legal basis and background, please see http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/info/whatisEulex.php.
region, within the ruling regional Communist Party Serbs dominated, while Albanian participation was extremely small at 0.16 per cent (Vickers 1998).

Throughout the twentieth century, the Kosovo Albanians - with brief exception post the 1974 constitution, which allowed Kosovo Albanians some rights until Milosevic revoked this in 1989 - had no specifically guaranteed minority rights, and lived under virtual Serbian domination. This has led many to argue that the course of national identity construction in Kosovo was at its height at the end of the twentieth century with the disintegration of Former Yugoslavia. However, this process preceded Milosevic and is ongoing and more pertinent since the Kosovo declaration of Independence; however it is certainly not complete, and more importantly it is imagined and an on-going process (Anderson 1991, Billig 1995, Wodak et al 2009).

In 2007, a two-day international symposium, entitled ‘The European Identity of Kosova’ was held in the Kosovo capital Prishtina (26th and 27th June 2007), the conference papers were later published in July 2008 (after the declaration of Independence). Eighteen international and national scholars attempted to argue and debate (what at the time seemed the most important issues that needed to be addressed leading up to independence), Kosovan identity, language, culture, history, politics, nation-building, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Western Europe and Kosovan aspirations to join the European Union (Pula et al., 2008). All the papers in this volume attempt to conceptualise a European ‘western’ rather than Ottoman ‘eastern’ Kosovo. Nonetheless, (and despite the historical belief in Kosovo that Europe has since the fall of the Ottoman Empire played games on the back of small nations such as the Albanians that were annexed to Serbia and Greece), there is also a paradox where Europe and European values are uncontested and idealized. Similarly to neighbouring East European countries who aspire to join the European Union, a discourse of European ideology as
suggested by Tomaz Mastnak (2002) has emerged in this area where Europe and European values and integration are embedded in the aspirations of individuals but also institutions and government. The hegemony of Europe and the European Union plays an important role in Kosovo and as well as on the discourses about the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, which is presented and discussed in Chapter 4 ‘Schatzi: Making Meaning of Diaspora’.

As already mentioned, Kosovo declared independence on the 17th February 2008; its constitution, which was guided by Martti Ahtisari’s (the former Finish president, diplomat and UN special Envoy), package proposed in 2007, and based on European values and ‘standards’ states that ‘The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities’ (The Kosovo Constitution, Article 3; Paragraph 1). This continues to be seen as part of the old paradoxical ‘love and hate’ relationship, which Kosovo has with Europe, where on the one hand Kosovo wants to appear European, and on the other hand, the game play and the ‘standards’ that Europe has imposed on them are seen as wrongs that Europe continues to inflict on Albanians. This is seen as a concession made by Kosovo Albanians in order to reach independence and continue on to join the European Union. Nonetheless, by accepting these terms, much debate was generated since the majority of the inhabitants of Kosovo are Albanian, and demanded not a multiethnic but a nation state. However, what is a Kosovo Albanian identity? Europe argued that the Albanian nation state already existed and the Russians, Serbs and Greeks used their influence to suggest that the Albanians in Kosovo wanted to establish a Greater Albania, thus a new Albanian nation state was not an option.

This not only continues to generate debate and political movements that are split, on the one hand those who envisage a European future, and one the other hand those who envision joining Albania, but furthermore these debates present another unique situation for Kosovo
Albanian Diaspora, where a Kosovan identity and Albanian identity are complicated by such allegiances and political discourses. Kosovo was left out of mainland Albania in 1913 at the conference of London when the Great Powers decided on Albania’s borders and not all its ethnic Albanian territories were included. Since 1913 there has been a crisis of identity for Albanians in Kosovo, effectively they are still in the place they have always resided, however, since the forced annexation in 1913 the Kosovo Albanians considered Albania as the ‘motherland’, thus I would argue making the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo also diasporic (this is certainly the case according to classifications by Safran 1991 and Cohen 1996).  

Kosovan independence in 2008 resulted in a movement to reclaim and redefine Kosovo origins and affiliations, which has also impacted Kosovo identity constructions and discourses of Kosovo Albanian identity inside and outside of Kosovo. Furthermore, for the Kosovo Albanians that reside outside of Kosovo, the ongoing contemporary identity politics in Kosovo as well as the historical events that preceded independence are equally important. This is why so many Kosovo Albanians in the UK and elsewhere in Europe chose to spend summer holidays in Albania where they also visit places such as Kruja the fortress of the Albanian national hero Scanderbeg. The myths of Albanian origins are firmly based on figures such as Scanderbeg and this is exemplified in the work of historians in Kosovo as well as Albania and elsewhere. Throughout the twentieth century, for the Albanians in Kosovo, Albania and its history were presented as their history and original homeland, thus corresponding to the traditional scholarly arguments and narratives of imagined homelands.

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Therefore, the case of Kosovo Albanians in the UK cannot be universalized by the particulars of other diasporas or diaspora scholarship. This thesis contributes new knowledge in this area, especially in light of globalization and recent emergence of more deterritorialized homelands.

Although, as aforementioned, scholarship has highlighted that diaspora and migration creates at least two and occasionally more places of significance, such as original homelands and new host countries, this thesis argues that such a simplified conceptual framework cannot be applied to all diaspora communities and need further exploration. The Kosovo Albanians in the UK, with a new Kosovo state and Albanian imagined homeland do not conform to traditional diaspora communities. The following section outlines the recent history of Kosovo Albanians migrating to the UK, in order to better contextualise the history of migration to the UK by Kosovo Albanians.

1.2. History of Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK

There are no precise and complete figures that confirm the number of Kosovo Albanians in the UK (IMO 2008, Kosotvicova & Prestreshi 2003). Most data and figures quoted in any previous studies (Kosotvicova & Prestreshi 2003) and reports are estimated, there has since the beginning of the 1990’s been a steady increase in the population of Kosova Albanians in the UK and more so in London. Rough estimates suggest that there are between 40,000 and 100,000 Kosovo Albanians living predominantly in the Greater London area.

In Britain the Kosovo Albanian community although assumed to be ethnically homogeneous, is highly heterogeneous. Similarly to other indigenous and diasporic communities, it also reflects a diversity of social and economic backgrounds. It includes second and subsequent
generation immigrants of Kosovo Albanians who were born in the UK, naturalised British citizens and those still awaiting asylum decisions, as well as students, economic migrants and undocumented ‘illegal’ migrants.

In September 2008, the UK government’s International Organisation for Migration (IOM) compiled and published a report, which attempted to ‘map’ the Albanian community living in the UK from both Kosovo and Albania. According to the IOM (2008) report, ‘after World War II there were about 100 Albanians in Britain’. However, by the beginning of the 1990’s this statistic was about to drastically change:

The 1991 Census records in the UK show that only 338 Albanians were registered in England. Whereas by 1993 … the figure had grown to 2,500 … [and] by the end of 1997 the Albanian community estimated the number at 30,000 (IOM 2008).

These figures by the IOM are still estimations. Most Kosovo Albanians in the UK were asylum seekers, yet the Home Office has never released any accurate data or estimates of their number. The fact that the Kosovo Albanians on arrival to the UK were citizens of former Yugoslavia could be an explanation, if not an excuse (IOM 2008). However, according to the UNHCR, 111,300 asylum-seekers from the Former Republic of Yugoslavia were granted refugee and humanitarian status in Europe in the period 1990-1999.6 More recently and after the 2011 Kosovan government census, reports have emerged that the Kosovan government and Ministry of Diaspora have launched projects to conduct the registration of Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora, and a general estimation that is commonly cited in Kosovo is that one in three Kosovo Albanians lives outside Kosovo.

6 See http://unhcr.ch/refworld/maps/europe.
Some Kosovo Albanians living in the UK are former political asylum seekers who escaped Kosovo during the 1990’s; others came to the UK during the 1998/9 war. For the most part Kosovo Albanians who came during the early 1990s and before the 1999 conflict were granted asylum in the UK due to the British High Court decision in June 1996, which accepted that Kosovo Albanians were persecuted in former Yugoslavia. This implied that all Kosovo Albanians should be given leave to remain in Britain (IOM 2008). This legislation meant that after being awarded leave to remain Kosovo Albanians obtained the right to neutralisation and British Citizenship and subsequently became British Nationals. Although there have been Albanians and Kosovo Albanians that previously came to the UK, most notably figures such as the intellectual Faik Konica7 and the Albanian King Ahmet Zogu8 who were émigrés in London, it can be argued that the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK is relatively new and the more substantial number of Kosovo Albanians who arrived in the UK in the 1990s represent the first immigrant generation of this diaspora (Destani 2000, Pearson 2006).

As a Kosovo Albanian living in the UK, but also as someone who spent from 2003 to 2012 living and researching in Kosovo, it is evident that Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora and in Kosovo continue to be actively involved in the construction and re-construction of Kosovan, history, customs and celebrations, through public displays of unity, performances, religious holidays, and a revived and reinvented sense of ‘Kosovan identity’. For example in London, Albanian Flag Day is celebrated and very often parties are organised at different Albanian

7 Faik Konica (15/03/1875 – 1512/1942) was a prominent Albanian cultural figure and an Albanian Ambassador to Washington. He was in London during 1903-1904 living in Oakley Crescent Islington. He also sporadically published a literary review, Albania, which was to become an important publication for émigré Albanian writers (Destani ed, 2000).
8 King Zog of Albania moved to London together with the Albanian Royal family (Queen Geraldina and his son Leka) during the Second World War in 1941, and settled in The Ritz Hotel. The Albanian Royal family moved to several locations in the UK before leaving in 1946 (Pearson, 2006).
owned bars and pubs around London, such as the Queen Arms pub in Kilburn, which hosts specific cultural and national festivals that are relevant in and to Kosova and Albania, like the days of declaration of independence, the 28 November day, which is the Albanian national day, other events that relate to what is being celebrated in Kosova and Albania (see Figure 1). Although the poster in Figure 1 is for Kosovo’s independence party and it would suggest that using the Albanian language, which is the mother tongue of Kosovo Albanians, would be a natural choice, the poster in Figure 1 by being presented predominantly in English, demonstrates the impact of the UK context and other diaspora places such as Germany, which have played an important role on the Kosovo Albanian identity construction in diaspora. Therefore, the poster in Figure 1 can be viewed as exemplary of a transnational Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, where the English language is used to construct Kosovo Albanians as English speaking and integrated.

*Figure 1:*

![Image of poster](image)

In contrast, the Kosovan government not only encourages UK based cultural and folk festivals, but has also started new initiatives such as the intentions stated by Ministry of
Diaspora in Kosovo (in interviews, October 2012 conducted in Prishtina, see chapter 5) to open cultural centres and schools in the diaspora for Kosovo Albanian children to learn Albanian. This coupled with the revival of Kosovan cultural associations, and the establishment, resurrection of Kosovan and Albanian icons, monuments, and folk songs, goes toward bringing the UK Kosovo Albanian community in line with the ministries discourses about the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora that they wish to construct (see Chapter 5 for more on this).

This is not surprising, as the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora (since at least the 1980s) has maintained an involvement in Kosovo. For example, throughout the 1990s the Kosovo diaspora supported their families in Kosovo through remittances. Some have invested in Kosovo, whereas the 1990s Kosovo government in exile demanded a 3% tax on earnings outside of Kosovo to be sent back to Kosovo. Furthermore, the diaspora were mobilized and to financially support their Kosovo Albanian families during the Kosovo war as well as to help refugees and people in camps (see Koinova 2013). Taken together all these elements have led to the Kosovo diaspora being referred to by those in Kosovo as the "third pillar of the Kosovan national budget". In addition, there are ongoing and active government campaigns to attract diaspora Kosovo Albanians to the homeland for investments in order to also secure political success for themselves (see chapter 5 for more on this). Furthermore, this is not only a phenomenon for Kosovo, as Michael Collyer (2013) has suggested, this is common in what he terms ‘Emigrant nations’ where the state policies are constructed within ideologies for engaging emigrants.

Similarly to other states, the newly established Kosovo state also aims to create and reinforce formal channels with diaspora communities, as well as public diplomacy initiatives such as the project entitled ‘Kosovo Diaspora, beyond remittances’ which encourages public
diplomacy. This is increasingly seen as an important asset for many national governments, which compete for the attention of Diasporas in Britain, for example, India (Van der Veer 1995), Italy (Migliore & Harney, 1999; Fortier 2000), Israel (Taras & Weinfeld 1990), and Croatia (Winland 2002).

It is clear that diaspora involvement has also continued, given the dependence of homeland Kosovo Albanians on diaspora support and the plethora of far-reaching and sophisticated forms of information dissemination and communication linking Kosovo Albanians globally. These include a digital communication system allowing worldwide reception of Kosovan television and radio programs like DigitAlb, Facebook, and the proliferation of Internet news-sites and news portals.

Arguably the diaspora-homeland interdependence is due to the high number of homeland Kosovo Albanians who have relatives living in the diaspora. One in three Kosovo Albanians lives outside of Kosovo. For example, the level of diaspora involvement and remittances as well as other forms of economic and material support for relatives increased exponentially during the war in 1999. Nonetheless, despite recent decreases in remittances it is often suggested that the amount of economic input made by diaspora exceeds amounts invested by the international community by one billion euros.10

For Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo and outside Kosovo, the 1990’s were marked by collective struggle against apartheid and passive resistance (led by Ibrahim Rugova) towards Milosevic’s regime. After 1999, this changed, especially for those in the diaspora, narratives

9 For further information, see the project http://kosovodiaspora.org/
10 This was first put forward in the Kosovo Parliament by a member of the opposition party Vetvendosja, who were protesting against the charges that the government of Kosovo placed at borders for those entering Kosovo with foreign number plates.
of exile, displacement, upheaval and dislocation from the homeland, were replaced by narratives of success and education (Kostovicova & Prestreshi 2003). Lately and especially after the Declaration of Independence for Kosovo, numerous signs of discord and tension among and between Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora and in the ‘new’ homeland are appearing, which will be the focus of part three and four of this thesis.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the historical context of Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians in the UK, as well as situated the different issues that have arisen due to Kosovo’s geopolitical position. This chapter also provides a historical account of the political situation that has led to Kosovo’s current borders, arguing that this is one of the reasons that migration emerged and increased from the area, but also why the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora are unique amongst diaspora communities. The section on the Kosovo Albanians in the UK provided the context of the migration of Kosovo Albanians to the UK and the formation of the diaspora. The following chapter will discuss scholarly and media arguments around the concept of multiculturalism and diversity in the UK, with particular focus on debates about asylum seekers, immigrants and refugees. This chapter aims to highlight the inhospitable political and media discourses that are present in the UK. By focusing on literature, which establishes the political and media context that Diasporas encounter in the UK, this chapter aims to provide the foundations for exploring identity constructions in the UK in light of dominant hegemonic discourses.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

Introduction

Analysing identities in discourse is not a new phenomenon (De Fina et al., 2006). Over the past sixty years, studies have ranged from those that explore particular niche or alternative identities in small online forums to broader themes such as those exploring national and European identity formations (see for example, Fägersten 2006 for hip hop identity in online forums and Wodak et al., 2009 for national identity). Indeed, as Fägersten asserts, although individuals possess the ability to construct and present their identities through language ‘successful construction of identity is actually a collaborative procedure’ Fägersten (2006:24). As Wodak et al., (2009) state, although identities are discursively constructed they are also ‘transformed and dismantled, discursively’ (Wodak et al., 2009: 4). Therefore, not only are individuals not completely autonomous in constructing their identities, they are also neither consistent nor stable.

In an era of global changes and transnational migration, exploration of identity, especially amongst migrants, diasporas and ethnic minorities, conveys on-going currency and relevance, particularly in the current anti-migration climate. Scholars such as Gillespie (1995; 2010), Vertovec (1999), Durham (2004), Shi (2005), Levitt and Jaworsky (2007), Georgiou (2010; 2013) have stressed that further research is required. This is specifically significant in relation to the complex nature of ethnic and diaspora identity and their interactions with host countries and homelands. Although research has tackled such complexities (see Stratton & Ang 1994, Van Oudenhoven et al., 1989; 2006, Cottle 1997; 2000, Verkuyten, 2005a; 2005b, Sala et al., 2009), most research has focused on racism and the negative constructions of
ethnic minorities by dominant groups and those in positions of power (Wetherall 1992, van Dijk 1992; 1998; 2000: 2009, Wodak 1999; 2009: 2012, Reisigl and Wodak 2001, Saxton 2003). Whereas research exploring minority group discourses in relation to racism, discrimination and identity within host societies as well as homelands are still lacking. For example, although studies of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in the UK, have steadily emerged since the 1990s, the number remains low and limited, mainly focusing on Albanians from Albania proper. Therefore, this study will make an original contribution to this relatively unexplored UK diaspora, and contribute to scholarship in this area, which is much needed.

This chapter contains three sections. Each section examines existing literature and central themes and arguments embedded within the literature. The first section explores multiculturalism and literature relating to asylum seekers and immigrants in the UK. The second section, examines multiculturalism by exploring the discourse of Orientalism, which I argue is implicit in current deployment of multiculturalism, while simultaneously exploring Orientalism in relation to East and West and Kosovo’s position within this order. In addition, this section examines Balkanism and the fallacies within Balkanism and the need to address Albanianism. The following section in this study will provide an overview on the literature on Kosovo Albanians in the UK, particularly highlighting the absence in the literature that explores discursive construction of identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

The analysis in this chapter allows for an assessment of the development of these themes in terms of how they account for, or marginalise, alternative readings of these key ideas and concepts as well as address the lack of critical literature in these areas and the limited studies and scope of studies on Kosovo Albanians in the UK. Furthermore, this thesis is fundamentally about the discursive constructions of identity, by analysing these approaches
and literature, I challenge the notion of dominant meanings that have rendered some of these concepts irrelevant and thus fuelled criticism. While the lack of literature on Kosovo Albanians in the UK, suggests that there are particulars within this diaspora community that cannot be borrowed from previous research on other communities, but also how the particulars in this case can help further diaspora and identity research. Finally, I propose that, as a way forward, previous assumptions should be revised in accordance with an attempt to better understand diaspora communities in the current globalised and mediatised world.

2.1. Multiculturalism and Orientalism

To this very day ethnicity strikes many Westerners as being peculiarly related to "all those crazy little people and languages out there", to the unwashed (and unwanted) of the world, to phenomena that are really not fully civilized and that are more trouble than they are worth (Fishman, 1989: 14-15).

The Kosovo Albanian population in the UK is a result of migration. This migration began during the early 1990’s due to the political climate in Kosovo under Slobodan Milosevic’s regime and subsequent armed conflict, which resulted in the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. Kosovo Albanians like many immigrants sought safety in the UK. Furthermore, the British government during the 1999 airlifted some refugees from refugee camps in the surrounding region, such as Macedonia and Albanian and dispersed them throughout the UK. The humanitarian catastrophe and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo touched many in the UK and surprisingly, the British media were more positive towards the plight of Kosovo Albanians, calling upon Western Europe and the United States to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Some suggested that the inaction of the West during the previous Bosnian War and the ensuing massacre at Srebrenica should be prevented in Kosovo, however, not long after the
conflict ended the media switched sides and branded Kosovo Albanians as ‘bogus Asylum seekers’ (KhosraviNIK 2009, Moore 2013).

Currently, refugees fleeing the War in Syria are center-stage. Although the conflict is in Syria, many in Europe are calling the current migration of Syrians a ‘European Crisis’ or a ‘crisis that Europe is facing’. Despite the desperate pleas of those fleeing, as well as images of drowned children washing up on Mediterranean shores, the country has yet to be moved to open its borders. Interestingly, in the UK the political discourse aligns itself with Europe by stating that ‘we’ in Europe cannot cope with the numbers of migrants coming to our European mainland borders (although such numbers are not at Britain’s borders, only a relatively few refugees are currently in Calais and any that attempt to cross as swiftly sent back). Such a discursive strategy, whereby the refugee crisis is projected as facing the UK, is in stark contrast to the discourses that suggest Britain will not be involved in a Europe wide relocation program as it is not part of Schengen and other EU programs.

Similarly, on the 30th of July 2015 after a few hundred migrants tried to cross through the Eurotunnel to Britain, the British Prime Minister David Cameron described them as a ‘swarm’. In a televised interview, the Prime Minister stated ‘…you have got a swarm of people coming across the Mediterranean’. Inevitably, embedded within such debates and any scholarship about migration, minorities, asylum seekers and settled diaspora communities are debates around integration, multiculturalism and social cohesion and vice versa. When I began my research, the notion of multiculturalism was fiercely debated. It seemed that both its supporters and opponents, including David Cameron who in February 2011 declared that ‘Multiculturalism is dead’, instantly and fashionably deployed the term. However, declarations such as the recent one by David Cameron referring to migrants as ‘swarm[s]’, were exclusive to declarations made by far right groups and parties such as the BNP and their
former leader Nick Griffin. This combined with increased racism, as well as terrorism acts by marginalised minorities, cannot be easily ignored. However, scholars have continually addressed and warned against such populist racist discourses (Cohen, 2000). Still, language is important, as Bourdieu states language is not simply articulation of words, but more importantly it is a symbolic system of power endowed with the inherent ability to make people see visions of the world that either confirm or transform their perceptions and beliefs, thereby influencing not only their own actions, but also the world itself (Bourdieu 1991: 170). Furthermore, as Stuart Hall (1982) has argued, the manner in which people are repeatedly talked about, especially by those in positions of power, affects how they are thought of.

For the past decade, the issue of migrants coming to the UK has remained important within public opinion as well as generated debate around ‘Britishness’. This has also produced both public and political discussion as well as scholarship and research about the integration of migrants and the diversification of the British demographic. Historically, multiculturalism was perceived as a conceptual framework to enable state policies to advance integration, tolerance and promote the recognition of cultural difference. In the attempt to eradicate racial inequality, multiculturalism was seen as a fitting framework for dealing with cultural difference (Favell 2001). Parekh (2000), in his Runnymede Trust report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain affirms this idea of ‘Britishness’ as a plural identity that celebrates difference, as a ‘community of communities’. Parekh states that:

> Everyone belongs to more than one community; every community influences and has an impact on, and in turn is influenced by, others. None is self-sufficient, entire of itself. ‘Britain’ is the name of the space they all share. Some have far more weight and power than others, but no group, no community, own Britain. It is no one's sole possession (Parekh, Runnymede Trust 2000: 105).
Nonetheless, multiculturalism as a concept for a British nation has recently encountered much criticism. Despite the idea perpetuated by scholars and research that no single community or group ‘own Britain’, at least since the 1980s, but more intensely in the past few years, multiculturalism has encountered multiple challenges, which includes some support but much more strong criticism (Rattansi 2011:2-4, see also Watson 2000 and Modood 2007). Rattansi (2011), highlights the problems with multiculturalism, however he concludes that:

I have come to the conclusion that most of the charges against multiculturalism as set out in public debates are either misguided or exaggerated when set against evidence garnered from research conducted by social scientists and for governmental inquiries (Rattansi, 2011: 4).

Nonetheless, Rattansi also suggests that multiculturalism no longer serves its purpose arguing that ‘multiculturalism suffers from flaws that cannot be remedied without moving on to a more sophisticated phase’, which Rattansi suggests would be better suited to what he coins as ‘interculturalism’. According to Rattansi, Western societies are increasingly multiethnic and as Vertovec (2006, 2009) has stated super-diverse’ therefore, notions of ‘interculturalism’ would be better suited. Rattansi suggests that the reason for this is a shift away from migration from former colonies and the migration that occurred during and after the Second World War, to migration due to what he describes as ‘failed states and civil wars’ (Rattansi, 2011: 5). The flaws that Rattansi highlights are worthy, however, the problem is not super-diversity or the term multiculturalism, but how such terms are deployed and how diversity is conceptualised and positioned.

The Cantle report (2001) suggests that lack of integration and social cohesion has led to frictions which have created the conditions for ‘less multicultural’ policies and increasing uneasiness regarding the supposed segregation of minority communities (McGhee 2005).
This has resulted in recent criticism of cultural difference, which suggest that there is an overall shift in British political discourse from multiculturalism to ‘social cohesion’, or from celebrating difference to affirming shared values (Grillo 2007; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010). As David Cameron, early in 2011, said in a speech in Munich:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We’ve failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We’ve even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.

Simultaneously, public and media discourses do not appear to support multiculturalism (Verkuyten 2007). In what academics have referred to as the ‘retreat of multiculturalism’ (Joppke 2004) and even as the ‘death of multiculturalism’ (Kundnani 2002), some such as Meer & Modood (2009), Modood et al., (2011) have contested such declarations. However, implicit in these argument, as well as in many definitions of multiculturalism by both opponents and supporters, is the suggestion that multi-culture is a product of ‘foreign’ cultures originating outside normative British values, incapable of ‘social cohesion’ or compatibility with British identity, furthermore, there is a strong argument that multiculturalism encourages separate lives. Problematic within this discourse, which has become naturalised is this very notion, which produces a threat to an imagined uni-culture, which is also equally produced through opaque discourse and power. Although scholars like Rattansi (2011: 5) who, on the one hand, suggest that multiculturalism is no longer sufficient, on the other hand, also suggest that without some form of democratic and egalitarian governance, the far right could seize upon the opportunity to dominate social discourse and strain multi-ethnic and multicultural relations. This is a potential risk especially when social and economic problems, such as present austerity, low public service funding and cuts to benefits leave disenfranchised members of society vulnerable to manipulation by populist
political discourses. Implicit in these debates are ideological frameworks about ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ and ‘belonging’ and ‘exclusion’. As Van Dijk states:

> Ideologies are basic frameworks of social cognition, shared by members of social groups, constituted by relevant selections of sociocultural values, and organized by an ideological schema that represents the self-definition of a group. Besides their social function of sustaining the interests of groups, ideologies have the cognitive function of organizing the social representations (altitudes, knowledge) of the group, and thus indirectly monitor the group-related social practices, and hence also the text and talk of members (1995: 248).

In addition, as Stubbs (1996: 93) states:

> It is necessary to identify the linguistic mechanisms which convey ideology...Ideology need not function at the level of conscious or intentional bias...Once it is realized that choices have been made, it is also realized that other choices could be made, and that reality could be presented differently (1996: 93).

Therefore, what is required in the reconstruction of the term is the notion that multiculturalism is not implicitly multi-ethnic ‘others’ that possess alien values, but multi-cultural in the sense that culture does not necessarily and implicitly denote ethnic or national origin or identity, but also sexuality, class, gender, art, high culture and low culture in a Raymond Williams sense (Williams 1983). Since fundamental and implicit in continued deployment of multiculturalism as it is currently discursively constructed are ideological frameworks that need to be de-essentialised and not positioned as a binary to ‘British culture’, whatever that is. Inherent in such binaries is an Orientalist discourse, which categorises other cultures as negative and in opposition to ‘Britishness’. Hickman et al, (2008) have stated that on the contrary to such suggestions that ethnic diversity causes social divisions, it is class and economic deprivation that play a more important role. They state:
In current public debates, there is an association made between increasing ethnic and religious diversity and the erosion of social cohesion. However, recent research has shown that age, class and where we live are far more important in shaping life chances than are ethnicity or religion and that the arrival of new migrant groups did not coincide with an increase in crime. (Hickman et al, 2008; viii)

Nonetheless, some continue to perpetuate the discourse that multiculturalism represents the notion of ethnically diverse populations, which has the potential to divide and segregate communities. Although ethnically diverse populations are a phenomenon in Britain, they must not a priori be viewed or conceptualized as negative, it is precisely this discourse, which creates the negative associations with a multicultural Britain, precisely because diversity is linked to immigration, religious extremism, terrorism and other negative stereotypes, in the public and media discourse, which result in overwhelmingly negative projections and associations of multiculturalism as negative. For example, Moore et al (2008: 3) found that media coverage of British Muslims increased partially due to increased coverage devoted to terrorism:

Our findings suggest that the coverage of British Muslims has increased significantly since 2000, peaking in 2006, and remaining at high levels in 2007 and 2008. This rise is partly explained by the increase in coverage devoted to terrorism and terrorism related stories - 36% of stories about British Muslims overall are about terrorism. This is especially notable after the terrorist attacks in the US and the UK in 2001 and 2005.

Nonetheless, there is no denying the diversity of populations in the UK. Since the 1950’s the British capital - London – has hosted a diverse population, with current figures stating that one in three Londoners was born outside the UK, and many more with parents and other relatives from other countries, either still living in their ‘native’ countries or originally from elsewhere, as well as numerous native British inhabitants, all living in within this cultural
mix (Nava 2007:14). In fact, at particular moments of ‘national interests’, this diversity is projected as positive and London frequently boasts this diverse population. This was most prominently displayed by the unity shown by the residents of London after the 7/7 bombings in 2005. However as Nava (2007) has noted this also marked ‘a new and dangerous phase of Islamic separatism and Islamophobia’ (Nava 2007:163). These recent developments are not exclusive to the UK, with similar worldwide incidents such as 9/11, the 2004 train bombings in Madrid, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, and the rise of the so called Islamic State, as well as many other similar attacks and threats, which have caused fears and insecurity about minorities, immigrants and other cultures, especially Islamic (a quick Google search with the term ‘Islamophobia’ reveals thousands and thousands of results, for interesting recent publications see the following: Ernst 2013, Tyrer 2013, Ansell 2013, Baker et al., 2013, Hertzke 2013, Allen 2010, Kumar 2012, Sheehi 2011. Whereas only one result contains the term Islamophilia, (Shryock 2010) and other than some basic definitions no research contains Muslimophilia, thus suggesting that scholarly research has not taken an interest in those who support, or even dare I say it ‘love’ Islam or Muslims, but rather have predominantly focused on the fear of Islam.

The ‘rise’ of the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS) and the recent migrant crisis in Calais are predominantly at the forefront of news media and public opinion. It is the Orientalist conflation of multicultural with extremist Islam, with ‘other’, and terrorism, which enables justifications for opposing multiculturalism as both a theoretical framework and policy tool. As Chrisina Julios (2008), observed this also results in nationalistic mass media discourse and pejorative and derogative language and depictions of ethnic minorities, migrants and minority religious groups. Fueling the fears of those already entrenched on the side of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, as Castles & Davidson (2000) have noted, most countries consider certain groups that reside within their borders as incapable of belonging and therefore either require
assimilating or to be denied citizenship if not entirely repatriated. This is fundamentally why constructing the concept of multiculturalism as powerful signifier of ‘threatening others’ such as multi-ethnic and religiously diverse groups and communities is problematic, and why, it also serves a rhetorical purpose to diasporic ethnicities, simultaneously, engaged in creating new maps of belonging for themselves, within nation states (Clifford 1994). For example Kalra et al., (2005: 5) suggest that:

[D]iasporic groups are just as likely to operate within the bounds of ethnic absolutism as any other group. For example, Black Muslims in the Nation of Islam or Sikh separatists may organize and exist as transnational groups, but they are also engaged in the process of building and maintaining quite rigid boundaries.

Not surprising then that with Islamophobia on the increase and fear of what has been coined as ‘radical Islam’ or ‘political Islam’ and the fear of ‘others’ prevalent, that we have contestation and representation of multiculturalism and cultural diversity as negative and linked to negative ‘others’ rather than to more positive heterogeneity, which also encompasses diversity but also art, music and literature, to enable multiple exchanges between cultures. It seems that heterogeneity and hybridity are being delegated to the ‘other’ cultures, and positioned as binary opposites to a discourse of a homogeneous ‘British culture’. Although scholars from a variety of academic disciplines have continued to question far-right politics and oppose attempts of national and cultural homogeny, more scholarship is required to redefine multiculturalism not merely as a tool for social policy, but as an idea, a theory which challenges dominant hegemonic discourse. Therefore, to recognise the Orientalist discourse with which multiculturalism is dismissed, requires more scrutiny.
As have Lynn and Lea (2003) identified, there is what they call ‘new-Apartheid’ in the UK discourse around ‘others’ and especially asylum seekers. They state that not only do the British media discursively construct asylum-seekers but also:

Ideas of citizenship, identity and Nation-hood are employed within a variety of discursive and rhetorical strategies that form part of an ‘elite’ discourse, one that contributes to a ‘new Apartheid’. …Asylum-seekers find themselves [re]positioned and contrasted with a variety of other social groups in such a way as to justify disregarding some of the central tenets of British democracy….It is argued that applied discursive work is necessary to bolster resistance and deconstruct the ‘new Apartheid’ (Lynn & Lea 2003: 425).

This scholarship is not only required but is also very important as it directly impacts the most vulnerable people in the world. As the United Nations High Commission for Refugees warns, even just a decade ago, many European countries were ‘blatantly closing their borders’ whereas others were ‘more insidiously introducing laws and procedures which effectively deny admission to their territory’. Kofi Annan (2000), the former United Nations Secretary-General, highlighted that ‘[a]mong the most vulnerable groups of people in the world are those who are displaced, whether as a result of conflict, persecution or other human rights violations’. The recent images of a drowned three-year-old Syrian boy fleeing the conflict, although heart-breaking, were met with David Cameron proclaiming that he does not ‘…think there is an answer that can be achieved simply by taking more and more refugees.’

What is evident within the British political sphere, at the very least, is the notion that multiculturalism is increasingly a failed project that encourages inter-group segregation. Although, the image of the drowned three-year-old Aylin Kurdi was a significant discursive moment, which rallied the UK public, and put pressure on David Cameron to act and allow more refugees into the UK, to what extent the political and media discourses will change to positively depict refugees and asylum seekers, remains to be seen. Especially, since asylum
seekers’ and immigrants’, projection, representation, perception and reception in host countries as well as their homelands are complexly constructed, with the role of the media being fundamental in this construct.

As many scholars have noted, in the UK, recently and historically, the dominant public, political and media discourses surrounding asylum and immigration are predominantly negative and typified by an essential suspicion of, and often direct opposition towards asylum seekers and migrants (Gross et al., 2007, Threadgold 2009, Moore 2010; 2012; 2013). Furthermore, although stories such as the one of the drowned three-year-old child demonstrate the heterogeneity of migrants as well as motives for migration to other countries, this is often homogenized by the media into negative and threatening dominant discourses about migrants and ‘migration crises’, which pose threats to the rights of the dominant groups (van Dijk 1993). Moreover, in the UK during the last decade, as Moore (2013: 349) highlights, the public and media discourse developed new negative labels such as ‘illegitimate (‘bogus’, ‘fake’, ‘cheating’)’ to describe asylum seekers, and refugees are referred to as ‘economic migrants’ that chose to travel to the UK due to its benefit system, rather than fleeing conflict or natural disasters.

Similarly to the UK, most European countries and the United States, continue to project asylum seekers and other immigrants as a serious problem. Facilitated by media representations, these issues have remained centre-stage in national and international public debates and political arenas. Negative and hostile discourses about asylum seekers and immigrants, can support or form the basis of evidence for ideas that suggest multiculturalism has failed to integrate, while a consolidating negative public and media discourse towards asylum and immigration, which are amalgamated and intertwined with hostility, rejection, and fear (Gross et al 2007) and therefore provide a platform for seemingly logical discourses
to emerge that suggest multiculturalism does not work. This then has the potential to lead nation-states towards more nationalist and homogenous discourses that inevitably drive ‘others’ out. As Stuart Hall states:

That notion of dominance which meant the direct imposition of one framework, by overt force or ideological compulsion, on a subordinate class, was not sophisticated enough to match the real complexities of the case. One had also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a property of the system of relations involved, rather than as the overt and intentional biases of individuals; and to recognize its play in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse before an adequate conception of dominance could be theoretically secured (Hall 1982: 80-81).

Similarly, Michael Dummett (2001) notes that when it comes to asylum seekers and immigration ‘… the standard complaint of racists and xenophobes who object to any level of immigration that is taking place, however low it may be, is that the country is being swamped.’ (Dummett, 2001:14), and this is exacerbated further by the media and British politics and politicians. Dummett argues, that:

The newspapers, with only occasional political lapses into decency, have acted upon a very simple principle: identify a fairly widespread prejudice, pander to it and inflame it, in the process misleading or actually lying to the readers as far as can be safely done. The objective aimed at in following this principle has of course been to increase the circulation of the newspapers and, likewise, the numbers of people listening to or watching the broadcast programmes… The principle governing the policies of the Conservative and Labour governments, and indeed, with a very few honourable exceptions, of all Conservative and Labour politicians, has been exactly the same. The objective, in this case, has been to maximise electoral support: to gain votes. This, indeed, has always been the principle on which British governments
have acted in respect of would-be immigrants and refugees (Dummett 2001: 14-15).

This is not a predominantly contemporaneous problem or media and government objective, but on the contrary can be traced to legislation starting in 1905 with the Aliens Act which was passed to exclude and prevent European Jews from reaching the UK as well as the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 and the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919, which interestingly was aimed at keeping out Germans (Dummett, 2001: 3-4).

Poignantly, the main findings from research conducted by the Article 19 project in partnership with Cardiff University School of Journalism published in May 2003 concluded that asylum reporting in the media is characteristically inaccurate and the use of language to describe migrants or asylum seekers was not only confused and inaccurate but ‘meaningless and derogatory’ (Article 19 2003: 9). Furthermore, they also stated that ‘Media reporting, particularly in the tabloid press, consistently fails to correctly distinguish between economic migrants and asylum seekers or refugees…’ as well as ‘News and feature articles on asylum rely heavily on politicians, official figures and the police as sources of information and explanation’ and ‘Asylum seekers and refugees feel alienated, ashamed and sometimes threatened as a result of the overwhelmingly negative media coverage of asylum.’ (Article 19 2003: 9) Article 19 also suggest that the Home Office have played a role in such negative discourse, stating that press releases from the Home Office use negative language suggesting an imminent threat to UK borders and benefits (Buchanan et al., 2003).

Gross et al., (2007) concluded that as far as media content on asylum was concerned, there were six key findings, and during their time of monitoring they found that asylum was not often the main focus of reporting, however, it was mentioned on other news topics. Although they conclude that negative words are not very evident, they suggest that the word asylum
has such negative connotations that there is no need to use other words to negatively describe it. Furthermore, labels are confusingly used without regard for accurate legal status about immigration status. Furthermore, Threadgold (2009) concludes that:

All the evidence gathered here shows that the national media in the United Kingdom – through the regularity with which they reproduce the dominant asylum narrative and discourse about loss of control and dangerous invasion – have produced a very negative view of what immigration is and might be (Threadgold, 2009: 20).

It is clear that scholars have good reasons to fear that not only are asylum seekers at risk of being negatively portrayed, mistreated and/or excluded, but more importantly – due to the media agenda setting capacity and driving of policy - the right of asylum (a basic human right) as defined in the 1951 Geneva Convention (which Britain is a signatory to) is being seriously undermined. Therefore, there is a serious concern expressed in studies such as those cited above, that the negative stereotyping of asylum seekers and other immigrants leads to an inhospitable environment for those persecuted individuals that may need to seek asylum. It can be argued that immigrant and diaspora communities are not concealed from the milieu of such social discourse, therefore as Benhabib (1996) has warned identity politics and differences will become (if they are not already) a major global political problem.

This is particularly important for this study as the majority of Kosovo Albanians in the UK, initially migrated as asylum seekers and refugees. Some were even airlifted by the British government from camps in Macedonia and Albania. Furthermore, according to Balkan Insight, this year alone ‘32,935 citizens of Kosovo, 18,287 Serbians, 8,418 people from Macedonia and 4,866 from Bosnia applied for asylum in Germany from January to July’ 2015. According to reports from the region, Germany has posted its own border patrols in countries such as Albania and has increased repatriations. Therefore, such hostile dominant
Discourses are important to consider especially in a study such as this one, which deals with identity constructions, belonging and exclusion.

Therefore, multiculturalism must be reclaimed and redeployed, and not only to function or denote ‘salad-bowl’ backgrounds or Orientalist discourses of ‘uncivilized others’, immigrants or ‘foreigners’ that threaten the cohesion of an equally discursively constructed and imagined homogenous national identity. Not doing so, at the very least, will result in further inhospitality towards those deemed incapable of belonging.

Such inhospitality, and discrimination to those deemed culturally different or diverse, asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, and migrants – ‘foreigners’ in contrast to those who belong, has long caused some to speak of *Fortress Europe*, constantly defended by those within who are trying to keep ‘foreigners’ out. Current European governments who are scuffling to close their borders as Syrian refugees feeling conflict attempt to enter Europe poignantly demonstrate this. Derrida (2000) tackles the problematic perception of incoming ‘foreigners’ in Europe, by deconstructing notions of hospitality, cosmopolitanism and the foreigner, which are central to European values and also this debate.

Derrida (2000) begins the topic of hospitality by posing several questions regarding the noun ‘foreigner’. Furthermore, he deconstructs the idea of hospitality, hospitality for the foreigner or hospitality for the absolute other. He opens with the ‘question of the foreigner’:

Isn’t the question of the foreigner [*l’étranger*] a foreigner’s question? Coming from the foreigner, from abroad [*l’étranger*]?... as though the foreigner were first of all the one who puts the first question of the one to whom you address the first question. ... But also the one who, putting the first question, puts me in question (Derrida, 2000: 3).
For Derrida, not only is the notion of the ‘foreigner’, a notion that must come only from the ‘foreigner’, but also the questions of and for the ‘foreigner’ must be answered only by putting into question both what is the ‘foreigner’, and what is the ‘native’ or the non-foreigner.

As aforementioned, on the one hand, the consideration of the notion of ‘the foreigner’ is the sole province of the foreigner himself, and Derrida’s questions of and for ‘the foreigner’, must inevitably begin with the questioning of what is (and isn’t) ‘the native’ - the non-foreigner.

Derrida also asserts, (through telling the story of Socrates defying and defending himself from the accusations of sophism made by the Athenian judges) that a foreigner is foreign because he speaks a different language and therefore does not speak legal language or the language of the courts and state, which is of crucial importance. Firstly, because as he states ‘[t]hat is where the question of hospitality begins’. Secondly, there are two initial considerations, the inability to speak a certain language, and the demand made on the foreigner to speak a particular language since if he could already speak it ‘would the foreigner still be a foreigner and could we speak of asylum and hospitality [my italics - emphasis]’. Therefore the:

Foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing etc…
He has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc. This personage imposes on him translation into their own language, and that’s the first act of violence.’ (Derrida, 2000: 15 -16)

Not only does Derrida’s assertion have important implications for the treatment of those considered ‘foreigners’ but furthermore it strengthens the argument made by Ruth Wodak,
who argues that not only do issues of discrimination, closing borders and inhospitality to migrants affect freedom of movement and travel, but also they affect those already settled who face discrimination and institutional racism as ‘belonging also implies access to work, education, housing…’ (Wodak 2013:173).

Whereas, perhaps as Martha Nussbaum (1997) states:

Our task as citizens of the world will be to “draw the circles somehow toward the centre,” making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers, and so forth. In general, we should think of nobody as a stranger, as outside our sphere of concern and obligation (Nussbaum 1997: 33).

Nonetheless, Judith Butler (2007) argues that ‘making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers’ is a noble notion, however, what is crucial in this process is the state and state institutions, and ‘if the state is what binds it is also clearly what can and does unbind…releases, expels and banishes (Butler, in Butler and Spivak 2007: 5). Therefore, state discourses are also instrumental in constructing, culture, difference, foreigners, natives, national and individual identity as well as access to work and other services. Since individuals through dialogic interaction, from legal language as Derrida suggests, to institutional engagement are in constant negotiation with dominant hegemonic discourses about what they should be or should not be, the who belongs to ‘us’ and who belongs to ‘them’ is central. This is not only in the case of host states but also in homelands, as is discussed in Part 3 of the thesis and Chapter 6, which explores the discourses of diaspora by the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo. What is at stake is dominant hegemonic discourses and governmentality, in a Foucauldian sense, that construct binaries and insiders and outsiders. As already stated, this is not only a host societies phenomenon but also a phenomenon present in countries of origin or homelands, as they are also in a dialogical process with
individuals constructing and representing populations at home and abroad, as well as impacting and influencing subjective constructions of identity.

In contemporary societies, as Foucault (1969) has argued, biopolitics construct ‘social order’, through the exercise of power, discipline, repression and the construction of identities. This strategy disciplines society, through governance and power while demarcating the borders and ‘others’ outside this group. This process creates compliance among the majority of citizens allowing for coherence between the discourses of the government and the population.\(^ {11}\) This all suggests that in the UK, at least, it seems that Britain is being constructed against the backdrop or binary of ‘migrant’, that these shores, must at all costs prevent the influx of those others that might like insects travelling in ‘swarms’ penetrate and thus take over or threaten Britishness (see David Cameron’s recent speech for references to swarms). It would seem that British citizenship, as Tyler (2013) has argued, is currently devised specifically to ‘abject specific groups and populations, producing paralysed, dejected and ‘deportable’ populations of non-citizens within the internal borders of the nation’ (Tyler 2013: 48). This is far from the ‘community of communities’ or ‘interculturalism’ that has been proposed by scholars (Nussbaum 1997, Vertovec 2006, Rattansi 2011). The discourse of multiculturalism as a framework for a myriad of ethnic minorities, associated with segregation and radical Islam is fundamental in creating the binary between ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘citizens and non-citizens’ and must therefore be challenged. As Hickman et al., (2008: ix) in their Joseph Rowntree report conclude:

\(^ {11}\)For more on this see Foucault’s lectures and other works which came after his publication of *Discipline and Punish* (1977)
Our overall finding is that to ensure the cohesion of the social fabric of society it is necessary to address both relational and structural issues. We need to consider how people relate to each other as well as addressing fundamental issues of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. *Discussing how people get on together without dealing with inequalities will not work* [my emphasis]. We concluded that the focus on shared norms and values that characterises current policies of social cohesion should complement, rather than substitute the established multicultural valuing of cultural diversity. It is important to enable and support both expressions of *unity* and *difference* for the social cohesion of local communities (Hickman et al., 2008: ix).

The section has argued that multiculturalism has been essentialised through biopolitical social and political control to other those in society who do not conform to mainstream identities. Furthermore, multiculturalism as is currently being envisaged and deployed is Orientalist. By this I mean that the fundamentals of multiculturalism currently function within the paradigm of the ‘west’ and the rest, and this construct, although operating with opaque power, has resulted in anxiety about its deployment either theoretically or as a social and political tool. This is problematic, as it does not enable society and government to deal with inequalities, on the contrary it entrenches and naturalises them.

The following section summarises Orientalism and Balkanism while suggesting how these two interdependent theories form the basis for analysis of Albanophobia, which has been coined by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (2004, 2008) as Albanianism.

### 2.2. Orientalism, Balkanism and Albanianism

Beyond and below what was once Czechoslovakia lie the deep Balkans. They are, it has been said, a sort of hell paved with the bad intentions of the powers (John Gunther in Todorova 1994: 1).
As aforementioned, this thesis adopts a CDA approach for the analysis of discursive actions and practices by those interviewed during this study. However, CDA operates with the premise that it must highlight opaque power within discourse (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000). This is outlined in more depth in the methodology chapter in Part 2 of the thesis, nonetheless, as Stuart Hall (2007) states that dominant western discourses, which described and differentiated between Europe and others, also use European cultural categories, languages and ideas to represent the ‘other’. Such connections are not always transparent. Therefore, the knowledge produced by this discourse is appropriated through use and practice and thus becomes perceived as reality or ‘truth’. Whereas, Europe as the ‘the ruling class’, by producing a discourse of difference still continues to maintain its dominance, creating the ‘other’ or subaltern group -which although intrinsic to the construction of ‘Europe’- is also simultaneously excluded from the production of power, knowledge and discourses of ‘truth’ (see Foucault 1972 and Gramsci in Durham and Kellner 2006:13). This dynamic does not necessarily and only function outside of European states nor is it always exclusively European, although the categories, language and ideas often are and are also disseminated through dominant Western media in a globalized and increasingly mediatised world.

This section focuses on outlining the literature and theoretical frameworks that underpin the theories of Orientalism and Balkanisim, but also what I refer to as Albanianism, which I borrow from Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (2008), in order to theorise the discrimination of ‘others’ such as Islamic, Balkan or Albanian. The final part of this section predominantly focuses on the discrimination of Albanians as both Balkan and Islamic ‘others’ both within the Balkans and Western Europe.

Recently, it can be argued that the external facade of Orientalism may have changed, and it may occasionally be more difficult to recognize, however, once exposed the core is the same.
For example, Britain and France no longer have expanding Empires deployed to places such as Egypt, under the guise of ‘recording’, ‘surveying’ or ‘providing civilized government’, but it could be argued that the recent Iraq, Afghanistan and Libyan conflicts, are Orientalism at the core (Said 1999, Gregory 2004, Said 2004, Little 2009, Porter 2013, Hashmi 2014). Britain and America, may have given different reasons for invasion, however these discourses are constructed in the same way. As Edward Said (1978) highlights, by quoting Karl Marx at the opening of Orientalism:

They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte\textsuperscript{12}

For Edward Said (1978: 1-5) Orientalism is a discourse, one that not only positions the Orient against the Occident, but which also through its own existence fashions and defines the Occident and Western Europe as its contrasting other ‘image, idea, personality, experience’ (Said 1978: 1). Clearly, as Said’s argument demonstrates, Egypt and the ‘East’ are opposite to the ‘West’ and are aligned within the superiority/inferiority binaries respectively. Since Said’s publication of Orientalism in 1978, this theory has been acknowledged, supported and researched thoroughly by countless scholars, indeed, to many to enumerate here. However, Orientalist discourse is present within European nation states especially within anti-Muslim sentiments and attitudes. For example, representations of gay emancipation are mobilized to shape narratives in which Muslims are framed as non-modern subjects, which consequently, as scholars have argued, fuels the rise of Islamophobia in Europe (Mepschen et al, 2010). Therefore, the problem that multiculturalism currently faces also stems from the Orientalist discourses, which are employed by both its critics and supporters.

\textsuperscript{12} Quoted in the paratext by Said (1978)
Not only Egypt, but also the Balkans are described as the ‘others’ of Europe, despite the Balkans geographic position within Europe. For example Kosovo is often described as the axis of where East meets West. This is not a recent phenomenon due to the disintegration of Former Yugoslavia or the establishment of the EU, as the 13th Century Serbian Saint Sava writing to Irinej noted:

At first we were confused. The East thought that we were West, while the West considered us to be East. Some of us misunderstood our place in this clash of currents, so they cried that we belong to neither side, and others that we belong exclusively to one side or the other. But I tell you, Irinej, we are doomed by fate to be the East on the West, and the West on the East, to acknowledge only heavenly Jerusalem beyond us, and here on earth-no one. - St. Sava to Irinej, 13th century (Bakic-Hayden and Hayden, 1992).

What the above quote demonstrates, is the deeply embedded and historical discourses of positioning the Balkans in opposition to the West. Negative descriptions of the Balkans are not uncommon, thus lending to the negative connotations associated with the noun ‘Balkan’. As late as the 1940, the Balkans were described thus:

Beyond and below what was once Czechoslovakia lie the deep Balkans. They are, it has been said, a sort of hell paved with the bad intentions of the powers (John Gunther in Todorova 1994: 1).

In addition, the term Balkanization, as is defined by the OED, is outlined as a process that divides regions into many, smaller hostile parcels. The name ‘Balkan’, is reported to originate from two Ottoman Turkish words; ‘Bal – Honey’ and ‘Kan - Blood’, proving quite useful for those who have contemporaneously tried to capture the region’s beauty as well as its horrendous bloodshed and genocide past. The recent film by Angelina Jolie ‘In the Land of Blood and Honey’ is one example of such depictions of the Balkans. However, according
to Maria Todorova, ‘[t]he Balkans have been ill served by discovery and invention’. In fact she describes the Balkans as ‘haunting’:

A spectre is haunting Western culture -- the spectre of the Balkans. All the powers have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter: politicians and journalists, conservative academics and radical intellectuals, moralists of all kind, gender, and fashion. Where is the adversarial group that has not been decried as "Balkan" and "balkanizing" by its opponents? Where the accused have not hurled back the branding reproach of "balkanism"? (Todorova, 1997: 3).

Thus, similarly to the way Said coined and deployed Orientalism, Todorova, coins Balkanism, which she describes thus:

Balkanism and its subject are imprisoned in a field of discourse in which "Balkans" is paired in opposition to "West" and "Europe," while "Balkanism" is the dark other of "western civilization" (Todorova 1994: 482).

Furthermore, Todorova highlights that the Balkans are more complexly intertwined with Europe as they are geographically ‘inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as "the other,"’ thus the Balkans developed to be ‘the object of a number of externalized political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European" and "the west" has been constructed (Tododrova 1997: 188).

Such depictions of the Balkans also stretch to those people, groups and communities who originate in the Balkans. Moreover, Todorova argues that this is an intertwined and complex relationship that goes beyond the simple binaries of Orient and Occident, and functions more conveniently for ‘the West’ as it exempts it from ‘charges of racism, colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian intolerance’ she states, that ‘the Balkans, after all, are in Europe,
they are white and they are predominantly Christian’. However, she forgets to mention Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo, half of Macedonia, as well as the Muslim minorities of Bulgaria. Furthermore, Todorova strongly criticizes Said and suggests that there are fallacies in his argument. Therefore, according to Todorova:

"Balkanism" is not merely a sub-species of orientalism, "orientalist variation on a Balkan theme. The absence of a colonial legacy (despite the often exploited analogies) is not the only, not even the main difference. "Balkanism" evolved independently from "Orientalism" and, in certain aspects, against or despite it, partially because southeastern Europe (or the Balkans)" has been considered geopolitically distinct from the near or the Middle East. Its Christianity opposed it to Islam and fed the crusading potential of western Christendom. Despite many depictions of its (Orthodox) Christianity as "oriental despotism," inherently non-European or non-western, still the boundary between Islam and Christianity continued to be perceived as the principal one (Todorova 1997: 3).

Todorova, also suggest an absence of a colonial legacy in the Balkans. Although it could be argued that the Balkans have not been subjected to western colonial powers, and were predominantly colonized by the Ottomans, who within Said’s Orientalism theory are the very subject within Said’s binary, nonetheless, Todorova herself notes that:

"Balkanization" not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the back-ward, the primitive, the barbarian…That the Balkans have been described as the "other" of Europe does not need special proof. What has been emphasized about the Balkans is that its inhabitants do not care to conform to the standards of behavior devised as normative by and for the civilized world. As with any generalization, this one is based on reductionism, but the reductionism and stereotyping of the Balkans has been of such degree and intensity that the discourse merits and requires special analysis (Todorova, 1997: 3).
What this suggests is that the Orientalist discourse does not require an in-situ physical colonial power to operate. That the binary between ‘west’ and ‘other’ is so well established, that it transcends territorial presence of a colonial power, and Todorova’s Balkanism is firmly based on Said’s Orientalism despite her criticism. Furthermore, a flaw in Todorova’s argument is her very brief mention of relations within and between Balkan states:

Balkan self-identities constructed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were invariably opposed to "oriental others": geographical neighbors, e.g. the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, as well as regions within the area itself and portions of one's own historical past (usually the Ottoman period and the Ottoman legacy) (Todorova, 1997: 20.

However, despite many nineteenth century national awakening movements throughout the Balkans including the Albanians of both Albania and Kosovo, the opposition to an ‘Ottoman other’ did not involve an immediate and total distancing or denial of Ottoman cultural and religious heritage. The Albanians and Bosnians, retained their Islamic religion, which they adapted in line with more moderate Islam, however, in some situations they retained Islam in order to differentiate themselves from their Slavic neighbours. The opposition to the ‘Ottoman other’ was positioned as an opposition to a colonizing force, however, for their Balkan Slavic neighbours, the Muslim Albanians and Kosovo Albanians as well as those in Muslims of Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Bulgaria, embodied the ‘Ottoman other’ that were to be defeated and expelled. Such was the extent of discrimination, that throughout communist Yugoslavia, their Slavic counterparts subjected the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians to discrimination and xenophobia. Scholars have recognized Albanophobia, in former-Yugoslavia but also in other places, such as Greece and Italy (Clark 2000, Vullnetari 2012, King & Mai 2013)
Most historical descriptions of Kosovo and the Balkans underscore this geographic area as the site where East and West meet, thus, overlapping with the system of thought outlined by Said’s Orientalism (1978). Edward Said has provided many explanations of Orientalism (Said, 1978: 1-12). In a very small newly established country in the Balkans, right on the axis (that it is argued) divides the two dominant civilizations (East/West) Said’s work is still current. The multiple colonisations of Kosovo as well as the more recent international missions require that we borrow Said’s central ideas behind - if not- the term. Where do the Balkans and Kosovo stand in this world order between the West and the East and the Orient and Occident. At one point Kosovo was the heart of Byanzantium, as the birthplace of the Emperor Justinian, as well as the place of the Battle of Kosovo against the swift conquering ‘Turk’ in 1389 (Malcolm: 1998). Yet, once the Ottoman Empire conquered Constantinople in 1453, and consolidated its empire including most of the Balkan Peninsula, Kosovo was firmly under Ottoman rule, which lasted over 500 years (Vickers 1998). This also led to the majority of the population converting to Islam, and currently 90% of Kosovo’s population is reported to be Muslim (Kosovo Office for Statistics 2011 census).

Todorova, in coining Balkanism focuses on the relationship between the West and what she describes as ‘predominantly Christian Balkans’. In fact, the neighboring ‘others’ that she refers to as ‘Ottoman’ are Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and all Muslim people in the Balkans, however they would object to the term ‘Ottoman’ opting for European.

Nonetheless, not only in the Balkans, but beyond, Albanians are stereotyped as the others of Europe, in fact even the branding campaign by the Kosovar government to promote Kosovo’s declaration of Independence (under EU guidance) entitled Kosovo ‘the young Europeans’ suggests that Kosovo has just recently come into Europe, when in fact it has always been in Europe. Therefore, the article entitled Albanians, Albanianism and the strategic subversion of
stereotypes, by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (2008), arguing how the stereotypical imageries and discourses in Europe of Albanians as culturally backward and prone to violence, have forced contemporary transnational Albanian migrants into subverting their identities and into ‘strategies and practices of identity mimicry’. Schwandner asserts that:

This powerful stereotypical imagery, a sub-category of balkanism known as Albanianism, can be traced through various European historical literature and contemporary policy as well as in historical auto-imagery which all have always mutually mirrored and influenced each other…‘Albanian violence’ valorized according to political and economic interests, i.e. romantically glorified as ‘noble’ or demonised – typically in reference to customary kanun traditions and customary ideals of heroism, manly courage and honour – in both hetero- and auto-imageries. But, equally, mutually skeptical attitudes (Occidentalist and Orientalist) can be identified as well as the historical precedents for outsiders appropriating paternalist protectionism towards the Albanians in reference to ‘primitive’ local customs (Schwandner-Sievers 2008: 47).

Despite Todorova’s argument, colonialism was present in the Balkans for those Muslims in such as the Albanians. For example, the Ottoman conquest was colonialism of the whole of the Balkans, but more recently the Serbs throughout the 19th and 20th century occupied Albanian territories, and later the Serbs were replaced with NATO, UN, EU, KFOR, etc.,. Many international and Western contemporaneous travellers and residence in Kosovo, have taken it upon themselves to write about Kosovo. Books have appeared with such titles as ‘Travels in Blood and Honey’, ‘The Rubbish-Picker's Wife’ and ‘Edith and I’ by Elizabeth Gowing, who not only exoticises the Albanians but also constructs herself as the Edwardian Edith Durham who wrote Orientalised accounts of the Albanians. Books such as ‘Travels in Blood and Honey’ ooze Albanianism. As one interviewee suggested:
KG: Well I mean, uh uh there is this Serbian director Emir Kustunica who once became famous and he stayed famous ever since, by just doing what [Name deleted] and his wife are doing with Kosovo. By taking the worst and the most authentic elements and by portraying them to a international audience as the the most important element and uh that’s why you still have I dunno every British newspaper whenever they talk about Kosovo you see a picture of a you know toothless old man or a mosque. But if you go to Prishtina you know that you will not see any old man and you can only see mosque in the old part of the centre of the city. But that’s just basically the authentic image that the British press and is putting to the to their audience, because that’s easy to identify it. If they put Prishtina in a view of Prishtina or a book about Kosovo or a book about Albanians which tells that you know people there in Prishtina drink coffee just like they do in London and they get drunk just like they do in London there is nothing interesting about there is nothing unique about that...

What the above quote demonstrates is a representation of Kosovo and Albanians as ‘others’ by focusing on particular stereotypes or ‘authentic’ elements that positions the Albanians as ‘others’. However, at simultaneously it demonstrates a hegemonic desire by Kosovo Albanians who aspire and desire to be seen in a similar light as ‘western’ Europeans.

That the Albanians of the Balkans, stand in opposition to the ‘West’ in a similar binary fashion as the Orient and Occident is evident, however, Albanophobia as well as the stereotypical imagery of Albanians, is not only a sub-category of Balkanism, but a category in itself, one that not only applies to the binary of the ‘East’ and ‘West’, but also within the Balkans, this why as Sievers (2008) discovered, Albanians preferred to subvert their identities to Croatian, that Croatian, which is also a Balkan identity, was perceived as more positive than Albanian. It could be argued that just like the Balkans is ‘haunting western culture’ the Albanians have haunted their Balkan and European neighbours (Poulton and Taji-Farouki, 1997). For western culture and the Balkans, the Christian Slavs who are
opposed to the Islamic ‘oriental other’ continue to be more accepted and less non-European, compared to the Muslim Albanians. Kosovo and Albania sit in the middle of Europe with ninety per cent Muslim populations. This is a challenge that continues to affect both Kosovo and Albania in their EU accession aspirations. Identity mimicry, denial of an Ottoman past, as well as subversion of identity result from Albanianism and are further explored in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

The following section will explore in more depth the theoretical foundations of this thesis and the epistemological and ontological foundations of identity literature and theory relevant to this study as well as how hegemony and discourse operate in the process of identity construction.

2.3. Identity, Hegemony and Discourse

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas (Marx and Engels, 1970: 64)

This section focuses on social constructivist epistemological and ontological identity theory. In addition, a brief historical context of the identity politics in Kosovo from the period of the Ottoman Empire until the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 and beyond is discussed. This will help situate my study and research participants.\(^\text{*13}\) I have elaborated throughout this thesis, that my research explores the discursive construction of identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK through in-depth interviews and critical discourse analysis. My

\(^{13}\) This was the second time that Kosovo declared independence, the first time was in 1992, however only Albania recognized it, whereas, in 2008 the declaration of independence, had the support of the international community and the international organizations such as UNMIK, NATO and the EU.
aim is to explore the ways in which ‘subjects-in-process’, which are arguably caught up in multicultural, transnational and diasporic flows, narrate, perform and construct their identities. Furthermore, through analysis of these narrative accounts, I will investigate identity construction, as well as identity politics and the socio-political setting, including issues around integration and representation. In order to explore this, I have also chosen to focus on cultural and physical landscapes identified as home, homeland, and host country.

Lissa H. Malkki argues that contemporaneous notions of nativeness and native places have become very complex due the way in which people have started seeing and identifying themselves, as well as the fact that they are categorized in relation to what she calls ‘determinitalized "homelands," "cultures," and "origins."’ (Malkki in Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 52) Thus migration and globalization are no longer about moving from one place to settle in another but what she describes as people who are ‘chronically mobile and routinely displaced, inventing homes and homelands in the absence of territorial, national bases -- not in situ but through memories of and claims on places that they can or will no longer corporeally inhabit’ (Malkki in Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 52). Contemporaneously, as Ernesto Laclau has remarked, there is a new and widespread proliferation in interest on social, national and political identities or multiple identities’ (Laclau 1992: 83).

It is not surprising then that Seyla Benhabib has warned that ‘identity’ and ‘[t]he negotiation of identity/difference … is the political problem facing democracies on a global scale (Benhabib 1996, in Wodak et al., 2009: 3). For Seyla Benhabib, identity is viewed as ‘differentiating oneself from what one is not,’ (1996: 3) So to use Benhabib’s example that one is a Bosnian Serb only to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem (in Wodak et al., 2009: 3) I argue that Kosovo Albanian identity, is not simply ‘I am Kosovo Albanian because I am not a Kosovo Serb or Serbian, or Albanian’ but it is more complex and
especially so vis-à-vis the diasporas context. Therefore, I aim to explore not only the process of identification, sameness or looking for clusters of togetherness, nor just identifying with one ‘sameness’ to differentiate another, but likewise I aim to explore the inherent ambivalence of identity and the discourses that attract and repel towards one or another identity, in a perpetual state of flux.

Wodak et al., (2009), focusing on Austria, have argued that national identity:

The national identity of individuals who perceive themselves as belonging to a national collectivity is manifested, inter alia, in their social practices, one of which is discursive practice. The respective national identity is shaped by state, political, institutional, media and everyday social practices, and the material and social conditions which emerge as their results, to which the individual is subjected. The discursive practice as a special form of social practice plays a central part both in the formation and in the expression of national identity (Wodak et al., 1999: 29-30).

Whereas, Christina Julios (2008), argues that:

[O]ur sense of identity ultimately depends on the meanings attached to it by us and those around us. Perceptions are indeed a fundamental factor in determining how individuals view themselves, how, in turn, they view others, and how others eventually look upon them. A second-generation English-speaking Bangladeshi child brought up in the East End of London, for example, may see themselves as being wholly British; however it is unlikely that the rest of the indigenous white British population may regard them as being ‘one of them’. Similarly, a Mexican-American child born and raised in the United States, may consider themselves to be a fully-fledged US citizen; however they will hardly be regarded in the same fashion by members of the dominant white North American Anglo-Saxon society (Julios 2008: 9).

Inherent in this argument is also hegemony and hegemonic ideology. In her 1981 essay, Chantal Mouffe (1981:173) similarly to Laclau (1977) argues that this ideology is ‘a battle
field where the principle classes struggle for the appropriation of the fundamental ideological elements of their society in order to articulate them to their discourse’ (in Bridges and Brunt, 1981: 173). This is a question of hegemony, which is particularly relevant in the Kosovo Albanian context also due to Kosovo’s history in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Thus, the ways in which a group is dominated is a question of discourse, power and hegemony.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx & Engels 1970: 64).

Raymond Williams (1977) further defines ‘hegemony’ as a complex, subtle ideology that penetrates into the ‘whole of living.’ Hegemony then according to Williams is a:

Whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values-constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming… [i]t is, that is to say, in the strongest sense a ‘culture’, but a culture which has to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes (Williams, 1997: 110).

Hegemony can be understood as both constitutive and constituting within the process of identity construction. Therefore, it can be argued that individuals construct their identities according to a number of subject positions and the meanings they attribute to them (Foucault, 1977), which is dependent on hegemony. This process of identity construction occurs through evaluations by others and themselves, within particular historic contexts, circumstances, relations, discourses and institutions (Foucault, 1977; 1980; 1982).
The following will explore the different historic context, circumstances, relations, discourses and institutions that relate to Kosovo’s numerous imposed hegemonic identities and eventual declaration of independence and formation of new national identity.

The newest state in Europe Kosovo (independence 17 February 2008), similar to all of South-Eastern Europe, was under Ottoman rule for nearly five hundred years. Not until the national awakenings and uprisings of the nineteenth century, which led to the Balkan Wars 1912-1913, did modern nation states exist, such as Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Hungary. However, Albania did not achieve this status (although the uprisings and the Balkan Wars raged in Albanian ethnic territories since the 19th century), until 1912 when it declared itself an independent state. Despite this declaration of independence, unrest continued and the Great Powers convened in Berlin at the conference held in 1912 and then a year later at the conference of London in 1913 where they decided the fate of the Albanian people. Although ethnic Albanians lived in the south of Albania, known as Cameria, this was annexed to Greece, whereas in the north the Albanians were divided between Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece (Vickers 1998). Thus the population of what is modern Kosovo and used to be the Ottoman Villayet of Kosovo, which also included Skopje as the capital of the Villayet of Kosovo, were divided. The territory that was annexed by Serbia, was still referred to as Kosovo, and was inhabited by a majority Albanian population. This population saw Albania proper as its mainland, and a strong nationalistic feeling as well as political movements, and uprisings continued. However, this was pacified during the Second World War when the Kosovo Albanians joined forces with Serbian and Albanian communist partisans, later joining Yugoslavia under Josip Bros Tito. However, unlike the other ethnic

14 Parts of Hungary were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; however, other parts were part of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the modern states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and northern Serbia were also part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, until WW1.
groups in Yugoslavia, the Albanians of Kosovo did not get recognition as a Republic nation state but as a province of Serbia with autonomous powers, which were only later granted by Tito in 1974. Although, at the time, the majority of the population was ethnic Albanians, there were a substantial number of Serbs indigenous to Kosovo. In addition, Kosovo is home to Byzantine churches and Monasteries that are important to Orthodox Christian Serbs as well as Albanians. But, since most Albanians had converted to Islam and under Tito religion was not practiced in public this was not a problem until the 1980’s when the disintegration of Yugoslavia began. This situation proved grave for the region and the Albanians found themselves an ethnic minority in Serbia (Vickers 1998, Wingfield 2003). This led to the Albanians uniting under their ethnicity and as a minority ethnic identity in the absence of a Yugoslav national identity (Jovic 2009). George Schopflin (1996) following Bourdieu (1993), states that ethnicity is a:

[C]ommunity which enables a reproduction of culture...a system of moral regulation within communities. Cultural identity of a community is a means by which it affirms its moral value vis-à-vis others. The elements of culture (language, religion, customs, and historical legacy) serve to an ethnic community for defining borders towards other communities’ (Schopflin 1996: 99).

After WW2, Kosovo Albanians showed allegiance to Yugoslavia. However, when Tito died in 1980 it was clear that Yugoslavia was at threat of disintegrating. In 1981, Soon after Tito’s death, the students of the University of Prishtina started protesting, demanding equal rights with their Serb counterparts, which led to widespread support and protests throughout Kosovo. The Yugoslav army was sent to Kosovo and the province declared a state of emergency. It is strongly suggested that after Tito’s death the discourse of brotherhood and unity, which had underpinned the construction of a Yugoslav Federal identity, was starting to sway. By the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia had
serious problems. This included financial crisis, as the economy was in recession, leading to an increase in nationalism, which brought Slobodan Milosevic to power in 1989 (refer to the speech Milosevic gave at the Battle of Kosovo 600 year anniversary, which kicked off the awakened Serb nationalism and enabled Milosevic to mobilize and set against each other the numerous ethnic identities that had been united by Tito under communism and the slogan of ‘brotherhood and unity’.

According to Schopflin, a ‘prominent role in that process is played by intellectuals, who have monopoly over cultural production’, he also highlights that this contributed to the ‘causes of intensive ethno-nationalist conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe’ Schöpflin (1996: 99—107). However, as Schopfin also notes these intellectuals were able to impose and preserve language standards (Schopflin 1996). Moreover, language (as it has been epistemologically established by scholars since the enlightenment) is very important in all cultural relations and productions. Not only is language crucial to identifying with and within a community, but it is also how identity is articulated and also carries social, as well as, political implications. Politically, the implications in Kosovo under Milosovic were immense. Not only did Milosevic revoke Kosovo’s autonomy, but he also banned the Albanian language from state institutions. This led the Kosovo Albanians to set up the parallel Albanian language system, which included schools and university as well as healthcare centers and doctors’ surgeries (which were held in private rented houses). This parallel system continued to operate until Milosevic began the ethnic cleansing and in some cases until the Serb army withdrew after the NATO bombings.  

15 For those who are interested further in the history of Kosovo, see Noel Malcom’s seminal historical monograph Kosovo A Short History (1998). Although not part of this current study, the parallel Kosovo
Therefore, language not only enables articulation of identity but also political allegiances, discourses of national unity, discourses of national and cultural greatness and so on, as well as narratives of belonging or exclusion. Consequently, it is through ‘narratives’ or what Wodak (2009) refers to as discursive practices, that individual identities, ethnic, cultural, sexual as well as national identities are constructed and re-constructed also in relation to each other.

Identity studies continue to occupy a central role in social science and cultural studies discussions, especially around increasingly politicised issues, such as nation, immigrant/ion, migration, asylum, borders and exile (Cohen 1997; Gilroy 1987, 1993; Hall 1990; Rouse 1991, 1995; Safran 1991; Tololyan 1991, Vertovec 1999).

In cultural studies literature, the social constructionist theoretical framework that identity/s is not simply a matter of aligning with one homeland normative or non-normative identity against another host country identity is not uncommon. However, this does not necessarily mean that the term does not convey ambiguities, in fact, as Stephanie Lawler has recently stated ‘Identity’ is a difficult term: more or less everyone knows what it means and yet its precise definition proves slippery’. Therefore, similarly to dominant social constructivist studies, throughout this thesis, the term ‘identity’ is intended as a complex subjective process, which is created through language. Following on from many scholars such as Stuart Hall, who have argued that ‘identity’ is a melting pot of amalgamated, unstable, fragmented, mobile and incessant performances of personal and collective history, culture, background, politics, and self, in a perpetual discursive process (Hall 1990&1996, Bauman 1996, 2000, Albanian system, which was established in Kosovo during the Milosevic regime, is interesting and requires further study.

16 This is also true of the term ‘diaspora’ and ‘diasporic identity’, which is discussed in the following chapter.

Discourse, as Foucault (1972: 117, 1980: 119) defines it, produces and reinforces dominance and thus power. This power is not merely a phenomenon that exists in a neutral state, or even in a negative repressive function, but on the contrary this power is ‘productive’ and ‘runs through the whole social body. Thus:

What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault 1980: 119).

This is particularly important in relation to what then becomes positive or negative discourse, or simply ‘true’ or ‘wrong’ identity, since as Jørgensen & Phillips have emphasized ‘[t]ruth is a discursive construction and different regimes of knowledge determine what is true and false’ (2002:13). Thus what is at stake is not only the self-ascription of identity and multiple identities, but how the self-ascribed or defined identity is influenced by language, discourse and others ascriptions.

In addition, ‘…identities are never completed, never finished; that they are always as subjectivity itself is, in process. Splitting between that which one is, and that which is the other…’ (Hall 2000: 144-154). Identity is matter of 'becoming' as well as of 'being'. It belongs
to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture (Hall 1990: 225).\textsuperscript{17}

Hall’s assertion that ‘identity’ is not an ‘already accomplished fact, which the new cultural practices then represent’ also underpins my position throughout this research. Instead identity is a “production”, which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation’ (Hall 1990: 222). Hall also states that identity is not about sameness but about the Other. Hall argues that:

The notion that identity has to do with people that look the same, feel the same, call themselves the same, is nonsense. As a process, as a narrative, as a discourse, it is always told from the position of the Other (Hall, 1997: 49).

In this study, my aim is thus not to attempt a retrieval of particular past or consolidation of sameness. My aim is to explore how identities are positioned and position us in discourse and through discursive practices (Hall 1990).

Hall ‘rearticulates the relationship between subjects and discursive practices’, he describes in detail that cultural practices and systems of representation ‘always implicate the positions from which we speak or write - the positions of enunciation’ (Hall 1990: 222). Accordingly, since on the one hand ‘[w]e cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, about “one experience, one identity”’, on the other hand, we cannot do so for multiple identities, or cultural identity, since although cultural identities ‘come from somewhere, have histories

\textsuperscript{17} Stuart Hall is one of the most influential British cultural theorists who pioneered theory and ideas on identity, race, class and representation. As David Morley and Kuan-Hising Chen (1996) proclaim ‘Stuart Hall’s work has been central to the formation and development of cultural studies as an international discipline’. Other scholars have asserted that Hall’s engagement with questions of ‘race’, ethnicity and identity has provided the frameworks of anti-essentialist identity theory (eds Hall and Paul du Gay 1996, Morley and Chen 1996, Bauman 1996, du Gay et al 2000, Brubaker 2000, Benwell and Stokoe 2006, Barker 2007, Lawler 2008, Wodak et al 2009).
…they [also] undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power’ (Hall 1990). Thus:

This is the Other that belongs inside one. This is the Other that one can only know from the place from which one stands. This is the self as it is inscribed in the gaze of the Other. And this notion which breaks down the boundaries, between outside and inside, between those who belong and those who do not, between those whose histories have been written and those whose histories they have depended on but whose histories cannot be spoken… This doubleness of discourse, this necessity of the Other to the self (Hall 1997: 48).

Hall goes on to state that identity is embedded in narrative, which he argues is also a form of representation. For more on this within this study, see Chapter 3, on Methodology, which will address this further by exploring the work of Mikhail Bahktin, and the concepts of hetereglossia and dialogics.

Bauman (2000) suggests that this constant flux and difference that Hall speaks of, in a modern globalized world can be described as ‘liquid’, whereas Lawler (2008), draws on the ambiguities of the term, stating that ‘[t]he notion of identity hinges on an apparently paradoxical combination of sameness and difference’ (Lawler 2008: 2). Difference rather than sameness has captured the imagination of most scholars, thus for Laclau (2000:8) difference is at the root of the most important theoretical approaches that have emerged. Laclau states:

The category of difference, in one way or the other, is at the root of the most important theoretical approaches of the last thirty years. Nomadic identities in Deleuze and Guattari, micro-physics of power in Foucault, differance in Derrida, the logic of the signifier in Lacan, are alternative ways of dealing with the constitutive character of ‘difference’ (Laclau 2000: 8).
Therefore, identity is located within discourse and through discursive practices. Both discourses and the subject positions resulting from them are not fixed but rather dependent upon time and place as well as historical and social context (Foucault, 1977). As such identity can be understood as being fluid, at times paradoxical and always dependent upon discourses and contexts. This conceptual framework of identity follows a long tradition within social-constructionist and CDA identity studies. Consequently my research takes the position that identities are products of hegemony and discourse, which are not fixed but in constant negotiations depending on historic contexts, situations and institutions (Foucault, 1977; 1980; 1982). Overall, identity it context bound and identity is located within discourse and produced through discursive practices and regulations (Wodak 2009).

Nonetheless, this study also argues that diasporas and ethnic minorities do not possess self-evident identity/ies, in fact, their very existence puts into question belonging, notions of allegiance as well as highlighting differences and exclusion. It is worth noting here, that in the UK however, ethnicity and ethnic identity are sometimes viewed differently. Giddens (2006) argues:

In Britain [...] ethnicity is commonly used to refer to cultural practices and traditions that differ from ‘indigenous’ British practices. The term ‘ethnic’ is applied [...] to designate practices that are ‘non-British’ [...], where certain parts of the population are seen as ‘ethnic’ and others are not. In fact, ethnicity is an attribute possessed by all members of a population [...]. Yet [...] in practice ethnicity is most often associated with minority groups within a population (Giddens, 2006: 487-488).

I suggest that on the contrary not only ethnicity, but also diaspora and diasporic identity need to be re-theorised and not be viewed as essentialised. There is a need to avoid lists of classification, which predominate previous scholarly work in diasporas (for example see
Safran 1991 and Cohen 1999) and to allow for self-ascriptions of being and belonging, similarly to ways in which race and identity have been re-theorised to accommodate self-ascriptions. Diaspora and diasporic identity are also constructed through discourse, which is mutually construed, by both host societies and homelands. Furthermore, the focus of diaspora studies and theory needs to turn its gaze towards homelands, since diaspora are not only constructed within diasporic contexts or host society contexts, but also by homeland contexts and diasporic flows, similarly to global flows, which are also multidirectional.

By using the example of Kosovo Albanains and Kosovo, which I would argue, is complex in nature due to Kosovo’s and Albania’s history and geo-political position, I aim to argue that similarly to Stuart Hall’s suggestion that Caribbean identity is always diasporic, the Kosovo Albanian is always diasporic whether in Kosovo or not. In fact, although Hall’s work is fundamental in understanding identity, cultural identity and diaspora, it does not lay the foundations for current de-territorialized homelands and take into account that there may exist multiple homelands. For Kosovo there exists an Albanian homeland, as the borders of Albania established by the Great Powers in 1913 excluded Kosovo, as well as a Yugoslav homeland, since Kosovo was incorporated into Yugoslavia after WW2. Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and later the 2008 declaration of independence that led to the establishment of the state of Kosovo, all suggest ‘rootless’ and de-territorialised places of origin, which

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18 As Demmers (2009) identified, there are problems with references to countries of origin as ‘homelands’ and countries of residence as ‘host countries or societies’. It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide alternatives, however, I do recognise that implicit in such lexical choices is the notion of a home or permanence in one place as opposed to the temporality or transitory nature of the other which is problematic, although I have continued to use these terms. Perhaps reference to ‘homelands’ as ‘countries of heritage’ and ‘host societies’ as ‘countries of settlement’ might prove more useful. However, the notion of both heritage and settlement may also bring their own complications to the debate.

19 I intend the term ‘multidirectional’ to suggest a process of exchanges (bipolar and multipolar), between people, ideas, discourses as well as other cultural exchanges. Multidirectional suggests that identities can oscillate and move and that they are dynamic between one or more places as well as when transiting for example through airports. This is not only a multiple identity i.e. mother, woman, British and Kosovan, but also an identity that is constructed in relation to two or more places, such as Kosovo and Britain, and is not only fluid but also strategic and is constructed by discourses from both homeland and host societies.
Kosovo is one of many. Werbner (2002) has suggested in the case of Pakistani diaspora in the UK, that they are not a single ‘ethnic group’ bounded by a ‘single boundary, but contains boundaries within boundaries’ (Werbner 2002: 64). Werbner does not address this further. In contrast, it is my argument that multiple identities and ‘boundaries’ also originate from the complex establishment of - in this case - the Pakistani state and that particular historical context. This is also problematised by Bowman (in Laclau 1994) with regard to the construction of identities by Palestinian exiles. Thus, notions of diaspora and identity do not always originate from stable territorialized nation state homelands, not even for states possessing multicultural and multiethnic origins.

Recently scholars have argued that diasporas are hybrid and fragmented, however, my aim is to also suggest that the self is never complete (Hegel, 1807; Heidegger, 1962). Therefore a diasporic context is not the place that produces these hybridity/ies and fragmentations. To suggest that diaspora communities produce such hybridity and fragmentation represents the diasporic as unusual from mainstream society. Identity and the self are always in flux and fragmented regardless of diasporic or national context, they are never complete, and to borrow from Bakhtin (1981), they are dialogic (see also Stuart Hall, in Hall and Du Gay, 1996). This thesis, therefore, investigates discursive actions and practices exploring how through discursive and social practices, identity is constructed, while simultaneously exploring how identity and national and cultural belonging are shaped by both a diasporic and homeland context. The following sections will discuss Diaspora theory and scholarship as well as the conceptual framework employed in this study.
2.4. Diaspora Scholarship and re-theorising Diaspora

A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing. Martin Heidegger, 'Building, dwelling, thinking' (in Bhabha 2004 edition)

‘Diaspora’ is not a term often deployed in the UK, neither by the UK media, who prefer to focus on immigration, or migrants, nor the general public. Nonetheless, much scholarly research has explored this concept (Safran 1991, Hall 1992, Clifford 1994, Cohen 1996). Diaspora provides a particular way of representing and understanding a community who live outside either a real or imagined country of origin. Whilst it promotes one way of seeing or discussing particular identity/ies or people, inevitably like all discursive constructions, it can restrict and deny other interpretations or understandings. However, in some cases it has also come to mean either very little or far too much. Scholarly publications persistently focus on diasporic communities or build on recent proliferation in diaspora and identity studies, which generally depart from the work of Arjun Appadurai, Paul Gilroy, William Safran, Khachig Tölölyan, Stuart Hall, Daniel and Jonathan Boyarin, Robin Cohen, Akhil Gupta, and many more. Although, these scholars were working within anti-essentialist paradigms, diaspora scholarship seems to continue to theories inherent essentialisms, especially by focusing on host society communities and their imagination of a homeland. To understand diaspora’s complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its relationship(s) with the imagined homeland/host-land.

In this section, my focus is on current scholarly debates and issues on diaspora as well as my arguments for a need to re-theorise diaspora theory and scholarship to include homeland discourses and other homeland involvement in diaspora relations.
According to Appadurai (1989), diasporas ‘always leave a trail of collective memory about another place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment’ (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1989: i). Hall, Gilroy, and Clifford have departed from more traditional definitions of the concept of diaspora, suggesting that diaspora and cultural identities are intertwined, symbiotic, liquid, and imagined. Benedict Anderson’s (1983) imagined communities not only apply to national and normative identities but also apply to non-national as well as non-normative identities and cultural and diasporic identities and communities.

Thus following social constructionist theory, diasporic identities and communities are socially and discursively constructed, as well as imagined and can be based upon myths of a common origin, ethnicity or other historical past. However, such imagination may not necessarily be based within communities in host counties. Homelands can construct and imagine diaspora, this study aims to highlight the multidimensional flow of diaspora construction between both those in the host society and in the homeland.

Moreover, diaspora communities are not only not homogenous, nor are only diaspora communities hybrid, hybridity exists in mainstream society as well. Furthermore, as the empirical data demonstrates an essentialist (essentialised) diaspora identity does not exist in a clear and list-able way as scholars such as Safran (1991) and Cohen (1995) have suggested, that Diasporas are also constructed by homelands, and there are differences between diaspora communities in different host countries, such as in the Kosovo Albanian case there are differences between those residing in the UK or Germany or Sweden.

Diaspora’s nostalgia for the homeland has been well researched and documented in copious literature, however, literature exploring homeland representations and discourses about diaspora is still lacking.
In 1991, William Safran published a journal article on the subject of diaspora entitled ‘Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return’. Safran defined Diasporas as:

Expatriate minority communities (1) that are dispersed from an original ‘center’ to at least two ‘peripheral’ places; that maintain a "memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland"; that "believe they are not-and perhaps cannot be fully accepted by their host country"; that see the ancestral home as a place of eventual return, when the time is right; (5) that are committed to the maintenance or restoration of this homeland; and (6) of which the group's consciousness and solidarity are "importantly defined" by this continuing relationship with the homeland (Safran 1991: 83-84).

However, ‘in terms of that definition’, Safran writes, ‘we may legitimately speak of the Armenian, Maghrebi, Turkish, Palestinian, Cuban, Greek, and perhaps Chinese diasporas at present and of the Polish diaspora of the past, although none of them fully conforms to the 'ideal type' of the Jewish diaspora’ (1991:84). Robin Cohen (1996) criticized Safran for this definition and suggested the following nine point categorization:

(1)dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically; (2) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions; (3) a collective memory and myth about the homeland; (4) an idealization of the supposed ancestral home; (5) a return movement; (6) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time; (7) a troubled relationship with host societies; (8) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and (9) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries (Cohen 1997: 180).

Braziel and Mannur (2003), argue that there is dispersal and instability in the term diaspora, due to instability in what was previously presumed clearly demarcated geographic territory, national identity, and belonging. They define diaspora from the etymological origins of the
Greek term diasperien, from dia-across and sperien “to sow or scatter seeds”. Braziel and Mannur, argue that ‘diaspora’ suggests a dislocation from the nation-states, territories, or countries. This is a fairly mainstream contemporaneous definition, which does not really go far enough in exploring diaspora/ric, outside a territoriality of some kind. However, they do depart from the strict Safran and Cohen definitions of diaspora, stating that ‘diaspora can perhaps be seen as a naming of the other which has historically referred to displaced communities of people who have been dislocated from their native homeland through the movements of migration, immigration, or exile (2003: 1). Braziel and Mannur 2003 also state that:

Diasporic subjects are marked by hybridity and heterogeneity — cultural, linguistic, ethnic, national — and these subjects are defined by a traversal of the boundaries demarcating nation and diaspora (Braziel and Mannur 2003: 5).

Braziel and Mannur suggest that hybridity and heterogeneity exist between different diasporic subjects, however, such hybridity and heterogeneity exists with supposedly the same diasporic communities. Noting such differences within diasporic subjects suggests that those who are not diasporic are binary opposites and thus homogenous, that the diasporic are the mix, however, those considered indigenous, whether in host or homeland societies are equally hybrid and heterogeneous. As Avtar Brah has also noted that diasporas, or ‘the word ‘diaspora’, often invoke the imagery of traumas of separation and dislocation, and this is certainly a very important aspect of the migratory experience’ (1996: 193). Although this also is very important, and in the case of Kosovo Albanians who experienced the violent dissolution of Former Yugoslavia as well as the 1999 war, for me, diaspora as James Clifford (1994: 320) has noted is a ‘traveling term’ in ‘changing global conditions’, and thus also changes and evolves, and that changes in the imagination and performance of a diasporic
identity are dependent on such changing conditions, local as well as global. Thus, as Clifford explains:

[C]ontemporary diasporic practices cannot be reduced to epiphenomena of the nation-state or of global capitalism. While defined and constrained by these structures, they also exceed and criticize them: old and new diasporas offer resources for emergent "postcolonialisms." The essay focuses on recent articulations of diasporism from contemporary black Britain and from anti-Zionist Judaism: quests for nonexclusive practices of community, politics, and cultural difference.

Thus, not only is territory or the ‘nation-state, as common territory and time’ traversed and subverted by diasporic attachments, furthermore, as Clifford has argued, ‘diasporic populations do not come from elsewhere in the same way that "immigrants" do’. However, Avtar Brah states, this does not mean that exclusion and inclusion or otherness, or othering are not present:

Diaspora space is the point at which boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, of belonging and otherness, of ‘us’ and ‘them’, are contested. My argument is that diaspora space as a conceptual category is ‘inhabited’, not only by those who have migrated and their descendants, but equally by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous. In other words the concept of diaspora space (as opposed to that of diaspora) includes the entanglement, the intertwining of the genealogies of dispersion with those of ‘staying put’. The diaspora space is the site where the native is as much a diasporian as the diasporian is the native (Brah, 1996: 209).

Brah’s notion of a ‘diaspora space’ can provide an alternative to thinking about identities, and more specifically national identities. This dimension could enable and empower individuals to question state-sponsored national identities, if not other discursively constructed dominant hegemonic identities such as class, gender, sexuality and many more. However, in terms of
national spaces, she argues that in the case of England, ‘African-Caribbean, Irish, Asian, Jewish and other diasporas intersect among themselves as well as with the entity constructed as ‘Englishness’, thoroughly re-inscribing it in the process’ (Brah, 1996, p. 209). This may undermine dominant hegemonies and essentialist national identities, both in host nation-states as well as homeland nation-states, thus creating a third space, neither here nor there, which destabilise homogenous discourses. As Homi Bhabha has noted (2004 edition):

The move away from the singularities of 'class' or 'gender' as primary conceptual and organizational categories, has resulted in an awareness of the subject positions - of race, gender, generation, institutional location, geopolitical locale, sexual orientation - that inhabit any claim to identity in the modern world. What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These 'in-between' spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood - singular or communal - that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself (Bhabha 2004: 2).

While as Brah notes, diaspora is inhabited not only by those who have migrated and their descendants but also by those who are constructed and represented as indigenous (1996: 181). Furthermore, the ‘indigenous’ are neither singular nor homogenous either. Thus diasporas not only subvert both notions of the homeland and host country and create what Paul Gilroy described as alternate public spheres (1987), or as Clifford suggests ‘forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time/space in order to live inside, with a difference’ (Clifford 1994: 308). Nor as Paul Gilroy explains, do diaspora only stand:

As an alternative to the metaphysics of ‘race’, nation and bounded culture coded into the body, diaspora is a concept that problematizes the cultural and
historical mechanics of belonging. It disrupts the fundamental power of territory to determine identity by breaking the simple sequence of explanatory links between, place, location and consciousness ... Consciousness of diaspora affiliation stands opposed to the distinctively modern structures and modes of power orchestrated by the institutional complexity of nation-states. Diaspora identification exists outside of, and sometimes in opposition to, the political forms and codes of modern citizenship (Gilroy, 1997: 328-329).

On the contrary, it is precisely this diaspora discourse, which is constructed and acts to separate and neutralise the construction of diaspora as the ‘weird’ of mainstream societies, in order to stand ‘opposed to …nation- states’ with their assumed hybridity and heterogeneity as strange and foreign clusters that function as the ‘other’ for nation-states, against the assumption of the uniformity of the nation state, whether in a host society or homeland. Furthermore, Anthias, (1998) proposes diaspora also function as alternative to the ethnic paradigm, however this functions within paradigms that view ethnicity as Giddens (2006) has described it within the British context, where it is commonly used in reference to cultural practices not considered British ‘indigenous’ practices. Therefore, this renews the notion of diaspora as somewhat strange from indigenous societies, without incurring the charges of racism, but also ethnicity or the ‘ethnic’ which has also incurred criticism, therefore now diaspora or diaspora communities are used to mark that difference.

Nonetheless, Brubaker (2005) and Sökefeld (2006) have suggested previous diaspora criteria are problematic, as they tend to essentialise and to categorize all individuals sharing a point of origin as a diasporic group. Brubaker suggests instead to ‘study empirically the degree and form of support for a diasporic project among members of its putative constituency’ (Brubaker, 2005: 13). However, Brubaker’s suggestion of membership and ‘putative constituency’ are also problematic, suggesting shared particulars among diasporic groups, which are on the contrary produced through discourses and power rather than inherent and
natural attributes. Whereas, Sökefeld (2006) recommends that a definition of diaspora needs to include an imagined transnational community, which is socially constructed. However, diaspora identity/ies are constructed similarly to national and cultural identity/ies. The complexities of these different discursive forces acting with each other and within each other create many different dynamics. Issues such as belonging, inclusion and exclusion not only plague government policy makers but also individual members of mainstream society, as well as diasporic communities. As Homi Bhabha has stated:

The representation of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, ongoing negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation (Bhabha 2004: 3).

For diasporic communities, inclusion, exclusion and belonging, are not only relevant upon the point of exit from the homeland but also from the moment of the conception of the diasporic state of being. On the one hand, exclusion and inclusion are also experienced upon returning to the ‘homeland’. On the other hand, scholarly research has focused on the hardship of being torn from the homeland and a constant feeling of liminality in the host society (Turner 1969, Sreberny in Cottle 2000). However, diasporas are not only marked by exclusion, physically and psychologically, from their hostland but also from their homeland society.

Some scholars such as Ang (2001) have analysed feelings of exclusion once those who return to countries of origin find themselves to be different. For example and important aspect of this is language, such as the evolution of language in diaspora and the ability or inability to speak the homeland language as well as western languages. What problem does not speaking
the language of the homeland pose, as well as, to what extend does speaking English or German privilege one.

Ang (2001) explores the issue of language in identifying with a national and cultural identity, in her case Chineseness. She argues that the ‘ambivalences of being interpellated, increasingly frequently, as ‘Chinese’ (even though [she] was born in Indonesia, a very different place in Asia than China)” (2001: 11). For Ang, it is clear that this is typical of the diasporic of being neither here nor there, and her family history also testifies to this. For example, when her grandfather returned to China in the late 1920s he observed that ‘the mainland Chinese no longer saw him as ‘one of them’ (2001: 27).

Therefore, as Homi Bhabha (2004 edition) states, ‘[t]he problem is not simply the “selfhood” of the nation as opposed to the “otherness” of other nations or the diaspora. We are confronted with is the nation split within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its population (Bhabha 2004: 212), therefore, although diaspora are also ‘split within itself’, this split is not symptomatic of diaspora or originating form there, on the contrary, the nation is also split.

In what Robin Cohen (1995) has described as ‘Fuzzy Frontiers of Identity’, in Britain, identity constructions of both British normative identity as well as minority identity continue to be hot topics. Although research has previously predominantly focused on populations that have migrated from British colonies, some work has also emerged on groups that have resulted from recent wars and conflicts in what Vertovec (2007) has termed ‘super-diversity’.

Parallel to recent increased migration, as well as issues around multiculturalism, integration and immigration, research focusing on transnational and multicultural theoretical and methodological perspectives is abundant. Diaspora studies and diasporic identity has, since the early 1990’s, also received much attention (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc,
1994 and Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004, Swedenberg 1996, Vertovec 2006; 2009, Vathi 2013, Cohen 1999, Brubacker 2000, Baumen, Brah, Chow, Ang). In addition, a considerable amount of literature has been published on transnationalism (reference, Cohen, Hall, Vortevec 2007). According Steven Vortevec (2009), studies dealing with transnationalism are ‘…everywhere, at least in social science.’ Furthermore, they transcend disciplines and the large volume of published studies focuses on a range of topics such as ‘economic, social and political linkages between people, places and institutions crossing nation-states borders and spanning the world’ (Vortevec 2009: 1).

Although studies on transnationalism and diaspora have focused on the links that people have between places, spaces and even online platforms, studies focusing on diaspora relations especially on problems and frictions with the homeland are still lacking. Nevertheless, in the UK, research on the different diasporic communities, especially in the wake of postcolonial studies is plentiful. However, much less research has considered the ‘new’ diasporas, especially those that emerged after the brake-up of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Wars of the 1990’s. The following section will map and explore the current studies about Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

2.6. Studies about Kosovo Albanians in the UK

In recent years, there has been an increased interest in the ethnic groups that migrated from former Yugoslavia and other Easter European areas. As far as the Kosovo Albanian community in the UK is concerned, the amount of literature on this topic has started to appear over the past ten years, however, despite the relatively large number of Kosovo Albanian migrants dispersed throughout the world, there are still substantial gaps in literature exploring
identity formation, changes and transnational movements as well as interactions between the host and home countries. Perhaps this is partially due to Kosovo’s status, which until it declared independence in 2008, was undefined. For over twenty years, Kosovo was in a liminal state of existence, with its population continuously resisting the regimes that governed them, firstly as an Autonomous Province of Yugoslavia (and not an equal Republic) which was also revoked by Milosevic in 1989, and later during ten years of apartheid and occupation by Serbia until the 1999 war and NATO bombing, which resulted with the international protectorate and administration under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo.

Indeed, by 1999 the disintegration of former Yugoslavia was irreversible and the world media and politics were firmly focused on the area. The NATO bombing of Serbia over atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo drew a proliferation of studies about Kosovo and the region. Academic, journalistic, fiction and non-fiction and even books and guides on tourism in Kosovo have been published since 1999, whereas before, most people were not even able to point to Kosovo on a map. Since the international intervention in 1999, Kosovo has come into the spotlight. Furthermore, international deployments as well as entire rule of law and administrative bodies such as UNMIK and later EULEX have proved interesting case studies for scholars (Franck, 1999; Monteux, 2009; Greičevci 2011). In addition Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 drew immense international media attention as well as a whole body of work, which looked at the legitimacy, or lack thereof, in declaring independence (Kostovicova, 2008; Summers, 2011; Sigona, 2012; Silvia 2014) . A simple Google search on Kosovo reveals hundreds of thousands of books, articles, and news-pieces. However, until very recently, not many studies focused on the people of Kosovo, either those that still live there or those that migrated, either through forced migration and exile or voluntarily, despite figures that one in three Kosovo Albanians now lives outside Kosovo. As
mentioned previously Kosovo Albanians began arriving in earnest in the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990’s with the numbers climaxing with the 1999 Kosovo war and NATO intervention. Although the number of Kosovo Albanians reached estimations of 100000 (IOM 2008) there are only a handful of studies dealing with the Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

This section maps research about Albanians and Kosovo Albanians in the UK in general, and more specifically highlights and analyses the available literature that has explored identity constructions amongst this community. This section also argues that although a body of research about Kosovo Albanians has steadily emerged since the 1999, the number of studies is still low and limited (Vathi, 2013). The literature is not only lacking, but also is inconsistent thus highlighting the need for further research.

An interesting article which explores Albanian identity constructions, albeit of those from Albania proper rather than Kosovo Albanians, is by Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (2008) which describes the ways in which various European host countries’ stereotypical imageries of Albanians as being culturally prone to violence, have forced Albanian migrants into subversive strategies and practices of identity mimicry. Her findings suggest that Albanians, when in contact with other nationalities, regularly claim to be Italian, Croatian or Greek, to avoid negative stereotypes and discrimination as Albanians, whether this is also the case for Kosovo Albanians has not been explored and therefore will be the focus of this study (see Part Four of this thesis). However, what Schwandner-Sievers (2008) fails to note is that this is a particular problem that stretches through time amongst Albanians with practices such as Crypto-Christianity being prevalent during the Ottoman occupation, although most Albanians had publicly and officially converted to Islam. Similarly in Kosovo, after the Second World War, Kosovo Albanians assumed a Yugoslav identity, which was predominantly based on South–Slavic discourses. Schwandner-Sievers’ (2008), article includes some references to
Kosovo Albanians she has encountered in her work in various locations around Europe. However, her title does not allude to this. Lumping Kosovo Albanians with Albanians from Albania proper, although similar in many ways, does not empower a separate identity especially since the establishment of Kosovo as a state. I think the issue of subverting identity, especially in light of deterritorialised homelands such as Kosovo requires further exploration, and is addressed in Part Four of this thesis, particularly in relation to subversion of identity in order to avoid discrimination.

Zana Vathi, who also researches Albanian ethnic identity and second-generation migrants in transnational contexts has published many articles relating to the identity and experiences of what she describes as ‘Albanian origin’ Diaspora. Despite her work focusing on some Kosovo Albanians, predominantly Vathi’s work explores Albanian migrants. Nonetheless, Vathi’s work does highlight the complexities of the second-generation migrants who are also settling into countries sometimes simultaneously with the first generation. Her work thus builds on previous work, which has mainly considered first generation migrants. Her more recent work (Vathi 2015) explores the tourism practices of Kosovo Albanians who choose to holiday in Albania and Albanian speaking areas in the Balkans. Although Kosovo Albanians are also Albanian, Kosovo Albanians lived in former Yugoslavia and under a different regime from Albanians in Albania proper. Despite similarities between Kosovo Albanians and Albanians, there are also many differences. Therefore, my work aims to go further by specifically exploring the identity constructions, migratory and transnational experiences within a host and homeland context by Kosovo Albanians, which still remains understudied.

Vathi’s work, such as ‘Have you got the British?’ which explores narratives of migration and settlement among Albanian-origin immigrants in London (2012), is particularly important in highlighting ways in which migrants experience integration within host country structures.
and the ways that immigration status affects migrant integration within the host society. Nonetheless, this research also focuses on Albanians from Albania predominantly. In another study, Russell King and Zana Vathi (2011), have explored the links that migrants maintain with their relatives and friends ‘back home’. They have suggested that these links are overlooked by scholars, and suggest that traveling between the host county and the country of origin, especially in the wake of cheap air-travel, also contributes to the lives of migrants and diaspora dynamics. However, their work also predominantly focuses on Albanians from Albania.

By focusing on Kosovo Albanians, and exploring not only the dynamics between host country and country of origin and the ways which this impacts on the construction of identity, but also feelings of belonging and/or exclusion, but furthermore, the discourses of the Kosovo homeland towards the diaspora, this study aims to also highlight perspectives of the Kosovo homeland towards the diaspora, which remain particularly unexplored within the literature on diaspora and migrants.

Furthermore, as aforementioned, literature that focuses specifically on Kosovo Albanians in the UK is limited. Some studies that exist have not explored the discursive constructions of identity for diaspora especially vis-à-vis both the host society and homeland. One of the earliest studies was undertaken by Alice Bloch (1999) and was published in the Forced Migration Review. Bloch focuses on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees that were air lifted from the camps around Kosovo, mainly those in Macedonia in 1999. Bloch argues that there was different reception and support that was given to those who spontaneously sought asylum in the UK and those airlifted as part of the UNHCR humanitarian programme. Bloch provides some valuable statistics, stating that around 80 per cent of Kosovo Albanians based themselves in London and "those who have settled in London have been subjected to
hostility from some sections of the British public and press' (Bloch 1999: 24). Furthermore, Bloch states that Kosovo Albanian dispersal across asylum reception centres around the UK caused subsequent secondary migration to London. Bloch highlights that around 30 per cent of Kosovo Albanians who were evacuated to other cities moved to London to be with or near family members' (1999: 25). Kosovo Albanians maintain strong familial connections, therefore, this is not a surprising phenomena. Although one would expect that, as European or even those from the Balkans, who are of Slavic origin, do not maintain such strong extended family links, Kosovo Albanians do. This is also why I chose to focus my interviews in London. Bloch also emphasizes that assumptions about other groups and immigrants from the same area of the world are problematic as shown by the assumptions made by the UK government between the Bosnians and Kosovans. As Bloch states:

…it became evident that the service providers were not aware of the needs of these particular refugees. For example, in one centre, the local authority had stocked up on pre-prepared frozen foods such as lasagnas that could be cooked in a microwave. But the Kosovans did not want to eat these, nor were they familiar with microwave ovens. People wanted water, flour and eggs to make full pastry pies and they needed orientation sessions to learn how to cook on gas stoves. (1999: 25)

This demonstrates that it is important to focus research on Kosovo Albanians separately from other diasporic groups from the Balkans or Albania proper.

Research exploring diaspora communities and their relationships to conflicts in homelands has also recently emerged. Maria Koinova (2013), has explored diaspora mobilisation and activism by diaspora towards homelands. Koinova (2013) explores the reasons behind moderate or radical diasporas depending on the links to homelands that are ‘experiencing limited sovereignty’. However, this demonstrates that such scholarship, by focusing predominantly on Diasporas in host societies, has ignored the homogenizing tendencies that
can be found in the discourses of homelands towards their Diasporas, which this study addresses. Furthermore, such studies have not explored how transformations of government on a national level are linked up with international developments and dynamics, especially in such cases as Kosovo where the international community has played such an important role. As Thomas Lemke (in Nilsson & Wallenstein, 2013) has argued, many studies have not explored the increasing influence of international, supranational and transnational organizations like the UN, IMF and World Bank on nation states, and as James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta (2002) suggest, analytics of different forms of power and governmental influence need to extend to government models that constituted on a transnational and global scale. However, this study proposes that this needs to go beyond superstructures and include analysis of Ministries of Diaspora with the same form of analytics of government. This will enable the exploration of the power and what I term as the distance based or tele-biopolitics of such institutions. This study focuses on this by exploring the case of Kosovo’s Ministry of Diaspora and the distance based, or what I term, tele-biopolitics that are deployed.

Jolie Demmers (2002; 2007) also investigates diaspora relations with homelands as conflicts become dispersed and delocalised due to globalization and increased media access. Demmers has suggested that diaspora are involved in long-distance nationalism and offer support for those fighting on the ground. However, homelands are equally involved in long-distance nationalism aimed at the diaspora and are not passive towards diaspora. Homelands are equally and actively engaged and interested in their Diasporas, whether to extend their

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20 It is worth noting that Kosovo Albanians from the diaspora sent remittances to Kosovo even before the conflict in 1999, and this continued during the war, was not necessarily aimed towards the Kosovo Liberation Army. In some instances the support to families continued while family members took up arms. I am not suggesting that Kosovo Albanian diaspora contributions during the 1999 conflict did not increase or were not aimed at those fighting. What I am suggesting is that this was a more complex and nuanced situation and that most individuals from the diaspora continued to send remittances to family members who took up arms rather than particular military organisations.
government, powers and visibility beyond national borders or to tap into diaspora investment and skills.

Furthermore, in the case of Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, many journalists from Kosovo went to work in Albania and with satellite television channels were able to broadcast to the diaspora during the war. Those from Kosovo, who fled to neighbouring Albania were instrumental in representing the conflict to Kosovo Albanians in the diaspora. Therefore, this study also suggests that more research is needed to address this, and not only on the support of diaspora towards homelands, but on how the homeland projects itself to the diaspora, construct their diaspora, represent diaspora involvement as well as how the homeland use global media and communication to construct ideas about the situation of diaspora in host societies. This will enable better understanding of the dialogic and non-autonomous nature of diasporic identity formation and negotiation. Chapter 5 in this study will discuss this further, by exploring how homelands are constructing identities and employing what I refer to as distance based or tele-biopolitics to tap into those individuals abroad and more importantly into their resources.

In the UK, there has been increasing media representation of asylum seekers and migrants. The discourses and constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ remain pivotal in maintaining dominant British hegemonic identity. KhosraviNik (2009) explored the representation of asylum seekers that originated from the Balkan conflicts, especially the Kosovo Albanian asylum seekers. Through a CDA approach, KhosraviNIK (2009) demonstrates that despite some positive representations of Kosovo Albanians, overall and due to the political rivalry about immigration in the UK, the representation of Kosovo Albanians in the UK also conforms to common stereotypes and negative attitudes. This research has enabled me to further explore how the Kosovo Albanians themselves view such representations and offer more empirical
evidence in this area of study. What this study demonstrates is that not only do such media representations impact diaspora in host societies but also play an important role in the homeland constructions of the diaspora.\textsuperscript{21}

The identity of Kosovo Albanians group as well as their integration in the UK has not been explored extensively, and less still comparing how identity and national and cultural belonging are shaped by a diasporic and homeland context. In fact, there are currently only two research papers exploring identity amongst Kosovo Albanians in the UK. Firstly, the work of Denisa Kostovicova and Albert Prestreshi (2003), who explore identity transformations of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK by looking at the issues of education, gender and religion. They conducted 32 semi-structured interviews and some ethnographic and participant observations. They were able to generate some very important findings, which show that the Kosovo Albanians in the UK are far from homogeneous, and new class differences (particularly those generated by the level of education and integration of individuals into the host society) were being shaped. According Kostovicova and Prestreshi, there were substantial gender differences within the community. They state that:

[The] majority of the female participants declared an intention to marry an Albanian man and all observed that [unlike women] Albanian men are not reprimanded for having non-Albanian partners. Women are assigned the role of guardian of the national boundaries and a commitment to the Albanian national culture and heritage is dominant amongst these women (Kostovicova & Prestreshi: 1089).

\textsuperscript{21} Research has also emerged in the medical sciences and psychology (Yoong et al., 2004). Despite falling beyond the scope of this study such studies have also importantly noted the lack of research on this particular community.
However, they do not explore such complexities in relation to homeland Kosovo Albanians and how they view such inter-cultural relationship. They do not explore if such discourses are due to the diaspora context or do they originate in homeland discourses. Furthermore, where they highlight the diaspora context as a liberating and more advanced social milieu for education and emancipation of women, due to their one dimensional host country focus, they were unable to identify the discourses that suggest the diaspora are more ‘backward’ than the homeland (see Chapter 4 in this thesis for more on this). Nonetheless, they do present some interesting empirical data, which suggests that the diaspora is more conservative than the homeland in relation to inter-cultural relationships, however, this is not explored with homeland Kosovo Albanians and their views on this issue.

Kostovicova and Presreshi, also highlight that Kosovo Albanians, although largely Muslim, differentiate themselves from other Islamic groups in the UK. Kosovo Albanians are mostly secular and rarely practicing Muslims, which may also explain why Kosovo Albanians do not socialise or gather around a specific religious community (Vathi Dphill 2011). Nonetheless, issues around the representation of Islam in the UK, and the Orientalist discourses surrounding Islam and cultural diversity is potentially a reason that causes Kosovo Albanians to align with secular and pro-western discourses.

In a more recent study, Hewer and Vitija (2013), argue that Kosovan identity is being conveyed in more hybrid forms, such as British Kosovan, they nonetheless argue that there continues to be a strong link to an Albanian identity originating from the historical and mythical ideas of Illyrian decent and Albanian ethnic territories. They conclude that:

Despite significant political developments providing the psychological space for an independent national identity, within this small group at least, identity was still
strongly affiliated to, or assimilated within, an Albanian identity (Hewer & Vitija 2013: 621)

Hewer and Vitija (2013) identify the changing nature of national identity formations within a diasporic context, however, their focus is strongly based around Kosovo’s independence, and whether Kosovo Albanians in the UK construct themselves within lines of a new Kosovan state identity. They do not explore in depth the impact of the establishment of what was termed the multi-ethnic state of Kosovo, which angered many Kosovo Albanians, who felt that with a population of ninety per cent Kosovo Albanian they deserved a Kosovo Albanian nation state. It could be argued that despite the identification with an Albanian homeland in a traditional diaspora sense prior to Kosovo’s independence, there are some suggestions that many Kosovo Albanians turned to an Albanian identity and discourses of unification with Albania as a result of the anger that was felt due to what they perceived as Western intervention and ‘ignorance’ of Kosovo’s demographics and autochthonic ‘rights’ of the Kosovo Albanians.

However, by focusing on identity constructions in relation to the establishment of Kosovo in 2008, Hewer and Vitija (2013) fail to engage with a diasporic identity of Kosovo Albanians in the UK due to the diasporic context itself. Where they state that Kosovo Albanians in the UK express themselves as British Kosovan or vice versa, they do not expand on this further. My research aims to focus on this particularly and show the ways in which identity transformations in a diasporic context are constructed also vis-à-vis a country of origin.

Many scholars have stated that essentialism is predominant in discourses of race and racism (Brah, 1992; Hirschfeld, 1996; Jones, 1997; Mason, 1994; Solomos & Back, 1994). In racism, race and ethnicity are presented as natural, inherent and biological categories (Verkuyten, 2003). These categories claim that individuals are fundamentally rigid. Racists
attempt to fix social groups through essential, stereotypical and fixed properties (Bhabha 1983). Nonetheless, Tenenbaum and Davidman (2007) have argued, biological discourses and essentialist views of identity can also be located in the discourse of minorities expressing their own identities. They focused on contemporary American Jews, and discovered that ‘many contemporary Jews actually continue to employ an essentialist understanding of Jewishness that emphasizes the biological, genetic basis of their identities’ (Tenebaum and Davidman 2007: 435). This has not been explored by current literature on Kosovo Albanians, and will be the focus of chapter 8, which presents the discourses of the interviewees. What has not been studied is to what extent identity transformation can take many different forms that not only rely on discourses of essentialism and biological categories but on discourses of transformation and fluidity as well. Although transformations of identity have been noted such the study by Kathy Sherrel and Jennifer Hyndman (2004) who have explored transformations of identity in the Canadian context. In this study they argue that refugees develop and preserve relationships with both host societies and homelands. This research highlights that migrants in diasporic contexts have multiple changing identities, which are drawn upon based on time, place and context. A quote from one of their respondents exemplifies this:

In Canada I identified myself as an Albanian ...but I ...stopped in Austria on the way ... [to visit] Kosova, and I leaned more towards identifying myself as a Canadian there ...I'm not sure [why], maybe just the politics that's been going on there ... [interviewer - maybe it felt safer] ... safe... not much safer, but I don't know, sometimes we're embarrassed too. Because not everyone understands. You know, they judge you by that thing (Sherrel & Hyndman 2004: 20).

This shows that Kosovo Albanians create their identities in response to situations and places. For example if they are frightened of announcing their identity/s and are aware of dominant
hegemony discourses that are negative towards them, or what I consider Albanianism, they may construct and project adopted host society identity such as Canadian. This may especially happen in inhospitable environments, such as in places like Austria where there is discrimination of South-Eastern European migrants, and or at airports where identity has implications on the way you are treated, perhaps hoping to be treated with less suspicion as a Canadian citizen then a former Kosovo Albanian refugee (See Salter 2008, Wodak et al., 2009).

Albanianism although mentioned by Schwandner-Sievers (2008), has remained relatively unexplored as a theoretical framework, which may highlight discriminatory discourse that position Albanians as inferior in Europe not only within the Balkans and vis-à-vis the Slavic nations, but also vis-à-vis Western Europe.

Furthermore, diaspora research originating from Kosovo has predominantly focused on policy, remittances, homeland development and brain drain projects (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharrà and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 2013). Such focus on financial and economic developments, although of interest to Kosovo, fail to address the cultural implications and transformations for both the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora and Kosovo. Whereas, as Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) state:

Our analytical lens must necessarily broaden and deepen because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited trans- national social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind (Levitt & Glick-Schiller 2004: 1003).
Summary

This chapter has outlined my epistemological and ontological position about identity and the theoretical frameworks that underpin understanding of diaspora and the formation of diaspora identity. The premise of this study is that diaspora theory needs to consider moving beyond essentialist ideas of diaspora and diasporic identity but also consider that diaspora is shaped by discourse and homelands which are also instrumental in such discursive constructions of diaspora. Therefore, the following section argues that diaspora and diasporic identities are context bound, and not only produced through historical context, places and circumstances but also through discourse and hegemony.

This chapter also outlined and highlighted the subject discourse bound and historical as well as situational aspect of diaspora and diasporic identity formation.

The last section in this chapter has highlighted the relevant literature that not only has explored identity constructions through discourse but in particular the literature that has, albeit limited, focused on Kosovo Albanians in the UK. This chapter has also argued that this study shifts the focus to examine the cultural relations of Kosovan Albanian diaspora, and the meaning of diaspora for those who remain in the homeland as well as migrants themselves and furthermore, has moved away from traditional CDA studies to examine minority discursive practices and language, by focusing on the Kosovo Albanians in the UK which are relatively unexplored.

The following chapter in Part 2 will focus on the methodological design of this study, including the data collection and analysis, as well as ethical implications and concerns.
Part TWO

Part 2 contains Chapters 3, which outlines the methodological and analytical approaches to this research, including methodological findings from the pilot study conducted in 2011. Chapter 3 underpins the epistemological and theoretical frameworks for both the data collection and data analysis methods, specifically in-depth semi structured interviews as prescribed by Seinar Kvale and CDA as principally developed and outlined by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, as well as other researchers deemed important.
Chapter 3

Methodology

Introduction

This chapter has a bilateral purpose, firstly, to underpin the epistemological theoretical framework for both my chosen analytical and methodological approaches, and secondly to outline and substantiate my data collection method. Thus, in this chapter, I will outline and review the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of my data collection and data analysis approach. Recently, many forms of discourse analysis have emerged, such as critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1992, 1995; Van Dijk, 1993; Caldas- Coulthard and Coulthard, 1996; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997), social linguistics (Gee, 1996, 1999), and social semiotics (Hodge & Kress, 1988; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996; Lemke, 1995). For this study I have specifically chosen in-depth semi structured interviews as prescribed by Seinar Kvale and CDA as principally developed and outlined by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak. The combination of CDA with semi-structured in-depth interviews is currently a well-established practice in social science research. However, I am aware that over the last century, academic discussions upon methodological approaches in the social sciences have focused on unpacking dichotomies between qualitative and quantitative methods. Currently, most literature published in this field addresses the extent to which there is an ongoing basis

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22 For this research, ethnography would also be a valid approach, nonetheless as a Kosovo Albanian myself I found it particularly difficult to apply either Geertz’s (1994) thick description and interpretative methods of theorising culture/culture, or other forms of ‘productions of anthropological knowledge’, including autoethnography. This is because at times I felt that having lived in Kosovo and the UK I may have also had similar views to the interviewees. By choosing a critical discourse approach, my aim was to eliminate bias. Nonetheless, when I initially began my research I thoroughly considered ethnography and autoethnography and these are valid approaches. ‘Critical distance’ or ‘critical proximity’ or even ‘objectivity’ can be problematic notions (see Haraway 1988), for this work using CDA rather than ethnography, or deconstruction or even content analysis proved more suitable, although I would be happy to consider ethnography for future work.
to concentrate on arguments of difference between these two methodological approaches (Bauer & Gaskell eds. 2000, Seale 2005, Kvale 1999, Flick et al., 2004, Sutton 1993). This research has demonstrated and achieved increased popularity for qualitative research in many diverse fields (Kvale 1999, Flick et al 2004, Given 2008, Seal 2005) and according to Flick (2004) in the social sciences there are almost no areas of research in which qualitative methods, [such as interviews], are not at least partially used Flick et al., (2004). Indeed, Kvale (1999) has argued further, stating that the qualitative research interview can produce new scientific and systematic knowledge.

A qualitative research approach (in-depth interviews and CDA) in contrast to a quantitative approach enables description and analysis of ‘the life worlds and lived experiences’ of my interviewees from their own point of view, and a ‘better understanding of social realities and to draw attention to processes, meaning patterns and structural features’. I have chosen this method, because qualitative research, such as interview material and critical discourse analysis cannot be reduced to statistical data in the same way as content analysis can. In addition, I do not attempt to make claims upon ‘truthful’ portrayals of ‘reality’, rather, I aim to reconstitute and explore meaning through the analysis of language, reconstruction and analysis using CDA, in order to contribute to wider cultural theory.

As Fowler (1991: 94) has stated discourse is an extremely powerful means by which to ‘facilitate and maintain’ discrimination against particular groups of people. He states that:

Language provides names for categories and so helps to set their boundaries and relationships; and discourse allows these names to be spoken and written frequently, so contributing to the apparent reality and currency of the categories (Fowler, 1991: 94).
Discourse also enables the creation of knowledge in society (Weedon, 1987). Furthermore, it constitutes identities and social groups (Hall 1996, Wodak et al., 2009). Moreover, CDA as an approach, consists not only as a theoretical framework or methodological guideline but - particularly important to my research - is the principle that CDA is ‘‘critical' in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009).

At present, the term 'discourse' is very loosely applied and often used indiscriminately, frequently lacking a strong definition. Furthermore, the concept has become blurred, either denoting very little or connoting far too much (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009, Threadgold 1997, Jaworski & Coupland 1999, Wodak et al., 2009). However, the fundamental premise that for me underscores ‘discourse’ is language, and language is …

…not merely a channel through which information about underlying mental states and behaviour or facts about the world are communicated. On the contrary, language is a ‘machine’ that generates, and as a result constitutes, the social world. This also extends to the constitution of social identities and social relations. It means that changes in discourse are a means by which the social world is changed. Struggles at the discursive level take part in changing, as well as in reproducing, the social reality (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009: 8-9).

Foucault (1972), spoke of discourse as:

[A] group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation … [Discourse] is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form it is, from beginning to end, historical - a fragment of history posing its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality (Foucault 1972: 117 in Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009).
For Foucault ‘discourse’ is made up of statements, which are acknowledged as meaningful and true in a particular society within a particular historical context and situation. Furthermore, according to Threadgold (1997) contemporary definitions of discourse or discourses go further than this, for example Kress states that:

Discourses are systematically organised sets of statements which give expression to the meanings and values of an institution … A discourse colonises the social world imperialistically from the point of view of the institution (Kress in Threadgold 1997: 59).

Jørgensen & Phillips (2009), state that the majority of existing discourse analytical approaches follow Foucault's notion of discourses as fairly rule-bound sets of statements which enforce limits on meaning as well as appropriating his ideas concerning truth as something which is discursively constructed (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that different discourses afford the subject different and possibly contradictory, sites from which to speak. That people use discourses as resources to create new consolidations, through language that is selected from different dominant discourses to draw from, such as dominant hegemonic discourses on identity or in the mass media, which potentially results in new hybrid discourses. As Norman Fairclough, put it '[I]ndividual creative acts cumulatively establish restructured orders of discourse' (1989: 172). However, people’s agency and position for social change are anchored in discourses that also limit the subject's scope for action and possibilities for innovation. Thus people function as agents of discursive and cultural change while at the same time being limited by it.

Consequently, discourse analytical methods such as in this case CDA cannot be understood, without considering ‘hegemony', which for me is also related to power and domination as well as subjugation. The following quote from Marx and Engels, is a good illustration of this:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (Marx & Engels 1970: 64)

Raymond Williams (1977) states that ‘hegemony’ in contrast to traditional understandings of political domination or rule over and between States is in fact more complex, subtle and penetrates into the ‘whole of living.’ Hegemony encompasses the whole of living, and shapes all perceptions, as well the creation of selves and the world around us. Hegemony is ‘in the strongest sense a ‘culture’, but a culture which has to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes’ (Williams, 1997: 110).

Thus, throughout this study, ‘hegemony’ and 'discourse' are considered intrinsically related through their mutual representation of a:

Fixation of elements in moments… the hegemonic intervention achieves this fixation across discourses that collide antagonistically. One discourse is undermined from the discursive field from which another discourse overpowers it, or rather dissolves it, by rearticulating its elements. The hegemonic intervention has succeeded if one discourse comes to dominate alone, where before there was conflict, and the antagonism is dissolved…Thus 'hegemonic intervention' is a process that takes place in an antagonistic terrain, and the 'discourse' is the result - the new fixation of meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009).

It should also be clear now, that I view ‘hegemony’ and ‘discourse’ as structurally linked and manifested in the discursive construction of identity (either national, cultural, ethnic or diasporic) and specifically for this study, by Kosovo Albanians in the UK. As argued above, both my aim throughout this work is to investigate the ‘dominant hegemony’ and ‘social
discourses’ that constitute and provide the conceptual, ideological, political, rationalizations involved in the processes of the discursive construction of identity.

Therefore this thesis aims to explore what is being constructed and represented as the ‘truth’ or taken for granted about diaspora Kosovo Albanians. How this is done, what discursive and rhetorical devices are employed to support such constructions and representations. Simultaneously the analysis is driven by investigating omissions and silences as well as what is foregrounded and backgrounded or made problematic. Through the CDA Toolkit, which I outline later in this chapter, the analysis aims to discover what alternative narratives are left out and what is joined together to create taken for granted knowledge. Through this the aim is to discover what interests are being mobilised and served and what interests do these overreaching narrative and discursive construction not serve. Furthermore, the analysis aims to identify the what identities, actions, practices are made possible and/or desirable and/or required by this way of thinking/talking/understanding as well as what is rejected while also looking at what is projected as normal and what is projected as abnormal i.e. normalised and pathologised. The following sections will outline my conceptual and theoretical framework for adopting a CDA approach, as well as my deployment of CDA in conjunction with in-depth interviews in more depth.

3.1. Critical discourse analysis (CDA)

CDA is an intertwining and amalgamation of theory and method for the empirical study of the relations between language, discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains. It surfaced in the 1980s and was developed by European discourse analysts, most notably Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk. Central to this approach
is the idea that ‘that discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned’. As Wodak (1997) has stated, critical discourse analysis:

Studies real, and often extended, instances of social interaction which take (partially) linguistic form. The critical approach is distinctive in its view of (a) the relationship between language and society, and (b) the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed (Wodak 1997: 173).

By using a discourse analytical approach, my aim is not to search out what people ‘truly’ mean or feel, on the contrary the premise of my research is a social constructivist one. The standpoint here is that ‘truth’ is discursively constructed and achieved only through discourse. Therefore discourse and discursive practices are the object of my analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009: 21, Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, Wodak et al., 2009).

Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen (2000) pointed out that ‘CDA states that discourse is an opaque power object in modern societies and CDA aims to make it more visible and transparent’. Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 448). Furthermore, CDA is a vital part of the economic, social and cultural aspects of late modernity (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999:4), that not only exist as discourses but are also process that occur outside of discourses, but nonetheless are still shaped by these discourses.


According to Jørgensen & Phillips (2009):

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Although discourse analysis can be applied to all areas of research, it cannot be used with all kinds of theoretical framework. Crucially, it is not to be used as a method of analysis detached from its theoretical and methodological foundations. Each approach to discourse analysis … is not just a method for data analysis, but a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package. In discourse analysis, theory and method are intertwined and researchers must accept the basic philosophical premises in order to use discourse analysis as their method of empirical study (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2009: 3-4).

The elements important to my study from the prescriptions of CDA provided by Fairclough and Wodak respectively are summarized below. I would like to argue that both authors provide very similar definitions of CDA. Both argue that ‘through discourse, social actors constitute objects of knowledge, situations and social roles as identities and interpersonal relations between different social groups and those who interact with them’ (Wodak et al., 2009: 8). Moreover, they state that CDA as an approach, consists not only ‘of a set of philosophical premises, theoretical methods, methodological guidelines and specific techniques for linguistic analysis’ but - particularly important to my research - is the principle that CDA is ‘‘critical' in the sense that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world, including those social relations that involve unequal relations of power’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009) Or as Wodak writes CDA aims to unmask the ‘discursive practises’ that ‘may influence the formation of groups and serve to establish or conceal relations of power and dominance’. Furthermore, CDA is not politically neutral, and on the contrary it is an ‘approach which is politically committed to social change’, which takes the side of oppressed social groups, as well as determined ‘to uncover the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of unequal power relations’. Therefore, the overall goal of CDA is to utilize empirical results towards contributing ‘to social change along the
lines of more equal power relations in communication processes and society in general’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2009). Therefore as Fairclough has stated:

[T]he discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people's heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures (Fairclough 1994: 66).

And:

Often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts and (b) broader social and cultural structures, relations and processes [.] how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power [.] how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony (Fairclough 1993: 135 in Jørgensen & Phillips 2009).

CDA’s theoretical positioning and additional inclusion of the concepts of dominant and dominated as well as use of hegemony to theorise the discursive subjugation of one social group by other social groups through particular dominant discourses in social life, makes it particularly relevant to my research. CDA aims to unmask and show such power structures, which are ideologically fuelled and frequently mask structures of power, political control, dominance and inclusion and exclusion. My aim is not to pretend that I am able to hold an impartial or neutral analytical stance (Wodak et al., 2009), but on the contrary, to explore such opaque power structures and struggles in discourse (Fairclough 1993).

3.1.1. In-depth Interviews

According to Steinar Kvale the ‘qualitative research interview is a construction site of knowledge. An interview is literally an inter-view’ (Kvale, 1999:1). As mentioned previously, in order to collect my data for analysis I will employ in-depth interviews.
Interviews can easily be conducted with individuals, enabling data collection on individual experiences, perspectives, stories and histories. As Seidman (2006) states:

Stories are a way of knowing. In order to give the details of their experience a beginning, middle, and end, people must reflect on their experience. It is this process of selecting constitutive details of experience, reflecting on them, giving them order, and thereby making sense of them that makes telling stories a meaning-making experience (Seidman 2006:7).

The format I follow is the semi-structured interview. I developed a list of questions and fairly specific topics to cover in the interviews. This was my interview guide, enabling me to choose - depending on the interview - either to follow the pre-determined questions or allow my interviewees to expand on topics themselves. Questions did not follow on exactly in the way outlined on the schedule. However, all of the questions were more or less addressed and followed a similar wording for all interviewees and interviews.

Throughout this study, I do not differentiate between fictional narratives such as those published in novels or short stories and those narrated by interview participants. I consider that both are constructed, and this underpins the premise of my approach towards the material generated by the in-depth interviews. Human beings construct stories through language and as Mikhail Bakhtin has noted, language used in both poetics (poesy) and prose (in novels and everyday language) exist in heteroglossia, which basically means different tongues or language (See Bakhtin, 1981). Bakhtin suggests that language is produced and reproduced dialogically, my argument here is that like language cultures and identities are also dialogically produced (Werbner 2002). Not only are identities produced through social and discursive practices, but also, the act of the interview and the dialogic setting of it allows for identities not only to be narrated but also constructed. By transcribing these interviews, I am then able to analyse the way in which the interviewees construct their own identities and the
Kosovo Albanian Diaspora. Therefore, the interview process employed a narrative style of interviews within a conversational setting. This was designed in order to allow for the narratives or the stories of the individuals to emerge and encourage the interviewee to draw on the elements of their ‘story’, which they find important (e.g. Sacks, 1989; Chase, 1995). Furthermore, as Labov (2001) found, narratives of personal experience reduced the effects of observation to a minimum and provide rich areas for the study of discourse (Labov 2001).

Encouraging narratives to emerge during the interviewing allows their dialogic construction, which also enables the identification of a number of subject positions within each narrative (Bloom and Munro, 1995). At the same time, this enables analysis of whether and how individuals are constrained within certain discourses, and how their stories are not fully determined by them (Chase, 2005). This aims to draw attention to the way in which prominent hegemonic discourses influence the person’s account of themselves and also the extent to which they experience struggle or conflict or similarity with the subject positions and these discourses. Yet, this style of interviewing also provides an opportunity to bring to life the individual meanings that people draw on and how they construct a notion of self through their own individual interpretation of discursive meanings. This approach thus serves the study’s aims in terms of studying how issues of struggle (Grima, 1991), unsettledness and ongoing identity construction (Josselson, 1996; Stein, 1997) take place over a number of contexts and identities (Foley and Faircloth, 2003). Furthermore, the narratives of interviewees also allow the interviewer to ‘give up power’, and allow room for interviewees to explore their lives, which are difficult to reduce to short answers (Riessman, 1993). As already mentioned, by adopting this approach the aim is not to assume objectivity but, instead, to privilege positionality and subjectivity (Fairclough 1993, Reissman, 2000, Wodak 2009).
Following the work of Ruth Wodak et al., (2nd edition, 2009), I conduct my interviews in relatively relaxed and flexible environments, which enables me to deal with unanticipated turns in the conversation and provide ample opportunity for feedback and clarification of ambiguous points (see Wodak et al., 2009: 146). The interviews were; ‘structured to resemble informal open-ended, private conversations so that there is no pressure to articulate statements conforming to group opinions or politically correct statements, as observable in focus group’.

The interviews were conducted in a dialogic manner in order to try and replicate conversations that may occur naturally, as well as in order to allow for a succession of thoughts to form without constant interruption or being pressed in a particular direction by the interviewer (Bahktin 1981, Wodak et al., 2009).

In collecting my data through in-depth semi-structured interviews, my aim was to obtain both descriptions of the life world of the interviewees and knowledge production through human interaction Kvale (1999: 6). However, my discourse analytical approach, is not applied in order to search out what people ‘truly’ mean or feel, on the contrary the premise of my research is a social constructivist one. The standpoint here is that ‘truth’ is discursively constructed and achieved only through discourse. Therefore discourse and discursive practices are the object of my analysis (Jørgensen &Phillips, 2009: 21, Jaworski & Coupland, Wodak et al., 2009).

This thesis also acknowledges that due to the nature of employing a qualitative methodology, the ability to generalise is limited (Burns 2000). Therefore, this study does not aim to make general claims that can be replicated in other studies, on the contrary this study will provide an in-depth, qualitative exploration which illuminates multiple and multilayered meanings. This is also why a discourse approach is adopted and a non-essentialist theorising of identity
is outlined, which aims to explore multiplicities of being and multiple ways in which individuals construct their lives and themselves.

### 3.1.4. CDA Toolkit

CDA scholars such as Teun Van Dijk, have resisted strict definitions of practical approaches to CDA. Van Dijk suggests that instead of a set template or cliché of a CDA approach that can be replicated, scholars should apply a diverse multidisciplinary approach that is best suited to their particular research. He states that:

CDA is not so much a direction, school, or specialization next to the many other "approaches" in discourse studies. Rather, it aims to offer a different "mode" or "perspective" of theorizing, analysis, and application throughout the whole field. We may find a more or less critical perspective in such diverse areas as pragmatics, conversation analysis, narrative analysis, rhetoric, stylistics, sociolinguistics, ethnography, or media analysis, among others (Van Dijk 1998:1).

Therefore, CDA includes a range approaches, and is not a set methodology. However, CDA is not unproblematic or easy in anyway. The practicalities of conducting CDA research are equally complicated. There are both Macro-level and Micro-level analytical tools that can be employed. In this study, I follow on a Macro - Level Fairclough’s (1989, 1995) recommendation of a three inter-related processes, which is tied to to three inter-related dimensions of discourse. They are:

1. The object of analysis (verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts).
2. The processes by means of which the object is produced and received (writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human subjects.
3. The socio-historical conditions, which govern these processes.

Fairclough also outlines specific kinds of analysis for each of these dimensions:

1. Textual analysis (description),
2. Processing analysis (interpretation),
3. Social analysis (explanation).

Fairclough’s first dimension as outlined above is focused on textual analysis. This encompasses not only linguistic and grammatical parts of text, but also as highlighted by many CDA theorists, how do such elements of text impact an ideological role and relate to social power. Therefore, the context of such textual aspects as well as the functions and purposes within the text are considered and analysed in relation to the ways in which particular ideological interests and positions are constructed, reproduced or resisted. Furthermore, such analysis will also entail what is left out of the text or silenced, what elements are excluded and what are included, thus analysing the linguistic choices of interviewees. This is further developed by analysing the second dimension that Fairclough outlines, which entails analysis of discursive practises, strategies and actions that are involved in constructions of identities, as well as, constructions of the ‘other’. This study explores discursive strategies within discursive practices. Strategies, in this case, as outlined by Reisigl and Wodak, (2009: 13) are taken to mean that they are intentionally applied and adopted to accomplish political, ideological, or linguistic goals. Finally, this relates to social practises and the third dimension of analysis that Fairclough outlines. Examination of social practises combined with discursive practises allow a CDA analysis to emerge which can identify dominant ideological positions as well as social and cultural practises that particular discourses are embedded within and the political relations and social inequality that they produce or reproduce (Fairclough, 1995).
Following this approach, I also adopt a general hermeneutic analysis, as well as a semiotic analysis and will not only focus on the signifiers that make up the text, the specific linguistic selections, their juxtapositioning, their sequencing and their layout. I will also analyse particular tropes that emerge such as the word ‘Schatzi’ or any other metaphors or ‘figures of speech’. Thick descriptions are also provided where possible and where deemed important.

Arguably, as already mentioned, there are many ways of analysing text and many more linguistic features. It would be an impossible task to try and identify and deploy them all. However, the main premise of this study is that social actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles, identities and interpersonal relations through discourse. That different social groups and social interactions also produce identities through discourse. Van Dijk outlines the difference concerning language operating on a micro level, and issues of power and inequality, which operate on a macro level:

Language use, discourse, verbal interaction, and communication belong to the microlevel of the social order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macrolevel of analysis (Van Dijk 1998:354).

In this study my analysis always begins with a general analysis of the transcribed material. I conduct this through a hermeneutic analysis of the transcribed text. I then move into a more detailed micro-level analysis of elements of language in order to later enable me to relate to ‘the broader socio-political and historical contexts, to which the discursive practices are embedded in and related to (macro theories)’ (Wodak, 2008:13). In this study, not only Fairclough’s framework and Van Dijk’s multidimensional approach, but also Wodak’s discourse historical approach is integrated as it enables integration of knowledge ‘and triangulates knowledge about historical sources and the background of the social and political fields within which discursive events are embedded’ (Wodak 2009: 38).
The micro-level tools that are employed in this study are presented in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Micro-level Linguistic Units</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analogy</td>
<td>A rhetorical device like metaphor, a comparison used to show a similarity. Usually inferred from already well-known similarities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Memory</td>
<td>Analysis and examination of interviewee narratives for instances where they draw from a collective struggle or history from the past. Do interviewees recall from an Albanian, Yugoslav or particular Kosovan collective or mythic memory? This also applies to collective memories about migration, and when during particular moments in history Kosovo Albanians migrated from Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disclaimers</td>
<td>Statements such as ‘I’m not a racist, but’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalizations</td>
<td>Discursive processes that expand an issue from beyond “one person or a small group to a larger group or category” (van Dijk, 1995:155). So if one member of a group displays certain attributes, then they are taken to stand for the entire group or community. E.g. ‘Kosovo Albanians have big noses and flat heads’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>Excessive exaggeration of aspects within texts (van Dijk, 1995).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Square</td>
<td>Maintaining positive image with the self, in contrast to the negative image of the other. Emphasis on our good properties, in contrast to their bad properties. Demonstrates how language can act ideologically, reinforcing binary oppositions and maintaining dichotomies in the portrayal of a positive self that contrasts with a negative other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexical choices</td>
<td>The use of words to demonstrate social and political power, such as the ‘us and them’ binary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>Figurative language use implying comparison but also hidden ideology and cognitive constructions. Metaphors can also privilege an intended understanding over others, thus influencing constructions of reality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metonymy</td>
<td>Like Metaphor, figurative speech usage in rhetoric, in which a thing or concept is not called by its own name, but by the name of something intimately associated with that thing or concept. This is an used in attempts to fix particular meanings or ideologies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myth</td>
<td>This is analysed in relation to Albanian origins and essentialised notions of identity that are based on a specific origin. Also for Kosovo’s origins, Yugoslav conflict and Yugoslav origins. Usually simplifying particular complex notions to one overarching taken for granted ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming</td>
<td>Analyses how interviewees name themselves. Do they name themselves as Kosovo Albanians, Kosovans, or British, or British Kosovan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative Structure</td>
<td>Examines if interviewee texts follow a beginning, middle and end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neologism</td>
<td>A term used to describe the creation of new words or the assignment of new meaning to an existing word of phrase such as ‘Schatzi’ or ‘Darling’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positioning</td>
<td>Examines how interviewees position themselves in relation to others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
<td>Stereotypes such as Kosovo Albanians from Germany are ‘Schatzi’s, wear white, and have large families originating from rural Kosovo, whereas those in the UK are the Urban elite who left the capital and other major urban cities in Kosovo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topics or Topoi</td>
<td>As defined by Reisigl and Wodak (2001), parts of argumentation, which are necessary for either explicit or inferable premises. They are the content-related warrants, which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, or the claim. They justify (a shortcut) transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion. For example, ‘I’m a Kosovo Albanian because I was born there’ or ‘I’m a Kosovan because it’s in my blood’ or ‘identity is a feeling that can’t be explained’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although in the subsequent empirical chapters in Part Three and Four, some of these terms are referred to and explained, this is not comprehensive and subsequent definitions will not be expanded on within the empirical analysis. Rather, by defining and outlining these tools here, the emergent critique rather than the tools will be presented in my later analysis.
3.2. The Interview selection and Interviewing Process

This section outlines the research process, the pilot study I conducted in order to collect my data and prepare for interviews, the actual process of interviewing and how I selected interviewees. I also outline what I learnt from the process of conducting the pilot study and then later conducting the interviews with policy makers in Kosovo and Kosovo Albanians in London. I also outline briefly the backgrounds of the people I interviewed, how I found the interviewing process, what I learnt and subsequently changed and tried to adjust so that it was more suitable to my work, as well as what did not work and what difficulties I encountered throughout this process.

I began the data collection process in 2011. I started with a small pilot study, preparing for a conference that was to be held in Cardiff in June 2011. The conference looked at ‘[h]ow can mainstream media engage effectively with Black and Ethnic Minority audiences?’. Since at the time I was based in Kosovo and I was working with Journalists in Kosovo, I decided to explore the experiences of Journalists from Kosovo, who came to the UK either to settle, to visit, for work experience or to find and make a career in Journalism in the UK. My paper was eventually entitled ‘Porters Without Borders: Kosovan Journalists in London’. During my work for this pilot study I had decided to transcribe the interviews as I was conducting them, a sort of simultaneous transcription, which I explained to the interviewees. They did not object to this, however, I found that it was quite disruptive. Although the data was collected quickly and I could check things with the interviewees in-situ, as well as show them the final transcript, I felt that perhaps this created an uncomfortable setting, and they had to slow down and not speak as they would normally in conversation. I decided that although there was a direct benefit to me as I could have the data available quickly, it did not in fact
enrich the interviewing process and it was interfering with the natural flow of the conversation. However, this pilot research project enabled me to test run the interview method as well as establish the best way to transcribe the recorded interviews. However, this form of simultaneous transcription also created a barrier and generated power imbalances between the interviewer and the interviewees, which I did not want to recreate in subsequent interviews. I wanted to enable the interviewees and myself to be in conversation and not have strict roles, which may negatively impact the interviewing process. Thus through this I was able to decide that I was not going to simultaneously transcribe the interviews for the rest of my PhD project. Nevertheless, the interview data was still very rich and interesting.

The second data collection period was from September 2012, until October 2012, and then I went back for more interviews in May 2013. For the second part of the data collection period, I was invited to a conference organized by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) and various NGO’s from the Balkans for their Grantmakers East Forum annual conference. I prepared a paper on *Identity Politics in a Globalizing World*. Since I travelled to Kosovo and later through the Balkans to Bosnia, and back to Kosovo, I decided to use the time I had left in Kosovo to interview politicians, ministers, NGO activists and journalists as well as Think Tank officials in Kosovo, about their perceptions of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in general and the one in the UK more specifically. I later followed up with more interviews in May 2013, and I presented these findings at the annual PhD conference in Cardiff. My paper was entitled ‘Schatzi: Kosovo Albanian Identity in Diaspora’. After conducting two phases of intensive field work and I began the third and final phase of data collection, the interviews with Kosovo Albanians in London. I started this work in September 2013 until December 2013, and later I went back to do more interviewees in January and continued until February 2014. I decided to increase my sample, despite the qualitative and in-depth nature of my work, as I wanted to further explore the initial ideas that were emerging from my research.
realized that this would take more time, especially the transcriptions which were exhausting, however, I felt that obtaining more interviews would also be beneficial later for writing journal articles and for future publications.

In terms of the sample for the study, I conducted thirty-eight in-depth interviews. The sample size is not large however, as already stated, my aim was not to create generalizable data than can be repeated by other studies, but on the contrary to analyse discursive practises. In addition, the population of Kosovo is approximately 2 million, by interviewing 13 participants in Kosovo from journalists to politicians, the sample although appearing small is justified based on the small overall population of Kosovo. Furthermore as Jette et al., (2003) suggest, expertise in the chosen topic can reduce the number of participants needed in a study. As a Kosovo Albanian myself, I did not need to recruit hundreds of participants that would help me identify the topics for exploration. As someone who lived in Kosovo from 2004-2012 I was already familiar with the discourses about the diaspora.

The interviewees were selected through a combination of already established contacts and snowballing techniques in order to introduce interviewees that were unknown to me and minimize bias in my work. Because of my familiarity with Kosovo and my previous work I was able to secure access to politicians and others in position of power, as well as those from the Kosovo Albanian community in the UK. As Van Maanen and Knolb (1985), have stated, gaining access to the research field is crucial. Furthermore, this is one of the main reasons why researchers opt for conducting research through questionnaires rather than in-depth interviews, or as Okumus et al., (2007) have argued, researchers who are considered outsiders are often not welcomed and one of the main reasons why research fails is the inability to gain access to the research field or participants (Renganathan 2009).
All interviewees were informed about my research and the aims of the study. They were also informed that the interviews would take approximately one hour, although this timeframe would and could sometimes be exceeded. All the interviewees were informed that if they wished they could withdraw from the study at anytime, they could stop the interview or decline to answer any questions they felt uncomfortable with. A consent form was sent to all interviewees and verbal consent was obtained prior to advancing with any questions about the study. This was particularly important, as some interviewees did not return the consent forms I sent them. I can only speculate as to why some did not return the consent forms, I assume some were busy and felt that due to their verbal consent they did not need to also return the consent forms. Another reason may also be the trust that is built between the interviewees and the interviewer through the course of conversations prior to the interview as well as the interview itself. However, despite this I made sure that verbal consent was always obtained prior to commencing the interviews.

On two occasions, two interviewees withdrew their interviews from the study. They cited personal reasons, and although there may have been other reasons that I am aware of, due to the nature of the reasons and ethical implications, I did not wish to include any information from their interviews within the study. Although some of the reasons for withdrawal were interesting in themselves and related to the study, I chose not to include them in order to preserve the trust built between them and myself. The interviewees were also informed that the interviews would remain confidential and anonymous, although some did express a desire to be named, and that was one of the options on the consent form, I decided against this and anonymised all the interviewees. I believe those who ticked the box that allowed them to be identified, did this from a desire to appear honest as well as for genuinely wanting to contribute to the subject and the work.
Currently, there are many scholarly debates around the subject of anonymising interview data within qualitative research (for more on this see Kitzinger 2014, Kitzinger and Saunders, 2015). As Saunders et al. (2015), have highlighted, there are issues around both confidentiality and anonymity and the two are sometimes conflated. Although as researchers within this field we can keep data confidential, anonymity is more complex. For example, the researchers always know who the interviewees are and therefore the interviewees are not anonymous to them. Furthermore, attempting to anonymise and change all details may cause the loss of valuable data. So although as Saunders et al., (2015) have suggested I have anonymised the interviewees names and changed them, and at times also changed place names and gender. However, on some occasions, especially in terms of gender, this was not possible as the data would not have made sense as the arguments put forward were relevant in terms of gendered discourses. Nonetheless, I also followed all Cardiff University ethical guidelines throughout the study, and the ethical approval form can be seen in Appendix 2.

Prior to conducting the interviews I drew up interview protocols, these are included in Appendix 4 and 5. However, these were not always followed precisely. The questions that were prepared at times needed amending to allow for the conversational turns and the narrative that the interviewees introduced. Nonetheless, most of the questions and the broad themes were followed in the interviews.

**Summary**

This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the methodological approach of the study and how the data was generated and analysed as well as the central ethical considerations that the research process identified and entailed. The following chapters form
Part 3 of this study, and outline the discourses of the homeland towards the diaspora. The aim of Part 3 of the study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to show the discursive construction of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora by those in Kosovo, as well as suggest that there is a need to explore diaspora theory outside the normative paradigms of diaspora within a host society context.
Part THREE

Part 3 of this thesis contains three chapters and presents findings from analysis of thirteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. Chapter 4 argues that despite copious Diaspora theorisation since the late 1980’s, especially focusing on identity, reception and integration in host societies, research exploring the relationship of diasporas with their homelands, in particular how homelands view their diaspora is still lacking. This chapter explores the discursive construction and representation of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora by homeland Kosovo Albanians. In addition, this chapter emphasizes that diaspora is shaped not only by relationships between the individual or community and the host country but also the relationship with the homeland context. The discourse of the ‘Schatzi’ is examined through analysis of interviews and a popular comedy sketch in Kosovo. The interviews show that ‘othering’ and the dominant discourses surrounding migration and immigration which have for a long time influenced discourses of identity, belonging, exclusion, multiculturalism, cultural difference and personal and national narratives of citizenship are not exclusive to host country contexts. Therefore, this chapter suggests that we must begin to explore diaspora theory outside the normative paradigms of diaspora within a host society.  

Chapter 5 explores the Kosovo Ministry of Diaspora politics towards diasporas. Centered on interviews conducted at the Kosovo Ministry of Diaspora, this chapter critically analyses the discursive construction of the diaspora by ministry officials. By identifying and analyzing

23 This chapter was also published as a paper in the JOMEC Journal Migration issue in July.
discursive and rhetorical strategies, I examine how the diaspora is constructed and how the ministry negotiate and construct their role vis-à-vis the diaspora and Kosovo. The main discursive strategies identified range from representation of the diaspora as passive and immobilized and needing the Ministry of Diaspora to ‘arouse’ and mobilize them, the hegemony of the Albanian language, identity and culture, the risks and anxieties about assimilation, and the constructions of a ‘good’ diaspora that can be used to promote Kosovo abroad, and contribute back to Kosovo through financial investment and public diplomacy.

Chapter 6 builds on the work from the previous chapters and continues to highlight the ‘othering’ of the diaspora vis-à-vis the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo in order to explore ideas of inclusion and exclusion, belonging and not belonging. This chapter aims to show that the differences that are constructed through discourse between the diaspora and the homeland precisely rest not on the distance between the two but upon their proximity. That is to say that the diaspora are not external satellites to Kosovo but on the contrary are very present and involved in the lives and lived experiences of homeland Kosovo Albanians. Finally, this chapter also analyses the discursive construction of new social groups that have recently emerged in the language of homeland Kosovans. By analyzing the language used to construct, position and represent what are termed the ‘locals’, ‘internationals’ and the -returning Kosovo Albanian Diaspora that are sometimes labeled as the - ‘hybrids’, this chapter builds on the analysis of discriminatory discursive practices towards diaspora Kosovo Albanians.
Chapter 4

‘Schatzi’: Making Meaning of Diaspora

Introduction

For the first time, I knew who I was. For the first time, I felt as if I had been simultaneously exploded in the gaze, in the violent gaze of the other, and at the same time, recomposed as another (Fanon, 1967: 118).

Diaspora and identity studies continue to increasingly occupy a central role in social science and cultural studies discussions, especially around increasingly politicised issues, such as nation, immigration and immigrants, migration, asylum, borders and exile (Hall 1990; Gilroy 1991, 1993; Safran 1991; Tölölyan 1991, 1996; Vertovec 1999, Cohen 2001). However, scholars continue to frequently define diaspora through proposed lists or inventories of characteristics that they apply to different diasporic groups (Safran 1991; Cohen 1997). While current studies have extensively explored diaspora’s nostalgia for the homeland and relationship with the host society, literature exploring how the homeland constructs the diaspora is still lacking.

‘Diaspora’ is a contested and unstable term. As Braziel and Mannur (2003) note, its etymological origins are in the Greek term diasperien, from dia, ‘across’, and sperien, ‘to sow or scatter seeds’. However, although this meaning is fairly mainstream in the contemporary context, its use is also problematic – suggesting clearly demarcated geographic territories, national identity, and belonging and dislocation from fixed nation-states, territories, or countries. Such definitions may not allow for diaspora as a self-ascription or a state of
consciousness and/or social form (Sökefeld 2006; Vertovec 1997), and risk falling within the same outdated paradigms that referred to ‘race’ and ethnicity (Sökefeld 2006; Anthias 1998; 2001). As such, experiences of the diaspora/ric, outside a territoriality of some kind, and, moreover, the relationships that homelands have with their diaspora have largely been ignored.

Kosovo and the Balkans drew much attention during the 1990s predominantly due to the nature of the conflict and the ethnic cleansing that ensued. Studies of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in the UK, have steadily emerged since the 1990s, but the number remains low and limited, mainly focusing on Kosovo Albanians as immigrants or ‘new migrants’ (Vathi 2013). Some important work has emerged, which explores Kosovo Albanian identity and integration (Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003; Vathi 2013). However diaspora research, especially that originating from Kosovo, predominantly focuses on policy, remittances, homeland development and brain drain projects (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 2013). As Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) state:

Our analytical lens must necessarily broaden and deepen because migrants are often embedded in multi-layered, multi-sited trans-national social fields, encompassing those who move and those who stay behind. (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004: 1003)

This chapter shifts the focus to examine the cultural relations of Kosovan Albanian diaspora, and the meaning of diaspora for those who remain in the homeland as well as migrants themselves. By analysing the use of the subverted German word ‘Schatzi’ by homeland Kosovo Albanians to construct and constitute the Kosovo Diaspora, I explore how diaspora discourse is shaped - not only by relationships between the individual or community in the host country, but also through homeland discourses about diaspora.
This chapter presents findings from analysis of thirteen semi-structured in-depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. The interviews were conducted during fieldwork in Kosovo between September 2012 and October 2012 and via Skype between January 2013 and July 2013. Out of the thirteen interviews conducted, nine interviews were conducted with members of civil society mainly those working in NGO’s, media and philanthropic organisations. Two interviews were conducted with Ministry of Diaspora officials, one interview with a government minister, and finally one interview with the leader of an opposition party.24

I employ CDA to analyse the interviews and other discursive practices. As already outlined in the methodology chapter CDA is an intertwining and amalgamation of theory and method for the empirical study of the relations between language, discourse and social and cultural developments in different social domains (Wodak 1997:173). I chose a discourse analytical approach not to search out what people ‘truly’ mean or feel, on the contrary the premise of my research is a social constructivist one. The standpoint here is that ‘truth’ is discursively constructed and achieved only through discourse, therefore discourse and discursive practices are the object of my analysis (Fairclough 1994, 1995, Coupland et al, 1999, Jørgensen & Phillips 2009, Wodak et al, 2009). Hence, through CDA, I highlight the rhetorical and discursive strategies used to construct and reconstruct the diaspora Kosovo Albanians, and reveal how these constructs are made in relation to time and place of migration. This enables me to suggest that that diaspora identity construction is not only about looking back to the homeland but also about the gaze of the homeland towards the diaspora.

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24This party also has its roots in civil society and was initially an NGO movement, which later was transformed into a political movement and political party.
I conducted my interviews in relatively relaxed and flexible environments, which enabled me to deal with unanticipated turns in the conversation and provided the opportunity for feedback and clarification of ambiguous points. I also chose to employ in-depth semi-structured interviews because I wanted to collect data from individuals involved in civil society with significant social capital, and who are likely to have influence in shaping discourses about diaspora. The approach also enabled me to explore how the meaning of Kosovan Albanian diasporic identity is constructed, both through relating personal experience and other kinds of story about the diaspora. As Seidman (2006) puts it:

Stories are a way of knowing. In order to give the details of their experience a beginning, middle, and end, people must reflect on their experience. It is this process of selecting constitutive details of experience, reflecting on them, giving them order, and thereby making sense of them that makes telling stories a meaning-making experience (Seidman 2006: 7).

Throughout the interviewing process, interviewees were not limited to answering a set or prepared questions. As aforementioned in the methodology chapter, I was able to draft interview protocols or schedules that allowed me broadly focus on the subject of Kosovo Albanian diaspora. The protocols at times were not followed since interviewees chose to answer and pose question themselves. At other times the conversations would take a different turn which was deemed at the time much more interesting or relevant. Since the idea of conducting the interviews was to obtain knowledge from the interviewees, I did not see it necessary to stick to predesigned interview protocol.

The interviews reveal that diaspora are imagined (Anderson 1983) and actively constructed by homelands. Not only is the diaspora not imagined as a homogenous entity, analysis of interviews reveals, that the inherent heterogeneity and hybridity of diaspora depends on factors such as time of migration, place of migration and emigration and socio-economic
The following sections will highlight that imagined diaspora are actively classified through stereotypes and other discursive devices into discursively constructed identities.

The analysis is divided into three sections. The first section, entitled ‘The Urban and Rural Divide’, explores the discursive construction of the ‘gastarbeiers’ – guest workers – and political exiles. This is followed by analysis of the discursive construction and representation of the Kosovo Albanians from Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Nordic countries as ‘Schatzi’. This word stems from a subversion of the German word Schatz, which literally translates into English as ‘treasure’. The word is used in German slang as the equivalent of the English words sweetheart or darling. However, in Kosovo ‘Schatzi’ carries a very specific connotation, around which a stereotypical discourse is articulated about the Kosovo Diaspora as a particular social, cultural and economic group. In the final section, a range of issues and perceptions about diaspora returning to Kosovo is explored, especially with respect to how they are strongly associated with financial investments and remittances to Kosovo.

4.1. Urban and Rural Divide

It is widely estimated that between one-in-three and one-in-four Kosovo Albanians lives outside Kosovo in what the Kosovo Albanians refer to as the ‘diasporë’. (Forum 2015 2007; FID 2009; UNDP 2010; World Bank 2011; European Commission 2012). In the Albanian language the word ‘diasporë’ is synonymous with what in English would be translated as ‘outside’ or ‘abroad’. However, if approximately one-in-three Kosovo Albanians live in the diaspora – ‘outside’ or ‘abroad’ – it is very likely that every family in Kosovo has someone living in diaspora. As Avtar Brah notes, diaspora is ‘inhabited’ ‘not only by those who have migrated and their descendants but equally by those who are constructed and represented as
indigenous’ (Brah 1996: 181). Therefore, it is important to engage those who have not migrated – the indigenous - in order to explore how they imagine, perceive and construct those who did.

The periods of migration from Kosovo can be historically traced and divided into four distinct phases: those who migrated from the 1940s to the 1960s due to the brutal Aleksandar Ranković security policy (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Blumi 2003), those who migrated from 1963 to the end of the 1970s (Bernhard 2012), and those who started to migrate from the 1980s to the early 1990s - before visas were introduced by western countries for Yugoslav nationals (although illegal migration continued), and finally between 1998 and 1999 during the Kosovo War (Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003).

Historically, Kosovo has had a very distinct urban/rural divide (Blumi 2002; UNDP 2004). Throughout Yugoslavia, those who were well educated and residing in the cities looked down on the agricultural and uneducated rural population, and Kosovo is no exception (Allcock 2002). It has been common to hear references to those from the city as ‘Qytetar’, implying that they were an elite class, and to the ‘Katundar’ or ‘Katunart’, meaning those from the villages, implying a backward, rough and uneducated person (or simply the equivalent of a ‘hick’). This discriminatory discourse has existed despite considerable mixing of individuals and families, particularly amongst those settling in the capital, Prishtina. It is important to draw attention to these stereotypes because the diaspora of Kosovo is composed of populations from a mixture of both urban and rural areas, cities and villages.

From the interview data, it is evident that destination matters in how these stereotypes play out in the homeland discourse surrounding Kosovan Albanian diaspora. Respondents clearly imagine those who migrated to Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Nordic countries as
predominantly rural, unskilled workers, whereas in contrast, those who migrated to the UK are thought of as urban city dwellers, who were already well educated before they migrated and who migrated due to political persecution, rather than for economic reasons. Moreover, in comparison to those ‘thinking’, ‘intellectual’ elites who were persecuted by the system and regime and had no choice but to leave, there is a suggestion that migrating for economic reasons is negative and a personal individual choice.

It is well documented that migration from the areas of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia to Western Europe increased during the 1990s as each one of the six republics and then the autonomous province of Kosovo resisted the Milosevic regime, which led to apartheid, ethnic cleansing and genocide (Sofos 1996; Malcolm 1998; HRW 2001; Tatum 2010; Booth 2012). However, migration from Kosovo to Western Europe started before the 1990s. In 1963 Yugoslavia legalised the emigration of its unemployed nationals and they were free to leave the country and find work as ‘gastarbeiers’ – guest workers – in Western Europe, predominantly in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and France (Bernard 2012). The total number of those who emigrated from the former Yugoslavia as guest workers during the 1960s and 1970s is deemed to have been around 1.3 million, with the participation of Kosovo estimated to be quite small (Bernhard 2012). The extent to which ‘gastarbeiers’ are distinguished from asylum-seeking Kosovo Albanians in the construction of the ‘schatzi’ discourse is one question that this chapter will address.

During the interviews I asked the interviewees what they thought about the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora. The answers were complex, usually beginning with a narrative that involved stance-taking, and the use of rhetorical and other discursive devices to position the diaspora in relation to the homeland, and into specific times and historical periods of migration. The interviewees also provided specific reasons they believed caused these migrations (either
economic, political or a mixture of both) and identified specific places they assumed that
certain socio-economic groups migrated to. The first group of migrants forming this imagined
diaspora were constructed as economic migrants who emigrated to find employment in the
West as guest workers or ‘gastarbeiter’; the second, those who were fleeing political
persecution during the late 1980s and 1990s; the third, the refugees who left during the
NATO intervention in the 1999 war.

The interviewees began describing the diaspora by providing historical narratives of
migration, which in most cases began with explaining the migration of guest workers, or
more generally talking about economic migrants from the 1960s. Indeed, there was a
disproportionate level of emphasis on describing the diaspora who migrated to Germany,
Switzerland, Austria and the Nordic countries as ‘gastarbeiter’. Other periods of migration,
for example, to places such as Turkey during the Rankovic years, 1946-1966, were largely
ignored. Distinct periods of migration linked with common destinations were referred to with
apparent ease, suggesting that this knowledge is drawn from a common national historical
narrative, or a ‘regime of truth’ in the Foucauldian sense. This was generally followed by
differentiation and classification of those time and destination specific migrant groups, with
examples of perceived reasons and routes of migration. For example, in response to my
question ‘how do you think that the diaspora is viewed by Kosovar society’, the interviewee
KG begins by recalling this narrative of diaspora:

**KG:** So as you know our Diaspora, we have the first wave of migrants from
Kosovo were in the mid sixties, with the German immigration program
gastarbeiter and basically this is the level of society that was unemployed
during communism which was something very very uncommon to be
unemployed during comm- unism that managed to get these jobs and establish
the first communities of Kosovo Albanians in in Germany and so on [...].
By beginning with ‘as you know’, KG suggests that this is a well-known phenomenon, the understanding of which is socially shared (although, in the case of KG’s statement, it could also imply that this is knowledge shared amongst those who are involved in study or work on the diaspora). As Homi Bhabha (1983) states in relation to colonial discourse, it could be argued that the classification of the diaspora into three distinct migrant groups relies on the concept of ‘fixity’, since a discursive construction reliant on difference as well as rigidity is present in the language and narrative of homeland Kosovo Albanians. This includes the use of stereotypes to indicate taken-for-granted meaning that cannot be proved, but which is presented as ‘in place’ and ‘already known’. How this stereotype operates can be found both in subtle linguistic features of KG’s statement, and also in more explicit presuppositions. For example, KG uses the term ‘our diaspora’, which functions to position the diaspora in relation to Kosovo, constructing it both as a possession belonging to Kosovans, and – with an implied power relation, favouring homeland Kosovo – an entity that is separate from Kosovo. KG also suggests that those who left to work as guest workers were somehow incapable of getting jobs in what he represented as a good economic climate in communist Yugoslavia where almost everyone was employed. In fact, at the time of the legalisation of migration to Western Europe, Yugoslavia was going through a recession; there was high unemployment and a hard currency crisis (Batović 2009; Bernhard 2012). By the end of the 1970s Yugoslavia was attempting to bring back those migrants and developed policies of return. However, due to the constant persecution of Kosovo Albanians during this period, and the common persecution of those who returned from the West in former Yugoslavia (returning migrants suspected by the security services for holding democratic ideas not in tune with the communist ideology of the time could be punished with imprisonment), it is possible that some did not return and instead became political asylum seekers – a possibility ignored by KG.
**KG:** The second generation is the one of migrants during the nineties basically between nineteen-ninety and nineteen-ninety-five and then the third generation is the one of the war refugees of nineteen-ninety-nine [...]  

Although KG in his account provides a very clear description as he attempts to define the diaspora, he subsequently states that this is difficult because it is now a mixture of many groups:

**KG:** So it’s very difficult to define Kosova Diaspora right now, even if we focus on one particular country or one particular region because it its consisted of three different generations of migrants who now have a hybrid community established and it’s really difficult to draw any kind of general conclusions.

However, this complexity, according him, is due to ‘three different generations of migrants’, rather than, for example, being a result of their complex diversity in terms of age, gender, geographic and socio-economic background within Kosovo and many varied places of destination as migrants. By structuring his account of the diaspora around the idea of ‘three different generations’, it is privileged, legitimised and further ‘fixed’. As such, any pre-existing hybridity of the diasporic group is obfuscated, hybridity instead being apparently born out of subsequent developments of the diaspora in host societies ‘who now have a hybrid community established’.

The idea that KG’s response taps into an already fixed stereotypical, ideological and historical framework through which the diaspora are seen is further supported by the account of another interviewee, HA. Opening with the statement that there are ‘phases of when the diaspora is made’, his narrative also reifies the temporal, or generational grouping of migrants. The two main motivations for migration he suggests, economic and political, are later amalgamated due to the Milosevic regime:
HA: [...] the key is to I think, uh, look at the different phases when diaspora is made. So I think up to 1989 it was purely [telephone interruption] So I think it was purely two types of diaspora people, one which was basically an economic, ah, or incentives for becoming diaspora were economic [...] or the one would be the political asylum seekers, or people who left the what was Yugoslavia at that time because they were seen as a threat or were threatened by the regime. These two groups were the majority of the diaspora for Kosovo, and then in 1989 it became a mixture of both political and economic because of the measures that were taken in expelling people from jobs and schools that was done by the Milosevic regime. So that basically these two clear divisions became unified in a way with the new diaspora, which I think it also, because of the assumption of the young population could potentially became part of the military and military forces that could fight the regime at that time, it was a lot more easier for young people to get out get a passport and get out in Europe but not only.

This historical narrative not only constructs binaries between those who left for economic reasons and those who left as political asylum seekers, but also conforms to a linear narrative structure implying a continuous process with a specific beginning, middle and end.

HA also differentiates the diaspora by country of destination, stating that the urban educated migrated to the UK. However, this complexity, according him, is due to ‘three different generations of migrants’, rather than, for example, being a result of their complex diversity in terms of age, gender, geographic and socio-economic background within Kosovo and many varied places of destination as migrants. By structuring his account of the diaspora around the idea of ‘three different generations’, it is privileged, legitimised and further ‘fixed’. As such, any pre-existing hybridity of the diasporic group is obfuscated, hybridity instead being apparently born out of subsequent developments of the diaspora in host societies ‘who now have a hybrid community established’.

HA also differentiates the diaspora by country of destination, stating that the urban educated
migrated to the UK, whereas the rural uneducated migrated to other parts of Europe:

HA: Also what is, I think characteristic for UK diaspora is that a lot of urban population moved to UK. Which was not the case in other parts of Europe, which mostly was a rural diaspora, people that moved from rural areas [...].

Despite a lack of clear official data about those who migrated to the UK, the assumption that most were educated and urban might be explained by the absence of guest worker agreements between the UK and Yugoslavia (since the guest workers or ‘gastarbeiter’ were the ones who were rural and uneducated). However, as the following extract from HA’s interview shows, the distinction ‘urban (educated)’-‘rural (un-educated)’ is also important in terms of the value judgments attached to the diaspora, especially in terms of their perceived contributions to the homeland:

HA: [...] you can see the influence of the urban diaspora on the cultural social life in Kosova when they either back for a longer period or for a temporary kind of interim period of their stay in Kosovo. That influence is easily seen in music for example, that has emerged in during the transition in Kosovo, and the designs and architecture, that a lot of educated UK diaspora tried to support development and I think you can also see a lot of very unique very expert or what do you call the, uhm, deficit in terms of the human capital that Kosovo had. In terms of planning and management, which still I guess because of other complexities of development in Kosovo not necessarily has become a main-stream but you see successful individuals, which come back and also connect to Kosovo from UK diaspora.

This type of classification of the diaspora reveals the perceived social layers through which these distinctions are embedded and linked to host-country place of residence. Specifically, those who are from the UK are constructed as urban-educated by nearly all the interviewees, as another interviewee, XHR, states in his reflection on Kosovan diaspora integration:
XHR: I mean that as far as it concerns my perception, in UK in London especially, uh, emigrated most people from Prishtina mostly. While people, uh, people from surroundings from villages emigrated to Switzerland and Germany where they already had a cousin, or father or somebody older living. But a part of that, I do have a feeling that British society and policies are more inclusive to newcomers. They gave more opportunities for the diaspora to get included to their life. I don’t know schools, work whatever, sort of they do not feel neglected or like Third World, as they do in Germany and Switzerland.

DP: OK, so you think there is more discrimination in Germany and Switzerland perhaps?

XHR: Exactly

The extract suggests that the UK is responsible for producing a more educated diaspora with the ‘opportunities’ and ‘inclusion’ that are supposed to exist in the UK, as opposed to in Germany and Switzerland. While emphasising the notion that the UK diaspora is more educated and likely to become more so, the perception that those in Germany and Switzerland must be less educated and necessarily less integrated in their host societies is revealed.

Similarly, another interviewee, VC, suggests that the UK Kosovo Albanian Diaspora has integrated well in the UK because it is well educated and urban:

VC: [...] Of course in UK it’s more specific because of the quality of migration there. Predominantly people who left for UK were from the cities, from Prishtina or from the big cities, and this has had an impact on their interaction to Kosovo and with our national cause so to say. So it is a more specific Diaspora, it cannot be compared with the one in Germany, where we’ve had bigger waves of migration that have started from seventies, sixties and then seventies and eighties. The same goes for Switzerland, whereas in in UK it’s a more recent Diaspora and it’s a Diaspora that predominantly comes
from the cities and from Prishtina. So that makes the relationship more specific. They are most of them are integrated in the societies they live in, you don’t see an Albanian street in London the way you have a Pakistani or a, I dunno, a Chinese or, uh ah, you don’t have an Albanian quarter in UK, or whereas in Germany you, although you don’t have a quarter, you have a neighbourhoods where the entire street is populated by Kosovar Albanians.

In these responses, a historic narrative of migration provides the structure through which the complexity and diversity of the Kosovan Albanian Diaspora is reduced and simplified into familiar binary categories of urban v rural, educated v uneducated, gastarbeiter v political exiles and integrated and un-integrated. The following section demonstrates how this framework of understanding diaspora from the homeland provides the conditions of possibility for the construction of the stereotype ‘schatzi’.

4.2. The Schatzi

The use of the word ‘schatzi’ in Kosovo originates from a subversion of the German word Schatz, which is literally translated into English as treasure. The word is used in slang German as the equivalent of the English words sweetheart or darling. As such, in Kosovo ‘schatzi’ is subverted and used as a familiar trope, a rhetorical device, which generates meaning in a new subverted context. The word ‘schatzi’ relates a very specific meaning, intended to signify a particular social and economic group in the Kosova Diaspora and their relationship to homeland. ‘Schatzi’ is used alongside the English words of endearment, ‘honeys’ and ‘darlings’, as a similar trope, having entered the Albanian language to describe diaspora stereotypically. Following the example of ‘schatzi’, the terms of endearment ‘honey’ and ‘darling’ are also subverted in their meaning when used by homeland Kosovo Albanians to construct and ‘other’ the diaspora, especially those who reside in the UK and US.
As the extracts from the interviews show, ‘schatzi’ is a well-established stereotype used in the language of Kosovo Albanians as a discursive and rhetorical device to generate meaning when referring to diaspora from continental Europe, but more specifically from Germany and Switzerland. For example, a certain social hierarchy is signified as one respondent describes the difference in ‘fashion styles’ between what she perceives as the ‘diaspora in England’ and the ‘diaspora in Germany and Switzerland’:

_XHR: I might touch upon one of my professions, like design, diaspora in England is very well, uh how to say, uh, has fit very well in the English England’s fashion styles, while for example diaspora in Germany and Switzerland, whenever you see them in Prishtina or other cities of Kosova you immediately know that they are schatzis, we call them schatzis from Germany and Switzerland because they mostly wear white things. They can be linen shirts or trousers, they are white, from their socks and shoes are white. So whenever our, uh ah uh... our Plaza becomes white, we know that it is because of diaspora from Germany and Switzerland. Although when we talk about diaspora in England they have much better cultivated taste when it comes to dresses, they are influenced by best fashion designers, they care about their quality of life, they enjoy beautiful dresses and they care about it. They are influenced very much by new fashion trends. Which we cannot say, at least I cannot say about people who live in Germany, Switzerland or other European countries._

The binary differences between those who are diaspora in ‘England’ and diaspora in ‘Germany’ here are represented as very evident, discursively fixed through an appeal to transparency (‘you immediately know that they are schatzis...’) and to the legitimising force of collective cultural practice (‘...we call them schatzis from Germany and Switzerland...’). As van Dijk notes, such expressions of group discourse ‘expresses not only individual opinions, but rather socially shared representations’ (1992: 115). Yet there was also a
reflexive awareness amongst respondents about the role of ‘schatzi’ discourse in stereotyping sections of the diaspora differently:

BL: [...] but then you know people here have stereotypes about the diaspora depending on like where they’re coming from, you know, so like you have the Schatzis from Germany, you have you know, so it really depends where you’re coming from you know, in terms of like what, what kind of stereotype in Kosovo you are gonna fit as.

DP: Do they have one for the ones that come from the UK?

BL: Definitely, the like the diaspora from the UK is considered more like a bit more stu- snobby, stuck up, you know, but a bit more creative, intellectual you know [...] that’s the stereotype about the diaspora from the UK. And that’s like referring to the generation that left during the 90’s [...] but more like the early 90’s. Whereas like the diaspora from Germany, you know, they you they, oh they are just like, quote ‘katunar’ you know, like ‘Schatzis’ and what not, it really depends on what country they are coming from, and you know, the diaspora from the US, it’s like different ... kind of like stereotype you know so, I think I think that’s actually very interesting because the people like have mostly families... the UK you had, you had more like individuals kind of like leaving Kosovo, like on an individual like basis you know and going to the UK, whereas in like Germany, you have like huge like families like all together, and emigrating to like Germany or Switzerland you know? (DP: hmm) and then in the in the US most of the like the moving to the US hap-happened like during 1999, [...] also then, that is a different generation, because they did experience the 90s you know, so it’s very interesting to look at what point and how these people left Kosovo and I think that that is a determining like a stereotype for those people when they come back to Kosovo as well.

BL acknowledges that diaspora stereotypes are differentiated by the migrant’s country of destination, stating that the UK diaspora are considered ‘snobbish’ and ‘stuck up’, as well as ‘creative’ and ‘intellectual’. A contrast is drawn between the large family groups
stereotypically associated with migration to Germany and Switzerland (corresponding with perceptions about rural populations in Kosovo, where larger families are assumed to correlate with a lack of education), and migration to the UK as a more individual venture. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that an image of diaspora more in keeping with neoliberal norms for global mobility (individualised, educated and professionalised) might be expressed with more positive connotations. Throughout the interviews, issues of power and social inequality emerge, especially as strategies of positioning one’s association with those diaspora who are more positively perceived become evident. For example, a respondent who works in civil society but also as a fashion designer suggests that he only has a clientele that is intellectual and UK-based rather than uneducated and Germany-based:

XHR: Lately we had those reunions […] it always depends you know what style designer has and with what sort of people one works. My clients are usually mostly intellectuals, and this is why I was working lately mostly with those coming for school reunions here in Kosova. And they usually needed improvements in dresses, which they already purchased in in London.

XHR clearly positions himself with the ‘intellectual clientele’, but he also suggests why the diaspora require his services. In stating that the UK diaspora come for school reunions, he again emphasises education as a distinguishing factor, in contrast to those who might, for example, need outfits for weddings, which are not constructed as intellectual events. For the latter, religious identity and practice is emphasised as a key characteristic:

DP: And what about those from other places like in Germany?
XHR: Other places it is usually for marriages, because during summer in Kosova is marriage seasons, this season is changing a bit, it is influenced by Ramadan, [DP: OK] Ramadan this year starts I don’t know whether beginning of July, and that’s why there are not too many weddings, they do still exist, and that had an impact because no one here organises weddings
without the confirmation of their whole family including diaspora. So wedding
dates are usually arranged by vacations or free days of those members of the
family living in diaspora.

By noting that he does not quite know when Ramadan begins, XHR distances himself from
the more religiously constructed diaspora from Germany. Although XHR relates his direct
experience working with diaspora, he also draws on culturally-shared ideologies and a
dominant hegemonic discourse which represents and reaffirms existing social power
structures valuing professional, intellectual, individual practices over traditional, cultural,
group activities such as weddings or religious periods and festivities (Van Dijk 1995).

The ‘schatzi’ stereotype appears in such accounts to be positioned in relation to more positive
perception of the UK diaspora, further emphasising the negative connotations of diaspora in
Germany and Switzerland. Asked specifically about the public image of seasonally returning
Kosovo Albanians from the UK diaspora, XHR asserts:

XHR: It is very personalised, I personally do have respect for those coming
from the UK, because I have the feeling, because as I said it’s not only for
fashion, but they are influenced by culture and by daily life there. While
diaspora in, let’s say Germany or Switzerland, those are most distinguished
ones, uh, have not changed much especially in their mentality. They earned
money, they are richer much richer than they were but their quality of life has
not changed. I sort of have feeling that they are not, they have not changed,
their mentality is the same one, even worse their mentality is the same as ours
was when they left.

The suggestion here that a certain entrenched, traditional ‘mentality’, impervious to cultural
influences, functions to mark the distinction between rural ‘schatzi’ and others in essentialist
terms. Whilst the UK diaspora’s ‘mentality’ is open and amenable to influence ‘by culture
and by daily life, the German and Switzerland group remains pathologically entrenched in 
pre-migration modes of thought.

It is worth noting that the interviews involving officials from the Ministry of Diaspora denied 
the existence of the ‘schatzi’ stereotype. One junior official’s approach was to subvert the 
‘schatzi’ trope, arguing that since ‘schatzi’ in German means treasure, what people mean 
when they call someone a ‘schatzi’ is to express an appreciation of their value. Furthermore, 
a more senior official narrating his own migration to Switzerland during the 1980s noted 
how, despite having lived previously in a rural area of Kosovo, he was a political exile, 
returning to Kosovo after the war to work in the Kosovo government. Drawing upon personal 
experience to offer an oppositional narrative that clearly contradicts the ‘schatzi’ stereotype, 
represents an important strategy of resistance, but one which remains vulnerable to dismissal 
as an exception to the rule, and which does not subvert the structure of dominance so 
devaluing the identity of guest workers labelled as ‘schatzi’.

The following section will analyse a popular comedy sketch in Kosovo, which depicts the 
return to Kosovo of a Swiss migrant.

4.2.1. ‘The return of my son from exile’

In order to illustrate the cultural references of homeland Kosovo Albanains about the German 
and Swiss Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, a good example is the comedy sketch by the popular 
Stupcat group of Kosovo Albanian comedians.\(^{25}\) The sketch is entitled ‘the return of my son

\(^{25}\) Stupcat is the Albanain word for Sticks or Rods.
from exile’. This parody begins with a stereotypical Kosovo Albanian villager father talking into the camera of a local TV crew who have come to film as he says the ‘big day’. The father explains that this big day is when his son is due to be returning from Switzerland for his annual visit ‘back home’ to Kosovo. He tells us that he has arranged for a reception for his son, which includes a traditional folk band and a children’s school choir (extremely bad). He then proceeds to lead the local TV crew cameras to his garden where the scene is set.

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

26 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxV3P1bFGUU (last accessed 08/07/2013)
27 It must be noted here that the setting is rural, thus further reinforcing the stereotype that rural populations migrated to places such as Switzerland.
His wife is also present (she is being performed by a man) and is also depicted as a stereotypical Kosovo Albanian villager. They seem very excited about the return of their son from the diaspora, they refer to him as a living hero. Within a few minutes the son comes through the garden gates, dressed in a white suit and black sunglasses, holding a silver briefcase, which looks like it is full of money. This is when the ceremonies begin, they praise him, the choir sing in his honour thanking him for his efforts during the apartheid when he supported the family financially, when he supported the war effort by sending money which enabled the family to defend themselves by buying arms.

Figure 4:

In contrast his sister presents him with a ceremonial glass of Kosovo water to drink, while simultaneously expressing that she is pregnant with a son that she intends to name after him (thus asking for patronage).
He proceeds to sit down with his parents at the table in the garden and tells them that in his briefcase he has 450,000 thousand francs, which his mother quickly converts to 350,000 thousand euros. He says that he would like to give them the money but, he cannot do this as he has been diagnosed with cancer and only has a few days to live. He says that he would like to spend the money to make himself comfortable in his homeland as he prepares for death. His mother asks him ‘who he contracted cancer off?’ This is important since most Kosovans still believe that cancer is a disease that has come to Kosovo from people living in the West. The son tells her that it’s not contagious and no one is to blame. At this stage the son is clearly unhappy and emotional exclaiming that he is not treated like a son, that he is only loved for his money. This is where the scene turns grotesque as the father tries to take the briefcase off his son and to run with it. The son runs after him catching up with his father and they begin to fight. Both parents turn violent and verbally abusive calling their son names and denouncing him as their son, the mother finally says he probably doesn’t have cancer but has AIDS – this again is believed to be a disease that the diaspora and the presence of the international community have brought to Kosovo. They eventually succeed to take the briefcase from him and lock him out. Then we see the son outside the gates of his family home counting down from 10, 9, 8 and we see an explosion, and the son declares ‘this is a greeting from the diaspora’.
Depictions of ‘schatzi’s’ dressed in white, coming back with money to a rural setting, are widespread throughout Kosovo. Even commercial advertisement in Kosovo refers to those from the diaspora as ‘schatzi’, such as the recent advertisement campaign by the main telecommunications company in Kosovo Vala, whereas in contrast, in such visual media, young beautiful actors portray homeland Kosovans as fashionable and European.

As one of the interviewee’s states that these stereotypes are born out of the relationship of money and remittances that the Kosovo society has with the diaspora. He states:

*HA: So schatzi in my sense, is that in a short way this explains ‘we love your money but we don’t like the way you behave in in the society’.*

However, the comedy sketch takes this and subverts it to show that those in Kosovo society are the ones not behaving well in society. Despite this there is still a suggestion that this behaviour is confined to those from the villages who are not well educated. The next section discusses the relationship that Kosovo has with its diaspora in terms of money and those returning to Kosovo.
4.3. Cash cows

Money is strongly associated with the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, and diaspora remittances continue to be a key resource (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Waehlisch 2012; KAS 2013). It is estimated that the diaspora infuses the Kosovan economy with somewhere around 500 million euro each year. This was a strong theme in the interview responses, and as one interviewee stated, ‘Over and over again, they are seen as cash-cows’:

*HA:* I think this connects with what I was just saying. I think that the fact that diaspora has been supporting mostly their families and making at one point even one third of the budget of Kosovo, in a way their identity became money, we identified them and we feel and lived with them through money the relationship of the money, and I think that there is a lot of humour that has come out of the idea or the ana – analysing the relation-ship between people from the diaspora and here. So schatzi in my sense, is that in a short way this explains ‘we love your money but we don’t like the way you behave in in the society’. Which means there is a huge gap between people who live in diaspora and people who live in here. There is a subconscious idea that everyone that receives the money in Kosovo knows that is wrong and that immediately translates into some kind of rejection of identifying them as schatzi that ultimately makes them lower in rank than people who actually receive their money. So it’s a huge disparity of relationships that has been built individually and then as a collective versus Kosovars who live in here, so it’s a very very complex I would say relationship that everyone tries to avoid the debate therefore you exclude them by identifying them with some with a term that literally puts them as less. I don’t think it’s a class issue, it’s a more ident-labelling them with something that makes them less equal with Kosovars, even though they are the source of funding and the money for families and society.
Another interviewee, SB, who was only seventeen when she came to the UK in 1990 as an au pair, elaborates the issue of sending money home from the position of the migrant, ‘I was the only person from my family to leave Kosova and due to the Milosevic regime which dismissed all Albanians from state institutions, I was the only member of my family to have an income and support my parents and siblings back home’.

In fact, even the government is trying to obtain more money from the diaspora, by charging those coming from the diaspora with western number plates more money to enter Kosovo. Nonetheless, recently there has been opposition to the treatment of the diaspora by the government of Kosovo. The opposition party Self-Determination or Vetvendosja expressed concern about the application of additional border fines that were being enforced and charged to ‘compatriots from Diaspora’. In a press release from May 2011, they criticised the government for ‘looting’ the Diaspora Kosovo Albanians:

> After many letters and e-mails that we receive from compatriots in the Diaspora, VETËVENDOSJA! has made an analysis of the policy issues that impose charges on foreign-registered vehicles entering Kosovo. As a result, each migrant who comes to vacation in Kosovo, pays twice for vehicle insurance, once in the country of origin and the other for the duration of their stay in Kosovo. (My translation)

Furthermore, according to Vetvendosja ‘from the millions "looted" from our diaspora, only 10% is used ‘for the payment of damages’ that the diaspora supposedly cause to the roads in Kosovo when they come for holidays during the summer months. The rest goes through to other budgets that are divided by the government at their discretion’. However, it appears that as Kosovo attempts to establish itself as a new self-reliant state, this economic relationship with the diaspora is changing, as KG states:
KG: So now how do we as Kosovars feel about them, well I think that we are in the process of getting detached from our dependency of diaspora which was basically created during the nineties where many sort of households had remittances as their only income of survival. Now we are entering a different phase where basically it’s, uh, it’s more like things are getting things are changing [...].

However, a more complex discourse emerges when the issues of the returning diaspora is addressed. Because the UK diaspora is positioned as well educated and intellectual, there seem to be two lines of thought. One suggests that the UK diaspora is so well integrated in the UK that they would not return, and the other, that if they were to return, some anticipate them making a positive contribution, whereas others suggest that they would take highly-paid jobs as ‘internationals’ because they possess British passports. Thus, as the two extracts below show, the anxieties surrounding the return of the ‘schatzi’ vary significantly between countries of destination:

DP: Do you think that sometimes there is potential to view the UK diaspora because of what you have said their trendiness with fashion, their intellectualism, their cultural, their high cultural tastes, do you think they are seen as a little bit of a threat, as opposed to what you’ve described as the ‘Schatzis’ in Germany? You know do they seem like competition?

XHR: No not at all, firstly because there is a common feeling that they do not plan to come back, they do not have reasons to plan to come, they are living a nice unstressful, not unstressful but less stressful life than we are, so while we have a feeling like when we when we talk with and about diaspora in Germany in Switzerland the feeling like we are still dealing with katunars, that feeling does not exists about and with Albanians in England.

Perhaps the anxiety around the UK diaspora is lessened by a perception that those in the UK do not intend to move back to Kosovo, as VC states:
VC: So in UK it’s more specific, what we have seen in UK is people who have gone there to live and not to live and come back. I mean this is, I believe, the biggest difference between the Diaspora in UK and Diaspora.

Nonetheless, when those UK diaspora do return, and perhaps due to the perception of the UK diaspora as ‘well-educated’ and ‘cultured’ there is an anxiety that they return to work for international missions which are highly paid, thus putting the locals at a disadvantage. As the following quote from VC shows:

VC: They come for jobs, but they work here, most of them work here as British citizens, they work with international organisations OSCE, EULEX, before UNMIK. So most of them have come back as Brits, and they have the British passport, they keep the British citizenship, they get very good salaries. But not many have come back to work for local salaries and local institutions, there are of course very few exceptions, but this was not the predominant trend and, there is nothing wrong with it, absolutely not.

Summary

‘Schatzi’ is not just a word, but a linguistic trope, embedded discursively and ideologically in the homeland culture of Kosova. It functions as a stereotype to construct and ‘other’ the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, especially in Germany and Switzerland. In the language and descriptions of the ‘schatzi’, interviewees state that on the one hand, the ‘schatzi’ have worked hard in host countries and have earned good incomes and accumulated wealth that has played an important role in the form of remittances. However, on the other hand, this ‘cash cow’ element of the ‘schatzi’ discourse has not necessarily translated into positive social status for the diaspora.
Whilst the UK-based diaspora are often attributed with a cultural sophistication and ‘mentality’ that is linked with a framework of understanding that accepts their integration overseas and role in the ‘international’ labour market when returning to Kosova, the ‘schatzi’ more generally are represented as lacking cultural advancement and social capital, failing to climb the social ladder in their western host countries.

Through analysis of interview data, I have argued that the meaning of diaspora is not merely dependent upon how a migrant community closely identifies with an imagined homeland. To understand diaspora’s complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its relationship(s) with the imagined homeland/host-land. Stuart Hall (2007), states that the dominant western discourses, which described and differentiated between Europe and others, used European cultural categories, languages and ideas to represent the ‘other’. As my analyses demonstrate, these dominant ‘othering’ discourses are also present in the discourses of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo who represent, categorise and differentiate their diaspora.

The inherent heterogeneity and hybridity of diaspora are not captured in ‘schatzi’ discourse, but instead, rather broad generalisations depending on factors such as time of migration, place of migration and emigration and socio-economic factors, are applied to classify and explain the differences internal to the ‘schatzi’ stereotype. Thus the diaspora is imagined and actively constructed as ‘schatzi’ in the Kosovan Albanian homeland, but not as a homogenous entity, or, necessarily, entirely consistently.
Chapter 5

Diaspora and Bio-Politics

Introduction

Most countries have established institutions and policies to enable organised institutional ties with Diasporas and/or expatriate communities. These institutions have recently proliferated, especially in developing countries, with the aim of among others to stretch influence and attract investment for development (Gamlen et al., 2013; Blackwell 2009). Thus Kosovo similarly to other countries, especially those with recent increased migration and those relying heavily on remittances from their diaspora, has also sought to establish ties in order to benefit from its diaspora population (IONESCU, 2005; Gamlen et al., 2013; Agunias, 2009; Odermatt, 2013). As the minister for Diaspora Mr. Ibrahim Makolli stated the Kosovo diaspora is ‘a community that without a doubt presents one of our strongest potentials both financially and culturally’. Nonetheless, most literature from Kosovo and about Kosovo diaspora involvements has predominantly focused on policy, remittances, homeland development and brain drain projects (FID 2009; USAID 2010; UNDP 2012; Xharra and Wachlisch 2012; KAS 2013).

The idea that Kosovo although small has an untapped resource in its diaspora is also reiterated in many reports. One such recent report by Xharra and Whalisch (2012) recommends public diplomacy through ‘tapping’ the diaspora ‘Kosovo’s foreign Public Diplomacy could benefit greatly from an untapped resource which has not yet been fully

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29 Xharra and Whalisch also established the government supported internet platform KosovoDiaspora.org
utilized as a foreign policy tool: its diaspora’ (Xhara and Whalisch 2012: 6). When Xhara and Whalisch who wrote the aforementioned report, launched their KosovoDiaspora.org platform which as they state on there focuses on highlighting and celebrating the ‘achievements of individuals, groups, and organizations related to Kosovo’, Petrit Selimi, the deputy minister for Foreign Affairs said that through ‘this platform, the world will know Kosovo as a country, as well as a thriving society’.30 Thus using the diaspora for public diplomacy and recognition for Kosovo seems well established, however this does not include all diaspora. What this also suggests is that the role of diaspora is predominantly seen as an economic and or diplomatic tool for homelands to exploit. This is clearly imbedded within the Kosovo Law on Diaspora, which aims to position Kosovo’s visibility outside of Kosovo as well as benefit Kosovo through investments by encouraging the diaspora to send money to Kosovo and/or invest in Kosovo.

Based on interviews conducted at the Kosovo Ministry of Diaspora, this chapter critically analyses the discursive construction of the diaspora by ministry officials. By identifying and analyzing discursive and rhetorical strategies, I examine how the diaspora is constructed and how the ministry negotiate and construct their role vis-à-vis the diaspora and Kosovo. The main discursive strategies identified range from representation of the diaspora as passive and immobilized and needing the Ministry of Diaspora to ‘arouse’ and mobilize them, the hegemony of the Albanian language, identity and culture, the risks and anxieties about assimilation, and the constructions of a ‘good’ diaspora that can be used to promote Kosovo abroad, and contribute back to Kosovo through financial investment and public diplomacy. Although, thirteen interviews were conducted with a variety of civil society actors, NGO activists, journalists and official and political actors, this chapter focuses on two interviews

with senior Ministry of Diaspora officials. While analysis will focus on the interviews with the two officials, other interviews with civil society activists, journalists and political actors will inform this work.

The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section outlines the key institutional and legal structures regarding the Kosovo law on diaspora. Secondly, the next section focuses on the discursive strategy that depicts the diaspora as a passive community. Followed by the third section, which analyses the use of rhetorical strategies to justify the establishment of cultural centres for the diaspora and supplementary education. The final section explores the focus on attracting financial investment and public diplomacy.

5.1. The Ministry of Diaspora, Diaspora Law and Policy

Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo, was established in May 2011. The ministry was created based on Kosovo’s constitution (Article 65) and the Law on Diaspora, was passed by the Kosovo assembly on 15th of April 2010.  

This section focuses on analysis of the establishment of the Ministry of Diaspora, Diaspora Law and policy in Kosovo. Article 1 of the law states that:

1. The purpose of this law is preservation and cultivation of national identity, language, culture and education of the Diaspora members and migration and their relations with institutions of Republic of Kosovo.

The lexical choices in the law focus on constructing a Kosovo collective identity abroad, essentially stretching Kosovo’s reach beyond its borders, but moreover, words such as ‘preservation’ and ‘cultivations’ imply an imminent threat to Kosovo’s ‘identity, language, culture and education’ that requires ‘preservation and cultivation’ through its institutions, thus arguably suggesting a threat and anxiety to its national identity. This discourse denotes that there is a desire, similarly to the ways in which other contemporary societies such as the UK do so, to exert social and political power over individuals, including those abroad. This is a form of Foucauldian (1969) biopolitics, more specifically distance based or telebiopolitics, where in this case a diasporic ‘social order’ is being constructed and a set of relations and identities are being constructed and manipulated. This is disguised with the topoi and argumentation present in the lexicon of the Diaspora Law. The argument suggests that the diaspora are at risk of assimilation and Kosovo through the Ministry of Diaspora and the Law on Diaspora will somehow protect diaspora from this. Whereas what transpires in the second part of the law is a desire to control and use the diaspora through a manipulative construction of particular identities that are preferable and that can contribute to Kosovo. Although the second part of the law employs a vocabulary that infers help and does not provoke anxiety around assimilation, in contrast, once the anxiety is established in the first part it allows for a discourse that will enable tapping into these particular identities which are receptive to Kosovo to benefit Kosovo from the ‘inter-cultural relations between Republic of Kosovo and countries in which the Diaspora is present’:

1. This law, also, aims to help in organization of the Diaspora in various countries where they live and help, encourage and develop inter-cultural relations between Republic of Kosovo and countries in which the Diaspora is present.

Furthermore, the law is broad, defining ‘Migrant or member of Diaspora’ as:
1.1. Migrant or member of Diaspora – any person dwelling or emplaced outside Republic of Kosovo and who was born or has family origins in the Republic of Kosovo;\textsuperscript{32}

By including anyone who was born in Kosovo and has family origins in Kosovo, it legally encompasses as many people as possible and their subsequent offspring. However, although this has its benefits for Kosovo as Bakewell (2009: 1) has noted:

As governments and donors scramble to engage diasporas in development, there is a tendency to claim all who have ancestral origins in a particular country for its diaspora. This is understandable as it broadens the pool of people to whom they can appeal. However, this relationship between individuals and a ‘homeland’ cannot be assumed and there are dangers in such assumptions.

According to Bakewell (2009), one of the problems with such assumptions is the risk of benefiting privileged, well-educated and economically wealthy transnational groups. However, it is precisely these groups that are being sought and coveted, since they are seen as potentially able to bring financial investment to enable Kosovo’s development but also extend the notion of a Kosovo nation beyond Kosovo’s borders. Not only does this create problems for anyone who does not conform to the dominant hegemonic identity as well as sidelining vulnerable and poor diaspora members, but there is also the potential of extending ethnonationalism, including on-going conflicts to diasporic communities. This constructs and generalizes the diaspora as nothing more than empty vessels for homeland ideology and nationalism, and is extremely problematic as it generates discourses such as the ‘schatzi’ phenomenon especially targeting those who are perceived as poor or uneducated diaspora

\textsuperscript{32} There is a spelling mistake present in the English version of the law, where it states Migration instead of Migrant.
(see previous chapter for more on this). Furthermore, such generalizations imply a lack of agency within the diaspora as is demonstrated in the following section, which examines this construction of the diaspora as ‘inactive’ and requiring ‘awakening’. Generalizations about the diaspora and the role of homelands and special ministries such as the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo enable the transmission and biopolitical reach of nations. Therefore, the following section critically analyses the discourses about diaspora of civil servants and policy makers that I interviewed in the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo.

5.2. ‘Waking the Diaspora’

This section, examines the language used by the officials at the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo to construct the Kosovo diaspora. According to the officials I interviewed, the diaspora and migrants are not well organized and move back and forth between Kosovo and their host countries twice a year in a flock like manner. A senior official I interviewed described the diaspora as follows:

*A Diaspora, which is not active, a Diaspora that moves strongly twice within twelve months, regularly in summer and winter. Even in this direction we have developed policies of the Ministry, and implement, make plans and specific programs where eh migrants find themselves in various forms of activity and pursuits.*

33 Një mergate e cila nuk ështe aktive, një mergate qe leviz fuqishem mbrenda dymbetëmuajësh dy here, në menstr të rregult, në verë dhe ne dimer. Edhe ne këte drejtim ne kemi hartuar politikat e ministris dhe i zbatojm, bëjm plane dhe programe të caktuara ku mergimtaret eh e gjejn veten ne forma te ndryshme te veprimtarise dhe aktivitete te tyre.
Thus, the diaspora is generalized and described as inactive and instinctual, lacking agency and moving/following like flocks or migrating birds. This constructs a flock like homogenous diaspora, one that does not reflect the hybridity and heterogeneity of diaspora that has now been formalized in diaspora theory in host societies. This also suggests that previous scholarship, by focusing predominantly on Diasporas in host societies, have ignored the homogenizing tendencies that can be found in the discourses of homelands in relation to diaspora. In contrast to such constructions by homelands, as scholars exploring diaspora and the imagined homeland within host country settings have demonstrated, there is evident activism and engagement that diasporas have towards their homelands. For example, in relation to Kosovo Albanian Diaspora Maria Koinova (2013) in her work exploring diaspora mobilization and diaspora activism by Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the US and the UK, found that Kosovo Albanian Diaspora are mobilized and active agents who engage and initiate activism. She has explored four types of diaspora mobilization and states that although the Albanian diaspora exemplify a moderately weak mobilization after the Kosovo 1999 conflict, which saw a more active diaspora mobilization, currently the diaspora focuses on particular issues to do with Kosovo’s sovereignty goals, nonetheless the diaspora is not ‘asleep’ or uninterested in Kosovo. As Koinova discovered, the UK diaspora is tactical and engaged when it is able to make a difference in the homeland, furthermore some members of the diaspora returned to Kosovo after the Kosovo war ended in 1999 in order to contribute there:

Diaspora entrepreneurs did not find a good reason to lobby the United Kingdom, which was mostly aligned with the sovereignty goal. Reinvigoration of diaspora networks occurred briefly after the 2004 violence in the homeland, but remained ad hoc. Processes of diaspora mobilization were primarily driven from the main secessionist elites in the homeland and not by the diaspora, but mobilization remained weak compared to that in the United
States…Political disengagement between the Kosovo-based elites and the UK-based diaspora took place almost immediately after the warfare ended for several reasons. Political activists, mostly associated with the KLA, relocated to Kosovo. Many educated diaspora members, mostly with experience in the information technology sector, returned to Kosovo hoping to find good jobs (Koinova 2013: 16).

However, such opaque power through the establishments of ministries of diaspora, where tele-biopolitics are used to control and discipline the diasporic body, without taking into account the heterogeneity of diaspora and the differences that diaspora have, including in their national identity constructions and identification compared to those in the homeland, can create disillusionment and other problems for the returning diaspora. As Koinova also notes those that returned to Kosovo were at times dissatisfied with Kosovo and subsequently returned to the UK. ‘[w]hile some became dissatisfied and sought their way back to the United Kingdom, others were keen on voluntary return’ but fundamentally ‘the diaspora was disillusioned.’

Furthermore, such discursive practices, where the diasporic body is constructed alongside potential investment and skills for the homeland, can create a discourse where the situation of diaspora and their social and economic wellbeing within the host society is seemingly ignored. Therefore, as Koinova reports, ‘[i]n the words of community leaders, the government “forgot about the diaspora,” and their own role as Kosovo representatives in the United Kingdom was disregarded’ (Koinova 2013: 16). Through such discourses the diasporic body politic is also bypassed and the diaspora is only represented alongside its potential to carry dominant hegemonic discourses from the homeland and to benefit the homeland. For example, throughout the interviews with the ministry officials the ‘preservation of language, identity and culture’, reverberated:
Ministry of Diaspora is obliged to take care and to develop plans and implement such internal policies for preserving their identity abroad, to preserve the language, culture, history, then it is obliged to draw up plans and to implement such internal policies towards educating the children of Diaspora abroad, in many different countries where Albanians live and reside and operate.\textsuperscript{34}

This also raises another issue. Kosovo is officially multiethnic, demographically consists of six main ethnic groups. Although the Albanian population makes up the majority with around 90 percent, nonetheless the remaining ethnic groups still live in Kosovo and abroad. However, the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian (or REA) minorities who are also marginalized in Kosovo are unacknowledged by the officials. Not only are they predominantly ignored and discriminated against in Kosovo and although they make up a considerable diaspora populations, they are mainly ignored by the official discourses which focus predominantly on the dominant hegemonic Kosovo Albanian identity (see Sigona 2012 for more on this).

In the interviews with the officials at the ministry, I continuously suggested that the diaspora was not only made up of Kosovo Albanians. Although they suggested that the provisions made by the ministry were for all residence of Kosovo, and suggested that the Serbian minority was tended to by Serbia proper as they did not recognize Kosovo’s independence, the lexical choices and generalizations made by the officials all seemed to focus on the Albanian language, identity and culture. So for example after the aforementioned quote above, where the officials states that the ministry is developing provisions for educating the children of Albanian migrants abroad wherever they may live, after some I suggested that

\textsuperscript{34} Ministria e diaspores eshtë e obliguar që të kujdeset dhe të hartojë plane dhe politika te atilla te zbatoj per ruajtjen e identitës te tyre jasht vendit, per ruajtjen e gjuhës, e kultures, historis, pastaj eshte e obliguar që të hartojë plane dhe të zbatoj politika te atilla ne drejtim te arsimimit te femive te merges jasht vendit, e të shume shtete të ndryshme ku jetojn dhe veprojn dhe banojn dhe jetojn shqiptaret.
Kosovo is multiethnic, he also adds as an afterthought ‘Eh yes also other people who are inhabitants of the Republic of Kosovo’. This suggests the possible exclusion of such vulnerable groups, who are also subjected to racism in host societies.

The distance based biopolitical policies also stretch to tangible projects such as engineering physical spaces for diaspora. Whereas traditionally diasporas themselves established cultural centers and other meeting places, in the case of Kosovo, throughout the interviews the officials at the ministry were very keen to stress their aims to open and operate what they termed ‘cultural centers’ in different places around the world, to - as they said be- ‘a home of Kosovans’:

*One other policy the Diaspora Ministry is drafting, applying in fact, are the openings of cultural centres through different countries, cultural centres which have to aim to be the home of Kosovans where various forms of activities, and various layers of migrants, can attend for their culture issue, the creation of businesses, mutual recognition, to lobby for Kosovo, to promote Kosovo culture and identity in those countries where these centres are opened, according to the law for the Diaspora and Expatriates of Kosovo.*

According to Bak and Brömssen (2010) who conducted research on children’s diasporic practices, also focusing on Kosovo Albanian children in Sweden, diasporic practices involve participation in associations or groups relating to the homeland, and ‘religion and rituals,

35 Nje politikë tjetër që ministria e diasporës eshtë duke hartuar, duke e zbatuar ne fact, jan edhe hapjet e qendrave kulturore neper vende te ndryshme, qendrat kulturore te cilat kemi per synim qe të jene shtepit e kosoves ku mund te frekuentojnë formë te ndryshme te veprimitarive, dhe shtresa te ndryshme të mërgimtarëve, per qeshtje te tyre te kultures, te krijimit te bisneseve, te njohjes reciproke, te lobimit per kosoves, te promovimit te kultures te kosoves, te identitetit te saj ne per ato vende tu ku hapen ato qendra, dhe te kultures, sipas ligjit per diasporën dhe mergaten e kosoves.
relations to the country of origin, language spoken, participation in and construction of transnational networks and communications’ (Bak & Brömssen’s 2010:116). However, by engineering such projects, rather than allowing them to arise independently and also independently of ministry control. The Ministry’s aim to establish cultural centers indicates a strong biopolitical power and desire to not only cultivate Kosovo Albanian diasporic identity, but also control the diasporic body, promote particular nationalistic ideology, political ideology and benefit from the diaspora’s potential economic power, while at the same time homogenizing the diaspora and excluding hybridity or those poor disenfranchised diaspora.36 The perception of the diaspora as possessing economic wealth that Kosovo can tap into and attract investment to Kosovo was a major and recurrent theme throughout the interviews. This will be the focus of the following section.

5.4. Investment: ‘Those who wish to invest in Kosovo are welcome’

Kosovo is one of the poorest countries in Europe with high unemployment (figures range from between 40%-50%) therefore one of the main aims throughout the political spectrum in Kosovo is attracting investment and economic development in Kosovo. This was also the main aim represented by those interviewed at the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo. The extract below from the interview with a ministry official highlights the importance placed on attracting financial investment and the prevalence of this discourse. What is emphasised above all else is investment from ‘highly successful migrants...who are powerful

36 This can also be observed in the conferences that the Kosovo Ministry of Diaspora together with the Ministry of Education in Kosovo organises for teachers who teach Albanian in the diaspora. The conferences provide the educators with the tools to (as they state in their publications) ‘preserve the Albanian national and cultural identity’, as well as providing them with instructions for teaching Kosovo Albanian Diaspora children.
businessmen’. This acts to alienate others who are perceived as less wealthy members of diaspora. This is further emphasized by statements such as ‘those who wish to invest in Kosova are welcome’, suggesting that if individuals from the diaspora do not have investment capital then they are not as welcome.

Furthermore, the discourse is predominantly gendered and aimed at men, which suggest a patriarchal construction of diaspora alongside tradition homeland Kosovo values. As the official at the ministry states:

Also we by implementing the law, act in it and in those directions so that the policy of the Ministry of Diaspora extends in other forms, in cooperation and in different relations with migrants, for example in matters of investment, and where highly successful migrants there who are powerful businessmen can look to their capitals to bring into Kosovo to establish their own businesses either close family ones or larger projects. Well, I know about some 400 businesses of Kosovo migrants operate and are successful, and they are very good example that those who wish to invest in Kosovo are welcome and have their profits in that already, that they also help the state in the economic development of Kosovo and more.\(^{37}\)

Nonetheless, Kosovo heavily depends on remittances from family members rather than ‘powerful businessmen’. Remittances have been extremely important in sustaining some of the poorest families in Kosovo (Vathi 2007; 2011), as well as in infusing the local economy

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\(^{37}\) Gjitheashtu ne duke zbatuar ligjin, veprojm ne ate dhe ne ato drejtime qe politikat e ministris te diaspores te shtrihen edhe ne ne forma te tjera, te bashkpunimit dhe ne relacione te ndryshme me mergimtaret, pershembul per qeshtjet e investimeve, dhe ku mergimtare shume te sukseshem ka qe janë biznismen te fuqishem dhe shikojm qe kapitalet e tyre ti sjellim ne Kosove edhe ta bëjm per ta te hapin bisneset e tyre qoft te ngushta familiare po edhe ne projekte te mdha. Eh dija qe reth diku 400 biznese të mergimtarëve në Kosove veprojn dhe jan te sukseshem, dhe një shemblul shume i mire se ata te cilet deshironj te investojn ne Kosove jan te mireseardhur dhe kan profitet e tyre ne ate, veq se ata i ndihmojn edhe shtetit edhe zhvillimit ekonomik te gjithe e me shume te kosoves.
with billions of euros. However, such contributions by the diaspora are not emphasized or coveted as much as bigger investments. Perhaps this is due to the unofficial nature of remittances, which the government has no means to control, whereas bigger investments through governmental channels such as the Ministry of Diaspora would enable clear involvement from the government.

Furthermore, a differentiation is made between good diaspora that Kosovo can tap into such as businessmen ‘highly successful migrants’ or celebrities like the Kosovo born British Rita Ora and the ‘bad diaspora’ that are involved in illegal activities and negatively depicted in western media. In fact, throughout the interviews emphasis is either placed on those with high economic and cultural capital or those with particular political struggles and connections, whereas others in manual labour and from Kosovo’s ethnic minority groups are ignored. For example, those diaspora members that were involved in political struggles, either those assassinated by the Yugoslav regime or those who returned to fight for during the conflict and died in the conflict are also positively constructed and associated with. As the interviewee states:

*There have been several cases when the former Yugoslavia and Serbia together with its secret services has killed political exiles in different countries such as has been Jusuf Gervalla, Kadri Zeka, Bajrush Gervalla and others. Eh eh whom and because of their political activity if within and outside the country and were executed we (Cant make out) from eh Serbian secret services. Well hmm these migrants played a particular role, and as Minister of Diaspora we have separate treatments for those who have given eh specific contributions for the children of Kosovo. Eh eh so as Ministry of Diaspora, the law also determines to allocate special gratitude for the special activities, whether postmortem, or whether for activities for which they have directly*
influenced the vision of Kosovo, and the contribution that they have given to freedom of the country.  

What the above extract demonstrates is the perpetuation and construction of the myths of political resistance and struggle that the dominant Kosovo Albanian identity of Kosovo is based on. This enables these national myths, which are also associated with the current political elite and political factions in Kosovo, who also control various ministries, to be perpetuated and venerated. As the previous chapter on the ‘Schatzi’ discourse demonstrated, those who may have migrated from Kosovo for economic reasons and were not involved in politics or seeking political asylum are constructed as less deserving. Taken together, all these elements suggest that the homeland is an important and active element of constructing the diaspora.

Summary

This chapter has argued that the Ministry of Diaspora constructs a passive diaspora that requires guidance and lacks agency, a diaspora whose national identity, which is assumed as Kosovo Albanian, is threatened by host society cultural and linguistic assimilation and acculturation. In contrast, one of the benefits of living outside Kosovo is the financially

38 kan pas raste te renda kur ishjugaslavia bashk me Serbin dhe shperbimet e saj sekrete ka ka vra mergimtaret politike neper vende te ndryeshme siq ka qen Jusuf Gervalla, Kadri Zeka, Bajrush Gervalla dhe te tjear, cillet te eh eh me pershkak vepritaris politike dhe mrenda dhe jasht vendit jan exekutuar fisikisht ne [cant make out] nga sherbime sekrete eh Serbe. Eh kjo hmm kjo mergate politike ka lujt ni role te veqant dhe si ministria e diaspores ka tretmant te veqant per ata te cillet kan dhën eh kontribute te veqanta per bijet e kosoves. Eh prandaj eh si ministri e diaspores edhe me ligj osht percaktuar qe te ndaj qmime te veqanta per veprimtarq te veqanta, qoft per postmortem qofste per veprimtarqi per cilat kan ndiku te drejtperdjet ne qellimin e kosoves, dhe kontributin qe kan dhan per lirin eh eh vendit.
advantaged, that the diaspora are perceived to have from economic wealth accumulated in Western Europe. Nonetheless, the diaspora is predominantly described as diaspora whose primary role should be to financially invest in Kosovo and positively promote Kosovo abroad. This chapter has demonstrated the opaque power and distance based biopolitics and governmentality exercised by homelands through the creation of Ministries of Diaspora, Diaspora Law and institutional discourses which act to control and discipline the diasporic body as well as construct a homogenized diaspora. The following chapter will continue to focus on the construction of diaspora by the homeland by further exploring the ‘othering’ of diaspora in the homeland as well as the construction of new social layers that returning diaspora are seen to occupy.
Chapter 6

The New ‘Other’

Introduction

The previous chapters highlighted the dynamic relationship between the homeland and diaspora Kosovo Albanians and the diaspora politics of the Ministry of Diaspora. The previous chapters demonstrated though analysis of different discursive and rhetorical devices as well as cultural reference points, the that the relationship between the homeland and its diaspora is extremely vibrant and involved, multidirectional, in constant flow and negotiation, endlessly imagined, constructed and re-constructed.

Firstly, this chapter builds on the work from the previous chapters and continues to highlight the ‘othering’ of the diaspora vis-à-vis the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo in order to further explore ideas of inclusion and exclusion. Secondly, this chapter aims to show that the differences that are constructed through discourse between the diaspora and the homeland precisely rest not on the distance between the two but upon their proximity. That is to say that the diaspora are not external satellites to Kosovo but present and involved in the lives and lived experiences of homeland Kosovo Albanians. Finally, this chapter problematizes the imagined homogeneous singularity of national and diasporic identity.

This chapter is divided into three smaller sections. The first section entitled ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, analyses an Internet meme that was shared and circulated on Facebook by Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. The analysis aims to demonstrate how the meme constructs a clear ideological discourse based on notions of financial differences between the diaspora and Kosovo.
Together with the interview material, this section builds on my earlier work in this study and highlights the ideological othering of the Kosovo diaspora by the homeland. This is further explored around the notion that the global and especially western media are responsible for the negative stereotypes that homeland Kosovo Albanians have about diaspora Kosovo Albanians. This is based on analysis of interviews where the interviewees state that the negative representations of asylum seekers in the western media, which are received in Kosovo, are responsible for the negative perceptions of the diaspora in Kosovo. Together with interviews that insist on differentiating between asylum seekers in the west and those who travelled as international students and are constructed more positively, the anxiety and insistence on this differentiation suggests that the negative stereotypes and perceptions of asylum seekers are also felt in Kosovo, whereas being an international student who returns to Kosovo is constructed as much more positive, and one interviewee provides details around how the diaspora can assimilate to fit in Kosovo. These prescriptions are similar to western assimilation and integration discourse, focusing on ideas such as ‘you must speak the language’. The second section explores the change in discourse of the diaspora from those who were the ones who predominantly provided remittances to now being seen as troublemakers who do not abide by the law and are specifically identified in interviews as those that cause the most traffic offenses in Kosovo. Finally, the third section, explores discursive constructions that position the diaspora as a new social group and ‘other’ alongside the local population and international population in Kosovo. The binary between the constructions of the diaspora and the locals, suggest that the diaspora are the ‘new other’ in Kosovo, helping to consolidate the normative identities of homeland Kosovo Albanians.

It must be noted that at times what emerges from the interview data suggests that some of the discrimination and othering is unintentional. However, it is my view, as Krzyżanowski and Wodak (2009) have stated, that discrimination can be both intended and unintentional.
Furthermore, ‘exclusion is linked to power’ and ‘discrimination may be legally legitimized, it may be structural, or it may occur in passing’ (my italics, Krzyzabowski and Wodak 2009: 1).

Gunther Kress states that many critical methods of language including CDA originate in a political process, which is preoccupied with changing unequal power relationships, by uncovering through analysis the way they work and are produced and reproduced through text. Fundamentally, CDA works have brought better understanding of social, political and ideological practices present in language (Kress: 2003 2nd edition). In this chapter, the aim is the same. By looking at the language of Kosovo Albanians in relation to diaspora Kosovo Albanians, this chapter demonstrates the processes that are at work in both discursively constructing the diaspora and othering the diaspora.

6.1. ‘Us’ and ‘Them’

Entitling work about Kosovo Albanians with ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ and not dealing with the infamous Serb vs Albanian problem may seem almost unnatural. However, it is precisely because of this dominant Serb/Albanian division - the Kosovo/Kosova - which overshadows all other relations in Kosovo that I wanted to highlight the discourses and power positions within relationships between the homeland and the diaspora.

Kosovo Albanian identity, is not simply ‘I am Kosovo Albanian because I am not a Kosovo Serb or Serbian, or Albanian’ but it is because of this binary that these relations vis-à-vis the diaspora context are overlooked, opaque and more complex. Therefore, this chapter explores on the one hand the process of identification, sameness or looking for clusters of togetherness in contrast to a constructed ‘other’, seeking out what is identified with one ‘sameness’ to
differentiate another, while simultaneously exploring the discourses that attract and repel towards one or another identity.

As a Kosovo Albanian I speak Serbian, however I refuse to speak it in conversation with Serbs opting to claim ignorance or speak English if possible. I also refuse to travel through Belgrade even if that is the cheapest option to get to Kosovo. I also view Serbia with suspicion. For me its simple, the personal is the political and although I understand that the notion of being Albanian in Kosovo has been built on the ideology and mythology that rests on not being Serb, I nonetheless behave in this almost irrational manner. However, researching the diaspora of Kosovo Albanians, is more complex than work dealing with constructions around differences and or similarities between Kosovo Albanians and their bordering neighbours or other ethnic minorities in Kosovo. Nonetheless, there are instances where this is also the same, where language is used to denote an imagined national ‘we’ in contrast to an imagined external and separate ‘them’ (in this case diaspora). For example, the following image which is taken from Facebook, and was well circulated, highlights the national ‘we’ and external diaspora ‘them’. It also perpetuates an interesting ideology about the diaspora, which can be interpreted as negative in this instance. The theme of money, which is so often related to the diaspora, is also present.

The meme is composed of a photograph of a squirrel, which has its hands held together and head back in a position similar to one that humans take when praying. It is commonly referred to online as the ‘praying squirrel meme’. In this picture text has been inserted to the side in Albanian which translated reads as ‘God, please make me appreciate the value of 20 euros like they do from the diaspora. AMIN!’ see below for original image.
Clearly the image, coupled with the text, suggest that ‘they from the diaspora’ appreciate 20 euros more than the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo.

Such generalizations and stereotypes about the diaspora generate a lot of humor about the diaspora, however, they also construct the diaspora identity as frugal and less generous than the inferred identity of those in Kosovo. This not only functions to construct the diaspora as different from the homeland Kosovo Albanians, but also suggests an ideological perception that the diaspora value money more than those in Kosovo. This is linked to ideas such as those explored in Chapter 4, which suggest that the diaspora is constructed along a rural/urban divide, where those who migrated from Kosovo’s rural areas for economic reasons have worked in Europe and made money, but do not enjoy life or know how to behave with their money. Furthermore, such generalizations conform to an overall discourse about the diaspora and money. Similarly, as shown in the previous chapter about the Ministry of Diaspora who also construct the diaspora identity alongside the assumption of the
diaspora’s potential for financial investment in Kosovo and an assumed economic power, which goes to privilege those groups from the diaspora who are financially well-off.

Such stereotypes and generalizations as exemplified in the meme, can be taken together with the language that is used to describe the diaspora, to suggest that the diaspora is not only viewed as separate and othered from Kosovo, but moreover, it is positioned ‘out’ of Kosovo. As another interviewee states, ‘we have a lot of people that were like they were born out’.

Nonetheless, what all the plentiful discourses, examples of stereotypes and generalizations about the diaspora suggest, is that the diaspora is very present in Kosovo. As one interviewee states:

*NL:* Yeah, uhm well you know I think uh well you know the diaspora is like this big myth, I think in in in Kosovo in people people in their everyday conversations of course you know and in their everyday lives, you know, I don’t have to tell you this just how important they’ve been to the livelihood of so many peoples, so that they are always present even though I think, you know they’re they’re far away physically, somehow they’re I think, maintain as part of everyday life in so many important ways.

Nonetheless, within the language of homeland Kosovo Albanians, the diaspora is consistently referred to as ‘them’ or ‘they’. In all the interviews, I asked the interviewees how they saw the diaspora, and although the responses differed, there was a definitive discourse that the diaspora are exclusive and separate. I asked the following interviewee how they saw those that came back to Kosovo, regardless of why they had left Kosovo in the first place:

*BL:* ...I was saying that there is the diaspora that immigrated during the nineties, and were you know a lot of people even were really young at that time, so they very much fitted, they became part of the societies to where they like to where immigrated, so when they come back to Kosovo, like here like from Kosovo within they are seen as you know not necessarily not necessarily
belonging let’s you know like 100% because they have been away for so long and they can not necessarily relate with what has been going on, with what has been going on in Kosovo. So you have that aspect to the diaspora, but then you have people who just went abroad for educational purposes, you know people who grew up here were shaped by the experiences of being and living in Kosovo, which went to society and you know when they come back I think uh a bit more accepted [inaudible] quote unquote.

This suggests subtle codification of discrimination, ‘they have changed too much’ is it similar to the ways in which in western societies far right groups suggest people are excluded because they are not ‘tolerant’ and have a ‘different way of life’ rather than explicit forms of racism seen previously (for more on this see Krzyzabowski and Wodak 2009: 1-2).

This type of trying to differentiate between the diaspora and Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo takes on a more intense and direct ‘othering’ discourse by those who themselves may have lived outside of Kosovo but desire to differentiate themselves from those that are considered diaspora. The following section explores the desires of those who were international students to differentiate themselves from those considered diaspora due to migration.

6.2. ‘I wasn’t an asylum seeker, I was an international student’

This section explores anxieties by those who were international students rather than asylum seekers or migrants about being confused as asylum seekers or migrants due to the negative stereotypes and discourses of being an asylum seeker or a member of diaspora by those in Kosovo.

One of the interviewees who was an international student, insists on distinguishing between ‘studying’ abroad and ‘living’ abroad. I asked about this experience of living abroad and the
extracts below highlight some of the discursive strategies used to build a case for studying abroad and construct an identity of someone who studied abroad. The interview begins by asserting that studying abroad started for her in high school:

**NL:** Uh for me, ah I guess I, I I never sort of saw myself as that because I was a student right, so I put myself in the in the the position of you know I’m I’m leaving because I am a graduate student. Uhm and I’m going there for studies, but I never I guess thought of myself also in in in that way or or at least participated actively I know, I never participated actively in any of uhm sort of the activities or the conversation and the discourse of the diaspora.

When I asked how the experience of living abroad shaped or if it had any effect on the international student, a construction of the self as someone who was always intending to return to Kosovo emerges. The interviewee BL states that the motivation for leaving Kosovo was education and a desire to study at ‘great universities’ and not due to economic scarcity or political issues. She states:

**BL:** Well, yeah, I mean definitely, but its interesting, I mean I was also for one year of high school, my sophomore year of high school in Maine, and following that I was in Bulgaria for example, I spent a summer in Washington DC and an internship in DC, I had really been to the US like back and forth. Even when I was in high school, I always knew I would study abroad, like that was the direction...like going to university, like finishing my higher education studies here so then it was interesting because all the time I was applying whether to university, or for my masters studies, like now looking back I remember that I always used to write these essays for acceptance, you know the way I would write them, it was always based on this idea that I wanna like study at a great university, like get the necessary skills and knowledge and experience that I can use an apply when I return back to Kosovo. And you know sometimes you write these essays because you think it is what they want to hear for you to be accepted and get the scholarship, but I think as I was writing them they really stuck with me....
What can also be seen here is a desire to construct a positive image of studying abroad and being an international student. An educational motive is emphasised, and the interviewee aligns herself with academic excellence, furthermore implying that this is a competitive application process not afforded to all who want to study abroad. This goes further to construct the self as not only better than the diaspora but also better than those in Kosovo, a truly educated and well travelled self. Therefore, I asked what was wrong with studying in Kosovo, it emerged that the poor parallel system of education which was established to function during the nineteen nineties is given as the reason for not wanting to study in Kosovo. However, BL continues stating that from an early age she had been influenced from her parents to obtain the best education, which according to BL is abroad. The following extract highlights this:

BL: No I mean just remembering during elementary school and high school here, you know like first it was like during the nineties, you know and like a parallel system of education and eh I just you I just knew that I wouldn't get the same type of (DP yeah) the same education here...that I could get elsewhere. I also think it had to do a lot with my family and the way I was brought up. I think my parents played a huge role in that, not just with me but also with like my two other sisters. They from very early on invested in our educations, and they were also very much keen on us getting the best, being at the best schools and getting the best education that we could, for us getting opportunities. It was just kind of the way I was also I was also brought up, and since I mean since I was a kid I was like doing all these extra curricula activities you know all the time...

BL. suggests that having Anglo-Saxon qualifications is privileging but it emerges that this only qualifies for those that are international students rather than asylum seekers or migrants who eventually obtained education and degrees. There seems to be a class issue emerging whereby those from rich backgrounds with highly educated parents who were sent by their
parents abroad as international students are constructed in opposition to those that came from less privileged backgrounds and were asylum seekers who benefitted from the educational handouts of the host society they migrated too.

BL: Definitely, I mean I look at everybody who has graduated from uh AUK like a lot of people have also gone to masters programmes or whatnot. Even before going to masters studies, you know graduate studies, everybody from AUK like immediately when they returned we were able to find paid jobs, you know, you were never really was a problem, no matter what field you know you you were in. ... I went for the purpose of education, for one year you know...

Such negative perceptions of those in the diaspora who migrated either as asylum seekers or economic migrants are explained by another interviewee who suggests that this is due to the ways in which asylum seekers and migrants are represented by global media. He suggests that this is why homeland Kosovo Albanians have developed stereotypes about diaspora Kosovo Albanians.

The globalisation of media has received much attention from scholars. Recent scholarship, has also explored diaspora and transnational groups and communities interest in homeland media as well as diasporic media (Bailey et al., 2007). Nonetheless, at the same time, homelands now have access to the media of western sending or host society countries. This phenomenon has not been explored extensively within recent scholarship. Therefore, what this interviewee suggests is that the representation of ‘others’ in host society media impacts the discourses of homeland citizens.

One interviewee suggests that there is a homeland perception of some Kosovo Albanians in the UK as criminal, drug dealers or car washers. When I asked why he thought this was, he states that:
KG: Well, uhm I mean one one thing is obvious, before we go to elaborate British immigration policies and then who who is who in terms of our diaspora in Britain...there is a huge influence by the British media, which is being accessed by Kosovars only in the last few years, only in the last three or four years, because previously we were not very interested and we didn't have access to the British media, and to be honest we were not really interested to see what the British media has to say about us, because they usually there was some sort of story about Kosovo be that in you know during the war or during the transition time or during independence there was a political nature. However, we've suddenly after independence we realise that our image in Europe is not as good as we thought it was, whereas the governments of most of the western European governments were helping Kosovo to establish independence and establish state institutions, the public perception was quite negative, and that was of course because of the British media, and I think that this is slowly transferred to to the Kosovo public as well, we are aware of what the British audience and the British media ...think and write about us about Albanians and how certain crimes are nationalised just ...in terms of sort of making this bombastic stories and and and uh serving to a uhm to audience which is uhm not so tolerant towards towards immigrants.

At least in the Kosovo case, it seems that in a globalised world, homelands are actively absorbing media that represent their diasporas. Thus through negative representations of migrants, asylum seekers, or diasporas such as the Kosovo Albanians by host society media, the media are not only impacting their own audiences which might not be tolerant towards immigrants or immigration, but also impacting homeland audiences that may develop negative stereotypes and discourses about their diasporas. Therefore, global media become channels and means for conveying and decoding ideologies and cultural repertoires beyond bordered physical spaces (Bailey et al., 2007).

Furthermore, the diaspora are imagined by the homeland. Despite their own wishes to present themselves in particular ways, those in the homeland form their own impressions. In the
comments part of the online edition of Kosovo 2.0 after an opinion piece by a member of diaspora writing his views on why ‘we’ the diaspora return to Kosovo, ‘Diaspora: Pse Kthehemi?’ a comment was posted expressing the views of an individual in the homeland on the topic. He states:

I think that most Albanians from diaspora come back in Kosovo/other Albanian places mainly to show how "successful" they have been in their attempts to reach the American/European dream. That's why they usually come with expensive cars to impress their pairs staying in the mother country. They have reached success and they have to show it to somebody who will believe that they are having a wonderful life. Because Albanians' pairs in European/American countries pretty well know that this is nothing else than smoke.39

Another interviewee suggests that the diaspora have ‘high expectations’ and homeland nostalgia. He describes the diaspora with their longing for the homeland as ‘romantics’ who are not in tune with the realities of the problems the homeland is facing. He refers to this problem as ‘diaspora are the romantics and the natives here are the cynics’. He goes further, suggesting that this what he terms a ‘fatal complementary’. He states:

*AK: Well, you know its, uh diaspora are the romantics and the natives here are the cynics. SO its like a very like ah complementary fatal complementary I think combination... you consider them to be as romantics, those who come from outside, and here are the postmodern cynics.*

He suggest that the diaspora is not wanted in Kosovo and homeland Kosovans by viewing the diaspora as ‘romantics’ suggests that they also view them as naïve. The interviewee confirms this as states that this is why some diaspora are called ‘Schatzi’ s’:

AK: Yes of course, there is this cynicism like ‘Schatzi’...and who is very naive with his patriotism and maybe they will come dressed in red and black, and it’s like what is this (laughs), like people who are still like romantic.

AK suggests that part of the problem with this lies with the treatment of diaspora in host societies. He blames the racism that diasporas face in Europe, and suggests that this engenders nationalistic feelings about homelands. Nonetheless, he suggests that the problem is not as extreme with diaspora in the UK, and advises me that I need to consider that the UK diaspora is more urban and better educated. He argues:

AK: ...they met a lot of racism in Europe. So, in a way they became more nationalistic in Europe, so it was Double. Once because you you suffered in Kosova since you were Albanian, and then you suffered in Germany because you are not German...or in the UK wherever. So, I have been more in contact with more Albanians in Switzerland and Germany, and I know much better I think (DP OK). And I must say something, that when you do your PhD you have to become more aware maybe you are already, about the spec..the particularity of uh Albanian British diaspora. Which is mainly from the Urban areas...like so it’s like a bit different from Germany and Switzerland, you know.

The discourses of a diaspora divided along a rural/urban and educated and uneducated divide continues to emerge. This is ‘knowledge’ is taken for granted and the interviewee above advises me on separating the notion of ‘Schatizi’ from the, what he terms as the ‘Albanian British diaspora. Which is mainly from the Urban areas’ and therefore implying that they may not only be different from those ‘Schatzis’ in Germany and Switzerland but also may experience less suffering through discrimination by those in the UK host society, because of their education and urban origins.
The following interviewee goes further and suggests that diaspora who are not well integrated in host societies and who experience discrimination and repression in host societies, end up being trouble makers in Kosovo and break the law especially by committing traffic offences.

He states that:

*EM:* ...For example. eh we have some statistics from police for example, eh most of the ones who overstep the rule, traffic rules during the summer, are the diaspora ones. ... And if you check this is a very interesting phenomenon, if you go back to eh the datas, those are most disciplined drivers in the host countries, in UK let’s say, so but the same guy with driving in UK, according to the traffic rules, is not following the same rules in Kosovo.

The reasons that the interviewee gives for this are due to the constraints that diaspora may feel in host societies. He states that:

*EM:* But also, I eh would add something else to this point, uhm, eh some of the countries, host countries, ehm you could easily say that there is kind of discrimination (DP yeah) if you call it so, so basically if you live abroad for 20 years you, you haven’t never eh got the position you deserve, because of your country, origin or whatever, and the fact that your back in your country, on your on your motherland, you expect to be treated eh equal with the others, because you missed that for the rest of your life, and this is also bringing eh some tensions, and frustration from diaspora side.

I suggested could this be due to perhaps an idea about a nostalgic notion of freedom in the ‘homeland’, and the interviewee agreed with this, but also proposes that diaspora feel like they do not belong in either place:

*EM:* Exactly, exactly, they feel free. And in the concept, eh in their mind, in their concept, this is their country this is free, and that’s what is what is the country where they really breathe and feel free. But its, it it’s as well the
phenomena that you feel strange there, stranger here, because you don’t belong to any society. If you living in UK for ages, with the dream of being back, this same in from Kosovo perspective, you feel stranger when you come here, and you feel stranger when you are there...this is the fact that most of the diaspora elsewhere in the world, eh general attitude ah, diaspora feel the same like this, because its a community that lives between two identities, between two culture, between eh two worlds and state.

The interviewee goes on to argue that host counties in Western Europe have failed to integrate their diaspora in society.

EM: ...But eh this is also I would argue that this is the fear of assimilation. And there is so much discussion elsewhere in Europe about integration of foreigners and on and on, but no one can define precisely what is what is division line between integration and assimilation. You know that Europe officially declared that they failed on the integration policy. You have a lot of communities living elsewhere in Europe and not fully integrated. You have Turks in Germany. You have maybe part of the Albanian community in Germany or elsewhere in UK, not integrated in the host society. This is due to the fact, from my explanation is that fear of assimilation, first of all, and second also due to the lack of the practical offers from the host countries, practical programs to include them in the in British society, at this case.

As already argued previously, the Kosovo Albanians in the homeland have clear ideas about the lack of integration and acceptance of their diaspora in host societies. The argument seems to indicate that if diasporas have not been integrated into host societies they will also cause problems in the homeland, that the lack of integration is a lack of progress, which is why it is assumed that the diaspora behave so badly when they return to Kosovo. However, the possibility that those returning from the diaspora who are perceived as financially wealthier and also travelling in cars with international numbers plates that can be identified or spotted by traffic police much easier is ignored by the interviewee. The interviewee above seems to
merge the discrimination of the diaspora with the ideas of lack of integration and assimilation that are perpetuated by western governments and media. This indicates that the negative discourses about migrants and asylum seekers are so entrenched globally that they are taken for granted by homelands and used to also other diaspora as well as criminalise them. Nonetheless, although those considered rural and uneducated are clearly discriminated and dismissed as ‘Schatzis’ who do not know how to behave in either place. However, those considered urban and educated are also stereotyped and ridiculed. Clearly they are assumed to come from the UK, however, the ‘hybrids’ as they are described, who turn up in Kosovo to work with international missions, are also stereotyped, differentiated, and are ridiculed for their ‘bottled water’ and ‘earphones in ears’ with their ‘Queen Elizabeth English accent’. This is explored in more detail in the following section.

6.3. Mission Hybrids: Between ‘International and Local’

This section analyses the discursive construction of new social groups that have recently emerged in the language of homeland Kosovans. By analyzing the language used to construct, position and represent what are termed the ‘locals’, ‘internationals’ and the - returning Kosovo Albanian Diaspora that are sometimes labeled as the - ‘hybrids’, this chapter builds on the analysis of discriminatory discursive practices towards diaspora Kosovo Albanians. Through CDA analysis of interviews with homeland Kosovo Albanians and CDA and textual analysis of online blogs/ articles published on/by the popular and current multimedia organization Kosovo 2.0, this section also explores negative narratives, discrimination and demeaning discourses about the - ‘hybrid’ - returning Kosovo Albanian Diaspora.
For example, *Working in the Mission*, was a series of articles written by Nensi Jasharaj and published on Kosovo 2.0. The author worked for international missions in Kosovo and based the three part blog entries on her experience. She writes authoritatively, explaining to the reader what roles the international missions played in former-Yugoslavia. In her articles Jasharaj describes those who return to Kosovo from the diaspora as the ‘Mission Hybrids’, mocking them ‘With the proper brand new nationality’ and ‘Queen Elizabeth English accent’.

Diaspora communities are immersed in cultural exchanges between the host societies as well as their own cultural identity/ies. However, they are required to function and negotiate their lives within the physical spaces of the host society environment, which requires contact and learning of a different language as well as at times different cultural values. However, how those in the homeland perceive such changes when the diaspora return - either permanently or during annual or seasonal visits, requires further exploration.

One interviewee suggests that the diaspora expect too much when they return. The interviewee recommends the UK diaspora ‘forget’ their recent British past and language. He states:

*AK*: I think Albanians are uh a bit too much anthropological nation. You know, they are into this context familiarization, very Heidegerian subject you know. Somehow, uh we are familiarised with everything here. Uh, from the details of everyday corruption to other gossip about the President. So in a way, this kind of familiarisation, which is has a lot of anthropological elements somehow, uh is uh part of us, not just being Albanian, but being from here...it's more this uhm uhm familiarization with the context, you know that ...its the place, the place. The place .. so and that is so, ...that’s so, because for me uh place is agrarian, feudal, and postmodern. Modernity is time. Like space and time, you know ...I think a space is postmodern. I think time is uh is
modern. And Albanians are quite linked with the place. So, in a way the very fact that you lived for so long elsewhere in your not completely here, it’s part of the problem... it’s like even if you perform like them, uh it’s like uh sharing the actual place here and now, uhm you’re not that here and you’re not that now. ... Maybe if you would, lets say few years living here, you are part of family...Yeah, you have to remain with Albanians, to forget your past...They must make us forget that they were there...being towards exile. So, when people see you, for example you, it’s not the problem that you tell them that you came from elsewhere, but you’re here not to stay. You know, this difference, for example, you going to KIJAC, you going to AUK, you speaking a bit English, more than you should, you know all these elements show that you’re not here to stay.\(^{40}\)

Whereas another interviewee suggests that the diaspora benefited greatly from their ‘foreign passports’ by obtaining employment within the various international missions which paid them ‘ten’ times more than the locals. He suggests that this created a market that was not normal and disadvantaged the locals. He states:

\[\text{KG: ...You have to bear in mind that everyone who had a foreign national a foreign passport could come and work in their home country in a way as international staff in one of the international missions, uh and then they would be paid of course uh up to six six unto to ten more than the locally hired staff would. Whereas you know very often it would happen that there would be uh uh two friends working the in the same in the same uh uh organisation with the same qualifications one being paid ten times more than the other. This was the huge advantage that some of our ah ah our diaspora has used return to work for the international administration in Kosovo. But unfortunately we don’t have that that much of international presence and these jobs are sort of being cut uh every day, so I think that we are getting}\]

\(^{40}\) KIJAC is the abbreviation for the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communications. AUK is the abbreviation for the American University in Kosovo.
back to the to the uh to a normal. What is normal, we are getting back uh to the market, where basically commercial interests and market will all dictate the incomes rather than one international organisation that was the case with UNMIK.

However, the resentment that the locals felt towards ‘Mission Hybrids’ was not felt towards ‘internationals’. As KG states:

KG: ... Everyone who has international and was wearing international uniform or wearing an international badge even if that’s someone was a local employee working for the international organisations were considered as Gods. ...Later on I think it is just a matter of cultural and economic difference, I see it very clearly how an Albanian family with kids who don’t speak Eng who don’t speak Albanian returns to Kosovo and is being faced with sort of very basic fundamental cultural differences, and given the fact that there is no post independence or post war euphoria anymore we are basically just the community sees the economic difference and sees the cultural differences and then uh doesn't really bother to welcome and integrate those Albanians who return, because simply there is no there is no force there is no euphoria to push it there is no solidarity to push it, and there is nothing greater than the the basic sort of economic and social and cultural interest to push that kind of integration. I dunno if I am clear.

This suggests that a clear preferential treatment continues to exist for internationals that are not of Kosovo Albanian origin. An Orientalist discourse where those of western origin are privileged over the returning diaspora who have Kosovan heritage is clear in the treatment they receive. The diaspora’s discrimination and othering is being used to sediment the national identity of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. Whereas traditionally that binary was based on Serb vs Albanian identities, with the relative peace between Kosovo and Serbia, the diaspora Kosovo Albanians are fulfilling the role of ‘others’ on society.
Summary

Taken together all these sections throughout this chapter have demonstrated the discursive construction of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in Kosovo. This chapter has argued through analysis of the interview data, as well as material from publications, that the diaspora is no longer a passive external satellite but a noticeable presence in Kosovo, which is used to construct social layers in Kosovo and construct an ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary, that goes beyond the previously assumed traditional Serb v Albanian dichotomy. The following chapters 7 and 8 in Part 4 of this thesis will focus on interviews with Kosovo Albanians who came to the UK to work and those who are already settled in the UK.
Part FOUR

This section contains Chapters 7 and 8, Chapter 7 presents findings from five interviews, which were conducted in Kosovo in 2011 with Kosovo Albanian broadcast journalists in Kosovo who had sought work in the UK with the same international media organisations they work for in Kosovo. Chapter 7 is based on five interviews conducted with Kosovo Albanian broadcast journalists who came to the UK to seek work. This chapter highlights the discrimination and institutional racism present in the UK that not only directly discriminates ‘foreigners’ but furthermore constructs a discourse and ‘feeling’ of exclusion and exclusiveness that act as boundaries to stop those considered ‘foreigners’ from attempting to apply and join these organisations. Chapter 8, analyses the narratives of UK diaspora Kosovo Albanians and their discursive construction of the diaspora, Kosovo the UK and their own identities within the UK and Kosovo. Twenty interviews were conducted with Kosovo Albanians from the UK, in order to explore how they socially and discursively construct their identities vis-à-vis a dominant British and Kosovo Albanian as well as diasporic identity discourse. This chapter is also informed by 13 interviews conducted with homeland Kosovo Albanians (for more on these interviews and the empirical data generated, see previous chapters in Part 3). This chapter seeks to understand the identity that is expressed, performed and represented by Kosovo Albanians in the UK through CDA analysis.
Chapter 7

Porters Without Borders: Kosovan Journalists in London

Introduction

Research and scholarly interest in migration and refugee issues is ample (Castles & Davidson 2000, Vertovec 2009, Tyler 2013, Moore 2010 and many more). However, we can still argue that discrimination whether based on country of origin, ethnicity, race or gender resulting in migrant marginalisation and barriers to belonging have not ceased (Castles & Davidson 2000, Bauman 2004, Tyler 2013). This is especially the case when it comes to competitive job markets and high unemployment in host countries. Employment and making a living - especially in a field or profession you have trained and worked in - impacts the lived experience of individuals, relationships, identity, self-worth and integration within a society, which I would argue give meaning to our lives as social beings (Hall 2000).

In the UK, especially London, diversity or even super-diversity (see Vertovec 2007) and multiculturalism is a visible phenomenon with estimations that one out of three people in London was born or descends from an immigrant background (Nava 2007), however, to what extent does this extend to different professions or media organisations. Are journalists, who have trained in non-western countries, able to find work within these organisations in the UK, and what are their experiences of this process and how do they make meaning of this? I was also interested in exploring what were the lived experiences of those experiencing institutional racism in journalism and media organisations, and how are they rationalised and
explained by those who are on the receiving end of this discrimination (for more on institutional racism in UK media see Keeble 2008).

In the run up to the UK General Election in May 2015 nearly all politicians repeated a desire to see and welcome skilled migrants to the UK. However, this sounds like more populist discourse designed at throwing sand in the eyes of those pro-immigration individuals and those who are afraid of unskilled migrants. What happens to skilled migrants in the UK? And can they overcome institutional racism that affects those of ethnic minority background already in the UK?

The UK media, such as the BBC have minority quotas, and aim to employ staff from black and ethnic minority groups, however the numbers are still low. Although the BBC had set a target of employing approximately 8 percent of staff from minority backgrounds, in 2000 only 2 percent of its employees in managerial positions were from ethnic minority backgrounds (Keeble 2008: 185). In 2007 the BBC was accused of being institutionally racist by the National Union of Journalists and its then Director General Greg Dyke accused it of being ‘hideously white’ (Keeble 2008:185). Simmilarly, Richard Keeble (2008) states that ethnic minority staff covered for coworkers who were their superiors, however, they were seldom promoted. And according to Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2000), white, middle class Britons still hogged all the stories at the BBC (in Keeble 2008).

Furthermore, as Ashika Thanki and Sonia McKay (2005) for the Working Lives Research Institute commissioned by the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) found:

There are structural and cultural norms that consciously or unconsciously operate as barriers to equal participation in the industry in London. These norms are not necessarily founded on overt or conscious discrimination, but rather occur in an environment which is competitive, sometimes seen as
caustic, and which can be unwelcoming to those viewed as ‘different’. However, several participants did refer to the sector as being institutionally racist and encouraging of a workplace culture that easily diminished the achievements of ethnic minority journalists. This included the use of racist and offensive language, creating at times an uncomfortable environment. Perceptions of discrimination and racism resulted in ethnic minority workers leaving the sector and moving into self-employment, freelance and charity work (Thangi and McKay, 2005:4).

Furthermore, according to Myria Georgiou (2010), media ‘increasingly shape scenario of identity and diasporic consciousness’, she argues that ‘[t]he imagination and the mediation of self-representation increasingly take place in media cultures’. So what does this mean for those who are left out of media cultures? This study argues that institutional racism prevails continues to prevail and prevents those migrants who are skilled and highly qualified from working within UK media establishments. Furthermore, it is those individuals who work for international media abroad that when in the UK are shut out of the companies that previously employed them.

I chose to interview Kosovo Albanian journalists in Kosovo who had at some point moved to the UK to live and work.⁴¹ None of the interviewees had stayed in the UK permanently, they had all come to the UK on a temporary basis and all had tried to find work as journalists. My aim was to try and understand what it was like for them to seek work in their profession in a Western country and whether they succeeded in this, but also to explore what constructions

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⁴¹ This chapter is based on interviews I conducted as part of a pilot study. I interviewed Kosovo Albanian journalists from Kosovo who had at different points lived in the UK and tried to work as journalists in the UK. I began my research into this topic in 2011, predominantly because I wanted to test my methodological design, which utilises the interviewing method. I also wanted to explore what was the best time and method to transcribe the interviews. In terms of transcription, I wanted to explore whether it would be easier to firstly conduct the interviews and then transcribe them as soon as possible, or transcribe them later, or as I did in this case, transcribe as I interviewed. I did this in order to be able to identify the most effective approach for my subsequent PhD interviews for my PhD research.
and representations of the UK work experience they were left with. All of them worked for either British or other European media organisations in Kosovo, so I thought it would be interesting to see to what extent it was possible for them to work in these organisations once they were in the UK. Nearly all of them were unable to find employment in journalism in the UK, and most subsequently returned to Kosova.

With this in mind, I wanted to know why a person was able to work for the BBC abroad, in a specific country or place where they were from, so for example Kosovo. What were the boundaries preventing them from working in journalism in the UK? As Simon Cottle has argued:

> Boundaries define the borders of nations and territories as well as the imaginations of minds and communities. By definition, and often by design, they serve to mark out the limits of a given field, territory or social space. Depending on where one is positioned or is able to stand – whether inside or outside, at the centre or on the margins, or perhaps crossing and recrossing borders – they serve simultaneously to include some of us, exclude others and to condition social relations and the formation of identities. Over time, boundaries can become deeply embedded in the structures and institutions of societies, in their practices and even in their ‘common sense’. Once institutionally sedimented and taken for granted, these boundaries all too often harden into exclusionary barriers legitimized by cultural beliefs, ideologies and representations. In such ways, the marginalized and the excluded can become ontologically disenfranchised from humanity, misrecognized as ‘Other, exploited and oppressed and, in extremis, vulnerable to systematic, lethal violence (Cottle, 2000: 2).

However, these issues do not only affect freedom of movement and travel, but also as Ruth Wodak has argued ‘belonging also implies access to work, education, housing…” (Wodak, 2013: 173)
Although journalists have transferable skills, especially broadcast journalists such as editing and video montage, most journalists that I met, when in the UK had ended up working in restaurants, or construction or other manual work. This is why this paper was entitled Porters Without Borders - playing around with the concept of Reporters Without Borders.

I interviewed five broadcast Kosovan Journalists.\(^{42}\) I chose to interview broadcast journalists, because I thought that broadcast had more transferable skills that were not language specific, such as video editing, camera work, mixing set skills, etc. For the interviews, I employed the semi-structured in-depth method. This was because I wanted to discuss a definite but a wide range of topics and I did not want to have questions planned in advance, because I wanted issues to arise naturally and then be able to discuss them further. So the majority of my questions were created during the interviews, although I sometimes I asked similar questions in all the interviews, such as where do you work? Where did you work in the UK? What skills do you have? How much experience do you have?

I chose interviews rather than questionnaires because I wanted to allow the journalists to tell me their stories and their lived experiences during this process. I also did not want to confine them to specific questions, as I wanted them to be able to tell me their stories as they had constructed them and anything else that would arise in conversation.

I interviewed five journalists from Kosovo. All the interviews took place in Prishtina in different cafes, which the interviewees chose themselves, as I wanted them to be in a comfortable environment. Despite the fact that I was transcribing on my computer while I was conducting and recording the interviews, which on the one hand as already mentioned was slightly intrusive, on the other hand, this enabled me to check and record everything

\(^{42}\) One interviewee withdrew from the study, so only interview material from four interviews is presented here.
which would have been difficult to do from recorded material due to the loud atmospheres in busy Prishtina cafes.

The first person I interviewed was a young journalist who works for the Radio Television of Kosovo (the national provider). She has degrees in Journalism as well as seven years of experience. She produces and presents many radio shows on RTK’s radio BlueSky. The second person I interviewed was also a young journalist who previously worked with BIRN – Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and RTK. The third journalist was an older female journalist and had extensive experience with the major broadcasters in Kosova. And finally I interviewed a male journalists who has over 10 years of experience working for the BBC and SkyNews and owns his own production company in Kosova. He mainly works as a local producer for these broadcasters. One interviewee withdrew their interview from the study.

7.1. Perceptions of Institutional Racism: ‘Because I was foreign’

These interviews generated rich data, however one interesting finding in particular that emerged, was the difference between all those who had come and tried to look for a job in contrast to the one person, who had still not really looked for a job in the UK but was going to start her job search soon. She seemed more hopeful than the rest. When I asked her what kind of job she was interested in? She replied that:

DK: Uh, yes, production and video editing, especially video editing, because in the UK there are different programs that are made and so I think that at the very least I can get an internship somewhere and later I can get a real job.
The hopefulness although presented with the caveat that she could at least find an internship suggest an anxiety as well as hope. When I asked her when she thought that would be, she replied saying:

_DK:_ I believe that I will get an internship somewhere, because I think that London is multicultural and there are quite a lot of media that also need people for production. I believe that my experience in Kosova in a place that recently came out of a war and my experience at BIRN should help me get in somewhere. Also since a lot of British people come to BIRN and the Balkans to gain experience, so if they come here then I suppose I don’t see any reasons as to why I should not be able to do something, since I already have the experience.

DK presents a strong case for her ambitions. She rationalises that a multicultural London would afford her the space to find an internship. Furthermore, she also believes that her experience would be seen on a par with the experience of British citizens who often take up internships to gain experience in organisations such as Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN).

DK had only been in the UK on and off between April and June 2011. She seemed very hopeful and throughout the interview she was extremely sure that she would get a job. When I asked her where she saw herself in the future, she said:

_DK:_ Well, I hope to eventually work at the BBC, which is my life ambition!

In contrast, TB., after months of searching for a job in London, eventually found a job working in a small café in London. TB narrates how disillusioned she became from her experience. She states:

_TB:_ There was this small radio I heard about, it was internet based and not very well known, so I thought I’d start with that. So I went to visit their offices,
since a friend of a friend told me about this radio and where they were based. Once I went there and met with the people there ... I met with this program editor, he was kinda young, which I thought was a good thing. ... he told me that they liked my CV and liked me and my ideas, but they told me that they did not have a job vacancy at the time and that if they do in the future they would call me later. I told him about all my experience in radio, and how radio functions in Kosovo, and how we do things at RTK and at that time, it was really interesting since in Kosova we did not have internet radio, and I thought it would be great and extremely interesting to get a job working for an internet radio in London. However, it was not meant to be, hahaha, and I ended up working in a coffee shop [laughs].

I decided to ask TB about the BBC Albanian service, since I knew that they had an internship scheme. However, she was quick to point out that the Albanian service at the BBC was hard to get into, that the rules of nepotism that are part of the Albanian culture transfer to the UK with the Albanians that work here. I asked her if she knew about the Albanian service at the BBC:

TB: Yes, I did, but I knew that at the BBC I would not get a chance, and for the Albanian service you need to know someone there or have a father with a strong surname! That’s life.

Since the Albanian service was perceived as exclusive, I wanted to explore how the BBC as a whole is viewed. TB, acknowledges that the BBC would require an experienced journalist, but what convinced her that she would not be able to work there was the people in London who told her she did not stand a chance at the BBC. The reason, in contrast to notions of experience and professionalism, are to do with her as she states being a ‘foreigner’:

TB: I was afraid of the BBC sort of, since at the BBC there are very famous people, who have a lot of experience. And everyone I spoke to in London told me that I would not stand a chance at the BBC.
DP: Why?

TB: Because I was foreign.

DP: What made you think that being foreign would impact you negatively at the BBC?

TB: No no, I think it is just that as a foreigner it would be so much harder for me to get my foot in the door at the BBC?

What transpired through the interview was that TB’s idea that she would not be hired at the BBC stem from the lack of seeing other ethnic minorities at the BBC or what she describes as ‘people like me’:

TB: Well, I guess you don’t see a lot of people like me on the BBC who come from a different background and a different country.

Nonetheless, TB was adamant that she possessed the right skills and experience to be a suitable candidate and her background was the main barrier to being hired within a mainstream British broadcaster such as the BBC. She states:

TB: Yes, editing. I am extremely good at that, and I could have done that at any medium that would have given me the opportunity to show my skills.

VS, did get an internship. She interned at Ten Alps a production company that amongst others was set up by Bob Geldof. She managed to get this internship through a BBC producer who had taught her previously. She is adamant that the UK media industry does not function on merit but on ‘who you know’.

VS: Professor K. who taught us documentary making at KIJAC, saw my documentary and said that he would like to help me. Just one thing, before this contact with K. I had tried to get an internship in the UK but I could not find anywhere that was willing to help me or take me on as an intern. Later K. told me I will help you because I know the producer at the company. So I went
through someone’s recommendation. As K. said once, ‘It's not what do you know, but who do you know’.

Whereas another interviewee AA, had worked for the BBC and new people at the BBC, but even that was not enough. He had worked for the BBC and other mainstream media for over 11 years. He currently works for the BBC as a local producer in Kosovo.

AA: The newsgathering room at the BBC consists of hundreds of journalists, which are deployed or sent to cover stories around the world. Those correspondents, initially when they go to a certain country, try to find local resources, namely producers, cameramen, video editors, fixers, to support them in their work. If those resources are not available in a particular country then the BBC will send their own crews of cameramen, producers, soundmen, whatever you have, therefore the chance is always given or in most cases given to local capacity. Then it remains only of issue of professionalism, whether they will work for the BBC or a British broadcaster in general. In my case, I was very lucky, and I stress the word lucky, to have been trained by some of the best professionals and well known professionals in this business. Therefore for the past eleven years I have never had a problem in this direction, clients were happy with my service because I was the best, and because of my previous experience with international organizations I was able to provide that service.

When I asked AA, why experienced and highly qualified journalist from Kosovo are not able to get media jobs in the UK, he suggest that this is fundamentally down to the institutional racism within the UK. He states:

AA: Perhaps for me the biggest problem when applying for anything in the UK, the biggest problem is the UK visa system. When I went to the UK, once as a tourist and once as a student, in both times I had no right to work. And also, I was obliged every month to go to the local police station to show that I was there, and even if there is legal opportunity to change ones status, this treatment alone that the UK state imposes upon you, does not give you much
hope that eventually you can work for a prestigious medium in the UK. I don’t know if you understand me, they treat you like a criminal. So how can you even think about doing work for the BBC or anything like that. They put you in your place straight away, so a lot of people feel that they are not worthy of any jobs in media that they may apply for.

One thing that was clear from speaking to the journalists I interviewed was that professionalism and achievement was associated with working for the BBC. That the BBC stood for most as a synonym for journalistic professionalism yet was also associated with the hardest place to be employed in.

Summary

Similarly to the findings by other scholars such as Thanki and McKay (2005) and Keeble (2008), the data from these interviews suggests that a combination of institutional racism and structural and cultural norms in operation within the UK media industry create boundaries, which exclude ethnic minorities, despite their experience and qualifications, from employment within the industry. That furthermore, far from opportunities being dependent on merit and qualifications, they are seen as dependent on certain contacts, the ‘who you know’ which disadvantages ethnic minorities who do not possess the social capital to have access to such contacts. However, this study also shows that double standards apply when it comes to employment of these journalists abroad, since for whatever reason these issues do not create a barrier when abroad, whether for lack of being able to employ the same people as in the UK or to save money by not flying out teams from the UK.

Despite all the issues of discrimination which all the interviews raised and stated, they all also used discursive strategies and disclaimers to state they believed the UK was not
discriminating them based on their origin but on professionalism and experience. Thus most tried to rationalise their exclusion based on not having UK experience or qualifications. This is another interesting finding since it suggests an internalisation by non-westerners of a Western political hegemonic discourse of the West or in this case UK experience and professionalism being more desirable over any other experience (for more on this see Chow 1997 2nd edition, and Hall 2007).
Chapter 8

Neither Here Nor There: Kosovo Albanians in the UK

Introduction

Called by an injurious name, I come into social being and because I have certain inevitable attachment to my existence, [...] I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially (Butler 1997: 104).

The previous chapters in Part 3 focused on the construction of the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora and diasporic identity by homeland Kosovo Albanians, whereas the previous chapter explored the experiences of Kosovo Albanian journalists who worked for British and other media in Kosovo looking for similar employment in the UK.

This chapter follows on from the previous chapter, however, this chapter analyses the narratives of UK diaspora Kosovo Albanians who are settled in the UK and their own discursive construction of identity within and beyond the UK, Kosovo and the diaspora community.

I conducted twenty interviews with Kosovo Albanians in the UK from a variety of social and economic backgrounds. Nonetheless, this chapter is also informed by 13 interviews conducted with homeland Kosovo Albanians (for more on these interviews and the empirical data generated, see previous chapters).

CDA scholars have traditionally focused on studying the language of the powerful, with the aim of exposing injustice (Fairclough 1995, 2002; van Dijk 1997; Wodak & Meyer 2009). This has demonstrated how such power normalizes dominant ideologies. Based on this work, more recently scholars have began focusing on minority discourses and articulations of
identities (Mellor 2003, 2004; Merino 2006, Merino et al., 2009, Rojas-Lizana 2014). This chapter falls within this small area of scholarship by also exploring and identifying the minority discourses and accounts by Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

The interviews took place in London and were conducted mostly in person, however, some were undertaken over Skype. This fieldwork started in January 2013 and was completed by March 2014. The participants varied in age from eighteen to sixty, and came from various areas of London and social and economic backgrounds. It can be argued that my sample is relatively small to enable definite conclusions or generalisations about Kosovo Albanians in the UK. However, my aim is not to generalise my findings but to highlight some of the discourses and discursive practices used by the Kosovo Albanians interviewed when they describe and construct their identity/s and experiences in the UK and Kosovo.

As previously argued within the literature review and the theoretical framework of this study, I adopt a social constructivist approach and also argue that identity is not shaped in a vacuum but rather through social and discursive practices. Similarly, diasporic identity is not shaped only within the parameters of the diaspora or host society. As Robin Cohen states diaspora has typically been defined as something of a context in which a people live/lived ‘scattered as a result of a traumatic historical event’ (Cohen, 1993: 5). However, modern day migration coupled with globalization has created for individuals, who inhabit a space - by choice or force - at least two and frequently more places/spaces of connection, attachment and residence. It could be argued that such diasporic and transnational positions both fix and challenge the fixity of ethnic identity (Kalra et al., 2009: 16). This chapter aims to explore the ways in which ‘subjects-in-process’, which are arguably caught up in multicultural, transnational and diasporic flows, narrate, perform and construct their identities. Furthermore, through CDA analysis of interviews, discursive practices are highlighted, as
well as identity politics and the socio-political settings, including issues around integration and representation. In order to explore this, I have also chosen to focus on cultural and physical landscapes identified by the interviewees as home, homeland, and host country.

Implicit in notions of ‘home’ are issues around settlement and integration within a host society. However, this chapter challenges this well established scholarly and theoretical approach to explore notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in countries of origin and imagined ‘homelands’ while simultaneously exploring discourses of integration, discrimination and identity in the host society, taken together, the CDA analysis of interviews in this chapter aims to highlight that both the homeland and host society are mutually constitutive in diasporic identity and that neither is fixed and immobile.

Scholarly research has seen a new and widespread proliferation in interest on ‘social, national and political identities or multiple identities’ (Laclau, 1992: 83). Furthermore, almost two decades ago, the renowned scholar Seyla Benhabib warned that ‘identity’ and ‘[t]he negotiation of identity/difference … is the political problem facing democracies on a global scale (Benhabib 1996, in Wodak et al 2009: 3). This continues to preoccupy being and belonging, as well as discourses around migration and identity. Benhabib suggests that identity is ‘differentiating oneself from what one is not,’ (1996: 3f.) She uses an example from the Balkans and suggests that one is a Bosnian Serb only to the degree to which one is not a Bosnian Moslem (in Wodak et al., 2009: 3). However, although this has been true for the Balkans during the conflicts that ensued throughout the 1990s, I argue that Kosovo Albanian identity, is not simply ‘I am Kosovo Albanian because I am not a Kosovo Serb or Serbian, or Albanian’ but it is more complex and especially for the diaspora context. As Bhabha (2004 edition) has stated:
The social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation...The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress (Bhabha, 2004: 3).

Therefore, I explore not only the process of identification, sameness or looking for clusters of togetherness, nor just identifying with one ‘sameness’ to differentiate another, but likewise the inherent ambivalence of identity and the discourses that attract and repel towards one or another identity, in a perpetual state of flux.

Although scholars have argued that diasporic contexts are hybrid and selves within such contexts are hybrid and fragmented, my argument aims to suggest that selves are and were never complete to begin with. As Derrida (1998) has stated in Monolingualism of the Other, where he makes his argument about being monolingual and at home in a language that is imposed or colonial, for Kosovo Albanians in the UK, they can feel at home in the UK while not fully belonging, and this is not necessarily in contrast to previous Kosovan belonging as in Kosovo ideas of belonging and exclusion predate their migration to the UK vis-à-vis a previous Yugoslav and Albanian identity. Therefore, as Wodak et al., (2009) have argued about national identity, identity is manifested in social practices, ‘one of which is discursive practice’ (Wodak et al., 1999: 29-30).

Despite ample scholarly works on non-essentialised notions of identity and scholarly attempts, from a variety of academic disciplines, to question and oppose national and cultural homogeny, most nation-states enforce a dominant hegemonic national and cultural identity. As Castles & Davidson (2000) have noted, the majority of ‘nation-states have had groups on their territory not considered capable of belonging and therefore either denied citizenship or
alternatively forced to go through a process of cultural assimilation in order to belong’ (Castles & Davidson 2000: vii). Despite these efforts, as James Clifford asserts ‘we are seeing the emergence of new maps: borderland culture areas, populated by strong, diasporic ethnicities assimilated to dominant nation states’ (Clifford 1992, in ed. Grossberg et al., 110). However, in some cases, the diasporic ethnicities are just as preoccupied with maintaining a dominant hegemonic identity, and building rigid boundaries around themselves (Kalra et al., 2005). Nonetheless as Lynn and Lea (2003) have argued, in the UK the representation, social and discursive construction of citizenship and the nation is constructed against contrast of ‘others’ that are positioned against the ‘elite’ discourses of Britishness. They have gone so far as to suggest the presence of a ‘new Apartheid’ in relation to Asylum seekers who are treated in, what they consider, non-democratic ways. Therefore, an important element that arose throughout the interviews was discrimination and the experience of discrimination in the UK. This also enables ideas around belonging and exclusion since implicit in exclusion is some form of discrimination.

Nonetheless, to assume that there are no essentialist discourses or notions of identity that is constructed as exclusive by minorities would be naïve, therefore, this chapter also explores - within the first section – discursive constructions of essentialist identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK. Section two entitled ‘Perceptions of Discrimination by Kosovo Albanians in the UK: Subverting identity ‘because ladies they like…the men from Italy’’’ explores how discrimination is spoken about by interviewees and how they manage and construct themselves alongside negative discourses that they may encounter. In addition, this section aims to highlight the discursive strategies and rhetorical devices deployed by interviewees in instances where they had experienced discrimination. Section three entitled ‘Who would you support in a football game between England and Kosovo?’ explores the creation or a sense of identity, national identity and nationalism expressed through declarations of support for
particular football teams. In the final section, section four, entitled ‘On going back to Kosovo’ the interviewees were all asked about going back to Kosovo and how they felt when in Kosovo. This section explored how the interviewees constructed Kosovo in relation to themselves and whether they aligned themselves with Kosovo Albanian values or British ones.

8.1. *Embodying Blood, biological discourses about identity*

Many scholars have stated that essentialism is predominant in discourses of race and racism (Brah, 1992; Hirschfeld & Van Dijk 1988; Van Dijk 1993, 1995). In racism, race and ethnicity are presented as natural, inherent and biological categories (Verkuyten 2003). These categories claim that individuals are fundamentally rigid. Racists attempt to fix social groups through essential, stereotypical and fixed properties (Bhabha 1983). Nonetheless, Tenenbaum & Davidman (2007) have argued, biological discourses and essentialist views of identity can also be located in the discourse of minorities expressing their own identities. They focused on contemporary American Jews, and discovered that ‘many contemporary Jews actually continue to employ an essentialist understanding of Jewishness that emphasizes the biological, genetic basis of their identities’ (Tenebaum & Davidman 2007: 435).

This also appeared to be the case with the language employed by some of the Kosovo Albanian interviewees. Some described being Kosovan as a ‘feeling’ that was hard to explain, whereas others used biological lexical choices such as ‘blood’. As one interviewee states when asked what it means to be Kosovan:

*RM: Uhm I don’t know, it’s just like in blood, so you just you know you’re born a Kosovan so you just say you’re Kosovan I dunno.*
Or as VK states:

VK: See hmm being Kosovan and Albanian I think that’s your roots, I think, I explain in uhm about in national, about how you feel, it’s a bit difficult, you just feel. I have a strong feeling about it I’m proud, I am not this hero or something, I feel it, that’s what I belong, that’s what I write about it, I don’t disregard any nationalities, I don’t disregard Serbs, and I am not, I work with hundred nationalities. [DP: hmm] I work with people from Africa, I have people, I have friends from everywhere, [DP: hmm] I don’t have Serbs friends, because it just didn’t happen, but I meet, and and they haven’t happened in my environment, because I wouldn’t exclude Serbs as friends.

On the one hand, such constructions act to claim a special and distinct identity for Kosovo Albanians, to present them as a separate group, which is unique from others, while at the same time as VK extract highlights, there is anxiety that through this essentialist position, you discriminate others, so he is quick to suggest that although he is proud of his identity he does not discriminate other nationalities. Serbs are the natural binary that emerge as the main ‘other’ for Kosovo Albanians, and VK suggests that although he does not have Serb friends he would not mind being friends with Serbs. Such a subjective essentialist approach suggests that there are broader ideological themes that need to be considered. As Kalra et al., (2005) and Anthias (1998) have argued, diasporic groups also construct boundaries around their identities. Nonetheless, another interviewee suggests that the problems of defining her identity are cultural differences, and new sets of boundaries are built between the diaspora identity and the identity of Kosovo Albanians in the homeland. She states:

NA: I don’t know what to say, I don’t fit in with them, it’s just to me is, like I don’t know, I grew up here since I was ten eleven, I came here and let’s say I have friends here that are Kosovans in London, but if I go out with them, I have to act completely different, I have to watch what I say, how I say it, and if I go out with English friends, it’s sort of like I think what you see is what you
get, and they have good they have a good humour, they joke around they take everything as a joke, they don’t take it as an offence, if in Kosovo you can’t say anything you want, you can’t say what’s in your mind, you have to sort of be careful what you say otherwise they take you as an idiot, or they say she just insulted me or whatever you know. [DP: Yeah] it’s that kind of thing, so to me it’s not, like I don’t have an identity really, I can’t be, you know, I can’t be, you know, it’s like I can’t be normal with the Kosovans, that’s the thing, I can’t, if I have to go out with English friends and have Kosovans friends with me it be very hard, coz I’d have to play two characters really.

What emerges from the interviews is that identity is bound to particular contexts and experiences. That at times, diasporic subjects feel the need to perform different identities with different social and ethnic groups. What is interesting from the interviewees extract above is the construction of a British identity as more positive than that of a Kosovo identity. The interviewee suggests that with ‘English friends’ she feels more at home and does not feel the need to ‘watch what I say’. Gossip and other negative stereotypes are attributed to the Kosovo Albanian identity, whereas good humour and jokes are associated with the British identity. Despite suggesting that she is torn between the two groups and has to play two characters, a preference for an English identity emerges.

Whereas, anther interviewee states that she feels more British in Kosovo and more Kosovan in the UK. However, that is also further complicated with feelings of an ethnic Albanian identity. She states:

FR: I think that that answers the question to be honest, its its just a sort of natural thing. You feel more British when you go in Kosovo, but when you come here you feel more Kosovan. But I mean Kosovan, its its, you know, when I think out Kosovan I mean Kosovan Albanian, you know, coz that’s still the mother, the identity, I couldn’t identify as Kosovan.
This suggests that diasporic identity is not fixed and is context bound. Furthermore, Albanian is considered ‘the mother’, which complicates the constructions of a Kosovan identity. She states that ‘I couldn’t identify as Kosovan’, suggesting that the Kosovan is diasporic in relation to a ‘mother’ Albanian identity. This emerges throughout the interviews. In a classical diaspora theory categorization, this would suggest that Kosovo Albanians in the UK are a diaspora of a diaspora and their relation to the newly formed Kosovan state is complicated by previous identity constructions alongside an imagined Albanian identity, which dominated normative constructions of identity between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. The fact that Kosovo Albanians in the UK were not part of the Kosovo state building procedures after the 1999 conflict and social discourses of a Kosovo identity have impacted the Kosovo Albanian identity in the UK. However, what this may also suggest is the problem that Kosovo and Kosovaness as such has since the Ahtissari package and declaration of independence in 2008, been constructed along multiethnic lines which has resulted in a movement by some to reignite Albanian nationalism. This suggests that the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora are also involved in such discursive constructions. Nonetheless, identity is strongly expressed as context bound and un-fixed. As another interviewee states:

\[\text{RM: Its weird coz when I’m in Kos Uhm when I’m London you know I feel like when I speak with people meet people you know I say I’m full Kosovan, but when I go Kosovo, I still say that you know, I don’t know I’m like from London and I don’t why its feels more it’s like opposite, when I’m here I say I’m Kosovan, when I’m there I kinda say I’m still Kosovan but I kinda say I’m from London.}\]

Whereas another interviewee suggests that a British identity is only a legal one.

\[\text{NS: Well the, OK, looking at it legally if I may say, British is only the citizenship that I have. I still have to apply for Kosovan citizenship, with which of course I am entitled to. But at the moment, I’m only British, but I don’t see}\]
myself as British, funny enough... I see myself as Albanian national by language, if I uh want to give you a bit more fully. I only see basically the connection, the way I see my own identity is related to this language Albanian language. ... the rest is all to me unimportant.

Whereas, when asked to define what being British is, one interviewee suggests a class difference and a discrimination as well as segregation from what she considers ‘true’ Brits. She states:

BG: Oh when you own house, first of all. [DP: ok] Not sitting those uh community areas at the council estates with every other uh nation people, I’m not a racist, but it’s quite difficult to fit with uh with everyone else, uh while you didn’t have any choice, you’ve been given that place, that accommodation since I arrived, so none of my neighbours are British, so somehow, sometimes I feel and I ask myself where am I, because I don’t get to hang around with British neighbours, like uhm probably in uh uh people living just a little bit away from central London, I’ve seen them, houses with a bit of garden, and sharing everything with their neighbours and that’s what I call British actually, being being in contact with them and talking and and changing ideas, while uh living in this urban area uh London doesn’t doesn’t make you feel British.

And when asked about being Kosovan, she also describes being discriminated, which results in exclusions of feeling Kosovan:

BG: ... to be honest with you, I, I don’t feel anymore Kosovan, no, I don’t feel anymore Kosovan. I feel like I’ve been left behind, uhm there are people, I, I have to tell you an incidence when I applied for a job in 2008, [DP: right] to a mutual friend of mine, and I handed him my CV and just a couple of hours later he he said to me, I’m sorry but you are threat for my position, [DP: yeah] so I shouldn’t have seen your CV, and please look for a job somewhere else, otherwise you could have taken my job [DP: ah yeah] I felt, I felt very
very bad, so since then I’ve changed my mind, I think I should stick to stick
to where I work where I have my family kids [DP: yeah]

However, being mistaken for an ‘English’ person, is viewed positively as one interviewee suggests:

NA: No, I don’t introduce myself to somebody, and obviously, I don’t say I’m Kosovan or Albanian, or English, if they ask, which was a kind of funny story, last week actually, one of the students in college asked me, he goes ’N... can I ask you a question’, I said ‘go on’, he said, ‘are originally English’, I said no ‘I’m not’. They had a bet with a friend of his, him and a friend had a bet, coz he’s friend said she’s not English, and he said I was English, and I said ‘I’m not’. Uhm because they did notice a bit of an accent right [DP: yeah]...When I talk to somebody and I tell them how, that Hi my name is N... and do say to them, and I hardly ever say that, I do same to them I do not come from England, I am Kosovan, and when I say I am Kosovan, and they look at me ‘oh that’s strange’ you don’t look Kosovan, or you know, some of them say I have an accent, some of them don’t. So, I don’t know to be honest, I, myself I look at myself, hmm, I do look at myself as English most of the time, yeah, most of the time, I do look at myself as English.

Taken together all these elements suggest that not only is diasporic identity un-fixed, fluid and multidirectional and context bound, but moreover, diasporic identity can be articulated through many rhetorical positions including political discourses that may be prevalent in both the homeland, such as in the case of an Albanian identity, and the host society in relation to segregation and what is perceived as social division. However, from the interviewees, there is a positive discursive construction of a British identity. However, as scholars have stated, whether you consider yourself British does not mean that those in the UK will consider you British as well (Nava 2007, Julios 2008). Furthermore, discrimination can affect how one positions themselves in relation to a particular identity, as demonstrated by the interviewee
above who was not hired for a job and felt that left her out. The following section presents the analyses of discourses around discrimination experience by Kosovo Albanians in the UK.

8.2. Perceptions of Discrimination by Kosovo Albanians in the UK

As many scholars have argued, identity is not only about what you are but also about what you are not (Benhabib 1996, Hall 1996, Derrida 2000). Furthermore, belonging and exclusion are inseparable binaries (Derrida 2000). One of my main questions throughout the interviews dealt with experiences of discrimination in the UK and London in particular. As previously mentioned this chapter, belongs to a small number of studies that have focused on the perspectives of minorities or of, in this case, victims of discrimination to develop a greater understanding of their discourses by analyzing these accounts and exploring how people who either believe they have experienced discrimination or not convey these stories (Mellor 2003, 2004; Merino 2006, Merino et al., 2009, Rojas-Lizana 2014).

This section explores the discourses of interviewees when describing experiences of discrimination or claiming the non-existence of discrimination. In addition, this section aims to highlight if there are any examples of discrimination despite suggestions that there may not be any and how are these experiences manifested through discourse. I asked interviewees if they had experienced any discrimination and how this made them feel in the UK.

8.2.1. Subverting identity ‘because ladies they like…the men from Italy’

The interviewees all acknowledged the existence of discrimination, however, they used mitigating strategies and various rhetorical devises and lexical choices to imply a positive
experience despite discrimination and to position themselves as integrated enough not to experience discrimination. Interestingly, one interviewee denies experiencing discrimination, stating that his ‘English was not bad’ but nonetheless, went on to state that upon meeting women he pretended to be Italian. Through his narrative he attempts to construct and demonstrate that this was not negative and rather than something that suggests discrimination and a lack of freedom to express one’s identity, he subverts this with suggestions that it was just one more thing to cope with and that ‘Italian men are very popular in the UK’. He states:

No no no uh myself I socialized a lot with English people and I didn’t feel any any like looking at me down like a second class citizen or something like that you know... maybe because my English was not bad, or because of my character or personality, I start straight away to chat to people and befriend them. I didn’t uh I have this, this experience. I don’t know myself because was one the reason I was coping easy with that life, for me was not difficult my experience. ... Well, when ladies were asking me I was saying always I’m from Italy [DP: ahh] because ladies they like you know the men from Italy, so it was easy for me to start conversation ...

Nonetheless, when I asked the interviewee whether being from Italy was more accepted in the UK, he suggested that this was the case and that Kosovo Albanians and other Eastern Europeans were looked down on. He states:

No, uh only easy was because if you say from Kosovo Albania or Eastern Europe they just look down at you they don’t want to socialize they look different at you, you know, and if you say from Italy, Italian men are very popular in the UK, they uh become straight away friends they chat to you, if I have relationship with a lady, after three months I told them that I am from Kosova and I asked them if I tell told you in the beginning that I am Kosovo would you go out with me, they would say straight no no no way, because at that time was like a taboo they didn’t have uh uh those of experience with
Eastern European men, they didn’t like them I don’t know it’s just different I don’t know.

Such subversions of identity have real consequences on the lives and relationships of people, as the interviewee goes on to explain:

...if I have a long relationship three months six months, sometimes last one year, sooner or later after or later after two or three months I would tell her where I am from but if it was a short relationship I didn’t tell her you know what I mean

DP: was it difficult for you to be in this situation?

no no no difficult because you have to cope with the situation when you are in situation like that, because you can’t explain to her you don’t know in Kosovo how bad its situation soon it’s gonna be war, what discrimination and what crime they doing genocide against Kosovan population or something. Ladies didn’t have the time to listen to this story you know what I mean, they just wanted to go out have a drinks meal have a fun that’s it.

As Van Dijk (1993) has stated in relation to the discourses of dominant groups about minorities, such seemingly subtle discursive devices are used to manage the ‘processes of understanding in such a way that preferred models are being built by the hearers/readers’ (Van Dijk 1993: 264). So here we witness the interviewees as minorities using similar discursive devices and attempting to present a positive reading of subverting one’s origins and building a preferred reading which is positive rather than negative and debilitating.

Scholars have recognized Albanophobia, in former-Yugoslavia but also in other places, such as Greece and Italy (Clark 2000, Vullnetari 2012, King & Mai 2013), as well the subversion of identity in light of negative stereotypes about Albanians (Schwandner-Sievers, 2008). What the above extract suggests is that the Kosovo Albanians are aware of such
discriminating discourses and are actively trying to avoid direct discrimination by subverting their identities.

Another interview when asked if they ever experienced racism suggests that because he is very successful people cannot really express any discrimination against him. However, at the same time he acknowledges that those from Western Europe would not get the same treatment. He states:

FB: Yeah racism [DP: Yes] No, no, no, uhm they’re a bit uhm surprised when they see, you know, what I’m doing and where I’m from or where I should be from, coz they think that I came yesterday fresh from the boat, and I tell them that, you know, I’ve been here for quite sometime. The-they realise, but then your right they don’t share the same feeling that they would with a Frenchman or or or an Italian, they would not be asking all those questions to a Frenchman or Italian. [DP: Yeah] Uhm but yeah I mean they are surprised of what I do and where I am from, that is certainly the case and but yeah I mean uh. What you gonna do, they have preconceptions, they have seen people who have not done so well and thieves and everything I mean by god you know like, the Sun and the Daily Mail do very good job of smearing our identity quite quite readily. Thank god there are many exemplars of that for them to use. So so they, it’s not racism per say, but people have the frame of mind of what they’ve seen and what they’ve heard and then they get almost surprised about you know what I do.

The notion that those who are successful and speak English and are well integrated are less likely to experience discrimination corresponds to dominant UK discourses and ideology about integration and normalizing of minorities. Another interviewee states that she has not experienced discrimination but when she was younger playing outside with her friends she would be called a ‘foreigner’ but suggests that she liked being different and didn’t want to be like everyone else:
DM: No, but then again I’m not the kind of person that likes to fit in, if you know what I mean, I never wanted to be like everyone else, so for me to be different was a good thing for me, like I never wanted to fit in with everyone or you know to be a certain way coz everyone is that way. So if they said oh D... you know you were different, I took that as a compliment I liked that, you know I wasn’t the kind of person that wanted to fit in so, but I never felt discriminated or anything like that, but obviously sometimes when we used to play outside or something with friends there would always be someone saying oh the foreigners or something. But it never ever got me down, like I don’t know maybe coz my family very like we were very strong and like supporting the way I grew up, like you always felt positive and you never like put yourself down, you know what I mean, (DP: you were proud of yourself?) yeas, always proud of myself and my family and you people if anyone said anything and anything they would ever say was the foreigners you know, but it never got me down you know.

Another interviewee states that he has experienced discrimination only when it comes to religious belief:

NA: No, huh, I experienced discrimination, racism when I told them I was Kosovans, a Muslim Kosovan, they thought because I was Muslim Kosovan, I would be the same as other Muslims that they see around her. But other than that I think they don’t look at me as a Kosovan, they look at me as English. I don’t really talk much about Kosova, I have really nothing to say about Kosova. Yeah it’s my country, I go back and forth, but at the end of the day as people, as you know, as people in Kosovo, you know, I don’t think we’re all there to be honest.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the interviewee attempts to one justify discrimination of ‘those Muslims’ and differentiate from them. Recent reports such as the one in The Telegraph
‘Inside Kacanik, Kosovo's jihadist capital’, suggest an anxiety about being identified as Muslim.43

Nonetheless, the interviewee continues to suggest that Kosovo Albanians in the UK are rightly discriminated if they have abused the system. When I asked her about the ways in which the British press represents Kosovo Albanian asylum seekers, the interviewee was concerned, however blamed the Kosovo Albanians, suggesting that the dominant discourses of the British media are adopted by those in the diaspora and are not necessarily challenged as untrue:

NA: To be honest, I’m not, if they, if they say something about Kosovans, asylum seekers or if they’re here illegally, or they do things illegally, to be honest that bugs me, it does. Why should, you know, I think when you see somebody young my age, who’s can work, hasn’t got any sort of disability, they’re choosing to, I don’t know, be lazy, have hundreds of kids and pretty much do everything wrong, why, why should that person get away, and apparently, well, and most of them were married, but they’re not paper married, and why should they get away with, you know things like that [DP: hmm] I don’t know much about immigration, I, you know, it’s been while, since I’ve been around Kosovans that are immigrants or live here illegally, but people who live here legally but do things illegally then that does bug me [DP: yeah] very much, and I, when I say that I mean youngsters, I don’t mean the older generation coz then I think the older generation can’t really do much, coz I think this country is hard, but my, say, people I mean somebody my age and your age and maybe younger, you know, so I think why should I work my ass off, being a full time mum, paying taxes, and and them just sort of going out every morning and getting money from the country and uh having a

husband work for them, who apparently their not their husband, but they live with them and have kids with them and have the money and everything.

This discursive strategy employed by N.A., is designed to present and construct her identity alongside the dominant British group by regurgitating common stigmatized discourses about asylum seekers and those claiming benefits in the UK. As Morošanu and Fox (2013) found in relation to Romanian migrants, this strategy despite its aims to detach the self from discrimination, in contrast, confirms it. They observed Romanian migrants who sought to transfer stigma onto ethnic Roma with whom they were frequently associated. For example another interviewee states:

BA. Whatever they say in the newspapers is the truth, in England doesn't feel like England anymore, compare to 13 years, when I arrived here! Too many foreigners now, I don’t blame the English for feeling like strangers and threatened in their own country. This is just my opinion... I see it every day, wherever I go. Immigrants hanging around coffee shops for hours or on the street and behave like in their own land. Do you not think that is disrespecting for English people? I’m an immigrant myself and cannot talk much but at least I integrate and live an integrated life without forgetting where I come from of course.

The dominant ideological frameworks in society underline such discursive strategies, and operate in this manner to discriminate migrants and other powerless groups. As Van Dijk (1993), outlines one of many ways of discrediting powerless groups, is to focus attention on their alleged threat to the interests and rights of the dominant group. Van Dijk outlines that this results in the following type of reasoning which we also see with the above quote from the interviewee:

[W]e will get less (or worse) work, housing, education, or welfare because of them, and they are even favoured, e.g. by special attention or affirmative action. Such a strategy is conducive to the formation of models that feature
such well-known propositions as ‘We are the real victims’, ‘We are being discriminated against, not they’ (Van Dijk 1993: 265).

Moreover, the discursive strategies employed by the interviewee, suggest mimesis (copying) of the dominant group and an active desire to construct oneself as part of the dominant group. One reason for this may be that while those in power, as Van Dijk (1993) has suggested, aim to persuade poor white groups and have them accept such negative attitudes, especially in austere economic climates, about ethnic minorities, ethnic minorities who aim to demonstrate integration within host societies are also adopting such ideologies and values from the dominant groups.

By identifying with the dominant British identity, the interviewees suggest that they are different from other Kosovo Albanians who have not managed to fit in. Here he find a racialised discourse which uses stereotypes and negative physical attributes to describe other Kosovo Albanians and what they look like. Similarly to racism, this is not about colour or ethnicity, but an ideological position. When one interviewee suggested that she was not like other Kosovo Albanians, I asked her what other Kosovo Albanians were like and looked like. Her language constructing this was full of negative stereotypes.. She states:

RA: ... what do Kosovans look like ...we were going to Durham actually ...and I said ok E... and if you see a person, a guy, I picked on a guy, if you see a guy with a flat head at the back ... big nose and rotten teeth, typical, but yeah.

What this suggests is a discourse based on the ideology that those who appear more ‘westernized’ are better able to integrate in the UK and therefore will be subject to less discrimination in the UK. Furthermore, within the diasporic community itself there is racism and othering of those considered less refined and unappealing, as the quote above suggests.
The following section discusses allegiances and constructions of identity around football and support for either Kosovo or England in a game. I decided to ask this question as much scholarship has indicated that nationalism is currently best displayed in team sporting events.

8.3. ‘Who would you support in a football game between England and Kosovo?’

Ample recent scholarship has shown that football is key in strengthening as well as creating a sense of identity, national identity and nationalism. Football not only enables interaction with identities and cultures but also provides a space and spectacle for witnessing identities and cultures (Armstrong & Giulianotti 1999). As Giulianotti (1999) states, ‘[a]t internationals, the team embodies the modern nation, often literally wrapping itself in the national flag’ (Giulianotti, 1999: 23). Moreover, as Duke and Crolley (1996) highlight, ‘[i]t is much easier to imagine the nation and confirm national identity, when eleven players are representing the nation in a match against another nation’ (Duke & Crolley, 1996: 4). Therefore, one of the questions I asked the interviewees was designed to elicit responses which would indicate stancetaking and discursive strategies with regards to which team they would support in a football game between England and Kosovo. Interestingly, nearly all stated that they would support Kosovo. Analysis of the discourses as they attempt to rationalize their choices demonstrates their constructions of themselves and their identities within such a scenario. This question also reveals anxiety for expressing support and some interesting subverting rhetorical devices such as ‘I don’t like football’ or ‘I always support the underdog and Kosovo is the underdog in a game against England’ emerged.

RM. hmmm UHmm I dunno, it’s a tricky one. Uhm I think I support, I don’t
No I think I’d support Kosovo definitely

DP: Why is that then?
RM: Even though, I dunno, I I dunno, it's just that their Kosovans, I'm a Kosovan, I feel Kosovan, so we just like just support each other.

DP: But London is you're home you said?

RM: I know, but I don’t know blood is, I just coz I’m a Kosovan I just support Kosovo.

What the interview extract above suggests is that although allegiances are clearly constructed around London and the UK by some interviewees, however, when pushed to align with a team some chose to support Kosovo. However, this is not the case with all interviewees. Some interviewees stated that if they were in the UK they would support Kosovo but if they were in Kosovo they would support England. That suggests that the notion of difference or aligning with one identity against another is present as Benhabib has stated, however, this is more complex since instead of a Kosovo Albanian identification in Kosovo some interviewees state that they would support England against their ‘original’ homeland. This suggests that generalizations about Diaspora and homelands require further analysis and diasporic subjects don’t necessarily align with a homeland identity against a hostland one. Nonetheless, as in the extract above, some do identify with a homeland identity in an essentialised way, with lexical choices that demonstrate a natural, inherent and unexplainable identification.

The following section in this chapter will look at the discourses of Kosovo Albanians as they recount narratives of going back to Kosovo. The interviews in this section demonstrate that those returning to Kosovo construct their identities around particular contexts and interests.
8.4. Going Back to Kosovo

Benedict Anderson in his seminal work states that nations are imagined communities. He states that:

[The nation] is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion... Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined... Finally [the nation] is imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson 1991: 6-7).

However, this section will explore how the Kosovo Albanian community in the UK imagines the Kosovo nation and how they position themselves in relation to the Kosovo nation. Part of the analysis will explore how Kosovo Albanians in the UK position themselves as either within this imagined community or outside it and why.

The interviewees were all asked about going back to Kosovo and how they felt when in Kosovo. Interestingly some stated that they did not feel like they were going back home. One interviewee who was a baby when her parents moved her to the UK, stated that she feels that Kosovo is home to members of her family, that she feels that it is their home and not hers:

*RM: I don’t think I imagined anyhow, but I just when we went five years later, having lived here and raised here since I was nine months, when I go down there it doesn’t seem as I’m going home. [DP: right] So like London is my home, see for family, they were T… was here, my sister she came at seven [DP yeah] and L… he he came around six, down there it feels like their home, and so does my mum, but here since I been raised here this feels home for me.*
The interviewee’s discursive practices and lexical construction suggests that she does not feel part of Kosovo. This suggests that diasporic subjects also do not necessarily discursively construct themselves within the Kosovo nation or belonging to the Kosovo nation. Similarly to the sense that the UK does not feel like home, the interviewees also position themselves outside of Kosovo. This suggests that a diasporic context is not necessarily identified as a homeland although connections are constructed around family and heritage. Interestingly the interviewee positions herself in London, she states repeatedly that London is her home, rather than Britain. The city with its diversity is continuously claimed as home, suggesting an attachment to London as it lacks a national context and boasts a multicultural population. She also explains how anxious she felt in Kosovo, and how she asked her mother when they would be returning ‘home’ to London:

RM: Even when we went to Kosovo, when I went to meet my grandparents and everywhere the whole place look different and I was like I was like to my mum can we home now.

So, ‘where is home?’ as Avtar Brah states (1996: 192). ‘When does a location become home? What is the difference between “feeling at home” and staking claim to a place as one’s own?’ (Brah 1996: 193) However, the interviewee was adamant that she still felt Albanian despite not ‘staking’ Kosovo as her home:

RM: I now I want to go to Kosovo because of the family, like you know cousins, but it’s still feels like I’m going on holiday, it doesn’t feel like I’m going home. [DP: hmm] This, London is my home. Even I still say I’m a shiptar like Kosovan [DP: right] I still feel like London is my home.

It would appear that this form of liminality, although usually attributed to failed asylum seekers or ‘illegal’ migrants who do not possess the right paperwork but identify with the landscape that they inhabit, is also evident in the narratives of those who migrated very
young or were born in the UK (Binaisa 2013). Similarly as in the case of RM, young Kosovo Albanians in the UK who came to the UK as very young or who were even born in the UK, reassert their Kosovo Albanian origins while expressing a liminality between their British and Kosovo identities. Although this suggests that individuals are also involved in establishing identities and boundaries, what is highlighted on the contrary, is not only the liminal transnational space between the host society and the homeland, but a hybrid and heterogeneous third or more, multiple identity construction the ‘Neither Here Nor There’ phenomenon. Where one’s country of origin can be seen as both a part of one’s identity and as a holiday destination and not a priori a ‘homeland’, furthermore, the city without its dominant hegemonic national identity and nationalism is repositioned as a ‘homeland’ as the space between two dominant hegemonic nations.

When asked what makes this particular interviewee different from the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo despite her self-identification as ‘Shqiptar’ or Albanian, the interviewee suggests linguistic differences as one of the main reasons that make her feel different:

*RM: I do feel different, as in when I go down there, it’s not like they treat me different, it’s just that, I don’t know when we speak, I was going to say ship [DP: it OK], ‘me perzi’, you know mix different language, I feel like sometimes, not make fun of me, but they you know they laugh at the stuff that and it feels a bit [DP: like you don’t really understand each other] yeah [you can’t instantly communicate what you feel] yes, so like I have Google translate, I have to go on there to translate what I’m trying say for them to understand it, it’s a bit, but it doesn’t bother me, but I still have a bit, I feel a bit different. Not different, but I just feel yeah.

Although the interviewee identifies language as a difference as well as referring to Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo as ‘them’, there is an anxiety present in her language, which she struggles to define. She positions herself as in-between, her use of Google translate, like so
many Brits abroad, enabling her to communicate with her family and friends. Fundamentally, in her discourse there is an ideological resistance to parting with a Kosovo Albanian identity and identifying herself as British.

The homeland discourses, as already mentioned, are also involved in the interplay of mutually constructing the ‘Neither Here Nor There’ phenomenon. For example, another interviewee, posted on Facebook when she was in Kosovo that she felt her objections to exploitations in Kosovo, earned her the description as ‘too English’. She writes:

This morning I was served coffee by a boy (11 or 12). He works an average 10 hrs a day, 7 days a week, earning €5 per day. He told me he gives all his wages to his dad (€35). There are about 5 boys working there! When I suggest that child labour is illegal and this is child exploitation to my fellow coffee drinkers I was told I was 'too English' and it was justified by saying that its better for children to work than to become 'thugs'. Although I understand the latter statement (I’m not going to dwell on the issue of being too English) I hate it that Kosovan gov[ernment] turns the blind eye to these issues. Its our shame! Child exploitation at its worse! Ignorance at its worse!

As already stated, this study explores notions of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ as an important discursive articulations which highlight the discursive construction of diasporic living in the UK. However, this is also important in relation to Kosovo, because fundamentally how Kosovo is constructed in relation to the lived realities of Kosovo Albanians in the UK, highlights that ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ can be in-between and within host societies and homelands, that a transnational practice of moving between the UK and Kosovo landscapes and social space enables discursive and rhetorical articulation which reconstitutes what and when is both ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ as host society and homeland identities come to the fore. This is poignantly demonstrated by Kosovo Albanians who go back to Kosovo and chose not to disclose living abroad. Some interviewees declared that they avoid telling those
in Kosovo that they live abroad. One interviewee described this situation and the cultural
idiosyncrasies that led to embracement and being found out that she lived abroad.

FH: Uhm, I try to hide the fact that I, that I’ve lived in London if I can. ...uhm, I just don’t want them to know that I live abroad. ...Well, if you, if you, if you go for a certain treatment they might, some, you always feel they will charge you more...and uh the lady asked us where do, where are you from, and I said from Prishtina yeah, and obviously H... has an accent when she speaks. Albanian, now like I have an accent when I speak English she has an accent when she speaks [DP: yeah] Albanian, laughs, so uhm I was talking to her in Albanian as much as I could, but she was speaking talking to me in English in a very low voice because she’s not a hundred percent sure and she didn’t want the lady to know that we you know we don’t live there, and uh she asked me where I was from, I said oh from Prishtina of course, laughs, [DP: laughs] and I uh, so she turned around and asked H... what year are you in, [DP: right] she said year nine, and there are no year nine in Kosovo laughs, [DP: laughs], she said year nine, I didn’t know we had a year nine, laughs... yes so, and that always brings further discussions and I just don’t want to deal with that.

Clearly there is anxiety about being charged more and seen as ‘cash cows’ as discussed in Chapter 5. However, this is also more complex in terms of how the interviews construct themselves regarding money and the values they hold in terms of talking about money. So although another interviewee describes being seen through financial interests, the interviewee expressed anxiety that those in Kosovo views him as financially well off.

NS: Yeah, although they look at you through the financial means, they think, they assume that you are rich, you have loads of money, and they often they either want to overcharge uh on uh various places wherever but its as soon as I uh explain to them that you know you can’t do that then they come back to reality. But there just like everywhere you find people are very honest, I personally believe the majority are are very nice and welcoming but of course
some of them they do want to uhm use this sort of say getting some money out of you.

The interviewee’s discursive and rhetorical strategies suggest that he is constructing himself alongside British notions of not talking or discussing money or just simply feeling uncomfortable around discussions with money. Therefore, I also explored how direct those in Kosovo were about the finances of those in the diaspora. I asked whether they ask the interviewee how much money he earns or has. The interviewee stated that this does occur quite often. He states:

NS: Yeah, they ask you basically, uhm they talk quite a lot about uhm uhm basically how much money you make, uh how much money can you save, uh all related to uh financial means, basically, and in a way in a way this is very interesting I also noticed that they think that we’re quite ignorant, maybe because we’re uh we’ve learnt how to be uh modest, [DP: yes] in the way we talk, in the way we react, and they, I think they believe we’re quite ignorant to what’s happening in Kosovo and maybe in the world as well.

Another interviewee supports this idea stating:

NA: …How people expect a lot more from you, and they don’t give anything back. Uhm they think that because I live in London, they think I’m loaded.[DP: hmm] I have a lot to offer to them, which I don’t, I work hard, uhm yeah my life is different to them, but, they think coz I live here, I’ve got a lot to offer if I go back you know there, you know, money wise, they basically they just look at me out of their whatever I have, they think oh maybe she has a lot, maybe she can give me, I don’t know, money, gifts all of that, its just the way they look at us from there to here. And To be honest that’s just one of the things that winds me up about it, so yeah.

Or as FR states:
FR: There, there is a gap, if I could say, you know, I try not to, if I could say, not to make it, if I could say, not to show off, in that sense. Obviously the people there, they are still more poor, and they are pretty low income, and I come and you probably when you go there, you going, you consider as a holiday, to spend three weeks to try and enjoy yourself, so maybe people they look you in a sense that you know you just uh as a foreigner as well, you just coming to show off as well.

Although all the interviewees suggest that the homeland Kosovo Albanians see them through financial means, and there are metaphorical constructions, which depict the diaspora as ‘cash cows’ such lexical choices and discursive strategy also reinforce the binary of ‘us and them’. Therefore, this constructs those in the UK as positive and not interested in talking about money, in contrast to the more straightforward and crude homeland Kosovo Albanians, who are prepared to talk about money and are thus more negative. This construction also positions the homeland Kosovo Albanians in line with British stereotypes of ‘foreigners’ who are happy to talk about money. Thus the Kosovo Albanians in the UK are constructing an identity more in line with British values.

Summary

This chapter has outlined the discursive construction of identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK. This chapter has highlighted that diasporic identifications and discursive constructions do not necessarily align with neither a predominantly homeland identity against a host society one nor do they construct themselves alongside a British identity. The Kosovo Albanians interviewed suggest that identity constructions occur alongside positive self-representations whether in either context. Discrimination is denied and identity is subverted to preserve ones notions of self-worth, and values and ideals that are perceived positively from a British social
context are adopted and used to dissociate from perceptions of negative or ‘rude’ behaviours, such as inquires about money and finances. Whereas, other Kosovo Albanians are racialised and pointed out as crude and deserving of discrimination, especially if they are perceived as conforming to British stereotypes about asylum seekers on benefits. Taken together this suggests diasporic identity is multidirectional, context bound and homeland discourses as well as host society discourses are involved and suggest not only a social construction of identity but also a complex and well thought out one where discursive and rhetorical strategies are intelligently used in the interplay between the two dominant hegemonic identities of Kosovo and the UK.
CONCLUSION

This final chapter provides a brief overview of the arguments I put forward in this thesis while outlining the main contributions to knowledge, and further research that this thesis enables and identifies for the future. Finally, at the end of this chapter, there is a short personal discussion and reflection on some of my experiences during this research project.

This thesis has argued that the interplay between diaspora, homeland and host society dynamics, combined with social and political discourses are at the core of discursive constructions of identity by Kosovo Albanians in the UK and those in Kosovo. My methodological and theoretical approach through in-depth interviews combined with CDA analysis have demonstrated the complex dynamics of homeland representations and stereotypes, hegemonic discourses, resistance and adaptation of dominant hegemonic identity in both the UK and Kosovo are at play in Kosovo Albanian Diaspora identity. The multidirectional and situational relationship between identities as well as belonging and exclusion across place and space within transnational and globalised flows suggest that a more comprehensive approach to diaspora identity constructions is currently required in diaspora identity theory.

Diaspora identities are also dependent on particular historical context, and the context of Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians in the UK, is also situated within Kosovo’s geopolitical position and history.

Part 3 of the thesis, examined homeland discourses of Kosovo Albanians and identified stereotypes such as the ‘Schatzi’ which show that ‘othering’ and negative discourses surrounding migrants and diaspora are not exclusive to host country contexts. By also including analysis of interviews with the Ministry of Diaspora in Kosovo in Chapter 5, I
identified the discursive and rhetorical strategies within the Kosovo government which represent the diaspora as passive and immobilized and needing awakening and mobilization in order to preserve the hegemony of the Albanian language, identity and culture, as well as to construct a ‘good’ diaspora that can promote Kosovo abroad, and contribute back through financial investment and public diplomacy. The distance based or tele-biopolitics by the Ministry of Diaspora also demonstrate the opaque power exercised by nation state through such institutional systems. This is juxtaposed with Chapter 6, which continues to highlight the ‘othering’ of the diaspora vis-à-vis the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo. Finally, this chapter also analyses the discursive construction of new social groups that have recently emerged in the language of homeland Kosovans, by analysing the language used to construct, position and represent the returning Kosovo Albanian Diaspora as ‘hybrids’ that predominantly occupy a position not within Kosovo society at large but within various international missions.

Part 4 of the thesis, which also belongs to a small number of studies that have focused on the perspectives of minorities and the ways they construct and articulate their identities through their discourses, focuses on the ‘Neither Here Nor There’ phenomenon, which suggests that Kosovo Albanians in the UK do not passively identify with a homeland identity or necessarily with a host society identity, and that this identity can at times be articulated through essentialisms, but is overall constructed as multidimensional and context bound.

As I have shown, this thesis contributes to knowledge by clearly demonstrating that to understand diaspora’s complexities also requires focus on the imagined diaspora and its relationship(s) with the imagined homeland. This thesis also provides an original contribution by extending current debates about migration and by highlighting how Kosovo Albanians already settled in the UK view and discursively construct their position and identities with the
UK. Coupled with all these elements, my work contributes to diaspora and identity studies as well as to studies about Kosovo Albanians in the UK, which are still lacking and therefore demonstrate the requirement for further research in this field.

This thesis was limited to in-depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians in the UK, based on the current findings further research could be undertaken by exploring diasporic identity constructions with Kosovo Albanians through focus groups especially with regard to some of the phenomenon such as the ‘Schatzi’ discourse. This study was limited to Kosovo Albanians in the UK, however, especially with the homeland discourses that differentiate between Kosovo Albanians in the UK and those in Germany and Switzerland where the majority of Kosovo Albanians reside, interviews and focus groups in those areas would complement the this study and reveal further complexities and a bigger picture of Kosovo Albanian Diaspora.

Other research studies that I propose for future work in this area, especially to increase literature and scholarship about Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, since one in three Kosovo Albanians lives in the diaspora, would be to explore identity constructions among second generation Kosovo Albanians and homeland discourses towards second generation Kosovo Albanians. This will not only generate knowledge and interesting empirical data but furthermore it will enable comparative studies with existing studies such as this one. Furthermore, with social media and digital media research proliferating, research employing either virtual ethnography (or netnography see Kozinets 2015) methods with CDA and/or combined with multimodal analysis of the social media pages of Kosovo Albanians in the UK and the way identity is constructed and represented in these social media spaces/places would be fruitful research to develop and conduct in the future. Combined with research in social and digital media, research exploring diasporic media and construction of identity through diasporic media that are emerging and proliferating through social media also have
the potential for further research. New news and lifestyle portals and online magazines set up in host countries by diaspora Kosovo Albanians for the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora such as (www.revistaporta.com, UK Albanians Network) and are exclusively disseminated through social media, are also interesting for future research projects in this area.

This thesis has made a major contribution to the study of Kosovo Albanian constructions of identity by exploring both the diasporic community itself and discourses by homeland Kosovo Albanians. This thesis has demonstrated that host societies and homelands are mutually constitutive parts of diasporic identity that create a complex interplay of discourses on different levels. Therefore, this thesis has broken new ground in highlighting the role of the homeland within identity constructions, as well as contributing to a greater understanding of the issues of diaspora and migration.

Methodologically, this thesis has demonstrated the potential of analysing minority discourses in order to explore the wider horizon of discourses of discrimination, othering and exclusion, as well as the benefits and in some cases limitations of researchers who come from the same ethnic background as the subjects of the research. This is particularly important as we can gain access to the field thus ensuring that projects such as this do not fail due to lack of access to the research field or research participants.

In addition, with migration to the UK continuing, and emigration from the Balkans once again on the increase, this research has laid the foundations for exploring the dominant hegemonic discourses that affect other already settled communities in the UK and specifically the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora.

The following section will provide a brief account of some my reflections from conducting this research.
**Personal Reflection and Discussion:**

When conducting research with human participants, we must always be mindful that our participants are people who may one day read our work. Although I attempted to maintain a critical distance through CDA, and then by transcribing the interviews and analysing the text, I also felt that it was important to consider the interviews and the people I interviewed as real rather than just the textual material that resulted post transcription. This is especially important when you are working with interviews that may not be favourable to particular groups. There can only be so much you can anonymise, the interviewees will be able to recognise material cited which is based on their interviews, regardless whether names are changed. Furthermore, despite explaining your research extensively before interviewing, participants may still not be happy with your analysis and interpretation of their words. When taking a critical stance based on a chosen and planned out methodology, as was this case with CDA, it becomes difficult when you, as a researcher, do not agree with what are especially negative stereotypes or particular language that is used by participants. Clearly, some interviewees may not be aware of the negative discourses that they deploy and just assume that this is taken for granted knowledge that everyone possesses. This is why I chose to anonymise much of the information and interviewees, and at times I changed where they lived or their gender and any information that could potentially identify them. With such a small population where people are well connected and know each other, this research has taught me that fundamentally you have to consider the ethical implications of your work and the people involved. I did not wish for interviewees, despite their consent, to look back at their words and feel any anxiety or unpleasantness, or worry that they may be identified as the source of such negative comments, which they may have unconsciously stated.

This process has been eye-opening for my own views as well. Until I began analysing my interview materials I had also somehow believed that all Kosovo Albanians who came to the
UK were urban elites and dissidents. This research through CDA analysis, enabled me to understand some of my own partial views, which I had taken for granted as ‘knowledge’.

Finally, I was asked to do an interview on this subject, which was very well received and reproduced countless times within Albanian speaking media offline and online. After this I had many people contact me to say that I had changed their perceptions of the word ‘Schatzi’ and they now do not use it. Furthermore, many from the diaspora have stated that they now feel that someone has finally stated how this term is pejorative and discriminatory. On the contrary amongst my friends, both in the UK and Kosovo I have now earned the nickname ‘Schatz’, which to me is remarkable since it suggests a further subversion of the term. This time, however, I think it may have more positive connotations.


45 http://zemra.de/a-eshte-termi-“schatzi”-diskriminues.html,
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[England]: James Currey.


APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Sample Interview Consent Form

Dafina Paca BA MRes PhD Candidate
School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
Bute Building
Room 1.24
King Edward VII Avenue
Cardiff, CF10 3NB
+44(0)29 208 75688
pacad@cardiff.ac.uk
PhD Student Cardiff University

Informed Interviewee Consent Form

1. I hereby agree to participate in an interview in connection with research being conducted by Dafina Paca in connection with work for her PhD thesis.

2. The interview will be audiotaped. In the interview I will be identified by name.

3. I understand that the interview will take up to 60 minutes and that I can withdraw at any stage. In the event that I withdraw from the interview, any tape made of the interview will be either given to me or destroyed, and no transcript will be made of the interview.

4. I understand that, upon completion of the interview, the tape and information content of the interview may be used as follows (please your preferred option(s) by ticking the box(es)):

   - [ ] Material may be quoted in the research papers and PhD thesis of Dafina Paca, and attributed to me.
   - [ ] Material from this interview may be quoted in the research papers and PhD thesis of Dafina Paca, but I wish to remain anonymous.
   - [ ] My comments are confidential, for the information of Dafina Paca in the writing of his/her PhD thesis only and may not be quoted.
   - [ ] I would like to receive a printed copy of the interview transcripts

5. I may request that portions of the interview are edited out of the final copy of the transcript.

6. I understand that at the conclusion of this particular study the tape and transcript of the interview will be kept by Dafina Paca and that the completed PhD thesis will be kept for public use by Cardiff University School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies.

7. If I have questions about the research project or procedures, I know I can contact Ms Dafina Paca.

Interviewer signature: ________________________________
Interviewee signature: ________________________________ Consent date: __/__/___
Address ____________________________________________ Phone number: _____________

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Appendix 2 – Sample Email of Introduction of PhD Research to Potential Interviewees

Dear [insert name]

Thank you for showing interest in participating as an interviewee in my research project. My PhD research explores the discursive construction of identity/s by Kosovo Albanians living in the UK. I investigate whether Kosovo Albanians in the UK consider themselves belonging to the British and/or Kosovan cultures and why. I also ask if Kosovo Albanians in the UK (London) consider themselves transcultural and/or in-between cultures.

In-depth interviews with Kosovo Albanians living in London, allow me to explore and identify - by using the analytical methods and theories of critical discourse analysis - the language used to perform identity and any particular alignment or identification with one, both or multiple identities. Through examination of language, I aim to identify any mainstream British or Kosovan social discourses that appear to have influenced any identification with and/or estrangement from British and/or Kosovan identity and/or culture respectively.

If you agree to participate in my research and be interviewed, your interview will be held in the strictest confidence and only used for academic purposes. If the interview is used in my PhD research it will be anonymous. Please let me know if you would still like to participate and when we can arrange a time and date for the interview.

Best Wishes,

Dafina Paca
## Appendix 3 – Jomcm Ethical Approval Form

### JOMEC ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM

Tick one box:  
- [ ] STAFF  
- [ ] STUDENT (UG)  
- [ ] STUDENT (PG)

Title of Project:  

Name of Researcher(s):  

Name of Supervisor (for student research):  

### The purpose of this form is for you to think about ethical issues in your research. Please answer “YES”, “NO” or “NOT APPLICABLE” to each of the following questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will you describe the research process to participants in advance, so that they are informed about what to expect?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you obtain written consent from participants?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their consent to being observed?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at any time and for any reason?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With questionnaires, will you give participants the option of omitting questions they do not want to answer?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you tell participants that their data will be treated confidentially in that, if they wish, when published it will not be identifiable as theirs?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you allow the participants the option of anonymity for all or part of the information they give in an interview or documentary form?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you considered the health and safety measures your research might necessitate (including the health and safety of you as a researcher, and of research participants)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will your project involve deliberately misrepresenting your identity? E.g. entering an internet chat room pretending to be someone else.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there any risk of participants experiencing physical and/or psychological distress or discomfort? If yes, please give details on a separate sheet and state what you will tell them to do if they should experience any problems (e.g. who they can contact for help).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Do participants fall into any of the following special groups? If so, please fill out Box B described how you will handle ethical issues dealing with doing research on these vulnerable groups.

- [ ] Schoolchildren (under 16)
- [ ] People with learning difficulties
- [ ] Patients
- [ ] People in custody
- [ ] People engaged in illegal activities (e.g. drug dealers)

If you will be working with people in these groups have you considered the University ethics guidelines and procedures which are relevant to your research?

**IF YOU HAVE ANY TICKS OUTSIDE OF THE GREY BOXES IT IS POSSIBLE YOUR RESEARCH MAY BE ETHICALLY PROBLEMATIC. IN ADDITION TO ISSUES COVERED HERE YOU MUST BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SCHOOL ETHICS COMMITTEE ANY ISSUES WITH ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS NOT CLEARLY COVERED BY THE ABOVE CHECKLIST**
THE RESEARCH SUPERVISOR MUST INITIAL ONE OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. The supervisor believes this research project has no ethical implications and the student can proceed with the research immediately.

B. The supervisor believes this research project has some ethical implications. In Box 'B', the student has provided a brief description of participants and their research methods. In addition, the supervisor has listed guidelines/recommendations to follow and/or issues that the student needs to address in order for the research to proceed.

C. The supervisor believes this research project may have significant ethical implications and should be brought before the School Ethics Committee. Further details about the project will be provided, see Box 'C'. The student SHOULD NOT proceed until the project has been approved by the Ethics Committee.

If the research supervisor initialled Statement B, please give a description of participants and procedures in up to 150 words.

Box B

If the research supervisor initialled Statement C, please provide all further information listed below in a

Box C
1. Title of Project
2. Purpose of project and its academic rationale
3. Brief description of methods and measurements
4. Participants: recruitment methods, number, age, gender, exclusion/inclusion criteria
5. Consent and participation information arrangements - please attach consent forms if they are to be used
6. A clear but concise statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project and how you intend to
7. Estimated start date and duration of project

All information must be submitted, along with this form to the School Ethics Committee for consideration

Signed
Undergraduate/Postgraduate Researcher
Signed
Research Supervisor or Lead Researcher

STATEMENT OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

This project had been considered using agreed School procedures and is now approved

Signed
Chair, School Ethics Committee
Appendix 4 - Interview Schedule/Protocol Kosovo Albanians in the UK

- Where were you born?

Migration

- When did you move to the UK? What was it like?
- Why did you leave Kosova/move to the UK?
- What area did you first move to?
- Did you have friends/relatives in that area?
- Did you intend to stay in the UK as long as you have or did you intend to return?
  o Have you made many friends in the UK?
  o Are they Kosovo Albanians or British?
  o Would you say you have more British friends or Kosovo Albanian friends?
  o How do you feel about other Kosovo Albanians in the UK?
  o Do you think the ‘Kosovo Albanian or Anglo Albanian community in the UK’ exists? Would you describe yourself as belonging to it?
  o Do you celebrate Kosovo Albanian events, such as Albanian Flag day and Kosovo Independence day? Do you take part in any Kosovo Albanian cultural activities?
  o Do you celebrate British holidays?

Identity
• How do you feel in terms of your sense of being Kosovo Albanian now that you are in the UK?

• Do you feel British in the UK?

• If you were introducing yourself to another either British or Kosovo Albanians person in the UK, where would you say you were from? (How would you recognise someone as Kosovo Albanian?)

• When you go back to Kosovo, how do you introduce yourself there? where would you say you were from?

• Do you feel part of your local community or where you live in London?
  o Do you go back to Kosovo often? Why? Is this important to you?
  o When you go back to Kosovo do you speak English or Albanian?
  o Would you consider returning to live there again? Have you had any negative experiences in Kosovo?
  o Have you had any negative experiences of living in the UK?

• (If they have children). Do you think your children are/feel Kosovan? Do you encourage them to feel Kosovan or British?

• What does it mean to be British?
• What does it mean to be Kosovan?
• What does it mean to be Albanian?
• Tell me about Yugoslavia? Did you ever feel Yugoslavian?

Discrimination

• Have you ever been discriminated in the UK?
• What about discrimination in Kosovo?
Football

- If Kosovo and England were playing against each other in football, who would you support?
- If they played other countries who would you support?
- Would it make a difference if the game was played in Kosovo or the UK? Why?
Appendix 5 Interview Protocol Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo

• I'm doing my research on the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK. Can you tell me what thoughts you have about the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora?

• Can you tell me what you think about the Kosovo Albanians in the UK more specifically?

• How do you think the Kosovo Albanians from the UK are viewed by the Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo?

• Why do you think this is?

• Are you doing any work on the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in general or the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK more specifically?

• Some have said that they think the Kosovo Albanian Diaspora in the UK is a threat to the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, why do you think this is the case?

• Have you ever been to the UK? If so what was your experience like?