


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| bncdoc.id | FAC |
| bncdoc.author | Cruse, D A |
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| <1459/c> | , then it follows that it's not a dog.? It's a dog, so it must be a cat.? It's not an animal, but it's just possible that it's a dog.? It's a dog, so it might be an animal. etc. The most interesting entailments from the point of view of lexical semantics are those which hold between sentences which differ only in respect of the lexical fillers of a particular syntactic slot (e.g. It's a dog, It's a cat; It's a rose, It's a flower). In appropriate cases, the logical relations between the sentences can be correlated with meaning relations between the differentiating lexical items. The intuition of entailment may be used to establish four logical relations between sentences: 1. Unilateral entailment: It's a dog unilaterally entails It's an animal 2. Mutual entailment, or logical equivalence: The meeting began at 10.00 a.m. entails and is entailed by The meeting commenced at 10.00 a.m. 3. Contrariety: It's a cat and It's a dog stand in a contrary relation: It's a cat unilaterally entails It's not a dog 4. Contradiction: It's dead and It's alive stand in a contradictory relation: It's dead entails and is entailed by It's not alive (and It's alive entails and is entailed by It's not dead). Another useful and reliable intuition is that of recurrence of semantic contrast, or semantic proportion. For instance, speakers are well able to judge that the contrast between 24a and b is the same as that between 25a and b, but different from that between 26a and b, and 27a and b: 24a. I like him. b. I dislike him. 25a. They approved of the idea. b. They disapproved of the idea. 26a. We appointed her. b. We disappointed her. 27a. You must embark now. b. You must disembark now. This, too, will be used as an elementary intuitive judgement (especially in chapters 2 and 5). But it is a relatively complex judgement, and, like entailment, will probably prove to be derivable from more elementary intuitions (e.g. from patterns of normality and abnormality), although it is not at present clear how this is to be done. 1.5 <u>The meaning</u> of a word It is taken as axiomatic in this book that every aspect of <u>the meaning</u> of a word is reflected in a characteristic pattern of <u>semantic</u> normality (and abnormality) in grammatically appropriate contexts. That which is not mirrored in this way is not, for us, |
|  <p>Key: <u>Footprint</u> <u>ConEn1</u> <u>Footprint</u> <u>ConEn2</u> <u>Footprint</u> <u>ConEn3</u></p> | |
| | <p><u>a question</u> of <u>meaning</u></p> <p>; and, conversely, every difference in the <u>semantic</u> normality profile between two items betokens a difference of <u>meaning</u>. The full set of normality relations which a lexical item contracts with all conceivable contexts will be referred to as its contextual relations. We shall say, then, that <u>the meaning</u> of a word is fully reflected in its contextual relations; in fact, we can go further, and say that, for present purposes, <u>the meaning</u> of a word is constituted by its contextual relations. In its basic form, this conception of <u>the meaning</u> of a word is of limited usefulness: much important information concerning word-<u>meaning</u> remains, as it were, latent. The picture can be made more revealing and informative in various ways. For instance, we can picture <u>the meaning</u> of a word as a pattern of affinities and disaffinities with all the other words in the language with which it is capable of contrasting <u>semantic</u> relations in grammatical contexts. Affinities are of two kinds, syntagmatic and paradigmatic. A</p> |

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| | <p>syntagmatic affinity is established by a capacity for normal association in an utterance : there is a syntagmatic affinity, for instance, between dog and barked, since The dog barked is normal (a syntagmatic affinity always presupposes a particular grammatical relationship). A syntagmatic disaffinity is revealed by a syntagmatic abnormality that does not infringe grammatical constraints, as in? The lions are chirruping. Paradigmatically, a semantic affinity between two grammatically identical words is the greater the more congruent their patterns of syntagmatic normality. So, for instance, dog and cat share far more normal and abnormal contexts than, say, dog and lamp-post: Arthur fed the dog/cat/? lamp-post. The dog/cat/? lamp-post ran away. The? dog/? cat/lamp-post got bent in the crash. We painted the? dog/? cat/lamp-post red. An extremely useful model of the meaning of a word, which can be extracted from the contextual relations, is one in which it is viewed as being made up, at least in part, of the meanings of other words. A particular word-meaning which participates in this way in the meaning of another word will be termed a semantic trait of the second word. To render this picture more informative, it is necessary to distinguish degrees and modes of participation. We shall do this initially by defining a number of statuses (degrees of necessity) of semantic traits: criterial, expected, possible, unexpected and excluded. Criterial and excluded traits can be diagnosed by means of entailment relations between sentences: for instance, ‘animal’ is a criterial trait of dog because It’s a dog entails It’s an animal; ‘fish’ is an excluded trait of dog</p> |
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