COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY:
AN URBAN REGIME ANALYSIS OF CARDIFF 1999-2015

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DECLARATION

This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

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The political and economic context following the election of the Coalition Government in 2010 has had a significant impact upon community safety work in England and Wales. More specifically, the governmental austerity agenda - the term given to policies aimed at reducing sovereign debt through reductions in public expenditure - and the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners present a number of challenges for community safety and the local coordination of multi-agency partnership practices around crime and disorder. In addition, the currently dominant discourses and policies of localism and a decentralisation of power have placed greater emphasis on the role of locally situated actors in having to choose how to respond to the external political and economic constraints placed upon them.

Borrowing and adapting concepts from regime theory, this research employs a single-embedded case study of community safety in Cardiff to examine how the Cardiff policy ‘regime’ has sought to respond to the current economic and political climate. Building upon the analytical framework offered by regime theory, and utilising a combination of ethnographic observations, interviews and documentary analysis of policy texts over the last two decades, this thesis explores the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff, from a well resourced multi-agency community safety team, to the dispersal of responsibility for community safety under the guise of integration and reducing complexity.

Demonstrating the opportunities presented by localism the research finds evidence of an attempt to form a governing regime around a ‘transformative’ strategic agenda orientated around ideas of social justice and civic inclusion. However, illustrating the constraints on this freedom afforded to local governing actors, the realisation of this strategic agenda has been compromised by changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff that have resulted in a degradation of governing capacity for community safety and the hollowing out of community safety expertise in the city. Accordingly, the research finds evidence of a disparity between the transformative rhetoric of the shared strategic agenda, and the fragmented and divergent operational practices of community safety. This use of regime theory makes an original contribution to the nascent conceptual and empirical debate about the contested and uncertain future of community safety in an age of austerity. It highlights the need for further locally situated case studies that can disambiguate the political agency available to local policy actors and the external political and economic constrains placed upon them.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

APB – Area Planning Board
ASB – Anti-Social Behaviour
ASBO – Anti-Social Behaviour Order
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BCU – Basic Command Unit
BID – Business Improvement District
C3SC – Cardiff Third Sector Council
CAQDAS – Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
CASSC – Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee
CDA – Crime and Disorder Act
CDRP – Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CPB – Cardiff Partnership Board
CSE – Child Sexual Exploitation
CSP – Community Safety Partnership
DTTO – Drug Treatment and Testing Order
EU – European Union
KPI – Key Performance Indicator
LAA – Local Area Agreement
LSB – Local Service Board
LSP – Local Strategic Partnership
MARAC – Multi-agency Risk Assessment Conference
MASH – Multi-agency Safeguarding Hub
NCA – National Crime Agency
NCSN – National Community Safety Network
NMT – Neighbourhood Management Teams
NMO – Neighbourhood Management Officer
NTE – Night-time Economy
NUS – National Union of Students
PCC – Police and Crime Commissioner
PCSO – Police Community Support Officer
PGA – Priority Geographical Area
PSA – Public Service Agreement
RBA – Result Based Accountability
TSO – Third Sector Organisation
UK – United Kingdom
WECTU – Welsh Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Unit
WLGA – Welsh Local Government Association
YOT – Youth Offending Team
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 CONTEXT AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH

Recent decades have seen radical changes to the local structures and approaches to crime control in the UK. Under the label of ‘community safety’ greater emphasis has been placed on the value of local partnerships and multi-agency working in effectively responding to the causes and consequences of crime and disorder. This has been seen most prominently in the introduction and expansion of statutory multi-agency partnerships in every local authority in England and Wales under the Labour Governments of 1997-2010. The election in 2010 of the Coalition Government posed a number of questions for the future of these local arrangements and the potential for continued commitment to multi-agency working around crime and disorder. Principally the Coalition Government’s commitment to an extensive austerity programme, the policy of reducing sovereign debt through severe reductions in public expenditure, presented a fundamental challenge to local partnership working as reducing financial resources could incentivise a prioritisation on ‘core activities’ as opposed to more nebulous partnership commitments (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).

Alongside this, the introduction of regional Police and Crime Commissioners, and the rhetorical commitment to localism pointed to a redistribution of power away from Westminster, presenting opportunities for greater local autonomy. This thesis provides an in-depth examination of how these wider economic and political conditions are being responded to by local governing regimes and the impact of this upon the local governance of crime and disorder.

Although a contested and capacious concept (Hughes, 2006: 54), ‘community safety’ has gained increasing policy significance in recent decades, both in the UK and globally (Gilling, 2007; Hughes, 2007; Garland, 2001). Typically, the term community safety signifies a model of governing social problems through partnership working by seeking ‘to move beyond a police-driven crime prevention agenda, to involve other agencies and generate greater participation from all sections of the “community”’ (Hughes, 2006: 54). Its origins can be traced back to an increasing recognition of the limitations of the state and the
criminal justice system’s response to problems of crime and disorder following rising crime rates in the 1970s (Garland, 2001), thereby acting as an impetus for change to responses to crime and criminality. Noting the perceived failures of the reactive policing of crime, attention shifted to consider how such events could be anticipated and therefore prevented. Initially these prevention strategies were dominated by situational crime prevention measures which, building upon ideas of rational choice theory, sought to manipulate the environmental and situational conditions in which criminal behaviour occurred (Gilling, 1994). However problems of displacement, the presumption of rational action and the failure to consider the more distal causes of criminality, required an alternative idea of crime prevention that sought to address the underlying causes of criminality. This emerged in the 1991 Morgan report that made a series of recommendations for the pursuit of a social model of crime prevention, paramount amongst which was the use of statutory partnership arrangements to facilitate partnership working between local authorities, the police and other partner organisations to provide a holistic response to crime and its causes.

These recommendations, ignored by the incumbent Conservative Government, formed a fundamental component of the Labour Party’s 1997 election campaign, typified by Tony Blair’s pronouncement that Labour would be ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (Labour Party, 1997). Shortly after their election in 1997 the Labour Government introduced the Crime and Disorder Act in 1998, which, building upon the recommendations of the Morgan Report, introduced mandatory multi-agency partnerships across England and Wales designed to facilitate partnership working around crime and disorder. Under the Labour Governments of 1997-2010 community safety became an increasingly prominent part of local responses to crime, disorder and safety, facilitating multi-agency working. This was particularly evident in large urban centres, which saw the establishment of large and well resourced multi-agency teams (Edwards et al., 2007; Gilling et al., 2013), tasked with overseeing, supporting and facilitating local community safety work. This expansion of community safety coincided with the emergent professional identity of the community safety practitioner and the development of a professional expertise for community safety (Hughes and Gilling, 2004).
This development and expansion of local arrangements for community safety is important for contemporary discussions of community safety. While by no means without flaws, the presence of dedicated community safety teams was important in driving forward partnership activity and facilitating cooperation and engagement from local partner organisations in the multi-agency response to crime and disorder. However following the 2008 global financial crisis the community safety infrastructure and the professional expertise that had developed under the successive Labour Governments have been under significant pressure as a result of the policies of the Conservative-led Coalition Government of 2010 to 2015 and that are continuing under the majority Conservative Government elected in 2015.

In the 2010 general election, the need to reduce the ‘record budget deficit’ (Conservative Party, 2010: 7) through reductions in public expenditure formed the centrepiece of the Conservative party’s election campaign with the promise to ‘ensure macroeconomic stability’ (Conservative Party, 2010) after years of alleged Labour largesse and profligacy. While just short of a governing majority, the Conservative-led Coalition Government with the support of the Liberal Democrats, pursued this austerity agenda through extensive financial cuts to public services across England and Wales. Alongside this policy of austerity, the Coalition Government has sought a substantial decentralisation of power away from Westminster through the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners and a rhetorical commitment to localism and greater autonomy for local authorities. As part of this the Coalition Government moved away from the philosophies of central public management pervasive under the New Labour Government (Gilling, 2007), resulting in the abandonment of central government targets for community safety work. This has granted greater autonomy to local authorities in pursuing more radical community safety agendas, however the freedom granted by this autonomy has been constrained by the austerity programme and the degradation of local governing capacity. Therefore, the current context of community safety is one characterised by both opportunities and challenges for local community safety arrangements.

These changes are fundamental for the organisation and control of local governing arrangements for community safety and represent a substantial change
to the conditions of local partnership working. This is recognised in the work of Gilling et al. (2013) who distinguish between three phases of community safety in England and Wales. The ‘voluntary’ period (1982-1997) encompasses the emergence of community safety as a ‘reaction discourse’ against the narrowly defined ideas of situational crime prevention within certain ‘radical left local authorities (Gilling et al., 2013: 329), while the ‘national mandatory’ phase (1999-2010) constitutes the duration of the Labour Governments and the establishment and expansion of statutory multi-agency partnership teams in each local authority. During this time community safety teams were highly resourced but subject to substantial centralised management (Gilling, 2007). The third phase, speculatively titled the ‘localised and devolved’ period of community safety marks the current period of community safety following the election of the Coalition Government in 2010. At present much is unknown about how conditions of austerity, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, and the commitment to localism will impact upon local governing arrangements for community safety and the impact of this upon local policy agendas for community safety. It is these issues which form the basis of this research, which seeks to explore this third phase of community safety and how the ideological commitment to austerity, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners and the decentralisation of power away from Westminster have affected the local governance of crime, disorder and safety.

1.2 Analytic and Methodological Framing of the Research

Implicit in the notion of community safety are the ideas of power, negotiation and compromise between partner organisations, which affect how partnership arrangements are organised, and the subsequent policy agendas that are pursued. A central concern for this thesis is how austerity, the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, and localism affect local power relationships and therefore the organisation of partnership arrangements. Although there is significant uncertainty in how these pressures will manifest themselves a number of possibilities have been identified. These include: a retrenchment of partnership working as financial pressures compromise commitments to extraneous partnership activity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Gilling et al., 2013); greater
roles for voluntary and community bodies in the wake of public sector decline (Gilling et al., 2013); and the proliferation of policies and techniques of risk management (Edwards and Hughes, 2012).

Borrowing concepts originating from American urban political analysis, this thesis draws upon the work of Stone and regime theory (1989; 2005) to provide a theoretical framework in understanding the local organisation of partnership arrangements for community safety. Stone and other regime theorists distinguish between four categories of regimes: maintenance regimes maintain the status quo, developmental regimes augment the status quo, progressive regimes progressively reform the status quo, and transformative regimes fundamentally alter the status quo. Using this distinction Edwards and Hughes (2012) suggested that these categories offered by regime theory could be reformulated for criminological thought in the following way: Maintenance regimes respond to problems of public safety through criminal justice responses and the police centric enforcement of crime and disorder; developmental regimes are those that seek to augment criminal justice responses through the identification and management of problematic people or places via policies and techniques of risk management; progressive regimes are characterised by attempts to move beyond criminal justice policies in actively seeking to divert people away from the criminal justice system, through recourse to principles of restorative justice; finally transformative regimes seek a radical reframing of responses to public safety, not as a matter of criminal justice, but rather of social justice and that of economic and social policies.

To assist in the empirical enquiry into the formation of these governing regimes, the research utilised concepts taken from regime theory to provide an analytical framework for the research. This analytical framework directed attention to four areas of interest. Firstly there must be a clear governing agenda around which the regime coalesces. Secondly a governing regime must comprise a coalition of actors or partners formed around a particular agenda. Thirdly this coalition must have access to governing resources to facilitate the realisation of its governing agenda. Finally there must be a system in which cooperation and engagement from partners is encouraged and incentivised. This analytical framework allowed
the research to understand how local governing actors are encouraged to mobilise
around particular agendas and through what arrangements.

This theoretical and analytic framework provided by regime theory foregrounded
the importance of empirical research situated within particular local contexts to
understand how local power relations and dependencies affect the formation of
certain governing regimes. Located in the city of Cardiff this research adopted a
case study research design, utilising a combination of ethnographic observation,
interviews, documentary analysis and an analysis of social media to enable a
comprehensive understanding of the Cardiff regime and the position of
community safety within it. The choice of Cardiff is significant for debates of
community safety given the context of devolution in Wales and the emergence of
a distinct Welsh agenda around social policy and the pursuit of social justice
agendas in what many authors have labelled a ‘dragonisation’ of policy (Edwards
and Hughes, 2009; Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2009). The distinctiveness of the
Welsh context is seen in this research in the advocacy of changes to local
governing arrangements through the introduction of integrated partnership boards
with a view to facilitating more holistic and strategic approaches to the
governance of social problems, with Cardiff as the flagship local authority in
pioneering this approach.

1.3 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH

The findings generated in this research offer insight into how local governing
regimes are adapting to the current economic and political climate. Within
Cardiff there was evidence of a radical reformulation of the governing
arrangements, through the integration of the various partnership structures
(including the community safety partnership) into an integrated partnership
board, known as the Cardiff Partnership Board. This reformulation of the
governing arrangements in Cardiff can be understood in two ways. Firstly, the
narrative of change offered by the Cardiff regime presented it as a beneficial
adaptation to local public service delivery in that it reduced complexity and
duplication while simultaneously facilitating better partnership working and
more holistic approaches to local governance. On the other hand, discussions
with local policy officers and practitioners revealed a contrasting narrative that
portrays the changes to the governing arrangements as a degradation of governing capacity for community safety. In this it is argued that the integration of the community safety partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board has resulted in a deficit of operational oversight, responsibility and expertise for community safety.

This reformulation of the governing arrangements coincided with the creation of a strategic governing agenda for all partner organisations within the Cardiff Partnership Board. Entitled the ‘What Matters’ strategy, this set out the vision for local governance from 2010 to 2020. The ‘What Matters’ strategy contained a clear transformative agenda which foregrounded the importance of addressing social inequalities and promoting social inclusion as a way of tackling social problems in the city. The emphasis on social justice and social inclusion is significant as it represents a departure from the crime orientated agendas of New Labour, and points to the opportunities posed by localism and greater local autonomy. However, as with the governing arrangements, the research found evidence of a discord between the rhetoric of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the operational practice of community safety work in Cardiff. Where the ‘What Matters’ presented a transformative agenda, which envisioned all partners working to the same shared goals and outcomes, the operational delivery of community safety work was characterised by variance and divergent operational agendas. Rather than being driven by the shared vision of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, operational practices were more heavily influenced by more immediate concerns and the motivations of particular practitioners.

This disparity between the rhetoric of a shared strategic governing agenda and the fragmented and disparate practices on the ground illustrates a failure of the Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation around the transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. In explaining this, the thesis draws attention to three implications associated with the changes to the governing arrangements for community safety work. Firstly the integration of the community safety partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the loss of staff it entailed, has resulted in the absence of clear lines of responsibility and operational oversight for community safety work. Related to this, the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure has also led to a degradation of community
safety expertise in the city therefore compromising the informational and organisational resources available to community safety work. Finally the absence of the community safety team has placed greater pressure on local practitioners to take responsibility for the delivery and coordination of community safety priorities. These locally situated practitioners are often not best placed to facilitate and develop new partnership arrangements and in some cases do not possess relevant expertise for orchestrating community safety activity. Taken together these three factors represent a significant degradation of governing capacity available to community safety as a policy agenda, and contribute to the failure of the Cardiff Partnership Board to effectively mobilise cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This failure to mobilise partnership work around this agenda is indicative of regime failure and points to the challenges of forming and sustaining a governing regime around a transformative agenda in times of reduced governing capacity.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

Following this introduction chapter 2 begins with some theoretical and conceptual ground clearing around community safety and its conceptualisation in this thesis as a mode of governance. Following this, the chapter provides a more detailed account of the historical context of the research using the periodisation of community safety offered by Gilling et al. (2013), which differentiates between three broad phases of community safety: the voluntary period, the national mandatory period and the localised and devolved period. Focusing on the final of these periods the chapter explores why the quadrumvirate of factors in the form of austerity, the big society, localism and the introduction of regional Police and Crime Commissioners are important for contemporary discussions of community safety and local governance more broadly. To assist in the analytical dissection of these factors the chapter examines theories of governance and explores the contribution of regime theory in providing an analytical framework for researching community safety in an age of austerity. Using regime theory the chapter provides a series of theoretically informed propositions drawn from the literature which posit a number of eventualities for community safety, ranging from the degradation of community safety and partnership work to the pursuit of
more progressive and socially just agendas made possible by greater local autonomy and the adaptation of local governing arrangements.

Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive discussion of the methodological choices made in this research. Beginning with the epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the research, the chapter explores the contribution of realist philosophies of social research in exploring the power dynamics of local governance. Building upon Yin’s (2003) arguments of analytic rather than empirical generalisation, the chapter positions the purpose of the research as a contribution to the theoretical framework of regime theory and its application to conceptual discussions of community safety in an age of austerity rather than an attempt to produce generalisable findings. Given the focus on analytical generalisation, the chapter provides an explanation of the value of Cardiff as a critical case for the testing of the theoretical propositions identified during the literature review. The chapter then moves to examine the research methods and the relevance of ethnographic methods in capturing the power dynamics at play in local governance and their impact upon community safety.

Chapter 4, the first of the three empirical chapters, provides a critical examination of the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. The chapter starts with a brief account of the evolution of governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff into the establishment of a large and well-resourced community safety infrastructure in the city. Linking into wider discussions of Welsh Government policy the chapter explores the impact of the Beecham review into public services in Wales and its influence on the structural changes to the governing arrangements that took place in 2010. Through analysis of policy documentation the chapter examines the changes to these governing arrangements through the integration of the various partnership structures into an integrated Cardiff Partnership Board. In justifying these changes the policy narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board appealed to notions of reducing complexity, more joined up working and a greater dispersal of responsibility for community safety which would help diversify partnership engagement and facilitate more progressive agendas. The chapter ends with a critical examination of this narrative of progressive change and raises questions around the degradation of governing capacity for community safety work and begins to
identify a divergence between the policy discourses of change and the operational experiences of these changes.

The second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, examines the evolution of the governing agenda in Cardiff. Through analysing policy documents it is argued that community safety in Cardiff during the Labour Governments of 1998-2010 was characterised by developmental agendas orientated around the augmentation of policing agendas and policies of risk management. The chapter then assesses the strategic governing agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board, the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This strategy places an emphasis on the importance of social inequalities in the city, the need to promote greater civic engagement and an agenda that sought to extend beyond the narrow confines of crime reduction. It is therefore argued that the ‘What Matters’ strategy represents at the rhetorical and ideological level a progressive and transformative governing agenda that seeks to move beyond the risk management discourses pervasive under New Labour. Counterpoised to this progressive and transformative narrative there was an emerging indication that the rhetoric of the Cardiff Partnership Board was not being fully realised in the prioritisation of issues for community safety. Examining the priorities for community safety work in the city it is argued that, far from the strategic socially just agenda aspired to in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, what is being seen is further evidence of an increasing pressure on governing capacity and a diminishing agenda for community safety.

The third and final findings chapter, Chapter 6, explores how the changes to the governing arrangements and the development of the ‘What Matters’ strategy translates into the operational delivery of community safety work. Central here was the point that the realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was dependent upon the ability of the Cardiff Partnership Board to mobilise cooperation and engagement around this agenda at an operational level. However this research provides evidence that the changes to the governing arrangements have had fundamental implications for the coordination and mobilisation of partnership work around community safety in the city. The chapter explores how the degradation of community safety expertise, and the absence of clear operational oversight for community safety has resulted in greater discretion and responsibility being afforded to the delivery leads in determining the operational
agendas of their activities and promoting cooperation at an operational level. This has culminated in the isolation and fragmentation of community safety activity in the city, and the pursuit of divergent operational agendas driven more by the immediate concerns and priorities of the lead practitioners rather than the strategic influence of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As a result, operational practice within the city lacked a clear coherent agenda, which stands in contrast to the strategic ambitions of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Through insights gained from ethnographic observation and interviews with practitioners the chapter provides an overview of these fragmented and disparate practices, and in doing so highlights the divergence of activity undertaken in the city and the barriers to the coordination of community safety work presented by the new governing arrangements.

Chapter 7 brings together the three empirical chapters and, drawing upon the literature identified in Chapter 2 offers a critical examination of community safety within the Cardiff regime and its significance for contemporary discussions of community safety. It is argued that the progressive and transformative rhetoric of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is significant as it represents a shift away from the crime focussed agendas of New Labour. This draws attention to the opportunities presented by localism and the decentralisation of power as opposed to the intensive central management of New Labour that had previously restricted the more progressive ambitions of community safety. However the failure to realise this agenda, indicated by the fragmentation and divergence of operational practices, presents a failure of the Cardiff regime to effectively mobilise and co-opt cooperation around this agenda. This is significant, given the analytic framework of regime theory as it suggests regime failure, and moreover points to the fundamental challenges of forming and sustaining regimes around more radical governing agendas in times of austerity. In seeking to explain the cause of regime failure in Cardiff, attention is drawn towards the changes to the governing arrangements and the degradation of governing capacity it entailed. In particular three factors are identified as important: the absence of operational oversight and responsibility for community safety; the degradation of community safety expertise; and the greater pressure placed on individual practitioners to organise and determine community safety
work at an operational level. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the analytical significance of Cardiff for understanding the constraints placed upon local governing actors as a result of austerity, and some methodological considerations of utilising regime theory in this research.

The final chapter, Chapter 8, explores the contribution of this thesis to contemporary discussions of community safety, and its significance for future policy and research. This research provides evidence of how local community safety arrangements are adapting and responding to economic and political conditions that commenced under the Coalition Government. More specifically it is argued that this research demonstrates that during this third phase of community safety, the ‘localised and devolved’ period, there exist opportunities for the realisation of more radical changes to community safety as seen in Cardiff in the pursuit of a more transformative agenda for community safety. However this research has also shed light on the barriers facing local governing regimes in mobilising cooperation and engagement around these agendas. Therefore this research contributes to theoretical and empirical debates about how and why certain agendas are pursued, and subsequently how and why these are or are not realised. In doing so it demonstrates the importance of locally situated actors in actively determining how local governing regimes adapt to external conditions, and therefore how such adaptations will be subject to significant national and local variation. This research therefore contributes to methodological discussions of how to investigate community safety, and the value of multiple-embedded case studies that can disambiguate the political agency open to local policy actors and the external constraints placed on them.
2. CONCEPTUALISING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the conceptual underpinnings of the thesis, beginning with a discussion of how community safety can be defined. Having positioned community safety as a mode of governance, the chapter moves to examine its historical context in England and Wales using the periodisation provided by Gilling et al. (2013) to distinguish between three phases of community safety: the voluntary period, national mandatory period and the localised and devolved period. While the voluntary period was characterised by a lack of uniformity and variation in community safety practice, the national mandatory period saw community safety pushed to the fore of New Labour policy with the standardisation of community safety arrangements as a result of the Crime and Disorder Act (1998). Following the election of the Coalition Government in 2010, the future of community safety has been subject to much uncertainty. While policies of localism and a decentralisation of power away from Westminster have afforded greater autonomy to local governing actors in implementing community safety arrangements, the pressures of austerity have placed substantial constraints on the ability of local actors to realise the potential of their new found autonomy (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).

This contextual background for community safety and local governance therefore requires empirical enquiry which is receptive to both the political and economic conditions of local government, and the power dependencies which affect how cooperation and partnership working is achieved at a local level. Using concepts taken from American political analysis, this chapter explores the contribution of regime theory as a model for conceptualising how local governing regimes are formed and sustained around particular governing agendas. Using this framework the chapter finishes with a series of propositions that map four potential futures for community safety, ranging from a retrenchment of partnership activity and a return to police-led enforcement of crime and disorder, to more radical changes
that may enable the pursuit of social justice agendas seeking a more holistic approach to the local governance of crime, disorder and safety.

2.2 Conceptualising Community Safety

A logical starting point for this chapter is some conceptual ground clearing around community safety in this research, because as Hughes (2006: 54) notes, it is a capacious and contested concept. The most fundamental distinction that can be made is between community safety as an outcome or product of certain responses to crime and disorder, and community safety as a mode of governance. The first conceptualisation of community safety is evident in the work of Hope (2001; 2005) where community safety is seen as a product of crime prevention strategies alongside other outcomes such as moral order and social justice (Hope, 2001: 424). Here community safety is seen to denote a condition of safer communities resulting from preventative practices, which places emphasis on the occurrence of crimes and victimisation within certain localities. This is in contrast to the second conception of community safety as a mode of governance, which has been most typically described as a ‘strategy which seeks to move beyond a police-driven crime prevention agenda, to involve other agencies and generate greater participation from all sections of the “community”’ (Hughes, 2006: 54). It is this conceptualisation, rather than that of community safety as condition, which underpins this thesis.

As will be seen shortly, the term community safety became increasingly pervasive in the UK during the Labour Governments of 1997-2010, which saw the creation of a statutory infrastructure to embed multi-agency practices within every local authority in England and Wales. During this period the more progressive potential of community safety was eschewed in favour of a tighter focus on the prevention of crime and disorder (Gilling, 2007; Gilling et al., 2013) and ‘served to ghettoise community safety as narrowly focussed crime prevention of one sort or another’ (Pease and Wiles, 2000: 25).

Given the conceptualisation of community safety as a method and approach to governing issues of crime and disorder in the UK in this thesis, it is worth
providing some definitional clarity on the term governance and its application in this research. Rhodes (1996: 652) citing Finer defines governance as:

i. The activity or process of governing or governance,
ii. A condition of ordered rule,
iii. Those people charged with the duty of governing or governors and
iv. The manager, method or system by which a particular society is governed

While this definition is helpful in providing some operational indication of what governance is and what it does, it is worth looking at the fundamental concept underpinning discussions of governance to understand its relevance to community safety. At the centre of the issue of governance is the concept of power and more specifically the limitations of state power to affect change alone. As outlined by Clegg (1989) an important distinction can be made between Hobbesian and Machiavellian conceptions of power. In Hobbesian conceptualisations of power the state is seen as the prime mover and has ‘power over’ subjects to implement change and exercise decisions. In contrast, Machiavellian ideas view the power of the state as ‘tenuous, unresolved outcomes of struggles between coalitions of public and private, formal and informal, actors’ (Edwards, 2006: 189). The limitations of state power are further noted by Kickert:

[...] the control capacity of government is limited for a number of reasons: lack of legitimacy, complexity of policy processes, complexity and multitude of institutions etc. Government is only one of many actors that influence the course of events in a societal system

1993: 275

Central to this Machiavellian conceptualisation of power and governance is the recognition of the inter-dependencies that exist between various state and non-state entities and the importance of ‘negotiation, bargaining, and other relationships of exchange’ (Edwards, 2006: 189). This emphasis on interdependency, cooperation and negotiation is particularly relevant to discussions of community safety. The promotion of partnerships between public, private and voluntary sector organisations recognises ‘the multi-faceted
composition of social-political problems’ and the ‘the limits to ‘do-it-alone’ governing – ‘government’ – and the need for cooperative arrangement – “governance”’ (Edwards and Beynon, 2001: 157). The study of governance therefore draws attention to the inter-relations between different organisations and how these inter-relationships affect the exercise of power. As Edwards describes, the focus on governance has also provided a way of understanding the exercise of power through self-organising networks of partner organisations rather than through command and control mechanisms (2006: 189). Such arguments tie in with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) notions of nodal governance, which emphasise the competing spheres of control beyond the state, and the plurality of interests that may influence upon local governance in particular locations.

The concept of governance and its repositioning of the state is also important when considering policy and its transmission. Helpful here is the concept of policy networks, which focuses on principles of cooperation, interests and interdependence (Cope, 2001: 1). For Cope a policy network is defined by ‘a highly complex and dynamic set of interdependent and consequently interconnected actors, cutting across different levels of government and different sectors of society’ (Cope, 2001: 3). Studies of policy networks draw attention to the emergence of various actors alongside the state and how that impacts upon the transmission of policy. Colebatch (2002) makes a useful distinction between vertical and horizontal policy transmission. Vertical conceptualisations of policy transfer echo Hobbesian notions of power whereby authorized decisions are transmitted down a policy hierarchy by a legitimate authority, and are followed by subordinates in the policy hierarchy. As outlined above, this idea of policy transfer is problematic due to the limitations of state power and the positioning of actors outside linear policy hierarchies. Colebatch therefore draws attention to the horizontal dimension of policy transfer, as ‘the structuring of action’, emphasising the fact that policies are shared among different organisations not through the basis of command and control but rather through cooperation and shared understandings:

[…] the implementation of authorised decision calls for cooperation of relevant others outside the line of hierarchical authority. And shared understandings reached
These discussions are particularly pertinent to issues of community safety that seek to challenge ‘the specialisation of government into discrete areas of functional expertise’ (Edwards, 2006: 190-191) and instead cross various policy areas. We return to the concept of governance later in the chapter but for the moment these discussions clarify the conceptual definition of community safety guiding this research, and provide a basis for understanding the emergence and evolution of community safety as a policy agenda and the significance of the election of the Coalition Government for future discussions of community safety in the UK. In looking at the progression of community safety as a policy agenda the chapter employs Gilling et al.’s (2013) periodic distinction between the voluntary phase, the national mandatory phase and the speculatively titled localised and devolved period. Each phase will be outlined in turn in the following sections.

2.3 The Voluntary Period of Community Safety

The concept of governance, with its recognition of the limitations of state power and its dependence upon other actors to achieve its aims, is important when considering the emergence of community safety as a reaction to the perceived limitations of the reactive policing of crime and disorder. An appreciation of the limits of the state in responding to problems of crime alone began to emerge in the 1950s with crime prevention publicity campaigns targeted at business premises in an attempt to encourage greater responsibility in mitigating the risk of victimisation (Gilling, 1994). The subsequent adoption and popularity of this type of campaign (Gilling, 1994) highlighted the early dominance of situational prevention techniques preoccupied with notions of risk, vulnerability and harm reduction (Clarke, 1997). For Garland (1996), these developments embodied ‘new kinds of objectives, new criminological discourses and forms of practical knowledge, and new techniques and apparatuses for their implementation’ (Garland, 1996, 450). Garland (2001) goes on to assert that this shift towards prevention was accelerated during the 1970s due to rising crime rates. This raised
questions regarding the ability of the police and other criminal justice organisations to adequately respond to the problems of crime and disorder, and culminated in the creation of the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit (Gilling, 1994).

The furtherance of crime prevention continued during the 1980s with a series of Home Office circulars, which sought to advance coordinated approaches to the prevention of crime (Home Office et al., 1984; Home Office et al., 1990). These contributed to various initiatives across England and Wales. Examples include the Five Towns Initiative, the Kirkholt Burglary Project and the Safer Cities Initiative, which were regarded as successful pioneer projects in crime prevention (Gilling, 1994). Despite these proclaimed successes it was apparent that such initiatives were not necessarily being emulated across England and Wales and represented ‘the success of a group of entrepreneurial government researchers’ within the Home Office rather than a product of coherent central government policy (Tilley, 2002: 19). As a result, Liddle and Gelsthorpe noted a ‘relatively patchy response across the country’ (1994a: 1).

The disparity of crime prevention provision was also recognised by Gilling who stated that ‘while there has been a gradual growth of crime prevention as general strategy, there has been an accompanying diversification of the methods employed in its name’ (Gilling, 1994: 239). This diversification of methods can be attributed to the absence of clear Central Government direction for the implementation of crime prevention initiatives during this period (Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994b). Colebatch’s (2002) distinction between the vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy is helpful for understanding the significance of this divergence. During the early 1990s central government policy around community crime prevention was largely characterised by low cost voluntary schemes (Hughes, 1998). As such the vertical transmission of community safety policy was structured around a limited brief. This lack of clear direction opened up opportunities for discretion about how such directives were implemented at the local level and ‘a degree of “relative autonomy” beyond the control of the central state authority’ (Hughes, 1998: 85).
This lack of steering by central government was identified as an issue in the 1991 Morgan Report (Home Office, 1991), which made a series of recommendations for the improvement of the delivery of multiagency crime prevention. Recommendations included mandating multi-agency partnership teams led by local authorities across England and Wales tasked with facilitating social crime prevention initiatives. The Morgan Report advocated use of the term ‘community safety’ as distinct from the concept of crime prevention, which was regarded to be ‘somewhat limiting in scope and generally police-driven’ (Hughes, 1998: 81). In the short-term, the impact of the Morgan report was limited as the incumbent Conservative Government largely ignored its recommendations. However, as we will see, the Morgan report became influential later on in the development of New Labours approach to community safety.

In summary, while social models of crime prevention were largely avoided at the level of central UK government policy during the voluntary period of community safety, the way in which prevention policy was implemented did open up opportunities for local discretion and autonomy in pursuing alternative methods of crime prevention beyond that prescribed by the state. At the time, Hughes recognised that ‘local multi-agency crime prevention initiatives’ during this period drew on, and created ‘agendas and projects’ which were ‘beyond the control of the centre’ (1998: 102). The importance and relevance of this period of community safety for contemporary debates around community safety will be demonstrated as the chapter progresses.

2.4 THE NATIONAL MANDATORY PERIOD

For Gilling et al. (2013) the election of the New Labour Government in 1997 was a pivotal moment for community safety, marking the commencement of the national mandatory period. While the voluntary period of community safety was characterised by divergence in local practices and a lack of central government commitment to multi-agency social crime prevention, the national mandatory period is defined by the dominance of community safety as a policy agenda, mobilised via a substantial provision of resources, and significant central government steering control. As Gilling (2007) describes, a principle tactic used in New Labour’s election campaign, was its ‘preparedness to countenance tough
measures of crime control’ (2007: 35), and to outflank the Conservatives on their
typical stronghold of law and order. This was most visibly seen in in New
Labour’s declared desire to target not just crime but also its causes:

On crime, we believe in personal responsibility and in
punishing crime, but also tackling its underlying causes -
so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime

Labour Party, 1997

The emphasis here on being tough on both crime and its causes, is symptomatic
of the ‘third way’ which guided New Labour’s political programme and sought
to ‘steer a course between the big ‘isms’ of the conservativism and socialism’
(Gilling, 2007: 38). New Labour’s focus on the causes of crime was also
informed by the work of Amitai Etzioni and his ideas of moral authoritarian
communitarianism (Hughes, 1996; Hughes, 1998) which positions the
‘community’ as a key vehicle for restoring morality in civil institutions (Hughes,
1998: 108). This moral authoritarian communitarianism was seen in New Labour
approaches to addressing the causes of crime which placed emphasis on
neighbourhood policing, zero tolerance, issues of anti-social behaviour and
disorder (Gilling, 2007), and the ‘exclusionary targeting of the dangerous
“other”’ (Hughes, 1998: 113). Communitarianism under New Labour was
premised on the idea that ‘rights were to be conditional on the exercise of
responsibility’ and that ‘a better life was to be achieved through participation not
through expectation’ (Crawford and Evans, 2012: 797). In seeking to realise the
ambitions of moral authoritarian communitarianism, New Labour sought to build
strong communities ‘backed up by an authoritarian state’ (Gilling, 2007: 45).
This approach had substantial repercussions for the evolution of community
safety work during this period.

In seeking to realise their vision, New Labour produced the Crime and Disorder
Act in 1998 which, building upon many of the recommendations of the Morgan
report, introduced statutory multi-agency arrangements in every local authority in
England and Wales. Known as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships

1 A page number is not available as this is a web archive of the 1997 Labour Manifesto available
at: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab97.htm
(CDRPs) in England, and Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) in Wales, these arrangements were designed to facilitate multi-agency partnership working around issues of crime and disorder. In line with the Morgan report, the Crime and Disorder Act stipulated who was required to participate in these multi-agency partnerships, but, departing from the Morgan Report’s recommendations, placed dual responsibility upon local authorities and the police to lead these activities. Alongside the police and local authorities, other statutory partners with an obligation to participate included the local health authorities and probation services (Tilley, 2002). Following the Police Reform Act four years later (Home Office, 2002), this list of statutory members expanded to include the local fire authorities, police authorities and primary care trusts.

The Crime and Disorder and Police Reform Acts implemented under New Labour demonstrated a clear commitment to a particular vision of community safety. However, this political and financial prioritisation of community safety work was accompanied by intensive centralised control and management over how these resources were to be used, in line with New Labours’ ‘enthusiasm for the rationalities and technologies of new public management’ (Gilling, 2007: 53). This was evident in the development of public service agreements, which stipulated what needed to be prioritised and the targets that needed to be met.

As such the agenda for community safety during this period was highly prescribed by central government, seen, for example, in the prioritisation and increased enforcement of anti-social behaviour through the use of ASBOs (Gilling et al., 2013). The highly centralised agenda for community safety during this period has been a source of much contestation within academic discussions of community safety. Key critiques include the argument that the more progressive potential of community safety has been stifled under New Labour Government due to its almost exclusive focus on crime prevention (Pease and Wiles, 2000; Gilling, 2007; Gilling et al. 2013). This prioritisation of crime prevention, it is argued, has come at the expense of ideas of social inclusion and environmental crime, which have been advocated as part of a more encompassing harm reduction agenda (Pease and Wiles, 2000). In addition to constraining the potential of community safety Hughes and Gilling (2004) comment on how the pervasiveness of performance management severely
inhibited the discretion afforded to community safety managers. As the New Labour government progressed, attempts were made to limit the role of the state in directing practice and affording greater responsibility to local authorities, for example with the introduction of Local Area Agreements in 2004. However, the impact of these attempts was somewhat limited (Gilling, 2007).

What was apparent, during this period, was an emerging distinction between what community safety could and should represent and what it actually did achieve under New Labour. As Edwards and Hughes state, community safety has the potential for:

[...] social democratic inclusion rather than neoconservative exclusion, prevention rather than enforcement and repression, social crime prevention rather than situational measures, and adaptive problem solving rather than symbolic repression

2008: 63

Similarly, Johnston and Shearing argue that community safety has the potential to facilitate greater community engagement with democratic processes, which are ‘fundamental to the construction of just and democratic forms of security governance’ (2003: 140). However as Hughes argues the potential for greater civic engagement and greater community participation ‘remains a lofty and often righteous aspiration that is very rarely realized in practice in the work of partnerships’ (Hughes 2007: 64).

Recognising that this is very brief and condensed account of two decades of community safety progression, and that much detail that has necessarily been omitted, this section has outlined how community safety evolved during the national mandatory and why it is important for the context of this research. During the voluntary period community safety was subject to little resource and was widely divergent in practice, but did hold opportunities for more progressive practices around social crime prevention. Under New Labour, community safety was an integral policy agenda, and accordingly was highly resourced, but was subject to intensive centralised management and steering which constrained the more progressive potential of community safety work envisioned by some commentators. Just as 1997 and the election of the New Labour government
represented a pivotal point for community safety, 2010 and the election of the Coalition Government marks the transition into Gilling et al.’s (2013) third periodisation of community safety.

2.5 The Coalition Government and Localised and Devolved Arrangements

Where crime and disorder formed a key cornerstone of the 1997 New Labour election campaign, the emergence of global and European financial crises in 2007 and 2008 ensured that economic issues took centre stage in the 2010 general election. Accordingly, the Conservatives campaigned on a platform of austerity and the need for financial responsibility to reduce the budget deficit that had resulted from a rise in public spending from the Labour Government (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 23). In May 2010 the Conservatives formed a Coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats, and upon formation they described state finances as ‘one of the most challenging fiscal positions in the world’ (Cmd-7942 2010: 5). In response, the Coalition Government immediately signalled its aim to ‘set the country on course for recovery’ (HM Treasury, 2010), by reducing the level of public debt through a drastic and prolonged commitment to austerity. The plans proposed by the Coalition Government were of ‘exceptional scale, speed, composition and distributional impact’ (Taylor-Gooby, 2012: 63). A significant component of the austerity strategy was cuts to the public sector as stated in the Coalition agreement:

We will significantly accelerate the reduction of the structural deficit over the course of a Parliament, with the main burden of deficit reduction borne by reduced spending rather than increased taxes.

Coalition Government, 2010: 15

The extent of these cuts to public services was estimated at around £30 billion over a period of four years (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012), mainly affecting local government (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: Taylor-Gooby, 2012). The scale of funding reductions to the public sector is consistent with the Conservative Party’s policy talk during its election campaign, which focused on the minimisation of public sector waste and bureaucracy. Particular emphasis was
placed on removing, or at least reducing, the scope of quasi autonomous non-governmental organisations (quangos) which were argued to represent inefficiency:

Government has been far too profligate for far too long. Billions are wasted each year on pointless bureaucracy and failed projects while taxpayers are left to foot the bill. The explosion of unaccountable quangos, public sector ‘nonjobs’ and costly bureaucracy is an indictment of Labour’s reckless approach to spending other people’s money.

Conservative Party, 2010: 69

The need for austerity was a central aspect of both the Liberal Democrat and Conservative election campaigns, and much weight was placed upon the need to reduce the growing deficit, thereby justifying ‘fast and deep’ cuts to public services (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 23). However, in addition to the economic rationale for austerity, this quote also reveals the Conservatives’ ideological reasons for austerity as a vehicle for the realisation of a smaller, less bureaucratic government. As noted by Bach (2012), ‘even before the full ramifications of the crisis were evident, the Conservative Party was committed to shrinking the state’ (2012: 400). Austerity, therefore, cannot just be regarded as a necessary burden to bear in order to put public finances back on track, but rather results from an ideological stance on the role and size of the state. Where New Labour sought to expand the role and reach of the state, the Conservatives, and as a result the Coalition, have sought to reverse this and shrink the scope of the state governing apparatus. As already described, the rise of community safety under New Labour came hand in hand with the expansion of the state, thus the Coalition Government commitment to a smaller state have had, and are likely to continue to have, significant ramifications for community safety work.

Austerity can be seen to impact upon community safety in three principal ways. Firstly, over the course of the New Labour term of government the prioritisation of community safety as a policy agenda resulted in the development of significant governing infrastructures for the facilitation of multi-agency partnership work in each local authority, particularly in larger urban areas. It has been speculated that this infrastructure is under threat from austerity and broader
political shifts potentially compromising local governing capacity for community safety (Edwards and Hughes 2012; Gilling et al., 2013). This threat is said to emanate from an apparent apathy to the community safety agenda within the Coalition Government, as indicated within the Coalition agreement (Coalition Government, 2010). Where the discourses of partnership working and community safety were prevalent features of New Labour policy, the Coalition agreement reverts to a more police-centric policy response to crime and disorder. No mention is made of partnership working or community safety, and instead the onus for crime and disorder is placed squarely with the police. This antipathy to community safety as a policy agenda is further evidenced in the substantial spending cuts allocated to the community safety fund (Home Office, 2011a), the eventual removal of ring-fencing around the community safety fund, and its integration into the Police and Crime Commissioners policing budget.

Secondly, in addition to the direct threat of shrinking funds for community safety, community safety work is also being affected by wider cuts to public services. As outlined previously, community safety is reliant upon partnership working and the participation and cooperation of partnership agencies. Therefore, as Lowndes and Pratchett argue, the financial pressures upon public sector agencies will likely act as a deterrent upon partnership working, as tightening budgets lead to an increased focus on core activity as agencies go into ‘defensive mode’ (2012: 30). In this sense, austerity and the associated pressures upon partnership working can be seen as detrimental to community safety work.

The final way that austerity can be seen to impact upon community safety is through welfare reforms and reduced funding to welfare and support services. As highlighted by Taylor-Gooby (2012) the welfare reforms sought by the Coalition Government are likely to ‘impose real costs on poorer and more vulnerable groups’ (2012:77), and that cuts to local government will ‘impact most sharply on poorer authorities’ (2012: 65). Such reforms and cuts will likely lead to reduced support services provided to the most vulnerable in society (Bochel, 2011). Whilst this third factor lies beyond the scope of this thesis, the first two form the foundations for this research.
As outlined at the outset of this chapter, community safety has been conceptualised as a mode of governance that foregrounds partnership working between a plethora of state and non-state actors and places emphasis on issues of cooperation, inter-dependency and negotiation. The election of the Coalition Government in 2010 is significant is because much of the rhetoric and changes proposed by the Coalition Government have had a substantial impact upon community safety and the pursuit of multi-agency approaches to the prevention of crime. Before going into more detail about how community safety may adapt to conditions of austerity, it is worth exploring the other Coalition Government policies that are relevant to discussions of community safety and local governance.

2.6 THE BIG SOCIETY, LOCALISM AND THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONERS

For the Conservatives, and accordingly, the Coalition Government, the repealing of the state was to be combined with greater civic engagement and civic responsibility, termed the ‘Big Society’:

Social responsibility not state control; the Big Society not big government

Conservative Party, 2010: 35

The Big Society has been described as an integral policy of the Coalition Government (Norman, 2010), and as an equivalent of New Labour’s ‘third way’ (Bach, 2012). Echoing the previous discussions of the Coalition approach to austerity, the ‘Big Society’ represented an ideological commitment to a less intrusive state but shares some similarities with the moral authoritarian communitarianism of New Labour (Sage, 2012). The Big Society aspires for greater civic engagement, and increased emphasis on individual and community responsibility:

[...] a society with much higher levels of personal, professional, civic and corporate responsibility; a society where people come together to solve problems and improve life for themselves and their communities. Redistributing power from the state to society; from the
centre to local communities; giving people the opportunity to take more control over their lives

Conservative Party, 2010

Like communitarianism under New Labour, the communitarianist underpinning of the Big Society envisages homogenous communities and makes appeals to collective action as seen in the pronouncements that ‘we’re all in this together’ (Cabinet Office, 2010:1). Where New Labour drew on communitarianism to justify an expansion of the state to facilitate these stronger communities, communitarianism in the Big Society under the Coalition Government has been used to ‘legitimise public service reform’ (Bach, 2012: 403). As Bach (2012) highlights, the Big Society has been framed as a response to the perceived failures of New Labour’s approach to generate civic engagement and community responsibility, and to free communities from ‘the technocratic systems of new public management’ (Bach, 2012: 404).

However, for all of the talk surrounding the Big Society and its prominence in the early discourse of the Conservatives election campaign and the early stages of the Coalition Government, it has been subject to scepticism, and criticised as merely a ‘smokescreen’ for the realisation of the austerity agenda (Bach, 2012). Ed Milliband, leader of the opposition during the Coalition Government, criticised the Big Society as ‘cynically attempting to dignify its cuts agenda, by dressing up the withdrawal of support with the language of reinvigorating civic society’ (cited in Watt, 2010). Indeed, many commentators have remarked upon the potentially oppositional nature of the austerity agenda, suggesting that the relatively short-term objectives of austerity are incompatible with the longer term aims of fostering a stronger civil society. (Coote, 2010; Sage, 2012; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Morgan, 2012). Furthermore, Coote (2010) highlights the challenges posed to voluntary sector and charitable organisations in times of austerity, whose roles would be essential in realising the goals of the Big Society. Morgan takes the argument further, to undermine the validity and efficacy of the Coalition government’s commitment to fostering civil society:

[…] were the government seriously committed to the concept of the Big Society, so the argument goes, they would place more emphasis on: stimulating economic growth and job creation; building more low-cost
opportunities for further education and training for school-leavers; more tightly regulating the banks and finance houses; and so on.

Morgan 2012: 468

As part of the Coalitions’ plans for the Big Society, a significant emphasis was placed on the decentralisation of power and granting greater autonomy and responsibility to local authorities, based on ideas of ‘devolution, localism, restored discretion, partnership working, and responsibility’ (Morgan, 2012: 467). This apparent commitment to localism and the reduced role of the state was intended to enable more innovative, effective and efficient services:

The Government is committed to passing new powers and freedoms to town halls. We think that power should be exercised at the lowest practical level - close to the people who are affected by decisions, rather than distant from them. Local authorities can do their job best when they have genuine freedom to respond to what local people want, not what they are told to do by central government. In challenging financial times, this freedom is more important than ever, enabling local authorities to innovate and deliver better value for taxpayers’ money.

Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011: 4

The Coalition Governments’ commitment to localism was manifest in the 2010 Localism Bill, which sought to free local governance from the tethers of New Labour control. This bill mandated the dissolution of central regulatory functions in addition to the ‘relaxation of targets’ and ‘the dismantling of central and local planning apparatus including the regional government offices, the Audit Commission, PSAs [Public Service Agreements] and Local Area Agreements’ (Joyce, 2011: 9). Keohane’s (2011) distinction between ‘positive’ and ‘negative liberty’ for local government is useful here. Keohane argues that for the proper realisation of the aims of localism, it is not enough to get central government out of the way, but initiatives have to be put in place to foster local democracy (2011). Of the various initiatives introduced by the localism bill, the most prominent were proposals to introduce locally elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to:

[…] make the police more accountable through oversight by a directly elected individual, who will be subject to
strict checks and balances by locally elected representatives

Coalition Government, 2010: 13

Consistent with the broader narratives of the Big Society and localism, PCCs were presented as a solution to the problems of accountability associated with the Police Authorities which had been weakened by ‘centrally imposed targets’ that ‘placed central concerns above local needs and considerations’ (Joyce, 2011: 7). It was also hoped that PCCs would combat the emergence of a counting culture in British Policing (Loveday and Reid, 2003). In addition to breaking down the controls from the centre, PCCs were seen as a vehicle for promoting the aims of civic engagement by putting ‘power directly into the hands of the public’ (Home Office, 2011b: 10).

However, following the first PCC elections, it was apparent that this power had been placed into fewer public hands than desired, with only 14.7% of the electorate turning out to vote (Joyce and Wain, 2013: 12; the Economist, 2012). Possible explanations for this low turnout include public disapproval of the policy, and ignorance as to the purpose and role of PCCs (Electoral Reform Society, 2012; Newburn, 2012). Others have pointed to problems of implementation, with suggestions that the election process had been conducted ‘on the cheap’ (James, 2012) without adequate provision of information to the public (Joyce and Wain, 2012). Whatever the causes, such a low turnout raises questions about the legitimacy of the candidates and the underlying rationale of citizen empowerment and local democratic participation.

The introduction of PCCs has also been opposed by some local government organisations (WLGA, 2011). In my MSc dissertation, a survey of community safety practitioners indicated concern regarding the impact of PCCs on community safety work (Cartwright, 2012). Participants attributed their concerns to both the transition of financial control for the community safety fund from the local authorities to the PCC, and to uncertainty about how PCCs would integrate with local actors and their impact upon governing agendas. The concerns of these practitioners echo Maguire’s summation that local service delivery could be subject to extreme changes ‘depending on the priorities and judgements of each individual PCC’ (Maguire, 2012: 489).
More fundamentally, the Coalition commitment to localism has been questioned on the grounds that austerity measures have disproportionately fallen upon local government (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Stoker (cited in Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 28), describes local government finances as the ‘elephant in the room’, explaining that ‘until local government gets access to a wider variety of revenue raising sources and funds more of its own services it is difficult to say that localism has arrived’. On the one hand the Coalition Government is granting greater responsibility and autonomy to local government as part of an agenda of decentralisation and localism, but with the other, they are imposing debilitating financial cuts, which inhibit the ability of local government to do anything with their new found freedom. As a result, critics from the opposition have criticised the Coalition Government’s ‘commitment to localism as cynical and unfair’ (Brown, 2010).

These discussions of austerity measures, the ‘Big Society’, localism, and PCCs lay important groundwork for my research in two key areas. Firstly, the changes in policy implemented by the Coalition Government are likely to have substantial implications for the future of community safety. Austerity measures, in combination with the loosening of central government control, present significant challenges for the pursuit of partnership work. Without centralised steering and management of community safety, there is potential that local governing actors pull back from the commitment to partnership working in an attempt to cut costs and save money, as cautioned by Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) and Gilling et al. (2013). Simultaneously however, despite austerity, decreasing central control of community safety may open up space for more progressive agendas due to the greater emphasis it places upon local political agency. Such opportunities are dependent upon local governing actors being able to adapt effectively to the challenges posed by austerity. This leads to the second reason why these discussions are important. Coalition Government proposals place greater emphasis upon the ways in which local partnership arrangements are organised and sustained at a local level, without the significant central government support previously provided under New Labour. Accordingly, the chapter now returns to the issue of governance, and specifically the usefulness of regime theory for contemporary discussions of community safety in a period of austerity.
2.7 Community Safety and Regime Theory

The origins of regime theory can be traced to studies of urban political economy in the United States through the work of Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989). A central aspect of regime theory is the recognition of the limitations of state power, and the dependency on other actors that this leads to. For both Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989), regime theory facilitated an understanding of the interplay between state and non-state actors, and how under certain conditions regimes can form around particular governing agendas. Early developments focussed upon the interdependencies of the state and the private sector as described by Davies:

[...] regime theory subscribes to this notion of a division of labour between state and market in which ownership of productive assets rest largely in the hands of the private sector while the machinery of government is subject to public control

2002: 3

For Stone this recognition of the interdependencies between state and non-state actors draws attention to the important distinction between discussions of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. The concept of power over represents a misconception that preferences are static entities and that certain courses of action are followed because A has more power than B and can force B to follow A’s interests (Stone, 2006). This, Stone argues, obscures the reality of governing relations, which entail compromise, rather than actors having immutable preferences. Instead, he advocates the view that preferences are susceptible to change: continuing the example above, ‘we have now left the realm of A getting B to do what B would not otherwise do because the preferences of A and B have both given way to involvement in activity X’ (2006: 36). Regime theory is concerned, therefore, with how this interdependence and cooperation takes shape within local arenas of governance and how these relationships impact upon the pursuit of certain activities over others. In this way regime theory ‘emphasises the provisional political power as an ongoing struggle rather than an accomplished state formation’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 436).
Originally confined to the context of urban governance in the United States, there has been expanding recognition of regime theory as a useful conceptual framework for examining various policy issues within the arena of local governance in the UK (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Davies, 2002; Edwards and Hughes, 2012). This wider appropriation of regime theory has been questioned by Mossberger and Stoker, who highlight that the increasing use of regime theory has put it at risk of ‘concept stretch’ (2001: 811). Davies (2002; 2003) goes further to argue that the theoretical framework offered by regime theory is not compatible with the context of local governance in the UK:

[...] where urban regimes are comparatively autonomous and informal networks, regeneration partnerships are bureaucratic structures under strong central government control…it seems unlikely in the context of a centralised UK government that they are the seed from which regime-like coalitions might grow

Davies, 2003: 3

The cornerstone of Davies’ critique of the application of regime theory to the UK is the presence of strong central government control and centralised UK government, which at the time of Davies’ writing was characteristic of the New Labour Government. However, as this chapter has described, such centralised and controlling tendencies are being reversed through Coalition Government reforms. The shift towards localism, reduced central government control, and a greater diversity of service provision as part of the Big Society, all act to create a context which is more suitable for the application of regime theory and its emphasis on local politics and interdependencies at local levels (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Conditions of austerity and the ideological push for reduced state control further directs attention towards the way in which local state actors interact with other stakeholders at a local level and how these competing interests play out. These conditions necessitate a conceptual framework that is receptive to the power relations that exist at a local level, the competing agendas that result from this dispersal of power beyond the state and how these power relations and competing agendas may impact upon the position of community safety within local governing agendas.
In departing from Hobbesian notions of power, regime theory, as a sub-set of governance studies, provides a suitable theoretical framework to understand these relationships of power and their impact on governing agendas. A possible alternative conceptualisation from the field of governance studies is Bayley and Shearing’s (2003) concept of *nodal governance*. Bayley and Shearing draw attention to the competing sources of power beyond the local state, and how these different ‘nodes’ may interact with each other. However, given the legacy of the dual responsibility of local authorities and the police for community safety under New Labour, it is important that the role of local government is foregrounded in this research due to their constitutional-legal mandate to lead local community safety arrangements.

Regime theory offers an examination of the ‘normative and empirical distinctiveness of public authority as an object of inquiry’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 444). This is in contrast with studies of governance that have a tendency to focus on alternative forms of governance beyond the state (Edwards and Hughes: 2012: 444). Therefore, while governance studies enable an understanding on the fragmentation of power in local governance and position of the local state within that, regime theory offers this but in addition allows an examination of ‘the legitimacy and governing capacities of public authorities embedded in particular political-economies’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 444). Regime theory provides a conceptual basis for investigating and understanding how the local authority and the police adapt to conditions of austerity, and how cooperation is sought from other state and non-state actors and the impact of this upon community safety work within certain localities.

The theoretical framework provided by regime theory facilitates the empirical investigation of local governing arrangements. Stone (2005) sets out four core components of regimes: First, there must be a governing agenda that is structured around particular issues. These agendas can be subdivided into four conceptual categories that Edwards and Hughes (2012: 448) apply to discussions of community safety:
• *Maintenance* agendas entail a focus on criminal justice where community safety policies are seen to ‘augment criminal law enforcement’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 448).

• *Developmental* agendas can be characterised as approaches that seek to identify and mitigate risks, through situational preventative measures and early interventions with problematic groups, and the responsibilisation of citizens to take greater precautions for their own safety.

• *Progressive* agendas are concerned with restorative justice and attempts to divert offenders away from the criminal justice system.

• *Transformative* agendas are aligned to aims of social justice through improving social inclusion and reducing inequalities.

A more detailed discussion of how these categories were operationalised in this research is found in the next chapter. The second necessary component of a regime is a governing coalition that forms around a particular agenda, which is likely to include both state and non-state actors. Third, regimes must have access to governing resources, which enable the realisation of the governing agenda. These governing resources can be differentiated into constitutional legal, financial, organisational, informational and political. Finally, a governing regime needs a way of inducing cooperation from the various actors and the sharing of resources, which Stone (2005) terms the schemes of cooperation and represent the ways in which partnership and collaboration is incentivised. Together, these four components provide a framework for investigating and understanding the formation of regimes, and therefore direct empirical enquiry towards these issues. By using this framework, it is possible to identify a series of propositions that outline the potential futures for community safety in a period of austerity.

### 2.8 Potential Futures for Community Safety

While the broader structural context of austerity cannot be ignored, as it ‘affects both the network structure and the resources that actors have to utilise within the network’ (Cope 2001: 17), it must be recognised that how local governing actors
choose to respond to these pressures is not predetermined. It is important to recognise, therefore, ‘the possibility of actors making their own history albeit not in conditions of their own choosing’ (Edwards and Hughes 2012: 436). The importance of appreciating the role of local actors in determining how to respond to structural conditions is further emphasised by Marsh and Smith:

We need to acknowledge that network structures, and the resource dependencies, which they entail, are not fixed. What is more agents choose policy options, bargain, argue and break up networks. So, agents can, and do, negotiate and renegotiate network structures. As such, any explanation of change must emphasise the role of agents, while also acknowledging that the broader context within which the network operates affects the interests and actions of network members

Consequently, while austerity does represent a significant challenge to the governing capacity of local regimes and the pursuit of community safety agendas, how this plays out in particular contexts is uncertain and requires empirical investigation. To aid this empirical enquiry, it is helpful to provide a series of theoretical propositions for the future of community safety using the conceptual framework provided by regime theory. As Fox et al. (2011) assert, such predictions about the future are limited due to the uncertainty within the academic literature regarding the potential impact of austerity strategies upon local governance and community safety more specifically. Nevertheless, such speculation is useful due to its provision of a series of scenarios to compare this research against. Therefore, using the available literature, it is possible to identify four potential futures for community safety in an age of austerity. These propositions are organised around the four types of agenda for community safety identified described by Edwards and Hughes (2012) in relation to community safety:

- Maintenance: A retrenchment of partnership activity and a return to a maintenance agenda.
- Developmental: A rise of smarter governance and emphasis on risk.
• Progressive: More progressive agendas and the continuation of partnership activities made possible by minor adaptations to the governing arrangements.

• Transformative: Radical change through the integration of partnership structures and the mainstreaming of community safety culminating in more transformative agendas.

2.8.1 THE RETRENCHMENT OF PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITY AND A RETURN TO A MAINTENANCE AGENDA

The first theoretical proposition is one of degradation and the breaking down of local partnership arrangements around crime and disorder, and a return to predominantly police-led enforcement of crime and disorder. As outlined previously, austerity has resulted in significant reductions to public spending, especially in the area of local government (Bach, 2012). Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) argue that reduced financial resources represent a challenge to the governing capacity of local authorities, and can result in the degradation of partnership work. The proclivity of partners to work together may be impeded by an increase in defensive thinking about budgets and a prioritisation of core priorities (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). Similar speculations are shared by Gilling et al. who suggest that austerity measures may generate ‘a centripetal force that encourages a focus on ‘core business’ and therefore a climate that is less supportive of partnership working in peripheral areas’ (2013: 329).

In addition to the pressures of austerity, the introduction of PCCs has compounded the uncertainty around the local governance of crime and disorder (Maguire, 2012), as shifting responsibilities for the allocation of funding removes control from local authorities. Gilling et al. (2013) build on this, positing that the introduction of PCCs risks sacrificing progressive multi-agency-based prevention and community safety expertise in favour of ‘deploying resources first and foremost for reactive, old-fashioned police led “crime fighting”’ (2013: 5). This concern about the potential prioritisation of more visible and more publically appealing reactive approaches to crime at the expense of progressive multi-agency partnership approaches is shared by Edwards and Hughes who state that: ‘the immediate wrongs of an offence and the harms experienced by particular
victims are more intelligible for most citizens that the relatively nebulous
concepts of social and political exclusion’ (2012: 20).

Community safety may be at heightened risk to budgetary cuts compared to other
policy areas since reductions in this area are unlikely to result in public
disapproval. In looking at this, Garland’s (1996; 2001) distinction between the
instrumental and emotional rationalities behind political decisions is helpful. For
example, Zimring (2001) and Spark (2007) suggest that the emotional and
symbolic value of criminal justice policies is more important than instrumental
concerns of effectiveness. Similarly, Frieberg (2001) argues that this is a problem
for crime prevention more broadly: potentially effective crime prevention
strategies are unlikely to gain political support, as they do not fulfil the emotional
components of crime control. These considerations highlight the difficulties for
the community safety agenda with regards to the limited political resources
available to it compared to other policy agendas that may generate greater public
support.

Gilling et al. (2013) are clear that such conditions of austerity and uncertainty are
likely to have significant impact upon the governing capacity of local authorities
to pursue community safety work. They describe how diminishing financial
resources is leading to the abandonment of the Community Safety Partnership
model in some local authorities, as only minimal compliance with the
requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act is sought. As noted earlier in this
chapter, these predictions are consistent with the findings of my own MSc
research (Cartwright, 2012), which indicated emerging concerns from key
community safety practitioners in the National Community Safety Network.
These concerns centred on the perceived decline in the number of community
safety officers, and the future of community safety in light of austerity and the
introduction of PCCs.

The speculations of Gilling et al. (2013) and Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) on
the challenges posed by austerity to the continuation of partnership activity in
local governance point to the potential for the degradation of multi-agency
activity for the prevention of crime and disorder. Without the support of the
community safety infrastructure there is the potential that a distinct community
safety agenda, as separate from an enforcement orientated policing agenda, will disappear. In such a situation, it is suggested that local responses to crime and disorder will revert back to reactive police led enforcement, whereby any remaining partnership activity is likely to be limited to supporting or assisting in the policing of crime and disorder.

2.8.2 A RISE OF SMARTER GOVERNANCE AND EMPHASIS ON RISK
The second proposition relates to the potential for a greater emphasis on ideas of risk management and the targeted provision of services. As Edwards and Hughes (2012: 451) argue, the structural conditions of austerity may ‘further reduce the scope for social justice agendas, and possibly for the resource-intensive agendas of criminal justice, while prioritizing risk management agendas that claim to minimize the opportunities for crime’. For Edwards and Hughes (2012), the potential resurgence of risk management narratives in periods of austerity are possible due to the preoccupation with reducing financial resources. The argument being that targeting crime prevention initiatives at those most at risk will enable the more efficient use of increasingly limited resources. This notion of ‘smarter governance’ is evident in recent literature, which also highlights the need for more targeted provision of limited resources and a system for identifying those most at risk (Taylor et al., 2015). For Taylor et al., such an approach is favourable as it would ‘improve operational efficiency and effectiveness through targeted and coordinated provision of preventative measures’ (2015: 346).

This emphasis on risk management is further seen in Edwards and Prins’ (2014) research on the policing agenda in London under former Mayor Boris Johnson. Edwards and Prins (2014) document how the agenda in London has largely ignored the wider social and economic context of criminality as evidenced in the foregrounding of enforcement strategies for problems of gang violence while ‘abstracting street violence from its social and economic contexts of poverty, diminishing welfare provision and exclusion for legitimate labour markets’ (2014: 76). Edwards and Prins define London as an example of a developmental agenda where ‘smarter forms of governance and risk management’ (2014: 71) augment police led enforcement strategies. It is apparent then, that austerity and
the associated reduction in financial resources may encourage a greater focus on identifying and mitigating risk.

Furthermore, given the aims of the Big Society to give a greater role to the commercial sector in local delivery, it is important to consider how private sector engagement may further facilitate a more risk-focussed agenda. Rogers and Gravelle suggest that partnership working in the UK may begin to resemble the European approach, where ‘a significant amount of partnership working tasks are contracted out to private companies and industries’ (2011: 30). However, this vision is reliant on the ‘assumption…that private contractors are able and willing to carry out the necessary partnership function’ (Rogers and Gravelle 2011: 30), and as Edwards and Hughes (2012) state, the role of the private sector is likely to be limited to instances where there are profit incentives. The most obvious example of this is in the management of the night-time economy, where private sector engagement in security and safety is conducive to the generation of profit and where bouncers are viewed as ‘the dominant providers of order’ (Hobbs et al. 2005: 171). However, such arrangements are fractious with an uneasy relationship between the competing interests of the state and the commercial sector (Hobbs et al. 2005). Moreover this contingency of private sector involvement, dependent upon profit incentives, limits the scope of such mutually beneficial arrangements where easily identifiable profit incentives are not apparent. In such cases the role of the private sector may be limited to contractual arrangements such as the provision of private prisons (Jones and Newburn, 2005), but even these arrangements ‘raise questions about principles of justice, and contain risks for all parties concerned’ (Maguire, 2012: 1).

Due to these constraints on private sector engagement, the increased emphasis on individual responsibility coupled with austerity measures and a retrenchment of public services, may lead to a proliferation of individualised security and the personal management of risk by citizens themselves. For Farrell et al. (2011), the increased use of private security devices (e.g. electronic gates, personal alarms, security lights, motion sensors, CCTV), has been instrumental in achieving the crime drop in recent decades. While the increased popularity of private security devices, and the associated responsibilisation of risk management to citizens is beyond the scope of this research, the implications of such a shift is worth
considering as part of the larger narrative of the potential retrenchment of the state. Hughes outlines how ‘situational measures can, by reassigning costs of prevention to potential victims, exacerbate the segregation of urban environs into zones of high and low risk’ (1998: 143). Morelle and Tadie recount such a problem in the context of Caracas:

[…] economic policies have an impact on the production of security…austerity packages and structural adjustments signalled the end of certain public initiatives, with consequences on both the action of police forces and the living conditions of city-dwellers. The pauperization of many inhabitants increased perceived insecurity and gave rise to private initiatives to ensure the safety of wealthy neighbourhoods, which the poorer ones could not afford

2011: 7

While the commodification of security and safety is not new in the UK (Atkinson and Flint, 2004; Farrell et al., 2011; Hughes, 1998), it has coincided with wider preventative strategies implemented within community safety partnerships. Therefore, should the governing infrastructure of the community safety partnerships disappear as cautioned by Gilling et al. (2013), the possible reassignment of costs to potential victims will likely result in the ‘abandonment of non-profitable populations and locations by both the State and the market’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 451).

2.8.3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION AND PROGRESSIVE AGENDAS
This third proposition focuses on the opportunities afforded by the Coalition Governments’ push for localism and a decentralisation of power. Lowndes and Pratchett describe this agenda as an opportunity for local actors to have ‘greater freedom to be innovative in the way that they work with and support their communities’ (2012: 25). Similarly, in relation to the devolution of powers to Wales, Drakeford (2010) and Muncie (2011) highlight the merits of greater discretion and decentralisation in Wales, and the enabling of a more progressive agenda around youth justice. Such a dispersal of power can ‘open up spaces for reworking, reinterpretation and avoidance of national and international directives’ (Muncie, 2011: 52). There is, therefore, the potential that, as a result of greater discretion, local authorities will be able to pursue more progressive agendas for community safety that extend beyond the narrow confines targeted
under New Labour, leading to more diversionary approaches to offending behaviour. However, given the extent of austerity, such opportunities are reliant on adaptations being made to the local governing arrangements that allow for the continuation of partnership activity.

For Houghton (2012), austerity does not necessarily translate into a retrenchment of partnership activity, and instead may incentivise partnership working as a way of providing cost efficiency in local service delivery through economies of scale and reducing duplication of work and services. As partner agencies strive to maximise efficiency, the benefits of shared resources and information may become increasingly attractive, incentivising participation. When considering how to address ‘problem families’, Houghton contends:

[...] the partnership approach allows for agencies to come together in teams and deal with these families in a coordinated and coherent fashion…such an approach will reduce costs and if properly focused can address dysfunctional families’ problems

2012: 109

Moreover, following a decade of sustained partnership working as part of the New Labour approach to community safety, O’Neil and McCarthy (2014) argue that partnership approaches to crime and disorder have become engrained in the operational activity of the police. It may be possible therefore that partnership activity is more resilient to pressures of austerity due to the perceived merits it has for improved practice and the sharing of resources.

It is also possible that the Coalition Government’s vision for a greater role of community and voluntary sectors (Gilling et al., 2013) may enable the continuation of partnership work. As Maguire states, the Big Society envisioned ‘the enhanced contribution to criminal justice services anticipated from voluntary (or ‘third’) sector organizations (TSOs)’ (2012: 483). Advocates for the growing use of commercial and voluntary sectors argue that such organisations may be more ‘innovative and flexible’ and better able to engage service users, introducing an element of competition to enable the best service delivered at the lowest cost (Maguire, 2012). Alongside the greater role of the voluntary sector organisations, the communitarian values of the Big Society are also calibrated to
empower ‘communities to take over state-run services’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 26). It has been suggested that such engagement of local communities in service delivery will benefit partnership working in five key ways: empowering communities; action-orientated communities; decentralised power; greater social enterprises; and information ability (Cabinet Office, 2010). It is important to state that the push for greater engagement of the voluntary sector and communities themselves was not represented as ‘the next best thing’ in the absence of public service provision, but rather as a way of improving service delivery. Indeed, Edwards and Hughes note how the engagement of the voluntary sector may be encouraged through a shift towards more progressive agendas, since ‘restorative justice has also attracted significant interest from voluntary or ‘third sector’ organisations’ (2012: 449). In particular, restorative justice chimes with religious notions of repentance and recompense (Edwards and Hughes, 2012).

However, relying on voluntary sector and community engagement to mitigate the effects of public sector cuts is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, aspirations for community engagement are hardly novel in the field of community safety, and in the past have largely failed to be actualised (Hughes, 2007). Instead, communities tend to be passive recipients of community strategies, a problem accentuated in areas of socio-economic disadvantage (Taylor, 2003). Secondly, Considine (2011), cautions against the push for civic engagement through the potential introduction of the ‘good Samaritan’ law. This law, consistent with the populist, neo-liberal Conservative ideology of devolved legal authority, offers immunity to those who intervene to stop criminal activity. For Considine, whilst such a law ‘has the virtue of being cheap’ and promotes ‘the value of civic responsibility’ (2011: 94), it could result in growing vigilantism in response to crime. This type of law could also be corrupted leading to what Edwards and Hughes call ‘authoritarian gangsterism’ (2012: 451).

Thirdly, it has been argued that the potential of greater civic engagement, as part of the Big Society, has been ‘overshadowed by the severe cuts in public expenditure’ and ‘the growing tide of unemployment’ (Morgan, 2012: 465). The assumption that budgetary cuts will be eased by an increase in unpaid volunteers (Rogers and Gravelle, 2011: 29) seems overly optimistic: the training,
recruitment, organisation and professional supervision of volunteers ensure that they cannot be considered a ‘free good’ (Morgan, 2012). This issue was evident in Liverpool, a former ‘Big Society vanguard area’, which withdrew from the pilot as ‘government funding reductions were forcing cuts in support to the voluntary sector’ (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012: 30).

2.8.4 Radical change, integrated partnership working and transformative agendas

The final proposition relates to the claims of Edwards and Hughes that ‘major political-economic shocks’, such as the implementation of austerity measures under the Coalition government, provide ‘the structural context for regime change’ (2012: 453). Faulkner outlines how the prospect of cuts can open up opportunities for improvements which, whilst fully justifiable ‘on their own merits’, would be ‘politically difficult in more favourable economic circumstances’ (2012: 22). Put simply, austerity, and the conditions it creates, holds the potential for more drastic reforms which would be difficult to achieve in less turbulent times. Evidence of this may be seen in the growth of strategic thinking about how localities can be governed in a joined up way recognising ‘interrelationships between crime, health, education, employment, housing, provision for young people’ (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: 21).

Such strategic ambitions are not in themselves new as in England Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) have been part of the governing arrangements of local authorities since 2000. Their equivalents in Wales, Local Service Boards (LSBs), have been piloted in Cardiff since 2007. While Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) argue that the Coalition government has neglected the partnership agenda, recent years have seen the emergent emphasis on the value of such strategic thinking in responding to the problems facing local governance. At a national level George Osborne (Chancellor of the Exchequer 2010-2016) has pursued devolution settlements in large urban centres in the United Kingdom (BBC, 2015). Within Wales, LSBs have been pushed to the fore, to take a more prominent role in local governing arrangements. This is visible in the Welsh Government ‘Shared Purpose – Shared Delivery’ paper that advocates the streamlining of partnership plans to reduce complexity and the role of LSBs as the ‘appropriate forum for formulating and reviewing single integrated plans’ (Welsh Government, 2012: 43).
The merits of the creation of an integrated partnership plan were stated as follows:

A single integrated Plan represents a significant simplification. It is the view of the Welsh Government that a single integrated plan should replace at least four of the existing statutory plans and strategies (the Community Strategy, the Children and Young People’s Plan, the Health, Social Care and Well-being Strategy and the Community Safety Partnership Plan (which incorporates the 3 crimes and disorder strategies)), thereby reducing complexity and duplication, and freeing up resources.

Welsh Government, 2012: 4

In Wales, LSBs have been presented as a way of reducing the complexity of partnership arrangements, cutting costs and improving efficiency. Indeed, the Partnership Council for Wales assert that this rationalisation and streamlining of partnership plans would enable them and their partners to ‘focus more effectively on improving outcomes’ (Partnership Council for Wales, 2011: 1). These plans are not only presented as a way of reducing expenditure in times of austerity, but also as a way to improve delivery. At the time, the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) reported that responses to these proposed LSBs were largely positive about their potential to facilitate the ‘prevention, early intervention and better handling of transition between service providers’ (WLGA, 2012: 1).

The implications of this increasing emphasis on strategic thinking for community safety are evident within the Welsh Government paper (2012) and the WLGA response (2012), where it is highlighted that the governing arrangements of the Local Service Board and single integrated strategy would be sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act (CDA). According to the Welsh Government, these statutory requirements ‘should not prevent LSBs from reviewing and streamlining partnership structures to make them fit for purpose’ (2012). This is reminiscent of Gilling et al.’s claims that some local authorities are abandoning the community safety partnership model and are seeking ‘only minimal compliance with the Section 17 of the CDA’ (2013: 329). Yet, in contrast to this idea of minimal compliance this integration of partnership arrangements is argued to improve delivery. This potential to improve service
delivery is consistent with early discussions of the CDA and the opportunities presented by section 17 and the ‘mainstreaming’ of community safety. For Moss and Pease (1999), section 17 was the most radical aspect of the CDA and had the potential to facilitate more holistic approaches to local governance. This section of the Act specified that:

Without prejudice to any other obligation imposed on it, it shall be the duty of each authority to which this section applies to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those function on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area

Home Office, 1998

The implications of this statement are significant: responsibility for issues of crime and disorder ceased to be the sole domain of the police, and instead all actors involved within local government should consider the possible implications of their actions on crime and disorder (Deane and Doran, 2002). However, as Moss (2001) argues, in reality the implications of Section 17 and the mainstreaming of community safety have been less significant than expected, due, in part, to the absence of any legal backing to enforce its directives. Others argue that the potential of section 17 has been hampered by the dual responsibility placed on the local authorities and the police, leading to community safety operating under a ‘policing agenda’ and stifling participation from other agencies (Crawford and Evans, 2012).

It could, therefore, be argued that Welsh Government recommendations regarding the integration of partnership plans, may be conducive to the more effective realisation of Section 17 and the mainstreaming of community safety facilitating a more holistic approach to the governance of crime, disorder and safety. In this way, the loosening of central government control, in combination with the financial pressures of austerity, may incentivise more integrated approaches to strategic governance. This, in turn, may reduce cost and potentially lead to more transformative agendas around crime and disorder. The integration of community safety partnerships into LSBs may not actually reduce governing capacity for community safety, but may instead facilitate more holistic approaches to crime prevention in line with a more transformative agenda around
social justice. However, as Edwards and Hughes state, ‘whether there is the political acumen to build a shared purpose around a social justice agenda for public safety remains an issue for empirical investigation’ (2012: 454).

2.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to provide the contextual and conceptual underpinnings of the thesis. Using the periodisation of community safety provided by Gilling et al. (2013), it has been possible to examine how community safety, as a way of governing social problems, emerged during the second half of the 20th century and rose to prominence under New Labour from 1997 to 2010. The contested nature of community safety (Hughes, 2006) has been a persistent issue since its conception. Conceptualisations have ranged from a mere synonym for crime prevention but with ‘fluffy overtones’ (Wiles and Pease, 2000) to those that emphasise its more radical potential to promote an encompassing social model of crime prevention. During the national mandatory period of community safety under the New Labour Government, central government control restricted the more progressive potential of community safety in favour of a narrow focus on crime and disorder (Wiles and Pease, 2000). Under New Labour, community safety was highly resourced, enabling the establishment of multi-agency teams and an emergent professional identity of community safety practitioners.

It is in this context that the developments following the election of the Coalition Government must be considered. A commitment to sustained austerity, an ideological belief in smaller government, and a greater emphasis on localism, raise important questions for the future of community safety and multi-agency approaches to crime prevention. This third phase of community safety represents a significant departure from the national mandatory period. It is characterised by reduced central control of the community safety agenda, in favour of greater autonomy of local governing actors. However, as a result of austerity measures, the potential benefits of this autonomy must be realised against a backdrop of severe cuts to public sector expenditure.

As has been demonstrated, these conditions foreground the importance of understanding local governing arrangements when looking at community safety
in a period of austerity. Using regime theory, which places emphasis on the power relations of local governing actors, it has been possible to formulate a series of theoretical propositions about how different community safety agendas may be realised in certain local economic and political contexts. These propositions offer insight into the type of community safety agendas that may be adopted, and the governing arrangements that may facilitate them. In summary, these propositions were as follows:

1. The degradation of partnership work and the return to a maintenance agenda organised around reactive policing and enforcement of criminal behaviour;

2. The emergence of a developmental agenda around ideas of risk management made possible by a desire to prioritise on resources on those most at risk and through the greater engagement of the private sector;

3. The pursuit of a progressive agenda around restorative justice made possible by the discretion afforded as part of localism but due to reducing financial resources reliant on community and voluntary sector participation;

4. The potential for transformative agendas that seek a more holistic preventative approach to social problems may be made possible through an increased emphasis on strategic governance and the development of integrated partnership structures.

These propositions are not exhaustive but do provide a series of theoretically distinct scenarios which can were to orientate this research. In reality such clear distinctions are unlikely, and it is very possible that community safety regimes may contain elements of all of these propositions, or may even fail to achieve any coherent regime (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Having provided this conceptual and contextual backdrop, Chapter 3 explores how the importance of understanding local governing arrangements has influenced the research design and methodological choices of this study.
3. RESEARCHING SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: A CASE STUDY APPROACH

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research was to assess how local governing actors have responded to Coalition Government policies of austerity and the impact of this upon the local governance of crime, disorder and safety. As discussed in the previous chapter, Coalition Government policies of austerity and the decentralisation of power away from Westminster, have granted greater autonomy to local governing actors while simultaneously posing challenges to local governing capacity. These conditions present a spectrum of possibilities of how local actors may respond to such conditions, and the impact of this upon community safety work. This ties in with the claims of Edwards and Hughes that ‘certain localities are not simply victims of; or politically defensive redoubts against, global forces but are, in relation to other localities, the origins of these forces’ (2005: 346). The recognition of the uncertain future for community safety, highlights the importance of empirical research situated within particular local contexts. Through locally situated case studies it is possible to understand how local power relations and dependencies affect the formulation of particular governing regimes, their arrangements, agendas and the schemes of cooperation used to sustain partnership work. This framing of the research problem was critical in influencing the choices and decisions made regarding the research strategy, design and methods as will be explored over the course of this chapter.

3.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY

The increased emphasis on localism, and the decentralisation of power following the election of the Coalition Government, places greater importance on situating changes to community safety arrangements within particular local political and economic contexts. This necessitates a conceptual and analytical framework that facilitates the empirical investigation of local governing conditions and their affect on the formation of governing regimes. Regime theory, as discussed in
Chapter 2, draws attention to the political and economic context of local governance, and how these conditions impact upon the formation of particular governing regimes, and how these regimes may be sustained or may subsequently fail. As noted in the previous chapter, a key concept underpinning regime theory is interdependency and its relation to the power relationships that exist at a local level. For Stone (2006), what is of interest is why, under particular conditions, some agendas are pursued and others are not, and how the interaction of local governing actors impact upon these decisions. Ideas of compromise, negotiation and interdependence form key aspects of Stone’s the arguments around the ‘power to’ govern (Stone, 2006). For Stone, the power to govern is dependent upon the coercion and encouragement of actors behind a shared agenda, rather than the command and control arrangements understood in Hobbesian discussions of power noted in Chapter 2. Regime theory provides a conceptual framework to consider the local political and economic context, which shape these interdependencies and influence local governing practices. This conceptual framework is organised around four components: an agenda, governing arrangements made up of a coalition of local actors, governing resources and schemes of cooperation.

This emphasis on the local context of governance implicit in regime theory may run the risk of, what Young termed, hermetic localism (2003 cited in Edwards and Hughes, 2005: 349). Similarly, Sayer has highlighted the limitations of research too deeply rooted in particular ‘geo historical context’ that the findings cannot be applied elsewhere (2000:133). This research did not seek to make generalisations from the findings generated here, nor did it seek to follow the interpretivist tradition advocated by Young (2011), whereby explanations of social phenomenon are rooted within the confines from which they originate. Instead this research adopts a realist perspective, which recognises the ‘culturally mediated’ nature of reality but acknowledges the existence of an objective reality (Edwards, 2012). This acknowledgement that there is an objective truth to be known, ‘implies that some descriptions will be “better” or more “realistic” than others’ (Williams, 2009: 8). This is a key point for realism, while it is acknowledged that there is an objective reality, we are only able to understand it through the application of particular descriptions. As Bhaskar states: ‘things exist
and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only know them under particular descriptions’ (1978: 250). For Bottoms (2000) and Sayer (2000) research cannot be conducted in the absence of theory, and in this sense regime theory forms the ‘theoretical lens’ of this research. Given the theory driven nature of this research, the purpose of this study was not to extrapolate these findings to broader contexts, but rather to achieve what Yin calls ‘analytic generalization’ (2003: 32). In this sense, the purpose of this research was to contribute to wider theoretical understandings of community safety in the ‘localised and devolved’ period. In doing so, the research demonstrates the value of regime theory for better understanding how and why local community safety regimes are formed, and following the arguments of Layder (1998), adapting this theory where necessary. It is acknowledged that the design and methods used in this research are but one way of conducting this study. In the following discussions I will outline why the research design and methods were considered appropriate given the research aim and its theoretical underpinning.

### 3.3 Research Design

Using the conceptual framework offered by regime theory, this research aimed to assess the extent to which Coalition Government policies of austerity have affected local governing agendas, arrangements, resources, and schemes of cooperation for community safety work. To accomplish this, a case study approach was employed, with the governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board serving as a single embedded case. In employing a case study design, Yin (2003: 42-43) makes a distinction between different types of ‘case’, which include: the typical case, the longitudinal case, the critical case, the exemplary case, and the unique case. In this research, the case was defined as a ‘critical’ case as Cardiff was considered analytically significant for the testing of the theoretical propositions outlined at the end of Chapter 2. The significance of Cardiff as a critical case site will be discussed shortly, but first it is necessary to consider the nature of this case study in more detail.

The following sections offer a more detailed examination of the case study used in this research, why it was applicable and how it was defined and operationalised in relation to the research aims. To facilitate this, the discussion
of the research design will be structured around the five key elements of case study work, identified by Yin (2003: 21), which are:

i. The study’s questions
ii. The study’s propositions
iii. The study’s units of analysis
iv. The logic linking the data to the propositions
v. The criteria for interpreting the findings.

3.3.1 The study’s questions

For Yin (2003), the choice of research design is dependent upon the questions that are being asked. Yin notes that questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ are most appropriate for case study research. This was reflected in the underlying aim of this research, which was:

*How have Coalition Government policies of austerity, localism, and the introduction of PCCs affected local community safety arrangements?*

Taking into account the analytical framework offered by regime theory, it was possible to operationalise this question in line with the four components of regime theory. Doing so enabled the overarching aim of this research to be phrased in a way that facilitated a clear empirical focus, and assisted in the creation of theoretically driven research questions. Using regime theory it is possible to rephrase the research aim as follows:

*How have Coalition Government policies of austerity, localism and the introduction of PCCs affected the governing resources available to the local governing regime in Cardiff and what impact has this had upon the agenda, governing arrangements, and schemes of cooperation pertaining to the local governance of crime, disorder and safety?*

When presented in this way, it was possible to separate this research aim into four theoretically driven, and empirically examinable, questions that enabled a more focused identification of the core questions in the research:
1. How have the governing arrangements for community safety changed and how can these changes be understood?

2. How have the changes to the governing arrangements affected the governing agendas within Cardiff?

3. How have these changes to the governing arrangements and agenda been realised in the actual delivery of community safety work?

4. What do the changes to local governance say about the regime in Cardiff and why is this analytically significant for discussions of the local governance of crime, disorder and safety?

3.3.2 The study’s propositions

The research questions are important as they capture the key points of interest within the research, yet Yin argues that the research questions ‘do not point to what you should study’ (2003: 22). For this Yin advocates the provision of theoretical propositions, as these ‘direct attention to something that should be examined within the scope of the study’. As has been stated already, this research was concerned with testing a number of predefined theoretically driven propositions, drawn from the literature. These propositions, drawn from the literature, were outlined at the end of the Chapter 2 and sought to explore the range of possible futures for community safety in the ‘localised and devolved’ period of community safety (Gilling et al., 2013).

Four theoretical propositions were identified within the literature. Using Edwards and Hughes’ (2012) typology of community safety agendas, these propositions were principally organised around the potential governing agendas that may develop and the governing arrangements that may facilitate them. The first proposition outlined the potential for a reversion back to police led maintenance agendas, where community safety work is subordinated to the role of supporting the police in a narrow agenda organised around the enforcement of crime and disorder. Proposition two, explored the possible emergence of developmental agendas around ideas of risk, which seek to realise smarter governance and the more targeted use of resources by identifying people or places who may be at
risk, or themselves risky, and mitigating this risk through targeted interventions or preventative measures. The third proposition considered the potential of more progressive agendas around restorative justice and the diversion of offenders away from the criminal justice system, which may result from the increased autonomy granted to local authorities and the increased role of community and voluntary organisations. The final proposition, speculated a more transformative agenda around principles of social justice, addressing inequality and citizen inclusion, enabled by more radical changes in local governing arrangements. While these categories of agenda were briefly described during the literature review, it is worth being explicit in how these categories were operationalised within this research using Edwards and Hughes (2012) typology.

For Edwards and Hughes (2012), maintenance agendas in regime theory can be equated to a criminal justice agenda in community safety, whereby community safety practice is seen to assist traditional methods of law enforcement and public order policing. In translating this into a coherent, analytical construct for the research, it was proposed that a maintenance agenda was identified if there was a sole focus on the policing of volume crimes, traditional police priorities, such as theft, violence, and antisocial behaviour. Moreover, for a maintenance agenda to be present, partnership work would have to be framed in terms of its utility in assisting the police in their function. Finally, a maintenance agenda would be characterised by an explicit focus upon the product or outcomes of the crimes and their response, rather than the causal conditions that might precede these offences.

As an analytic category for the research, developmental agendas would be characterised by a focus on traditional definitions of crime. However, rather than assisting law enforcement strategies, developmental agendas would seek to augment traditional policing methods with risk management strategies (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). This management of risk, could entail the identification of those at risk of offending, or particular environmental factors that present risks to particular people or places. A developmental agenda would then seek to mitigate these risks, either through situational preventative methods or through intervention work with those groups deemed at risk of offending. Finally, while a developmental agenda would evidence an appreciation of the immediate
environmental and situational factors that may contribute to crime, a consideration of the broader social and structural causes of criminality would be absent.

Where maintenance and developmental agendas sought to see a continuance or augmentation of criminal justice agendas, progressive agendas are defined by their aspiration to move away from a law and order stance and from punitive or repressive practices. For this research, progressive agendas have been equated with ideas of restorative justice and the diversion of individuals away from the criminal justice system, in line with the arguments of Edwards and Hughes (2012). While the actual priorities of community safety work may not differ from those of the maintenance and developmental agendas, how these problems of crime and disorder are responded would be different under a progressive agenda.

Transformative agendas are characterised by attempts to fundamentally change the way in which social problems are governed, by emphasising values of social justice and citizen inclusion (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). Unlike the other three categories, transformative agendas recognise the structural and social causes of social problems, such as criminality, and seeks to ameliorate these problems through political and social inclusion. For this research a social justice agenda was determined by the aims to improve access to services, attempts to engage communities and the public by local state actors, and recognition of the social and structural precursors to criminality.

These four types of governing agendas, transposed into criminological thought by Edwards and Hughes (2012), helped organise the four propositions drawn from the literature at the end of Chapter 2. These agendas, and the four propositions structured around them, aided the research by acting as sensitising devices for the collection and analysis of data during the fieldwork. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) note, when commencing fieldwork researchers can face a deluge of information, so much so, that it is impossible to note down everything that is seen, heard and experienced. These propositions assisted the research by acting as a conceptual filter for the mass of data collected during the fieldwork, and helped focus my observations, thereby making the recording of fieldnotes more manageable.
3.3.3 The study’s units of analysis

For Yin (2003), an effective case study design requires a clear elucidation of what the ‘case’ is. As briefly noted earlier, the study was conducted in Cardiff, but more specifically the ‘case’ was the governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Given the analytical focus of the research on local governance and the formation of governing regimes in certain places under certain conditions, the Cardiff Partnership Board was chosen due to its status as the lead partnership arrangement in the city. While the organisational boundaries of some of the governing actors extended beyond the Cardiff Partnership Board, it was at the level of the Cardiff Partnership Board that their interaction with each other was negotiated and therefore organised. Given the focus on local governance it is acknowledged that the findings generated in this research are contingent upon the geo-historical context in which they have been found. Therefore, this case was chosen on the basis of theoretical, rather than representative, sampling. It was not chosen due to its capacity to generalise to broader geo-historical contexts, but rather, due to its analytic significance for testing the propositions outlined earlier and for contributing to the theoretical understandings of the local governance of crime and disorder in periods of austerity. As discussed in Chapter 2, Coalition Government policies have placed greater importance on understanding the particular conditions of local governance, and how, under certain conditions, local governing regimes are formed and sustained. In consideration of this, Cardiff represents an analytically significant case for the following reasons:

i) Firstly, Cardiff is located in Wales, in which the Welsh Government have sought to take advantage of the devolved powers afforded them, around social services, health, and education. In doing so, some commentators have remarked upon the ‘dragonisation’ of social policy in Wales, which is distinct from the policy developments in England (Drakeford, 2010; Haines, 2009). This has been seen in the adoption of more socially just orientated approaches to issues of community safety and community cohesion. (Edwards and Hughes, 2008; 2009). The situation of the research within Cardiff, and therefore the broader context of Welsh Government policies of social justice, distinguishes it from urban centres in England. Accordingly the research demonstrates
how the politics of devolution may factor into wider narratives about the future of community safety work.

ii) Secondly, its status as the capital city of Wales demarcates it from other Welsh local authority areas. Reflecting its importance, the city plays host to a number of cultural events including large scale sporting events, live music as well as co-hosting political events such as the NATO visit in 2014. Furthermore, it possesses a large urban centre, which attracts both retail commerce and a vibrant night-time economy. These put particular pressures on the maintenance of order in the city, and as will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6, represent particular challenges for community safety work in an age of austerity and limited governing capacity.

iii) Thirdly, Cardiff has been recognised as an area of good practice in relation to community safety and its response to issues of crime and disorder. This was evidenced in the receipt of a national Tilley Award for innovations in developing neighbourhood led partnership working. This award winning reputation, further cements Cardiff as a site of analytic significance as it demonstrates a clear commitment to community safety as policy agenda. Therefore, any degradation in the governing capacity around community safety can less convincingly be attributed to a lack of commitment by the governing regime and therefore will more reliably point to the impact of austerity.

iv) Finally, due to its capital city status, Cardiff represents the vanguard of Welsh Government policy. Following the Beecham inquiry, the Welsh Government implemented changes designed to facilitate more integrated approaches to public service delivery. Cardiff was chosen as a pilot site for this new way of working, and in 2007, the Cardiff Local Service Board was introduced. In 2010, the Local Service Board evolved into the Cardiff Partnership Board, which in turn, led to the development a single integrated agenda, the ‘What Matters 2020’ strategy. As seen in Chapter 5, this strategy indicated a clear commitment to a progressive and transformative governing agenda. Therefore, Cardiff as a case site, offered the opportunity to examine whether more progressive and
transformative agendas for community safety were possible, and how such regimes are formed and sustained in periods of austerity.

It was important to distinguish between the ‘case’- the Cardiff Partnership Board - and what Yin calls, the study’s units of analysis. To inform this discussion it is worth clarifying what constitutes the ‘regime’ in Cardiff. As just briefly mentioned, the Cardiff Partnership Board was introduced in 2010 and represented a radical reformulation of the governing arrangements in the city. The Cardiff Partnership Board provided the ‘strategic management of the partnership activity’ in the city and was comprised of senior managers across a number of partner organisations. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, but for now it is worth noting that the core members of this board were the chief executives, or person of equivalent position, from:

- Cardiff Council,
- South Wales Police,
- South Wales Fire and Rescue Service,
- Cardiff and Vale University Health Board,
- Cardiff Third sector Council and
- Director General, Local Government and Communities, Welsh Government

As this board represented the senior officials from the various partner organisations, and fulfilled the strategic management function of partnership work in Cardiff, it was argued that this was the ‘governing regime’ in Cardiff. Underneath the Cardiff Partnership Board, the governing arrangements were divided into two delivery structures, the neighbourhood management structure and the programme and priority workstreams. The ‘case’ in this research then, was the entirety of the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. The case encompassed the strategic aspects of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the delivery structures of the neighbourhood management teams and the programme board aligned with community safety, the safer and cohesive communities programme board. However, these represent three analytically distinct components of the governing arrangements in Cardiff. In recognition of
this, the units of analysis embedded within the ‘case’, were aligned with these analytically distinct areas of interest.

i) The first unit of analysis in the research encompassed the strategic decision making group of the governing regime called the Cardiff Partnership Board which was a meeting of all senior directors of the main governing partners.

ii) The next unit of analysis pertinent to this research, was the safer and cohesive communities programme board and the workstream activities that constitute it. This board represented the city-wide community safety priorities of the Cardiff Partnership Board.

iii) The final unit of analysis was the neighbourhood management programme board, which comprised the six neighbourhood management teams, responsible for the organisation of localised partnership activity in the city.

These three units of analysis represented the key points of interest for the local governance of crime, disorder and safety within the case study. The governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board was responsible for determining the direction of strategic governance within the city, within which the strategic response to crime, disorder and safety were organised. The safer and cohesive communities programme board represented the mechanism for the governance of citywide priorities relating to community safety. The neighbourhood management teams represented the mechanism for dealing with localised problems or priorities identified in particular areas.

Each of these analytic sub units was approached differently. For example the strategic direction of the Cardiff Partnership Board was predominantly determined through documentary analysis and interviews with relevant key strategic actors. The work of the neighbourhood management teams and safer and cohesive communities workstreams were primarily addressed through fieldwork observations and interviews with practitioners. Furthermore, because these units of analysis represented differing aspects of the governing arrangements, they offered contrasting insights into how partnership working within the Cardiff regime was being realised. To ensure that these insights could
be compared against each other, a level of consistency was achieved by using the analytic framework of regime theory. This enabled the data collection in these sub units of analysis to be organised around the same concepts of agenda, governing arrangements, resources and schemes of cooperation.

Within these different units of analysis it was acknowledged that there would be variance in the knowledge and understanding of some elements of the analytic categories. For example, some of those working within the delivery mechanisms of the neighbourhood management team, or the workstream activities, may not have been cognisant of the broader agendas of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Similarly, those involved in the more strategic aspects of the Cardiff Partnership Board, were not aware of some of the problems and issues in relation to negotiating and cooperating with partners in practice. A further consideration here is Pollitt’s distinction between talk, decision and action (2001). This is particularly pertinent to this discussion of the units of analysis. The units of analysis that are more concerned with the strategic aspects of the study provided an insight into what Pollitt termed, the policy talk of the Cardiff Partnership Board. As Pollitt (2001) notes it should not be assumed that policy talk is indicative of practice on the ground or the decisions made by a governing regime. This formed a key consideration in the research, which influenced the research methods used and the analysis of data, which sought to differentiate between the talk of the governing regime, and how this talk was realised in practice. This tension between talk and practice formed a key component of the findings in this research, as reflected in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

A further consideration in this research design was the duration of the case study, which was particularly significant given the application of regime theory. Regime formation is not a static event, but rather a continuous process of negotiation, compromise and change between governing actors. At the point of commencing this research the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, had been in place for four years and was reaching the midpoint of its initial vision. This research was conducted on the basis that, through a sustained period of immersion, the aspirations contained within the ‘What Matters’ strategy could be empirically examined, in order to make claims about the status of the regime and whether it is succeeding or failing.
in achieving its stated aims. Given the salience of austerity measures in this study, the length of time during which the fieldwork took place was aligned with the budgetary period of the local authority. Accordingly, the research was conducted from February 2014 to March 2015, corresponding with the 2014-15 budgetary cycle. By means of this year-long immersion it was possible to gain a snapshot of a regime in change. However, it has been necessary to acknowledge that the findings borne out of this research are rooted within the particular temporal, political and economic conditions in which the data was collected.

3.3.4 The logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings

An important part of case study design is the logic linking the data to the propositions (Yin, 2003). Part of this is how the data gathered during the research is applied to the theoretical framework and how this impacts upon the interpretation of the data collected. Yin describes how the logic to link data generated within a single case study data back to the theoretical propositions is based on the idea of pattern matching where ‘several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition’ (2003: 26). This was applied in this research, by using the various data collected from the mixed methods approach to identify instances of convergence or divergence in the data gathered. Where there were examples of convergence in the data, this helped to increase the reliability of the claims, while any instances of divergence in the data, allowed an examination of why this divergence existed. In adopting this pattern matching approach, the research acknowledged the differences between the different units of analysis and how this was reflected in the data. Furthermore, reflecting the theoretical and analytical framework underpinning this research, this process of pattern matching was conducted according to the four components of regime theory outlined earlier. Through this process, it was possible to identify the stated aims of the governing regime, and whether that was shared throughout the governing infrastructure. This enabled me to distinguish between more symbolic pronouncements about the changes and improvements being made regarding the agenda, governing arrangements, resources and schemes of cooperation and the operational realities of such changes.
3.3.5 Summary

This section has outlined the underlying strategy and design of this research, and why it was applicable given the theoretical framework of regime theory that informed the thesis. The principal aim of this research was to examine how Coalition Government policies have affected the local governance of crime and disorder. This has highlighted the need for case study research to examine how local political and economic contexts and conditions impact upon the formation of local governing regimes. Therefore, through a single embedded case study, this research aimed to contribute to the theoretical understanding of how local community safety arrangements can be conceptualised during the ‘localised and devolved’ period of community safety. Utilising the analytical framework offered by regime theory, the research was structured around four key concepts: an agenda, governing arrangements, governing resources and the schemes of cooperation. Considering this analytical framework, and the aim of the research, Cardiff was chosen as a critical case site for the research as it provided an analytically significant location in which the theoretical propositions of this research were critically tested.

3.4 Research Methods

The chapter now moves on to discuss the specific research methods used to collect the data, how it was analysed and the political and ethical considerations that arose during the research. As noted by Bottoms (2008), a realist stance recognises that data collection cannot be separated from the theoretical assumptions of the research. In this case the research design, and the methods used, were contingent upon the application of regime theory and the way in which this framed the research problem and dictated what research questions were asked. This relates to the distinction made by Bryman (2006) between the ‘epistemological argument’ and the ‘technical argument’ in social science research. The ‘epistemological argument’ (Bryman, 2006) posits that there is an intrinsic and irrefutable relationship between research methods and their epistemological and ontological foundations. The ‘technical argument’, on the other hand, calls for a more fluid consideration of research methods, in that their application should be dependent upon the problem to be solved rather than upon
epistemological and ontological loyalties. For Bryman (2006), the rise of the ‘technical argument’ is connected with issues of pragmatism and the increased importance of research questions in determining methodological choices. As Erzberger and Kelle note, ‘the selection of adequate methods should not be made mainly on the basis of sympathies toward a certain methodological camp or school. Methods are tools for the answering of research questions and not vice versa’ (2003: 482). Therefore, given the theoretical framework of regime theory, and the subsequent framing of the research questions in this study, a mixed methods approach was deemed appropriate to addressing the research questions. More detail will be provided shortly regarding the research methods and how they contribute to the study, but first it is worth noting why the research has taken a predominantly qualitative approach to investigating the governance of crime and disorder in Cardiff.

In line with the technical arguments of Bryman (2006) and Ezberger and Kelle (2003), the choice of qualitative methods was justified due to the empirical focus necessitated by regime theory in this research. To understand the governing regime, it was necessary to gather data on how governing actors understood the political and economic climate in which they were situated, how they negotiated with other actors involved in local governance and the impact of this upon community safety work. Such concerns lend themselves to qualitative inquiry, which was able to capture the data on how policy officers and practitioners within Cardiff perceived the governing arrangements and their roles within it. It was recognised that through qualitative research methods the narratives that were collected were dependent upon who and what was being analysed. Therefore, using different qualitative methods enabled the comparison of data collected to identify areas of convergence and divergence in the narratives in a process of triangulation (Lilleker, 2003; Davies, 2001).

The methodological choices made in this research, were further influenced by Stone’s detailed account of his methodological approach to examining the governing regime in Atlanta (1989). Due to the length of interest within his research, covering 40 years of urban governance within the city, Stone noted that ‘exhaustive primary investigation was not practical’ (1989: 259). In its place he utilised a number of methods that took advantage of existing secondary data.
This included previous research in Atlanta (including his own), extensive use of local media publications, and the examination of public records. These secondary sources were supplemented with 93 interviews over a six year period, though these interviews were ‘not so much evidence about events as they were a source of background and context’ (1989: 260). Drawing on the insights offered by Stone (1989), the methods used in this research took advantage of pre-existing data sources in the form published records, local media outputs, existing research concerning the area and social media analysis. The use of pre-existing data was combined with a sustained period of ethnographic observation, both participant and non-participant, alongside semi-structured interviews. These research methods are now discussed in more detail to ascertain their suitability for the research and how they were employed.

3.4.1 Ethnographic Observation

A fundamental component of this research was the ethnographic observation of partnership activity relating to crime, disorder and safety within the Cardiff Partnership Board. This approach enabled the research to attain a detailed and nuanced understanding of the processes of governance and partnership working, but more importantly allowing the research to get beyond the official policy construction of the Cardiff regime. A key consideration here was the limitations of interviews and documentary analysis in achieving this. Through participant observation, it was possible to build relationships of trust with those involved in the daily work of the Cardiff Partnership Board, thus enabling more frank discussions about the realities of partnership working in the city. Through the use of both participant and non-participant observation, it was possible to gather a greater insight into the ‘backstage’ processes of partnership working, the complexities of such work and how the narratives presented in the strategic documentation and espoused by senior policy officials were realised in practice by those involved in the actual process of partnership activity. This approach enabled the research to avoid conflating the policy talk of the governing regime with the practices of community safety work in acknowledgement of the arguments of Pollitt. As Flick argues where interviews can often ‘comprise a mixture of how something is and how something should be’, ethnographic observation allows ‘the research to find out how something factually works’
This observation work took place over a 12-month period, beginning in February 2014 and ending in March 2015.

The participant observation also acted as an aid in attaining access, as the contacts developed through my participation helped open doors and facilitate my entry into certain meetings, and acquiring interviews with more senior policy officials. My positioning as participant observer meant that I was given access to a desk and computer within the Policy and Partnership team, which provided a useful home base within the research site. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 37) caution, it was important that I did not try to ‘see, hear and participate in everything’ when first entering the field as I would have been unable to make sense of all the data before me. As discussed briefly earlier, to mitigate this and to make sense of the vast amount of data presented during my observations, I used the framework provided by regime theory, and the theoretical propositions, to help make sense of my observations and to organise my field-notes. It is acknowledged that this may have affected the data collected in that issues that did not fit into the conceptual framework may have gone unnoticed. However, I would argue that this was a necessary process to ensure that I was not overwhelmed by the volume and breadth of data available to me. An ancillary benefit of this was that it ensured that the data I collected was pertinent to the research questions and the overall aim of the thesis.

3.4.1.1 Where and what to observe?

Changes regarding community safety arrangements in Cardiff presented some challenges for observational research, and opened up questions of where and what to observe. Whereas previous research into community safety has focussed upon community safety practitioners and community safety teams, the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff meant there was no longer a dedicated community safety team to observe. In place of the community safety team, was the Policy and Partnership team. This team was responsible for supporting a broad range of partnership activity within the Cardiff Partnership Board, of which community safety was one aspect of its remit. This team was also the location of the neighbourhood management officers, responsible for driving forward partnership activity at a neighbourhood level. For these reasons, the Policy and Partnership team was an ideal base for the ethnographic
observation. It provided access to the supporting infrastructure for partnership activity in the city, and therefore, offered an insight into both the more strategic elements of governance and more operational issues of delivery and practice. In this way the Policy and Partnership team was identified as a potential ‘obligatory passage point’ (Callon, 1986) for observing issues from ‘above’ (The Cardiff Partnership Board management structure) and from ‘below’ (from the delivery mechanisms of the neighbourhood management teams and the safer and cohesive communities programme board workstreams). Access to this team, was granted through a key gatekeeper working within the team and who was interested in developing relationships between the university and the council. A key condition of access was that this arrangement should be mutually beneficial, in return for access to the field I was expected to contribute to the research capacity of the team. In this way I was not a passive observer of the partnership team, but rather, actively took part in some of the work required. The issue of access will be discussed in more detail shortly.

Having commenced my observation within this team numerous opportunities for other sites of observation presented themselves as I became more familiar to those within the office. During my fieldwork I was engaged in a number of work activities, most of these were research based. Examples of this work included: working on small scales surveys to distribute as part of a neighbourhood management activity; a literature review to inform the potential development of a multi-agency safeguarding hub for issues of child protection and domestic abuse; reviews of literature around the harms of pay-day loan companies; a review of domestic violence recording practices. Engaging in these activities helped develop contacts with individuals in the team, which in turn, assisted gaining access to various meetings, forums and individuals that would otherwise have been difficult. These included neighbourhood management meetings, anti-social behaviour problem solving groups, human exploitation workstream meetings, safer and cohesive communities programme board meetings. These meetings were important as they shed light on the practicalities of partnership working and its organisation. These meetings offered glimpses into the power relations within partnership work as it was possible to identify key contributors in the meetings and to observe the interactions between different governing actors regarding
certain agendas. Crucially however, access to these meetings was often contingent upon relations developed during my fieldwork. For example, I attended more meetings in one neighbourhood management area because I was involved in work led by a practitioner in that neighbourhood area chair, and accordingly was invited to more meetings to assist in that work.

These observations were written down in a series of small notebooks. The overt recording of such observations caused few problems in the meetings, as it was not unusual for notes to be made by other individuals present. At the outset of each meeting I ensured my role as a researcher working with Cardiff Council was known to everyone. In most cases this caused no issues, but in one instance, a MARAC meeting, I was asked that the details of the meeting not be shared or recorded due to the sensitivities of the cases involved. In other instances, I was unable to make detailed notes of interactions as they occurred (Bryman, 2004); this was particularly the case in the recording of informal conversations. These informal conversations were more difficult to record in situ, as I was hesitant to draw attention to the recording of these events in case it affected how those around me behaved. In those instances where these conversations took place while I was at my desk, I was often able to make notes on the computer under the guise of doing work, and when appropriate transfer these notes to my notepad. On occasions where this was not possible, I was reliant on my ability to recall these interactions until a time I could write them down without drawing attention to my recording of these events. These observations recorded in the notepad were written up fully as soon as possible (typically in the evening following the fieldwork) to ensure my ability to recall the days events, in which my hand written notes served to trigger my recollection of the events of the day (Emerson et al., 2001)

I also undertook non-participant observation of the Cardiff Community and Adult Services scrutiny committee meetings, due to their responsibility for scrutinising community safety work in the city as of 2007. The scrutiny committee aims to ‘to look at things from a service user and citizen perspective and use this to inform our observations and recommendations to the Executive’ (Cardiff Council, 2012: 6). This passage is useful for illustrating why the Scrutiny Committee was important as a research site. It offered an alternative
representation of community safety problems in Cardiff, and therefore acted as a point of comparison for the observations coming out of the Policy and Partnership team. Whereas my observations within the Policy and Partnership team focussed on the work of practitioners and officers, the observation of the scrutiny committee enabled an insight into the role of publicly elected officials within the governing arrangements. In line with the focus of regime theory, and building on the findings of Edwards et al. (2007), the extent of participation by locally elected officials could be assessed and enabled the identification of potential frictions between the narratives of councillors and those of policy officers and practitioners.

3.4.2 Semi-structured interviews

As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest, the combination of ethnographic observation and interviews is useful as they provide complementary forms of data. Therefore, alongside the observational research, semi-structured interviews were used in this research. While the observations constituted my interpretation and understanding of events and situations, the interviews enabled the collection and analysis of data from those who are embedded in the day-to-day practicalities of partnership work. At the outset of each interview, I provided a brief summary of my PhD, in doing so I avoided framing the research strictly in terms of ‘community safety’ instead referring to broader issues of the governance of crime, disorder and safety and partnership working. This was important given the structural changes in Cardiff and the dismantlement of the community safety team, which had resulted in lack of awareness by some participants of what was actually meant by ‘community safety’. The more encompassing terms of governance and partnership working proved to be far more effective in eliciting responses from respondents.

The use of semi-structured interviews provided enough structure to the interviews to address the elements of the theoretical framework provided by regime theory but were flexible enough for the respondents to discuss what they though was important in relation to the questions. As Berry states ‘open-ended questions have the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer what’s relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researcher’s preconceived notions about what is important’ (2002: 681). This flexibility was
crucial to the interview process as participants were drawn from differing layers of the hierarchy within the Cardiff Partnership Board and from different organisational backgrounds and therefore the interviews had to be able to accommodate these differences yet stay within a broad analytic framework. Therefore these interviews were more in line with, what Burgess terms, ‘conversations with a purpose’ (1984:102).

3.4.2.1 SAMPLING

Given the interest of the research on community safety arrangements within the city, and ascertaining the views of those involved in community safety work, there was a limited sub-set of people pertinent to the research. Therefore, a purposive sample was adopted, which aimed to acquire responses from all who were considered relevant in the new infrastructure around the governance of crime, disorder and safety in Cardiff. The desired participants were drawn from the main components of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, including the Cardiff Partnership Board strategic group, the safer and cohesive communities programme board and workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams. In identifying the potential interview respondents from these different aspects of the governing arrangements a number of methods were used. Firstly, the use of documentary evidence produced by the Cardiff Partnership Board helped identify key interview participants, as the documentation highlighted the responsible officers for the different aspects of the governing arrangements. In addition, I delayed the start of the interview stage of my research until 6 months into the participant observation; this enabled me to converse with people during my observation about the relevant people to speak to regarding certain activities. Typically, this supported the sample identified in the documentary analysis, but in a couple of instances highlighted where there had been changes in responsibility or deletion of posts. Through this process it was possible to generate a suitable sampling frame for the research, which targeted the lead responsible officers across the various elements of the governing infrastructure.

In an effort to increase the response rate, when approaching participants for interview I highlighted the collaborative nature of the research between the council and the university and how the findings could be beneficial in understanding and improving partnership activity. In addition, I also sought to
use my existing contacts developed during my observations to help encourage participation. Through these strategies I was able to conduct a total of 20 interviews across the hierarchy of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Every effort was made to encourage participation, but in some cases it was not possible and pointed towards a number of challenges in conducting research in this sort of environment and context. While there was no obvious pattern to the non-participation in interviews, there are some things that may be worth considering. Perhaps most saliently were the practicalities of time for those working within the public sector during times of austerity, where practitioners were constantly being told to do more with less. Throughout the research I was constantly reminded that staff losses were a common occurrence, but that the level of work had stayed the same. Therefore, time was a limited resource for those involved in the research and may have acted as a barrier to participation for some respondents. Furthermore given the context of staff losses, some of the positions I wanted to interview were in a period of transition, whereby members of staff had been lost and had yet to be replaced and as such nobody was available to interview in such cases. A full list of interview participants is available in appendix 1.

3.4.2.2 Interview schedule

Given the differing responsibilities of the interview participants, and their varying positions in the organisational hierarchy, it was necessary for the interviews to reflect this and to be adequately structured to make the best use of the opportunities presented by the interviews and to acquire the best data. As Gerson and Horowitz (2002) note, spending time prior to the interview, constructing a schedule that is informed by a theoretical framework and is appropriate to the respondent, is crucial for making the most of the interview process. Recognising this, prior to each interview, I undertook some background research into the roles and responsibilities of the interview participant, to inform the construction of the interview schedule. Inevitably the interviews and their contents were dependent upon the people being spoken to, and therefore, comparisons between the different groups of participants had to recognise this fact. While differences were present in the interview schedules, a level of consistency was provided by ensuring that the questions asked related to the
same thematic concepts drawn from the theoretical framework offered by regime theory. Therefore, while the interview schedules differed slightly depending on the participant, each interview schedule was constructed around the same thematic framework. A generic example of the interview schedule used can be seen in appendix 6.

Through the use of these thematic categories, each interview contributed to the analytic framework underlying this research, while being receptive to the particular requirements of the interview participants. While the interview was structured according to these thematic areas, it was also recognised that the interview was a co-produced activity (Fontana and Frey, 2005; Gubrium and Koro-Ljungberg, 2005). Therefore the interview schedule and the interview itself, was flexible enough to accommodate the interests of the participants and to allow them to discuss what they believed was important. For these reasons, a semi-structured approach was taken, as it provided a framework to address the main theoretical concepts, but within this, the respondents were able to discuss what they thought was pertinent to the issues.

3.4.3 DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS
Alongside the observation work and the interviews, documentary analysis was used to provide data about the Cardiff Partnership Board and the way it operates. Noaks and Wincup (2004) highlight the value of documentary analysis for looking at policy issues over time and how policy may shift. It is for these reasons that documentary analysis was considered particularly relevant for this study. In line with the comments of Noaks and Wincup (2004), documentary evidence was used to identify how policies regarding community safety practice in Cardiff have changed over time. The use of documentary evidence enabled the research to consider a broader time frame beyond the immediate confines of the ethnographic study. Therefore through, existing research, and policy documents, the research was able to examine the evolution of the community safety arrangements and agendas in Cardiff through the three analytically distinct periods offered by Gilling et al. (2013) This use of documentary evidence was influenced by the methods used by Stone, who states that ‘even the backstage negotiations for which Atlanta is noted find their way into the record; although
some details are never reported, the events themselves and their outcomes can be observed by the diligent and systematic observer’ (1989: 260).

There was a plethora of documentary evidence available, including: policy documents, meeting minutes, scrutiny documents, scrutiny committee minutes, budget documentation, local media and existing research. Recognising this breadth of evidence, and heeding the advice of Silverman (2001) regarding the risks of attempting to analyse too much documentary evidence, a sampling criteria was employed in the first instance to draw attention to key documents for the research. However as the research progressed, attention was drawn to other documentary evidence that was outside the sampling frame, but was important for the research. For example, documents highlighted as important by practitioners and policy officers encountered in the research. Similarly as the research progressed and data was gathered, emerging findings would lead towards new interests that entailed further documentary evidence that was not anticipated in the original sampling frame.

Given the importance of examining the governing arrangements and agendas in Cardiff, local policy documents were a core component of the documentary analysis. Within the voluntary period of community safety, there was limited policy documentation and local research pertaining to Cardiff. However for the national mandatory period of community safety, there was a greater availability of local policy documentation and research relating to Cardiff. These included local community safety strategies, which provided evidence of the community safety arrangements and priorities during the national mandatory period. For the localised and devolved period of community safety, the core documents were the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual reviews, which set out the strategic agenda for local governance in Cardiff. Alongside these policy documents and existing research, Cardiff Council scrutiny reports were an important source of information. A list of the main policy documents used for the documentary analysis can be found in appendix 2.

While the use of documentary evidence enabled the identification of changes in the official narrative of the governing regime, there are caveats that must be considered in documentary analysis. First and foremost, the information
contained within documentary evidence is not necessarily an accurate representation of how an organisation works, as noted by Atkinson and Coffey (2004: 58). Scott (1990) provides a useful framework to consider the usefulness of documentary evidence, through the criteria of whether it is authentic, credible, representative and meaningful. Considering these criteria, it was the issues of credibility and representativeness that were of most relevance for the documentary analysis of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As Atkinson and Coffey (2004) note, documents need to be considered as products of certain ways of thinking and as attempts to presents things in a certain way. Therefore, while the ‘What Matters’ strategy represented the agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board, or more specifically, particular players within the Cardiff Partnership Board, it did not necessarily reflect the interests of those not involved in the regime.

3.4.4 Social Media Analysis

The research methods discussed thus far have all been firmly connected within the governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board. This is significant for this research given the claims of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) regarding studies of governance and the importance of ‘non decisions’. In situating myself within the particular governing regime of the Cardiff Partnership Board, I was only presented with the problems as defined by the Cardiff Partnership Board. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue that it is necessary to consider other problems that might exist but have been excluded from the narratives of the governing regime. To do this, the research utilised social media, specifically the social media site, Twitter, to ‘follow’ popular twitter accounts in Cardiff. These consisted of local media, community organisations, Cardiff fan pages, the twitter pages of public services, all of which generated data on a regular basis about key issues affecting Cardiff, including issues of crime, disorder and safety. By doing so it was possible to identify any problems or issues in the city that were arising, but were not being addressed, or even discussed, by the Cardiff Partnership Board.

This twitter analysis took place alongside the ethnographic observation work and was conducted over a twelve-month period from February 2014 to March 2015. In collecting the data generated by the twitter accounts, it was not possible to run a search of particular issues or ‘hashtags’, as this would rely on my own
impositions of categories thus defeating the point of the social media analysis. Instead I scanned through the tweets of the accounts followed on a daily basis and imported all relevant tweets into a word document organised by date and referenced the account the tweet was from. Typically this was conducted every morning and would extract all pertinent tweets from the previous day. While continuity was sought throughout the twelve-month period it was not possible to collect data for all 365 days. Through this process it was possible to glean an alternative perspective on the problems of the city, and assisted the fieldwork as I was often informed of events or situations before heading into the office for fieldwork. While this process was helpful, it did not reveal evidence of ‘non decisions’ in Cardiff, and therefore it did not feature in the findings of this research.

Utilising this mixed methods approach enabled the collection of an extensive range of data produced in fieldnotes, interviews, documentary analysis and the analysis of local social media. These multiple forms of data provided multiple perspectives of the Cardiff Partnership Board, its agenda and the ways in which governing actors participated and contributed to this agenda with the hope of building a more robust study of the governing regime. However the amount of data collected during this research presented challenges for the analysis of the data as will now be discussed.

3.5 Analysis of the Data

Echoing the points of Fielding and Thomas, I began the analysis by becoming ‘thoroughly familiar with the data’ (2008: 259). The interviews were transcribed, and each day of fieldwork was written up into more formal fieldnotes. This process of transcription and writing up of fieldnotes, was itself a useful process for getting to know the data and orientating myself with some of the emerging issues. Once the interviews had been transcribed, I listened to them again while reading through the transcription to ensure accuracy, but also to familiarise myself with the transcript and provide additional context to the written transcript. Similarly, as part of this familiarisation with the data, I would frequently reread my fieldnotes during my fieldwork, which helped crystallise my ideas before the more formal analysis of the data. These emerging ideas and themes that
developed over the course of the research, were reflected in the writing of my fieldnotes, which were not just observations, but were in themselves the result of emerging trends and themes in the research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995).

To assist with the analysis of the large data set, the data was imported into the Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package, NVivo, which assisted the storage, retrieval, coding and analysis of the data. This included all of the transcribed interviews, written fieldnotes and documentary evidence. The process of inputting data into NVivo and coding was carried out alongside the data collection. The data was analysed using a theoretically driven thematic analysis, structured around the analytical framework offered by regime theory. As Braun and Clarke (2006: 12) state, the use of theoretical thematic analysis ‘tends to provide less a rich description of the data overall, and more a detailed analysis of some aspect of the data’. This was considered appropriate, as it allowed the analysis to focus in on the data most pertinent to the concepts of regime theory and therefore the questions that guided this research. The use of theoretical thematic analysis informed the way in which the data was coded and assisted in developing the coding framework. This framework enabled me in my preliminary coding to organise the data according to the key themes of regime theory: i) the agenda, ii) the governing arrangements, iii) schemes of cooperation and iv) the governing resources. These broad categories were then demarcated into sub codes informed both by regime theory and the data. Therefore, while this coding process was theoretically informed, it was not purely deductive, and in line with the adaptive approach (Layder, 1998) adopted within this research, the coding process was receptive to emergent issues within the data and the trends and themes that had been developed in my fieldnotes.

The coding of data in this way has been subject to some criticism regarding the fragmentation of data and the potential removal of context following the use of code and retrieve functions (Fielding and Lee, 1998). However, when coding the data, I avoided coding short sentences or specific words, but typically coded larger passages in which the key points were located as to avoid losing context. Furthermore, on a practical level, due to various stability issues with NVivo, as part of the coding process I also engaged in the manual coding of the transcribed interviews, fieldnotes and key documentary evidence in line with the coding.
framework developed using NVivo. While this was somewhat borne out of necessity due to the problems of the computer software it was advantageous in that, relating to the criticisms of Fielding and Lee (1998), the codes developed through NVivo were then reapplied manually into the text which allowed me to see how these codes fit into the particular context of the interviews and documentary evidence.

Having coded the research, I was able to compare how the themes and categories identified in the coding were reflected across the data, as part of a process of ‘pattern matching’ (Yin, 2003) as discussed earlier. For Yin, pattern matching involves the identification of how ‘several piece of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical proposition’ (2003: 26). Accordingly, the analysis was able to establish how the analytic themes of regime theory were reflected across the different sub units of analysis in the research. For example, key differences were identified in regards to the narratives around the governing arrangements within policy discourses and those espoused by practitioners. The identification of these instances of convergence and divergence through the data analysis were key in structuring the findings of the research and the fundamental distinction made between the rhetoric of the regime and the operational practices of community safety work. In presenting the data in a clear and accessible manner, the themes and categories identified during this coding process were used to inform the subsequent discussions and organisation of the findings chapters.

### 3.6 Methodological Limitations

As with any research project, it was necessary to consider its methodological limitations. Given the scope of the study there were significant limitations to what was feasible, given the time and resources available. Firstly, due to the focus on the governance of crime, disorder and safety and the breadth of work that this entails, rather than focussing on one specific aspect of the community safety agenda, the research was at risk of spreading itself too thinly. This can be seen in relation to the interviews and the sample employed, whereby, I only interviewed those with senior responsibility as this enabled me to look at differences between workstream and neighbourhood management areas. While it
would have been desirable to speak to others involved in these activities, given the scope of the research such an approach would not have been feasible within the time frame. To some extent the participant observation and documentary analysis mitigated this problem, however it was still necessary to acknowledge that the interview data was skewed to more senior positions, and therefore, may not reflect the opinions of those at the level delivery but who do not possess senior positions in these arrangements.

A further limitation to the research concerns the use of participant observation in relation to community safety work in Cardiff. As alluded to earlier, changes in the governance structure of community safety in Cardiff has led to the disappearance of the community safety team and raised questions of where and what to observe. While the observation mostly relied upon the policy and partnership team as the ‘base camp’ of the observation work, it was apparent that community safety work was only one aspect of work for this team. Many of the actual processes of governing issues of crime and disorder took place through a range of dispersed meetings, as these were the instances where practitioners met, discussed and negotiated the practicalities of partnership work. While access to some of these meetings was straightforward due to existing contacts developed during my immersion within the partnership team, other meetings were more problematic to access, and often were made more problematic due to staff turnovers, changing roles and responsibilities. Moreover a condition of my access to the partnership team, which I shall discuss shortly, was that I would be engaged in work with, and for, the partnership team. As a result, I was drawn into work with certain people, and not others, which resulted in a differential level of access between different workstream activities and different neighbourhood management areas. However, despite these limitations, the combination of methods used in this research has produced a range of data that was used in a process of triangulation to assist in the validation of the findings. Furthermore given the changes regarding community safety and the governance of crime and disorder in Cardiff this study offers an insight into the challenges of researching community safety practice in this localised and devolved period of community safety.
Gaining access for the ethnographic observation was a long process, and highlighted the relevance of Silverman’s (2001) claims that securing gatekeepers to the field is crucial for developing opportunities for research and gaining access to research sites. In this regard, I was fortunate that my supervisory team were in communication with a potential gatekeeper in the partnership offices of Cardiff Council. Through this relationship I was able to meet with the gatekeeper and organise access for the observation work. In concordance with an emergent mutually beneficial relationship between Cardiff Council and Cardiff University, access to the research site was conditional upon my contribution of research capacity to the partnership team. As a result of this meeting I was granted a desk and computer within the partnership team, a Cardiff Council electronic ID pass to allow me access to the building and access to shared network drives on the Cardiff Council computer network. Undoubtedly this level of access was a significant boon to the research and enabled the collection of data that would otherwise be unattainable.

Access, especially in ethnographic observation work, is not a one-time event but rather is a continuous process throughout the research. While my discussion with the gatekeeper enabled entry into the partnership team, I was continually involved in a process of negotiation and communication to gain access to other areas and people. My immersion within the partnership team did assist in gaining access to these other areas of practice. This was especially true as time progressed and I became a familiar face within the team, as I could use my contacts developed in my observations to assist me by inviting me to meetings, or contacting interview participants in advance to assure them that I was ‘ok’ to talk to. This was particularly helpful when trying to access more senior members of the Cardiff Partnership Board, whereby contacts developed within the partnership team assisted in identifying how best to reach certain individuals. Of further assistance in gaining access, was highlighting the importance of this research for the council and noting that senior officers had endorsed this research. While inevitably some respondents were still non-responsive to interviews and some meetings were not accessible, I would argue that through
the contacts developed during my research, I was able to achieve a far higher response rate to interviews than would be possible otherwise. In this regard the arrangements for access and the reciprocal relationship developed between myself and the council has been greatly beneficial for the research but does necessitate a discussion of how such arrangements for access problematise issues of research ethics and the politics of social science research.

Throughout the research process the aspiration was to become more than a passive observer of changes in community safety and instead aimed towards a position of critical friendship. Such an approach is concordant with the alternative evaluative criteria posed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) of authenticity, which aims to ‘evaluate the quality of the research beyond its methodological dimension’ (Morse et al., 2002: 2). While this places greater emphasis on the value of the research for the participants and the improvements that the research can enable, there have been concerns that issues of validity and reliability can be compromised in such cases (Morse et al., 2002). These issues are particularly salient in this research and relate to the exchanges between Gouldner (1968) and Becker (1967) around partisanship and its place in social research. Throughout the study I was cognisant of the importance of ensuring that I was conducting research of the governing regime not for the governing regime, thereby not compromising the validity and reliability of the research by becoming too aligned or too invested in the agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board. In this regard, it is argued that the evaluative criteria of authenticity is not incompatible with ideas of reliability and validity, due to what Edwards and Sheptycki (2009) term, the ‘formative intentions’ that have guided this research process. In practice this has manifested in the use of multiple methods to help identify potential discrepancies within the research and to ensure that I maintain a critical distance from the data.

As well as the political considerations I also acknowledged the various ethical considerations that arose during the research. Prior to entering the field and during the initial planning of the research strategy, an assessment of the various ethical risks took place and a framework of how to deal with these challenges was developed and submitted to the Cardiff School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee and was duly passed. Further ensuring the ethical rigour of the
research, the ethical guidance provided by the British Society of Criminology (2006) was followed within the research. A key aspect of this guidance is the acquisition of informed consent by research participants. How this consent was obtained depended upon the research method in question and the people being spoken to. For instance, for the interviews I emailed participants with an information form that contained details regarding the research and why I would like to speak to them. Having informed the participants about the research, consent was recorded through the use of written consent forms that were signed prior to commencing the interview. This form included details regarding the voluntary participation in the interview and that they could pull out if desired, the recording and transcribing of the interview, storage and security of the interview transcripts and contact details, should they have any further questions or issues following the interview. A copy of the first contact email, information sheet and consent form are included in Appendix 3, 4 and 5 respectively.

During the participant observation gaining written consent was impractical due to the unplanned nature in which conversations would arise or pertinent issues of observation be identified. In this case, informed consent was seen more as a process rather than a singular event as with the interviews. As part of this process while in negotiations for gaining access to the field I made sure to be clear about the purpose and aims of my research to the gatekeeper and upon entering the field I was introduced to the members of the team and told them about my research. Furthermore, continuing this process I made sure to talk about my research and what I was interested in when first speaking to people to ensure they knew who I was, what I was doing and how I was doing it. Therefore, while no written consent was granted at an individual level with members of the team, my fieldwork was permitted by senior individuals within the team, and those who I would be interacting with on a daily basis were made aware of my role and interests. Similarly with regards to the attendance of meetings, typically these meetings would start with introductions of everyone around the table, which gave me the opportunity of introducing myself, my research and how it was being undertaken. In these cases, informed consent was achieved through the process of informing those around me of my role and position as a researcher.
4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR GOVERNING SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: FROM STATUTORY DUTY TO ‘LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED’?

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Sustained periods of austerity and continued reductions to financial resources have presented significant challenges to the continued commitment to multi-agency crime prevention in Cardiff. This chapter demonstrates how the Cardiff regime has attempted to respond to these challenges through the reformulation of local governing arrangements for partnership work. In contextualising these changes, the chapter uses documentary analysis of local policy documentation and existing research within Cardiff, to chart the development of community safety within the city. In doing so the chapter demonstrates the establishment of a large, well resourced community safety infrastructure in the city which enabled Cardiff to be recognised as a site of good practice and innovation in relation to the local governance of crime and disorder.

The chapter then examines the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff as austerity measures took hold in 2010. These changes saw the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure and the diffusion of responsibility for community safety work under the guise of mainstreaming. Through analysis of recent policy documents, interviews with senior actors and policy officers, and my own observations the chapter examines a dualism in the narratives behind this change. At a strategic policy level, the Cardiff Partnership Board has presented these changes as part of a narrative of progression and improvement for public service delivery that facilitate greater strategic thinking and the pursuit of a more progressive governing agendas. However, counterpoised to this argument of progression, the chapter ends by exploring the impact of these changes, in which it is argued that the governing capacity for community safety work has been compromised. This is seen in the absence of clear lines of operational oversight for community safety and the degradation of community safety expertise.
4.2 THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN CARDIFF: FROM VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS TO STATUTORY DUTY

4.2.1 THE EMERGENCE OF COMMUNITY SAFETY
Tracing the evolution of community safety in Cardiff is not a simple task given the historical nature of the exercise and the paucity of information available. This is particularly true of the period prior to 1997, in the infancy of community safety arrangements, where there was much local variation in partnership arrangements and little locally produced evidence. Despite these constraints, it is still possible to make some claims about how Cardiff fits into the broader narrative of the evolution of crime prevention and community safety in England and Wales based upon some, albeit limited, evidence. Existing evidence pertaining to the actual arrangements for the facilitation of partnership activity in the city during this period is scarce. The only example being the creation of the Cardiff crime prevention panel which is exhibited in an historical timeline produced by the South Wales Police Museum (South Wales Police, 2015). While this evidence is limited, and must be treated with a degree of caution, the timeline provides an overview of the changing nature of policing in South Wales and Cardiff in the 1970s and 1980s. It highlights the significance of the police force restructuring and the closure of a number of police stations across Cardiff, which occurred in response to financial pressures in the early 1990s. In this context of financial crisis the Cardiff crime prevention panel, alongside the endorsement of neighbourhood watch schemes, highlights the emerging recognition of the need to engage other actors in responding to and preventing crime.

There is evidence that Cardiff Council, known then as South Glamorgan County Council, became more formally involved in crime prevention during the 1990s. This was exhibited in research regarding the provision of street lighting and its affects on crime and people in one neighbourhood of Cardiff (Herbert and Moore, 1991). This research points to the pre-eminence of situational prevention techniques in these times. However, it is worth noting the emergence of a narrative that begins to recognise the importance of social approaches to crime.
Better lighting is one element of better control. It needs to be bolstered and sustained by people. A multi-agency, people-intensive approach which involves the whole of the community is the ultimate goal. Improved street lighting is a relatively cheap, focussed ameliorative, to give it lasting effect it must be part of a strategy for change which will cost a good deal more but will be justified if it improves the quality of life and reduces the burden upon society. The Mechanisms for achieving change are already largely in place. There are crime prevention initiatives, there are victim support schemes, there are policing and council services policies to deal with problematic areas. The lighting project is an excellent example of ways in which the responsibility for local authorities for maintenance and improvement of the fabric of the local community can be coordinated with the police. Better lighting, road safety, paved alleys, litter-free streets, dog-control are all roles which the local authority can carry out towards the end of improving the environment. Police and social services have the heavier responsibility of controlling youths and the criminal element but they are all part of the same strategy. Community safety is now a planning and policy priority

Herbert and Moore, 1991: 56-57, emphasis in original.

This quote regarding the infancy of community safety in Cardiff resonates with the broader national narratives on community safety in the early 1990s discussed in Chapter 2, where there was an emergent recognition of the role that local authorities could and should take in regards to crime prevention. This quote demonstrates the beginning of a shift towards multi-agency approaches to addressing the causes and consequences of crime and the recognition that partnership practices should extend beyond situational preventative measures to encompass more holistic approaches to crime and its control. Further research in Cardiff and South Wales by Williamson et al. (1997) noted how youth workers were becoming increasingly concerned with the needs of young people and the value of youth work in pre-empting the onset of problematic and criminal behaviour. So, despite the paucity of data regarding the voluntary period of community safety in Cardiff, what data exists does point to an alignment of the
experiences of Cardiff and the broader national narrative of the evolution of community safety as a policy agenda outlined in Chapter 2.

4.2.2 Statutory Partnerships and Community Safety Infrastructure

Following the 1997 election of the Labour Government and the introduction of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA), community safety arrangements in Cardiff became formalised. Building upon the recommendations of the Morgan Report, the CDA introduced the mandatory requirement to implement multi-agency partnerships orientated around ideas of crime and its prevention in all local authorities in England and Wales. Accordingly, the Cardiff community safety partnership was established in 1998 and, as further stipulated by the CDA, produced community safety strategies setting out the strategic vision for community safety. These documents provide an insight into the evolution of the governing arrangements of community safety during the national mandatory period. The first of these, the 2002-2005 Cardiff community safety strategy, is a 16-page document that provides evidence of the community safety infrastructure and priorities in the early days of the statutory period of community safety from the creation of the partnership in 1998 to 2005. This document, reflecting the infancy of arrangements in this period, provides an overview of the basic governing arrangements and community safety priorities but offers little detail regarding the schemes of cooperation and governing resources afforded community safety in this time.

In accordance with the CDA, the dual responsibility of the local authority and the police in leading the community safety arrangements in Cardiff was evident, with the deputy leader of Cardiff Council and the divisional commander of Cardiff BCU occupying key leading roles for the community safety partnership. The governing arrangements for community safety in this early period were characterised by two key groups. The first, the Community Safety Statutory Partners Leadership Group, fulfilled the statutory requirements set out in the CDA in relation to the participation of the local authority, the police, and the probation, health and fire services and was responsible for the strategic coordination of community safety work.
The second group, the Community Safety Stakeholder group, comprised members of the statutory partners group but also ‘stakeholders from the wider community’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 2). This stakeholder group was responsible for consultation and the monitoring and evaluation of the operational task groups for each priority of the community safety partnership. From 1998-2002 these priority task groups were: recorded crime, burglary, auto crime, race hate crime, homophobic hate crime and domestic violence. In the period of 2002-2005 these task group priorities had changed to anti social behaviour, violent crime and hate crime, drugs, burglary, and auto crime. An examination of these priorities is returned to in Chapter 5, when I assess the governing agenda in Cardiff. While the 2002-2005 strategy document contains little detail about the schemes of cooperation within this period, it does outline who the core governing actors involved in community safety are. It also demonstrates the leadership role of the local authority and the police, in keeping with the requirements set out in the CDA.

The 2005-2008 strategy illustrates the continuation of the structures described in the 2002-2005 strategy. Again, there was a clear delineation between the strategic arrangements for community safety and the operational task groups. Notable, however, was the addition of the Statutory Partners Executive group. This group comprised a more concentrated membership of local partners, consisting of senior officers from Cardiff Council, South Wales Police and Cardiff and Vale University Health Board. The emergence of this group is significant as it sheds light on the dispersal of power within the governing arrangements and the greater power afforded to the local authority, police and local health board. In addition to the introduction of the Statutory Partners Executive group, the Statutory Partners Leadership group had also expanded to encompass a larger membership of partners as required by the Police Reform Act (Home Office, 2002). This expanded membership of the Statutory Partners Leadership group is shown below in Table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Representatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Wales Fire and Rescue Service</td>
<td>Divisional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff Council</td>
<td>The Corporate Director; Deputy Leader, Community Safety Manager, Local Substance Misuse Action Team Manager, Cardiff YOT Manager and Substance Misuse Lead Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Wales Police</td>
<td>BCU Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Wales Police Authority</td>
<td>Executive Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Wales Area Probation Service</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
<td>Area Commander Cardiff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Health Board</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardiff &amp; Vale NHS Trust</td>
<td>Director of Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Wales Fire Authority</td>
<td>Executive Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Criminal Justice Board</td>
<td>Performance Manager</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 1: MEMBERSHIP OF THE STATUTORY PARTNERS LEADERSHIP GROUP, SOURCE: CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 41**

The structures outlined thus far have largely concerned the strategic arrangements for community safety practice in Cardiff, and have provided little insight into the practice of community safety through the operational task groups and the work of the community safety team. This delineation between the strategic partnership groups and the operational task groups is mapped out below in Figure 1, which is taken from the *Cardiff Community Safety Strategy*, a document produced by the Cardiff Community Safety Partnership (2005). These task groups were organised around particular priority issues and were led by task group chairs who were chosen from a range of partner organisations according to their expertise and skills. As part of the management and monitoring of the work undertaken in these task groups, each group was responsible for developing annual action plans. While the 2002-2005 strategy was unclear as to how these task groups were governed and managed, the 2005-2008 strategy is more explicit in this regard and provides an insight into the governing resources afforded to community safety as a key policy agenda during this period.
Like many large local authorities, a significant component of local community safety arrangements under New Labour, was the presence of a dedicated community safety team, an example of what Gilling et al. termed ‘extensive bureau-professional multi-agency teams’ (2013: 329). The community safety team served an intermediary function between the individual task groups and the strategic level community safety groups, and ‘played a key role in coordinating the work of the statutory and responsible public authorities’ (Gilling et al., 2013: 329). As seen in Table 2, below, the community safety team comprised a number of dedicated support officers tasked with facilitating the partnership response to crime and disorder in the city. Furthermore, the team served as the site for the development and accumulation of community safety expertise and knowledge (Hughes and Gilling, 2004). The roles of the officers within the community safety team ranged from dedicated administrative and financial staff to operational support through researchers, data analysts, anti-social behaviour case
workers and substance misuse workers. These practitioners provided informational and organisational governing resources to facilitate partnership work in the city for purposes of crime and disorder prevention and reduction. The size of the community safety team reflected the sizable commitment of financial resources to community safety during this period. An overview of the team is included below, in Table 2. Within this team, the role of the community safety coordinator was particularly important due to their responsibility for ensuring that the task groups were ‘operating smoothly and effectively’ and ‘within their defined “terms of reference”’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005: 34). Alongside the community safety manager, these two posts provided an important function in the coordination and strategic management of the disparate elements of community safety work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety Manager</td>
<td>Responsible for managing the Community Safety Team and for community safety issues within Cardiff Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) Coordinator</td>
<td>Responsible for the coordination and implementation of a Council wide ASBO policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBO Caseworker (x2)</td>
<td>Provides casework and takes victim statements in the preparation of ASBOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCSP Coordinator</td>
<td>Coordinates the activities of the CCSP. Also organises the CCSP task groups and monitors their activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Officer</td>
<td>Provides administrative support to the CCSP and the Council team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Officer</td>
<td>Provides specialist research and policy skills to inform the Partnership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Officer</td>
<td>Provides specialist skills in Designing Out Crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Officer</td>
<td>Employed on a part-time basis to provide specialist financial advice to Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substance Misuse Coordinator</td>
<td>Coordinates a city wide response to Substance Misuse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Officer</td>
<td>The contact for council based initiatives and responsible for performance monitoring CCSP interventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications Officer</td>
<td>Responsible for developing and implementing a Communications Strategy for the CCSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Analyst</td>
<td>Provides specialist analytical skills to inform the CCSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Time Economy Coordinator</td>
<td>Coordinates city center response to alcohol related issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Cardiff Community Safety Team, Source: Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005: 38
In understanding the importance of this community safety infrastructure during this national mandatory period of community safety, it is helpful to refer to the work of Edwards et al. (2007) and their distinction between ‘minimal’ and ‘maximal’ models of community safety within Wales. The community safety infrastructure described here in Cardiff is reflective of Edwards et al.’s (2007) categorisation of a maximal model. For Edwards et al., these maximal models are typified by well-resourced community safety teams that ‘envisage a strategic leadership role for the head/manager of community safety’ (2007:18). For Edwards et al., the seniority of these senior community safety managers was integral in equipping ‘them with the capacity to make firm commitments about local authority’s contribution to CSP and, in return, secure commitments on action from other responsible authorities’ (2007: 20). These discussions highlight the importance of the role the community safety manager played in negotiating with senior officials in other partner organisations to facilitate partnership work around community safety. As Edwards et al. note the power available to the community safety manager to do this was contingent upon the size of the community safety infrastructure as the greater size and resources provided greater leverage in encouraging cooperation. Accordingly, those smaller local authorities with ‘minimal’ models of community safety ‘struggled to commit resources from key services within the local authority’ (Edwards et al., 2007: 20).

The resources afforded to community safety and, in turn, the size of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff therefore marks it as a relatively fortunate local authority. Linking back to the conceptual framework of this research, this maximal model of community safety in Cardiff helps explain how cooperation for community safety was mobilised in this national mandatory period. The size and scale of the community safety infrastructure can be seen to have performed a vital function in leveraging and encouraging cooperation from other stakeholders. The strategic functions of the community safety manager and the community safety coordinator was likely to have played a key part in promoting engagement from other actors and providing strategic oversight of community safety practice. The community safety team can also be seen to have provided significant informational and organisational resources for the
facilitation of partnership activity. Therefore the community safety infrastructure, and its role in facilitating partnership work is important considering the changes to the community safety infrastructure that have taken place in recent years. These changes will now be examined.

4.3 THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE

4.3.1 THE NEED FOR SCRUTINY, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ‘NEIGHBOURHOOD’

During the national mandatory period under the Labour Governments of 1997-2010, the Cardiff Community Safety Partnership became recognised as a site of good practice in terms of partnership working and information sharing. Work around tackling alcohol related violence in the city through improvements to information sharing protocols were increasingly recognised as being effective and worth emulating (Caerphilly County Borough Council, 2005; Accounts Commission, 2000). Likewise, Cardiff’s response to domestic violence was held up ‘as an example of best practice’ both in national media (BBC, 2005: para 1) and in academic work (Maguire and Brookman, 2011; Robinson, 2006). Similarly, examples of effective partnership working around the night-time economy, highlighted by respondents during this research, were developed during this period. Despite these perceived successes and the financial resources afforded to community safety work in Cardiff, there remained indications that improvements were needed.

The distribution of power and the dominance of council officers in the community safety arrangements at the time echoes Edwards et al.’s comments regarding the ‘officer-driven’ nature of community safety work in Wales (2007). In an attempt to redress this balance and encourage greater participation by elected members - as well as addressing broader concerns that community safety arrangements were becoming ‘talking shops’ rather than effective partnership arrangements - a number of changes were introduced. Cardiff, in line with the legislative changes of the Police and Justice Act 2006, introduced annual community safety reviews as well as mechanisms for the scrutiny of community safety practice by local authorities. This scrutiny was conducted through Cardiff
Council’s Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee (CASSC) that met on a monthly basis. More significantly, this legislation led to the emergence of a substantial change in local governing arrangements in Cardiff in response to perceived barriers to the realisation of section 17 of the CDA and the mainstreaming of community safety in the city. Reports produced by the CASSC exemplify this concern. The following extract is taken from a progress report of an inquiry carried out by the Scrutiny Research Team into the structure for the delivery of community safety, in particular, into the compliance of Cardiff Council with section 17 of the CDA.

The Inquiry members were concerned at the lack of mainstreaming of community safety into all service provision. Community Safety is not extensively integrated into service area business planning processes or considered in the formulation of new policies and services.

The Inquiry received evidence of a number of key barriers to effective mainstreaming, including: low organisational awareness of Section 17 duty; lack of available information and training on Section 17 duty; lack of recording of cost of crime to council services and assets; inconsistent recording of incidents of crime across service areas; and community safety information not shared extensively between service areas.

CASSC, 2008: 3

A key point of consideration for the improvement of partnership working involved examining the organisational levels at which partnership commitments were negotiated and organised. While the community safety manager was able to secure commitments at a senior level within council directorates and other partner organisations, the scrutiny committee report suggested that these commitments were not being realised further down the hierarchy. In response to these challenges a neighbourhood transformation programme was proposed which placed greater emphasis upon locally based partnerships to facilitate local cooperation. By encouraging greater communication and organisation of partnership practices between local practitioners, it was argued that the programme would lead to more sustainable cooperation in addition to encouraging greater community engagement as alluded to in the following extract:
The aim of the Neighbourhood Transformation programme is to ‘design, develop and implement a sustainable model for citizen-focused, intelligence-led, problem-oriented multi-agency neighbourhood management across Cardiff’

CASSC, 2009: para 13

This neighbourhood transformation programme emerged in 2007 following broader reviews of public service delivery in Wales, including the Welsh Government review ‘Making Connections’ (Welsh Government, 2006). Alongside this, national changes, in particular the implementation of neighbourhood policing, were placing greater emphasis on the importance of local neighbourhoods as the site for effective governance. In 2009, the neighbourhood transformation programme developed into the Cardiff neighbourhood management programme, which, building upon existing neighbourhood policing team boundaries, consisted of six areas covering the 29 electoral divisions of Cardiff. These neighbourhood management areas consisted of a local partnership structure chaired by a senior council manager and were designed to promote local level engagement between local partners. Typically these partners included local council officers, the existing neighbourhood policing teams, fire station commanders, local schools, health clinics, doctors’ surgeries and elements of the voluntary sector. The absence of representation from the community fits with the broader narratives around these sorts of arrangements, which tend to ‘manage’ communities, rather than actively working with them (Foster, 2002; Taylor, 2003). These partnership teams were tasked with the following core objectives:

- To understand neighbourhoods;
- Develop partnership working;
- Improve service delivery;
- Communicate improvements and changes; and
- Promote community cohesion and community engagement.

Welsh Government, 2010: 2

To achieve these goals each neighbourhood management area was allocated a budget of £10,000, as well as access to a £400,000 neighbourhood management budget upon submission of a ‘business case’ to the transforming neighbourhoods
tasking group. This tasking group consisted of high level individuals from the council, the police, health and fire services, and the six neighbourhood management chairs, and was responsible for providing ‘strategic support’ and ‘strategically coordinating activities and allocating resources’ (Welsh Government, 2010: 2). Both Cardiff Council and Welsh Government regarded the first year of the neighbourhood management programme positively. It was claimed that there had ‘been a notable reduction in crime and anti-social behaviour…including 5,192 fewer victims of crime over the 12 months to June 2010’ (Welsh Government, 2010: 1). The perceived successes of the neighbourhood management approach to governing crime and disorder in Cardiff were further recognised at a national level following the receipt of a Tilley award in 2010 for integrating partnership and problem solving approaches into their work.

4.3.2 The blurring of boundaries and the need for integration

Alongside neighbourhood based innovations, broader changes to public service delivery were also taking place following the 2006 Beecham report into public service delivery in Wales. The Beecham report highlighted a divergence between Wales and England in the development of public services. Whereas public service delivery in England was developing in line with a consumer model - where public services were to be improved through increased choice and increased competition - in Wales it was argued that public services should be developed according to the ‘citizen model’ of service delivery:

> In the citizen model, exit is not the driver of improvement. The model relies on voice to drive improvement, together with system design, effective management and regulation, all operating in the interests of the citizen

Beecham, 2006: para 2.14

To achieve this, the Beecham report recommended substantial changes to public service delivery in Wales as ‘the citizen model cuts across the culture and

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2 The Tilley award encourages the recognition of good practice in implementing innovative approaches to crime and disorder reduction (Williams, 2007)
working practices of traditional public service delivery organisations’ and required a ‘weakening of organisational boundaries’ (Beecham, 2006: para 2.17). Under the citizen model, the effective governance of social problems required far greater coordination and integration of public services at a local level and greater strategic thinking. The report noted three main barriers to the realisation of the citizen model: culture, capacity and complexity. The third of these, complexity, is worth briefly highlighting, as it is something that is returned to later in this chapter. The Beecham report argued that ‘there is a widely held view that there are far too many partnerships and that they are not sufficiently effective in improving delivery’ (Beecham, 2006: para 3.51). It went on to state that the ‘Police Service in Wales expressed frustration at the limited impact of the Community Safety Partnerships, in tackling substance misuse and its impact on health, employment and community safety’ (Beecham, 2006: para 3.55). This is an important point as it relates to the fundamental frictions around leadership for community safety and the compromise of joint leadership between the police and local authorities implemented under the Crime and Disorder Act. The police’s frustration in regards to the ineffective partnership practices around substance misuse points to the challenges of mobilising cooperation for certain partner organisations around particular community safety objectives. These problems of incentivising cooperation can be linked to the limitations of joint leadership arrangements for community safety, which inhibit the mobilisation of other partners to engage around community safety objectives. This issue of leadership is important when considering the subsequent changes to the governing arrangements and agendas for community safety in 2010, and will be returned to later in this chapter and in Chapter 5.

The Welsh Government set out its response to the Beecham report in the document Making Connections – Delivering Beyond Boundaries: transforming public services in Wales (2006). Building upon the recommendations of the Beecham report, the Welsh Government sought to introduce Local Service Boards (LSBs) to ‘bring together the key contributors to local service delivery’ (Welsh Government, 2006: 3) and to break down organisational boundaries and facilitate more ‘joined up’ public services. These recommendations made within the Making Connections paper are important when considering the power
relations of local governance as they sought a fundamental redistribution of power within local governing arrangements in Wales. This talk concerning the breaking down of organisational boundaries and more joined up delivery, is a managerialist discourse employed by the Welsh Government, that disguised a repositioning of the local authority as the ‘lead’ actor in local governing arrangements given that it also stated ‘local authorities will provide the enabling locus for Local Service Boards’ (Welsh Government, 2006: 9). The repositioning of the local authority as the lead actor in the governing arrangements is significant for this research and wider discussions of community safety given the historical contest of power between the police and local authorities. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Morgan Report advocated for a clear leadership role of local authorities in local community safety arrangements, which was eschewed in favour of dual leadership alongside the police, when introduced as part of the Crime and Disorder Act.

In progressing the Welsh Government agenda around LSBs, Cardiff was chosen as a pilot area, and in 2007 the Cardiff LSB was established. Its membership comprised of chief executives from Cardiff Council, Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, South Wales Fire and Rescue Service, South Wales Police (Cardiff BCU), Cardiff Third Sector Council and the Welsh Government’s Director General for Local Government and Communities. In line with the rhetoric of the Beecham inquiry, the LSB was envisioned as a lead partnership, responsible for the overall strategic direction of public services in Cardiff, driving forward partnership working in all areas of service delivery and to facilitate the strategic governance of social problems in the city. Discussions regarding the LSB and broader issues of public service delivery in Wales outlined here are important for considering the changes that were made to the governing arrangements around community safety in Cardiff and will be returned to shortly. However, before doing so, it is worth examining the extent of the financial challenge in Cardiff following the 2010 election of the Coalition Government and the commencement of austerity measures.
4.4 The Financial Challenge in Cardiff

As discussed in Chapter 2, the significance of the election of the Coalition Government for community safety results from the decentralisation of power and the responsibilisation of local authorities, the introduction of regional PCCs and the extensive reduction of financial resources to the public sector, and local government in particular (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Since the commencement of the austerity agenda, the amount of financial resources available to Cardiff Council has decreased as a result of both shrinking budgets and increasing demand for services, a situation echoed across all local authorities in Wales (WLGA, 2015). In 2010-2011 Cardiff Council was required to make budgetary savings of £14 million, followed by £22 million in 2011-2012, £14.4 million in 2012-2013 and £19.2 million in 2013-2014. Therefore, in the four years preceding this research, Cardiff Council had experienced budget reductions totalling £69.6 million. The year on year cuts experienced in the four years prior to 2014-15, although significant, were notably less than the financial challenges posed in 2014-15.

Welsh Government funding had largely protected Welsh local authorities from the scale of cuts experienced in England from 2010-2014. This protection was not sustainable and, facing a continued commitment to austerity in Westminster, Welsh Government reduced the amount of funding allocated to Cardiff Council from £463.6 million to £450.2 million. This reduction in funding from Welsh Government, which had previously been increasing year on year (from £400 million in 2010-2011), coincided with increasing budgetary pressures. Thus in 2014-15 the amount of financial savings required to be made by Cardiff Council totalled £52 million. £4 million of this was to be funded through increases in council tax, and the remaining £48 million was to be achieved through cost and efficiency savings. Given the extent of the cuts in the preceding four years, amounting to close to £70 million, and the unprecedented levels of savings to be achieved in 2014-2015, this represented a substantial challenges to the governing capacity of Cardiff Council. The extent of these pressures can be seen below in Table 3, which outlines the budget savings required in each financial year since 2009/10.
South Wales Police have also been subject to significant financial pressure. According to the 2014-2018 medium term financial budget and the Police and Crime plan 2014-17, (both produced by the PCCs Office) South Wales Police have faced a budget gap of £38 million from 2010 to 2014, with a further £10 million budget gap in 2014-15. This was estimated to account for roughly 20% of the force’s budget. Much of this budget gap has been addressed through efficiency savings and staff losses.

The Police and Crime Plan states, that in the last four years, the number of police officers employed in South Wales has fallen from 3400 to little over 2800. As with local authorities in Wales, the Welsh Government has attempted to mitigate the impact of these budget cuts through the funding of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs). In 2011-12 325 fulltime PCSO positions in South Wales Police were funded by the Home Office and zero by Welsh Government. By 2014, the number of PCSOs funded by the Home Office had reduced to 200, however this reduction was mitigated by the funding of 206 PCSOs by Welsh Government.

The financial challenge outlined here in relation to Cardiff Council and South Wales Police was also compounded by budget reductions targeted at Cardiff and Vale University Health Board and the local voluntary sector, therefore presenting a significant reduction in the governing capacity of public services in Cardiff.

More specifically to community safety, as part of the Coalition Government’s austerity strategy, there had been a significant disinvestment in the community safety agenda in England and Wales. This was evidenced in Cardiff with the reduction of the community safety fund from £369,000 in 2010/11 to £149,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Million (£)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/11</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/12</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/13</td>
<td>14.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013/14</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>52.4</td>
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TABLE 3: BUDGET SHORTFALLS 2009-2015
in 2012/13 (Home Office, 2011a). Further problematising the allocation of resources for community safety was the regionalisation of the community safety fund. Previously, the fund was granted to the local authority but, as of 2014-15, responsibility for the fund has been afforded to the PCC. This reallocation of the community safety fund from the local to the regional level created power dependencies between the local Cardiff regime and the regional PCC office. Moreover, the regionalisation of community safety funding and its positioning with the PCC present a possible tension with the Welsh Government’s vision for the local authority as the leader in local partnership arrangements.

Due to the salience of this issue and the potential impact of the PCCs upon local partnership arrangements (Gilling et al., 2013) it is worth noting how the PCC has been received in Cardiff. The PCC for South Wales Police (and therefore Cardiff) is a Labour candidate who was involved in the creation of the Crime and Disorder Act. The reception of the PCC amongst practitioners encountered during this research was mixed. Some spoke positively of the PCC and their involvement with the Crime and Disorder Act, regarding Cardiff as relatively fortunate given the strong ties of the PCC to the community safety and crime prevention agenda. This view was apparent in an interview with a senior practitioner involved with the youth offending team:

[…] he [the PCC] takes a great interest in what we do because he, to be fair to him, does understand the argument, you grab ’em young and you divert where you can and then chances are they are far less likely to become adult offenders and be in and out of prison for the rest of their days basically.

Youth Offending Service Practitioner

In contrast to this more positive outlook, some members of the partnership team were more critical of the PCC. During a conversation with one practitioner in the partnership team, they commented upon the PCC’s lack of cooperation around the governing arrangements in Cardiff, in particular the neighbourhood management model. This was noted during one quarterly meeting of the safer
and cohesive communities programme board\(^3\), the first of which, I was informed, the PCC had attended. As the meeting progressed, attention turned to the potential expansion of neighbourhood watch schemes leading to a discussion of the role of neighbourhood management in facilitating this. This culminated in an exchange around the utility of the neighbourhood management teams, as the following extract from fieldnotes shows:

While the PCC recognised the function of the neighbourhood partnerships he was resistant to their role in facilitating engagement with the neighbourhood watch. This was met by immediate frustration by some around the table who retorted that all of the organisations have agreed to work to these boundaries and that it is important that these arrangements should be used. To lend credence to their point they invited one of the neighbourhood partnership chairs to share their opinion on the subject, after which the PCC conceded the point but without committing to any decision.

Fieldnotes 25/07/14

This extract points towards tension between the agendas of the Cardiff regime and the regional power of the PCC. This contest of wills around the community safety agenda and how local governance is best achieved within Cardiff places strain on the governing capacity of the Cardiff regime in realising its agenda. This point is explored further in Chapter 5, when I consider the differences between the strategic agendas of the PCCs Office and the Cardiff Partnership Board.

In terms of governing arrangements, there was evidence of an emerging regional infrastructure for community safety work developing under the PCC in which some partnership activity, formerly under the remit of the Cardiff community safety partnership, had migrated towards. This was seen in the relocation of the violence reduction partnership. Formerly a task group of the Cardiff community safety partnership, following the organisational restructure within Cardiff, there

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\(^3\) The safer and cohesive communities programme board was a meeting of the senior practitioners involved in the delivery of community safety work with a senior official within the governing arrangements.
has been a breakdown of local arrangements for the pursuit of this work as recounted by one member of the partnership team:

[...] the violent crime task group when I spoke to **** who is the chair of that violent crime task group, he’s never been contacted since the community safety partnership has been dissolved, he’s never been contacted by anyone from community safety Partnership Officer

In the absence of local support provided under the new governing arrangements in Cardiff, the work of this group had been picked up and supported by the PCC at a regional level. Alongside this, conversations with local practitioners indicated an emerging body of community safety expertise being developed at the PCC’s Office. While evidence of any impact of this emerging regional infrastructure was not yet apparent during my research, these points nevertheless raise questions for future research into how this regional and local relationship between the PCC and local authority actors develops. What is clear however, is that the combination of austerity and the introduction of the PCCs presents a significant challenge to the capacity of local governing regimes to take advantage of the greater autonomy presented by localism.

The chapter now considers how local actors in Cardiff have sought to respond to these challenges by adapting the governing arrangements for partnership work. This consideration examines two competing narratives behind these changes. The following section, examines how changes to the governing arrangements have been positioned as a positive progression of local governance. The subsequent section, section 4.6, demonstrates how the changes can be viewed as a regression of the partnership infrastructure necessitated by austerity, which has resulted in a degradation of governing capacity for community safety.

4.5 LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY: PROGRESSIVE OPPORTUNITY?

4.5.1 REDUCING COMPLEXITY

As identified in the literature review, despite the reduction in the community safety fund, and the impact of PCCs, some commentators have highlighted the
opportunities presented by localism and the loosening of central government control (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). Similarly, others have speculated that austerity may encourage changes that might be perceived as beneficial but ‘politically difficult in more favourable economic circumstances’ (Faulkner, 2012: 22). These arguments are prevalent in the discourse of senior policy officials and senior managers and are persistent throughout the strategic documentation, which outlines the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff.

The origins of the changes to the governing arrangements can be traced back to the introduction of the Local Service Board in Cardiff in 2007 and the recommendations made by the Beecham inquiry (2006) and the Welsh government paper, Building Connections (2006) discussed earlier. Tied up within these documents was the assessment that partnership arrangements in Wales had become increasingly complex. Senior policy officers within Cardiff adopted this argument of complexity when referring to the partnership arrangements in Cardiff before 2010 as ‘partnership complexity’ in conversation. For reference this complexity is illustrated in Figure 2, overleaf.

Figure 2, taken from a policy document, outlines the different partnership structures that had evolved over the years of successive Labour Governments. In the diagram, these structures are denoted by four colours, with the community safety infrastructure mapped in green. The interconnections between these structures are shown by the red lines and demonstrate the shared interests of the different partnership structures. This diagram provides a helpful portrayal of the arguments presented within the policy discourse, and the advocacy for the reduction of complexity through the rationalisation of ‘existing arrangements to reduce duplication and increase effectiveness’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2012a: 6).
Statutory Partnership Complexity...
4.5.2 The Creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board

This process of rationalisation commenced in 2009 when the Local Service Board began taking a more pivotal role in the strategic governance of the city; beginning with the initial integration of the four statutory partnership plans into a single Integrated Partnership Strategy. This integrated partnership strategy was designed to set out a ‘shared agenda’ for every partner agency within the Local Service Board with the aim of facilitating a more strategic approach to local governance. This integrated plan would go on to form the Cardiff ‘What Matters’ strategy, which sets out the strategic governing agenda within Cardiff and forms the focus of Chapter 5. In 2010 this process of integration was taken further, with the integration of the various partnership structures into the Local Service Board, which had been rebranded as the Cardiff Partnership Board. The integration of these partnership structures into the Cardiff Partnership Board represents a substantial reformulation of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, and of importance for this thesis, had significant implications for community safety work in the city. Before exploring the effect of this integration of partnership structures on community safety work, it is worth examining the Cardiff Partnership Board and the new governing arrangements it entailed in more detail.

The Cardiff Partnership Board represented the centre of the new governing arrangements and was responsible for the strategic management and direction of partnership work in the city. This included community safety given the integration of the community safety partnership. Recognising this, it stated that the Cardiff Partnership is responsible for ‘overseeing the operational delivery of ‘What Matters’, the governing agenda in Cardiff’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2012a: 16). As discussed in Chapter 3, due to this strategic management role, it is argued that the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the core members that constituted it, represented the governing regime in Cardiff during this research. Building upon the arrangements of the existing Local Service Board the Cardiff Partnership Board consisted of a core membership of chief executives, or persons of equivalent position, from seven partner organisations:

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4 These four plans were the Health Social Care and Well Being Strategy, the Community Safety Action Plan, the Children and Young People’s Plan and the Community Strategy.
The addition of a representative from the probation service resulted from the integration of the community safety partnership and the statutory obligations that go with it in terms of partner engagement. These seven officials formed the permanent members of the Cardiff Partnership Board and therefore represented the core actors of the governing regime in Cardiff. In terms of the powers of this board, its terms of reference state that ‘the Board is not a formal decision-making body with executive powers’ and that decisions will be ‘agreed by consensus among the full members’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2016a: para 7). This idea of agreed consensus is relevant to the analytical framework underpinning this research, which seeks an understanding of how this ‘consensus’ is actually reached and the importance of local power dynamics in influencing this. Crucially, the terms of reference, and other policy documentation, are relatively silent on the issues of leadership within the Cardiff Partnership Board and the language of consensus is suggestive of a partnership of equals. However, as discussed previously guidance produced by the Welsh Government relating to integrated partnership boards does offer some indication that all is not equal within these partnership arrangements, due to its recommendation that local authorities should take the lead in these arrangements (Welsh Government, 2012).

This was somewhat played out in this research. My examination of meeting minutes of the Cardiff Partnership Board indicated a consistent greater presence of local authority officials at these meetings. Moreover, the perception of local authority dominance was also noted in a report put forward to the Cardiff
Partnership Board which stated that there was not ‘enough clarity over different partners’ roles and responsibilities’ and that ‘there was also a view that partnership working is Council led’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2014a: 5). This dominance of the local authority in the new governing arrangements was also noted by a senior practitioner during an:

I’ve heard of people in the third sector who have complained that it’s all very well these partnership arrangements but the local authority is in charge, and they resent that. Unfortunately the programme boards I think every single one of them is chaired by a local authority senior manager. Well you are not finding much favour with small third sector organisations because y’know the local authority is the big elephant in the room they’re bloody everywhere and in charge of everything

Local Practitioner

While definitive evidence of these power relations in action was difficult to acquire given the backstage nature of such interactions, the dominance of Cardiff Council within the governing arrangements was clearly apparent and not altogether unsurprising given the size and breadth of its responsibilities. The greater influence afforded to Cardiff Council within the governing regime had a significant impact upon the development of the strategic agenda through the production of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This is discussed in more detail shortly when considering some of the arguments made in favour of the new governing arrangements for community safety that allude to a lessening influence of the police and the potential for more progressive agendas. Before this, however, it is worth elaborating on a discussion of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, and the mechanisms for community safety delivery that are managed by the Cardiff Partnership Board.

Sitting underneath the Cardiff Partnership Board and building upon the innovations provided by the emergence of neighbourhood management, the operational delivery of the strategic partnership agenda was organised through two primary mechanisms. Firstly, through one of eight thematic programme boards that addressed issues that were perceived to exist at a city-wide level. The second mechanism was the neighbourhood management structure, which aimed to address local issues specific to certain geographic localities and required more
localised partnership responses. This rationalised structure is illustrated below in Figure 3, which is taken from documentation produced by the Cardiff Partnership Board. Where Figure 2 (page 101) was presented as statutory partnership complexity, Figure 3, overleaf, presents a visualisation of the integrated partnership structure and the bifurcated modes of delivery through the neighbourhood management model on the left and the eight thematic programme boards on the right. This bifurcated delivery model is important for discussions of community safety and is worth examining.

Beginning with the eight thematic programme boards, these are strategic boards that meet on a quarterly basis and are responsible for determining practice around one of eight broad policy agendas. Membership of these boards varies according to the policy focus, but typically comprise a range of actors from partner organisations both within and outside of the public sector. As seen in Figure 3, these policy agendas are organised around eight thematic areas:

- Family and Young People
- Education Development
- Safer and Cohesive Communities
- Older People
- Emotional, Mental Health and Wellbeing
- Healthy Living
- Thriving and Prosperous Economy
- Urban Environment

The feel good language deployed in these broad thematic areas is itself worthy of a passing mention, as how could anyone disagree with the priorities ‘healthy living’, ‘thriving and prosperous economy’, or noteworthy for this thesis ‘safer and cohesive communities’? The framing of these thematic areas in such broad, and inclusive terms can be understood in relation to earlier discussions of the Beecham inquiry. These eight thematic areas, covered by the programme boards, have been designed to cross organisational boundaries so that responsibility for these groups cannot be left to any singular agency or group in an attempt to promote partnership working.
The restructuring of the governing arrangements through the integration of the partnership structures and the introduction of the programme boards can be seen as a continuation of the trends of local governance that emerged following the Beecham report. In this sense, the narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board suggests that the reorganisation of governing arrangements in Cardiff was not a reaction to austerity but, rather, a continuation of the path set in motion in the latter years of the New Labour Government. This is supported by the Welsh Government who refer to the Cardiff Partnership Board as an example of good practice and recommend ‘that a single integrated plan should replace at least four of the existing statutory plans and strategies…thereby reducing complexity and duplication, and freeing up resources’ (Welsh Government, 2012: 1-2). Given the extent of austerity outlined previously, this narrative is perhaps a little surprising, and as will be explored over the course of the next three chapters, there is substantial reason to question these claims. Yet, for the moment, it is worth continuing this line of enquiry before exploring some of the more contested aspects of this narrative.

4.5.2 The possibility of more progressive agendas

The Welsh Government support of the organisational restructuring is largely in relation to the benefits it poses in a managerial sense as it contributes towards more efficient and less complex local governance structures. These benefits of reducing organisational complexity and facilitating more effective and joined up public services are argued to lead to more effective and progressive community safety agendas in the city. Related to this, the organisational restructuring and integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board is presented within the policy discourse as a way of challenging the dominance of the police in agenda setting. This is particularly important given the legacy of community safety and the role of the police in influencing the agenda in favour of more narrow conceptions of crime and disorder prevention (Crawford and Evans, 2012). This argument that the changes to the governing arrangements had facilitated a reduced influence of the police on the community safety agenda was remarked upon during discussions with policy officers, as evidenced in the following interview extract:
[...] now the community safety sort of element of the partnership, as its not its own partnership is more inclusive, its broader, it looks at wider issues than just the sort of the police focus and its less driven by the crime stats which was the old community safety partnership used to be very driven by that.

Policy Officer

This argument builds upon the points made earlier regarding the problems of not adequately mainstreaming community safety as a policy agenda within Cardiff. This was argued to result in a lack of concern for issues of community safety across the different directorates of the council and amongst other partners. Instead, concerns of community safety were argued to have been confined to those directly involved in the community safety partnership, in particular the police, which therefore inhibited attempts to provide a more holistic approach to problems of crime and disorder. Through the integration of the community safety partnership into the Cardiff Partnership Board it was argued by senior officials that community safety would be more effectively mainstreamed as a policy agenda. During an interview with a senior director within Cardiff Council who was responsible for community safety, it was outlined that this diffusion of responsibility for community safety work had facilitated a wider engagement of partners and allowed the community safety agenda to move in a more progressive direction:

When I asked [the senior director] about the progression of community safety in Cardiff they suggested that the old Community Safety Partnership structure did have some very positive aspects and was well regarded, but ultimately there were substantial problems. These problems were described as lack of connection of the community safety partnership with other council agencies, the dominance of the police in agenda setting and the lack of engagement from other organisations like health, education and social services. Following mainstreaming of community safety through the integration of the community safety team and the introduction of the Cardiff Partnership Board, these problems were argued to have improved. The police were argued to hold less power in determining community safety agendas and engagement from other council directorates and partner agencies was far more common.

Fieldnotes 06/08/14
What is apparent in this extract and the interview extract previously, is that the new governing arrangements have been argued to alter the local dynamics of power for community safety away from the police in favour of the local authority and other partner organisations. This is consistent with the earlier discussions relating to the increased dominance of Cardiff Council in the new arrangements. These changes have been argued to facilitate more progressive and transformative agendas for community safety. Within the ‘What Matters’ strategy, and echoed by individuals involved at a strategic level within the governing arrangements, it is evident that the changes to the governing arrangements are not being presented as negative, or as reaction to austerity, but rather as a move towards more effective public services and allowing more progressive and transformative agendas for community safety. Yet, for all the talk of mainstreaming and diffusion of responsibility for community safety, partnership work around ideas of community safety is still principally delivered through the two mechanisms outlined earlier, either through one of the eight thematic programme boards or as part of the neighbourhood management teams.

4.5.3 Locating Community Safety

The primary programme board for community safety work was the safer and cohesive communities programme board. Participants within this research frequently referred to the safer and cohesive communities programme board as the *de-facto* replacement infrastructure for the community safety partnership. This is unsurprising given the similarities between the safer and cohesive communities programme board and the prior infrastructure of the community safety partnership. The programme board is chaired by a senior director in Cardiff Council who holds responsibility for the strategic oversight of workstream activities undertaken as part of the programme board. These workstream activities are directly comparable to the ‘task groups’ of the community safety partnership in that they represent the priorities of the safer and cohesive communities programme board and comprise issues such as domestic violence and the night-time economy. Similar to the task groups of the

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5 The extent to which this is realised in the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is discussed in Chapter 5
community safety partnership, these workstream activities are coordinated by lead officers who are responsible for driving forward partnership activity in these areas. The operational practices of these workstream activities are discussed in Chapter 6.

While there are similarities between the programme board and the community safety partnership, to equate the two would ignore some fundamental differences. Where the community safety partnership constituted a substantial infrastructure of dedicated officers for the pursuit and support of community safety work, the safer and cohesive communities programme board is a quarterly board meeting of key individuals. Attending these meetings would typically be the lead practitioner for each priority workstream, local authority employed policy officers, representatives from the police, probation service, the third sector and representatives from local universities. These meetings were designed to give opportunities to the workstream leads to report on progress and identify any barriers to progression rather than providing direct support and coordination to the delivery of these activities. Even then, the support provided to the workstream leads in these meetings was limited, as observed in a programme board meeting that I attended, in which little attention was paid to the actual operational practices of the workstream:

During the meeting little time was afforded to discussions of the actual delivery and partnership practices of the workstream activities. Much of the meeting was taken up by a presentation given by the PCC, and while there was some discussion of the progress of some of the workstreams, actual discussions of problem solving and coordination of partnership activity was absent.

Fieldnotes 25/07/14

These observations of the programme board meeting question the role and capacity of the programme board to provide any degree of support and coordination to the workstreams. This was an issue raised in an interview with one practitioner who attended these meetings on a regular basis and was concerned that it had ‘started to become a bit of a talking shop, it has started to become a place where people have come to do presentations’. Therefore in
contrast to the support provided by the previous community safety infrastructure, the new arrangement through the safer and cohesive communities programme board is more limited in the support that it provides to the operational practices of community safety. Furthermore, where the community safety partnership had dedicated community safety officers, under the new arrangements such provision has been integrated into a non-specialised partnership team who offer support for all partnership activity in the city, of which community safety forms a small part. These differences cannot be ignored, and are returned to shortly when considering the implications of the changes to the governing arrangements and how they contrast with the progressive narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board.

The other mechanism through which community safety work is delivered is through the neighbourhood management teams. As with the other governing arrangements in the city, the neighbourhood management structure did not escape the restructure of the governing arrangements. The biggest change to the neighbourhood management structure stemmed from the mainstreaming of community safety within the Cardiff Partnership Board. When first introduced, the neighbourhood management teams were exclusively tasked with addressing issues of crime and disorder as part of the Cardiff community safety partnership. As a result of mainstreaming through the integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board the scope of the neighbourhood management teams was extended to include issues regarding health, education and any other problem perceived to affect particular neighbourhoods. As will be seen in Chapter 6, while this broadening of the agenda of the neighbourhood management teams has been argued to facilitate more progressive and holistic responses to the problems facing particular neighbourhoods, there are also concerns that the community safety agenda is being marginalised as a result of competition with alternative policy agendas at a local level.

Alongside the change to their remit, the structure of the neighbourhood management teams had also been subject to change. When first introduced, each neighbourhood management area was led by one neighbourhood management chair from Cardiff Council. Under the new arrangements, each neighbourhood
management area had seen the addition of a second neighbourhood chair, a position occupied by individuals from a partner organisation outside of the council. During this research, practitioners from the local health board, the police, Communities First, and a private housing association provider occupied these positions. The justification for this was that it would facilitate a greater sense of shared ownership of neighbourhood management amongst partner agencies. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the addition of these new chairs altered the dynamics of power within these teams and the prioritisation of community safety within the neighbourhood management areas.

Neighbourhood management saw further change in 2014, following a Cardiff Council white paper that recommended a rebranding from ‘neighbourhood management’ to ‘neighbourhood partnership’. The white paper recommended that greater input from local councillors was required. This was achieved through the introduction of a new position in each area, which was occupied by a local elected member who was tasked with acting as a conduit for local councillors to interact with the neighbourhood management teams. This rebranding and attempt to involve elected members in the neighbourhood management structure represented a desire to address the common problem of community-based governance, in that they often fall victim to top-down officer driven management of local areas (Hughes, 2007) rather than bottom-up community-led practice. These points regarding the neighbourhood management structure are explored further in Chapter 6. The purpose of these discussions have been to demonstrate how the changes to the governing arrangements have been presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board as a progressive change enabling more joined up and strategic governance of partnership activity in Cardiff. Yet, despite the optimistic narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board, the impact of austerity and the realities of substantially reducing financial resources are clearly having an affect on the governing capacity within the Cardiff Partnership Board.
4.6 LOCALISED AND DEVOLVED ARRANGEMENTS FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY: NECESSARY REGRESSION

4.6.1 DIMINISHING RESOURCES AND REDUCED GOVERNING CAPACITY

Considering the discussions of section 4.2, which highlighted the role of the community safety team in facilitating partnership work the need for such radical change to the governing arrangements are questionable. While the integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board has been justified under the guise of reducing complexity, these changes have involved significant reductions in staff. As seen in previous discussion, these reductions in staff numbers have been explained away as merely a reduction in duplication and complexity, however this loss of staff has entailed a degradation of resources available to community safety. These competing narratives of change, on the one hand reducing complexity and promoting progressive change and, on the other hand, responding to austerity and reducing resources through mergers and staff losses, emerged in one conversation with a senior policy officer when discussing the changes as documented in fieldnotes:

At first their description of the changes was consistent with the reasons for change outlined in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, stating the complexity of partnership arrangements often working on the same issues and the subsequent amount of duplication of work. This, they argued was solved by establishing the Cardiff Partnership board and merging the different partnerships together into this one centrally located team. Having said this, they then went on to describe what this entailed in practice and when actually talking about the realities of this rather than the policy they began to deviate from the official line and discussed how the reality was that a significant reason for change was the necessity to make savings. Ultimately the driving force for the merging of the partnerships was largely austerity and the need to achieve a massive reduction in the number of staff and therefore costs.

Fieldnotes 17/04/14

This exchange was significant in revealing the problems of the progressive narrative offered by the Cardiff Partnership Board. While the changes to the governing arrangements and the loss of staff in Cardiff have been justified through the argument of reducing duplication and improved service delivery,
such claims are problematic given the evidence that will be outlined in the remainder of this chapter, and the following two chapters. The previous extract mentions the merging of the four partnership structures and the co-location of partnership activity within one office. In practice, this has resulted in the dismantling of the various dedicated partnership support infrastructures including the community safety team, and the creation of a non-specialised, generalist partnership support team. The assimilation of the community safety team into the generalised partnership team resulted in a relocation of the council employed partnership officers from the police headquarters to council offices and ended the co-location of police and council staff as discussed by a senior police officer involved in partnership activity:

[…]

…

[...] the office you just walked through there, that was my community safety department, and they’ve been slimmed down from what they used to be, so there’s less numbers in there, as there is in the rest of the service, we’ve lost around 700 officers due to austerity measures, the funding due to austerity and also in that office used to be the council’s neighbourhood, the council’s community safety team, so we were co-located, but about 2 and a half years back, just as I was coming here they were taken back to county hall to work. So in my view a backward step, I can see that the council is under the same pressures as us, they’ve got money to find, not easy in this time and they found it was cheaper to work in at county hall maybe multi-hatting with jobs outside of that, but purely from a community safety aspect if we needed to discuss something around housing, for example problem tenants and anti social behaviour, may not be a council tenant but the council officers here would have access to the housing manager and the social landlords so all of that was a built in across the desk as opposed to a phone call or booking appointments, so that is a backward step in my view driven by finance.

Police Inspector

The co-location of practitioners from different organisations in one office is regarded as a key component in promoting partnership working as discussed by Berry et al. (2011). Co-location is argued to assist in developing informal working relationships, encouraging better information sharing and facilitating cooperation, as noted in the above extract. Therefore the ending of co-location, as a result of the changes to the governing arrangements, represented a stepping
back of partnership activity in relation to community safety as a consequence of the financial pressures facing the council. Moreover, the quote above refers to the disappearance of the community safety team and the creation of the non-specialised partnership team in terms of the multi-hatting of council employed partnership staff. Rather than representing a shift to improved service delivery, what is discussed here is cost efficiencies achieved by dismissing staff and an amalgamation of roles achieved through fewer staff taking on more responsibilities.

4.6.2 COORDINATING COMMUNITY SAFETY

As discussed earlier, the community safety team in Cardiff played a key role in co-coordinating partnership activity and provided financial, operational and organisational support for community safety practice in the city. Therefore, the reformulation of the governing arrangements in Cardiff and the subsequent dismantling of the community safety infrastructure had a detrimental impact on the governing resources available for community safety work. This has, in turn, affected the operational oversight of community safety activity in the city. Following the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure posts such as the community safety manager, community safety coordinator and many of the other supporting roles have been lost. These were posts that provided clear lines of responsibility and operational oversight of community safety within the city and, as noted by Edwards et al. (2007), performed a key role in facilitating cooperation and engagement from other partner organisations.

The loss of the coordinating and supporting function of the community safety team formed a persistent concern during this research. This was apparent in my own experiences of fieldwork within the partnership team. While not easily captured in any singular event or moment, as the fieldwork progressed I realised that building a complete picture of what was happening in regards to partnership working around community safety was a complex task due to its diffuse nature and lack of clear lines of responsibility and accountability. Far from reducing complexity, the changes to the governing arrangements have compromised the coordination and oversight of the disparate elements of community safety in the
city. Such an assessment was revealed in a conversation with an officer from the National Crime Agency (NCA) following a workstream activity meeting:

[The NCA officer] stated that changes made to CSPs under the guises of reducing duplication and reducing costs have made it increasingly difficult in coordinating NCA activity across local areas due to the absence of a direct point of contact for community safety who is responsible for coordinating multi-agency activity. Indeed, [the NCA officer] recount the complications that have taken place since 2010 in the local councils and police forces [the NCA officer] works with where there have been ‘restructures and then restructures of restructures’ and that this has made things increasingly complicated in terms of partnership working and getting in contact with the right people due to the ambiguity of who to contact.

Fieldnotes 02/07/14

Here the NCA officer recounts an experience whereby the changes to community safety governing arrangements have made it increasingly difficult to identify who to engage with and where responsibility lies for coordinating partnership activity. In this instance, such difficulties were complicating attempts by the NCA to coordinate multi-agency responses with local actors on the ground due to the absence of clear lines of responsibility for community safety work. One conversation with a senior policy officer highlighted that, although the changes to the governing arrangements have been politically favourable in terms of Welsh Government support, in practice, they have severely inhibited the coordination of partnership arrangements around community safety. They surmised that there should be someone suitably placed to provide the operational oversight that is needed to connect people together and identify where overlapping areas of interest were present and have sufficient seniority to facilitate the engagement of these actors around a shared agenda. This aligns with the role formerly provided by the community safety manager, whose seniority and position assisted in leveraging cooperation from other partner organisations (Edwards et al., 2007). This issue was often brought up in regular conversation with one individual in the partnership team who lamented the absence of coordinated partnership practices in relation to crime and disorder as a result of the disappearance of the community safety team. In an interview they said:
[...] see when you had that community safety department you had someone there who would bring everyone together so everybody, that’s the link that’s missing I feel, when you had that community safety department you had someone there bringing everyone together, arranging meetings, and all this type of thing and I thought that was an important role really because it was to bring that joined up working together. And although we’ve got the partnership group that’s at a higher level, you haven’t got that lower level coordination anymore and that’s what I feel is missing, that lower level coordination which is what you had as a community safety team.

Partnership Officer

These problems were further identified by another member of the team who discussed how the disappearance of the community safety partnership and the absence of operational responsibility and clear lines of accountability may lead to problems at a practical level:

The one thing that I do think is missing from the current arrangements is that there is not one single person who has responsibility for community safety at an operational level. At a strategic level a lot of the sort of policies, if you take, lets just think of an example, if you look at domestic homicide reviews that’ll say that basically the responsibility lies with the chair of the community safety partnership but because we’ve got the integrated partnership that would be the chair of the CPB so the responsibility would ultimately lie with him. But then really at an operational level, if there was a domestic homicide in Cardiff probably that would come to us as a team to organise because there isn’t a designated community safety officer as such that could be the person who could coordinate the review so ultimately the strategic sort of responsibility lies with the chair of the Safer and Cohesive and the chair of the Partnership board but there isn’t that sort of operational, you know, this is where the coordination of community safety takes place all of the original functions still take place throughout the council and we still have those relationships in terms of having those relationships with the police and you know the other public sector bodies as and when you need them but there isn’t that one person with a real overarching operational view.

Policy Officer
The preceding extract draws attention, again, to the lack of operational responsibility and accountability for partnership activities around issues of crime and disorder and how this problematises the statutory legal requirements set out from central government, in this case a domestic homicide review. This ambiguity regarding the responsibility for community safety under the new governing arrangements is problematic for its coordination. As described earlier, some individuals referred to the safer and cohesive communities programme board as a source of oversight for community safety work, but the consensus amongst practitioners was that this programme board was too strategic and was not suitably placed to provide sufficient oversight and coordination of the community safety practice. This echoes with my own observations of the safer and cohesive communities partnership meetings and agendas, given that it only take place on a quarterly basis and acts more as a conduit for the workstream coordinators to voice any problems and report progress upon their workstream activities rather than a meaningful mechanism for the coordination of partnership activity.

4.6.3 Marginalisation of Community Safety

The dispersion of responsibility for community safety following the restructure of the governing arrangements further complicated statutory requirements to scrutinise community safety work as required by the Police and Justice Act 2006. By attending the monthly Community and Adult Services scrutiny committees, responsible for scrutinising community safety within Cardiff, between February 2014 and March 2015 it became apparent that community safety rarely featured on the agenda. Instead, the agenda of these meetings were predominantly focused on issues of health and social care, both of which were also policy areas facing significant financial pressure. While quarterly reports of ‘community safety indicators’ were discussed briefly on occasion, scrutiny of actual community safety work was limited to only two examples throughout the year. Reinforcing this impression of the marginalisation of community safety within the governing arrangements were comments heard from a senior council official within the partnership team when speaking to a policy officer and senior practitioner within the team:
From what I could hear it seemed that [the senior manager] is not happy with what is going on in the council and was critical of the work pressures being placed upon a shrinking team and of the proposed structural changes, commenting that ‘it’s not just about cuts though is it?’ A key point of this criticism was that more senior officials within the council had been focusing upon issues of health and well-being and social care at the expense of partnership working.

Fieldnotes 24/04/14

In seeking to explain the marginalisation of community safety as an agenda item it can be argued that the lack of clear responsibility and accountability for community safety under the new governing arrangements has made scrutinising community safety work more problematic. Adding credibility to this argument are the claims of one member of the scrutiny committee who, during an interview, discussed how the current scrutiny arrangements around issues of community were ‘muddled’:

[...] so we have the scrutiny committee, which is probably fair to say, though I don’t know in percentage terms, it tends to be the housing, communities areas, not community safety, health and social care, and oh by the way you’ve got this other bit, I don’t mean the scrutiny process, and certainly our scrutiny officer its not her intention, but its all of that other bit that we say ‘well we are meant to be the scrutiny committee that looks at community safety’

Scrutiny Committee Member

Furthermore, when connecting this low prioritisation of community safety on the agenda to the governing arrangements within the Cardiff Partnership Board, attention was again drawn to the lack of clear lines of responsibility for community safety. While the mainstreaming of community safety was consistently claimed as a way of improving ‘buy-in’ across the council by the Cardiff Partnership Board, there were concerns that, in practice, the dispersal of responsibility has actually resulted in an complete absence of responsibility as:

[...] by having one person together, one person who collectively brings it all together and then goes back out to the various directorates is the best way to go, and I think the partnership board ought to do the same, whilst there are issues in education, health, wherever, there has to be
one place where all of that is collectively bought together, and the administration via the cabinet member is held to account for doing that, if he rolls out to his education cabinet member, so if [the chair of the scrutiny committee] talks to [scrutiny officer] and says there is a problem here, that’s to implement improvement because if you melt down the responsibilities, if you dilute them down not melt them down, dilute them down they become everybody’s responsibilities but nobodies and that’s why I said its muddled

Scrutiny Committee Member

Consistent across all of these responses, my observations, and conversations with practitioners encountered during fieldwork observation, was that, despite claims of the reduced complexity and improved delivery, the coordination of partnership activity has been negatively affected by the changes to the governing arrangements in the city. So what can be made of the policy narrative regarding progression and reducing complexity outlined in section 4.5? Certainly, the Beecham inquiry and the Welsh Government Making Connections paper is important in considering the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff, through the introduction of the Local Service Board with the ambition of promoting more joined up strategic planning of local services. Up until 2010, this integration had largely taken place at a strategic level. This chapter has shown how following the commencement of austerity, a more radical reorganisation of the governing arrangements took place through the wholesale integration of the various partnership arrangements into the Cardiff Partnership Board. Therefore it is likely that the more radical changes to the governing arrangements around community safety are a direct consequence of austerity measures, which necessitated significant cost savings within the local authority and other partner agencies. By taking advantage of the recommendations of the Beecham enquiry, the Cardiff Partnership Board sought to use this narrative of reducing complexity and increasing efficiency to make a virtue from necessity and in an attempt to frame these changes in a positive light rather than as a regressive response to austerity. Therefore, despite the positive pronouncements presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board regarding the mainstreaming of community safety, a clear discrepancy can be seen between the official rhetoric of the Cardiff
Partnership Board and the realities of these changes for the responsibility and management of community safety work in the city.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the significant changes to the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff. During the statutory period of community safety, Cardiff and its well-resourced community safety team became a site of good practice and innovation in relation to the local governance of crime and disorder. However, as austerity took hold in 2010, and in the following years, the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff was dismantled and responsibility for community safety work was dispersed under the guise of mainstreaming. The Cardiff Partnership Board has presented this change as part of a narrative of progression and improvement for public service delivery that facilitate greater strategic thinking and the pursuit of a shared governing agenda. However, the latter part of this chapter began to question this narrative of progression. Using data collecting during the fieldwork, the chapter has begun to explore the impact of these changes for community safety work, through the identification of three key implications. Firstly, the changes have resulted in the dismantling of the community safety partnership team. This has led to the ending of the co-location arrangements between the police and council officers, and replacement of dedicated community safety practitioners with generalist partnership support staff. Secondly, these changes have compromised the coordination and oversight of community safety work, which was previously facilitated by the community safety manager and community safety coordinator. Finally, there were signs that community safety work was being eclipsed by larger and more pressured areas of responsibility in the Council, such as health and social care, which may be attributed to the degrading governing capacity available to community safety work.

The impact of these changes upon the delivery of community safety work is explored in Chapter 6, but before that, it is necessary to consider the governing agenda within Cardiff. A key argument of the Cardiff Partnership Board is that these changes have facilitated the creation of a shared agenda amongst partner agencies in the city. Furthermore, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board,
and the integration of the community safety partnership, has affected the distribution of power within the governing for community safety in favour of Cardiff Council. This rebalancing of the dynamics of power is noteworthy to a consideration of the governing agenda in Cardiff. It is to the analysis of the governing agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board that this thesis now turns.
5. AGENDAS FOR GOVERNING SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: TOWARDS A PROGRESSIVE REGIME?

5.1 INTRODUCTION

A key rationale for the changing governing arrangements was the potential for a more strategic model of governance, which would see governing actors unite behind a shared agenda. Moreover the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board was argued to facilitate engagement from a broader range of actors allowing the pursuit of more progressive and socially just agendas for community safety in the city. These claims regarding the possibility of more progressive governing agendas are assessed through the course of this chapter by examining the official policy discourse of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Given this focus on the official policy discourse, rather than the operational practices of community safety (discussed in Chapter 6), much of this chapter will rely on policy documentation and insights gained from formal and informal discussions with individuals familiar with the policy context within Cardiff.

The chapter begins with an examination of the developmental governing agenda for community safety during the Labour governments of 1998-2010. The chapter then examines the strategic governing agenda in Cardiff, the ‘What Matters’ strategy, in which a clear commitment to ideas of social and restorative justice is evidenced. This progressive and transformative agenda has resulted in a reframing of the community safety agenda around more encompassing ideas of safety rather than the narrow focus on crime and disorder. Despite this rhetorical commitment to a transformative agenda within the ‘What Matters’ strategy, the chapter provides evidence that the realisation of this strategic agenda is being constrained by the reductions to governing capacity caused by austerity measures. The chapter finishes by assessing how this strategic agenda is translating into the prioritisation of community safety work in the city, in which evidence is found of a diminishing agenda for community safety.
5.2 The Evolution of Agendas in Cardiff

As with the previous chapter, tracing the progression of the governing agendas for community safety in Cardiff is a difficult task due to the paucity of information and the reliance on policy documentation. As required by the Crime and Disorder Act, every local authority produced three-year crime reduction strategies that outline the governing agenda for community safety and the priorities for community safety work. While the use of such textual evidence must be treated cautiously, these documents provide a useful insight into how problems of community safety were conceptualised during this period. The first evidence illustrating the agenda for community safety can be seen in the Cardiff Community Safety Strategy 2002-2005, which provides a summary of the priorities of the Cardiff community safety partnership from 1999-2002. In recounting the work of the first three years of the Cardiff community safety partnership the strategy presents an agenda orientated principally around ideas of crime reduction, as seen in the priorities for the period:

- To reduce recorded crime,
- To reduce dwelling house burglary,
- To reduce auto crime,
- To increase reporting of racist incidents
- To increase reporting of homophobic incidents
- To increase reporting of domestic violence

Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 4

Reflecting the infancy of the community safety agenda at the time, the document offers little detail into how these priorities were addressed. However, the measures of success used to show the ‘achievements’ of the Cardiff community safety partnership during the years of 1999-2002 does shed some light on the conceptualisation of community safety during this time. The achievements recounted in the strategy are exclusively focussed on law enforcement practices and how the Cardiff community safety partnership has been able to assist the police in addressing these priorities, either through reducing the amount of recorded crime or increasing the amount of crimes that are reported to the police. This is supported in a report presented to Cardiff Councils Environmental Scrutiny Committee in which in describing the targets for the community safety partnership
it was stated that the ‘Council will work with partners to support South Wales Police in meeting their race hate targets for Cardiff in 2002/03’ and ‘The Council will support the police’s ongoing drive to meet crime reduction targets for 2002/03 (Environmental Scrutiny Committee, 2003: 3). Although limited, these statements and the preponderance on police defined priorities of crime reduction are indicative of a maintenance agenda within Cardiff where community safety work was subordinated to supporting local policing through assisting in the detection and enforcement of crime (Edwards and Hughes, 2012).

Alongside evidence of this maintenance agenda, these early community safety strategies and supporting documents also revealed a emerging tendency towards more developmental agendas organised around risk management. Within the report provided to the environmental scrutiny committee outlined previously, there was reference to ‘innovative work’ around anti-social behaviour:

> The police and council reviewed how they had been collecting data on anti-social behaviour and created new data analysis systems. This enables them to target problems areas and perpetrators.

Cardiff Council, 2003: 2

This discourse around risk and the targeted delivery of services at those perceived to be at risk became more apparent as the strategy explored the strategic objectives for 2002-2005. The priorities identified for 2002-2005 were anti-social behaviour, violent crime, burglary, substance misuse and auto-crime. Moving beyond discourses of supporting the police, the 2002-2005 strategic objectives began speaking of plans to ‘develop and implement strategies aimed at young people who are perpetrators of crime and disorder, particularly anti-social behaviour and drug misuse’, or ‘to develop and implement strategies which combat drug-related crime, by stifling the availability of drugs on the street’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 7). This prevalence of notions of risk is further apparent in the consideration of Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTO’s) to reduce risks of drug related re-offending to the consideration of Prolific Offenders and the use of ‘intensive Probation and Police supervision to avoid the risk of re-offending’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 8).
Further highlighting the prominence of a developmental agenda organised around risk was a discussion of the ‘HASCADE model’. This model, included below in Table 4, provided a framework to ‘inform strategic crime and disorder evaluation and action for continuing crime and disorder reduction’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2002: 10). In this table ‘key strategic community safety approaches’ are described in relation to four different ‘priority geographical areas (PGAs)’. This matrix indicates the contrasting needs within geographical areas pertaining either to the prevalence of crime or the level of vulnerability within that area. In looking at this model the prevalence of approaches that advocate ‘recourse to the criminal justice system’ alongside ‘situational crime prevention’ techniques indicate a clear tendency towards a developmental agenda that seeks to supplement criminal justice policy with risk management approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>EXPLANATION OF GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS</th>
<th>TYPE OF RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR A</td>
<td>Exhibiting several types of crime, disorder plus community vulnerability</td>
<td>A balanced approach: recourse to the criminal justice system, situational crime prevention plus prevention of future criminality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR B</td>
<td>Exhibiting one specific type of crime, disorder plus several types of community vulnerability</td>
<td>A balanced approach: recourse to the criminal justice system, situational crime prevention plus prevention of future criminality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR C</td>
<td>Exhibiting several types of crime, disorder but no community vulnerabilities</td>
<td>Recourse to criminal justice system and situational crime prevention methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACTOR D</td>
<td>Exhibiting no crime and disorder, but several types of community vulnerabilities</td>
<td>Support to: promote community safety and the prevention of criminality. In-depth analysis to highlight any existing good practice or potential risks within these areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4: THE HASCADE MODEL, SOURCE: CARDIFF COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP, 2005: 10
The 2002-2005 community safety strategy, which recounts the agenda for both the 1999-2002 and the 2002-2005 periods, indicates that these early years of the national mandatory period were characterised by maintenance and developmental agendas. The developmental agenda apparent in the 2002-2005 strategy extends into the 2005-2008 Cardiff community safety strategy. Indeed the five main stated priorities for the period of 2005-2008 mirror those of 2002-2005 however there was notable addition of a second tier of priorities including:

- Prolific and other priority offenders
- Public transport
- Arson
- Hate Crime
- Business and retail crime

This expansion of the agenda in 2005-2008 through the provision of a second tier of priorities reflects the growing resources afforded to the community safety agenda over the successive New Labour Governments. In addressing these priorities, the 2005-2008 strategy presents a strong emphasis on situational crime prevention methods used alongside targeted prevention strategies for particular populations deemed to be at risk of offending. The prevalence of these situational preventative methods was highlighted with the presence of a full time appointment of a ‘community safety design officer, to help design out crime’ (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005: 17).

These discussions demonstrate the pre-occupation with risk-based approaches to preventing crime in the community safety agendas from 1997 to 2008, synonymous with Edwards and Hughes’ description of a developmental agenda (2012). Moreover the priorities identified during this period, which were largely equated with crime reduction, are consistent with much of the academic literature pertaining to this period (Gilling et al. 2013; Gilling, 2007; Wiles and Pease, 2000). This is significant, given the managerialist approach adopted by New Labour in dictating the delivery of public services, including community safety, which resulted in ‘a relatively narrow focus on recordable crime’ (Gilling et al., 2013: 329). The presence of a developmental agenda in Cardiff, and its reflection of broader national agendas for community safety demonstrate the restricted nature of community safety work during this period. As Hughes and Gilling state:
‘since 1998, practitioners have been drawn into an environment which seems to be responding to changes rather than setting the agenda. The reference point is mainly what is happening from ‘above’ or from the ‘centre’…. Practitioners and local policy strategists have been given little opportunity to flex any professional muscle’ (2004: 135). In furtherance of this point, the 2005-2008 strategy indicates that the prioritisation of anti-social behaviour, substance misuse and burglary were responses to the requirements of centrally determined public service agreements (PSAs). Therefore the potential of local policy actors to pursue alternative agendas within this time were constrained by managerialist tendencies of New Labour.

It is for these reasons that the election of the Coalition Government in 2010 and its promise of greater localism, and reduced central management of public services, provide opportunities for more expansive agendas. As has been seen in Chapter 4, despite the financial pressures facing the Cardiff Partnership Board it was argued that the new governing arrangements would facilitate more progressive and socially just agendas. This formed the basis of the Cardiff ‘What Matters’ strategy, which set out the unified vision for public services in Cardiff from 2010 to 2020.

5.3 THE ‘WHAT MATTERS 2020 STRATEGY’ – TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATIONAL AGENDA?

5.3.1 APPEALS TO ‘BROAD PURPOSES’
A key argument made in favour of the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board and a single integrated partnership strategy was that it would lead to a common objective for all local partner organisations to unite behind and contribute. Therefore this unified agenda, the ‘What Matters’ strategy, is crucial in facilitating greater strategic thinking about local governance within the city. This was discussed during an interview with a senior individual within the governing arrangements as recorded in my fieldnotes:

After highlighting the strains that budget cuts and cost saving targets were putting on core services and partnership commitments they pointed out that a key challenge for partnership working under these conditions has been the difficulty of evidencing and exhibiting the benefits of responding to social problems through a collaborative partnership approach and why there is a need
to tackle the problems facing local government together. In trying to achieve this they remarked how the rationale and process of developing the ‘What Matters’ strategy was about getting all of the relevant people together to identify a collaborative vision for the issues that need addressing to facilitate a greater sense of shared ownership of the strategic agenda.

Fieldnotes 06/08/14

Therefore the ‘What Matters’ strategy does not just represent the governing agenda, but rather is an attempt of the Cardiff Partnership Board to appeal to, what Stone calls, ‘broad purposes’ in an attempt to mobilise cooperation from partner organisations. As Stone notes ‘the politics of investment – for example, of establishing governing arrangements- requires bringing together substantial resources, both tangible and intangible, from a variety of players. Broad purposes deemed to be socially worthy play a vital part’ (2005: 318-319). For Stone, broad purposes are not about particular material incentives for cooperation, but rather highlight the mercurial ‘motivational force’ of appeals to broad civic purposes. The ‘What Matters’ strategy is a good example of a ‘large change agenda’ (Stone, 2005), in that it seeks to frame the problems of local governance in the city not as a suite of separate disconnected problems, but rather as a shared social cause around which partner organisations should mobilise. These appeals to broad purposes within the ‘What Matters’ strategy are pervasive and are evident frequently in the framing of the problems facing local governance. Given the importance of the ‘What Matters’ strategy both in terms of its status as the governing agenda in the city, but also as a call to action for local partner organisations, how this agenda is framed is crucial for this discussion of local governance and community safety specifically.

Pervasive through the ‘What Matters’ strategy is a framing of the problems of crime and disorder consistent with Edwards and Hughes’ description of a transformative agenda which ‘augment policies for the social and political inclusion of all citizens’ (2012: 448). From the outset of the strategy it is possible to observe how this transformative agenda was linked to the changes to the governing arrangements and the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board. As discussed in Chapter 4 a key factor in the changes to the governing arrangements
were the recommendations of the Beecham inquiry and the need to work across organisational boundaries to achieve the best outcome for citizens. This narrative was highlighted in the ‘What Matters’ strategy when discussing the social and structural causes of social problems in the city:

Achieving our outcomes is not the responsibility of any individual organisation. In fact, it simply would not be possible for one organisation to achieve any of these outcomes alone. Whilst all individual service providers work to manage and deliver the best services they can, they also recognise that the big and complex problems, such as tackling the many forms of inequality, can only be solved by working together. This represents an acknowledgement that each organisation is only one of the many partners, but together we can address what really matters in the city

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 5, emphasis in original

This quote is notable due to its affinity with the discussions of the previous chapter whereby effective public service delivery is contingent upon governing actors working collaboratively, and that this style of work is necessary to realise the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Moreover it is further evidence of the attempts of the Cardiff Partnership Board to appeal to broad social purposes (Stone, 2005), in this case the problems of inequality, through the ‘What Matters’ strategy. The language used, and the approach described in the extract, is not new and have been prevalent in narratives around community safety and partnership working for the last two decades as evident in the work of many commentators on the growth of community safety and partnership work (Hughes, 1998; Gilling, 2007; Crawford, 1999).

As Crawford and Evans (2012) state, and noted in Chapter 2, for many reasons, these progressive and transformative aspirations have often failed to be realised in practice. Accordingly the transformative narratives presented within the ‘What Matters’ strategy should be treated with a degree of caution. However within the ‘What Matters’ strategy there are indications that the Cardiff Partnership Board has implemented changes to facilitate this aim. Supporting the approach displayed in the quote and reflecting the structural arrangements of the thematic programme boards discussed in Chapter 4, the ‘What Matters’ strategy has framed the
solutions to social problems in the city not around particular organisational priorities but rather through seven shared outcomes for all partner organisations:

- People in Cardiff are healthy
- People in Cardiff have a clean, attractive and sustainable environment
- People in Cardiff are safe and feel safe
- Cardiff has a thriving and prosperous economy
- People in Cardiff achieve their full potential
- Cardiff is a great place to live, work and play
- Cardiff is a fair, just and inclusive society

Like the thematic programme boards it is tempting to assume that each of these outcomes relate to specific service areas or issues, for instance that crime and disorder is limited to the third outcome of ‘people in Cardiff are safe and feel safe’. This assertion would result in the understandable question of what is progressive or innovative about these outcomes? At a basic level the framing of the issue away from explicit notions of crime and disorder to more encompassing ideas of safety is important and is discussed later in this chapter. The argument of the Cardiff Partnership Board is that these outcomes do not reflect particular service areas or organisational priorities. Rather, each of these seven broad outcomes are the responsibility of every partner within the Cardiff Partnership Board, and that policy issues such as crime and disorder do not lie within any one programme board as reflected in the following interview extract with a member of the Cardiff Partnership Board:

[…] they’re not really seen as separate issues at all, crime is integrated throughout all of the workstreams of the partnership board, so offenders who, young people who are not in education or employment, some of those people will also be offenders, not all of them but some of them will, some of the other health and well being issues to do with smoking cessation is a big issue for instance, well a lot of those people might be offenders as well, so offenders sit within them all so we don’t actually have a separate offender stream

Cardiff Partnership Board Member

This extract indicates the importance of the seven shared outcomes and the attempt to encourage holistic solutions to the problems of local governance. In this way
then the seven shared outcomes can be seen as a further example of the framing of the ‘What Matters’ strategy around ‘broad purposes’ and social action (Stone, 2005). The seven broad outcomes identified here are not structured around particular priorities but are kept purposefully broad. This is important for cooperation as they cannot be easily dismissed as someone else’s responsibility but also, as Stone states, the durability of such broad framings of social problems ‘that governing arrangements do not have to be reinvented issue by issue’ (2005: 318).

5.3.2 The Spatial and Temporal Nature of Inequality

Of further importance when considering the transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, and the appeals to broad purposes around the problems caused by social inequalities in the city, is the recognition of the spatial nature of these inequalities. In explaining the extent of social and structural inequalities the ‘What Matters’ strategy affords particular attention to the geographical differences that exist in the city in which a clear geographical divide is stated to exist as seen in the extract below:

Although Cardiff can be described as a ‘quality of life’ capital, the benefits of this are not spread equally across the city. There are marked disparities in affluence between the north and south of Cardiff, with the majority of deprivation falling in the south… this is not to ignore the fact that pockets of inequality exists within even the most affluent areas and that certain socio-economic groups are more vulnerable to deprivation, but recognising the broad pattern of deprivation can help us to understand the causes and associated effects that characterise the city

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11, emphasis in original

The recognition of the spatial nature of inequalities within Cardiff demonstrates awareness to the uneven distribution of need within the city. Moreover recognising the connection between crime and deprivation (Trickett et al., 1992) the strategy notes that burglaries, thefts, drugs and violence are ‘all higher in the more economically deprived communities’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11). It is worth comparing this to the developmental agenda in London examined by Edwards et al. and the use of aggregated city wide data which ‘obscured crucially the diversity of community safety challenges across London and thus the need to tailor the allocation of resources accordingly’ (2015: 200). The geographical
variance of inequality in the city was also seen to demonstrate the need for the
neighbourhood management structure, which was able to respond to the particular
conditions of local neighbourhoods. Of further interest in the extract above, is the
acknowledgement that this pattern of deprivation can help explain the ‘causes and
associated effects’ of more specific social problems in the city. This consideration
of the antecedent conditions of social problems is explored in relation to the role of
income levels within the city:

[…] income, unemployment, education, health, housing and
crime all form a clear north/south divide and more in-depth
analysis reveals that low income is the key determinant of
almost every from of deprivation. This is certainly noticeable
in Cardiff since the most income deprived areas also suffer
from the most pronounced social problems, such as poor
health, child poverty, and some aspects of community safety.

As a consequence income deprivation must be recognised
as a key concern, to which other solutions are anchored.
We need to address deprivation in its entirety. Recognising
income as the central component, if we are to find
sustainable long terms solutions to persistent problems

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 11-12, emphasis in original

This quote demonstrates an important insight into the conceptualisation of social
problems that affect communities such as poor health, lack of housing and crime
and disorder. These problems are presented not as isolated issues but are instead
symptomatic of wider structural and social challenges, in this case, the income
inequalities that are argued to pervade the city. This transformative agenda of the
‘What Matters’ strategy, which sought to address the social and structural causes of
criminality, was corroborated in discussions with senior members of the Cardiff
Partnership Board as seen in the following interview extract:

It [The Cardiff Partnership Board] oversees the
governance of integrated issues really to do with the
health and well-being and safety of citizens of Cardiff, so
included in that are people who we term ‘offenders’ but
they are people who from time to time commit offences,
so they are citizens of Cardiff as such so they’re people
who tend to have, often have a difficulty in accessing
universal services and their consequential thinking and
their under-developed life skills and social skills mean
that they need to have a voice within the agenda of the
partnership board

Cardiff Partnership Board Member
In addition to the spatial characteristics of these inequalities, the ‘What Matters’ strategy highlights the temporal and persistent nature of problems of inequalities, as ‘some areas of Cardiff are seeing recurrent worklessness and more and more children are growing up in poverty’ and ‘if the gap in educational attainment is not addressed then young people from the more deprived wards could be consigned to a future with fewer opportunities’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 12-13).

The discussions contained within the ‘What Matters’ strategy regarding the spatial and temporal characteristics of inequality are consistent with Hughes’ distinction between ‘communities of choice’ and ‘communities of fate’ (2007: 13). Communities of choice represent the neighbourhoods of the northern arc of Cardiff that are typically more affluent, less transient and suffer from fewer social problems than their southern equivalents. Equally the ‘What Matters’ strategy description of the southern arc of the city fits well with Hughes’ depiction of communities of fate as ‘socially and spatially trapped’ (2007: 13). The narrative of the ‘What Matters’ strategy asserts that some communities in the south of the city are socially trapped as opportunities to elevate their social position through education and employment are scarce, and spatially trapped due to income deprivation and the inability to relocate to more prosperous areas. These are mutually reinforcing. In recognising the uneven distribution of inequalities in the city, the ‘What Matters’ strategy asserts the need for the targeting of limited resources to areas identified as those most in need of support and resources:

Organisations must be agile enough to target intervention and geographically tailor responses to meet local need. Addressing inequality is dependent on partners being able to direct resources to the people and areas who need it most. Only by focusing our efforts on the areas of distinct disadvantage can we break the pattern that has come to characterise need in the city

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 13

However interviews with practitioners and councillors from the north of the city revealed a cautionary note about complacency with regards to the north of the city. This was raised in an interview with one councillor who highlighted that areas of high deprivation within the northern arc of the city were almost doubly
disadvantaged due to the increased targeting of resources in the south which was resulting in a reduction of services to the north of the city:

[…] In a sense if you look at areas, I’m slightly envious of areas like Riverside, Grangetown, there’s loads of stuff going on, and there’s loads of issues knocking about and you know what you do have in those areas is, you have funding from various groups as well, what you do have is a lot of activity and a lot of groups as a result of that, I mean we don’t have that

Local Elected Member

The above extract points to some of the areas where the targeted provision of services in the south of the city may be having a negative impact upon the pockets of deprivation within the more affluent north of the city. This was seen in regards to the changes to the provisions of youth services in Cardiff. While Youth Activity Centres in the south of the city had continued to be provided and managed by the council, those in the north of the city had been closed and replaced by a ‘youth bus’ that provided a roaming provision of youth services to young people in these areas. The importance of this is discussed later in the chapter when highlighting the concerns of practitioners around the degradation of youth services in the city. Taken together these discussions demonstrate a clear foregrounding of inequalities, and their spatial and temporal nature, as the central problem within the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Of further importance is how the need to tackle inequality in the city is presented as joint effort. This is presented in the ‘What Matters’ through clear connections of how different policy agendas can all be seen to contribute to this ‘broad purpose’ of addressing inequality. Before examining how this has affected the framing of community safety in the city, it is worth providing some examples of how this holistic approach to local governance is evidenced within the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

5.3.3 Responses to Inequality

In tackling inequality the ‘What Matters’ strategy placed great emphasis on engaging communities in decision-making processes and actively involving them in partnership work. In this way the communities and residents of Cardiff were not framed as being incidental to these problems, but were rather seen to be crucial in
addressing the systemic problems within the city. The importance of mobilising community participation in partnership work is highlighted in the extract below:

Working together does not just mean working with other organisations; it means working with individuals and communities, sharing responsibility and sharing success. We will move forward towards a new emphasis on individual and social responsibility and will be guided by the principles of fairness and sustainability. The challenges we face...will only be met if we can successfully work together to release the potential of our communities

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 5

It is worth noting that attempts to mobilise community participation have formed a common refrain in discussions of community safety. Furthermore as Hughes notes, such attempts to leverage community engagement participation have often failed to be actualised and ‘the people who live in high crime areas have generally been incidental rather than central to the practical enactment of ‘community’ crime prevention efforts’ (2007: 65). In facilitating this aim the ‘What Matters’ strategy highlights the role of the neighbourhood management structure as a key mechanism in achieving the goals of localised delivery and community empowerment when addressing the persistent problems of inequalities and disadvantage across the city. The neighbourhood management teams were presented as facilitators of this community participation, and therefore were seen to play, what Hughes has termed, an ‘enabling, harnessing, even “manufacturing” role’ (Hughes, 2007: 16). However as will be further explored in Chapter 6, there was evidence that the role of local communities in the neighbourhood management teams was limited as was noted by a local practitioner:

It [the neighbourhood management programme] is still as far as I can tell only professionals who come together as opposed to really engaged local communities which had always been the intention that it would do

Local Practitioner

In addition to the role of communities, the ‘What Matters’ strategy further highlighted the role of private business within the local economy and its importance for reducing unemployment as a vehicle for addressing the inequality in the city. Accordingly, the ‘What Matters’ strategy emphasised the importance of
economic development in creating an environment that is conducive to investment from business and therefore job creation. This focus on the importance of economic development for tackling inequalities in the city is premised upon two assumptions. Firstly that a growing and vibrant economy should facilitate the growth of jobs in the city that would ‘generate wealth and prosperity that can be shared by all, thereby reducing the inequalities in Cardiff’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011:43). Secondly, that the jobs created as part of the focus on economic development would assist in reducing unemployment and poverty, which would have long term benefits for people in Cardiff:

[...] increasing adult employment and reducing workless families can perhaps have the greatest impact on child poverty. Because income can be seen as the anchor for all other forms of poverty, increasing the wealth of the family can improve the health, well-being and education attainment of children and young people. In this way we can break the cycle of poverty and encourage social mobility

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 45

While framed in terms of its importance for job creation and the reduction of unemployment, the emphasis on economic development also posed challenges for the local governance of crime, disorder and safety. A good example of this is the night-time economy, or as Stenson highlights ‘the alcohol retail industry upon which urban economics are increasingly reliant’ (2005: 278). While the night-time economy in Cardiff was a key source of revenue for Cardiff Council, and due to its size, a substantial provider of job opportunities in the city, it also accrued substantial costs for partner organisations involved in the control, policing and enforcement of problematic behaviour. Further examples of the challenges posed by the emphasis on economic development include Cardiff’s desire to attract high-level investment from international business as well as the ambition to increase its presence on the world stage through hosting sporting and political events, including the hosting of some aspects of the NATO summit in 2015. Such attempts, while beneficial for economic development are problematic for the priorities of the CONTEST strategy, as will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Alongside the role of communities, and the private sector in addressing the problems of inequality, the ‘What Matters’ strategy positioned the many elements of the public sector as crucial in tackling inequality in the city. This was evident in the discussion of the role of housing in addressing spatial mobility, in that effective housing strategies play were important in disrupting the cycle of deprivation and the inequality that affect those communities in the southern arc of the city. The provision of affordable housing was argued to represent a key way of addressing the spatial disadvantages experienced by certain communities, and in doing so would have further benefit with regards to social mobility, as evidenced in the following extract:

[...] the affordability of housing is a key determinant of quality of life...inequalities in housing have a particular impact on child poverty...housing wealth creates freedom, allowing those who have it to choose the area they live which may be determined by proximity to job opportunities, high performing schools, popular facilities or healthier physical environments. As a result access to housing in the short term and housing wealth in the long term can have a major impact on geographical and generational socio-economic disadvantage. This once again reinforces the fundamental importance of increasing the incomes of the most disadvantaged in our society

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 58

Alongside concerns of poverty and income deprivation the ‘What Matters’ strategy also places great emphasis on the importance of inclusion in developing ‘active citizens’. The ‘What Matters’ strategy presented two notions of inclusion. First, it outlined ideas of inclusion around young people and ‘participation poverty’ where it asserted that some young people, typically those from deprived communities are being excluded from some activities and that this exclusion can lead to further ‘social exclusion and stigma, as well as impacting on health, well being and development’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 59). The second aspect of inclusion discussed in the ‘What Matters’ strategy related to a more encompassing idea of civic inclusion in the local democratic process as seen in the extract below:

Some members of society may face challenges that prevent them from fully engaging in the democratic process or in civil society; this reflects how inclusive a society is, as well as determining how a society is shaped. Engagement and
involvement is therefore crucial, an end in itself that recognises the rights of every individual, but also because the more people who are empowered to influence decisions, the more representative those decisions, and therefore the more representative society becomes

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 65

The emphasis on ideas of inclusion is important for this thesis. Firstly it offers further credence to the arguments that the ‘What Matters’ strategy represents a transformative agenda, as citizen engagement and active citizenship is noted by Edwards and Hughes as a key component of a transformative community safety agenda (2012: 448). Secondly, this emphasis on inclusion affects how traditional priorities of community safety, such as anti-social behaviour, are framed as problems. As Edwards et al. assert the history of community safety has tended towards the ‘social control of young people’ rather than more progressive or transformative framings of inclusion (2015: 198). Within the ‘What Matters’ strategy there is a clear recognition of the exclusionary potential of responses to anti-social behaviour and the need for more inclusive strategies to deal with young people:

Children and young people often feel they are perceived negatively in relation to crime and antisocial behaviour by the media, service providers and even their own communities. Whilst it is a priority for many of the neighbourhood management areas to reduce the number of young people engaged in antisocial behaviour and criminal activity it is also recognised that young people’s sense of belonging must be improved and their participation in positive activities increased

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 38

These discussions demonstrate how issues of inequality and inclusion have permeated the ‘What Matters’ strategy, and how the solutions to these problems are presented as requiring a holistic approach to local governance. This attempt to mobilise cooperation around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda of addressing inequality within Cardiff is significant for discussions of community safety. The primacy of issues of inequality and social inclusion are reminiscent of Hughes’ (1998) identification of a more transformative model of community safety, that of ‘civic and inclusive safe cities’ (Hughes, 1998: 146). This model described by Hughes
privileges ideas of social democratic participation, inclusion and engagement and partnership between the police, local government and the communities they serve. So far the chapter has focussed on the broad framing of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, but of further importance is how community safety, in particular, is framed within the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

5.3.4 CONCEPTUALISING SAFETY

The outcome that is most explicitly linked to issues of crime and disorder in the city is the outcome ‘people are safer and feel safe’. While it may be easy to look past this title, doing so would miss an indication of the progressive and transformative conceptualisation of community safety in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Titles are useful and worthy of attention as they provide clues as to what is considered important, and indicate how social problems are presented and therefore rendered governable. Earlier it was shown that community safety in Cardiff during the national mandatory period was characterised by a developmental agenda largely orientated around ideas of risk management and crime reduction. Reflecting this co-opting of community safety under a crime reduction agenda and illustrating the importance of titles, Hughes, writing during that time, asserts:

It is telling to note that we have community safety in a Crime and Disorder Act rather than crime and disorder in a Community Safety Act

Hughes, 2002: 128

It is significant then that within the ‘What Matters’ strategy issues of crime and disorder are encompassed within the outcome of ‘people are safer and feel safe’. What is presented is more akin to the latter half of Hughes’ statement where safety is not seen as a product of effective strategies to address crime and disorder, but rather crime and disorder is one aspect of a broader agenda around the governance of safety. This lends further credence to the argument that the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is in contrast to the developmental agenda of the national mandatory period. This divergence is emphasised in the introductory statement highlighting the importance of safety:

Being safe and feeling safe are fundamental aspects of citizen well-being, and these issues have consistently ranked as top priorities for residents and visitors alike. This
means people from all sections of the community being free from harm, injury or risk and being secure in their surroundings. Feeling safe means feeling confident that none of these things will be compromised. Partners in Cardiff recognise how much these issues matter to people and are committed to creating a city that is safe in the broadest possible sense. This means protecting our citizens from harm and exploitation, particularly those who are most vulnerable, in every neighbourhood across the city.

Cardiff Partnership Board, 2011: 35

The latter half of this quote is significant in its appeals to safety in its ‘broadest possible sense’ and the protection of those who are most vulnerable to harm and exploitation. This agenda of promoting safety in its broadest sense is divided into four thematic priorities concerning different elements of safety, only one of which specifically notes the concern of crime and its effects:

- People are safe from harm, abuse and exploitation
- Communities and neighbourhoods in Cardiff are cohesive
- People are free from crime and the effects of crime
- People are safe in their environment

The breadth of these thematic priorities indicate an agenda that extends beyond the exclusive focus on crime reduction displayed in the developmental agendas of the national mandatory period (Gilling, 2007) where community safety was equated with a ‘narrow brief of certain types of crime reduction’ (Hughes, 2002: 128). Such a narrow scope for community safety was also noted by Croall (2009) and Tombs and Whyte (2006) in regards to the absence of corporate, white collar or economic offences in any community safety agenda. The inclusion of these four broad priorities provides more opportunities for progressive and socially just responses to the problems of crime, disorder and safety. This is evidenced in the consideration of broader harms and threats to safety that may exist in the city, such as road safety, but also more significantly, and arguably more encompassing, is the desire to protect vulnerable adults which is significant due to its potential to encourage a broader agenda around exploitation. Moreover, the first of these priorities, ‘people are safe from harm, abuse and exploitation’, places particular emphasis on children. This emphasis on the abuse and exploitation of children firmly foregrounds the role of social workers and children’s services in relation to
the safety agenda in Cardiff, further demarcating it from previous arrangements in which social services were far removed from the concerns of community safety.

Therefore the ‘What Matters’ strategy presents an agenda focussed on the issues of inequality in the city, from which other social problems, including crime and disorder, stem. In addressing the causes and consequences of this inequality, the Cardiff Partnership Board has sought to appeal to, what Stone terms, a social change agenda in attempt to mobilise cooperation and to draw attention to the need for a holistic approach. More specifically to community safety the ‘What Matters’ strategy demonstrates a repositioning of the relationship between ideas of safety and concerns of crime and disorder, whereby community safety is structured around a broader agenda of safety, of which issues of crime and disorder are subordinated to. In considering the framing of the ‘What Matters’ strategy it is important to recall the discussions of the previous chapter, and the repositioning of the local authority as the lead actor in the governing arrangements. This repositioning of the local authority as the lead actor within the governing arrangement has likely had an impact on how this agenda was created. Certainly it was apparent in the fieldwork that council officers within the policy and partnership team played a key role in the development of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual revisions. The dominance of Cardiff Council within the governing arrangements and its responsibility in authoring the ‘What Matters’ strategy is important when considering the transformative agenda, as the effective realisation of this agenda is dependent upon the mobilisation and coordination of partnership activity around this agenda. This is particularly relevant due to the appeals of broad purposes within the ‘What Matters’ strategy, for as Stone asserts:

Purposes compete with one another, and individuals face an abundance of worthy claims, some of which concerns matters immediate in their everyday lives. Indeed, under the constraints of bounded rationality, human beings are focused on what is immediate

2005: 319

This is of paramount importance in this research. While the presence of a transformative agenda is itself significant, whether this appeal to broad purposes around inequalities and social justice is realised at an operational level and in the
face of more immediate priorities is an important question. These issues are
tackled in Chapter 6, when considering how the strategic agenda of the ‘What
Matters’ strategy is being reflected in operational practice. In assisting these
discussions it is also worth briefly noting other policy agendas that may influence
practice in Cardiff. It is therefore worth highlighting that the social justice
orientation of the ‘What Matters’ Strategy and its focus on reducing poverty
through employment opportunities corresponds to the Welsh Governments anti-
poverty agenda. Like the ‘What Matters’ strategy the anti poverty agenda
explicitly states a commitment to ideals of social justice, and the importance of
effective social policy to reduce poverty and its affects on society. Unlike the
‘What Matters’ Strategy, the anti-poverty agenda does not directly connect issues
of poverty to the onset of criminal behaviour but does draw connections between
areas affected most afflicted by poverty and those most likely to experience the
affects of crime and disorder.

In contrast to the ‘What Matters’ strategy’s consistency with the Welsh
Government anti poverty agenda, the agenda on display within the Police and
Crime Plan for South Wales suggests potential for conflict. Where the ‘What
Matters’ strategy can be described as transformative, the agenda of the Police and
Crime Plan would better be described as a maintenance agenda with elements of
progressive practice in regards to the restorative justice and diversionary practices.
The Police and Crime Plan unsurprisingly put the police at the centre of the crime
reduction agenda. Within the Police and Crime plan is the understanding that other
agents of local governance should support the police in the enforcement and
control of crime and disorder. This is observed through the prioritisation of issues
within the Police and Crime plan that represent a narrower focus on crime and
disorder and are reminiscent of agendas of the national mandatory period of
community safety. So whereas the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy has
sought to shift focus away from an explicit crime and disorder remit, this is at odds
with the agenda of the Police and Crime plan, which is more directly focused upon
issues of crime and disorder. This friction between the progressive and
transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the Police and Crime
plan is important when considering operational practices of community safety
work in the city and the differing agendas that are influencing local decision making and partnership work. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

5.4 A SUSTAINABLE AGENDA? REVISIONS OF THE ‘WHAT MATTERS’ STRATEGY

As has been seen the ‘What Matters’ strategy presents a clear rhetorical commitment to a transformative and progressive agenda for local governance in Cardiff, however, highlighting the potential challenges caused by austerity such rhetoric is less pervasive in subsequent annual reviews of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. While the importance of poverty is still identified and the need to minimise it through various means of increasing education and employment are clearly illustrated, a clear recognition of how addressing these issues could have a preventative impact on other social problems including crime and disorder are absent. Within the original ‘What Matters’ strategy document there was a recognition of how addressing broader structural issues such as poverty, inequality and social mobility can impact upon other social problems. However in the annual revisions of the ‘What Matters’ strategy these priorities of addressing poverty, addressing income inequalities and improving education and social mobility are seen to be ends in themselves rather than part of a broader preventative strategy orientated around ideas of social justice. This disconnect between wider structural problems and more specific policy issues is reinforced in the revisions to the conceptualisation of community safety within the outcome of ‘people in Cardiff are safe and feel safe’. In the revisions the conceptualisation of community safety had reverted to a narrower focus on problems of crime and disorder and eschewed the wider issues of safety that were apparent in the original strategy. This is seen in the focus on the priorities of anti-social behaviour, violent crime, domestic abuse, first time entrants into the criminal justice system and perceptions of crime. These priorities, which are the same throughout the revisions, are more akin to the priorities in the national mandatory period.

Whereas the more transformative elements of the original ‘What Matters’ strategy were obfuscated in the annual revisions of the strategy, the more progressive elements around ideas of restorative justice have persisted. This commitment to
restorative approaches can be traced throughout the various annual reviews of the strategy, and the value placed upon diverting people away from the criminal justice system. In the 2012 revision there is a stated aspiration to become a ‘restorative city’ (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2012b: 54) and these restorative ideals are seen in relation to crime and disorder but also other areas such as problematic behaviour in schools to prevent transition into criminal or disorderly behaviour. This commitment to restorative justice was evident in the 2013 review and the piloting of neighbourhood resolution panels in neighbourhood management areas (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2013). This aim was strengthened in 2014 with the roll out of restorative approaches in response to low-level crime and disorder in accordance with the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2014b). The discrepancies between the original ‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual visions indicate a lack of continuity in the transformative elements of the agenda but an apparent continuation of commitment to the restorative elements of the progressive agenda. The question this raises, is whether these discrepancies represent changes in practice, or whether they indicate something about the policy process in Cardiff.

There is evidence that these differences reflect the ways in which these policy documents are written and subsequently highlight some of the fundamental limitations of looking at policy ‘talk’. As the governing agenda outlining the vision for local governance for a ten-year period, the original flagship ‘What Matters’ strategy was subject to substantial strategic direction and input from various stakeholders. In comparison, insights gained through discussions with members of the policy and partnership team revealed that the creation of the annual reviews of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was more heavily influenced by the individual officers within the team and received more minimal input from more senior actors in the Cardiff Partnership Board. To an extent this helps explain the lack of continuity between the original strategy and its subsequent revisions in that it may reflect variances in the authoring of the reviews rather than policy discontinuity. However, given the extent of austerity it is plausible that the variance between the original ‘What Matters’ strategy and its annual revisions is indicative of the problems of sustaining a strategic agenda orientated around more transformative ideals. In seeking to further clarify the sustainability and feasibility
of this agenda in times of austerity this chapter now moves to identify how the ‘What Matters’ agenda is translating into actual policy decisions, in terms of the allocation of funding and the prioritisation of certain issues within the safer and cohesive communities programme board.

5.5 THE CHALLENGES OF AUSTERITY FOR ACHIEVING THIS PROGRESSIVE AGENDA

The progressive and transformative agenda communicated in the rhetoric of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is itself important as it represents a clear demarcation from the developmental discourses prevalent in the Cardiff community safety strategies during the national mandatory period. This indicates the greater autonomy afforded to local governing regimes in developing their own agendas following the decentralisation of power advocated by the Coalition Government. However, as noted in Chapter 2 this greater autonomy has come hand in hand with austerity and diminishing governing resources available to local actors. This raises questions of how governing regimes can mobilise cooperation around particular agendas given the challenges of austerity and the pressures on partnership working (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012). This is critical for this research as the realised of the ‘What Matters’ strategy is contingent upon the effective mobilisation of local partner organisations and directorates within the council around this agenda. However there is evidence that more immediate concerns, such as reducing financial resources, are overshadowing the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Given their size and remit, Cardiff Council is crucial for the realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, however the extent of austerity facing local authorities (Taylor-Gooby, 2012) posed a number of challenges to their commitment to the ideals espoused in the strategy. The following section explores how budgetary savings within the Council indicate how more immediate concerns of austerity superseded the broader purposes of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

The most contentious budgetary savings encountered during the research concerned the extent of cuts to youth provision in the city, which faced budget reductions of £250,000. Savings on youth provision were a persistent issue during the fieldwork and there were significant concerns about the impact of these cuts on young people
in the city, as highlighted by numerous practitioners encountered during the research. One neighbourhood chair remarked upon the impact of the cuts to youth provision in their area and how it may lead to future problems in terms of crime, disorder and anti social behaviour:

[…] my biggest worry is around some of the budget cuts that are coming about, you know most anti social behaviour I think comes out of boredom rather than intent as I don’t think people wake up in the morning and say I’m going to go out and really upset people, actually what happens is they just get bored and they start doing things, and things turn into anti social behaviour and my biggest concern is actually the improvements we’ve made through working with PCSOs, working with the youth service and things like that is actually, you know, there are significant cuts to the youth service in the council, there are significant cuts in policing and my concern is that we will withdraw some of that, what people see as nice to have, and we will go back to fighting ASB rather than actually preventing it which isn’t good use of resource but its much easier for people to argue ‘oh I need this to stop this happening’ than to say ‘well actually we need this because that’s going to prevent this in the long-term’ so yeah I think you know what instigates it is around boredom and I do have concerns around the improvements that we’ve made

Neighbourhood Chair

This quote illustrates the dominant concerns around the significant cuts to the youth service, much of these focussed around counter-productive long-term impact of such savings. The degradation of youth services have not been confined to Cardiff, but have been emulated elsewhere, as reported by Firmin (2013) for the Guardian, who argues that the disappearance of youth services nationally are reducing opportunities for social mobility and addressing child poverty. However given the unequivocal commitment in the ‘What Matters’ strategy to the importance of early intervention and equality of access for all young people in the city, the degradation of youth services in the city is a significant problem for the realisation of the progressive and transformative agenda espoused by the Cardiff Partnership Board. In addition to reducing funds available for youth provision in the city, it was apparent that a range of support funds were being cut back as a result of the pressures of austerity as noted by one practitioner who was working within the safer and cohesive communities programme board:
[...] so the cuts are going to be brutal… they’re going to decimate youth services and outreach services around an agenda that we know politically is just massive at the moment so street outreach is crucial to get to these kids and if in the proposal its there that they’re going to cut the service, then there’s a massive risk, not to the programme, to children and young people, it’s not about the programme, it’s about what happens for the people on the ground, so massive risk, the other risk is the supporting people grants are going or being cut, so the money that supports the most vulnerable of women who are in hostels so that money is being axed, you know we are going to have a real crisis situation where people who have got complex needs, their money will be taken away and there will be nobody to care for them and there is a chance that we are heading back to Victorian, Dickensian days where there will be people begging on streets because there won’t be money to support them

Local Practitioner

Both extracts included above draw attention to a number of provisions under the remit of the council affected by austerity such as the provision of sports, leisure and culture, and grants aimed at supporting vulnerable people. The loss of these provisions are problematic for the philosophy of addressing the ‘inequalities of opportunities’ which emphasised that all people should have equal access to services regardless of their circumstances. Within the ‘What Matters’ strategy there was recognition of the long-term repercussions of these inequalities of access for wider social problems. Such long-term thinking and commitments are compromised by the placement of these cuts, which reinforce rather than reduce the inequalities of access. Cuts to sports provision, and more controversially in Cardiff, the cuts to library services have most impact upon the most vulnerable in Cardiff in that the people that it will affect the most are those who are in most need of public provision of these services. The presence and extent of these cuts to the youth service and the provision of sport, leisure and culture facilities within the city are important given the explicit connection made between the importance of these services and the prevention of crime and disorder displayed in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Therefore the cuts to these services indicate the challenges of realising the more progressive and transformative aspirations of the ‘What Matters’ strategy in times of reducing financial resources, in which the immediate
pressures of austerity have constrained the ability of Cardiff Council to effectively contribute to the commitments outlined within the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

In addition to problematising the fulfilment of the ‘What Matters’ strategy these cuts necessitated by austerity have also affected the political legitimacy of Cardiff Council as seen in numerous protests across the city against the cuts to services. In an attempt to mitigate this Cardiff Council has engaged in an approach to gather political resource to defend future funding decisions. This engagement exercise, called the Cardiff Debate, was an on-going three-year public consultation exercise that commenced during the summer of 2014 and was designed to gather public input on the allocation of resources and the delivery of services in times of austerity. The Cardiff Debate was therefore presented as a way of facilitating public engagement and public participation in the prioritisation process and local decision-making. During my fieldwork this engagement exercise comprised a key element of the work undergone in the partnership office and was delivered through a series of workshops and engagement sessions in every ward area of the city, and through the use of social media. These engagement methods sought to inform the public of the financial challenges facing public services in the city and aimed to identify what residents thought were the most important services and what issues should be prioritised in these times of reduced public budgets. This presentation of the Cardiff Debate is concordant with transformative agendas around ideas of social inclusion in decision-making processes, however observations gained through my fieldwork revealed an ancillary motive to this engagement. In discussions with research officers and policy officers it was apparent that they suspected that Cardiff Debate and the responses it was gaining would be used to justify future disinvestment decisions. This was mostly clearly evidenced when I attended a pilot of one of the Cardiff Debate sessions alongside members of the policy and partnership team:

In talking to some of the research officers present it was apparent that one of the more significant aims of this session was to find out people’s view on which should be provided by the council, and which could be delivered by other sectors. They suspected that the senior decision makers in the council are hoping that respondents do not prioritise this as an issue so that the council can defend itself when services are contracted out to third parties.
This was confirmed later in the session when one of the policy officers commented that it will give the politicians ammunition in their defence in future as they can say ‘well in the consultation you said it didn’t matter who delivered the services?’

Fieldnotes 22/07/14

In this regard, the Cardiff Debate exercise represented an attempt by Cardiff Council to accumulate political resources that could be used to justify disinvestment decisions, and in particular justify the distribution of responsibility for service delivery to other sectors. Therefore while the Cardiff Debate has been framed around social democratic principals of inclusion it has also facilitated the accumulation of political resource to justify future disinvestment from service delivery and to act as a bulwark against public disapproval, in the wake of reducing financial resources and the necessity of cuts to public services in the city.

These discussions are important considering the analytical framework underpinning this research. In Cardiff there is a governing agenda emerging around progressive and transformative ideas within the ‘What Matters’ strategy demonstrating the opportunities of the greater autonomy given to local governing regimes. However, the realisation of this agenda is dependent upon the effective mobilisation of governing resources around this agenda. In this last section it has been shown that Cardiff Council, as one of the leading players in the Cardiff Partnership Board, has been unable to deliver on the more aspirational claims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy due to the pressures of austerity, which are superseding the more aspirational aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

5.6 THE SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES PROGRAMME BOARD

It was evident that the immediate pressures caused by austerity were problematising commitments to the progressive and transformative aspirations of the ‘What Matters’ strategy at its broadest level. There were also signs that the agenda around community safety explored in the ‘people are safe and feel safe’ section of the ‘What Matters’ strategy was not translating into practice. This problem of translation can be seen in two ways. Firstly the prioritisation of particular issues within the safer and cohesive communities programme board
which represent the city wide priorities for issues of crime and disorder within the Cardiff Partnership Board. Secondly, the actual practice and agendas within each of the Safer and Cohesive Communities Workstream activities and the six neighbourhood management teams. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the first of these, how the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy aligns with the prioritisation of citywide workstream activities. Therefore the remainder of this chapter is purposefully restricted to the identification of what community safety priorities are identified at a citywide level. The operational practices and agendas of the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams are discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to the mobilisation of partnership working and cooperation at an operational level. This discussion of the safer and cohesive communities programme board is divided into two sections corresponding to the two workstreams underneath the safer and cohesive communities programme board. Section 5.6.1 is concerned with the safety and safeguarding communities workstream and section 5.6.2 addresses the community cohesion workstream.

5.6.1 The Safety and Safeguarding Communities Workstream
The safety and safeguarding communities workstream was considered to be the replacement infrastructure to the community safety partnership by both policy officers and practitioners due to its explicit focus on citywide issues of crime and disorder in the city. However in looking at the priorities within the safer and cohesive communities programme board there is a clear difference between its priorities and the priorities identified during the national mandatory period outlined earlier. During the period in which this research was conducted the priorities were:

- Reducing domestic and sexual violence
- Improve offender management/Reduce first time entrants to the youth justice system
- Develop a vibrant and safe night time economy
- Addressing exploitation
- Reduce anti-social behaviour

The presence of only five priorities represents a significant reduction in the size of the agenda in contrast to the priorities prior to 2010. In comparison the 2005-2008
strategy contained five main priorities, in addition to a second tier of five further priorities. For those few individuals who had experience of both the pre 2010 and post 2010 community safety arrangements, this reduction in the number of priorities was reflective of a diminishing role for community safety as remarked by a member of the research side of the Policy and Partnership team:

[…] years ago there used to be a lot committees, such as, you had a criminal damage group, you had a violent crime group, you had serious inquisitive crime group, you had an anti social behaviour group, multi agency groups and I used to service all of those groups with reports but those groups don’t exist anymore

Partnership Officer

This was also alluded to by one of the Policy officers in the team:

So I mean the differences, are I guess at the time at there was more of a focus on community safety but that’s understandable as it was part of the community safety partnership and there were a lot more focussed meetings to that end, there were a lot more focussed sort of I guess they were predominantly, sort of police heavy meetings about you know tackling violence and things like that

Policy Officer

These extracts, which point out the diminishing activity around community safety, also touch on another issue, the reduced focus on volume crimes. In keeping with the commentaries of Gilling (2007) and Gilling et al. (2013) the priorities for community safety in Cardiff during the national mandatory period were dominated by issues of law enforcement and volume crime as seen in the prioritisation of violent crime, burglary, auto crime substance misuse and anti-social behaviour. In contrast the priorities of the safer and cohesive communities programme board are notable due to the absence of volume crimes. This absence is significant as it denotes a retrenchment of partnership work around these issues and suggests that volume crimes have been left to the police to address on their own, counter to the narrative of joint working and partnership appealed to in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. While it may be argued that these issues are being addressed through the neighbourhood management teams, during this research it was apparent that volume crimes, other than anti-social behaviour, were not addressed within the
neighbourhood management teams either. This omission of volume crimes in discussions of partnership activity was not only raised by interviewees but was clear when analysing and reviewing my fieldnotes of observations within the Policy and Partnership team. In this review process what was apparent, and what was always in the back of my mind during this research was the absence of discussions regarding volume crimes within this team.

This raised an obvious question, was the central coordination and oversight of community safety happening elsewhere and was that somewhere where I should have been located? Recognising this during the research I sought clarification from policy officers, research officers, operational practitioners and strategic actors, all of which affirmed the site of observation in which I was located. Nor could it be that I was located in the wrong part of the team, throughout my year observation I circulated around the office, from the research team, to the policy team and to the neighbourhood management team, and in each location discussions of criminal activity was sparse. What was evident then during this research was a definitive absence of considerations of volume crime within the policy and partnership team which was reflected in the lack of prioritisation of volume crimes within the safer and cohesive communities programme board. This relegation of volume crimes from the agenda indicates a degradation of the partnership resources afforded to addressing volume crimes in the city and represents a shrinking of the agenda for community safety.

The reduction of the community safety agenda in the city was not just evidenced in relation to volume crimes but can be seen in further changes that have occurred following the organisational restructure in 2010. The priority of alcohol related violence has disappeared from the community safety agenda in Cardiff, and has migrated to the remit of the PCCs Office as revealed in conversation with members of the Policy and Partnership team:

He [the lead for the violent crime group] tends to liaise with the police commissioners office now, because he’s been left out on his own, there’s no control over it so he’s doing what he likes out there basically, and the other problem is he’s got no one to go to with any issues, what he tends to do now is go straight to the police and crime commissioners office

Partnership Officer
Alongside this substance misuse as a policy issue has also fallen off the community safety agenda, however unlike violent crime and volume crime substance misuse is still being addressed within the Cardiff Partnership Board. Substance misuse was a priority within the Cardiff community safety strategy in the national mandatory period, and following the changes that took place in 2010 was initially an agenda item within the safety and safeguarding communities workstream. However responsibility for substance misuse has since transferred to the ‘Healthy Living’ programme board and been reprofiled as a health issue rather than that of criminal justice. In some ways this reprofiling of substance misuse as a policy issue is consistent with the progressive leanings of the ‘What Matters’ strategy as it diverts people away from the criminal justice system and is indicative of a longer term preventative view of the problem as evidenced in the following extract taken from an interview with a police inspector involved in community safety work:

[…] so if we can push them into health and they get treatment whether or not it be methadone as a substitute or if they’re taking off drugs altogether, great, yes you got to spend money in the first instance to get it but the end result is that it’s not just the police time you’re freeing up

Police Inspector

Furthermore this interview indicates how this approach is consistent with the emphasis on inclusion within the ‘What Matters’ strategy:

[…] if you can get them onto an alternative drugs or want to come off drugs altogether, they might still be productive members of society, they might be functioning addicts but they need support because very, very few of them will do it on their own

Police Inspector

While these quotes demonstrate how the shift of responsibility for substance misuse towards health was consistent with the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy the extent to which this change can be solely attributed to the Cardiff Partnership Board is questionable. This preventative health agenda around substance misuse is driven by the recently established Cardiff and Vale Area Planning Board (APB), a board that specifically advocates this health orientated approach to substance misuse. The introduction of Area Planning Boards were part of a broader Welsh Government agenda set out in the Substance Misuse Delivery
Plan 2008-18 (Welsh Government, 2008) which sought a more health orientated preventative approach by emphasising the value of support and the provision of health services.

Moreover, in keeping with the argument that the capacity for community safety work has diminished as a result of austerity and the repositioning of community safety as a result of the changing governing arrangements it cannot be escaped that the transferral of responsibility for substance misuse represents a loss of funding to community safety work. The transferal of rehabilitation services for the community and alcohol drug team to the NHS away from Cardiff Council must be considered in relation to the disinvestment from community safety work in the city as it represent a shrinking of the community safety agenda and minimises the leverage available for community safety concerns on the substance misuse agenda. The repositioning of substance misuse as a policy concern was framed in the following way:

A saving of £87,000 has been realised following the realignment of Community Safety within the directorate and the transfer of Substance Misuse to Health

Cardiff Council, 2014: 24

This framing of the ‘realignment’ of substance misuse as a health issue rather than that of a community safety as primarily a ‘saving’ rather than a functional attempt to improve practice is significant and points to the overriding concern of financial resources. More importantly there was evidence that as a result of this repositioning and the greater control afforded to health practitioners the substance misuse agenda had largely been appropriated under the guise of addressing the health problems of alcohol abuse. This was seen in one meeting regarding substance misuse attended by members of the Area Planning Board as recorded in my fieldnotes:

As with many times during the weekend, members from the neighbourhood management team tried to steer the discussion towards the impact of heroin, cannabis and cocaine within these communities, but like the previous points those practitioners from the Area Planning Board continually put alcohol at the centre of the discussion at the expense of other substance misuse concerns.

Fieldnotes 10/01/2014
This increased focus of the substance misuse agenda around the health issues of alcohol as opposed to broader issues associated with substance misuse problems indicates that the criminal justice concerns around substance misuse have become less prevalent as greater control over the agenda is handed to health practitioners. This was confirmed in an informal discussion with a fellow PhD researcher who had undertaken research related to substance misuse services within the city and the increasing status of alcohol as a public health issue for substance misuse workers. This suggests that while the change in responsibility for substance misuse may have the potential to lead to more progressive approaches, that this is not happening and that the community safety concerns are falling by the wayside in favour of a greater concern on the repercussions of alcohol misuse on peoples health rather than the broader social implications in terms of crime, disorder and community safety. This is also echoed within the APB strategy, which places significant emphasis on problems of alcohol misuse, and is further demonstrated in the Cardiff Partnership Board documentation where the two priorities listed under substance misuse are ‘reducing damaging alcohol consumption’ and ‘reduce smoking’. Therefore while the hiving off of substance misuse has enabled a financial saving and fits with the rhetoric of shared delivery and holistic support what is happening is the health agenda around substance misuse is eclipsing broader community safety concerns and therefore stands in stark contrast to the ideals of mainstreaming community safety.

The reduction in the scope of the community safety agenda within Cardiff was further evidenced in my fieldwork, emerging first as signs that anti-social behaviour was to be removed as a priority within the workstream as discussed in the following quote:

I still think at some point that there is a case to have a look at what we’ve got as priorities and see if really, y’know one of the things we’ve got down there is anti social behaviour and that’s never going to go away and its never not going to be a priority broadly speaking but really in what we need to tackle for community safety and the partnership, this is personal opinion now, I think that could go to a watching brief, we’ve got an anti-social behaviour team, we’ve got thousands of PCSOs now, there are a lot of resources to tackle that as an issue

Policy Officer
The removal of anti-social behaviour as a priority from the safer and cohesive communities programme board was realised at the end of 2014. This is worthy of note given the 2014 anti-social behaviour legislation bringing in Public Space Protection Orders and imposing a greater emphasis on the role of local councils in reducing anti-social behaviour. However, as indicated in the above quote the removal of anti-social behaviour as a workstream was argued to reflect that the infrastructure and procedures put in place to deal with anti-social behaviour were developed enough that it no longer needed to be prioritised as an issue within the Cardiff Partnership Board. This is further indicated in minutes of a meeting of the Cardiff Partnership Board (2014c): ‘Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) workstream removed as agreed. Acknowledged that this would always be a priority, but Cardiff has a robust partnership process in place to deal with ASB and this no longer needs to be viewed as an intractable issue’. However as discussed in the next chapter, the robustness of the partnership practices around anti-social behaviour are more contested than the narrative displayed here suggests and point to a more fractious relationship between the police and the local authority. What is being demonstrated then is a further example of how the community safety agenda is constricting as a result of reducing financial resources.

Taken together the disappearance of volume crime, alcohol related violent crime, substance misuse and anti-social behaviour represent a significant reduction in the scope of the community safety agenda and further point to a reduction in the governing capacity available to community safety work in the city. Far from being progressive or transformative, the community safety agenda is being constricted and constrained as a result of austerity and the mainstreaming of community safety resulting in certain agendas being hived off to other parties. This is in contrast to the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy that posited an integrated and holistic approach to service delivery whereby responses to crime and disorder are to be situated with an integrated strategy of social and economic policy. Here however we have seen the pressures of austerity place these priorities back within particular functional service areas: substance misuse as a public health issue, and volume crimes as a police and criminal justice issue.

This diminishing scope of the community safety agenda is important when
considering the changes to the governing arrangements discussed in the previous chapter. It is not simply the case that austerity has caused a reduction in the scope of the community safety agenda, but rather in times of austerity there is a reduced amount of resources being afforded to the community safety agenda within the Cardiff Partnership Board. This is an important distinction as it draws attention to the allocation of governing resources, and the reasons why resources are not being afforded to the community safety agenda. An important point here relates to the dismantling of the community safety team and the loss of key roles such as the community safety manager and coordinator who played important roles in promoting the community safety agenda and facilitating engagement from partner organisations. The absence of these key actors championing community safety as an agenda at a strategic level and the lack of clear lines of responsibility for community is likely to have had an impact upon the prioritisation of community safety against competing policy agendas. Therefore it can be argued that the changes to the governing arrangements has degraded the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff and the institutional capacity to mobilise commitment and cooperation for community safety work resulting in the diminishing resources afforded to it.

Reflecting this, the only example of an expansion of the community safety agenda did not arise from top-down strategic thinking but rather resulted from consistent pressure from the bottom-up involving a singular motivated practitioner. The priority in question, that of addressing human exploitation, emerged from approaches to tackle the problems of sex work in the city around 2010. While exploitation was identified as a key issue within the original ‘What Matters’ strategy it was not until 2013 that addressing exploitation became a priority for the safer and cohesive communities programme board. The prioritisation of this work on the safer and cohesive communities programme board was considered important for cooperation around this agenda from other partners however the process of getting it recognised as shared priority did take a substantial commitment of time and personal resources. In the following extract a key figure involved with the human exploitation agenda described how political and organisational pressure was used to encourage the prioritisation of this issue as an agenda item:
I’ve been really consistently tenacious and vocal and championed and its taken me years… locally I’ve just beavered away with local councillors, and whoever the chair was, it was [Local Councillor] at the time, just really bent her ear about all of this, scrutiny enquiries came for sex work, and then they redid a human trafficking one, which then put the local authority in the spotlight in terms of what are the recommendations you have to be seen to be implementing the recommendations, so there’s some weight coming politically, in terms of the partnership board I’ve just made myself a regular feature, because I’ve thought this is important enough and they should hear about it so I have asked over the years for frequent spots when issues have come up, written briefing papers, put words into their mouths that this is a shared priority, and I’ve listed why, the risks for different organisations and why it is a shared priority, culminating in the establishment of a new workstream

Local Practitioner

This cultivation of political resources through the scrutiny committees and the recommendations that they make in terms of improving practice was verified through analysis of past scrutiny committee meetings where the evolution of the agenda can be seen. The second half of the quote demonstrates how in addition to political resources it was possible to achieve leverage through the cultivation of hierarchal resources by taking advantage of the programme board and using it as a way of garnering strategic buy in from other partners. That the origin of this prioritisation lied with the persistence of one individual rather than as a product of strategic direction is problematic for the claims of strategic governance and points to a lack of proactive agenda setting for community safety at a strategic level, which again can be linked to the diminished community safety infrastructure in the city. What appears to be happening in Cardiff is the degradation of formal institutional support for the facilitation and promotion of partnership work around community safety at a strategic level, which is compromising the prioritisation of community safety work. What the example of human exploitation demonstrates is that it is still possible to mobilise support around new agendas but at the expense of a significant personal investment of time and resources in negotiating support and cooperation from partner organisations. This greater emphasis on individuals in driving forward in partnership activity in the absence of the dedicated support of the community safety partnership is discussed further in the next chapter.
5.6.2 COMMUNITY COHESION WORKSTREAM

The shrinking of the agenda was also observed within the community cohesion workstream, which formed the other half of the programme board. The community cohesion workstream focuses on three areas of work: i) Delivering the outcomes sought by the CONTEST strategy ii) mainstreaming, managing and promoting community cohesion and supporting inclusion iii) citizen involvement. Like the Safer and safeguarding communities workstream there was evidence that one of these priorities had disappeared. Firstly this was seen in the dominance of the CONTEST board as noted by one senior manager involved in the workstream:

The part of the community cohesion workstream that I’m most intimately involved in and how I, I don’t see the workstream as anything separate to this, is through the coordination of the Counter terrorist work, the CONTEST work and the prevent work as part of that. So where... there are probably some other bits and pieces within the workstream that sit outside that but my focus is entirely on that work

Senior Manager Cardiff Council

While this individual’s work covered the three priorities within the community cohesion workstream it was apparent that their efforts were focussed solely on the CONTEST board and not on the other two activities. In explaining why this was the case they outlined that one of their other roles was specifically linked to the CONTEST board and as an attempt to reconcile the pressures of two roles they had conflated the two roles to manage the ‘pressure of work’ as they have ‘a set of core deliverables there and that’s where I’ve put my energies in’. So while the community cohesion workstream has been focussed on the CONTEST board, the mainstreaming, managing and promoting community cohesion and supporting inclusion workstream and the citizen involvement workstream have been marginalised. Indicating the diminishing scope of the community cohesion workstream, there was evidence that the citizen involvement workstream activity has been removed, which was revealed in a informal conversation with the stated lead on citizen involvement who revealed that they had ceased working in that capacity years previously. This was clarified in the most recent iteration of the programme board where the agenda for the community cohesion workstream has been reduced to two activities, with the absence of community involvement. I was
unable to interview the third workstream activity lead within the community cohesion workstream due to a change of staff, but I was made aware of a dedicated community cohesion officer within the council who was responsible for driving forward the community cohesion agenda within Cardiff. Again, what is apparent is further evidence of a diminishing agenda within the safer and cohesive communities programme board, which is indicative of diminishing financial resources being afforded to community safety under the Cardiff regime.

5.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter, like the previous, presents two competing narratives. On the one hand there is the narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board, which through the ‘What Matters’ strategy presents an agenda organised around principles of social and restorative justice. Within this strategy, there is an appeal to mobilise engagement around a ‘broad purpose’ of addressing the inequalities that exist in the city, from which other social problems, such as crime and disorder stem. The ‘What Matters’ strategy places significant emphasis on the need for a holistic and joined up response to addressing the causes and consequences of inequality in the city. The agenda displayed is therefore consistent with the justifications for the changing governing arrangements offered in the previous chapter, whereby the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board would enable a more joined up response to social problems, and facilitate the strategic governance of the city.

Counterpoised to this narrative of progression, we have seen how the changes to the governing arrangements have resulted in significant repercussions for the community safety infrastructure in the city that has been stripped back under the guise of mainstreaming and integration. Similarly this chapter has demonstrated how the progressive and transformative rhetoric encountered within the ‘What Matters’ strategy is dependent upon the ability of the Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation and resources around this agenda. This chapter has begun to illustrate some of the challenges of doing this, as more immediate financial pressures are taking precedent over the progressive and transformative aspirations of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This is seen within Cardiff Council where commitments made in the ‘What Matters’ strategy to reducing inequality and ensuring equality of access are being overshadowed by the necessity of reductions in financial
expenditure seen in the budget cuts to youth, sport and library provision in the city. Moreover, despite the claims that the changes to the governing arrangements would enable the pursuit of a more progressive and socially just community safety agenda, there are signs of a diminished community safety agenda, where previous partnership priorities have been hived off to particular functional service areas. The response to volume crimes have been left to the police, work around alcohol related violence has migrated towards the Police and Crime Commissioners Office and responsibility for substance misuse has been transferred to health. This shrinking agenda for community safety work in Cardiff is significant considering the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff.

This discussion, however, has been limited to the broad prioritisation of community safety priorities and says little about the partnership practices on the ground, both in the workstream activities of the Safer and Cohesive and Communities Board and the neighbourhood management teams. Given the repercussions of austerity on the governing arrangements, the disintegration of the community safety infrastructure in the city, how cooperation is achieved and induced by practitioners without the institutional support of the community safety team is important. It is this which forms the focus of the final findings chapter, what schemes of cooperation are employed to achieve partnership working and how do these schemes of cooperation affect the pursuit of community safety work in the various workstream activities and neighbourhood management areas.
6. GOVERNING SAFER AND COHESIVE COMMUNITIES IN CARDIFF: REALISING THE ‘WHAT MATTERS’ STRATEGY?

6.1 INTRODUCTION

For the progressive and transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy to be realised, cooperation at an operational level needs to be encouraged and facilitated. However the commencement of austerity and the degradation of the institutional infrastructure for community safety, as part of the mainstreaming and integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board, have made partnership arrangements increasingly precarious. The dissolution of the Cardiff community safety partnership ended the co-location of police and local authority staff, adding barriers to communication and the development of professional relationships. Yet, more problematic was the loss of expertise and support following the disappearance of the community safety team, which has resulted in a lack of coordination and oversight of the disparate practices of community safety work. In the absence of such coordination, the operational practices of community safety work have become increasingly isolated and disconnected, culminating in partnership arrangements that were largely driven by the locally situated operational leads of these activities. As a result of this, the operational practices of community safety in the city were fragmented, with divergent operational agendas, and varying levels of success in promoting cooperation from partner organisation. This variance is problematic for the realisation of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the aspirations of strategic governance highlighted in Chapter 5.

6.2 COOPERATION, COORDINATION AND THE COMMUNITY SAFETY PARTNERSHIP

It is useful to begin this discussion with a brief account of the schemes of cooperation within the national mandatory period of community safety prior to the reorganisation of the governing arrangements in 2010. As seen in Chapter 4, the resources afforded to community safety during the Labour Governments of
1997-2010, had allowed the establishment of a sizable community safety infrastructure in Cardiff reflective of Edwards et al.’s (2007) maximal model of community safety. Chapter 5 demonstrated how this provision of resources was accompanied by central government targets and performance management (Gilling, 2007) that resulted in a developmental agenda in Cardiff. The extensive provision of financial resources for community safety, and the centralised management of local community safety work, reflected the importance of the community safety agenda for the New Labour Government. The highly resourced nature of community safety work, and its primacy as a policy agenda under New Labour was important for local partnership practices and leveraging cooperation from other actors as will now be explored.

Firstly, the highly centralised management of community safety work during this period, did not just incentivise partnership work, but actively made it a statutory duty following the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act. As described in Chapter 4, this statutory duty dictated who should participate in partnership work and the nature of that cooperation. This centralised steering of local partnership arrangements was further seen in the Police Reform Act 2002, which stipulated an expanding membership of local partnership practices for community safety. Therefore at a strategic level of local partnership arrangements, these legislative acts were important in driving forward partnership activity, in dictating who should be involved and the nature of their involvement. Alongside this strategic influence, the central management of community safety also affected cooperation at an operational level through centrally determined public service agreements. This was evidenced in the 2005-2008 Cardiff community safety strategy in reference to anti-social behaviour and substance misuse, both of which corresponded to centrally determined public service agreements (Cardiff Community Safety Partnership, 2005). These public service agreements not only set out specific targets for these priorities but also influenced who should be involved through Home Office issued action plans. Therefore, during this national mandatory period of community safety the agendas, the governing infrastructure and therefore the schemes of cooperation in place were significantly influenced by central government policy.
In addition to the influence of central government steering in this period, the provision of financial resources for community safety work enabled the development of extensive governing infrastructure for community safety in the form of multi-agency teams comprised of community safety practitioners. As seen in Chapter 4, in Cardiff this was seen in the sizable community safety infrastructure, which comprised of dedicated officers for situational prevention strategies, anti-social behaviour and substance misuse, as well as researchers, a community safety coordinator and a community safety manager. The practitioners played a key role in offering organisational support to the priority task groups, coordinating partnership work and facilitating cooperation in the city, in addition to ‘establishing new and distinct forms of community safety expertise’ (Edwards et al., 2015: 195). This coordination role was evidenced within the Cardiff community safety strategy, which highlighted the role of the community safety team in ensuring that ‘the task groups are operating within the their defined ‘terms of reference’ and that they are successfully implementing the intervention that are detailed within the Action Plans’ (2005: 34).

In addition to the coordination of operational activity, the community safety team also played a key role in the brokerage of partnership activity and mobilising strategic buy in for community safety work. In explaining this it is worth reflecting upon the discussions in Chapter 4, and the argument that the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff was indicative of a ‘maximal’ model of community safety (Edwards et al., 2007). Due to the size and well resourced nature of these large community safety teams, the community safety manager occupied a relatively senior position in local governing arrangements which granted greater leverage when co-opting engagement from other partner organisations (Edwards et al., 2007). Therefore the community safety infrastructure, and the governing resources it had access to, was integral in facilitating partnership work in the city. The community safety team enabled the coordination of operational activity, while the community safety manager was able to promote engagement at a strategic level. Therefore the importance of this infrastructure for the schemes of cooperation at both a strategic and operational level is clearly apparent.
This discussion is important, as this period can be regarded as the ‘high water mark of the ‘preventative turn’” (Edwards et al., 2015: 191), as austerity measures and the introduction of PCCs have compromised the continued commitment of financial resources to community safety as seen in Chapter 5. The influence of legal constitutional resources for pursuing community safety arrangements have weakened as a result of the Coalition Governments abandonment of public service agreements and a reduced emphasis on the centralised management of public services discussed in Chapter 2. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board has resulted in the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in the city, which has reduced the governing capacity available to community safety work. These factors, when considered together, present a fundamental challenge to the schemes of cooperation within the city, and the realisation of the transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. In the absence of the centralised management of community safety, and without the resources formally provided by the community safety team, there are significant questions about how cooperation around community safety work is incentivised, and how the operational practices of community safety are coordinated. It is these issues that the remainder of this chapter focuses on.

6.3 Partnership Without the Partnership

In considering the impact of the changes to the governing arrangements on cooperation in the city, it is worth reflecting on some of the points made at the end of Chapter 4. The most visible impact of the dissolution of the community safety partnership and its infrastructure, was the loss of the physical location of the multi-agency community safety team, which had formerly provided a central point for community safety enquiries and a site for the situation and development of community safety expertise. This also ended the co-location of police and local authority staff, as discussed in Chapter 4. This was problematic and was seen by some participants as a regressive step in the governing arrangements, and an added barrier to cooperation. This was evident during an interview with a police inspector responsible for community safety work who recalled the benefits of co-location between the police and the council:
[...] purely from a community safety aspect if we needed to discuss something around housing, for example problem tenants and anti social behaviour, may not be a council tenant but the council officers here would have access to the housing manager and the social landlords so all of that was a built in across the desk as opposed to a phone call or booking appointments, so that is a backward step in my view driven by finance.

Police Inspector

The importance of co-location for cooperation highlighted in this quote is consistent with Berry et al.’s (2009) claim that co-location was a key mechanism for effective partnership work and facilitating communication between partner organisations. The benefits of co-location were further recognised in a Home Office report which stated that co-located multi-agency arrangements ‘yielded benefits for speedier information exchange, information sharing, greater area engagement and facilitating the culture of joint working as working together in the same place fosters mutual respect among different agencies and builds trust’ (2013: 5). Therefore the absence of the community safety team, and the co-location arrangements it represented, is problematic for partnership working between South Wales Police and Cardiff Council as it added barriers to communication and information sharing. Accordingly, the Police Inspector spoken to in this research, spoke of this change as a ‘backward step in my view driven by finance’.

Alongside the ending of co-located arrangements, the dismantling of the community safety team has compromised the responsibility and coordination of community safety work. As with co-location, the presence of a clear coordinating role was noted as a core mechanism for effective partnership working by Berry et al. (2011: 22). For one policy officer, the community safety team, in particular the community safety coordinator and manager, were pivotal in providing cooperation between organisations and facilitating partnership work. Accordingly this practitioner was concerned that in the absence of this team, and the key individuals employed within it, nobody was in a position to coordinate activity and promote cooperation around community safety work. Another partnership team member mentioned this in relation to the neighbourhood management teams:
before you had the community safety tasking manager who used to attend every neighbourhood management meeting so you had that link centrally across all neighbourhood management areas, you haven’t got that anymore, that coordination… and that’s the downfall of community safety see, because community safety to me, the community safety partnership was that linkage across all the agencies

Partnership Officer

A common thread in the concerns of the policy officers spoken to within the partnership team, and discussed by some practitioners, was that the lack of central responsibility for community safety was problematic for the coordination of activity and continued cooperation of partner agencies around particular agendas. The perception was that the community safety team was important for the schemes of cooperation within Cardiff and that the new arrangements had degraded the local bureaucratic and structural resources available to facilitate community safety work. This itself is an important finding, however what is of further interest, is the impact of this upon the operational activities of community safety work. What was apparent and what will be shown throughout the remainder of this chapter is that these operational activities have become increasingly fragmented. This fragmentation of community safety work was discussed by an anti-social behaviour practitioner who had worked in a similar capacity prior to the restructure in 2010:

when asked what they [the anti-social behaviour practitioner] thought of the changes to community safety in Cardiff their response was immediate, it was more ‘disjointed’ and there was noticeably less coordination with other aspects of the council. They went on to argue that in previous arrangements there was a greater sense of strategic coordination between the activity groups, and that this coordination was provided by a tasking manager, a role which has since been lost. They outlined that now, the workstream activities are insular in their partnership working and were isolated from one another. As a result they aren’t really aware of what is happening elsewhere in regards to community safety, a problem that did not exist in the community safety partnership they argue. As an illustration of this problem they outline that the phone number used here in these offices is the same phone number used by the old community safety partnership so
they still occasionally get phone calls relating to community safety issues but because of the lack of responsibility or ownership of community safety issues they were unclear on where to forward these calls or who to direct enquiries towards

Fieldnotes 3/09/14

This fragmentation of activity into the varying workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams had led to diverging operational practices, which are highly reliant upon the practitioners leading those activities. This divergence of operational practices and operational agendas is problematic for the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its appeals to ‘broad purposes’ (Stone, 2005) around inequality as part of a transformative agenda. The dependency of operational practices and agendas upon the people and priorities they are dealing with, rather than the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, points to the greater influence of more immediate factors rather than the more nebulous appeals of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As Stone states: ‘given the bounded rationality of human beings, sustained purposes depend on the reinforcing support of networks’ (2005: 320). Considering this, the dismantling of the community safety team can be seen as compromising this ‘reinforcing support’ that Stone refers to. In its absence the responsibility for coordinating partnership work had been left to the lead practitioners of these arrangements. Given this fragmentation of activity and the discontinuity of practices and agendas involved the following discussion is separated into the constituent workstream priorities of the safer and cohesive communities programme board before exploring the neighbourhood management teams.

6.4 Promoting Cooperation Within the Safer and Cohesive Communities Programme Board

These changes to the governing arrangements for community safety work, and the dispersal of responsibility towards the individual workstream activity leads, has meant that these workstreams have adapted in different ways depending upon the particular pressures and people working within those areas. Therefore it makes sense for the following discussion of these workstream activities to be organised separately around each workstream activity.
6.4.1 Human Exploitation

The human exploitation workstream was described by one policy officer as holding a ‘unique position’ as it was the only example of a new agenda item being incorporated into the safer and cohesive communities programme board. Its addition was largely brought about the drive of one practitioner who had championed the agenda as explored in Chapter 5. The importance of this lead practitioner for the workstream activity was highlighted during an informal discussion with a senior policy officer in the safer and cohesive communities programme board:

When talking about the importance of particular people [the senior policy officer] states that yes while there is a significant amount of reliance placed upon the lead officers in driving forward partnership activity in instances where the activity is a statutory obligation the issue of staff turnover should not make a difference as the activity is required and would carry on regardless. However other cases are more reliant upon the work and drive of particular individuals’ interest and these examples are more at risk from staff turnover. In exemplifying this they refer to the work carried out around human exploitation, which they argue has been highly dependent upon the work of one key individual and therefore is at real risk of disappearing if that person should leave

Fieldnotes 06/08/14

This was further evidenced in a scrutiny meeting where one councillor, reviewing the activity of the workstream and concerned about the sustainability of the work asked the lead practitioner ‘what would happen to this work if you were hit by a bus tomorrow?’ The expansion of this agenda, discussed in Chapter 5, which developed over time from an initial focus on sex work, to encompass issues of human trafficking and child sexual exploitation, was described as a completely bottom up approach. However over the course of the fieldwork it was apparent that this approach to agenda setting had entailed a significant number of obstacles in getting the agenda recognised. In a meeting of the South Wales anti-human trafficking and slavery group, one police officer made the comment ‘that it was good to see [the workstream lead for Cardiff] without bruises on their forehand from knocking their head against a brick wall’ (fieldnotes, 13/05/14).
Conversely, the lack of direction offered from a strategic level has afforded greater discretion to the operational lead in choosing how to address the problem of human exploitation in the city. Influenced by their occupational background in the health service, the workstream has been structured around the minimal use of enforcement strategies, instead privileging the use of support services to prevent further disorder. These included addressing barriers faced by sex workers around housing, substance misuse and essential skills, but also longer-term considerations regarding social care provision and pathways into exploitation. In achieving these aims, the workstream was dependent upon the cooperation of the police, children’s services and a number of voluntary sector organisations. In promoting cooperation from partner organisations it was noted on numerous occasions, both by key practitioners, and a senior individual within the Cardiff Partnership Board, that due to limited financial resources, more informal approaches to promoting cooperation were necessary. This had led to focus on developing social capital and professional relationships, alongside appealing to shared goals and values, to encourage cooperation. This pursuit of improved relationships with local practitioners was observed often in meetings, in which the workstream lead shared an easy familiarity with practitioners from a number of organisations. During an interview with a leading practitioner within the workstream they made a point of highlighting the importance of fostering personal relationships with practitioners as a way of promoting engagement:

[…] some of the things we’ve done have cost absolutely bugger all to do, so its not about cost, some of its about cost, but its not all about cost, and certainly getting people on board on the agenda and pooling resources is about getting people signed up to a common goal which you don’t need money for… I went to the practitioners, I went to people who cared, so this has been a completely bottom up approach

Human Exploitation Workstream Practitioner

Here it was argued that developing relationships with practitioners at the local level was crucial to the success of the workstream activity. However that success is entirely dependent upon the ability of the workstream lead to identify who would be motivated to help and encouraging them to do so. This was raised
during a conversation with a senior policy officer over lunch, who talked about the addressing human exploitation workstream:

[policy officer] spoke about the importance of having someone who is able to see what is going on, where people might be addressing similar issues and how this work can be connecting joined up effectively and how important personal networks are in having the knowledge of who is doing what and where. In exemplifying this they refer to the work of [practitioner] in regards to addressing human exploitation and how [practitioner] is so effective at leading this activity as they have the social capital to know who is doing what and the social and personal skills to get these people together and mobilise them around the work [practitioner] wants them to do

Fieldnotes 01/07/2014

It is apparent that the schemes of cooperation within this workstream activity was reliant upon the social capital and social skills of the lead practitioner to encourage cooperation by appealing to those who work at the ground level and are personally invested in the work. However it is important to recognise that this approach to promoting cooperation has, in some part, only been possible due to the lack of contestation by other partners resulting from the lack of prioritisation as this as issue as noted by a practitioner working within the human exploitation workstream:

No it’s not a priority for them [the police] you see so that’s why they’re not all over it like a rash, that’s why they’re not going out raiding parlours and stuff like that, if for one minute the policy changed and they said you’ve got to go out and shut down all of the parlours then we would be at war

Human Exploitation Workstream Practitioner

Here, the lack of prioritisation of this issue by other actors has circumvented some of the power struggles around leadership and control, which allowed greater affordance to the workstream lead in pushing forward their own agenda. Nevertheless this reliance upon developing local relationships in facilitating cooperation does have its limitations in pursing more radical and politically contentious changes as observed in a sex work steering group with plans for the diversion of street sex workers away from residential areas:
The most interesting point of discussion here though were plans to set up a ‘no tolerance’ approach to street sex work in residential areas through the diversion of sex workers to other areas where its impact would be less disruptive. While there were concerns about the safety of such proposals this approach was met positively by many in the meeting except the Police officers who were concerned about the legal and political implications and what they argued to be the tacit legalisation of sex work. Hesitant to agree to anything they argued that such issues could not be organised locally and required the green light from South Wales Police HQ.

Fieldnotes 07/05/14

The reliance on pursuing progressive alliances at the grass roots was problematic, as local practitioners did not have the power to pursue the more radical approaches to diversion due to its substantial legal and political repercussions. Despite these limitations, the addressing human exploitation workstream was an important example as it demonstrates the lack of institutional support provided to the agenda. This placed greater reliance upon the lead practitioner in pushing forward the agenda and mobilising partnership activity. Therefore, this workstream highlights the role of particular actors and the shift from bureaucratic to more personalised modes of administration under the new governing arrangements, which have hollowed out the support capacity of the community safety team.

6.4.2 Domestic Violence

Where the addressing human exploitation workstream was characterised by a lack of contestation, the provision of domestic violence services was more disputed. Throughout the fieldwork it was apparent that there were significant problems in the coordination of partnership activity around domestic violence. Early on during my immersion within the Policy and Partnership team, a conversation with a senior policy officer indicated some of the challenges around coordinating domestic violence provision in the city:

Using the work around domestic violence as an example discusses the ‘complex delivery structure’ that has emerged in some areas of activity. In explaining this issue they refer to the reliance on the third sector in delivering this activity, and the presence of three competing third
sector organisations addressing domestic violence in the city. The problem, they outline, is that these services aren’t cooperating effectively, even going as far to say that these services are actually in competition with each other due to the competition for external funding.

Fieldnotes 17/04/14

This extract indicates the problems facing domestic violence provision in the city due to its delivery predominantly being provided through three voluntary sector providers. This has provoked a sense of competition between the providers and inhibited coordinated partnership activity. Another policy officer raised this issue during an interview in which domestic violence provision was discussed:

Things like domestic violence which really no ones got a sort of city wide handle of because the services are so disparate, y’know they’re delivered through a lot of third sector organisations there’s some services that are delivered by health or the council that there needs to be far more of a focus on something like

Policy Officer

What was evident regarding domestic violence provision in the city was the lack of coordination and cooperation from the various providers. Accordingly, over the course of research it was made apparent that the council wanted to take greater control in coordinating this activity, and, reflecting the increased importance on individual coordinators, the council tasked a member of staff within the housing team provide this coordination function. The introduction of a council employee to coordinate this activity is important when considering that, within the existing governing arrangements of the programme board, the position of workstream lead for domestic violence was occupied by an individual from one of the voluntary sector organisations. Therefore the tasking of a council employed member of staff represents an attempt to leverage greater council control of the disparate provision of domestic violence services. In furtherance of this point, I was invited and involved in a data subgroup meeting of domestic service providers. The meeting was convened to standardise the data recording practices of the various domestic violence providers to facilitate the more effective reporting of delivery and the coordination of resources. During this meeting attention was drawn to the problems unifying data recording practices:
When discussing why some providers collected certain data, and why others did not, the issue of contrasting sources of funding was raised. Much of the rationale for the recording of data, was connected to the monitoring requirements of different funding organisations, and due to breadth of funding sources for the providers this meant vastly different monitoring practices between agencies.

Fieldnotes 04/08/14

The different monitoring practices adopted by the various providers, resulting from their own internal processes, and the requirements of funders, meant that the data being collected on domestic violence provision was inconsistent and not conducive to assessing activity between the varying organisations. This problem of data collection was further evidenced during my time within the Policy and Partnership team when a member of the team showed me the data they were receiving from domestic service providers:

Putting the report cards on to the screen [partnership officer] goes through them and outlines various problems including contradictory and incomplete data. Pointing at a particular case [partnership officer] points out that while they indicate the number of clients they have they don’t outline what activity has taken place and how that is broken down by participants therefore obscuring what outcomes have actually taken place. [partnership officer] then goes on to say that some of the organisations are having problems using the RBA [Result Based Accountability] report card, pointing to a number of blank fields where none of the outcome measures have been filled in which [partnership officer] thinks is because they don’t collect any data that can correlate to the measurements included in the RBA performance scorecard.

Fieldnotes 20/08/14

These problems in the monitoring of the activities of domestic violence provision were a source of frustration for those in the partnership team as it inhibited their ability to identify the extent of the problem and the contribution of different services to addressing it. This was important when considering the longer-term plan of the council to introduce a commissioning process for domestic violence services. Again, this was framed in terms of resource efficiency and the greater control of service delivery to the council as discussed by one policy officer:
I think in terms of commissioning domestic abuse services it’ll go a lot further in terms of meeting the need because you can do a needs analysis for the needs of domestic abuse services in Cardiff and actually put that out into commissioning instead of the same services getting the funding year on year hopefully that’ll help towards bridging some of the gaps we’ve got at the moment

Policy Officer

In contrast to the addressing human exploitation work the domestic violence workstream was characterised by contestation and a lack of coordination. In seeking to rectify this, the council has sought to leverage greater control of this agenda through a number of means, such as introducing a dedicated coordinator of the activity, and improving data recording practices in anticipation of a competitive tendering process by which the council can influence greater control through the commissioning process.

6.4.3 Anti-social Behaviour

The two key actors in this workstream were the council anti-social behaviour team, located within the council housing team, and the police. Other key partners included the youth offending service, the neighbourhood management teams and private housing associations. At a wider level, engagement was sought with children’s services, adult and mental health services, though it was acknowledged that cooperation with these services were ‘less joined up’ (ASB Workstream Practitioner). What became evident during the research was the increasing compartmentalisation of responsibilities for anti-social behaviour work. This was primarily seen in the retrenchment of local authority participation through its exclusive focus on anti-social behaviour involving council tenants as discussed by a senior council officer within the safer and cohesive communities programme board:

[Senior officer] highlights that the council has a statutory requirement as social landlords to tackle anti-social behaviour involving council tenants. As this is where the legal responsibility lies for the council this is what they focus on and goes onto argue that the council can’t then be expected to engage with ASB in the neighbourhood as they don’t have the resources or statutory obligation to do so and therefore it is the responsibility of the police

Fieldnotes 06/08/14
The financial limitations on the council, and the need to focus on incidents involving council tenants, were further highlighted by a senior practitioner involved with anti-social behaviour: ‘due to our financial costing we have to have the council tenant as a victim or a perpetrator’. This prioritisation of resources by the council, and the retrenchment of wider support, was described by a police inspector for community safety as a stepping back of partnership activity:

[...] what we’re finding now is that they are withdrawing. I’ll give you an example, in one of the sectors in Cardiff a council tenant or the son of a council tenant is causing a lot of anti social behaviour in the local library which is owned and operated by the council, we’re looking to take an ASBO out against him, we’ve asked the council to manage that ASBO through the court process and we’ve had the answer back, no he’s not, it’s not against council tenants or council property, but it’s in a library where 50% of the complaints have come from library staff, the other 50% of the street that have complained, and are not council tenants so the council have pushed that back to us, that is purely down to cost

Police Inspector

These extracts are important, as they demonstrate how cooperation between the police and the council is degrading as a result of the council’s exclusive focus on incidents involving council tenants. This pulling back of resources, and the territorialisation of responsibilities around anti-social behaviour stand in stark contrast to the ideals of shared working, and shared responsibility espoused in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. These problems are indicative of a breakdown of the schemes of cooperation around this agenda. Illustrating this degradation of cooperation there was evidence of a discontinuity in the operational agendas of the police and local authority in relation to anti-social behaviour. The approach adopted by the council team centred on ideas of restorative justice and the avoidance of more punitive and exclusionary interventions, instead choosing to focus on the development of dialogue and understanding between those involved in offending and those affected, as noted by a senior practitioner involved within anti social behaviour work:

A degree of our cases are clash of lifestyles and people not understanding and interpreting peoples’ behaviour, not incorrectly, but in a different way than it should have
been perceived. So with restorative approaches it’s more about discussing the reasons why people act in that way and how they interpret it... the idea is not to get to the point of eviction, we try to do everything we can to, you know we don’t want to make people homeless, and the idea is to resolve the ASB rather than evict people or move people on so we start with restorative approaches

ASB Workstream Practitioner

Consistent in the council approach was an attempt to avoid interventions that might have an exclusionary affect and the recognition of the longer-term repercussions of exclusionary approaches as seen in the ‘What Matters’ strategy. In this way the council approach was broadly progressive in its advocacy of a diversionary approach. Discussions with the police inspector for community safety also revealed an approach focussed on the diversion away from a criminal record, but where the council team focussed on restorative approaches, the police pursued approaches that favoured ideas of exclusion as seen in the following extract and the approaches to exclude problematic individuals from particular areas through the use of ASBOs and exclusion orders:

[...] now under the Crime and Disorder Act we can give you a ticket which tells you you’re banned from a certain area, so we will give you a map on a Saturday night which shows you the city centre, and the ticket and section 35 of the crime and disorder act tells you that you’re leaving town and if you come back into that area you will be arrested so you don’t go to the police station, you don’t get a criminal record, we have a note of your name and address, if you don’t come in and don’t misbehave, it’s gone, if your behaviour is worse than that you get a ticket to leave but you also get a penalty notice for disorder

Police Inspector

This divergence between the approaches of the council and the police to anti-social behaviour is significant given the breakdown of cooperation around this agenda. Taken together, the division of responsibilities and work between the police and the council, alongside the different operational agendas adopted by these agendas indicate a lack of cooperation and coordination of activity around this agenda. In part this can be attributed to the ending of co-location arrangements, which restricted the sharing of expertise between organisations like the police and the
council on how problems, such as anti-social behaviour, should be governed. Also important, is the pressures of reduced financial resources which has resulted in a pulling back of council activity to focus only on statutory duties.

6.4.4 REDUCING FIRST TIME ENTRANTS TO THE YOUTH JUSTICE SYSTEM

The reducing first time entrants to the youth justice system workstream equated to the work of the youth offending team in Cardiff. The youth offending team was itself a separate partnership arrangement to the community safety partnership, but had also been affected by the changes to the governing arrangements in the city. A key aspect of this workstream was the identification of young people who had offended, or were at risk of offending, and diverting them from the criminal justice system. To realise this agenda, the youth offending team were reliant upon effective communication channels with a number of partner agencies to help identify those individuals at risk and act as referral routes into the youth offending team. Primarily this involved engagement with the police, probation, education and children’s services. As with the community safety arrangements during the national mandatory period, a key part of these arrangements were the co-location of these actors within the youth offending team’s offices through the secondment of staff from these partners. Unlike the community safety team, however, this co-location arrangement has not been compromised as part of the changes to the governing arrangements but it has been put under threat due to austerity:

I had three police officers, we now have two, we had three or four probation officers we now have two, its substantial people power walks away because those statutory partners apart from children’s services don’t give me cash, they give us people and at the same time the local authority asks me to make some very substantial cuts which means I lose social workers and this place [gestures to building] to be as full as an egg, now all the spare desks about, so we are really contracted as a service

And later in the interview:

[…] it’s long term investment, that’s the whole point about prevention work that we sadly end up overlooking now because of the cuts coming from everywhere particularly for youth offending service which is a partnership in its own right and is dependent on, not so
much cash but people, secondments from the different agencies and that’s contracting

Youth Offending Service Practitioner

These extracts highlight the pressures facing partnership activities and the extent to which, sustained cooperation was problematised by the continued reductions to financial resources. This gradual degradation of partnership engagement with the youth offending team was problematic for the pursuit of its work which was dependent upon the accessibility of partner organisations to identify and refer those young people at risk of offending. This placed strain on the longer-term preventative capacity of the workstream as cautioned by the workstream lead: ‘if we’re really cut down to basics that we can’t afford to do the prevention work’.

Alongside the impact of austerity upon the commitment of staff to co-location arrangements there was also evidence that the new governing arrangements for community safety work were inhibiting the engagement of the youth offending team in partnership work. The was apparent during a discussion with a senior individual within the safer and cohesive communities programme board who commented upon the lack of engagement from the youth offending team and their lack of cooperation under the new arrangements. This lack of engagement was observed throughout my fieldwork in which no officers from the youth offending team were seen during the neighbourhood management meetings I attended, nor were they present at the safer and cohesive communities programme board which was attended by a representative from every other workstream activity. The only meeting where they were present was at the anti-social behaviour problem solving group meeting. Without specifically asking about this, this issue was raised during an interview with an individual from the youth offending team:

It’s a very difficult one for my little service because there are six neighbourhoods, so there are six meetings and there are six problem solving groups underneath it although that may not be quite true, a couple are combined. Now we’ve just had to make decisions about what we can and can’t attend so we focus on the problem solving groups so that means that a lot of knowledge, information and ideas pass me by that might be discussed in the neighbourhood management meetings. So it’s
become more complicated, it’s become larger. At one level I think yeah spot on as we all know that if you localise you are likely to get better engagement and better intelligence as the police would say, that you can do something with, but if you’re small like us you’re not seen around the table and in a way that was the beauty of the community safety partnership, I was there so the YOS was represented and I was visible and that’s, I’m far less so than I used to be so for us I don’t think it has worked

Youth Offending Service Practitioner

It is argued that the sheer number of possible meetings and commitments are problematic for the youth offending team due to its size, and the limitations of its resources in having the staff available to cover these meetings. In contrast, the prior arrangements of the community safety partnership were argued to be easier as they could ‘hit’ all of their relevant partners at the same time. Here then the diffusion of community safety, and the changes it has resulted to in the governing arrangements, have problematised the youth offending teams engagement with other actors and has incentivised a targeting of their limited resources and staff at particular meetings. This stands in contrast to the arguments of reducing complexity and streamlined partnership arrangements, and points to the barriers to securing the cooperation of partners presented under the new governing arrangements.

6.4.5 MANAGING THE NIGHT TIME ECONOMY

The night-time economy forms a significant component of Cardiff’s local economy, providing a major source of revenue and employment, yet it places particular pressures on the policing of the city centre. As a result the night-time economy workstream was principally concerned with assisting the police. This was seen with the alcohol treatment centre, which was frequently held up as good practice by numerous individuals encountered during my fieldwork, particularly in its ability to free up local emergency services. Similarly the importance of street pastors, a Christian based voluntary organisation, was highlighted in terms of the assistance the offer vulnerable individuals but more importantly their role in freeing up police time:

[…] the street pastors and you would have seen those, again they’re worth their weight in gold…before they
came on the scene, you know we [the police] would be left to look after those, because you know they’re a medical emergency

Police Inspector

Reflecting the discussions of Green and Johns (2011), the street pastors were described by the night time economy manager as the ‘moral conscience of the city’ and were seen to support and work with vulnerable individuals for the wider purpose of safety rather than that of crime prevention more specifically. Their engagement within this agenda was reliant on funds from Cardiff Council and the police, yet reflecting the work of Green and Johns (2011) details on these funding arrangements were difficult to trace. When asked about this, the night-time economy manager commented that the arrangements have been based upon donations rather formal funding arrangements:

They’ve always relied on donations so they’ve never been funded by Cardiff Council, Cardiff Council has given donations to them in the past you know has donated money to them in the past to provide the services they provide

NTE Workstream Practitioner

A similar supporting role was also seen in the presence of taxi marshals, who were argued by many respondents to be an essential component of the social control apparatus within the night-time economy. However, as a result of the 2014-15 council budget, funding to these posts was reduced leading to ‘a reduction to the taxi marshalling service’ (Cardiff Council, 2014: 184). In itself, this reduction was important as it represented a degradation of governing capacity in the city centre and was highlighted as a detrimental decision by numerous stakeholders, including local councillors involved in scrutinising community safety activity, the police and the city centre manager. However, what was more interesting about the reductions to the taxi marshals is how this decision related to the changes to the governing arrangements discussed in Chapter 4. This was remarked upon by the night-time economy manager when discussing the redistribution of responsibility for the night-time economy to the economic development portfolio as part of the mainstreaming of community safety:
[..] the community safety aspect doesn’t really have a role to play within there…they’re not interested in that, you wouldn’t cut a certain role, you wouldn’t cut the taxi marshals if you knew the impact they have out there

NTE Workstream Practitioner

Here then, the mainstreaming of responsibility for community safety has meant decisions regarding community safety were being made in places where they held less weight than other policy concerns within the economic development portfolio. The issue of cuts to taxi marshals also illustrated the challenges of scrutinising these decisions when they are done as part of economic development rather than community safety as noted in observations of a scrutiny committee meeting:

In recognising the importance of the taxi marshals the committee members discuss different funding sources to negate the need for a reduction to the taxi marshal service. This discussion is brought to an abrupt end when the scrutiny officer informs them that the decision was made and agreed in the budget in February. This did not please the committee who were unhappy with the lack of consultation they received which inhibited their ability to argue against the reduction in provision.

Fieldnotes 03/09/14

These extracts were important as they denoted the fundamental problems of mainstreaming community safety, in that decisions were being made which were directly related to community safety work, but where community safety concerns were marginalised in favour of more pressing policy concerns. Related to this, these new decision makers may not possess the specific expertise or knowledge to appreciate the implications of these decisions on community safety work. In dispersing this responsibility, the scrutiny of these decisions have been made more problematic, as clear lines of decision making and responsibility for making and scrutinising these decisions are absent.

In light of these reductions the night-time economy workstream has sought to leverage greater input and contribution from the private sector. Engagement with the private sector was centred around the pursuit of developmental agendas organised around risk. Cooperation with the private sector was largely achieved by developing relationships with licensed premises, but also, working with licensing
and trading standards to pressure licensed premises to engage in less problematic business practices. This responsibilisation of licensed premises resulted in the proliferation of situational prevention techniques to assist the police in the detection and identification of offenders. Alongside this, there were more fundamental attempts to alter the market within the city centre to encourage certain types of less problematic behaviour:

[... ] we have saturation policy areas and within those areas now we would not normally provide an alcohol license unless they can demonstrate they are going to actively contribute to that area... so you know where there are premises that want to cater for the mature, if you like, visitor or the more discerning visitor if you like, then we can do that in the regulatory structure that we have with regards to planning and licensing

NTE Workstream Practitioner

This extract demonstrates the frictions between the concerns of crime and disorder and that of economic development. By addressing the more problematic behaviours that exist in the night-time economy, by diverting them outside of the city centre, it enables the cultivation of a city centre that is more attractive to commerce and tourism. However such an approach contravenes the more inclusive agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy in its exclusion of certain activities, individuals, or groups, away from the city centre, which, far from representing a progressive approach to tackling the causes of these concerns, merely displace the problems of alcohol related violence and disorder. Here, the bounded rationality of local practitioners can be seen in that more immediate concerns of the management of the night-time economy and the management of problematic populations, superceded the broader purposes of inclusion within the ‘What Matters’ strategy (Stone, 2005).

Reductions in funding to the public sector have incentivised attempts to encourage more financial contributions from the private sector. Two of such attempts were discussed during a scrutiny committee meeting: the potential implementation of business improvement districts (BID) and the introduction of a night-time levy. While the committee was positive about the potential of leveraging such funds for community safety work in the city centre, discussions
with the night-time economy manager highlighted barriers to this approach. For instance, the implementation of a BID entails a financial contribution from local businesses, however, in order to generate enough financial resources the BID would need to include the retail sector potentially shifting the agenda away from concerns of crime and disorder. Similarly, while the night-time levy was aimed specifically at licensed premises open past midnight and would be used specifically for those purposes, there were concerns from the licensed trade that business rates in Cardiff were already high and any extra costs may act as a disincentive for new licensed premises as noted by the night-time economy coordinator. This was further highlighted by the chair of the licensees committee and licensees forum in an article for a local newspaper (Hutchinson, 2013). The chair raised concerns about the fairness of such a levy and the consequences that it might lead to, in terms of closures and premises seeking to avoid the levy by closing earlier thereby negating its purpose. These proposals outline the challenges of encouraging financial provision from the private sector without disincentivising private sector investment in the night-time economy.

6.4.6 The CONTEST Strategy

The issue of terrorism, and the work of the CONTEST Board, was pushed to the forefront of concern following the radicalisation of a number of individuals in Cardiff, which captured the attention of both local and national media. While such attention posed difficult questions for the CONTEST board, the attention this media scrutiny offered was regarded by those involved in the CONTEST strategy as conducive to promoting cooperation from partners and communities, which were central to the agenda of the CONTEST strategy:

[…] you only need something like a couple of local kids on a ‘YouTube’ video from Syria encouraging others to go and practice Jihad to focus minds and say ‘oh alright we need to prioritise this’

Senior CONTEST Practitioner

The CONTEST strategy was reliant upon the engagement of partner organisations, the private sector and communities groups to provide intelligence to assist in the identification and mitigation of risk, which was central to the Prevent, Protect and Prepare strands of the CONTEST strategy. This point was
discussed with a practitioner involved in the Prevent strategy, who highlighted that the increased media attention had helped induce greater cooperation from practitioners within the education services – tellingly, the only occasion during this research where the cooperation of local education services was spoken of favourably. The participation of practitioners within the education service was perceived as crucial for the Prevent strategy, as those involved within educational services were regarded as a key source of information for identifying those at risk of radicalisation. In a similar way, communities and local religious groups were also mobilised to act as providers of information to assist in the risk management of radicalisation. Indicating the importance of engagement from education services, the prevent strategy did not just rely upon external pressures but actively sought engagement through a dedicated Higher Education coordinator employed to facilitate engagement with higher education institutions. This focus on identifying and reducing risk was met by resistance by the NUS (National Union of Students) over attempts to monitor speakers at higher education institutions and prevent certain speakers from appearing.

Where the prevent strategy sought greater engagement from educational practitioners and communities, the Protect and Prepare strategies sought to develop relationships with the private sector. A key aspect of the protect and prepare strategies was the utilisation of situational preventative methods including rise and fall bollards to manage traffic access in important locations, CCTV and more resistance building materials to minimise the damage of an attack. These approaches to risk mitigation were reliant upon cooperation from the private sector in adopting these approaches. Accordingly emphasis was placed upon influencing new infrastructure developments so that such techniques were considered from the group up:

We have discussed it a lot in the past and its not been terribly fruitful because planning applications etc. they go down a whole path where we wouldn’t even get a chance to look at them. But now as we’ve worked, I like to think because we’ve worked a long way with protect field that when the new BBC building is going to be constructed by the station we are going to be in at the bottom line there, we are in at the beginning, so hopefully along with WECTU we can influence how that’s developed so that could be a great example of how you can build things and
get, because the very nature of it is, the BBC will be next to a railway station in a large public space, it has to be accessible but at the same time it has to be protected.

Protect and Prepare Workstream Practitioner

This quote describes the approach to work with the new development of the BBC headquarters in central Cardiff, to ensure that target hardening techniques were considered from the beginning of the planning process and were embedded within the design of the building. However, this quote alludes to the historical problems of engaging with the private sector which relate to tensions between approaches to risk management and attracting private sector investment:

[...] you have emerging economies which mostly are the driving force of all governments, and the desire to create more and more jobs if you are then saying to these people I want you to come to Cardiff, I want you to come to Swansea, I want you to open big buildings and this is talking about the Protect element of things, and then we say but we want you to provide rise and fall bollards, we want you to provide glass that is not going to shatter, we want you to provide a whole environment which is safe, secure and cohesive and they’ll say well I could go to Sweden and do that, or some other place, so we then as an emerging economy coming out of a recession what do we do, do we say well we’ll make this a terrorist friendly environment on the basis that we need growth, or do we put in, do we take the advice of the professionals, WECTU, local authority, other people who say no you should do this

Protect and Prepare Workstream Practitioner

What is apparent then, and similar to the management of the night-time economy, attempts to work with the private sector have largely been limited to encouraging the proliferation of situational prevention measures. Within the Protect and Prepare work such attempts involved working with new developments and the Welsh extremism and counter terrorist unit (WECTU) to incentivise the need for such measures. In both cases there has been a desire to balance the needs of risk management for concerns of crime and safety with the suitable conditions to attract private sector investment to the city. This balance places constraints on what is possible when seeking to promote cooperation with the private sector.
6.4.7 Summary

These discussions show the varied ways in which the workstream activities of the safer and cohesive communities programme board were affected by austerity and the changes to the governing arrangements and the disappearance of the community safety team. Despite these differences, there is one point of commonality, which is that within all of the workstreams the disappearance of the community safety team had affected the schemes of cooperation and the ways in which partnership working was encouraged. The loss of central support and expertise provided by the community safety infrastructure resulted in the workstream activities becoming isolated and discrete partnerships with little operational support, the implications of which have manifested in a number of ways. For instance while this lack of structural support had been ameliorated within the addressing human exploitation workstream by developing social capital and local professional networks, in other workstreams this loss of central support and fragmentation of activity had been detrimental to cooperation and community safety work.

6.5 Managing Neighbourhood Management

6.5.1 Facilitating Partnership

As with the safer and cohesive communities programme board, the neighbourhood management arrangements have been directly affected by the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the mainstreaming of community safety in the city. Since its introduction in 2007, the neighbourhood management structure has played a key role in facilitating the cooperation of practitioners at a neighbourhood level. A key innovation of the neighbourhood management approach was its structure, which was designed to induce cooperation from the various directorates of the council in engaging with local community safety work:

Neighbourhood management was set up years and years ago with the point of getting agencies to work together, not to spend money, not to spend extra money, and in this financial situation at the moment this is what it should be doing now, it should be working together with all the different agencies and saying instead of costing, the idea was initially when they put a different manager across the
city they’d have a street lighting manager in charge of one area, they’d have someone from parks in another area as a manager, someone else from another in an area, so the idea was that if that area had a problem with street lighting that manager would go to that manager and go look I’ve got a problem with street lighting in that area could you sort it out for me, and he’d sort it out, then that one would say well I’ve got a problem with this hedge needs cutting in that area could you sort that out for me and he’d sort it out, and that was the idea of neighbourhood management

Partnership Officer

This quote describes a reciprocal relationship between the neighbourhood chairs, designed to facilitate partnership working without resorting to financial recourse, and to improve communication between the different directorates of Cardiff Council to streamline cooperation. The neighbourhood management teams were also seen to facilitate local partnership working by assisting the development of relationships between practitioners at a local level. This was achieved through the standardisation of local delivery areas for each partner organisation and the introduction of regular neighbourhood management meetings to bring people together. In doing so, these localised arrangements were designed to negate the need for the middle management of partnership activity in the city and to create more formal, yet sustainable, local arrangements. This greater emphasis on local relationships in promoting partnership activity was discussed by one neighbourhood chair, in terms of the dispersal of knowledge of partnership working to more police officers, rather than relying on the a centrally located community safety team:

[…] all the inspectors in Cardiff are far more partnership orientated than they would have been 10 years ago, where the inspectors would have been very police-y police-y police-y, and allowed community safety working in Cardiff Central [police station], as it would have been at the time, to be the ones who did all the liaising with the council… there’s been a flattening out, a spreading out of the knowledge and the different sorts of working together, the community sergeants would probably have more contacts within the council departments than they would have had 10 years ago

Neighbourhood Chair
This quote illustrates how neighbourhood management has facilitated partnership working at a local level, by enabling local practitioners to identify local counterparts within other organisations and to develop their own professional relationships and contacts. The neighbourhood management structure is therefore an integral component of the approach to promote cooperation at a local level. It is important to note, that these neighbourhood management teams did not inhabit a permanent physical space within the neighbourhoods they were located, but instead, operated through a series of thematic meetings organised around particular issues on a regular basis.

During the research it became apparent that partnership working in these arrangements was not assured through structure alone. It was clear that local partnership work was highly dependent upon the direction of the neighbourhood chairs, and the coordinating role of the six neighbourhood management officers, who were centrally located within the Policy and Partnership team. The six neighbourhood management officers were employed by the council, and were responsible for coordinating the day-to-day activity of the neighbourhood management teams. This coordination function was seen regularly during my time within the Policy and Partnership team, and usually involved the neighbourhood officer liaising with numerous practitioners as seen in in one typical example of the work:

While sitting at my desk [neighbourhood officer], sitting opposite me, received and made a series of phone calls and was heard recommending a series of names and providing a number of solutions. Upon finishing these conversations [neighbourhood officer] turned to me and outlined that they had received an enquiry from a PCSO who wanted [neighbourhood officer] to get in contact with social care services and coordinate a package of care for a vulnerable individual and was asking [neighbourhood officer] for assistance in facilitating this

Fieldnotes 16/09/14

Although a relatively mundane extract, this exchange was important as it revealed the role of the neighbourhood management officers in providing a conduit for communication and facilitating partnership work. These neighbourhood management officers provided clear point of contact within the
neighbourhood management teams, and were equipped with the social and professional networks to coordinate local level problem solving. Therefore the neighbourhood management structure, and the neighbourhood management officers, played a key role in facilitating partnership work at a local level. However during the research it was apparent that the prioritisation of community safety in these arrangements was being marginalised following the broader structural changes within the Cardiff Partnership Board.

6.5.2 A BROADENING REMIT AND COMPETITION FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY

When first introduced in 2007, the neighbourhood management teams were solely tasked with facilitating partnership working around crime and disorder prevention. In 2010, along with the broader structural changes taking place within Cardiff, the remit of the neighbourhood management teams was expanded to encompass a broader range of local issues including health, environment and young people in addition to the focus on crime and safety. For some, this change was met positively as they argued that issues of crime and disorder were less prevalent in their area:

So those are probably the three areas of crime but crime as I say in Cardiff North doesn’t feature highly on our action plan…

And then later in the interview:

So we use each of those pieces of information to, if you like validate each other and that’s how, that how we’ve come up with those three and I suppose that’s also how we’ve come up with the fact that they [anti-social behaviour, domestic violence and rogue trading] are not major priorities for the area

Neighbourhood Chair

As part of this broadening remit, the structure of the neighbourhood managements teams were adapted to include a second chair from another partner organisation. While not explicitly stated, it is reasonable to assume that a similar logic based upon reciprocity and the development of local professional networks was used when inviting creating these chairing positions for wider partner organisations to. During this research, the six council neighbourhood chairs were joined by six practitioners from the following organisations:
Two practitioners from the local university health board
One Communities First\(^6\) cluster manager
One local police inspector
One local housing association manager
One partnership manager working who occupied a role jointly funded by the local health board and Cardiff Council

The introduction of the additional chairs from these partner agencies, alongside the broadening of the remit of neighbourhood management, was perceived by one participant as a threat to the continued pursuit of community safety agendas within these teams, as it has shifted the focus of these teams away from community safety work to other policy areas:

It’s gone, community safety within the partnerships [neighbourhood management teams] has fallen by the way, the problem you have is if you look across at the community partnerships across Cardiff, it depends who the chair is, like if you look at [neighbourhood management area] for example and look at their priorities, a lot of the priorities are health related because who is there chair, a health related person. If you look at another area, I can’t remember the area but one of the other areas has got another health related person and a lot of the issues are health related so it depends on who your chair is as to what seems to be the focus but if you look at the action plans, there’s very little in those action plans regarding community safety issues

Partnership Officer

Here then there were concerns that competing agendas resulting from the broadening of the scope of the neighbourhood management teams were eclipsing community safety priorities. This side-lining of community safety was directly linked to the occupational capacity of the new neighbourhood management chairs and the professional knowledge and expertise that they brought to the table. These concerns, raised by the partnership team member, were further played out during the research. For instance a conversation with a policy officer

\(^{6}\) Communities First is a community focused tackling poverty programme run by the Welsh Government
responsible for overseeing the neighbourhood management teams revealed a similar impression of the neighbourhood management work as noted in my fieldnotes:

Just before [policy officer] left to attend the neighbourhood management meeting, they embarked on a lengthy and self-confessed rant about neighbourhood management. They described the meetings as talking shops where partners talked about what they were doing rather than organising a multi-agency approach to local problems. Admitting that this wasn’t the case for all of the neighbourhood management teams, they remarked that in some cases the neighbourhood chairs did not know what they were doing. As an example of this they referred to community safety work and how in the majority of cases the neighbourhood agendas have been copied from the city wide priorities negating the purpose of locally based partnerships in facilitating bottom up approaches

Fieldnotes 15/05/14

This observation indicates some of the frustrations associated with the neighbourhood management teams and their ability to deliver upon their purpose. Like the preceding quote from the partnership team member, this extract points to the potential abandonment of locally determined community safety agendas within the neighbourhood management teams, evident by the appropriation of broader citywide priorities. This appropriation of citywide priorities was further seen when looking at the neighbourhood action plans where there was a strong tendency towards priorities of anti-social behaviour, domestic abuse and addressing community perceptions of crime. While the presence of anti-social behaviour as a priority was hardly surprising given the breadth of activity it entails, the prioritisation of domestic violence within some of these areas was considered evidence of a broader problem with the neighbourhood management agendas:

I’ve queried in the action plans, when you’ve got [neighbourhood management area] for example, as one of the main hotspots for burglaries and thefts in the area and there’s not a mention of burglaries and thefts within the action plan. That’s what I find, and they tend to do things like, things they’re not going to have much of an impact on, things like, for example domestic violence, yeah, I know domestic violence is important, I’m not saying its
not important but you have got specialist agencies within Cardiff who deal with domestic violence yet you get domestic violence raised as a priority within an area

Partnership Officer

This issue was also raised during an interview with one of the neighbourhood management chairs, who admitted that although domestic violence was a priority, they were not truly aware of its prevalence as they ‘were still doing research’ into the issue. What was apparent then within the neighbourhood management teams, was that while every neighbourhood management team had a community safety agenda, some of the identified priorities within these areas did not reflect actual practice, but were instead an appropriation of the city-wide priorities. In most cases the prioritisation of community safety issues seemed to be considered more of a procedural exercise rather than an indication of actual activity. This was reflected in one instance, when a neighbourhood management officer, writing a review document for their neighbourhood management area, was retrospectively trying to think of activities that they could say met the community safety priorities of their area. Therefore, while community safety was stated as a priority for each neighbourhood area, in some instances this seemed to reflect lip service rather than a genuine commitment to locally determined community safety priorities. The extent of this issue varied across the neighbourhood management areas, depending on the neighbourhood chairs and the organisational expertise that they brought to the table. This was evident during interviews with the neighbourhood chairs where it was possible to identify diverging local agendas for community safety.

6.5.3 DIVERGING AGENDAS FOR COMMUNITY SAFETY

In three of the six neighbourhood management areas it was apparent that responses to issues of crime, disorder and safety were largely being left to the police. The reasons for this varied. In one area this was because one of the neighbourhood chairs was a local police inspector. When asked about the neighbourhood management agenda, the neighbourhood chair simply referred to the policing priorities of the area and what the police were doing to respond to problems of crime, disorder and safety in the area. In another area, staff turnover
within the Council had resulted in the Council chair position being vacant, leaving sole responsibility for leading the neighbourhood management team with the other co-chair. This co-chair had no expertise and knowledge about community safety work, and as such was limited in their capacity to make effective decisions around the partnership agenda for community safety. This was regarded as weakness to the partnership arrangements by the chair:

[…] in your day job you pick up on other issues within your own organisation and you make links between things that are happening within your organisation, a large part of the partnership agenda and the action plans that represent each of the neighbourhoods, a large part of it is council related business so personally I don’t make the links… I don’t get to hear about community safety or any of the other aspects through my own organisation and that probably is a weakness, so its a weakness if I’m left to chair a group on my own, its not a weakness if my council colleague is with me because the two of us make up a whole

Neighbourhood Chair

This extract alludes to a fundamental problem of the neighbourhood management arrangements and its reliance upon particular people and the knowledge and expertise that they contribute to the teams. In this case the absence of the council chair was detrimental to the partnership approach to community safety in this neighbourhood management area. In the absence of a clear partnership agenda, issues of crime and disorder in the area were delegated to the police who reported upon progress to the neighbourhood management team:

[…] we do rely on police to come to the group and report on what they’ve been doing, so they do something like operation perception, they tell us they’re doing operation perception which is door knocking and asking people who answer the door a set of questions, they tell us they’re going to do it and give us an opportunity to feed into those questions, add to those questions and then they come back in so many months later and report back on their success and in the mean time they would have been back to the group, they would have told us how many doors were answered, how many responses they’ve got, and they would have analysis of that information at later data

Neighbourhood Chair
These examples point to the absence of a clear neighbourhood management agenda around community safety, instead indicating a pushing back of responsibility for responses to crime and disorder to the police. This reversion to police led approaches to local problems of crime and disorder is reflective of Edwards and Hughes’ (2012) description of a maintenance agenda. These examples of maintenance agendas are in contrast to the transformative aspirations of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, which sought a wider ownership of issues of crime and disorder. In both of these cases, and consistent with the claims of the partnership team members, the absence of partnership agenda for community safety can be understood in relation to occupational capacity of the neighbourhood chairs.

In the previous cases, the professional capacity of the neighbourhood chairs had stifled the pursuit of a clear partnership agenda for community safety. However, it was shown that the roles and expertise of the neighbourhood management chairs could also enable the pursuit of more encompassing approaches to community safety consistent with the aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Of the six neighbourhood management teams, two had community safety agendas that were consistent with the transformative ideals of social inclusion highlighted within the ‘What Matters’ strategy. As with the discussions previously, these local agendas can be linked to the neighbourhood chairs of those areas. In one neighbourhood management team issues of crime, disorder and safety were framed as consequences of broader social factors. This was evident in the action plan for this area, in which, unlike the other neighbourhood management teams, there was no specific categorisation of community safety priorities. Instead priorities of community safety were embedded within broader priorities around the ‘local environment’ and ‘young people’. This positioning of crime, disorder and safety within broader priorities, which was consistent with the framing of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, was discussed during a conversation with the neighbourhood management officer during my fieldwork within the policy and partnership team:

I asked [the neighbourhood officer] about community safety work in the area and they replied that community safety isn’t addressed in any one task group but rather is an issue that applies across all of the task groups. In
exemplifying this they discuss issues of anti social behaviour in which the children and young people task group is important due to its focus on young people in the area. Equally the attractive neighbourhoods task group is important as there are issues around the renovation of old and disused land to which they refer to an example of a plot of land where needles and drugs have been a problem. Finally the social inclusion task group is important in promoting cohesion in the area due to the diverse communities that live there. For these reasons, they point out, community safety doesn’t have a section itself in the action plan as it is seen as an issue that pervades all of the task groups which they admit contrast to some of the other neighbourhood action plans.

Fieldnotes 27/08/14

This extract provides a clear demarcation from the neighbourhood agendas discussed previously. Where previous discussions illustrated an absence of distinct partnership agenda for community safety, this neighbourhood management area had a clear partnership agenda for community safety and its integration across the task groups. This integration of community safety within broader agendas was observed during a meeting of a ‘promoting a clean and attractive environment’ task group, where issues of anti-social behaviour were discussed in relation to environmental considerations. Discussions moved towards the need for the rejuvenation of a particular street, which had been identified as a location for anti-social behaviour activity. Following discussion it was agreed that a local third sector organisation would organise a community led mural that would actively seek the engagement of local young people in its creation. This area demonstrated a consistency with the transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy due to the framing of community safety within broader policy goals and to be delivered upon through the three task groups in the area. Unlike the areas discussed previously, one of the chairs in this area was experienced in partnership working and was situated in a role, which meant that they were familiar with the strategic context of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This was illustrated following a neighbourhood management meeting during a brief conversation with the neighbourhood chair about community safety work in the area:
Following the meeting I took the opportunity to ask [the neighbourhood chair] about the focus on issues of improving opportunities for young people, local inequalities and issues of social isolation that were so prevalent in the meeting. In response [the neighbourhood chair] replied that these are the problems that are precursors to crime and disorder and that if you want to address issues of crime in the areas these need addressing. They then made a point of connecting this to the broader preventative agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its desire to be seen as progressive and why the issues of social justice are so within this area.

Fieldnotes 12/06/14

Therefore these discussions illustrate the pivotal role played by the neighbourhood chair in influencing the agenda of the neighbourhood management area. In other areas, the lack of knowledge or expertise around community safety and partnership working had resulted in an absence of clear coordinated partnership agenda around community safety. In this area however, the occupational expertise and knowledge of the neighbourhood chair was crucial in aligning the neighbourhood agenda with the aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. The contingency of local agendas upon the neighbourhood chairs is reflective of the arguments of Foster and the importance of ‘people pieces’ for partnership work (2002). This was further demonstrated in another neighbourhood management area where there was evidence of an appreciation of a more holistic approach to addressing issues of crime, disorder and safety as discussed by the neighbourhood management chair:

Its evolved very much over the last three years from a community safety focus, so very much around policing issues and anything that was supported through PACT meetings, to cover far broader kind of areas around, its probably a more holistic approach, an approach that looks at health, looks at learning, looks at children and young people and family units, not just looking at key issues around the number of, for example, anti social behaviour incidents in the area, so there’s been a real change in that, and probably one of the key factors in that is probably the evolution of the Partnership Board in Cardiff

Neighbourhood Chair
In this area a more holistic approach to addressing issues of crime and disorder was seen in its emphasis on community engagement, co-production and attempts to mobilise community responses to problems. The neighbourhood chair referred to this as ‘valuing the kind of assets in the community, so doing with people not to people is really important’. This emphasis on co-production and community engagement can be attributed to the fact that one of the chairs was a manager for a Communities First cluster. Here, the occupational capacity and expertise of the neighbourhood chair has helped develop the neighbourhood management agenda around a transformative agenda, which privileged issues of civic participation and social inclusion. This was exemplified in the response to issues of motorcycle annoyance in the area. When speaking to the neighbourhood chair, it was acknowledged that attempts to police the issue had been unsustainable and ineffective. Therefore a more sustainable, and longer-term strategy was identified, which sought to work with those involved in the problem to identify a way forward. This was observed later in the fieldwork when attending a local problem-solving meeting alongside the neighbourhood management officer:

In the car on the way to the meeting I had a lengthy discussion with [the neighbourhood officer] about the progress being made around motorcycle annoyance in the area through prolonged engagement with some of the individuals involved in the activity. [the neighbourhood officer] informed me of developments around creating a legitimate output for those involved in the activity through the formation of a formalised club and a legitimate location for the activity. These developments were later to be raised in the PSG meeting in which they were well received by the Police present who acknowledged the limitations of their capacity to deal with the problem

Fieldnotes 03/02/14

These discussions of the neighbourhood management teams have demonstrated how the broadening of its remit and the addition of the extra neighbourhood management chairs has had implications for local community safety work. Consistent with the claims of the partnership team members at the outset of this section, it was evident that the community safety agendas in these areas were directly linked to the occupational capacity of the neighbourhood chairs. In some
cases, the lack of awareness, knowledge and expertise around community safety work has resulted in an absence of clear partnership agendas for community safety resulting in the delegation of responsibility for crime and disorder to the police. In other areas, the occupational capacity of the neighbourhood chairs had allowed the development of more transformative agendas around community safety consistent with ‘What Matters’ strategy. These discussions point to the significance of the neighbourhood chairs, as important ‘people pieces’ (Foster, 2002), whose expertise and resources impact upon how local community safety agendas and arrangements are determined. This dominance of the neighbourhood chairs in the neighbourhood management teams meant that engagement from communities and local councillors was limited. Recognising this the Cardiff Partnership board had sought to encourage greater engagement from communities and local councillors by further adapting the structure of the neighbourhood management teams.

6.5.4 FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD ‘MANAGEMENT’ TO ‘PARTNERSHIP’ AND ENGAGING COMMUNITIES

Towards the end of 2013, and shortly before commencing my fieldwork, the neighbourhood management structure went through further change. Reflecting the discussions that have just taken place, there were concerns that the neighbourhood management structure had become overly officer driven, and was not engaging adequately with the communities in which they were located. This was highlighted during an interview with one elected councillor:

I think it's improved, I have to be honest my first meeting that I went to, I found very difficult after just being elected because it felt very, very officer dominated and they were clearly doing a lot of valuable work but there didn’t seem much scope for members to have input into that, which is what they’ve tried to address,

Local Elected Member

These concerns are consistent with the arguments made by Edwards et al. (2007) regarding the tendency of officer driven arrangements within the local governance of crime and disorder and the minimal role of elected officials. As just seen, the power afforded to the neighbourhood chairs in formulating partnership agendas had resulted in vastly divergent agendas for community
Recognising this, a number of changes were recommended to improve community engagement, and provide greater input from locally elected officials, in an attempt to shift power away from the neighbourhood chairs. This began with a process of rebranding, from ‘neighbourhood management’ to ‘neighbourhood partnership’, to reflect the desire to move away from the officer driven management of local communities. The rationale for this was explored in a Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee meeting observed during my fieldwork:

[...] the council officer highlighted that the terminology of neighbourhood management had the wrong connotations in that it signifies that neighbourhoods are to be managed rather than engaged with and that as a result had become overly officer driven. The change in rhetoric to neighbourhood partnership was meant to signify the desire for community engagement and participation.

Fieldnotes 10/10/13

This rationale was further exhibited in the *neighbourhood management white paper* with a recommendation to ‘re-launch and rebrand neighbourhood management as ‘neighbourhood partnerships’ to better reflect the role and activities that take place’ (Cardiff Council, 2013: 20). The shift from ideas of officer driven management, to the engagement of communities and participation of local councillors, in these local governing arrangements is consistent with the ‘What Matters’ strategy, and its focus on transformative ideals of civic participation. To encourage this shift, each neighbourhood management area was required to identify a local councillor to become a lead elected member to act as a representative of the local councillors. As the fieldwork progressed it became apparent that the input of local elected members was still limited and their integration into the neighbourhood management structure was still developing:

[...] it’s only been going for less that a year, there hasn’t been the time for anybody to kind of get in the room and move from the old action plan, into the new process, into the new action plan... it is still probably driven more by officers than lead members at the moment

Local Elected Member
Despite attempts to increase the role of local elected members and to shift power away from the neighbourhood chairs, it was apparent that such shifts in power had yet to be achieved. In some cases the neighbourhood chairs had resisted the increasing role of elected members with one neighbourhood chair talking of ‘an attempt to take over the neighbourhood partnership groups by the elected members’. This friction between the elected members and the incumbent neighbourhood chairs was noted in relation to the agenda and how the elected members might encourage more short-term responses:

I think that’s where, that’s the conflict between neighbourhood partnerships and local members, we tend to be talking about different things on occasions. And quite rightly, they need things short term, they need the vote for next time whereas some of the things in our action plan is going to take years to change, that’s not a vote winner if you like

Neighbourhood Chair

Therefore, despite the attempts to promote engagement from local councillors, there had been resistance to this from the neighbourhood management chairs, some of which viewed it as an attempt to usurp power and alter the agenda. This indicated a contestation of power within these arrangements between the neighbourhood chairs and the newly introduced neighbourhood councillors. During this research this contestation was still on-going with any shifts in responsibility to neighbourhood councillors yet to occur and the dominance of the neighbourhood chairs still remained. As a result of this continued contest of power there was evidence of an emerging dualism in local delivery. This was seen in the accounts of a local elected member of a neighbourhood management area who had pursued their own agenda outside of the neighbourhood structure:

[…] what I’m doing in the [neighbourhood management area], and I’ll come back to that because I think it’s a good example, is not necessarily being done through the neighbourhood partnership groups, its being done through the housing department, and sports and leisure and as a initiative by myself

Local Elected Member
Over the course of the fieldwork it was apparent that while attempts had been made to redistribute power away from the neighbourhood chairs and towards locally elected officials, this had yet to be achieved. Alongside difficulties in shifting power away from the neighbourhood chairs, there was evidence that despite the rhetorical change from management to partnership, community engagement within the neighbourhood management teams was limited. This was evident in the dominance of public sector organisations within the neighbourhood management meetings I attended. In addition to this, informal conversations with individuals who had attempted to engage with the neighbourhood management process illustrated frustrations with the process:

When talking about their experience with the neighbourhood management team they said that engagement with the council was problematic and that often it felt like there were frequent barriers to cooperation due to the level of bureaucracy... they pointed out that there was a meeting tomorrow that they don’t plan to go to as and stated that the neighbourhood partnerships were just talking shops where not much really happens, and were of little benefit to the work they were trying to organise. When I asked why this was, they replied with the question ‘how much can they really be doing if they only meet every 6 weeks

Fieldnotes 25/06/14

These barriers, described by this individual, were most visible in the introduction of a competitive bidding process for a ‘neighbourhood fund’. Following the removal of annualised funding to many third sector organisations and local community groups from Cardiff Council, these same organisations were invited to enter a competitive bidding process for up to £5000. This was framed as part of the shift towards neighbourhood partnership with the explicit aim of encouraging community participation. In practice, the move from annualised funding to the neighbourhood fund represented a significant financial reduction allocated to these groups. As part of my observations I attended an assessment panel of the bids. What was notable in this assessment panel was the criteria used to assess the bids submitted by local organisations. During this meeting, when reviewing bids that were regarded as poor quality, the review panel, who were all local practitioners, noted that the quality was hardly surprising as the
organisation had little experience of writing competitive bids. Accordingly, many of the practitioners acknowledged that this process might be detrimental to those smaller community organisations with little experience of formal bid writing and applying for external funding. A consistent criticism of this process was the level of bureaucracy involved for those applying for the fund:

[…] you know you’ve had the local authority asking for funding applications and evidence for a few hundred quid for a ridiculous amount of paper work for that amount of money, so its that whole thing about the council being the one taking the risk, and trusting the community to get on and do and having a way of recording that and being happy with that rather than having a long winded process of grant application…

Neighbourhood Chair

Many involved in the application process remarked upon its flaws, in that it was overly bureaucratic and did not take into account the expertise and knowledge of the organisations applying for funding. Illustrating this, after the first of two rounds of funding, 5 of the 6 neighbourhood management teams had spent only a small amount of the £35000 available in each area. This was noted in conversations with neighbourhood management officers during my fieldwork and was raised by one neighbourhood chair: ‘you know we’ve got £21,000 left in ours out of £35,000. I think for people, its put a lot of people off from coming to the table’. My immersion within the policy and partnership team also revealed that the neighbourhood management officers were critical of the amount of paperwork in that it occupied too much of their time, kept them in the central council offices and stopped them from engaging in activities that they perceived to be more beneficial.

These discussions of the neighbourhood management teams demonstrate how they have been beneficial in improving the communication between practitioners from different organisations at the local level. However there is evidence that partnership agendas around community safety within these areas have become marginalised. This marginalisation of community safety within the neighbourhood management teams was connected with the broadening of the remit of the neighbourhood management teams. Under these conditions greater
dependency has been placed upon the neighbourhood chairs as important ‘people pieces’ (Foster, 2002) in dictating the development of local partnership agendas. This breadth of remit, combined with the dependency on the neighbourhood chairs, and the absence of dedicated support previously provided by the community safety team, had a varied impact upon community safety work in these areas. Some areas demonstrated an absence of partnership agenda around community safety resulting in the delegation of responses to crime and disorder to the police alone. In others areas there was evidence of local partnership agendas that were consistent with the transformative aims of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Recognising this dependency on the neighbourhood chairs, there have been attempts within the Cardiff Partnership Board to reframe the role of neighbourhood ‘management’ towards neighbourhood ‘partnership’. This entailed an increased emphasis on community engagement and greater input from local elected councillors. However, given the early stages of this change it was apparent in this research that the neighbourhood management teams, were still highly reliant on the neighbourhood chairs and were still engaged in the management of neighbourhoods.

6.6 Conclusion

In summary, the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the mainstreaming of community safety had substantial implications for the schemes of cooperation for partnership working around crime, disorder and safety. The abolition of the community safety partnership, and the co-location arrangements it provided, had presented additional barriers to partnership working, and the reduction in the organisational and informational resources available for community safety work. Resulting from this, partnership practices at an occupational level had become increasingly dependent upon their lead officers. In the case of the workstream activities, this was the workstream activity lead, and in the neighbourhood management teams these were the neighbourhood chairs.

Within the workstream activities, the dependency upon the workstream leads meant that there were varying levels of success in promoting cooperation from partner organisations. Due to the strong leadership provided within the human exploitation workstream, and the lack of contestation over that agenda, the
workstream lead was able to promote partnership activity by developing professional relationships with practitioners at a local level. Furthermore, due to the discretion afforded to the workstream lead, they were able to pursue a more progressive and transformative agenda for this work. Conversely, the workstreams relating to domestic violence and anti-social behaviour represented a more contested partnership arrangement, evidenced in competition for funding between the domestic service providers, and divergent practices between the police and the council over anti-social behaviour. Attempts to engage the private sector within the night-time economy and the Protect and Prepare strands of the CONTEST board, were limited due to the constraints of needing to attract private sector investment in the city. As a result cooperation with the private sector was limited to the proliferation of situational prevention methods to identify and mitigate risks in line with a developmental agenda.

Similarly, within the neighbourhood management teams, the continued control of the neighbourhood management chairs meant that partnership practices within those areas were contingent upon the expertise and knowledge that each neighbourhood chair brought to the table. As a result, two neighbourhood management teams possessed agendas that sought more holistic approaches to responding to issues of crime and disorder. In one instance this was due to the capacity of one of the chairs as a partnership manager who was well versed in promoting partnership practices, in the other area the occupational background facilitated an agenda around community engagement. In the other neighbourhood management areas, coherent partnership agendas for crime and disorder were less prevalent, either resulting from a lack of perceived issues in the area or through a delegation of responsibility to the police to take the lead on local responses to crime and disorder.

Consistent in both cases, was that without the operational support previously provided by the community safety team, the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams, had become isolated pockets of activity. This development of discrete partnership units had resulted in pursuit of diverging agendas and approaches to achieving partnership work with little sense of shared purpose. Considering the commitment to strategic governance and the delivery of the shared agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, this variance of operational
activity is problematic. This discord between the strategic ambitions of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the operational practices of the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams indicates a collapsing of the schemes of cooperation in the city. This collapse of the schemes of cooperation for community safety work can be understood in relation to the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure in the city and the bureaucratised model of support it provided. In its absence, this chapter has shown how a more individualised model of partnership work has emerged. The implications of this degradation of the bureaucratised model of cooperation provoke important questions about the value of bureaucratic authority for local governance (Du Gay, 2000), and the nature of the governing regime in Cardiff, as will be discussed in the discussion chapter.
7. DISCUSSION: THE CARDIFF REGIME

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The principal aim of this research was to examine the impact of Coalition Government policies of austerity upon community safety in Cardiff. Given the uncertainty in existing literature (Gilling et al., 2013; Fox et al., 2011) this research provides a critical test of four theoretical propositions drawn from this literature that posit a number of possible scenarios for community safety in an age of austerity. These propositions, outlined on pages 34-46, were used to guide the research and provided analytical points of reference for the examination of the Cardiff regime. These propositions will now be discussed in relation to my findings. Below is a summary of the main findings of this research:

i. At a rhetorical level, the Cardiff regime is characterised by a positive narrative of adaptation and progression in relation to the governing arrangements, and the pursuit of a transformative strategic agenda.

ii. In practice, the operational activities of the neighbourhood management teams and the safer and cohesive communities programme board workstream are disparate and varied encompassing a wide range of operational agendas that stand in contrast to the rhetoric of a strategic agenda and shared delivery.

iii. The disparity between the rhetoric of the governing regime and the reality of operational practice indicates the failure of the Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation around the strategic agendas, and highlights the challenges of forming and sustaining a stable governing regime around transformative agendas in periods of austerity.

iv. The failure of the Cardiff regime to realise its strategic agenda can be attributed to changes to the governing arrangements and the subsequent degradation of governing capacity for community safety, posing fundamental problems for the coordination and support of community safety work.

These findings make an important contribution to our understanding of the localised and devolved period of community safety within England and Wales.
They shed light on how the Cardiff regime has reformed the local governing arrangements in pursuit of a transformative agenda, and the factors that have inhibited and frustrated the realisation of this agenda. This work also highlights the value of regime theory and case study research, in facilitating the recognition of the role of locally situated actors in actively determining how local governing agendas and arrangements are constructed in response to external political and economic constraints.

This chapter is organised into three principal components. Firstly, the key findings are explored and considered in relation to the extant literature and propositions outlined in Chapter 2 (sections 7.2) and a fundamental distinction is made between the policy talk of the Cardiff regime and policy action (section 7.3). Secondly, this discussion considers how regime theory helps us better understand the pressures facing community safety (section 7.5) and the reasons that Cardiff can be seen as an example of regime failure (section 7.4). The third and final part of the chapter considers the analytic contribution of Cardiff to regime theory (section 7.6) and the methodological considerations, limitations, and next steps for this research (section 7.7).

### 7.2 The Rhetoric of the Regime: Radical Change, Strategic Ambitions and a Transformative Agenda

The first findings chapter (Chapter 4) provided an overview of the evolution of the governing arrangements in Cardiff, and, importantly for this thesis, the integration of the community safety partnership into the newly introduced integrated partnership structure of the Cardiff Partnership Board. This integration represented a radical reform to local governing arrangements, and a key juncture for the structuring of local governance in the city. Prior to this integration, Cardiff, along with other local authorities, had seen the gradual expansion of the community safety infrastructure and the development of specialist expertise around community safety (Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Edwards *et al.* 2007). Indeed, the size of the community safety infrastructure in Cardiff during the national mandatory period could be described as a ‘maximal’ model (Edwards *et al.*, 2007). As Edwards *et al.* note, maximal models of community safety benefitted from sizeable resources, and
were able to facilitate local partnership work for crime and disorder. Accordingly, community safety managers responsible for these larger community safety teams had access to significant governing resources that granted greater leverage in negotiating cooperation and engagement from other partner organisations for the pursuit of local community safety work (2007: 20).

The disappearance of the sizable community safety infrastructure in Cardiff is therefore noteworthy. It raises questions about how partnership work around community safety could continue to be organised and incentivised. However, as we have seen, the rationale for this change to the governing arrangements was not presented as a necessity resulting from austerity, but rather as a way to reduce complexity, improve efficiency, and deliver more holistic and joined up public services (Faulkner 2012). This idea that simplification would lead to improvement is consistent with the recommendations of the Beecham inquiry (2006) that advocated a fundamental simplification of partnership arrangements to facilitate the wider engagement of partner organisations. More specifically, it has been noted that under New Labour, community safety arrangements had been dominated by the local police (Crawford and Evans, 2012), which, it can be argued, contributed to the ghettoization of community safety as ‘narrowly focussed crime prevention of one sort or another’ (Wiles and Pease, 2000: 25) and limited wider engagement.

The integration of community safety into the Cardiff Partnership Board, therefore, was based on the premise that it would allow for the effective sharing of responsibility for community safety across agencies and directorates, and would reduce the dominance of the police. It was also argued that this redistribution of responsibility would facilitate greater collective action on issues of crime, disorder, and safety, and would allow for a more progressive and transformative governing agenda. This message was pervasive through the ‘What Matters’ strategy, where it was argued that the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board would facilitate a shared responsibility for social problems, and would enable the joined up delivery a single shared governing agenda. This attempt to mobilise a holistic response to social problems was evident within the ‘What Matters’ strategy which foregrounded issues of inequality and social inclusion, in an attempt to appeal to what Stone (2005) refers to as, ‘broad purposes’ as a way of mobilising collection action. As Stone notes ‘the politics of investment—for example, of establishing
governing arrangements- requires bringing together substantial resources, both tangible and intangible, from a variety of players. Broad purposes deemed to be socially worth play a vital part’ (2005: 318-319).

In addition to its role of appealing to a broad purpose agenda to mobilise cooperation, the emphasis on addressing social inequalities and promoting social inclusion is of further significance for the research as it denotes a transformative governing agenda with Cardiff (Edwards and Hughes, 2012: Edwards and Prins, 2014). Consistent with the ideals of shared delivery and responsibility, the task of addressing these inequalities was not allocated to any one agency or directorate, but rather was presented as a shared problem to which collective action was required. This sense of common purpose was distilled into seven ‘shared outcomes’ designed to cross organisational boundaries to further incentivise cooperation. Crime and disorder fell under the broader shared outcome of ‘people feel safe and are safe’. The conceptualisation of crime and disorder as a subsidiary concern to wider issues of safety is a key departure from the New Labour agenda, which saw safety subordinated as an issue of crime and disorder policy (Hughes, 2002).

The transformative narrative of the Cardiff regime was further evidenced in Chapter 5 through the establishment of a more diverse agenda that moved community safety beyond the explicit focus on crime and disorder (Wiles and Pease, 2000) to encompass broader notions of safety and exploitation. The ‘What Matters’ strategy represents a substantial shift away from community safety agendas under New Labour, and points to the opportunities of localism and the greater agency afforded to local actors in pursuing more radical agendas for community safety. As recounted in Chapter 2, under New Labour community safety was part of a moral authoritarian communitarianism (Hughes, 2007), which foregrounded the role of local state apparatus in promoting stronger communities ‘backed up by an authoritarian state’ (Gilling, 2007: 45). The emphasis on social justice and the shift in rhetoric towards a more inclusive agenda in Cardiff represents a departure from this moral authoritarian model of communitarianism, and is reminiscent of Hughes’ identification of a more progressive model of communitarianism, that of ‘civic and inclusive safe cities’ (1998: 146). This model, in foregrounding the ideals of social democratic participation and principles of
social inclusion (Hughes 1998), is consistent with the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

According to the official policy discourse of the Cardiff Partnership Board, there is a clear commitment to a more transformative agenda orientated around ideas of social justice, social inclusion, and civic engagement. Radical changes to existing governing arrangements, through the integration of partnership structures, were presented as pivotal in facilitating this strategic aim. Freed from the intensive management of the local delivery of community safety under the New Labour Government (Gilling, 2007), the Cardiff Partnership Board has committed to pursuing a local governing agenda oriented around principles of social justice. It is clear that changes to local governing arrangements and the pursuit of a more transformative agenda are intrinsically linked within the Cardiff regime.

In summary, the rhetorical narrative presented by the Cardiff Partnership Board best aligns with the fourth proposition outlined in Chapter 2. This proposition stated that the opportunities presented by localism would open up space for the pursuit of transformative agendas. The strategic governing agenda in Cardiff has been labelled as transformative because it appeals to social justice and social inclusion. This distinguishes it from other governing regimes, notably the developmental agenda that arose in London under the stewardship of Mayor Boris Johnson (Edwards and Prins, 2014). As already discussed, the integration of partnership structures into the Cardiff Partnership Board was presented as a key mechanism for the realisation of this agenda rather than as a response to conditions of austerity and reducing financial resources.

However, the validity of this narrative has been undermined throughout Chapters 4-6, through an exploration of the ways in which the repositioning of community safety has contributed to the dismantling of community safety infrastructure within the city. This has coincided with the diffusion of responsibility for community safety, which is notable when considering the key role formerly played by the community safety team in negotiating and facilitating cooperation with others actors. Taken together, these changes fundamentally challenge the sustainability of a coherent community safety agenda, let alone more progressive and
transformative agendas for community safety work. This is the topic of the next section of this discussion.

7.3 THE REGIME IN REALITY: OPERATIONAL ISOLATION AND DIVERGENT AGENDAS

Building upon the work of both Pollitt (2001) and Brunsson (1989), this research sought to identify how and if the policy narrative of the Cardiff Partnership Board was being realised in operational practice through intensive ethnographic fieldwork. This fieldwork brought to light significant discrepancies between the narratives of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the operational realities of the delivery of the community safety agenda. Instead of the coherent strategic agenda offered in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, in practice, the delivery of community safety work was characterised by operational variance and disparate agendas. This variance exemplifies the inability of the Cardiff Partnership Board to induce cooperation around the coherent shared agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and challenges of using appeals to ‘broad purpose’ agendas (Stone, 2005) in times of more pressing and immediate concerns, such as those posed by austerity measures (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012).

Returning to the propositions outlined in Chapters 2 and 3 can help us to interpret this variance. Proposition one laid out the potential for the degradation of partnership activity and a reversion back to police driven maintenance agendas. Proposition two speculated that reducing resources may lead to an increased emphasis on risk management and ‘smarter governance’. Proposition three envisioned the prospect of governing agendas organised around restorative justice, enabled by the greater engagement of the voluntary and community sectors. The fourth proposition, as already touched upon, explored the potential for transformative social justice agendas through the radical adaptation of local governing arrangements.

At the level of policy talk, there was a clear parity with proposition four. However, at the level of operational practice, none of these four propositions is dominant. Contrary to the concerns of Lowndes and Pratchett (2012) summarised in proposition one, it cannot be said that partnership work around community safety
in Cardiff has degraded to the point that there has been a return to silo working and a reassertion of a maintenance agenda. That is not to say that elements of Lowdnes and Pratchett’s (2012) assertions are not apparent: while partnership work was valued and ongoing within the workstreams and the neighbourhood management teams, it was evident that partnership work around more routine criminality was less prevalent, with volume crime being framed as the responsibility of the police alone. Some neighbourhood management teams lacked a clear partnership agenda for crime and disorder, and as a result, issues of crime, disorder and safety were left to the police.

Equally, it cannot be said that the operational practice of community safety is wholly reflective of proposition two, which was premised on the dominance of ideas of risk management and smarter governance through the targeted provision of services, as apparent in London (Edwards and Prins, 2014). Certain activities did demonstrate a preoccupation with risk, most obviously seen in the counter terrorism agenda of the CONTEST strategy. The ‘prevent’ strand of this strategy was entirely organised around principles of risk management through the identification of those at risk of radicalisation, and the reduction of that risk through the Channel project, an intensive ‘deradicalisation’ programme aimed to counter radical ideologies. Likewise, the ‘protect’ and ‘prepare’ strands were unequivocally structured around ideas of situational risk management through the identification of vulnerabilities and the development of strategies to mitigate risk.

This emphasis on risk within the CONTEST strategy cannot be attributed solely to the Cardiff Partnership Board, but rather reflects the broader preoccupation with risk in the national counter terrorism policies. That being said, this fieldwork also identified examples of risk management in more locally produced agendas. For example, it is clear that the management of the night-time economy in Cardiff is heavily influenced by ideas of risk management. This is visible in the extensive use of surveillance techniques and the coercion of business practices through licensing boards. Variation also emerged in the way that particular actors, working around the same priority, responded to anti-social behaviour. While the approach of local authority actors was consistent with principles of restorative justice, the police response centred on ideas of risk management, the exclusion of problematic individuals from the city centre, and the smarter allocation of resources through

The fieldwork revealed a similarly patchy operational alignment to the third proposition, that of the pursuit of progressive agendas around restorative justice. Principles of restorative justice are evident in operational responses to sex work in the city, which sought to divert those involved in sex work away from the criminal justice system. As has already been seen, in contrast to the police response, which centred on risk management, Cardiff Council’s approach to anti-social behaviour was underpinned by restorative ideals. It prioritised the facilitation of resolution and reconciliation between perpetrators and victims of anti-social behaviour. Within the neighbourhood management teams specific examples of restorative approaches in practice were limited, but there was evidence of appeals to restorative justice within neighbourhood action plans and the integration of neighbourhood resolution panels. Therefore, despite the intention of becoming a ‘restorative city’ stated in the ‘What Matters’ strategy, a clear concerted agenda around ideals of restorative justice and diversion was absent within the operational practices of the Cardiff Partnership Board.

In terms of the final proposition, that of transformative agendas and the foregrounding of issues of social inclusion, equality, and civic engagement, again these ideals were somewhat reflected in operational practices, but were far from routine and far from embedded. At one level, ideas of social inclusion in local democratic processes could be seen in the public engagement exercise of the Cardiff Debate. This was framed as a way of promoting public participation in local decision-making. However, conversations with policy officers and research officers suggest that the Cardiff Debate also served as a vehicle for bolstering local political resources for the defence of future funding cuts and future decisions about who should deliver public services. The aspirations of equal opportunity and access foregrounded in the ‘What Matters’ strategy have also been undermined by austerity and the associated cuts to sports, leisure and culture facilities in the city. A number of practitioners participating in this research noted their concerns about the impacts of these cuts upon young and disadvantaged people in the city.
At an operational level, the presence of the transformative agenda is sparse. Within the safer and cohesive communities programme board, examples of transformative ideals around social justice were limited, and only the workstream concerned with reducing human exploitation was discussed in these terms. Here, responses to sex work were not only diversionary, but also sought to actively identify and address the multiple barriers to other forms of employment faced by sex workers. These were wide-ranging and included housing, education, health, and substance misuse issues. In seeking to move beyond the more immediate causal conditions of human exploitation, the agenda was beginning to encompass issues of social care, and the status of looked after children, as potential pathways into exploitation. However, within the neighbourhood management teams, only two of the six teams presented agendas that were consistent with the ideals of social justice and inclusion. One of these teams placed significant emphasis on civic engagement, co-production and working with communities, as exemplified in its response to the problem of motorcycle annoyance. The other team viewed local approaches to crime and disorder as the outcome of effective solutions to broader social issues relating to the environment, children and young people. This was evident in the inclusive framing of these issues by the neighbourhood chair and within the neighbourhood action plan.

What we’re seeing is that despite the appeals to strategic thinking, shared outcomes, and more joined up delivery, the operational practices of community safety are discordant with this aim. While the governing agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board presented a strategic vision organised principally around ideas of social justice and community engagement, in keeping with a transformative agenda, in practice this vision has been eschewed in favour of a diverse and divergent suite of operational agendas. These agendas range from developmental agendas orientated around ideas of risk, to transformative agendas targeting the social causes of crime and the engagement of citizens.

7.4 Community Safety and the Cardiff Regime

It is fundamentally clear that the state of community safety in Cardiff during the period of fieldwork does not represent a retrenchment of partnership activity (as speculated by Lowndes and Pratchett 2012), at either the rhetorical or operational
level. In fact, this research indicates that despite the fragmentation of community safety work, partnership working was still valued at both a strategic level, through the Cardiff Partnership Board, and at an operational level within the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams. In line with arguments made by Houghton (2012) and O’Neil and McCarthy (2013), practitioners in this study surmised that a key incentive for partnership engagement and activity was the perceived potential for improved effectiveness and efficiency. The neighbourhood management chairs also postulated that the changes made around neighbourhood management had facilitated local partnership work by developing professional contacts at the local level. One practitioner described this as a ‘flattening out’ of partnership knowledge and practice. These findings demonstrate that the pressures of austerity have not led to the abandonment of partnership activity around community safety, and that partnership work continues to be regarded as a valuable and effective way of working. However, that is not to say that the changes to the governing arrangements have not entailed a degradation of governing capacity for community safety in the city.

To summarise, while partnership working has continued, the Cardiff regime has been unable to realise its transformative governing agenda outlined within the ‘What Matters’ strategy and a disparity between rhetoric and operational practices has emerged. The rhetoric of social justice, civic engagement and social inclusion is reminiscent of the early aspirations for social crime prevention and Hughes’ description of a more progressive model of communitarianism around civic and inclusive safe cities (1998: 146). This is significant given the historical context of community safety in which, arguably, the more progressive and transformative potential of community safety work was stifled during the national mandatory period. Under New Labour the centralised control of community safety through intensive target setting, performance management and the principles of public management (Gilling, 2007) resulted in the dominance of developmental community safety agendas. Therefore the policies of localism and the greater agency afforded to local actors has opened up opportunities for more progressive and transformative agendas which seek not only to work within or augment criminal justice policy, but also to fundamentally alter how crime, disorder and safety is governed.
Counterpoised to this transformative rhetoric for community safety and the ambitions of strategic governance, the operational practices of community safety within the Cardiff regime present a more complex and variegated picture. This raises a fundamental point in relation to regime theory: a transformative regime is not merely the pursuit of a governing agenda organised around principles of social justice, but rather requires the mobilisation of resources and cooperation to realise that agenda. Therefore, the success of the Cardiff regime is dependent upon its ability to effectively encourage cooperation across the disparate aspects of operational practice and the more contested arenas of local delivery where more immediate concerns may take priority. The discord between the unified rhetoric of the governing agenda and the varied operational practices discussed above is indicative of regime failure.

In spite of a coherent and consistent governing agenda organised around the principles of social justice and social inclusion, the operational delivery of community safety work was characterised by multiple and divergent operational agendas with little indication of a shared and coherent strategic agenda. Therefore in practice what is evident in Cardiff is the fragmentation of community safety work into a number of discrete partnership projects, organised around specific citywide priorities or particular geographic territories.

Given the ambitions of strategically led governance and the emphasis on joined up delivery and shared outcomes, this discrepancy between the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the isolated project activity of operational practice is significant. With the ‘What Matters’ strategy we have the rhetoric of a governing agenda, but in the diverging operational practices it is evident that there has not been an effective mobilisation of cooperation around the objectives and outcomes of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Relating back to the work of Stone (2005) and his discussion of the use of ‘broad purposes’ agendas in mobilising cooperation, it is clear that in Cardiff, the appeals of the ‘broad purpose’ agenda in the ‘What Matters’ strategy have been marginalised by the more immediate concerns of the operational practices. The lure of the more immediate concerns facing operational practitioners is unsurprising, for as Stone asserts ‘under the constraints of bounded rationality, human beings are focused on what is immediate’ and ‘it is easier to imagine one’s role and potential in a small purpose than a large one’ (Stone, 2005:
This discrepancy between the policy rhetoric and the operational practice is important in itself as it indicates the need for empirical research to consider not just the policy talk of governing regimes, but also to examine how and if the talk of governing regimes is translating into coherent delivery of governing agendas. Moreover, it opens up a discussion about the factors inhibiting the mobilisation of partnership working and the cooperation of governing actors around the strategic agenda.

7.5 REASONS FOR FAILURE

Given the challenges outlined in the literature review (Chapter 2), the outcome of regime failure in the Cardiff context is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, as Edwards and Hughes (2012) point out, the prospect of regime failure is often a likely scenario given the challenges of mobilising activity around more radical agendas. It is here that the explanatory power of regime theory really comes to the fore in enabling an exploration of the reasons behind regime failure in this case study. As has already been highlighted, this is the fundamental contribution that regime theory can make to discussions of local governance (Edwards and Prins, 2014).

Given the focus of this research, it might be tempting to conclude that the failure of the Cardiff regime is reducible to austerity alone. However, this in itself is not enough to explain the disparity between the rhetoric and practice of community safety in Cardiff. Focussing on austerity alone obscures the agency available to local political actors in choosing how to respond to external conditions, as these responses are not predetermined (Edwards and Hughes 2012). Therefore it is necessary to consider other factors that have inhibited the mobilisation of cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its realisation in practice. In seeking to understand the failure of the Cardiff regime it is necessary to consider the changes to the governing arrangements and the impact that has had on the organisational and informational resources available to community safety work in Cardiff. In looking to explain regime failure in Cardiff, attention needs to be drawn to three factors: the absence of operational responsibility and oversight for community safety work, the degradation of community safety expertise and the increased importance of individual agency within operational practice. These three factors are discussed, in turn, below.
7.5.1 OVERSIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY

As we have seen, while there was a clear transformative governing agenda for community safety in Cardiff at the strategic level, and a capacity and willingness to engage in partnership practices at an operational level, the integration and *de facto* removal of the community safety team meant that there was an absence of operational responsibility for community safety. As discussed in Chapter 4, under the previous governing arrangements the community safety team could be considered an example of Edwards *et al.*’s ‘maximal’ community safety structure (2007). This multi-agency team included staff dedicated to community safety work, ranging from operational support to more strategic roles entailing the operational oversight and coordination of community safety activity. The importance of multi-agency teams and the support and coordination functions they provide was recognised in two Home Office research reports which made recommendations around good practice in partnership working (Berry *et al.*, 2009; Turley *et al.*, 2012).

Therefore, the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure as part of the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board raises questions about the locus of responsibility and oversight for community safety work and how cooperation around community safety was incentivised under the new arrangements. Following the disappearance of the community safety team, responsibility for community safety became diffused, and subsequently coalesced upon the lead practitioners for the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams, who undertake these roles in addition to their day-to-day occupation. These individuals come from numerous occupational backgrounds spanning many organisations, and bring with them a range of vastly divergent experiences and expertise, which may not have relevance to community safety. It is apparent that without dedicated community safety support, operational practices under these lead practitioners have become isolated pockets of partnership activity. Left to themselves to determine operational agendas, the lead practitioners have developed disparate operational practices.

The new governing arrangements in Cardiff, and the associated degradation of organisational resources, are a significant problem for the realisation of the transformative agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Under these new
arrangements the coordination of local community safety practice has been undermined. While quarterly meetings take place within the programme boards for the safer and cohesive communities programme board and the Neighbourhood Management team, the day-to-day coordination of community safety activity is absent. This impacts upon the coordination of both operational agendas and partnership activity within and between operational partnerships. This coordinating role, formerly provided by members of the community safety team, has been discussed by Hughes and Gilling (2004) in their study of the habitus of community safety officers, and by Edwards et al. (2007) in their discussion of ‘maximal’ models of community safety. A key role performed by community safety managers, identified by Hughes and Gilling (2004), was the ability to identify potential overlaps of practice between different organisations and partnership groups, and the skills and capacity to incentivise cooperation between these groups. For Edwards et al. (2007), the seniority of the community safety manager in ‘maximal’ community safety teams meant that they carried enough weight and power to push community safety as an agenda item, and to encourage cooperation from senior decision makers in partner organisations.

Under the new arrangements, the identification and pursuit of potential avenues of collaboration has been left to the operational leads. For some more entrepreneurial operational leads, this was possible at an operational level, but required a significant investment of time and resources to develop the relationships needed to facilitate collaboration. Such commitment was not possible in all cases, and many workstream leads accepted that they did not have the capacity or ability to identify potential collaborations, let alone commit the time and resources needed to facilitate cooperation. The establishment of collaborations was therefore highly dependent upon the motivation and ability of the individual. These issues were compounded by a lack of central responsibility: the absence of a community safety team and manager added barriers to the facilitation of cooperation, and made the negotiation and navigation of the disparate but related elements of practice undertaken by the range of actors operating within Cardiff more challenging.

7.5.2 COMMUNITY SAFETY EXPERTISE

In addition to the deficits of oversight, responsibility, and coordination, the dismantling of the community safety team, has also led to a degradation of
community safety expertise in the city. Since the establishment of multi-agency partnership teams in light of the statutory duty set out in the Crime and Disorder Act, the emergence of a distinct professional identity and professional expertise for community safety has been frequently noted (Edwards and Hughes, 2002; Hughes and Gilling, 2004; Edwards et al., 2007). Although still contested, this expertise entails a breadth knowledge of the policy context of local government and community safety; from techniques for the social and situational prevention of crime and disorder to knowledge of communities and organisational culture, change and management. Community safety work is predicated on a number of specific skills for utilising this knowledge to affect change. These include facilitating cooperation through communication and negotiation with actors from various partner organisations.

This expertise, and the skills and knowledge it included, are important considering that this research is concerned with understanding how partnership work is mobilised and how conflicting interests are negotiated. Clearly, a substantial component of this expertise is geared towards facilitating partnership working: through being cognisant of the different interests and power relationships within local governing arrangements, and how this awareness can be used to incentivise engagement and cooperation for community safety work. Recognising the distinct expertise of community safety practitioners is important when considering the changes in Cardiff, which have led to their disappearance, and replacement with generalist partnership officers. While a few of the old community safety team remained within the partnership team, the majority of the partnership officers had no experience of community safety, were unfamiliar with its policy context, and lacked the specific knowledge of techniques to prevent and reduce crime. This shift from dedicated community safety officer to a more generalist function represents a substantial degradation of community safety expertise and the informational resources it provides. This is not just a problem in the short term, as it represents a collapse of institutional memory within local government for community safety work as a particular area of policy expertise. This poses challenges in the longer term, in a time post austerity, when attempting to rebuild governing capacity around community safety, as there will be no expertise or capacity on which to develop.
As a result, the operational leads of the workstreams and neighbourhood management teams have had to operate without the technical expertise formerly provided by the community safety team. The significance of this was evidenced through the exploration of the variations in operational practice in Chapter 6. The salience of this absence was particularly evident within the neighbourhood management teams, given their broad remit and the varying occupational backgrounds of each neighbourhood chair. There was some acknowledgement, by members of the partnership team and some of the neighbourhood chairs themselves, that some neighbourhood managers had little experience of community safety or of approaches to responding to crime and disorder. In some of the neighbourhood management teams, this lack of expertise, combined with the absence of dedicated community safety support, resulted in a delegation of responsibility for responding to crime and disorder to the police alone. Similarly, while the operational leads of the specific workstream activities within the safer and cohesive communities programme board were typically well versed in their field, the broader policy context of community safety within Cardiff did not form part of their considerations. In these cases, while the lead practitioners were able to influence change within the existing partnership arrangements, the potential identification of new avenues of cooperation was limited by practitioners’ awareness of the broader structures and context of local service delivery.

This degradation of community safety expertise is a fundamental problem inherent within the argument of mainstreaming and integration adopted by the Cardiff Partnership Board. As made clear by Moss and Pease (1999), advocates of mainstreaming seek to diffuse responsibility for community safety across governing actors. As this research demonstrates, this diffusion necessarily obfuscates the potential for the development of community safety expertise, as there is no site or responsibility for its development. The consequence of this, in Cardiff, is the degradation of the informational and organisational resources afforded to community safety as a policy agenda within the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the loss of the expertise, and associated skills and knowledge, that facilitated cooperation between local governing actors for community safety work. Therefore, when considering the failure of the Cardiff regime to effectively
mobilise cooperation around the strategic agenda for community safety, the
degradation of this expertise is an important facet of this story.

7.5.3 Individualisation of Responsibility
The loss of operational responsibility and oversight and the degradation of community safety expertise in Cardiff have meant that greater pressure has been placed upon the operational leads of the workstream activities and the neighbourhood management teams. Indeed, a common refrain amongst participants was that the absence of strategic direction meant that operational delivery was highly dependent upon decisions made by lead practitioners. This indicates, then, that current governing arrangements have placed greater importance upon the individual agency of lead practitioners. Additionally, due to the absence of the community safety team, the governing structures of the Cardiff Partnership Board play a more minimal role in influencing operational practice. The greater responsibility and discretion afforded to the operational leads enabled them more flexibility to pursue operational agendas of their own choosing. This operational discretion has opened up opportunities for more progressive and transformative agendas driven by some local practitioners, but has resulted in the pursuit of more developmental agendas by others.

This operational discretion, and the subsequent variance of operational agendas, is linked to the structuring of the partnership arrangements in Cardiff and the diffusion of responsibility for community safety. As previously discussed, in place of the specialist expertise of the community safety officer, responsibility for issues of crime and disorder have been placed upon individuals with varying occupational backgrounds. Examples of this include: an individual with a background in housing management becoming the local authority lead for anti-social behaviour, and various neighbourhood management teams led by health practitioners, housing officers and senior managers from various council departments. This diversity of actors taking responsibility for issues of community safety is important. Although diversity brings with it a wide range of skills and knowledge that could challenge narrow definitions of crime prevention, the occupational backgrounds of these actors also meant that they had negligible understandings of community safety and crime prevention. Whereas, previously, this diverse expertise was supplemented by dedicated community safety expertise and support, the disbanding of the
community safety team has placed greater pressure on individuals to take responsibility for the local delivery of community safety. This helps us to understand the emergence of contrasting agendas, and in some cases, the buck-passing of responsibility to the police.

Furthermore, greater reliance upon individual agency has opened existing partnership arrangements up to significant levels of risk. This is due to increased reliance on the social capital and professional networks developed by individuals, and the danger that this knowledge would be lost should they vacate the role. This risk is not new to community safety; indeed partnership practices and effective cooperation have often been contingent upon particular ‘people pieces’ (Foster, 2002), and key individuals and the social capital that they possess (Crawford and Evans, 2012). However, the greater reliance on lead practitioners without the support of a community safety team intensifies this risk.

7.5.4 DEGRADING GOVERNING CAPACITY

It is evident that the rhetoric of progression and reduced complexity in Cardiff conceals a significant reduction to the governing resources afforded to community safety. The creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board has resulted in the degradation of governing capacity for community safety work, visible in the discordant practices of the various operational teams. This degradation is critical in understanding why the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy has failed to be realised in practice. These findings regarding the adaptations of the governing arrangements in Cardiff and their effects on the delivery of community safety work in times of austerity resonate with the claims of Gilling et al.:

In some areas the CSP [Community Safety Partnership] model has been effectively abandoned as cash-strapped local authorities seek only minimal compliance with section 17 of the CDA [Crime and Disorder Act], which legally requires local authorities to mainstream crime and disorder reduction across their routine activities

Gilling et al., 2013: 329-330

It may be cynical to state that the positive narratives around the integrated partnership arrangements and the mainstreaming of community safety adopted by the Cardiff regime represent attempts to disguise the degradation of community
safety and minimal compliance with statutory legislation. Indeed, the changes adopted within Cardiff may represent a genuine attempt to take advantage of the opportunities presented by localism, to implement radical change and to realise more progressive and transformative agendas. It is beyond the capacity of this research to make judgements about the intentions behind changes to the governing regime in Cardiff, so the discussion necessarily focuses on the outcomes of these changes instead.

In Cardiff, changes implemented under the guise of mainstreaming and integration have not resulted in more effective joined up approaches to local governance, in fact, they have adversely effected the governing capacity for community safety. Indeed, the incorporation of the community safety partnership into the integrated partnership structure has resulted in the loss of responsibility and expertise around community safety, leaving those involved in the delivery of community safety work isolated, fragmented and without operational support. This fragmentation and lack of operational oversight and support is a major contributor to the disparity between the strategic aims of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the operational practices of community safety work. This disparity, in turn, indicates regime failure, and demonstrates the challenges entailed in attempting to mobilise the disparate practices of community safety around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda of social justice without the appropriate operational support and mechanisms formerly provided by the community safety team. As Stone highlights ‘sustained agenda (and purpose within those agendas) need ongoing protection against attention shift’ and in providing this ‘crucial role of networks as channels of communication and sources of reinforcement’ must be recognised (Stone, 2005: 319). Therefore, using the terminology of Stone, the dismantling of the community safety team, or network, has compromised the communication and reinforcement of the broad purpose agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy at an operational level, allowing the attention of operational practices to shift to more immediate pressures, such as the influence of lead practitioners evident in previous discussions.
7.6 The Analytic Significance of Cardiff for Regime Analysis of Community Safety

The overarching aim of this thesis was to identify how Coalition Government policies of austerity have affected the local governance of crime, disorder and safety in Cardiff. Using Regime Theory, this investigation was structured around four analytic categories: the governing resources, agenda, arrangements, and schemes of cooperation. This analytic framework was pivotal in structuring the ethnographic approach, analysis and subsequent findings. Regime theory foregrounds the agency of local governing actors in determining local governing arrangements and agendas, but recognises the contested and fragile nature of these regimes, and the struggle to mobilise cooperation and engagement around a governing agenda. Using this approach, this study has provided answers to the research questions presented in Chapter 3 which, by way of reminder, were as follows:

1. How have the governing arrangements for community safety in Cardiff changed and how can these changes be understood?
2. How have the changes to the governing arrangements affected the governing agendas within Cardiff?
3. How have these changes to the governing arrangements and agenda been realised in the actual delivery of community safety work?
4. What do the changes to local governance say about the regime in Cardiff and how is this analytically significant for discussions of the local governance of crime, disorder and safety?

Research questions one and two were concerned the governing arrangements and the impact these arrangements have had on the governing agenda. As seen in the first of the discussion points in this chapter, community safety arrangements in Cardiff have undergone a significant change through the creation of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the integration of the community safety partnership under the guise of mainstreaming, reducing complexity, and increasing efficiency. This
Restructuring of community safety was framed as a way to facilitate more strategic approaches to local governance through the formulation of a shared agenda (the ‘What Matters’ strategy), orientated around social justice and social inclusion. In terms of research question three, the empirical evidence points towards a clear distinction between the progressive rhetoric of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the operational practices of community safety work. It was apparent that despite the ambitions of strategic thinking, shared outcomes and joined up delivery, the operational activity of community safety work was fragmented. This resulted in a variety of operational agendas inconsistent with the unified agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

In addressing research question four, it was argued that the disparity between rhetoric and operational practices indicates an inability to effectively mobilise cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy, thereby constituting regime failure in Cardiff. The impact of changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff can be seen in the diminished governing capacity for community safety work, through the disbandment of the community safety team and the consequent loss of the associated expertise, skills and knowledge it had provided. This degradation of community safety expertise and diminishing governing capacity undermined the coordination of community safety activity and cooperation between partners, which frustrated the realisation of the strategic agenda of the Cardiff Partnership Board.

The analytical significance of Cardiff, and more specifically the Cardiff Partnership Board, as a case, can be found in its adaptation of local governing arrangements and its pursuit of a strategic agenda organised around social justice. The pursuit of a more progressive and transformative agenda in Cardiff demarcates it from previous community safety agendas under New Labour (1997-2010), which were narrowly focussed on crime prevention (Wiles and Pease, 2000; Gilling, 2007). This case outlines the opportunities that the Coalition Government’s policies of localism enable for the local reimagining of community safety. It also draws attention to the agency of locally situated actors in actively choosing how to adapt to the external constraints of austerity. The empirical evidence gathered in this research has shed light on how changes to the governing arrangements within Cardiff, necessitated by reducing financial resources, have altered the governing
resources available to community safety, and compromised the progressive and transformative agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

These findings demonstrate how regime theory can aid our understanding of community safety work, by drawing attention to the agency of locally situated actors in producing new agendas, and adapting arrangements in an attempt to deliver upon these agendas. This is important for future discussions of community safety beyond Cardiff, as it shows that local community safety agendas, and the governing arrangements for realising these agendas, are likely to be subject to greater local variation in light of the decentralisation of power, and the greater political agency available to local actors. For instance the progressive and transformative agenda for community safety identified in this research can be clearly distinguished from the developmental regime in London under Boris Johnson (Edwards and Prins, 2014). Therefore, these findings highlight the need for situating research in particular local economic and political contexts, to facilitate an understanding of why certain agendas are pursued in particular places and times, and what arrangements are implemented to deliver upon these agendas.

It is here that the rich contribution that regime theory makes to these discussions is apparent: it provides insight into why, under certain conditions, some agendas are pursued and others are not, and how or if cooperation is mobilised around particular agendas. This research has shown how changes to the governing arrangements have led to a fundamental reframing of community safety as part of a broader policy agenda around safety. Moreover, the formulation of the Cardiff Partnership Board has altered the balance of power towards Cardiff Council in the development and production of a transformative strategic agenda around social justice. Both of these factors are helpful in understanding the departure from the crime focussed agendas of New Labour government. Yet these same changes to governing arrangements in Cardiff have also resulted in the disappearance of the community safety team, and the failure to mobilise cooperation around this strategic agenda. These findings support the argument made by Edwards and Prins regarding the utility of regime theory for understanding the formation of governing regimes:
Regime theory recognises that governing coalitions inhabit economic as well as political environments that can enable as well as constrain their power to govern. A key contribution of regime theory is to recognise this structural dimension whilst acknowledging the agenda of governing coalitions, the acumen, guile and leadership of coalitions which can, in turn, inform a comparative understanding of the uneven adaptation of urban governance to global pressures in the political and economic environment.

Edwards and Prins, 2014: 67

The value of regime theory therefore lies in a conceptual framework that not only allows for an investigation into what regimes and governing agendas are formulated, but also a consideration of why certain regimes are formed, and how they may succeed or fail. Given the context specific nature of this research, as a case study, it is not possible to make claims about how the findings generated here apply to other geo-political contexts. However, this is not the point of the research, nor should it be, as the wider context of localism, greater local political agency and increased local variance do not lend themselves to ideas of generalisation. This research seeks instead to generalise to theory (Yin, 2003). The conditions opened up by localism and the greater discretion and responsibility it affords to local authorities, in pursuing and forming governing coalitions and agendas of their own choosing, is reminiscent of the voluntary period of community safety described by Gilling et al. (2013). During this period the provision of community safety was characterised by local variation and divergence (Gilling et al, 2013). The fact that the findings of this research in Cardiff contrast with those of Edwards and Prins in London (2014) supports this assertion of local variation. However further research utilising regime theory is required to explore how, and under what circumstances similar or contrasting governing agendas may be pursued, and how under different conditions these agendas may or may not be realised.

7.7 Methodological Considerations

As with any research, there are a number of methodological caveats and considerations to reflect on. The limitations of this research were acknowledged in Chapter 3 (pages 73-74) and are revisited here in light of the preceding discussion. The first methodological point worth considering relates to the choice of the
Cardiff Partnership Board as the ‘case’. More specifically, the decision that the research should be situated at the strategic level of the Cardiff Partnership Board rather than within specific operational activities, for example focusing on how austerity is affecting partnership working around domestic violence or anti-social behaviour. The decision to look at a strategic level of governance within the city, rather than at particular operational activities, was taken to enable a more encompassing view of the Cardiff regime, its governing agenda and the partnership arrangements in place to facilitate that agenda.

Such a decision unavoidably limited the level of detail that could be gathered, given the breadth of activity covered under the auspices of community safety within Cardiff. This was reflected in my ethnographic fieldwork, and my interview sampling, which both focussed primarily on the lead officers responsible for leading on operational activities, rather than practitioners involved in the actual delivery of that work. There is therefore the risk that the findings generated may not reflect the actual practices of partnership activity on the ground. However, this was a necessary research strategy, as to become embroiled in the particular activities of a few operational practices would have inhibited an holistic emphasis on the Cardiff regime as a strategic governing body. Moreover, to focus on particular operational activities would have undermined my ability to capture the disconnect between the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy and the agendas of the operational partnership teams discussed in this chapter and the one preceding it.

Secondly, it is important to recognise the temporal nature of regime change as an ongoing process of negotiation. This poses obvious challenges to a time-bounded doctoral research study. In his study of Atlanta, Stone (1987) charted 40 years of regime change through many years of study, examination of local records, and sustained residence and research in the city. As discussed in Chapter 3, works like this have inspired and informed the methodology of this research, but with some necessary compromises and sacrifices.

While the documentary analysis component of this study spans a significant period of time, from the early phases of community safety to the development of the ‘What Matters’ strategy, the fieldwork element was mainly situated within the
budgetary period of February 2014 to March 2015. The data generated during this relatively short period were then used to compare against the strategic vision of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. Consequently, the fieldwork endeavoured to capture the regime at a specific point in time under certain conditions, rather than the process of regime change. This needs to be taken into account when interpreting the data. While these findings demonstrate the situation in a particular period, they do not indicate whether this situation represents a progression towards, or a regression from, the vision of the ‘What Matters’ strategy.

The sustained historical approach adopted by Stone (1987) would have some obvious benefits in providing direct comparisons between the Cardiff Partnership Board and the community safety partnership arrangements it replaced. My ability to explore this transition was impeded by the fact that the changes to the governing arrangements had resulted in the changing of the guard for community safety in Cardiff. Practitioners and policy officers who had experienced both arrangements were few and far between. In overcoming these difficulties, whilst insights from key respondents were important, policy documents also provided more substantial points of comparison, as they were products of particular governing regimes and provided textual footprints of how problems were conceptualised as governable (Noaks and Wincup, 2004).

Thirdly, there is an analytical consideration regarding what constitutes regime failure. The discussions of regime failure in this chapter have not described a wholesale failure of the Cardiff regime in its totality, but rather a failure of the Cardiff Partnership Board to realise the strategic governing agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This raises an analytical question about whether this indicates regime failure, a regime in the process of failing but has not yet failed, or a regime that is suffering from ‘attention shift’ (Stone, 2005: 320). One way of circumventing this issue is by stating that a ‘regime’ is intrinsically linked to its governing arrangements and agenda. Consequently, in this case, the Cardiff regime is defined by the governing arrangements of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This is analytically useful as it provides analytic criteria for demarcating between failed, failing, and drifting regimes.
Looking forward, it is also notable that governing arrangements within Cardiff have been subject to further change as a result of Welsh Government legislation in the form of the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act. As of April 2016, the governing arrangements of the Cardiff Partnership Board have been replaced by the Cardiff Public Services Board. At the time of writing, the impact of this upon the actual governing arrangements and agenda in Cardiff is largely unknown. However there is an indication that there will be a less significant role for the police. As noted on the webpage for the Cardiff Public Services Board (Cardiff Partnership Board, 2016b), the Chief Constable of South Wales Police has been relegated to the status of ‘invited partner’ alongside Welsh Ministers, the Police and Crime Commissioner, representatives from the National Probation Service and Community Rehabilitation Company, and the Cardiff Third Sector Council. In their place, the statutory members of the Cardiff Public Services Board are Cardiff Council, Cardiff and Vale University Health Board, South Wales Fire and Rescue and Natural Resource Wales. It is too soon to know what this means for community safety in Cardiff, however the potential downgrading of the role of the police raises questions about the statutory obligation put in place under the Crime an Disorder Act, and the continued engagement between the police, probation service, the community rehabilitation company and other governing actors, principally the local authority. How these changing governing arrangements play out, and their impact upon the governing agenda, is worthy of further research. If governing arrangements change substantially from those that have been evidenced in this research, then there is a more definitive argument for the failure of the Cardiff Partnership Board and the transformative agenda examined here.

To summarise, this chapter has sought to bring together the key arguments of the thesis, and highlight the importance of this research to contemporary discussions of community safety. It has demonstrated how the greater political agency available to local actors in this localised devolved period of community safety has allowed for the pursuit of a more transformative agenda in Cardiff, compared to the regime under New Labour (Gilling, 2007; Hughes, 2007). Using regime theory, the research has shown how the Cardiff Partnership Board has failed to effectively mobilise participation around this agenda at the operational level. This is significant as it points to the challenges of inducing cooperation in times of
austerity (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Edwards and Hughes, 2012). In seeking to account for these findings, the discussion has drawn attention to a number of factors resulting from the changing governing arrangements, which have degraded governing capacity for community safety. These findings have implications for wider discussions of how community safety is conceptualised as a policy agenda beyond Cardiff in this localised and devolved period of community safety, and how it should be researched. It is these wider discussions that form the crux of the concluding chapter, which explores implications for policy and future research.
The purpose of this research was to investigate how Coalition Government policies of austerity, localism and the introduction of regional Police and Crime Commissioners have affected local community safety work. In considering the contribution of this thesis to discussions of community safety in England and Wales, it is worth returning to the three phases of community safety identified by Gilling et al. (2013) discussed in Chapter 2, and specifically the distinctions between the national mandatory period of the Labour Governments of 1997-2010 and the localised and devolved period for community safety that commenced in 2010. During the national mandatory period, in which community safety work was subject to intensive management from central government (Gilling, 2007), community safety was structured around developmental governing agendas driven by centralised performance targets and priorities as recounted in Chapter 2 and discussed in relation to Cardiff in Chapter 5. During the shift into the current period of ‘localised and devolved’ community safety, this centralised management of community safety has been superceded by arrangements that place primacy on local and regional actors in determining local arrangements and agendas for community safety. Crucially however, reducing financial expenditure in the public sector as a result of sustained austerity measures has presented a significant challenge to local governing capacity and continued partnership work (Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012)

This research makes an important contribution to contemporary discussions of community safety, which can be distilled into two key points. Firstly, it provides empirical evidence of how the increased agency available to local actors in Cardiff has allowed a reformulation of the local governing arrangements and agendas for community safety, indicating the potential for locally determined conceptualisations of community safety. Secondly, in examining this, the thesis offers insight into the value of locally situated case study research and the analytical framework of regime theory in exploring how the political agency available to local policy officers is exercised and the factors
that frustrate or facilitate the formation of certain governing regimes. The conclusion now attends to each of these points in turn, beginning with a summary of the key findings of the research.

8.1 RETHINKING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

This case study has examined an attempt by the Cardiff regime to pursue a strategic agenda, the ‘What Matters’ strategy, which prioritises principles of social justice, social inclusion and addressing social inequalities. The emphasis of this agenda on principles of social justice demarcates it clearly from the more risk orientated and narrowly focussed agendas on crime prevention prevalent under the central management of community safety by New Labour. However this research found evidence of a discord between the rhetoric of the Cardiff regime and the operational practices of community safety work in the city. Where the ‘What Matters’ strategy posited a shared agenda for all partnership work, the operational practices of community safety were characterised by multiple and divergent operational agendas. This operational divergence was driven by the discretion afforded to lead practitioners involved in the delivery of community safety work that took precedence over the ‘broad purpose’ agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy (Stone, 2005).

This discrepancy between the rhetoric of the governing agenda and the divergent operational practices of community safety indicate a failure of the Cardiff regime to mobilise cooperation around the ‘What Matters’ strategy. In seeking to understand this, the research found evidence that the changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff have had a detrimental impact upon the governing capacity for community safety. Presented as a simplification of partnership arrangements and a reduction of complexity, it was argued that the assimilation of the various partnership structures into the integrated Cardiff Partnership Board was a progressive and beneficial adaptation to public service delivery and would facilitate more holistic and joined up service delivery. However the findings of this research indicate that this integration of the community safety partnership has compromised the coordination and facilitation of community safety work. This is due to the obscuring of clear lines of responsibility and operational oversight following the dismantling of the
community safety team, the degradation of community safety expertise, and subsequently the greater responsibility placed upon locally situated practitioners in determining and coordinating local practice.

These findings are important when considering the conceptualisation of community safety in this localised and devolved period in which its local organisation is driven not by the intensive management of central government, but rather by locally situated actors working within particular local political and economic contexts. The transformative agenda and the adaptations made to the local governing arrangements signify a radical departure from the discourses of community safety prevalent under New Labour. This indicates the importance of locally situated actors in actively determining how they respond to the external political and economic conditions and the potential for more progressive and transformative local agendas for community safety. Equally, the failure of the Cardiff regime to effectively mobilise cooperation around this agenda indicates the challenges posed to local governing actors in attempting to incentivise partnership working around a ‘broad purpose’ agenda in the absence of central government steering and reduced financial resources, which incentivise a focus on more immediate concerns (Stone, 2005).

This recognition and evidence of the role of locally situated actors actively involved in determining and adapting local arrangements and agendas for community safety in the localised and devolved period of community safety is important. In the absence of centralised management of community safety, there is now greater potential for more divergent local conceptualisations of community safety, driven by the local socio-economic and political contexts in which local actors are situated. This presents both potential for the emergence of more progressive and transformative agendas as seen here in Cardiff, but also for developmental and maintenance regimes. Moreover as this research shows, how cooperation and partnership is incentivised around these agendas is dependent upon the arrangements implemented within these local regimes. What is apparent then, is the potential for greater variance in the formation of local community safety regimes, their agendas and the governing arrangements utilised to achieve them.
This potential for greater variation in the local conceptualisations of community safety is further reinforced through wider regional, national and international political, economic and social changes. As Gilling et al. (2013) note the introduction of elected Police and Crime Commissioners raise important questions about their impact upon local community safety agendas and will contribute to the local variation of community safety work. This research found evidence of an emerging tension between the transformative agendas of the Cardiff Partnership Board, and the more developmental agenda of the Police and Crime plan. Moreover there was evidence of a migration of local partnership arrangements within Cardiff towards the Police and Crime Commissioners office, pointing to the potential gradual regionalisation of community safety work. Similarly, broader national factors will further reinforce the potential for diverging agendas and practices for community safety work. The ‘dragonisation’ of social policy within Wales has been noted as a consequence of the devolved politics of Welsh Government (Edwards and Hughes, 2009; Haines, 2009; Drakeford, 2010). This research demonstrates the influence of the managerialist tendencies of the Welsh Government in advocating more effective public service delivery and the development of the Cardiff Partnership Board. Equally the social justice agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy shows a clear parity with the drive for a distinct agenda within Wales around social justice driven forward by the Welsh Government.

More widely, global economic and political conditions will further impact upon local conceptualisations of community safety. Increasing concerns around migration resulting from the European financial crisis and growing unrest in the Middle East has fuelled the rise of right-wing nationalist parties across Europe and in the UK, and was a contributing factor to the British public’s vote to leave the EU in June 2016. Alongside this, a series of terrorist attacks across mainland Europe have fuelled concerns about terrorism and the role of migration in facilitating this. In the wake of these factors growing antipathy towards migrants presents significant challenges for issues of community cohesion; indeed plenty of anecdotal evidence is emerging in the national media of rising numbers of hate crimes in the few weeks after the referendum (Dodd, 2016; BBC, 2016) and locally within Cardiff (Wightwick, 2016).
Thinking more specifically about the future of community safety, the value of this research lies in its elucidation of the opportunities and challenges facing community safety in this localised and devolved period (Gilling et al., 2013). On the one hand, the research sheds light on the opportunities presented by localism and the greater autonomy afforded to local actors in pursuing more progressive and transformative agendas for community safety (Edwards and Hughes, 2012). This was evident in this research in the ‘What Matters’ strategy and its appeals to social justice, and the attempt to promote a ‘broad purpose’ (Stone, 2005) agenda around addressing issues of inequality and social exclusion. Counterpoised to the opportunities presented by localism, the research demonstrates the challenges facing local governance as a result of sustained austerity measures, which severely constrain and inhibit the choices available to local governing actors in exercising this new found freedom. This was evidenced in this research in the degradation of governing capacity for community safety work in the city, which was seen in the dismantling of the community safety infrastructure, and the decimation of local community safety expertise.

Of relevance here is the work of Du Gay, who, noting the increasing managerialist tendencies towards issues of efficiency and the modernisation of public services, highlights the value of the bureaucratic ethos in providing ‘enough skill, status and independence to offer frank and fearless advice about the formulation and implementation of distinctive public purposes and to try to achieve purpose impartially’ (2000: 146). This is salient to these discussions, as the dismantling of the community safety team was promoted under the guise of reducing complexity and a drive towards efficiency. As Du Gay notes, this drive for efficiency obfuscates the value of bureaucratic structures, such as the community safety team, and the expertise that they provide in influencing decision-making and implementing policy agendas impartially. Therefore, the degradation of governing capacity is of fundamental concern for future discussions of community safety. As seen in this research, the absence of a dedicated community safety infrastructure compromises the effective coordination and delivery of community safety work, and raises questions around the sustainability of local community safety agendas. This degradation
of community safety capacity, also poses longer-term challenges as it is producing a collapse of the ‘institutional memory’ around community safety work within local government. This is important for future discussions of local governance post-austerity, in which attempts to re-establish local governing capacity for community safety work will be hindered by the absence of institutional memory.

This degradation of local governing capacity and the erosion of institutional memory of community safety expertise is crucial given continued austerity measures, the PCCs, and the challenges to community cohesion in the wake of broader international pressures. In the absence of governing capacity for community safety how will continued partnership work be sustained, and more importantly, what will be the impact of this absence upon future community safety agendas? This research has shown the challenges of realising social justice agendas under such conditions, consistent with the assertions of Edwards and Hughes (2012). This is important for future empirical research, which is able to identify how, and under what conditions, certain regimes are formed, and how, within these regimes, cooperation is mobilised around particular governing agendas. Recognising this, this thesis makes an important contribution to the methodological discussions of how such a programme of research could be achieved.

8.2 RESEARCHING COMMUNITY SAFETY IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY

These discussions of the opportunities and challenges facing community safety arrangements raise important methodological questions for future research in to community safety. The crucial question for research into community safety during this period is not how have Coalition Government policies affected community safety work, but rather, how have local community safety arrangements adapted to current economic and political conditions? This framing of the problem recognises the role of locally situated actors in actively determining how local governing regimes adapt to wider political and economic changes. In doing so it draws attention to the local power relationships that are important in understanding the governing agendas of particular regimes, what partners are involved in the pursuit of these agendas, and how cooperation is
incentivised and governing resources mobilised around these agendas. Such an approach facilitates the examination of why certain agendas are pursued within particular places and times, and what factors contribute to the realisation of these agendas. This opens up space for the role of critical social science in contributing to these developments by identifying the factors that frustrate and inhibit the realisation of more progressive governing agendas for community safety.

To do this, a programme of research is needed which is able to identify how, and why, certain governing regimes are formed and sustained. This research has demonstrated the value of regime theory in providing an analytical framework for examining governing regimes in relation to community safety. Using the four components of regime theory (the agenda, the governing arrangements, the resources available to the regime, and the schemes of cooperation) this research identified how changes to the governing arrangements in Cardiff has degraded the governing capacity available to community safety and compromised the realisation of the transformative strategic agenda. In doing so this research shows how regime theory can be used to examine “how the variegated governing arrangements indicated by partnerships of state and non-state actors in local political economies enable or frustrate” particular agendas (Edwards et al., 2015: 216)

In doing so, regime theory facilitates an understanding of how and why certain regimes succeed or fail, as seen in Cardiff with the failure to mobilise cooperation around the strategic agenda of the ‘What Matters’ strategy. This utilisation of regime theory prioritises the understanding of the political and economic context of local governance, and the distribution of power between actors that affect how regimes are formed. Therefore the research highlights the value of locally situated case studies in achieving this understanding, and facilitating an understanding of local power relationships and their impact upon the formation of particular governing regimes. Moving forward, the research demonstrates the importance of multiple embedded case studies to identify and understand how local governing agendas and arrangements for community safety are developed in different contexts and under different local conditions. Through such a programme of research it would be possible to distinguish
between the political agency open to local policy actors and the external constraints placed upon them in contemporary discussions of community safety.

In summary then, the findings of the research can be distilled into two contributions. Firstly, the findings of the research provide empirical evidence of how local governing regimes are actively responding and adapting to the conditions of austerity and the decentralisation of power and point towards the potential for more variegated local agendas for community safety. In doing so, however, the findings of the research also indicate the challenges to governing capacity, evident in the degradation of the infrastructure and expertise for community safety work in the city. The second key contribution of the research is the demonstration of the value of regime theory and multiple embedded case studies for future research for understanding why, and how, certain governing agendas are pursued, and the factors that frustrate or facilitate the realisation of particular governing agendas for community safety. Such a programme of research opens up space for the role of critical social science in contributing to the local developmental of community safety work, and the potential for more progressive framings of community safety practice.
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### APPENDICES

**APPENDIX 1: LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS**

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<th>Position</th>
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## Appendix 2: List of Documents

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<td>Western Mail</td>
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<td>Scrutiny Report</td>
<td>Cardiff Community and Adult Services Scrutiny Committee</td>
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<td>2014</td>
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Dear

I am a PhD student at Cardiff University looking into partnership working and community safety in the city of Cardiff. As part of my research I am working with the Partnership and citizen focus team in County Hall but I would also like to conduct interviews with key individuals. Due to your role as for I would greatly appreciate the chance to talk to you about this work.

I am writing this email to see whether you would be happy participating in an interview about . I anticipate that this should take sometime between 30 and 45 minutes. I am hoping to conduct these interviews over the next couple of months, but I would appreciate it if you could let me know when be convenient for you so we can arrange a meeting.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Many thanks,

Tom

Tom Cartwright
PhD Researcher
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University
Top Floor, 1-3 Museum Place
Cardiff
CF10 3BD
Participant information sheet:  
**Doctoral Research into the organisation of community Safety in Cardiff**

**What is the project about?**

This project aims to explore how partnership working and community safety is achieved in the city of Cardiff in these challenging times of stringent budget cuts. In particular, it seeks to examine:

- What the priorities of the city are;
- How these priorities are addressed;
- What partners are involved with addressing these issues?

The views of people involved with the Safer and Cohesive Communities Programme and the Neighbourhood Partnership teams are therefore central to this research.

**Who is conducting the research?**

The research is being conducted by a doctoral research student at Cardiff University called Tom Cartwright as part of his PhD thesis. This project is supervised by Adam Edwards and Gordon Hughes at the Cardiff School of Social Sciences, and funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

**What am I being asked to do?**

As part of the research I would like to conduct interviews with key individuals involved with partnership working and community safety issues in the city. These interviews are anticipated to last between 30 and 45 minutes and will be digitally recorded.

**What will happen if I do agree to take part?**

If you agree to be interviewed a date will be arranged at your convenience; no preparation is required. All attempts will be made to anonymise your responses and your name will not be used, however complete anonymity cannot be guaranteed. This is something we can discuss further if you have any concerns.
What if I change my mind?

If you change your mind you can decide not to take part at any point before, during, or after the interview. You do not have to give a reason for withdrawing from the study, and upon doing so all data pertaining to your interview will be destroyed.

What will happen to the data?

The recordings will be transcribed and stored in a password protected file to ensure confidentiality. Hard copies will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and will only be read by myself and my supervisors. Extracts from the interviews will be used in the PhD thesis for analytic purposes. Parts of what you say in interviews may also be incorporated into conference presentations, and included in subsequent journal articles arising from the research. It is also university policy to publish a copy of completed theses online in a digital repository.

Contact Details

If you have any questions or concerns about this research please don’t hesitate to contact me.

Email: CartwrightT@cardiff.ac.uk

Post: School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University  
Top Floor, 1-3 Museum Place  
Cardiff  
CF10 3BD

Supervisors:

Adam Edwards: EdwardsA2@cardiff.ac.uk  Gordon Hughes: HughesGH@cardiff.ac.uk
Consent Form

I, ............................................. agree to take part in this research project exploring how partnership working in community safety achieved in the city of Cardiff, being conducted by Tom Cartwright from Cardiff School of social Sciences.

Please initial each box to confirm that you have read and understood each section.

| I understand that participation is entirely voluntary, and that if I wish to withdraw from the study, I may do so at any time, and that I do not need to give any reason or explanation for doing so. |
| I understand that the study involves an interview that will be audio recorded. |
| I understand that because of this study, there could be violations to my privacy. To prevent violation of my own or others’ privacy, I will not talk about any of my own or others experiences that I would consider too personal or revealing. |
| I understand that all the information I give will be confidential to the greatest extent possible, but in some cases anonymity cannot be guaranteed due to the public nature of some roles in the council. |
| The researcher has offered to answer any questions I may have about the study. |
| I have read and understood this information and I agree to take part in the study. |

Signed:............................................................
Date:............................................................
APPENDIX 6: GENERIC INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Participant Name:
Role/Responsibility:

Section 1: The Work
• Can you tell me a bit about your role?
  o What does your role entail
  o How did you come to occupy this role?

• What would you say is the purpose of [the activity] and what should [the workstream/neighbourhood management team] achieve?

• What are the priorities in this [activity]? (Probe for community safety issues if not mentioned)
  o On what basis have they been identified

• How are these priorities addressed? How should they be addressed?
  o Why is this approach taken?
  o Can you provide some examples?

• How much autonomy do you have in your position?

Section 2: Partnership Arrangements
• Can you describe the governance structure of [the activity in question]?  
  o Who are you accountable to?
  o Where does responsibilities for decision making lie in this activity?
    ▪ Who has input the decision making process?
    ▪ On what basis are these people involved?

• What partners are involved in this [activity]?  
  o What is the nature of their involvement? What do they contribute?
  o Why are they involved?
  o Is there anyone who doesn’t participate but you think should?
    ▪ Why should they be involved, what would they offer?
    ▪ Why aren’t they involved?

• How is partnership working achieved?
  o How is it organised? How does it happen?
  o What incentives are there for co-operation?
  o What barriers exist for co-operation?
• What is your opinion on how partnership working is structured in Cardiff?

**Section 3: Current Context**

• Have reduced financial resources within the council affected this activity?
  o Reduction of services?
  o Less provision for young people in the city a problem?

• How do you think this is affecting partnership work in the city and who is involved?
  o Role of public sector?
  o Role of private, voluntary or communities?

• What do you think are the big challenges going forward?