What explains agency heads' length of tenure? Testing managerial background, performance, and political environment effects

Petrovsky, Nikolai, James, Oliver, Moseley, Alice and Boyne, George A. 2017. What explains agency heads' length of tenure? Testing managerial background, performance, and political environment effects. Public Administration Review 77 (4) , pp. 591-602. 10.1111/puar.12735

Preview

PDF - Accepted Post-Print Version Download (380kB) | Preview

Abstract

There are a number of influences on how long an agency head serves. The importance of particular influences in turn depends on the prospective destination of the agency head: elsewhere in the public sector; the private sector; or retirement. We estimate survival models of agency heads’ tenure using panel data on British central government executive agencies from 1989-2012. Our findings suggest that chief executives of poorly performing agencies are encouraged to retire sooner. We find no evidence of change in political control increasing risk of any form of exit, suggesting that political pressure to leave is not substantial for this type of official. Outsiders (agency heads recruited from outside central government) are relatively difficult to retain for a longer time, such that potential shortfalls in suitable managers caused by retirements in an aging workforce may be difficult to make up by appointing from this source.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	0033-3352
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	6 April 2017
Date of Acceptance:	9 April 2016
Last Modified:	06 Nov 2023 22:44
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/99687

Citation Data

Cited 17 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item