The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion

Simion, Mona ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7289-0872 2018. The explanation proffering norm of moral assertion. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (21) , pp. 477-488. 10.1007/s10677-018-9922-6

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Abstract

In recent years, much attention has been given to the epistemic credentials of belief based on moral testimony. Some people think pure moral deference is wrong, others disagree. It comes as a surprise, however, that while the epistemic responsibilities of the receiver of moral testimony have been closely scrutinized, little to no discussion has focused on the epistemic duties of the speaker. This paper aims to supply this lack: it defends a function-first account of the normativity of moral assertion. According to this view, in virtue of its function of reliably generating understanding in the audience, a moral assertion that p needs be knowledgeable and accompanied by a contextually appropriate explanation why p.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Springer Verlag
ISSN:	1386-2820
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	8 February 2018
Date of Acceptance:	11 August 2018
Last Modified:	05 May 2023 09:17
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/108980

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