Institutional Fragmentation in Parliamentary Control: The Italian Case

Furlong, Paul 2004. Institutional Fragmentation in Parliamentary Control: The Italian Case. The Journal of Legislative Studies 10 (2-3) , pp. 174-192. 10.1080/1357233042000322292

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Abstract

The article considers the accountability of the Italian Parliament in the light of empirical findings using data collected by methods originally associated with studies by Dunleavy, Jones and others in studies of the Westminster Parliament. The findings demonstrate how Westminster concepts of accountability cannot be transposed into the Italian context and reveal how other forms of accountability are significant, especially those directly related to the law-making powers of parliament. The study investigates how senior ministers responded to parliament over a seven-year period and finds that ministerial response to oral questions and other forms of interrogation was limited. This does not lead to the conclusion that Italian ministers in this period were not accountable, rather that their accountability operated through law-making functions, especially those of the permanent committees.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Publisher:	Routledge
ISSN:	1357-2334
Last Modified:	28 Jun 2019 03:13
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/3530

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