

**Self-serving National Ideologies:
A Critical Discourse Analysis of Turkish Cypriot Radio News**

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Abstract

This thesis examines the historical formation and contemporary circulation of competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms as they are realised in different Turkish Cypriot radio news outlets. Unlike North Atlantic models of journalism, these media are not governed by the values of neutrality nor of a fourth estate role, being closely aligned to political interests.

Presently, there is an ideological struggle between two versions of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 'Turkish nationalism' sees TRNC as part of a pan-Turkish nation. Within this ideology, TRNC's future is linked to Turkey and independent of the Republic of Cyprus. 'Pro-federation' nationalism sees TRNC as part of an inclusive Cypriot identity. TRNC's future is in a federation with the Republic of Cyprus. TRNC radio, each station closely affiliated to one of these nationalisms, is one site where national discourses can be accessed and evaluated.

In this thesis, Critical Discourse Analysis is used to reveal how participants and their actions are represented in news stories. These shape the way that events appear, contributing to prevailing nationalisms. This analysis is contextualised historically, conceptually and ethnographically with newsroom studies. These produce an understanding of the processes behind a set of highly ideological news texts.

This thesis adds to existing academic work which indicates that Cypriot media frame events in ways which aggravate the Cyprus conflict. Unlike other studies, this thesis challenges the myth that national discourses are uniform expressions and allegiances in news media. Instead, the data analysed reveal national discourses are internally fractured, politically differentiated and temporal. Though discourses mostly support interests associated with each station, some pretextual discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity are revealed. Though minimal, these contribute to a solution-friendly atmosphere which frees residents from a life of embargoes, fear and isolation.

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I. Introduction

1.1 Opening rationale for this thesis

I came to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 2001 for a short visit and was struck by the prevalence of national symbols on public display. As someone who worked in radio and television news, I was surprised by the abundance of TRNC radio and television channels. Before returning to TRNC again in 2006, I read up on the history of the division of Cyprus. This helped in understanding the importance of national symbols in TRNC.

Living in TRNC, one cannot help noticing how all aspects of life are political. Political affiliations affect one's position, employment prospects and even friends. Listening and working in TRNC radio reveals how radio news is very political. It is clear that radio is in the hands of those with particular political interests, but what is less clear is how they use language to conceal their own interests. Unlike my 11 years experience of working in radio and television news in Britain and Canada, this observation points towards there being a very different model of journalism adhered to in TRNC.

The aim of this thesis is to systematically reveal the historical formation and contemporary circulation of competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms in TRNC radio news. All stations are highly nationalistic yet carry subtly different versions of this, which represent the participants of the TRNC, their Greek counterparts, mainland Turkey, and the wider international community in subtly different ways. All of this serves to shape events in ways that serve the subtly different political and economic interests of those who control the stations while aggravating tensions in the Cyprus conflict.

It is only through understanding the historical background of TRNC and the Cyprus conflict that radio's role in TRNC can be understood, so this is examined first in the thesis. Scholars who use CDA highlight the importance of historically contextualising analysis (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993). This history is then

placed into the broader sociology of nations, national identities and media's role in these.

The reader is then taken into newsrooms through an ethnography of radio stations to look at newsroom practices. This reveals the "social goings on" behind the making of news answering how, why and where texts take on the shape they do (van Leeuwen, 2005:13-14).

Equipped with all this contextual information, the reader is then offered a close analysis of a selection of language used on TRNC radio news. Critical Discourse Analysis is used to reveal hidden ideologies in these news stories. This reveals that stations not only disseminate political opinion, but represent events in ways which serve their own different interests.

1.2 TRNC historical context

TRNC for all intents and purposes is independent from the Republic of Cyprus (hereafter the Republic), closely bound to Turkey, and has existed and continues to exist on the edge of violent conflict. It is a self-proclaimed unrecognised nation-state occupying one third of the island of Cyprus. TRNC was established in 1983 due to intercommunal violence, mainland Turkey and Greece vying for power in the area, and western powers' (specifically American and British) designs on a military presence on the island.

Cyprus was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for over three hundred years after being captured from Venice in 1571. The Ottomans settled Turkish-speaking Muslims on the island to administer the Greek-speaking inhabitants. In 1878, Cyprus was ceded to the British before it became a British crown colony in 1925. After a short-lived shared Republic (1960 until 1963), intercommunal violence and political pressures forced Turkish Cypriots into enclaves. It was during this time that Turkish Cypriots began self-government. In 1974, after over a decade of inter-communal violence, a Greek-backed military coup increased violence against Turkish Cypriots and gave Turkey an excuse to intervene and effectively take control of one-third of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot authorities seized the opportunity to declare the 'The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' in 1975 as an

interim measure until an agreement could be reached with Greek Cypriots. With a lack of progress in gaining an agreement or recognition, TRNC was unilaterally declared by President Rauf Denktaş in 1983. This declaration resulted in international embargoes and isolation which remain to this day.

Today, TRNC is a multi-party parliamentary democracy governed by a 50-member House of Representatives. A president is the head of state and a prime minister is the head of the government. TRNC is a political, social and economic state¹ which operates independently of the Republic. It has political, social, health, education, media and entertainment institutions as do other states. Residents go about their daily lives working and socialising, despite living with international isolation and economic sanctions which dictate that all links to the outside world are through Turkey. This negatively affects all aspects of life, whether this be participation in international culture and sport, having a voice in international bodies or buying and selling goods, services and information.

Turkey is the only state which recognises TRNC. Turkey supports TRNC financially, militarily, politically and culturally, with some questioning its very sovereignty (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). The Turkish government and military are major power holders in TRNC, as Greece is in the Republic.

It is questionable whether Turkey will relinquish its presence and influence in TRNC (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Mallinson, 2005). Presently, the Turkish military has approximately 30,000 troops on Cyprus. This military presence prevents the south of Turkey being exposed to potential hostile fire if Greece was to gain control of Cyprus, directly or indirectly (Richmond, 1998: xv). This presence also gives Turkey and TRNC a strong bargaining position with the Republic (ibid.).

Turkey's interest in Cyprus is more than of a military nature. On a social level, TRNC is seen by many mainland Turks as part of their nation. To give up part of their nation to an historic enemy is unimaginable. Politically, it would be a major

¹ This thesis refers to TRNC as a 'state'. Though it is not recognised as a nation-state within the world community of nation-states, for all intents and purposes it functions as a nation-state.

climb-down for the Turkish government to no longer recognise TRNC, being its only official backer. Finally, many accuse Turkey of using TRNC as a political chip in its bid to be an EU member (Mallinson, 2005: 111).

1.3 Turkish Cypriot Nationalisms

Nations are “an imagined political community” (Anderson, 1991:5-6). They are mental constructs; a type of group identity. Unlike other group identities, nations are an ideological consciousness people believe are worth dying for (Billig, 1995: 83).

There are between 200,000 and 300,000 people who live in TRNC, the majority who consider themselves Turkish Cypriots. However, there are two dominant ways of defining Turkish Cypriot nationalism, with different political motivations behind these definitions. These variant nationalisms are rooted in “competing claims for state power (and state-allocated wealth and status)” (Lacher and Kaynak, 2005: 148).

‘Turkish nationalist’ politics see Turkish Cyprus independent from the Republic, yet part of a pan-Turkish nationalism.² The main nationalist party is the *Ulusal Birlik Partisi* (hereafter UBP). During the years between partition (1974) and the *Annan referendum* in 2004, the UBP and Turkish nationalist ex-President Rauf Denktaş were very popular, winning all but one election. TRNC was closely aligned to Turkey and being a Turkish Cypriot meant seeing oneself as a Turk living on Cyprus (ibid.: 156). The Greek Republic was feared and mistrusted due to past violence against the Turkish minority.

The UBP, with its pro-Turkey stance and pessimism towards talks and settlements, has been a natural ally of the Turkish government and military. However, it has had to soften its stance due to a changing political environment since 2003 which has seen a rise in the popularity of pro-federation sentiments in TRNC and within the Turkish government (ibid.: 148-149). The UBP still

² The descriptions of both types of nationalisms are according to interviews with the UBP Shadow Minister of the Economy, Ersin Tatar and the CTP’s Minister of Ideology Nazım Beraltı. These concur with descriptions by Lacher and Kaynak, 2005.

promotes the idea of independence from the Republic with strong links to Turkey. However, it also has agreed to a very loose federation or confederation with the Republic.³ Though this is presented as a 'solution', it is unlikely to ever succeed. The Republic has rejected proposals which would have given TRNC far less power. However, this 'solution' allows the UBP to present itself as 'solution'-friendly yet maintain its political and economic power in TRNC.

The second type of Turkish Cypriot nationalism is 'pro-solution', 'pro-federation' or 'left' politics.⁴ Its popularity was evident by the electoral victories of the pro-federation *Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi* (CTP) which governed from 2003 until April 2009. This support was confirmed with the acceptance by TRNC residents of the UN-brokered *Annan referendum* in 2004, which sought to establish a federation in Cyprus. 'Pro-federation' politics strive to create a federation with the Republic. It acknowledges its Turkish historical roots and cultural distinctiveness from Greek Cypriots, but distances itself from mainland Turkey.

The CTP made gestures towards improving relations with the Republic during its governance, such as opening up five crossing points and engaging in a new round of UN-brokered peace talks which started on 4 September 2008. However, though these are positive moves in relations, it is questionable whether TRNC has the ability to agree to a solution (ibid.). Turkey has continued to determine much in TRNC. The CTP claims to be pro-solution, but all major decisions in TRNC are in close consultation with the Turkish government and military (ibid.). This situation finds the CTP taking a pro-solution stance, but within the factual nature of its dependence on Turkey. It is how these two 'solutions' are presented that is of interest in this thesis.

Since 2003, there has been a move away from 'Turkish nationalism', though it still remains very popular.⁵ Each political party works within the confines of voters' desires and fears, political, economic and military realities, and Turkey's

³ This was agreed with the Denktaş-Makarios accord and re-iterated in an interview with the UBP Shadow Minister of Finance, Ersin Tatar.

⁴ These labels are used interchangeably to identify this brand of politics in TRNC. However, seeing as both nationalisms claim to want a 'solution', this thesis refers to this type of nationalism as pro-federation.

⁵ Turkish nationalist UBP won the parliamentary elections in April 2009.

role in TRNC. Political parties provide competing models and discourses about a Turkish Cypriot nation which serve their own interests at the expense of others' interests. The media have been a key tool in the dissemination of these discourses.

1.4 Turkish Cypriot Media

TRNC has an abundance of media relative to its small population. It has nine television stations, 29 radio stations and eight daily newspapers. Its newspaper presence alone represents one of the highest concentrations of newspaper titles per capita anywhere in the world (Vassiliadou, 2007). Almost all broadcast media include news as part of their programming, increasing the amount of news offered to residents.

Fairclough (1995: 219) claims the media is the single most important social institution in articulating discourse where "consent is achieved, ideologies are transmitted, and practices, meanings, values and identities are taught and learnt." In TRNC, the media have been used systematically as a means to disseminate particular models of the world. Partially due to media's close links with political parties, economic interests and the government, nationalisms differ across stations.

The relationship between journalism and political and economic interests has been explored in various national settings (Weaver, 2005 and 1998; De Burgh, 2005). Hallin and Mancini (2004) note the nature of a nation's news media is closely linked to other social factors. They (ibid.: 8) write:

one cannot understand the news media without understanding the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations between economic and political interests, and the development of civil society, among other elements of social structure.

They distinguish three models of media and politics in developed capitalist democracies of Western Europe and North American journalism: *the Northern/Central European Model, the North Atlantic or Liberal Model and the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model*. The nature of TRNC media can be thought of as characteristic of Hallin and Mancini's (2004) *Mediterranean or*

Polarized Pluralist Model. Like the *Mediterranean* model, TRNC has a politically oriented press; high political parallelism in journalism where the government, political parties, and industrialists with political ties use the media; the state plays a large role as owner, regulator and funder; there is weak journalistic professionalisation and a high degree of ideological diversity and conflict in society with a strong role for the state and political parties. There are also differences between TRNC and this model. For example, TRNC has a large press circulation, not small. Also, political power holders continue to control the media, so TRNC is not experiencing “savage de-regulation” or a rapid and uncontrolled transition from state controlled to commercial broadcasting; and freedom of the press is still curtailed (ibid.: 68-73).

Hallin and Mancini's (2004) *Mediterranean* model differs from the model associated with Britain, America, Canada and Ireland, *the North Atlantic* model, in a number of ways. Nations whose media are characteristic of this model have a neutral commercial press, information-oriented journalism, low political parallelism, strong professionalisation and formal autonomy from governance (ibid.: 67). These social factors contribute to objectivity and the role of the fourth estate being an ideal, especially in nations characterised by this model.

Golding and Elliot (1979: 46), considering the roles of journalism in the state globally, identify the fourth estate as the role associated with Western media. In this role:

[...] journalism acts as an independent watchdog of the liberal freedoms in a parliamentary democracy, its independence guaranteed constitutionally, its public responsibility by the exercise of consumer sovereignty in the marketplace.

More contemporary research claims the fourth estate's 'watch-dog' role has been the cornerstone of liberal accounts of the news media (Machin and Niblock, 2006: 96; Lloyd, 2004). These accounts claim there are three estates or branches of government, such as the executive, legislative and judicial. The fourth estate is the press. The principle is that the press make accountable or

“watch over” the other three estates of government. Machin and Niblock (ibid.) suggest without the fourth estate, democracy itself is threatened.

Objectivity is one key factor in the notion of journalism’s fourth estate role. According to Chalaby (1998: 130), objectivity encompasses clusters of discursive norms which became universally accepted in American journalism at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. The norms of neutrality, impartiality, balance, fairness, truthfulness, factuality, accuracy and completeness were formed during the process of, and as a result of, separation of the press from party politics. The norm of retreatism is related to media organisations’ and journalists’ reluctance to take sides in the political processes.

But objectivity is not a universal norm. It is an ideal, a social construct of western journalism (Hanitzsch 2004; Schudson 2003; Chalaby 1998). It came late in some western nations, such as France, and not at all in other parts of the world. For example, McGoldrick (2005: 4) claims in sub-Saharan Africa, journalists from 11 nations do not consider objectivity a news value. Instead, journalists “use their education and position to improve the outlook for their society” and “believe they have a vital role to play in the prevention (sic) and resolution of conflict.”

Objectivity does not sit well with many nations with high political parallelism, such as TRNC. Even though some of these nations “are seeped in the ideology of American journalism”, believing they are objective, this is not the case. For example, in Latin America, “journalists concealed from themselves that they were implicitly colluding with military regimes in the 1980s by priding themselves on being neutral professionals” (Waisbord, 2000 in Curran, 2005: xiii). Mancini (2000:267) observes that Italian journalists in the 1990s presented themselves as though part of an Anglo-American model when they were not. Mancini (2000: 272) writes:

The journalist knows that he is practicing a strongly advocate journalism while thinking that his professionalism is essentially legitimated by his being objective and impartial.

The role of TRNC journalism does not suit either the fourth estate role or objectivity. Almost all media, broadcast and print, are directly or indirectly linked

to political parties, commercial and political interests, the military or universities (which are semi-governmental organisations). Media are too close to these power holders to fulfil a “watch-dog” role (Lloyd, 2004).

Like many other nations, objectivity is not part of TRNC journalism culture. Despite the appearance of journalism with employees called ‘journalists’ and ‘editors’ who work with news agency feeds, write, produce, edit and air news stories for newscasts daily, this thesis’s ethnography and discourse analysis reveals that discursive norms such as neutrality, balance and objectivity are not present. In TRNC, according to this thesis’ ethnography, journalists claim they are “helping to solve the Cyprus conflict” and writing “what’s good for the nation.” Of course, how these priorities are articulated in news differ amongst stations, reflecting political interests associated with each station.

1.5 The object of investigation

It has been widely argued that news is important culturally and politically (Richardson, 2006; Fairclough, 2003, 1995a and 1989; Knightley, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 1996; Billig, 1995; van Dijk, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). Richardson (2006: 13) claims:

Journalism has social effects: through its power to shape issue agendas and public discourse, it can reinforce beliefs; it can shape people’s opinions not only of the world but also of *their* place and *role* in the world [...] [it can] influence what you have opinions on; in sum, it can help shape social reality by shaping our *views* of social reality.

This takes on particular importance in regard to broadcast news due to its large audiences (Krishnamurthy, 1996: 129). In TRNC, although no official audience figures are kept, station managers believe radio is a popular form of media.⁶

This thesis examines the historical formation and contemporary circulation of competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms in TRNC radio stations. Specifically, this thesis analyses how radio represents events in news to promote, maintain and legitimise different politically motivated versions of TRNC,

⁶ Interviews with Ersin Tatar, *Radyo T*’s manager and owner, and *KFM*’s manager Erdinç Gündüz reveal that they believe their radio stations are popular amongst car drivers. *BRT*’s Director Hüseyin Gürşan believes *BRT* radio is the most popular radio in TRNC.

the Republic, their citizens, and the way they behave. Though it is clear TRNC radio is political, what is much less evident are differences between radio stations' representations. A close analysis of language in radio news reveals the subtly different, yet quite destructive way that pro-solution ideas are essentially denied. This analysis demonstrates that stations not only disseminate political opinion, but recontextualise even the most mundane events in ways which serve their own interests. Mundane events can be framed such that national identities become "a routine way of talking and listening", a useful way to promote nationalism (Billig, 1995: 109).

Radio news from three stations is analysed. Stations are *Bayrak International (BRTI)*, *KFM* and *Radyo T*. Their economic and political affiliations can be summarised as:

Station	BRTI	KFM	Radyo T
Economic affiliations	English language service of state-run broadcaster BRTK Mostly state-funded	Radio service of large commercial media group KMG Funded through advertising and KMG's newspaper operations	Radio service of small media group Kanal T/ Radyo T Funded through advertising
Political Affiliations	Accountable directly to the Prime Minister Legally mandated to promote TRNC Answerable to a board of governors	Not independent of political parties (contrary to its claims) with management and owners closely associated with	Owned by UBP's shadow minister for the economy. Interested in political affairs, though claims to be party a-political

	<p>made up of military and government appointments</p> <p>The government's mouthpiece, so considers all parties in the Cyprus conflict</p>	<p>pro-federation CTP⁷</p>	
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These stations frame events in ways which represent different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. Differences challenge the working assumption that nationalism finds uniform expression and allegiance in and through the media. Instead, this in-depth examination of the complex and differentiated processes of news mediation reveals that news represents different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms which benefit those associated with each station.

1.6 Language and Ideology

It has been argued that ideology is key to understanding issues of language, power and politics (Fairclough, 2003: 9 and 1989: 2; Kress and Hodge, 1979: 15). This makes it a useful concept for analysing and understanding Turkish Cypriot radio news. However, there are many meanings attributed to ideology (Williams, 1976: 156). One useful definition by Fiske (1990: 165) sees ideology as “a way of making sense [of the world], the sense it makes always has a social and political dimension.”

Althusser (1971) believes dominant ideologies are inescapable, being “deeply inscribed in the ways of thinking and ways of living [...]” (in Fiske, 1990: 174).

⁷ In March 2009, *KFM*'s owner Asil Nadir and the CTP government had a disagreement over a business deal to take over the running of a second airport in TRNC. This resulted in Nadir pulling his support from CTP and giving it to the Democratic Party, a Turkish Nationalist party. This support was evident in public statements and news content.

This all encompassing role of ideology is shared by Gramsci. However, while Althusser's ideas entrap everyone in ideology, Gramsci liberates society through the idea of "hegemony". Williams (1976: 145), summarising Gramsci, writes hegemony,

[...] is not limited to matters of direct political control but seeks to describe a more general predominance which includes, as one of its key features, a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships.

Hegemony introduces the idea of struggles for ideology, empowering society. Hegemonic struggles are on-going, winning and re-winning the consent of the majority in society (in Fiske, 1990: 176). Drawing on these concepts we can say that in TRNC, though Turkish Cypriot nationalism achieved near hegemony in the past, it is now a site of ideological struggle.

Echoes of Gramsci are found in contemporary definitions of ideology. For example, Fairclough (2003: 9) defines ideology as,

[...] representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power domination and exploitation.

Fairclough's definition is useful for this thesis. It allows for the idea of Turkish Cypriot national ideologies being "represented" on TRNC radio news. This acknowledges language's role in ideology. It also encompasses the idea that representations are linked to "power, domination and exploitation" in TRNC. Finally, this definition includes "establishing, maintaining and changing social relations", acknowledging the struggle for dominance of national ideology. For these reasons, this thesis uses a definition which is closely aligned to that of Gramsci and Fairclough.

A group of researchers working in linguistics began to investigate the way ideology could be studied through the analysis of language. They found that ideology, always "involve[s] language", and language choices (Kress and Hodge 1979:15). Fairclough (1989: 2) believes "the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through

the ideological workings of language.” This highlights the importance of the study of language and discourse.

The relationship between discourses and ideologies is one of both informing and being informed by each other. According to Wodak (2001: 66), discourse is “a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts”, which are thematically interrelated. She gives examples of discourses of unemployment, racism and immigration restrictions. Scholars link the two concepts by recognising that discourses are ideological (Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen 1993). However, ideologies differ from discourses in being more encompassing. Ideology is “[...] a particular way of seeing the world and human nature and relationships” (in Williams, 1976). However, discourses are less-encompassing, being linguistic acts concerned with topics like unemployment. For this thesis then, political parties and interests closely associated with radio stations have their own different national ideologies. These are a factor in how events are represented in news which articulate different ideological discourses about nationalism.

1.7 Critical Discourse Analysis principles

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a critical social science which is applied to the analysis of language (Fairclough, 2003: 15). It is critical in the sense that scholars who use CDA have political commitments opposed to social inequality and the abuse of power (van Dijk, 1996). They presuppose that composing texts involves making lexical and grammatical choices which have political repercussions (Kress, 1985: 3). CDA analyses these choices to reveal ideologies within texts (Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Fairclough, 2003, 2001, 1995a, 1995; Wodak 2001; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen 1993; Kress, 1985). In fact, Wodak (2001: 10) claims “[o]ne of the aims of CDA is to ‘de-mystify’ discourses by deciphering ideologies.”

This thesis aims to reveal ideological discourses about differing Turkish Cypriot nationalisms evoked by representations of events on TRNC radio news. It

follows then that CDA is an appropriate approach to analyse this ideological language on TRNC radio news.

Scholars who work with CDA perceive discourse as a form of social practice, closely interconnected with other elements of social life. There is a two-way relationship between texts and their production and consumption contexts. For this reason, both text and context must be analysed (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 92; van Dijk 1991).

1.8 This thesis' structure

The analysis of discourse in this thesis is contextualised in three ways. In chapter two, TRNC's recent political history and the role of TRNC media are described. This description clarifies the historical formation of competing variants of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms. It answers how stations can claim they are writing "what's good for the nation" and "helping find a solution", yet mean different things.

In chapter three, ideas of nation and media's role in nation-building/ maintaining are explored. This examination reveals that nations are a relatively recent type of group identification and media play a role in its creation and maintenance. Part of media's role is creating national 'us' and 'them' groups (McLaughlin 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1997, 1996). These observations are essential for understanding media's role in Turkish Cyprus. The two Turkish Cypriot national ideologies vying for dominance are then examined. This informs the discourse analysis by defining who and what each Turkish Cypriot nationalism believes is part of their nation.

In chapter five, this thesis's analysis of discourse is contextualised by the carrying out of newsroom ethnographies. This ethnographic research reveals the "social goings-on" behind news; that is, the complex and differentiated processes of news production behind the news which evokes different discourses of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. The running of stations is examined, including economic,

political and production factors such as news gathering, writing and editing practices. This ethnography enhances understanding in the meanings within texts and answers where, why and how scripts take on different ideological discourses.

In chapter six through eight, radio news scripts from three TRNC radio stations are analysed. In these chapters, analysis is carried out on stories about an event (the opening of Lokmacı crossing point between TRNC and the Republic), stories about relations between TRNC and the Republic, and stories about more mundane events which are commonly referred to as “routine coverage”. While news output, particularly of political events, can appear ideological even at a casual listening, close analysis of texts through CDA reveals “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance”, many of these only noticeable through close analysis (Wodak, 2001: 2). CDA of TRNC radio texts uncovers hidden messages which demonstrate differences between stations. CDA reveals language strategies employed by the three stations which show exactly how listeners are being persuaded.

1.9 What's at Stake?

During the time of this research, TRNC was governed by pro-federation CTP. The Republic of Cyprus also voted in a pro-federation government. UN-brokered face-to-face peace talks between the Presidents of the Republic and TRNC were being organised and the Lokmacı official crossing point between the Republic and TRNC was opened by both sides. Despite these pro-solution gestures, stations mostly omitted pro-solution discourses. By drawing upon discourses which satisfy stations interests and exasperate the Cyprus conflict, stations poison a volatile and potentially violent situation.

Nationalist violence against Turkish Cypriot visitors to the Republic is a reality⁸, as is the threat of para-military violence.⁹ By evoking national discourses which

⁸ Violent attacks against Turkish Cypriot students and visitors have been reported. This was reported in <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/> downloaded 21 .01.09.

do not offer possibilities for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, a life with economic embargoes, international isolation, the threat of violence, military presence and restrictions on the lives of TRNC residents is sustained and aggravated by stations. Alternatively, with discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity, an improvement in the life of TRNC residents is imagineable.

⁹ TMT has threatened to restart an armed conflict if they feel CTP compromises in its negotiations with the Republic. This was reported on <http://www.brtk.cc/index.php/lang/en/cat/2/news/36492> downloaded on 21 January 2009

II. A history of Cyprus and Cypriot media from the British colonial period to present

II.1 Introduction

Cyprus has a history of violence and the past century, since the popularisation of mass media, is no exception. Turkish and Greek Cypriots have fought amongst each other in the name of nation, with the encouragement of outside influences. The media have played a role in this, contributing to opposing nationalisms and aggravating the conflict. Even today this is the case with power groups using the media as a tool to propagate ideas of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in their own interests. With an historical understanding of the Cyprus conflict and media's role in it, today's media and their associated discourses can be best understood.

Cyprus has been fought over throughout its history due to its geopolitical importance. Presently it holds the dubious honour of hosting the UN's longest running conflict zone. Though violence since 1974 is minimal, Panayiotou (2006: 26) believes "the conflict is still open and unresolved."

The conflict has not been resolved partly due to its complex nature. Richmond (1998: xvi) claims the conflict is tri-levelled. At the intercommunal level, the Greek Cypriot majority views the problem as one of minority-majority rights, legitimising its claim for a dominant voice in Cypriot affairs. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot minority sees it as being between two equal communities, legitimising its claim for an equal say in Cypriot affairs. At the regional level, Turkish authorities believe the TRNC is essential for the security of the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey itself, whereas the Greek government and many Greek Cypriots believe Cyprus is part of the Hellenic world. On a broader international level, the partition of Cyprus serves various global interests. For example, as there is no agreement in Cyprus, the 1960 Treaty of Establishment is still valid. This treaty permits British sovereign bases which house American listening posts and has given the West great influence on Cyprus (Mallinson,

2005: 111). Furthermore, by allowing a Turkish military presence on Cyprus, the US keeps Turkey as part of its middle-east strategy (ibid.).

A symptom of the unresolved conflict is the two Cypriot states. The Republic, based in the south, is Cyprus's only UN-recognised government. It controls 63 percent of the island and its Greek-speaking population of over 700,000. TRNC, based in the north, is an unrecognised, self-declared nation-state. It has a population of approximately 200,000, with an additional 150,000 students, expatriots and migrant workers from Turkey. The status of both states is a result of UN resolutions from 1964 until 1974 which do not recognise Turkish Cypriot's independent administrations and condemn Turkey's military action of dividing Cyprus (Richmond, 1989).

TRNC media have historically aggravated the Cyprus conflict, contributing to Turkish Cypriot nationalisms and fear of Greek Cypriots (Bailie and Azgın, 2008).

Azgın (1996: 642) sums up its role as:

The history of the Turkish Cypriot mass media in a nut-shell is one of reaction to the Enosis movement [the Greek Cypriot idea of Cyprus uniting with Greece] – and one of refuting the Greek views on the Cyprus question.

The analysis of TRNC newsroom practices and news texts carried out in the following chapters of this thesis are done with this rich historical context of conflict in mind. CDA theorists, on which the textual analysis in this thesis draws, emphasise the need to understand texts both as part of historical and ongoing social and cultural processes (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993).

This chapter's historical contextualisation exposes the emergence, processes and development of national ideologies produced through history and the media in different ways and at different times. The chapter is divided into three parts which follow chronological periods of Cypriot history. Within each part, events, issues and media's role in disseminating national ideologies in Turkish Cyprus are explored. Media sections focus mostly on radio after its introduction in 1948.

Part one examines the British colonial period up to independence in 1960. This section reveals how the media contributed to the idea of a distinct Turkish Cypriot nationalism. The second part examines the duration of the “shared” Republic¹⁰ (1960 to 1963) followed by the turmoil on Cyprus until the Turkish intervention in 1974. This reveals how the news media and especially radio, reflected a radicalisation of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms divided along party political lines. The third part examines the time from the division of Cyprus until the present. Here, broadcast news media contribute to different national ideologies which benefit different power holders in TRNC.

Wodak’s (2001: 70) “discourse-historical” approach to CDA enables analysts to “detect and depict the disfiguring of facts and realities” by historically contextualising texts. The contextualisation in this chapter enhances an understanding of national discourses and their often subtle yet important differences when the thesis carries out newsroom ethnographies and textual analysis. It is on this information that light is shed on what discursive resources speakers and journalists draw upon, even if they are not aware of these during this time of ideological struggle in defining Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

II. 2 British Colonial Period (1878 to 1960)

II. 2.i Events and Issues leading to Cypriot Independence

Cyprus was part of the Ottoman empire for 300 years with Turks brought over to administer the Greek-speaking indigenous population. When Cyprus was ceded to Britain in 1878, Britain promised its return when an imminent Russian threat to Turkey subsided. However, due to Ottoman support for the Germans in the First World War, Britain reneged on its promises, annexing the island in 1914 (Gazioğlu, 2000: 130). During the First World War, many Turkish Cypriots, who were descendents of Turkish administrators, emigrated to Turkey as Britain treated them harshly as Ottoman allies. After the war, despite the Russian threat subsiding, Britain officially annexed Cyprus in 1923.

¹⁰ This thesis refers to the time between 1960 and 1963 as the “shared” Republic because this is the only time governance of a united Republic of Cyprus involved both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Cypriots considered the British occupation temporary. The Greek Cypriot population claimed Cyprus belonged to them since they were the majority. They saw themselves as part of the Hellenic world. Alternatively, Turkish Cypriots believed Cyprus would be returned to Turkey one day as agreed with the Ottomans. Both communities were convinced they were Cyprus's rightful heirs.

Britain's divide-and-rule policies during this colonial period stoked conflicting nationalisms and emphasised segregation (Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Richmond 1998). For example, the British segregated schools, separating Greeks and Turks. Britain also encouraged the immigration of significant numbers of Greeks and Turks with nationalist sympathies. This fostered conflicting patriotisms, emphasised ethnic segregation, but also aroused anti-colonial sentiments. The Greek community, with the Orthodox Church, instigated a campaign of civil disobedience in 1931. Subsequent rioting resulted in ten Greek Cypriots being deported by the British authorities and the suspension of both the constitution and Greek and Turkish flags (Beratlı, 1999: 106-110). From this time until 1955, Turkish and Greek Cypriots co-existed relatively peacefully, though intercommunal tension "lurked ominously beneath the superficial calm" (Richmond, 1998: 70). In fact, the two communities co-inhabited the whole island until 1964.

A popular form of Greek Cypriot nationalism was *Enosis*, which is unification with motherland Greece. Their outlet was the *National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA)*. *EOKA* began with a series of attacks in 1955. Attacks against the British administration between 1955 and 1958, like the bombings of the *Cyprus Radio Station* and the *Military Radio Station*, later became attacks aimed at Turkish Cypriots (Gazioğlu, 1998a: 71). *EOKA*'s activities affected not only Cyprus and Greece, but by the Greek government actively supporting *Enosis*, "the seeds of future conflict with Turkey" were sown (Richmond, 1998: 71).

Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged later encouraged by the British to counter *Enosis* (ibid: 73). This included the arming of a paramilitary police force made up of Turkish Cypriots. In 1957, due partly to *EOKA*'s activities, the British

announced that Cyprus would become conditionally independent (ibid.: 74). Britain was to disengage from Cyprus politically, but not militarily. This allowed Britain to maintain its military bases.

The Turkish minority were completely excluded from negotiations for independence resulting in riots by Turkish Cypriots and the establishment on 1 August 1958 of the *Türk Mukavemet Teshkilati* (Turkish Resistance Movement or *TMT*) (ibid.: 73). The aims of the *TMT* were to provide security and protection from *EOKA*, educate Turkish Cypriots, and promote *Taksim* (Özcan, Özdemir and Sağduyu, 1983; Gazioğlu, 2003). *Taksim* aimed for division of Cyprus between the two motherlands Turkey and Greece.

The London Agreement was signed on 19 February 1959 and the structure for the semi-independent Republic of Cyprus was drawn (Gazioğlu, 2000: 94). The plans had more to do with external than internal considerations. Cyprus was seen as essential for NATO, being its eastern-most flank. It was considered too important strategically to be entirely independent. Importantly, British bases with US listening posts remained. Mallinson (2005: 2) claims,

After the USA came to regard Cyprus as a geostrategic necessity, a totally sovereign Cyprus was out of the question, both for the USA and Britain, whatever the inhabitants thought.

II. 2.ii Media's role in establishing Turkish Cypriot nationalism

From their start in 1879 to the present, newspapers for the Turkish speaking population have been political tools, mapping out a Turkish Cypriot community distinct and mostly in opposition to Greek Cyprus. The ways these have been distinct have been differently formulated at different times and by different voices. Throughout the colonial period, newspapers were all linked to political movements, parties and ideas (Azgın, 1996: 642).

During this time, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was seen by most Turkish Cypriots as part of a wider pan-Turkish nationalism. For example, the owner and chief editor of *Zaman*, first issued in December 1891, also owned "Kiraathane-i Osmaniye" (The Ottoman Club). This political organisation was founded as a

reaction to 'The Cyprus Club'¹¹ with the aim, "to repel their [Greek] attacks against the Turkish community" (ibid.). According to Dedeçay (1988: 18), *Zaman's* manifesto was to fight against English colonialism, Greek newspapers' views on the Cyprus issue, and *Enosis*, to propagate Turkish Cypriot views and to ensure Turkish language and society survived in Cyprus.

Another early newspaper was *Yeni Zaman* whose political stance was "Cyprus legally belonged to the Ottoman state and should be returned to its legal owner – the sooner the better" (Dedeçay in Azgın, 1996: 643). *Kıbrıs* newspaper's aim was "to fight against the Greek press, to render a service to the Turkish culture and Turkish people, to support the Young Turk movement, and to avoid writing false news" (ibid.).

Clearly, the aims of these early newspapers reflect variations of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which saw itself as part of Turkey and opposed to Greek Cypriots and the British. The colonial government closed down newspapers when they were too critical of British policies. Despite these setbacks, Turkish Cypriot newspapers continued.

Due to disruptive actions by Greek Cypriots who began to challenge British colonial rule in 1931, clauses were added to the Press law which gave the colonial administration powers to cancel or suspend newspapers. Azgın (1996: 647) notes that journalists were not allowed to write about controversial public issues. Yet despite these restrictions, Turkish Cypriot newspapers continued to be politically charged. For example, "newspapers like *Soz* which insisted on carrying articles with nationalistic flavour, were temporarily closed (with the responsible editors sent to prison)" (ibid.).

Azgın (1996: 648) observes that another newspaper named *Ses*,

[...] touched upon a substantial number of important problems of the Turkish community in Cyprus, such as education, migration, women's rights, the debts of the peasants, and the approaching war danger in Europe.

¹¹ 'The Cyprus Club' was a Greek Cypriot political organisation which promoted the idea of *Enosis*.

Between the two world wars, newspapers continued to produce content that depicted Turkish Cyprus mostly as part of mainland Turkey and opposed to Greek Cyprus and Britain.

Newspapers began to become more party-political as the century reached its halfway point. Despite this trend, newspapers continued the pattern of being Turkish nationalistic by representing the Turkish Cypriot nation as part of motherland Turkey, and opposed to its Greek Cypriot counterpart. *Halkın Sesi*, established in 1942, became the voice of the owner Fazıl Kuçuk (the first and only Turkish Cypriot vice-president of the shared Republic) and his political party, Milli Parti. One of its policies was for *Taksim*, division of the island between Turkey and Greece. Azgın (1996: 649) attributes *Halkın Sesi* with being:

[...] instrumental in the promotion and spreading of Turkish nationalism, especially after the uprising of the Greek Cypriot national movement *EOKA* in 1955 and *EOKA-B* in the 1960 and 1970s.

Nacak, which started publication in 1959 was owned by Rauf Denktaş, a leading member of the *Federation of the Turkish Associations* at the time and future president of TRNC. It used militant, agitated language, representing a Turkish nationalist view and was regarded as the mouthpiece for the Turkish resistance movement *TMT* (Dedeçay, 1988: 71). So the pattern of newspapers articulating discourses which defined a Turkish Cypriot and Turkish mainland 'us' group and a Greek Cypriot and British 'them' group continued through editorial policies, though emphasis differed depending on political alliances and interests.

Like other British colonies, radio was established in 1948 by and for the British military (Dedeçay, 1988: 45). It initially broadcasted half an hour a day of Greek programming and Turkish programmes were broadcasted twice a week for half an hour. *Cyprus Radio* was established a few years later in 1952. According to Kannaouros (2004: 2), the project was initiated to promote the colonial government's policies. The *Cyprus Broadcasting Service* started broadcasting in 1953. Programming was in Greek, Turkish and English reflecting the size and needs of the communities. News bureaus were established in every city and small town in Cyprus. These bureaus provided Cypriot news which made up

some 45 percent of all programming (Dedeçay, 1988: 49). In 1955, EOKA bombed CBS but programming continued.

Cyprus Television started in 1957. Again, the British used it to promote its economic and cultural existence in Cyprus (ibid.: 76). In 1959, the television and radio service became the *Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (CyBC)*. Broadcast media promoted Britain's vision of Cyprus; that is, a Cyprus led by the British with two distinct "peoples" in order to maintain its hold on power. So, television, like radio and newspapers, served the interests of their owners, none of which promoted a single Cypriot nation for Cypriots.

II. 3 The Republic of Cyprus to Turkish Intervention (1960 to 1974)

II.3.i Events and Issues leading to military intervention

On 15 August 1960, after two years of negotiations between Turkey, Greece, Cypriot leaders and Britain, the British disengaged politically and the Republic of Cyprus was declared. However, there were many conditions for independence. For example, the Treaty of Guarantee, one of the agreements for independence, ensured that Britain, Greece and Turkey were allowed to intervene in Cyprus in order to maintain the Republic.¹² Britain secured its prized sovereign military bases and access to all military installations on Cyprus. There was also a rejection of *Enosis* and *Taksim* by each community and their respective mainlands, as well as constitutional safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot minority. These safeguards included a Turkish Cypriot vice-president and Turkish Cypriot quotas in government and public service positions. The president was Greek Cypriot Archbishop Makarios II and the vice-president was Turkish Cypriot Dr. Fazıl Küçük.

Unfortunately, the constitution seemed doomed to failure. Despite British, Greek and Turkish influences, Makarios was reluctant to sign the constitution, didn't

¹² Downloaded 20.04.09 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Guarantee.

support it and failed to create a stable government. His goal was to achieve *Enosis* and he saw the Republic as a stepping stone towards this aim.

Mallinson (2005: 109) describes a radical nationalism in both communities that made a constitutional crisis inevitable. The Greek Cypriot leadership and many Greek Cypriots wanted *Enosis*. Many Turkish Cypriots and their leadership wanted *Taksim*. Both nationalisms stressed their respective motherland's importance and a lack of importance to a shared Cyprus. The new regime soon reached deadlock which caused both communities to pass separate laws and led to the emergence of a violent underground militia. Even during this time of a shared Republic, both sides envisaged very different ideas of Cypriot nationalism.

Regionally, undermining the constitution, *EOKA*, Greece and Turkey all sought to dominate Cyprus at the expense of its Turkish and Greek populations. This interference gave rise to a real possibility of war between Greece and Turkey on several occasions. Only through American diplomacy was it avoided. The West did not want war because it would threaten the eastern-most wing of NATO. A weakened NATO would play into the hands of Russia, the feared enemy of the West during these cold war days. Russia had interests in Cyprus by supplying arms. More Russian influence in the area was not desirable.

During the time of the shared Republic (1960 to 1963), the Greek Cypriot majority in parliament tried to change the 70:30 power sharing agreement. Meanwhile, *EOKA* applied pressure on Turkish Cypriots in the form of violent attacks (Alasya, 1987: 23). This culminated in President Makarios' proposal to change the constitution on 30 November 1963 "which would abrogate power-sharing arrangements" between the two communities¹³, thereby diminishing the powers of Turkish Cypriots (Lacher and Kaymak 2005:152; TCHRC: 23).

Richmond (1998: 79) suggests that through these changes,

Makarios was pursuing a policy of limited violence in order to obtain recourse to the UN and to nullify the voice of Turkish Cypriots, have the

¹³ Downloaded 23.04.08 from <http://bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/fi/world/europe/countryprofiles/1021835.stm>.

Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee abrogated and so gain complete independence.

With independence and no voice for Turkish Cypriots, *Enosis* could be achieved (ibid: 78).

The proposed changes were rejected by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey (Bahçeli, 1998: 103-104). This rejection paved the way to an escalation of violent attacks in Nicosia by Greek Cypriots (Gazıođlu, 2003: 415). A ceasefire was supervised by British troops from the sovereign bases "as fighting in Cyprus threatened Britain's strategic interests in the region" (Richmond, 1998: 78). On 26 December 1963, the 'Green Line' in Nicosia was drawn and patrolled by British troops. From this time onwards, Nicosia has been a divided city. In 1964, the UNFICYP force took over from British troops who returned to their sovereign bases and have not been called on since.

On 1 January 1964, with Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians absent, Makarios abolished the power-sharing agreements. Turkish Cypriots abandoned their homes, villages and jobs for the relative safety of Turkish Cypriot ghettos or "enclaves".¹⁴ These enclaves were under the control of the Turkish resistance group *TMT* and beyond the control of the government. The move to enclaves ensured residents' security against continued violence and satisfied pressure from Turkish Cypriot hard-liners who wanted a complete withdrawal from cooperation with Greek Cypriots. Enclaves effectively divided the island and "implied that Turkish Cypriots also wanted to change the 1960 constitution and effect greater political and practical separation" (ibid.: 79).

Between 1963 and 1967, Turkish Cypriot enclaves evolved into a distinct political entity under the auspices of the *General Committee* (Özcan, Özdemir, Sađduyu, 1983: 179). Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriots were prevented from taking up their positions in the Republic's government unless they accepted Makarios's constitutional changes. They did not return. The Greek Cypriot government, paralysed by its constitution which stipulated Turkish Cypriot participation,

¹⁴ See Appendix 1-A for a map of Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

appealed to the UN for help. The UN obliged by recognising the Greek Cypriot-led government on 4 March 1964 as the only legitimate government in Cyprus. This remains the case to this day.

In 1967, the UN and US stopped Turkey from invading Cyprus in return for Greece removing its troops from Cyprus. Greek troops left, tensions relaxed and Turkey prepared to intervene. Both sides agreed to intercommunal talks in June 1968 and UN troop numbers were reduced.

On 18 July 1970, the Turkish Cypriot leadership declared the *Cyprus Autonomous Turkish Administration* (Alasya, 1987: 74). The administration continued to govern until the establishment of the *Turkish Federated State* in 1975 (Ismail, 1998). The formation of these administrations demonstrate Turkish Cypriots' desires to distinguish themselves from their Greek Cypriot counterparts.

In 1973, inter-communal violence escalated again. Greece and the West wanted to maintain close relations with Cyprus to maintain its NATO-friendly eastern flank. However, Makarios upset the West by purchasing arms from Russia and the US-friendly Greek junta's relationship with Makarios fell to new depths. The result was a Greek-backed military coup on 15 July 1974 with "a strong dose of secret American connivance" (Mallinson, 2005: 118). Makarios fled to London. Coup leader and Greek *EOKA* fighter, Nicos Sampson, took control of Cyprus. Again inter-communal violence erupted.

Turkish Cypriots appealed to Turkey for help due to the escalation in violence. After unsuccessful UN talks, Turkey intervened on 20 July 1974 and again on 14 August 1974. The coup was one reason given for Turkish military intervention (BBC, downloaded 18.02.08; Lacher and Kaymak 2005; Mallinson 2005). Mallinson (2005: 119) notes,

The clumsy 'Sampson' coup in July 1974 gave Turkey not merely an excuse to land on Cyprus, but a reason to do so, invoking Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee.

Turkish troops advanced from the north of the island until they had secured 37 percent of Cyprus. Where they stopped, the border between the Republic and present-day TRNC was drawn.¹⁵

11.3.ii Media's contribution to a radical Turkish Cypriot nationalism

Newspapers were used as political tools that produced content about a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation, aligned to the views of political parties. This was especially pronounced during the time of Turkish enclaves (1963 to 1974). For example, *Zafer*, published between 1965 and 1969, backed the nationalist views of the Turkish military leadership and “took on itself the duty of exalting the personality cult around Denktaş and criticised the policies of Küçük” (Azgın, 1996: 653). *Savaş* (1968-1973) became the mouthpiece for the CTP party and *Zaman* (1973-1979) became the organ for the Turkish nationalist UBP.

Before the crisis of 1963, radio, run by the pro-*Enosis* government of Makarios, was seen as essential for propaganda purposes for the new Republic (Dedeçay, 1988: 79). However, instead of creating harmony between the two communities, broadcast media created division. Panayiotou (2006: 30) writes,

The emergence of the electronic media played a decisive role in the development of division between the two communities, to such a degree that these media incorporated the previous dominant medium (print) as their ‘content’.

According to the 1960 constitution, 30 percent of personnel and programming at CyBC had to be Turkish Cypriot. This gave Turkish Cypriots a voice on radio and television. However, on 22 December 1963, with the collapse of the shared Republic, Turkish Cypriots were forced to abandon their places at CyBC.

Though Turkish programming continued (and still does), it was (and still is) prepared by Greek Cypriots, giving control of broadcasting exclusively to Greek Cypriots. This monopoly on broadcasting was short-lived due to the priorities of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Azgın (1996: 657) notes:

¹⁵ See Appendix 1-B for a map of Cyprus with the border between TRNC and the Republic.

A radio station was one of the predominant tasks of the Turkish leadership. On 25 December, 1963 the voice of Bayrak (Flag) Radyo was heard for the first time.

Two weeks after the start of *Bayrak Radyo*, *Halkın Sesi* newspaper (14 January 1964: 2) through overly charged language, described the propagation of Turkish radio stations:

When the last conflict appeared in Cyprus, another stupid action was made by the Greeks to dominate the government radio station and to make it a Greek Propaganda machine. Certainly, Greeks thought, simplymindedly, that the Turkish Cypriot community would be deprived of the opportunity to announce their voice by means of radio. But they were amazed to learn that Turks formed not only one but four radio stations that spread over the whole island.

During the time of Turkish enclaves, six radio stations were established and controlled by the Turkish *TMT* (Azgın, 1996: 657; Sayıl, 2000: 5). They were known as *Sancak* stations, named after 'Sancaktir', a commander of the *TMT* (Dedeçay, 1988: 56). They aimed to make the outside world aware of the existence of the Turkish Cypriot struggle, counter propaganda produced by *CyBC*, inform Turkish Cypriots about political issues and *TMT*'s policies, lift morale, and entertain (Sayıl 2000; Dedeçay 1988; Atun 2000). One of these stations was *Canbulat Magusa* radio. Atun (2000: 4) describes the role of the station:

Programmes of *Canbulat* radio were a unique source of entertainment for Turkish Cypriots during the war, where there was not any connection with other regions. *Magusa Canbulat Radio* did not only give political news, but also included cultural, artistic, and humourous programmes and these programmes provided Turkish Cypriots' social dynamism and morale.

One worker at *Canbulat Magusa* radio, Ismet Kotak, announced the aims of the station on its first day of broadcasting, 10 February, 1964. An extract from the text reads:

Because of the gaining speed of events and the increase in the number of broadcasts, which aim to wear Turkish Cypriots out, establishment of a radio in *Magusa* was inevitable. One needs a friend, who will lighten the way for his or her opinion against the made up news that are communicated by hypocritical people (in Çatal, 2003).

This announcement of aims demonstrates how Turkish Cypriot radio from 1963 onwards defined and shaped the concept of a Turkish Cypriot community, distinct from and opposing its Greek Cypriot counterpart through news and cultural programming.

II.4 Division (1974) to Present

II.4.i Events and Issues contributing to diverse Turkish Cypriot nationalisms

The Sampson coup in Cyprus only lasted a few days and democracy was restored. President Makarios did not return from London immediately, but spent five months securing international recognition of his administration as the only government in Cyprus.¹⁶ Though this was achieved, when Makarios returned, the Turkish Cypriot community was separated from its Greek counterpart by the Turkish military.

In the north, almost immediately after Turkish troops took control of 37 percent of the island, Turkish nationalist political leader Rauf Denktaş formed the UBP, which claimed that 'no solution was a solution' (Richmond, 1998: 135). On 13 February 1975, Denktaş unilaterally declared the *Turkish Federated State*, reportedly as a temporary governmental measure until a new agreement with the Republic could be reached. Though this announcement received popular support from Turkish Cypriots (TCHR: 42: Alasya: 261), their provisional state was only recognised by Turkey. International trade embargoes and political isolation were announced by the UN.

The UN found itself fighting a losing battle in negotiations. The Secretary-General called for a federal solution, but Turkish Cypriots questioned the merits of a federation now that they had a separate state, and Greek Cypriots were not in favour, as they were already recognised internationally as the only legitimate power on Cyprus. Both sides continued talks with the UN for self interest; hopes

¹⁶ Downloaded 20.09.09 from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archbishop_Makarios#Makarios_and_the_Cyprus_problem_.281964.E2.80.931977.29

of recognition for the Turks and maintaining the Cyprus issue on the world agenda for the Greeks.

From division until the present, there have been numerous peace processes and proposals with some agreement reached. In March 1977, both sides agreed that Cyprus should become an independent, non-aligned, bicomunal, federal republic. This was seen as a compromise by both sides: Turks giving up their dream of a state independent of the Greek Republic and Greeks giving up their desires for greater control of Cyprus to achieve *Enosis*.

Throughout the seventies and eighties, the Turkish community integrated closer with Turkey as the economy of the north worsened due to embargoes and political isolation. This integration was promoted by TRNC President Rauf Denktaş and the Turkish government, whose relationship was (and still is) close. This integration led to an increase in Turkey's influence in TRNC. It also costed Turkey, which financially supported (and still supports) TRNC.

TRNC's lack of recognition and UN blame for a lack of progress in UN-brokered talks contributed to Denktaş proclaiming independence from the Republic on 15 November 1983 (Richmond, 1998: 164). The Turkish government was angered (at least officially) by the proclamation, though it was the only nation to recognise the new state. The international response has been political, economic and social embargoes and isolation.

The Republic applied to join the European Community in July 1990. Richmond (1998:201) claims the government "now appeared openly to pin [their] hopes on entry into the European Union (EU) to give [them] more leverage, a development that Turkey found somewhat alarming." Turkey now encouraged talks with the UN and officially was willing to accept a confederation, while Denktaş continued to want a confederation or absolute recognition. Positions on both sides of Cyprus hardened, though economic realities produced some cooperation.

Richmond (1998: 227) notes one reason there was no agreement during the nineties was that relative stability was preferred by Cypriots to a settlement with possible compromises. Some in the international community also prefer a lack of

agreement, such as Britain which maintains its military bases with American listening posts (Mallinson, 2005: 5). It is feared that this historic anomaly would be questioned if Cyprus was united. Also, by playing down Turkish demands to maintain a presence on Cyprus, America keeps Turkey as part of its Middle East strategy. And the powerful American arms industry benefits from tensions between Turkey and Greece. Both are supplied with the majority of their arms by American arms companies.

Turkey not only benefits due to division, its military-bureaucratic establishment considers support for TRNC a “national cause” (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005: 148). This “cause” gives the military and political establishment a reason to involve itself in all matters of state. Observers believe the very sovereignty of TRNC is questionable (ibid.), with Turkey playing a major role in all decisions. The TRNC’s questionable autonomy relates not only to policy, but also to top positions in the civil services. For example, the head of the Central Bank is reserved for citizens of Turkey and the police are under the control of the Turkish army.

Because TRNC residents consistently elected Turkish nationalist governments, Turkey’s dominant presence in TRNC and its long-term demand for a “two state confederate solution” could be justified. This situation has changed since 2003.

On 24 April 2004, a referendum was held on both sides of Cyprus for a single Cypriot federation. The Prime Minister of TRNC at the time, Mehmet Ali Talat and his pro-federation CTP party, campaigned in favour of the *Annan plan* while the then President Rauf Denktaş, Turkish nationalists and the Government of Cyprus campaigned against the plan. According to *Halkın Sesi* newspaper, the question voted on was:

Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?

75.8 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against the plan while it was accepted by 64.9 percent of Turks. Greek Cypriots joined the EU on 1 May 2004 despite

rejecting the plan, while isolation and embargoes continue against Turkish Cypriots despite accepting the plan. The EU has attempted to lift some of the restrictions on TRNC, though these moves have mostly been blocked by the Republic.

There are several reasons given for the large discrepancy between the two communities' voting on *Annan*. Mallinson (2005: 189) claims the plan did not succeed in the Republic due to a lack of information, the Republic having already secured EU entry, and aspects of the plan being seen as unfair. Media coverage also played a part, as discussed below. Turkish Cypriot support for the *Annan Plan*, according to Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 154), was due to a re-imagining of community from one of Turkish nationalism to a Turkish Cypriot identity. Papadakis (2005: 249) believes Turkish Cypriots saw the plan as an end to decades of economic and political isolation.

The Turkish government has redefined its position on TRNC since the referendum. This is due as much to Turkish strategic objectives as to TRNC residents' desires. Lacher and Kaymak (2005: 148-149) observe,

As the Turkish government embraced EU membership as Turkey's primary strategic objective, the division of Cyprus was now considered an obstacle, rather than as a strategic goal in its own right.

Turkey has now effectively discarded its long-term demand for a 'two state solution' and accepted the idea of a federation, though it continues to play a key role in all major political matters.

On 24 February 2008, the Republic voted in Dimitris Christofias' pro-federation government. Christofias won on a similar platform to the CTP; that is, prioritising a solution to the Cyprus conflict based on a federation. At his victory ceremony, he pledged, "As of tomorrow, we unite our forces [...] to achieve the reunification of our country."¹⁷ This election victory brought about two pro-federation governments for the first time since division of Cyprus.¹⁸

¹⁷ Downloaded from www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-24-cyprus-elections on 22.08.08.

¹⁸ Subsequent to this research, on 23 April 2009, TRNC voted back in Turkish Nationalist UBP, reducing the pro-federation governments on Cyprus to one again.

11.4.ii Media's contribution to diverse Turkish Cypriot nationalisms

Since division of Cyprus in 1974, newspapers in TRNC have flourished. In 2004, there were eight dailies and five weeklies, representing one of the highest concentrations of newspaper titles per capita anywhere in the world (Vassiliadou, 2007). All newspapers are mouthpieces for political parties, promoting TRNC as a political entity in one form or another. For example, *KIBRIS* newspaper, which was closely linked to pro-federation CTP, actively promoted a 'yes' vote during the run up to the *Annan referendum*. This reflected CTP policies and their aim for a federation with the Republic.¹⁹

Radio in TRNC has seen many changes since division. In 1974, *Sancak* radio was re-organised to become *Bayrak Radyo*. With the introduction of *Bayrak Televizyon* in 1976, the two media were incorporated into *Bayrak Radio-Television Corporation (BRTK)* in 1983. *BRTK* was not granted autonomy from the government, but is directly answerable to the Prime Minister (Article 95 *BRTK Law*).²⁰ The Prime Minister has the right to ban news or broadcasts deemed a threat to 'national security'. It is governed by an executive board of six members and a director appointed by the government and the Turkish Armed Forces. This system results in both a lack of impartiality and changes in personnel and policies with every government change. *BRTK* is also financially dependent on the government. Furthermore, its constitution demands it promotes the TRNC nation (Article 5 *BRTK Law*). The role of *BRTK's* news is to promote a Turkish Cypriot view on events, producing content which depicts a distinct Turkish Cyprus, separate from Greek Cyprus.

In 1997, a new broadcast law introduced by the ruling UBP government ushered in private broadcasting and a new body, the *Broadcast High Commission (Yayın Yüksek Kurulu - YYK)* to oversee broadcasting. All broadcasting, both private and state, fell under the jurisdiction of the *YYK* which establishes frequencies, issues licenses and enforces broadcasting regulations. *YYK* is defined as an

¹⁹ For a list of all TRNC newspapers and their political affiliations, see Appendix two.

²⁰ This is taken from article 95 of TRNC Law No. 50/ 1983 which established *BRTK* downloaded from http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/dir_docs/50-1983.doc on 07.09.09.

'autonomous and impartial public judicial person'.²¹ But again, this body has political links. Its board is made up of eight members appointed by political parties according to their representation in parliament, and one member appointed by the president. So, political parties with power control this aspect of broadcasting.

Due to the influx in private broadcasters, TRNC now has 11 television stations, 29 radio stations, and numerous Turkish mainland radio and TV services. This is for a population of about 200,000. Most private radio and television stations are associated with political parties, the state, the military and universities.²² For example, *Simm FM*'s owner is in the secretariat of the CTP. *Radjo T*'s owner is a leading member of UBP. *Güven FM*'s owner is the Turkish Cypriot national forces, while *Vatan FM* is owned by the Turkish military.²³

Despite this large number of radio and television stations with diverse political interests, almost all TRNC news is sourced from the semi-official *Türk Ajansı Kıbrıs (TAK)* news agency. *TAK* was founded in 1973 with only a single person. It now has over 20 employees. *TAK* offers written news and a photography service aimed mostly at newspapers, though it is used extensively by local broadcasters. In fact, over 90 percent of news that appears in newspapers comes from *TAK*.²⁴ It focuses mainly on activities and statements of TRNC politicians which *TAK* considers "qualifies as news". *TAK* journalists perform three functions. Firstly, they gather TRNC news through announcements of press conferences and events from e-mails, faxes, press releases, sources and phone calls from politicians and non-governmental organisations. Secondly, they gather foreign news from *Reuters* and *Anatolia News Agency*. Thirdly, they send news items to *AP*, *AFP*, *Reuters* and *Anatolia News Agencies*.

TAK's political and economic context suggests it is far from impartial. It is overseen by a seven member board of directors (six at the time of research)

²¹ This is taken from article six of TRNC Law no. 39/1997 which established *YYK* downloaded from <http://www.kktcyyk.org/docs/esas.doc> on 07.09.09.

²² Interview with Erdinç Gündüz, *KTV* and *KFM* General Manager on 20 July 2007.

²³ A list of all stations and their affiliations is provided in appendix three.

²⁴ Interview with Selim Kumbaracı, *TAK* journalist on 12 February 2009.

which consists of two representatives from the government, the director of the *Press and Information Office (PIO)*, the *BRT* general director, the director of *TAK* and a member from the *Gazeteciler Birliđi* (Journalists' Association). All members but one (the Journalists' Association member) are government political appointments. It is financed by the TRNC government and subscription fees. This political and economic context ensures *TAK* is pro-government. During the time of this research, the government was pro-federation CTP.

However, it is too simplistic to claim *TAK* simply reflects the CTP. *TAK* is just one part of the Turkish Cypriot civil service built up by 40 years of Turkish and UBP nationalist rule. According to Bekır Azgın²⁵, the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot civil services are nationalistic. Azgın said:

Our civil service was, for years, shaped according to ideology and not according to knowledge or ability. So was *TAK*. The yeast is nationalistic and you could see its traces during the CTP era in all spheres. Moreover the military has the ability to influence groups of people even if they are not represented somewhere. Turkish military officers, unlike their western colleagues, 'know everything' and they know what is best. So they have the right to shape the society.

Although *TAK* at the time of this research promoted pro-federation CTP and its activities, it also retained Turkish nationalist sympathies, like the rest of the civil service. In short, its dependence on the government, and choice of content, again suggest a political agenda reflecting political interests in TRNC.

Politics play a direct role in media, as outlined above, but media also play a role in TRNC politics. For example, media reflected their political alliances in the relatively recent acceptance and failure of the *Annan referendum* on both sides of Cyprus. The UN-brokered *Annan referendum* was a simultaneous referendum throughout Cyprus which asked whether residents wanted a single federation. It failed because the Republic rejected it, even though TRNC accepted it.

In TRNC, large media, such as the *KIBRIS Media Group* amongst others, supported the *Annan plan referendum*. News output on their radio and television

²⁵ Interview with Bekır Azgın on 25 May 2009, professor of Journalism at Eastern Mediterranean University and author of numerous academic articles about TRNC and Cypriot media.

services increased significantly and their content was purposely written in favour of the CTP and a 'yes' vote to the *Annan plan*.²⁶ *KIBRIS*'s news output may have been one of many factors which resulted in a strong 'yes' vote in TRNC.

Alternatively, the Republic voted strongly against the *Annan plan*. Panayiotou (2006: 31) claims the Greek-Cypriot media's nationalist leanings were used in the run-up to the referendum. The media used "manipulation", "censorship" and promoted selective news "to create the climate for a 'resounding no'" (ibid.). A majority of the media created a spectacle of struggle which "hid the reality that Greek Cypriots were also saying 'no' because they did not want to lose the monopoly of the state" (ibid.). This recent and brief example illustrates how media are used by power holders, their content reflecting power holders' interests, sometimes at the expense of Cypriot interests.

II.5 Conclusion

Some theorists in CDA have pointed to the importance of setting out an historic context, otherwise text analysis appears out of social and historical context (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; van Leeuwen 1993). The above historical contextualisation aids in understanding the institutions, practices, texts and discourses now found in TRNC radio.

This chapter has revealed how the conflict in Cyprus is a complex issue, involving many parties' interests. Mallinson (2005: 5) claims on a communal level, the majority has taken over the title of the government, while the minority has retaliated by declaring a separate state. In Turkish Cyprus, expressions of self-determination, independent from the Republic yet closely aligned to Turkey, have resulted in numerous forms of governance. On a regional level, two opposing powers see Cyprus as a key part of their military and political strategy against each other. On a wider international level, many participants benefit, including the American arms industry and the governments of Turkey, America, and Britain.

²⁶ Interview with *KFM* news presenter Aysu Basri February 2008.

TRNC news media have historically exacerbated the conflict by producing content which depicts diverse, yet mostly Turkish nationalist, views about Cyprus. These are not uniform expressions and allegiances in news media, but internally fractured, politically differentiated and changing through time. The language used in TRNC news analysed later can only be understood as part the historical processes outlined in this chapter.

III Nationalism

III.1 Introduction

Theoretical and empirical work has described nations as mental constructs or 'imagined communities' rather than the popular notion that nations are 'natural' group identities rooted in antiquity (McLaughlin 2001; Smith 1999, 1995; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm 1997, 1996; Billig 1996; Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983). Such group identification is a relatively recent construct (ibid.). Attention has also been drawn to the central role media play in the construction and maintenance of this idea of nation and national membership in the minds of the public. It is this idea of the constructed nation and the role of the media in this process that can be usefully used to characterise the processes of construction and legitimisation of national discourses in TRNC generally and specifically in the role played by radio news.

The first part of this chapter explores the historically-constructed nature of nations, people's imagining of nations and reasons for its rise to prominence. The second part of this chapter examines media's role in how nations emerged as a concept and how they are currently maintained. Particular attention is given to Billig's (1991) idea of 'banal' nationalism. This concept highlights the important role language in media plays in nationalism, such as defining 'us' and 'them' groups. Others concur that creating national in-groups and out-groups is an important linguistic strategy used by media (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Billig 1996). The creation of national 'us' and 'them' groups in language used in radio news is explored in great detail in this thesis's textual analysis chapters.

Ideas and concepts explored in the first two parts of the chapter are considered when examining the contested area of Turkish Cypriot nationalism in part three. Firstly, the emergence and development of Turkish Cypriot nationalisms and their

associated discourses are explored. Then the two dominant national ideologies in TRNC which are currently struggling for dominance are described in detail. These national ideologies provide the context through which this thesis's ethnographic and textual analyses are carried out. The way various powers in TRNC use language to construct and 'imagine' the nation is a factor in how radio stations reflect these imaginings in their news. These reflections are presented to TRNC residents and all have their political ramifications.

III. 2 The Ideology of Nation

III.2.i Nations' constructed nature

It has been demonstrated that nations are a recent historically constructed form of group identity (McLaughlin, 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Billig, 1995; Hobsbawm, 1997, 1996, 1993a; Anderson, 1991; Gellner 1983).

One relatively recent development in society which relies on nationalism is industrialisation. Gellner (1983: 35) writes the development of nationalism and industrialisation are closely linked. Industrialisation needs "universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication", so there is a homogenisation of culture across previously heterogeneous areas. Low cultures are swept aside and a replication of a standard high culture takes their places.

Gellner (1983: 55) explains:

When general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify.

Hobsbawm (1993a: 14) concurs with Gellner by demonstrating that modern nations are not rooted in remotest antiquity, but "what makes up the modern nation is made up of fairly recent symbols, or national histories and invented traditions." Symbols, histories and traditions have been embellished and invented for ends beneficial to those in power "to establish continuity with a suitable historic past" (ibid.: 1). Trevor-Roper (1993) demonstrates how the Scottish tartan was invented for the benefit of a few manufacturers, while

McLaughlin (2001) notes mythical stories of the past in Ireland were invented to promote various versions of Irish nationalism.

The constructed nature of nations includes creating attachments to a homeland. MacLaughlin (2001: 129-130) illustrates this in nineteenth century Irish nation-building. Billig (1995: 75) makes the following analogy about national feelings of territorial integrity:

Losing a part of the imagined homeland is worse than merely losing an ear: in the case of territory, the lost ear always turns up on someone else's face.

National construction also involves constructing a world of nations (ibid.: 83).

Within a world of nations, each nation is unique in time and space. This suggests differences between those 'in' one's nation and those 'outside' of one's nation. Billig (1995:61) observes a national identity,

[...] include(s) ways of conceiving of 'us, the nation', which is said to have its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of 'them, the foreigners', from whom 'we' identify 'ourselves' as different.

This idea of difference, of 'us' and 'them', is a defining factor in the construction of different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms.

III.2.i.a 'Hot' and 'Banal' nationalism

Importantly, Billig (1995) explores how the nation-state and nationalism, which have become ideological norms, are maintained in established states. For this, he distinguishes between 'hot' and 'banal' nationalism.

'Hot' nationalism is associated with struggles to create new states or extreme right-wing politics. 'Hot' national passions arise in times of social disruption, are reflected in extreme social movements and are used by existing nations in times of crisis and celebration.

But 'hot' nationalism, in the form of occasional events bracketed off from ordinary life, is not sufficient to sustain national identities. Nationalism is on-going with flags and national anthems recounted when needed. This is the role of 'banal' nationalism which is the continual, numerous, mindless, unconscious, daily

reminding of citizens' national place in a world of nations. Billig (1995: 38) exemplifies 'banal' nationalism by,

The national flag, hanging outside a public building or decorating a filling-station forecourt [...] thousand upon thousands of such flags each day hang limply in public places.

'Banal' nationalism is also achieved through lexical choices in news and sporting events. It provides a continual background for political leaders' texts and cultural products such as newspapers. These constantly remind 'us' of 'our' nationality (ibid.: 8), discursively creating national 'us' groups, distinct from those outside the nation.

III.2.ii National imaginings and their origins

Anderson (1991) describes nations as "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (ibid.: 5-6). The idea that the nation is a mental construct is an idea shared by many theorists and researchers across a range of academic fields (McLaughlin 2001; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Hobsbawm 1997, 1996; Billig 1996).

Anderson believes nations are imagined because despite members of the nation not knowing all fellow members, "[...] in the mind of each lives the image of their communion." Nations are imagined as limited, with borders beyond which are other nations. The nation is imagined as sovereign; that is, a territory which is free to govern itself. Each nation is imagined as a community with shared interests and characteristics, despite all the inequalities that in fact exist within them.

These national imagined group identities have taken on the form of modern nation-states. Anderson identifies two related factors which brought them about in Europe. Firstly, with scepticism about religions and Latin losing favour over vernacular languages in Europe's religious communities, a process of fragmentation, pluralisation and territorialisation gave rise to nationalism.

Hobsbawm (1993b: 268-269) points out that “[w]ith the demise of church and monarchy, an alternative ‘civic religion’ had to be constructed.”

The second factor was print-capitalism. Anderson (1991: 38) observes that with the demise of Latin and the saturation of the small Latin-reading market, publishers from 1500 to 1600 produced the bible using vernaculars which created large new reading publics. The many existing language types were assembled into far fewer print languages. This activity made publishing more profitable and “created the possibility of a new form of imagined community” (ibid.: 46).

These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three ways. Firstly, print created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the vernaculars. People with similar languages shared the same information, ideas, mediated experiences and interpretations of information. Secondly, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language. This helped to build the image of antiquity central to the idea of the nation. Thirdly, print-capitalism created languages of power. Certain dialects which were ‘closer’ to print languages became dominant, while other dialects were demoted or died out.

By the eighteenth century, Hobsbawm (1997: 94) notes that print capitalism and the use of certain administrative languages resulted in languages of mass spoken communication. This century also saw newspapers and novels which “re-present[ed]’ the *kind* of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 1991: 24-25).

In nineteenth century Europe, schools, universities and the press championed nationalism (MacLaughlin, 2001; Hobsbawm, 1993; Anderson, 1991).

MacLaughlin (2001: 9) illustrates how ‘organic intelligentsia’ in Ireland, both nationalists and unionists, “struggled relentlessly” to convince both Protestants and Catholics that their best interests lay with their respective leaders (ibid.: 9).

The First World War brought an end to high dynasties and nation-states became the norm. After the Second World War, new nation-states (mainly non-European) copied their European counterparts. The mass media, education

systems and administrative regulations all contribute to the hegemonic concept of the nation-state. Anderson (1991: 135) claims,

Above all, the very idea of 'nation' is now nestled firmly in virtually all print-languages; and nation-ness is virtually inseparable from political consciousness.

III.3 Media's Roles in Nations

Media's roles are central to the nation. These roles can be divided into two main activities: nation-building and nation-maintaining. Both are evident in TRNC radio news.

III.3.i Nation-building

Anderson (1991: 34) describes the newspaper as an "extreme form of the book", being very popular and binding imagined national communities together. The act of citizens simultaneously reading newspapers each day at specific times instills a feeling of nation in its readers. Newspaper reading is individual,

Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence, he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion (ibid.: 35).

Newspaper readers witness others reading the same newspaper and are "continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life" (ibid.: 35-36).

MacLaughlin (2001) demonstrates the importance of the press in nation-building. It was essential in the creation of the two ideas of nation in Ireland (Catholic Ireland and Protestant Ulster). Since the nineteenth century, newspapers allowed wealthy farmers from both communities to defend their right to control the economy and manage the country's affairs in their interest, not those of the landed elites. MacLaughlin (2001: 193) notes these views in newspapers "provided the communicative cement" which linked together the bourgeoisie "binding them to their communities in great 'reading coalitions'." MacLaughlin (2001: 195) writes these 'coalitions' provided a new form of community by:

[...] putting ordinary people 'in touch' with each other, and by permitting them to have a common sense of history and a complimentary image of themselves either as 'Irish people' or as 'successful' Ulster Unionists.

Broadcast media also contribute to nation-building. Anderson (1991:135, 327) sites radio and television as "print allies" in conjuring up imagined communities. Martin-Barbero (1997) believes film and radio in the 1940s gave people from virtually all Latin American countries their first taste of nation by giving them common experiences. Colombia's national experience is described as:

Before the appearance and growth of radio, the country was a patchwork of regions, each separate and isolated [...] radio allowed the country to experience an invisible national unity, a cultural identity shared simultaneously by the people of the coast, Antioquia, Pasto, Santander and Bogota (ibid.: 51).

Moore (2000) believes broadcast media furthered the idea of nation in Britain through simultaneous reception, similar to newspaper reading described by Anderson. Describing British broadcasting before cable and satellite, Moore (2000: 40) writes,

Programmes were heard or seen live by absent millions who were dispersed in their domestic settings. They were thereby invited to identify with a wider 'general public' - to imagine themselves as members of a national community which was then reproduced by TV and radio day in day out, week in week out, and year in year out.

The twentieth century saw the press, cinema and radio not only propagate national ideologies through blatant propaganda, but more significantly through the use of symbols. Hobsbawm (1997: 142) believes,

[...] deliberate propaganda was almost certainly less significant than the ability of the mass media to make what were in effect national symbols part of the life of every individual [...]

For example, symbols such as the British royal family in their Royal Christmas broadcast have made them an icon of Britain. Sportsmen and teams play an important symbolic role:

The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his nation himself (ibid.: 143).

II.3.ii Nation-maintaining

Though Billig like Anderson believes the nation is an imagined community, he differs in the role he assigns to the media. The media do more than create a feeling of national community through the simultaneous consumption of media products. The language used in media also contributes. Billig (1995: 125) observes:

They [the media] operate directly, through their messages, stereotypes and deictics, rather than [...] a perceived feeling of similarity.

Many agree that language in media plays important roles in nations and researching language is a way to access discourses of nationalism (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999).

Billig describes media's role in nations in terms of 'banal' nationalism. The media produce 'banal' nationalism in two ways. Firstly, the speeches of politicians reproduce cliches of nationhood. Politicians reach millions on a daily basis through the media. Secondly, the media (like politicians) choose words which continually point to the audience's home as the national homeland. Politicians and media discursively construct a national 'us' and a foreign 'them', defining who is included in 'our' nation. Billig (1995: 11) observes that newspapers daily address their readers as members of the nation within a world of nations.

This banal discursive construction is achieved by employing a routine 'deixis' continually pointing audiences to the national homeland. Deixis is a form of rhetorical pointing. It is how words are anchored to aspects of their contexts of utterances (ibid.: 106). This deixis is on-going, so we are unmindfully reminded of who 'we' are and where 'we' are; 'our' national identity. Billig (1995: 109) writes, "In this way national identity is a routine way of talking and listening; it is a form of life [...]".

'Banal' nationalism operates with prosaic, routine words which take nations for granted (ibid.: 94). The nation is constructed using the first person plural such as 'we', and 'us' and spatial deixis such as 'this' and 'here'. 'The' in phrases such as

'the people', 'the nation', even 'the weather' all play their part. Billig (ibid.) observes,

In English, the definite article is continually playing its quiet part in a routine 'deixis', which banally points out 'the' homeland.

Likewise, those not in the nation are constructed in the third person. Billig (1995: 78) notes, "There can be no 'us' without a 'them'." To conceive of 'us' the nation, one must also imagine communities of foreigners "from whom 'we' identify 'ourselves' as different." These lexical strategies identified by Billig which contribute to 'banal' nationalism are examined in this thesis's textual analysis of TRNC radio news.

The creation of 'us' and 'them' groups when discursively constructing the nation is explored by others. Millas (2006: 16) found the Greek and Turkish press exploit this strategy by creating national 'us' groups opposed to the 'other'. Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999:2) note that "identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the creation of difference." An "image of an enemy" is essential for the imagining of a nation. They claim national identities emphasise national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity, ignoring intra-national difference. In the case of TRNC news, 'othering' the Republic and constructing a homogenous Turkish Cypriot 'us' group are two common strategies used.

There are other discursive strategies used by media in constructing nationalism. Flowerdew and Leong (2007) examine the role of metaphors in the discursive construction of national identities in post-colonial Hong Kong newspapers. They find that metaphors and other discursive strategies such as foregrounding, presupposition, framing, othering and subject positioning are used in newspapers to express various national ideologies (ibid.: 291).

Higgins (2004) analyses political stories in Scottish newspapers surrounding the opening of the Scottish parliament. He notes the role of lexical choices which remind readers of their nation. One lexical choice is naming the home nation (Scotland) far more than non-home nations (England and Wales) in coverage of

the same event. Higgins also finds that 'local' place names and 'us' and 'the' deixis further promote nationalism in news coverage (ibid.: 633, 639).

'Banal' nationalism is not confined to just stories about politicians and politics. Billig (1995: 114) notes that daily newspapers "drape" the flag around all types of stories, such as economic news, front page news, home news, sports and the weather. Flowerdew and Leong's (2007) analysis includes a variety of news stories, opinion articles and editorials. Though Higgins's (2004: 635) analysis is of political stories, he notes the importance of symbols in,

[...] the Scottish press clothes itself in symbols of national identification and allegiance, with icons such as upright lions and thistles dominating the mastheads of most major newspapers.

Billig writes that sports sections wave the national flag with "regular enthusiasm" in all newspapers. This is because sport is historically a largely masculine domain and male sport is dominant on British sport pages. It uses terminology about men 'doing battle' on 'foreign fields' on the nation's behalf defining 'whole national honour'. These pages are a banal preparation for war. Billig (1995: 11) observes:

They [sport pages] can be seen as banal rehearsals for the extraordinary times of crisis, when the state calls upon its citizenry, and especially its male citizenry, to make ultimate sacrifices in the cause of nationhood.

Bishop and Jaworski's (2003) analysis of coverage of the England-Germany Euro 2000 football match exemplifies nationalism found in sports pages. While examining the representation of participants, they find homogeneous national groups are constructed by using 'us' and 'them' deixis. Discourses of national unity are realised through literary strategies invoking stereotypes, generic references, shared sporting and military history and the timelessness of the nation (ibid.: 244).

Though this thesis does not analyse sports stories, all these studies point to the importance of both political and non-political stories in nation-building and maintaining. Most also examine the representation of participants when

analysing the nation. Both of these dimensions in an analysis of nationalism are important and are included in this thesis.

Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999: 2) believe that the nation and national identities “are produced and reproduced, as well as transformed and dismantled, *discursively*.” This expands the role of media described by Billig.

Their study of Austrian nationalism (ibid.: 33) identifies four main types of “macro-strategies” in formulating national identities. These are:

1. *[Constructive strategies]* attempt to construct and establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation.
2. *Strategies of perpetuation* attempt to maintain and to reproduce a threatened national identity, i.e. to preserve, support and protect it.
3. *Strategies of transformation* aim to transform a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity the contours of which the speaker has already conceptualised.
4. *Dismantling or destructive strategies* aim at dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide any new model to replace the old one. (my numbering)

Importantly to this thesis, which analyses participants, van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 92-93) add that constructive strategies:

[...] constitute a ‘we’ group and a ‘they’ group [...] [they] invite identification and solidarity with the ‘we’ group, which, however, at the same time implies distancing from and marginalization of the ‘they’ group.

These strategies are an important supplement to Billig’s work, in that they identify media’s role as more than just supporting a single idea of nationalism.

Nevertheless, none of the above studies on the role of media and nationalism examine specifically how nationalism across media outlets are different, many assuming consistency. This thesis demonstrates that nationalism does not find uniform expression and allegiance in and through the media, but varies between media and throughout time.

III.4 Turkish Cypriot Nationalism

Turkish Cypriot nationalisms reflect Cyprus’s turbulent history and power holders’ interests. These nationalisms contribute to how people identify with being

Cypriot and Turkish, and not being Greek and Greek Cypriot. Presently, there are two dominant Turkish Cypriot nationalisms vying for ideological prominence. These have similarities, such as both acknowledging their Ottoman origins, but also differences. Clearly identifying both these nationalisms is vital to understanding the national discourses drawn upon in TRNC radio news. A careful language analysis is needed to pick these apart, showing how they work, the models of the world they suggest and sequences of future action that they imply. Listeners know newscasts are political with different points of view. However, a close analysis of the language used in media can reveal fine details, language strategies and subtle differences in news content which demonstrate exactly how listeners are being persuaded (Wodak, 2001: 2). Though this is not always carefully thought out by news workers, discourses evoked in newscasts serve the interests associated with each station.

One nationalism is known as 'pro-solution', 'pro-federation' or 'left' politics. This ideology aims to establish a federation with the Greek Republic of Cyprus. It acknowledges its Turkish historical roots, but tries to distance itself from Turkey. It does not consider itself a part of a pan-Turkish nationalism, but more as a part of a future united Cyprus. The main pro-federation party is the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP). It was established in 1970. Its roots are in Communism, though it now brands itself as a socialist party. The CTP was in power during the time of this research from December 2003 until April 2009.

The other nationalism claims Turkish Cyprus is part of a pan-Turkish nation. It sees itself independent from the Republic. This is reflected in what is termed 'Turkish nationalist' politics. The main nationalist party is the Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP). It was established in 1976 by Rauf Denktaş. It claims to be a Liberal party which supports a free market economy. The UBP has been in power for most of TRNC's history. After a six year absence from power, April 2009 saw the UBP return to power.

III.4.i History of Turkish Cypriot nationalism

Nationalisms are as much to do with internal as external grapplings for resources and power. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) observe,

Competing nationalist projects and inter-ethnic conflict are often rooted in (though not reducible to) intra-ethnic elite competition and mass mobilization for power, status and wealth. This, at least, was and is an appropriate framework for the case of Cyprus, where competing claims for state power (and state-allocated wealth and status) were legitimized on the basis of nationalist ideologies.

On an all-Cypriot level during the British colonial period, there were three groups competing for state power: the British, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots instigated an uprising against the British in 1931. Turkish Cypriots' Turkish nationalism came mostly as a defence to the Greek Cypriot anti-colonial struggle and their attempts to achieve *Enosis* with Greece (Kizilyürek, 2003: 222).

Cypriot nationalisms were aided by Britain's divide and-rule policies, relying on Turkish policemen, administrators and prosecutors to repress Greek actions before Cypriot independence in 1960. After independence, Greek Cypriot attempts to change the constitution played into the hands of the ultra-nationalist Turkish Cypriot leadership. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) write the leadership created a "hegemonic conception of a Turkish identity, which had been constructed and sustained in the struggles against Greek-Cypriot enosis (union) with Greece".

After division of Cyprus in 1974, the aim of the leadership, headed by Rauf Denktaş, was legalisation of two separate states which would end any possibility of Greek Cypriot influence in Turkish Cypriot affairs. Many bureaucrats and administrators felt sovereignty most desirable, though Denktaş preferred *Taksim* with Turkey. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 156) describe nationalism at the time as:

The 'self' in question was not the political community of Turkish Cypriots, but the Turkish nation, of which the Turkish Cypriots were regarded to be an extension [...] Self-determination was widely seen as something that would be pursued within the larger framework of Turkish nationalism.

Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 152) describe the mechanisms used to reproduce Turkish nationalism as the distribution of assets taken as a result of controlling

more than a third of Cyprus by approximately 20 per cent of its population.

These were used to secure support through patronage. Patronage came in two forms. One was the granting of land, which was plentiful, and the other was lucrative import monopolies. This patronage resulted in a significant group that had (and has) strong material reasons to favour division of Cyprus (ibid.: 153).

But this vision of a Turkish Cypriot nation was and is popular even amongst those who have not enjoyed the benefits of patronage. The TRNC government “has been able to shape social, economic, political and cultural life in North Cyprus as if it were sovereign; it had, for a while, also built on considerable legitimacy among its citizens” (ibid.: 148). This is evident by nationalist parties winning all elections from 1974 until 1998 and again in 2009.

Symbols have also played a part in Turkish Cypriot nationalism. A new TRNC flag was produced with the establishment of TRNC which closely resembles and is flown alongside the Turkish flag. Anastasiou (2002: 587) observes these flags are symbols that Turkish Cypriots identify with, bringing positive feelings of their own nationalism and loathing from Greek Cypriots.

However, there has been a gradual decomposition of Turkish nationalism since 1983. This has happened due to external and internal affairs. Externally, the Turkish mainland’s financial crisis of 2001 reduced payments to TRNC. This reduced the ability of the Turkish Cypriot elite to contain discontent and the envisaging of political alternatives through patronage (ibid.: 154). The Republic joining the EU has also played a role in softening Turkish nationalism. The fact that the EU would admit the Republic with or without a settlement in Cyprus served as an incentive to pro-federation nationalism (Tocci, 2003).

Internal matters also contributed to the rise of pro-federation nationalism. Firstly, many citizens were disenfranchised and resentful of not enjoying the benefits of patronage. Secondly, many in TRNC considered it a “failing state”. Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 154) note its legitimacy eroded as Turkish Cypriots questioned whether the state actually reflected their political will, sceptical of the quality of

TRNC's sovereignty. Turkey's dominance "contributed to a latent sense of alienation of administrators and citizens from 'their' state" (ibid.: 156).

Thirdly, with the immigration of large numbers of Turkish mainlanders, came a growing sense of Turkish Cypriot cultural distinctiveness through these close relations. Fourthly, there was dissatisfaction with the failure to gain external recognition. Lastly, invented traditions were employed to create a distinctively Turkish Cypriot national identity. According to Güven-Lisaniler and Rodriguez (2002: 185 in Lacher and Kaynak, 2005: 158):

Emerging from decades of cultural construction in the margins, classic mechanisms of nation-building were employed, inventing traditions like 'typical' Turkish Cypriot folk-dancing – the left promoting dances similar to Greek Cypriot ones, while Turkish nationalist dance groups stress Anatolian and Ottoman traditions.

These factors contributed to many citizens favouring pro-federation nationalism. This nationalism prevailed when residents voted for the CTP in parliamentary elections in 2003 and the 2004 *Annan referendum* which called for a federation.

Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 148) describe pro-federation nationalism as a re-imagining, which puts distance between the Turkish mainland and Turkish Cyprus.

Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 157) observe:

Turkish Cypriots no longer generally posit an identity of themselves with Turks in Turkey based on ethnic origins, but claim a distinctive self on the basis of cultural idiosyncrasies. This transformed notion of the "self" now became the basis for an increasing willingness to abandon demands for formal sovereignty in exchange for a more substantial form of self determination, even if that meant accepting the framework of a new federal state on Cyprus.

Pro-federation nationalism is a movement which re-defines "the ethno-nationalist definition of political community". Instead, there is "no Turkish Cypriot ethno-nationalism, but a post-national form of identity formation, marked precisely by an absence of a singular identity" (ibid.: 159).

However, this nationalism, similar to Turkish nationalism, rejects just being "Cypriots pure and simple". Lacher and Kaynak (2005: 158) note,

While no longer considering themselves to be merely Turks in Cyprus, most Turkish Cypriots insist on the recognition of cultural distinctions between themselves and Greek Cypriots.

III.4.ii Present Turkish Cypriot Nationalisms

Though Lacher and Kaynak trace Turkish nationalism's roots to British rule and pro-federation nationalism's roots to more recent times, they also acknowledge that both forms of nationalism are very popular. In fact, the Turkish nationalist UBP party won the 19 April 2009 federal parliamentary elections, while pro-federation CTP's Talat was still president. The present is a time when nationalism in TRNC is a contested ideology. Both the CTP and the UBP hold power, though differ considerably in how they see the nation.

To gain a clear and detailed account of these two nationalisms as they translate into practical party-political thinking, they are described by politicians below.

These politicians were powerful authorities in regard to their parties' respective thinking at the time of research. This is due to their high positions in each party. They were interviewed using a list of open-ended questions to reveal their thinking about the nation, making interviews somewhat formal. However, interviews diverged considerably from the set of questions, revealing priorities and concerns of the politicians and their parties. In the spirit of ethnography, all information gathered was recorded and used as evidence in the following account. These interviews proved invaluable, identifying political thinking during the time of this research, including who is a part of the nation and who is not. These descriptions provide the context through which this thesis's ethnographic and textual analyses are carried out. Because radio stations are linked to political parties, and parties emphasise their ideas of nation, political ideas described here are reflected in radio news scripts, despite claims to the contrary.

III.4.ii.a The CTP's Turkish Cypriot Nationalism

Dr. Nazim Beraltı was the Minister of Ideology for the CTP during this research. He was one of six people at the top of the power structure of the party and the government. The ideas expressed here reflect those of the CTP.²⁷

The CTP does not believe there is such a thing as a “Cypriot nation”. Instead, it sees two “peoples” on Cyprus. Beraltı said:

Unfortunately we don't have a nation in Cyprus. It would be better for us if we did. We have two main peoples living in Cyprus, the majority belonging to the orthodox church who claim they are Greeks – Hellenics. And the minority claims that they are Muslims, though we don't practice. We speak Turkish and claim to be Turks. We claim we are part of the Turkish nation and the other part used to think they are a part of the Greek nation. But, we don't have two independent nations and we don't have a Cypriot nation.

The CTP sees no nation on Cyprus, just people who “claim” to be Turkish or Greek. The CTP distills differences and similarities with Greeks and mainlanders to language and religion. Even claims of religious similarities with mainland Turks are usurped by “not practicing” their same religion.

There are some contradictions in the CTP's ideas of Cyprus's two peoples. On the one hand, Beraltı notes commonality between Cypriots: “For three centuries we were living together under the Ottoman empire, so we have some common customs, traditions and values.” On the other hand, later in the interview, he makes clear there are differences in “religion, language, and our culture.” This discrepancy may be part of political banter which attempts to construct the idea of Cypriot commonality, yet appeal to conservatives who see distinct differences.

The CTP distances itself from Turkey, but recognises its importance on four fronts. There are historical ties, Turkish Cypriots being descendants of Ottoman administrators. There are Turkish troops which prop up Turkish Cypriots' confidence in living with Greek Cypriots. There is Turkey's political establishment whose acceptance of a solution is essential for its success. And

²⁷ The following information was taken from an interview when Beraltı was Minister for Ideology 15 October 2008 . I use “Beraltı” and “CTP” synonymously in this section because Beraltı was speaking to me on behalf of CTP as the Minister of Ideology.

there is Turkey's public which must be convinced that a federation is in the interest of Turkey's economy and EU aspirations.

But Turkey and Turks are not part of the CTP's Turkish Cyprus. The CTP wants to send Turkey's "foreign" troops back to Turkey. Beraltı said, "Nobody wants foreign troops in his own country. Even if they speak the same language as you." Turkish mainlanders or "settlers" who have immigrated to TRNC since 1974 are also not part of the CTP's Turkish Cyprus. Some settlers may be sent back to Turkey with a CTP solution. In fact, all Turkish mainlanders, Beraltı believes, are different from Turkish Cypriots. He described the relationship between Cypriots and Greek and Turkish mainlanders as,

Both of them [Turkish and Greek Cypriots] don't like the people who are living on the mainlands. They think that their neighbours [Cypriots from the other community] are more sincere than the people living on the mainlands.

Beraltı clearly creates an 'other' Turkish mainlander group, describing it as "foreign", "different" and "not sincere", distinguishing it from Turkish Cyprus.

The CTP aims for a united Cypriot state, despite there being no "nation" and differences in "religion, language, and our culture." Statehood is envisaged which is "not dependent on nationality but on citizenship with the two peoples." The CTP sees two independent states and a common federal state, as a first step in a process of integration into one political state. Beraltı believes the state would firstly give all Cypriots "a common identity, a common passport and common money". Interestingly, two of these three first steps are symbolic: passports and money. This illustrates the importance the CTP puts on symbols in creating a future united Cypriot nationalism.

The federal government would start with less important ministries, such as Health and Tourism, to "build confidence in both people towards a common state." As confidence grows, the federal state would gradually become more integrated. The CTP also wants "compositional equality"; that is, representational power relative to population size. This would recognise respect for the two peoples.

Beraltı said, "We are ready to respect their identity and we want them to respect our identity too."

To achieve a future state, Beraltı wants to negotiate and find a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict. The CTP sees this as a top priority, especially since the February 2008 election of Christofias's pro-federation government in the Republic. Though the *Annan referendum* which called for an all-Cypriot federation was agreeable to the CTP in 2004, it is not essential. Beraltı said what is important is "we must negotiate."

There are reasons for this urgency. Firstly, with no solution, recognition of TRNC would necessitate the opening of two airports, three seaports, and at least 150 diplomats all of international standards. With such a small population, this is difficult. Secondly, without a solution, "the world will choose to divide Cyprus." This will result in foreign interests such as Turkey, Greece, Britain and the US becoming even more dominant and Turkish Cypriots losing out. Thirdly, there are ideological reasons for wanting reunification. Beraltı stated,

We want unification with Europe and after unification of the world. According to our ideology of socialism, it is against our ideas to divide such a little country, such a little island. We prefer a solution and to live together on Cyprus.

The CTP sees the root problem of the Cyprus conflict as internal. Beraltı said, "Greek Cypriots look toward Hellenic Nationalism and Turkish Cypriots look to Turkey." Beraltı believes the solution to the problem is to "find our own way out". This does not mean ignoring outside powers, because this is impossible. Turkish and Greek Cypriots need to change their minds about their fear of the 'other'. Beraltı said,

We have fears against the Greek Cypriots and they have fear against our population. They have fear against Turkey and us. We are afraid of their church.

The CTP sees this fear subsiding through negotiations and more bi-communal interaction between politicians, families and schools.

The CTP stresses a close affinity with Europe. Beralti believes Turkish Cypriots are not European but “can become European”. He said,

We believe we can easily join that culture and most of us can speak different languages, so most of us don't feel different. OK, our colour is different but our ideology and mentality are the same. If we are members of the European community, we can think more European.

Not only does the CTP think culturally they can be European, the CTP's socialist ideology dictates that its future is with the EU, as part of a more global Socialist comradeship.

III.4.ii.b The UBP's Turkish Cypriot Nationalism

The UBP is the largest nationalist party in TRNC. At the time of research, Ersin Tatar was the UBP's Shadow Minister for economic policies. He was in the upper echelon of the party. The ideas expressed here reflect those of the UBP.²⁸

Like the CTP, the UBP does not believe there is one Cypriot nation. Instead, Tatar claimed, “In Cyprus we believe that there are two nations on Cyprus: Greeks and Turks.” Tatar sees the Turks on Cyprus as “an integral part of the Turkish nation.” This membership of a pan-Turkish nationalism is reflected in all aspects of the UBP's nation. Tatar said,

We believe our future is based on a close partnership with Turkey because our motherland is Turkey. We share the same language, religion and culture. And after all, we are all Turkish people. We are Turkish Cypriots, but we have roots on the motherland, mainland Turkey.

Like mainland Turks, Tatar believes Turkish Cypriots are the same in terms of religion, political beliefs, and the reverence for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.²⁹ By aligning many aspects of social life with those of mainland Turks, the UBP forges a national bond with the mainland.

²⁸ The following information is taken from an interview with Tatar on 20 September 2008. Tatar is now Minister of the Economy in the new UBP government. I use “Tatar” and “UBP” synonymously in this section because Tatar was speaking to me on behalf of UBP as its Deputy General secretary responsible for economic policies.

²⁹ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is the founder of the modern nation-state Turkey formed out of the remains of the collapsed Ottoman empire.

The UBP also acknowledges economic bonds. Tatar claimed the TRNC economy has developed “since Turkey came here”. It is not just past actions which bind the nations. In 2008, Turkey contributed 790 million dollars to the TRNC budget. These are strong economic bonds which the UBP wants to continue.

Turkish mainlanders are considered part of the UBP's nation. Settlers who are “working here in TRNC in every possible industry” are seen as “keeping our economy at work”. Mainland Turkish settlers and Turkish Cypriots are one and the same. Tatar said, “We are all Turks, afterall.”

The Turkish military also enjoys membership in the UBPs vision of its nation. Throughout UBP policy, the Turkish military are praised for their contributions in the past and present. In the past, the Turkish army are credited with ending the “massacre” of Turkish Cypriots, the prevention of *Enosis*, dividing Cyprus and giving Turkish Cypriots their own country. Tatar said,

If Turkey did not come in 1974, we would have all been slaughtered and there would be no Turkish Cypriots on the island. This is a fact of life.

Since division and currently, the army is credited with “giving TRNC security and economic power in order for Turkish Cypriots to live in a civilised manner. So 1974 was a fortunate year.” Tatar also sees the army remaining on Cyprus to ensure security for Turkish Cypriots in its version of the future.

Part of UBP policy is stressing the success of TRNC as a state independent of the Republic. According to the UBP, TRNC has thrived ever since division.

Tatar recalled:

Turkish Cypriots were a poor minority who were just a community of workers and state employees employed by the Ottoman government. But since 1974, we have had our own businesses growing, we have had our own civil society growing, six universities, a number of hotels, an airport, harbours. Therefore we feel we have achieved a lot of good things in the past 30 years.

But the UBP praise for TRNC goes beyond its civil society. Tatar observed:

We live in a nice country and Turkish Cypriots through the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus is part of the civilised world. We are living healthy like most Europeans.

Though Tatar speaks positively about the present, the UBP grudgingly acknowledge a settlement to the Cyprus conflict is needed. Tatar believes this for two reasons. Firstly, at the moment "we believe that we have only partially achieved peace." Some form of lasting agreement with the Republic is necessary to ensure the safety of the UBP's Turkish citizens. Secondly, he believes a settlement is needed because there is "pressure from Europeans and the world community for a peaceful settlement on the island."

The UBP's answer to a settlement is a confederation "on the basis of a bi-zonal, bi-communal island with two separate and equal states, Greek Cypriots in the south and Turkish Cypriots in the north." This confederation would have a very weak central government with two equal and "distinct" states. This ensures there would be little interference and influence between the two states. This solution, Tatar believes, is the only way for lasting peace.

To achieve this, the UBP does not suggest negotiating with the Republic as freely as the CTP suggests. Tatar noted:

We have to be very careful in searching for a new agreement with the Greek Cypriots because if we were to lose all this, we can not possibly get it back.

Tatar is referring to economic and political control of the north. Tatar shows his wariness of the Republic when claiming the Republic have ulterior motives for negotiating: they want Turkish troops and Turkey's influence out of Cyprus. Turkish troops out of Cyprus plays on historical and present fears of Greek Cypriots. For these reasons, the UBP is hesitant about negotiations with the Republic.

The UBP displays an obsession with security and fear of the Greek Cypriot 'other' who may be characterised as the 'enemy'. This fear is expressed in various forms. Politically, Greek Cypriots are credited with wanting *Enosis*. *Enosis*, or union with Greece, was and still is a political goal for some Greek

Cypriots. For example, the only President of the shared Republic, Archbishop Makarios II, made an oath that all his life he would work towards the goal of *Enosis*. The UBP does not trust Greek Cypriots and believe this is still a Greek Cypriot aim.

Culturally, Greek Cypriots are to be feared. Tatar described it as “a radical society with an orthodox religion and their history is very much tied with Greek history.” The education system in the Republic is credited with stirring up dangerous national feelings. Tatar explained that young Greek Cypriots believe Turks are “barbarians” so the two communities “can not possibly live together”. Historically, the UBP fears violence, as was the case throughout the sixties and seventies, before division. This violence is part of UBP’s fear of a possible future. Tatar said,

If the Turkish army are to leave the island, you might have a lot of unpleasant events happen because you have 700,000 Greek Cypriots on the other side, young and excited people who might want to take revenge for the past 30 years.

Fear of Greek Cypriots is an integral part of UBP policy which legitimises its calls for a separate state.

The UBP’s outlook towards Europe is mixed. On the one hand, the UBP thinks Europe is partly to blame for hindering TRNC progress. Pressure from Europeans for a settlement and associated property issues hinders economic growth. For this reason, the UBP does not believe joining the EU at any cost is what is best for TRNC. Tatar attributes this position to the CTP. UBP policy is to join the EU as part of a confederation.

On the other hand, Tatar repeatedly claimed that Turkish Cypriots are “conditionally” European. Both Turkish Cypriots and Europeans share many “beliefs” and “values”. Tatar stated:

We [UBP] are aiming to be members of Europe. We are Muslim people, secular people, who adhere to Atatürk principles. And although we are Muslim, we feel very much we can be a part of Europe and we value our relationship with motherland Turkey.

So the UBP wants to be European, but on their terms. The UBP wants to become part of the EU, but only if accepted as a separate state within a confederation.

III.5 Conclusion

This chapter has revealed that the nation is a mental construct recently invented due to industrialisation, print capitalism and the demise of an old world view. The media have played a role in the building of nations. Presently, media play their part in constructing and maintaining the hegemony enjoyed by the concept of a world of nations, though this thesis demonstrates how the nation is defined is not necessarily the same across media outlets and time. This maintaining of nationalism is described by Billig through his idea of 'banal' nationalism. Importantly, media's representations of nations create groups of 'us' distinct from 'them'. This emphasises the importance of a close analysis of how participants are represented when studying discourses about nationalism in media.

These ideas and concepts help in understanding the two nationalisms vying for dominance in TRNC. These ideologies and their associated discourses have been identified, historically contextualised and described in great detail by politicians. Prevailing TRNC national imaginings contextualise the newsroom studies and textual analysis of radio news in the coming chapters. The way various powers in TRNC imagine the nation and who are a part of it is a factor in how stations represent events in news. These representations evoke differing ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism and illustrate how nationalism varies between media and throughout time.

At the time of this thesis, Cypriot peace negotiations were being discussed by two pro-federation parties, while a vocal and popular pro-Turkish nationalist opposition remained influential. In TRNC, there are two nationalisms and their associated discourses. This domain of ideology is being contested, like never before in Turkish Cypriot history.

IV Methodology

IV.1 Introduction

It is widely assumed that news has a powerful effect on the social construction of reality. This takes a number of forms from direct effects, as in the “behaviourist approach” to more mediated ones like that proposed by Burton (1990: 206-223). News informs people about issues, events and politics (Fairclough, 2003: 8; *ibid.*: 217). Tuchman (1978: 2) claims news helps audiences prioritise issues, has the power to “shape opinions” and provides “the context in which news consumers debate the meaning of events.” There are different ways to assess this construction of reality, one is through the language media uses and another is to examine news production through ethnography. For reasons that follow, both are used in this thesis.

The importance of language may be summarised as “[the use of language] is a version of the world, offered to, imposed on, exacted by, someone else” (Kress and Hodge, 1979: 9). Its role in society is not only to communicate, but also to control (Fairclough, 2003: 34 and 1989: 37; Silverstone, 1999; *ibid.*: 6). These roles of language take on particular significance in news (Richardson, 2006; Fairclough, 2003, 1995a: 2 and 1989: 37; Knightley, 2002; Krishnamurthy, 1996; Billig, 1995; van Dijk, 1991). For example, language in broadcast news aids governmental control in society by representing and transforming politics and government texts which are then represented,

[...]in the texts and interactions of different practices, including, crucially everyday life, where it contributes to the shaping of how we live, and the meanings we give to our lives (Silverstone, 1999 in Fairclough, 2003: 34).

So a close study of language, according to Fairclough (1995a:16), “remains a central element of media analysis”, used to reveal what are often hidden ideologies and world views of the language producer.

Newsroom ethnographies describe the social goings-on behind texts. They are a “microanalysis of news production processes” describing newsroom environments, professional routines, news gathering and writing practices and

decision-making processes within temporal, organisational and economic constraints (van Dijk, 1988: 7-8). These produce detailed descriptions of newsrooms and practices, answering why texts appear as they do.

These two approaches to media research are used together in this thesis because of their compatibility (Richardson 2007; Bellier 2005; Fairclough 2003 and 1995a; Moores 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; van Dijk 1999; Pujolar 1997). When analysing news, van Leeuwen (2005:13-14) claims the two work well together: a close textual analysis to identify the issues and ethnography to explain the issues by examining “processes of selection and editing that precede such reporting”. This thesis follows this use of methodologies; the textual analysis looks at lexical and grammatical choices that communicate identities, sequences of events and behaviours which contribute to the different versions of nationalisms considered in the previous chapter, while the ethnography examines the processes of selection, writing and editing which explain how, why and where ideological discourses identified in the textual analysis come from.

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, this thesis’s approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), the chosen form of textual analysis for this thesis, is examined. In the second part, newsroom ethnographies and a description of the ethnography employed in this thesis, are described. A review of a number of newsroom studies is examined. This is not an exhaustive review, but used to inform this thesis’s methodology and contextualise its findings. In the concluding part, limitations of this thesis’s approaches to the study of TRNC radio news are disclosed and how these are overcome are explained.

IV. 2 Critical Discourse Analysis

IV.2.i Basic principles of CDA and Rationale

CDA examines lexical and grammatical choices made by text producers to reveal obvious and not so obvious discourses in texts. Discourses are “complex bundle[s] of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts”, which are

thematically interrelated (Wodak, 2001: 66). CDA presupposes these compositional choices in texts have political repercussions (Kress, 1985: 3). For example, naming a member of the *Palestinian Liberation Organisation* a “freedom fighter” or a “terrorist” carries with it political significance.

Wodak (2001: 2) describes CDA's political role as:

CDA may be defined as fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequalities as it is expressed, signalled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use (or in discourse).

This explanation illustrates how CDA is concerned with relations between language and power, a sentiment echoed by many CDA practitioners (Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Wodak and Fairclough 1997; van Leeuwen 1993). In fact, CDA prioritises a political commitment. Van Dijk (1996) highlights that scholars who apply CDA start by identifying a social problem with a linguistic aspect, choose the perspective of those who suffer the most then critically analyse those in power, those who are responsible and those who have the means and opportunity to solve such problems (cited in Richardson, 2007: 1; Wodak, 2001: 1).

Writers such as Fairclough (2003: 9) point out that it is important to see all discourses as ideological. By ideological, this thesis uses Gramsci-inspired meanings such as “a systematic body of ideas, organised from a particular point of view” (Kress and Hodge, 1979: 6). CDA reveals ideologies in texts (Richardson 2007; Fairclough, 2003, 2001, 1995a, 1995; Wodak 2001; Kress, 1985). In fact, Wodak (2001: 10) notes “[o]ne of the aims of CDA is to ‘de-mystify’ discourses by deciphering ideologies.”

CDA perceives discourse as a form of social practice or action. Discourse is a form of action, something people do to, or for, each other (van Leeuwen, 1993). It is an element of social life which is closely interconnected with other elements of social life (Fairclough, 2003: 3). Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 92) describe a “dialectical relationship” where “[...] discourse constitutes social practice and is

at the same time constituted by it.” Due to this relationship, both text and context must be examined (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; Fairclough, 1995a: 62).

CDA is a useful approach for the textual analysis in this thesis. Its suitability is three-fold. Firstly, as noted above, CDA is highly suitable for the analysis of ideology. CDA offers the framework for revealing ideological discourses about nationalism realised through lexical and grammatical strategies used in radio news.

Secondly, it has been argued that all scholarly discourse and textual analysis are socio-politically situated, selective, limited, partial and thereby biased (Richardson, 2007; Fairclough, 2003). Choosing a critical approach provides “a scientific basis for a critical questioning of social life in moral and political terms, e.g. in terms of social justice and power” (Fairclough, 2003: 15). So, research should question and not support unjust aspects of social life. In the case of this thesis, research should question TRNC media’s prioritising of power holders’ interests at the expense of not finding a solution to years of social, political and economic isolation for TRNC residents.

Thirdly, CDA can be tailored to individual projects, depending on research needs. Wodak and Weiss (2005: 125) claim scholars who use CDA must ask “[w]hat conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this and that context?” Due to this flexibility, CDA offers a framework which can be tailored to reveal ideological discourses of nationalism realised in TRNC radio news.

IV. 2.ii This thesis’s Approach to CDA

IV.2.ii.a Station and Story Samples

This thesis analyses news from three stations in order to obtain political and economic contextual variety, allowing for the investigation and revealing of a variety of discourses. One station is *BRTK*, the state-owned broadcaster. *BRTK* has an array of influences and interests which must be satisfied, such as the pro-federation CTP Prime Minister, but also the Turkish military. This thesis analyses news from *BRTK*’s English language service, *BRTI*, because its audience is large

and influential. *BRTI* is aimed at English speaking residents of TRNC, English-speakers in the Republic, especially the Republic's politicians, and English-speaking internet users.

The sample of stations also includes two private commercial radio stations. One is *KFM*, part of a large successful commercial group which claims to be independent of political parties, but is in fact closely affiliated with the ruling CTP government. The other, *Radyo T*, has close connections with the Turkish nationalist UBP party. These two stations were chosen as their political connections and associated interests are from opposing near-ends of the TRNC political spectrum: *KFM* and pro-federation CTP; *Radyo T* and Turkish nationalist UBP.

The corpus of scripts of newscasts are taken from the period 24 September 2007 until 30 September 2007 and then from 1 February 2008 until 11 April 2008. These two periods of time were chosen arbitrarily in that they fitted in with the research schedule. *BRTI* and *KFM* keep scripts in an archive, so access to all stories was not problematic. For *Radyo T*, however, not all these dates were accessible because the station has no archive system. In total, 77 newscasts (approximately 900 stories) were collected from both *BRTI* and *KFM* and 94 stories from *Radyo T*, a large representation of news. These stories were all taken from each station's evening newscasts. Evening newscasts were chosen for consistency, as all stations broadcast a daily main newscast at 19:00.

At the time samples were collected, a number of issues and themes became apparent. These issues and themes produce three samples for analysis. Due to the large number of texts, repetition of lexical and grammatical strategies which evoke discourses about nationalism occur quickly. For this reason, sample sizes are large enough to reveal discourses throughout the corpus without reaching saturation. Stories within each sample were selected on three criteria. Firstly, stories must represent Cypriot parties in the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, the stories must be more than a few sentences long. Longer stories generally produce more detail. Thirdly, stories were selected based on story sourcing. A

variety of primary sources, such as the CTP government, the UBP opposition, ex-president Rauf Denktaş, non governmental organisations and foreign politicians reflect stations' choices which contribute to a variety of perspectives on Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

The three samples chosen are the coverage of a specific event, stories about political relations between TRNC and the Republic and stories about events which appear to be non-political. The first sample comprises stories about the opening of the Lokmacı-Ledra Road checkpoint between TRNC and the Republic. This event was chosen as it was widely covered by the media. It was also seen as an event about the nature of the future of TRNC and the Republic. This thesis analyses 12 stories taken from 31 March to 5 April, the week of Lokmacı's opening.

The second sample comprises stories about political relations between TRNC and the Republic. This was chosen because relations were going through a process of change during the time of this research. This change can be put into three time periods. The first time period was during the governance of the Republic's anti-federation President Papadopolous' regime. The second time period was during a transition in the Republic's governance to pro-federation President Christofias. The third time period was during President Christofias's governance. Nine stories, three from each time period, were chosen.

Ten stories about non-political events comprise the third sample. Events covered are the opening of an office, the announcement of Cancer Week and tourism events. These more mundane stories were chosen as they are a staple part of output on TRNC radio stations. A count of stories in the corpus reveals that such stories make up about ten percent of stories on *BRTI* and about twenty percent of stories on *KFM* and *Radyo T*. On *BRTI*, the Cyprus conflict told from a Turkish Cypriot perspective is a news priority, so there are fewer non-political stories. On *KFM* and *Radyo T*, they are more numerous, fitting into their news priority of "what is good for the nation".

Two problems were encountered when building the sample of these more mundane stories. Firstly, stories about events covered by all stations were desired for comparison reasons. This proved to be difficult. In the case where tourism is analysed, two different events on the same day are part of the sample. The second problem involved finding stories about non-political events which were more than a few lines long. There are many stories analysed which are long, but in two cases shorter stories were used in order to compare stories across stations.

These three analyses facilitate a body of data that approaches the central question of this thesis; that is, how different radio stations draw upon different discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

IV.2.ii.b This thesis's approach to the analysis of texts

Discursive acts are constructed representations of events (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 93). For example, a radio story about a fire is not a fire itself, but a representation of a fire. CDA analyses representations as 'recontextualisations' of social practices; that is, "how social practices [...] are turned into discourse (into *representations* of social practices) [...]" (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 93). Recontextualisations have three elements: actions or 'process types', circumstances and participants (Fairclough, 2003: 141; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 94). Any of these elements of discourse, whether participants, actions or settings, can signify, evoke, draw upon, and realise whole discourses (ibid.).

This thesis examines how participants are named and their actions represented. These representations realise discourses in texts. For example, identifying someone who was found guilty of benefit fraud as 'a Muslim man' or 'a father of three' carries different meanings with political and social repercussions. In the first case, the man is labelled as an 'other', a Muslim who is part of an out-group. In the second, he is humanised, perhaps invoking sympathy as a father, while his difference as a Muslim is excluded. These may evoke different discourses,

depending on their contexts, the first possibly anti-Muslim and the second financial hardship.

Participants other than objects are referred to as 'social actors' (Fairclough, 2003: 145; van Leeuwen, 1996: 67). It has been shown how analysing social actors is central to studying nations (Wodak and Weiss 2005; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart 1999; Billig 1995). Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999: 35) note one "important issue in this context [analysing nations] is the linguistic representation of those social actors who are perceived as members of a national collectivity". Representations of those not in the nation are also essential to the study of nations. Wodak and Weiss (2005: 131) observe "the general concept of *insiders* and *outsiders* is salient in all societies and between societies."

There are a number of ways that social actors can be classified and categorised. Fairclough's (2003) and van Leeuwen's (1996) highly influential approaches to analysing social actors is followed in this thesis, though many differences are also evident. For example, Fairclough points out that social actors can appear grammatically as a participant in a clause, within a circumstance, or as a pronoun. In this thesis, pronouns are analysed lexically and then grammatically within the first two roles. Other modifications in this thesis's approach include a close examination of reported speech and the selective use of Appraisal theory. Modifications have been introduced to tailor the approach to the thesis, not the reverse.

The following outlines the elements of texts analysed in subsequent chapters. This provides a thorough framework for revealing discourses' ideological implications in nation-building and maintaining. Analysing participants involved in the Cyprus conflict and their actions reveal the different ideological discourses in different stations' news.

IV.2.ii.b.1 Inclusions and exclusions

What is included or excluded in a text may be politically or socially significant in that these may suit text producers' interests and purposes (Fairclough, 2003:

149; van Leeuwen, 1996: 38). Exclusions come in the form of either “suppressions” or being “backgrounded”. A participant is “suppressed” if they are not mentioned in a text. A “backgrounded” participant is not mentioned, but inferred, in relation to an activity by being mentioned elsewhere in a text. For example, a text may contain the two utterances of “John hit the ball” and later “the ball that was hit”. In the second utterance, John is “backgrounded”, though inferred.

IV.2.ii.b.2 Lexical Strategies

IV.2.ii.b.2.i Namings

When considering namings, Fairclough (2003) states participants can be represented by names, such as “Mehmet Ali Talat” or in terms of class or categorised as individuals, such as “the president” or groups, such as “politicians”. When participants are classified, they can be represented specifically, such as “TRNC government politicians” or generically, such as “politicians”. Van Leeuwen (1996) claims these choices affect readers’ perceptions of participants. For example, named as groups, such as “Turkish Cypriots”, participants can become homogenised, ignoring differences between individuals (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005: 133). Homogenisation can be used as a nation-building strategy. For example, Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart (1999) observe homogenising members of a nation ignores intra-national differences. This represents the nation as a single social and political entity, excluding differences which may threaten a single national ideology.

Van Leeuwen (1996: 48) states participants can be generically represented or specifically as individuals. As individuals, such as “Mr. Brown” or “Mr. Talat”, a “point of identification” for readers is presupposed. So, the government and “we” are more likely represented individually while “others”, in terms of class or race, are generically represented. By representing participants generically, they are “symbolically remove[d] from the readers’ world of immediate experience, [they are] treated as distant ‘others’ rather than as people ‘we’ have to deal with in our everyday lives” (ibid.).

According to van Leeuwen (1996), participants can also be “nominated” or named as individuals, such as “Mr. Talat”, categorised in ‘functional roles’ such as “the president”, or categorised by more or less permanent and unavoidable ‘identities’ they share with others, such as “the Turkish Cypriot man”.

Though nominations offer a point of identification for readers to identify with, titulation plays a role in nominations. For van Leeuwen (1996: 53-54), the degree of formality attributed to participants contributes to representations of power and status. Names can be formal (surname with or without honorific). Honorifics include prefixes such as “Mr. Talat” or “Prime Minister Soye”. Names can be semi-formal (first name and surname such as “Mehmet Ali Talat”) or informal (first name such as “Mehmet Ali”). Formal namings with honorifics contribute more to representations of power and status than informal namings.

Participants categorised in ‘functional roles’ are represented by what they do rather than what they are (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2005: 134). In the study of a conservative newspaper’s feature article, van Leeuwen (1996: 59) found that “high-status social actors ... such as ‘government’ and ‘experts’, are always functionalised”.

Where participants are represented through ‘identification’, they are identified socially, such as by age, gender or race. Such identification can be classified as relational (‘friend’ or ‘aunt’), cultural (‘Turkish Cypriot’) or biological/ physical (‘blonde’). Van Leeuwen found that biological identification tends to have connotations, many negative (ibid.: 58).

Participants can be named using pronouns. Fairclough (2003: 149) identifies nouns and pronouns which promote ‘us’ and ‘them’ divisions, such as, ‘we’ and ‘they’. These represent and construct groups and communities. But the groups and communities constructed using ‘we’ in political discourse are vague, referring to party, nation, government, residents or other combinations. How these are used serve politicians’ purposes (Billig, 1995: 106; Fairclough, 1989: 148). For example, Fairclough (1995a: 181) notes:

On the one hand, they [politicians] claim solidarity by placing everyone in the same boat, but on the other hand they claim authority in that the leader is claiming the right to speak for the people as a whole.

IV.2.ii.b.2.ii Personal or Impersonal Representations

Participants can be represented impersonally such as “the Republic of Cyprus” or personally, such as “President Dimitrius”. Fairclough (2003: 149) states “Impersonal representations of social actors [...] can dehumanise social actors, take the focus away from them as people”, while personal representations emphasise their human qualities.

IV.2.ii.b.2.iii Deixis

Billig (1995) is also interested in how lexical choices contribute to our understanding of texts. Though his focus is not on participants, he reveals other lexical strategies used in nation-building and maintaining. He reveals that lexical choices, such as deixis, realise ideological discourses about nationalism. Deixis is a “banal” method of naming aspects of nations. It includes lexical choices such as ‘the’, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘we’, ‘here’, ‘this’, ‘now’ and ‘our’ which point readers to their nation and construct those who are in the nation and those who are not (Billig, 1995:106-109). This is done by continually and unobtrusively collocating deixis in combinations such as “our homeland”, “the people”, “this country”, “the prime minister” and “the nation”.

IV.2.ii.b.3 Grammatical Strategies

The grammatic role participants are given in recontextualisations is a significant part of CDA. Van Leeuwen (1996: 43) points out that grammatical “[r]epresentations can reallocate roles, rearrange the social relations between the participants.” Participants are represented grammatically either as participants in a clause or within a circumstance (e.g. in a preposition phrase).

IV.2.ii.b.3.i Participant in a clause

As participants in a clause, participants can be activated or passivated.

Activated, participants are represented as “the active, dynamic forces in an activity”, the ones who do things and make things happen (van Leeuwen, 1996:

43-44). For example, in “John hit the burglar”, John is activated. Being activated is an important and generally positive aspect of representation. An activated participant’s capacity for “action, for making things happen, for controlling others and so forth is accentuated” (Fairclough, 2003: 150).

Alternatively, when a participant is passivated, such as “the burglar” in the example above, “what is accentuated is their subjection to processes, them being affected by the actions of others” (ibid.). This is generally a negative aspect of representation being subjected to others’ actions. But when a participant is subjected to negative actions by another, though weakness is represented, sympathy may also be constructed. For example, “John hit the puppy” creates sympathy for the puppy being hit.

Discourses can also be signified and ideologies identified by a close analysis not only of how the participants are represented but through how they are depicted as acting. In English, there are five types of actions or ‘process types’ participants perform. These are action, event, state, mental and verbal processes (Fairclough 1992; Halliday 1985 in Fairclough, 1995a: 110).

Fairclough (1995a: 110) describes these as:

- i. An action “the actor does something to patient” (eg. Police kill 15).
- ii. An event involves just one participant (15 die).
- iii. A state describes a state of affairs as ‘being’ or having (15 are dead)
- iv. There are three types of mental processes: cognition (eg. Thatcher realises it’s time to go), perception (Thatcher sees the writing on the wall), and affect (eg. Thatcher wants to go)
- v. Verbal processes involve an actor and what was said.

The types of actions ascribed to participants are important. For example, action processes foreground agency, contributing to representations of power (ibid.: 113). Alternatively, Fairclough (2000) notes that transforming an active process into a relation or ‘state of affairs’ “removes agency” (in Richardson, 2007: 56) removing the representation of control and power. Furthermore, Hodge and

Kress (1979) draw attention to nominalisations; that is, transforming a process, such as “the door opened”, to a nominal (or noun) such as “the opening of the door”. These changes may be ideological because agency is omitted or backgrounded, making the representation “very abstract and distant from concrete events and situations” (in Fairclough, 1995: 112).

IV.2.ii.b.3.ii Within a Circumstance

Other than being activated or passivated, participants can also be represented within a circumstance. Here, prepositional phrases and subordinate clauses are used extensively. For example, “The burglar was hit by John.” Here, “by John” is a prepositional phrase, John represented within a circumstance.

Although Fairclough (1995a: 82) states using subordinate clauses achieves backgrounding, he does not specify that this is a strategy for de-emphasising participants. This thesis argues that participants within subordinate clauses, and especially prepositional phrases, are de-emphasised. This de-emphasis works as follows:

Prepositional phrases are used to provide context to dominant clauses.

Richardson (2007: 207) notes this when analysing newspaper headlines. He claims prepositional phrases are “used to provide context ... not responsibility”.

Prepositional phrases provide “details on the time, place or the manner of action” (ibid.). So, the “action” is in the dominant clause, while the prepositional phrase supplies the circumstances. Thus far, there is no mention of de-emphasis.

However, Richardson’s examples demonstrate how de-emphasis occurs. A headline from *The Guardian*, 2 April 2003 reads:

Children killed in US assault.

Here, “Children killed” is the emphasis of the sentence while “in US assault” is de-emphasised in a prepositional phrase. According to Richardson (2007: 208) “more forcefully, the sub-editor could have written ‘US kill children in assault’. In this second hypothetical utterance “US” becomes dominant, its action to “kill” foregrounded and “children” passivated. “In assault” is de-emphasised,

supplying circumstances to the emphasised dominant phrase. These examples demonstrate how “US” and “assault” in prepositional phrases are de-emphasised.

In a similar argument, van Dijk (1991) claims participants' actions can be “played down” when represented later in a sentence and/or embedded in a clause. Van Dijk (1991: 216) notes:

Events may be strategically played down by the syntactic structure of the sentences, for example, by referring to the event in a 'lower' (later, less prominent) embedded clause, or conversely by putting it in first position when the event needs extra prominence.

So sentence position and 'lower' embedded clauses, such as prepositional phrases, effect prominence. One use of prepositional phrases which de-emphasises actions is the passive sentence (Richardson, 2007; van Dijk 1991, 1988; Sykes, 1985; Fowler et al., 1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979). Van Dijk (1991: 215-216) observes,

[...] negative acts of in-group members, such as the authorities or the police, may be reduced in effect by placing them later in the sentence or by keeping the agency implicit, for instance in passive sentences.

Again, Richardson offers examples. Richardson (2007: 55) notes 'John kicked the ball' is an active construction. A passive construction is 'The ball was kicked by John'. 'By John' is now in a prepositional phrase at the end of the sentence. This is a less dominant sentence position, according to van Dijk (1991). Furthermore, the process type becomes a state process, removing the representation of control and power. The end result is participants are de-emphasised and less prominent when in prepositional phrases.

IV.2.ii.b.4 Reported Speech

Reported speech plays a prominent role in news reporting. Francis (1989: 202) claims that even though “the ostensible purpose of news reports is to inform the reader about *events*....a good deal of news is also about what people say about events.” In other words, what people say is much to do with what is reported (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 303; Bell, 1991: 53; Verschueren, 1985: 9).

Reported speech also works ideologically. It is a powerful resource used by media writers to legitimise what is reported, implicate reliability, and support “their aims and ideological point of view” (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 303).

It is not only what is reported, but also how something is reported. How speech is reported reveals the politics of those who compile reports by either distancing or evaluating what is reported (White, 2006: 62; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 307). For example, media generally choose sources of speech with power (Fairclough 1995a; Schudson 1986; Fishman 1980; Tuchman 1978). Choices made by media within this sphere of power are ideological (White, 2006: 58). Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 304) points out that speaker selection reflects power structures and cultural beliefs of media writers, giving voice to some people instead of others. Likewise, which participants are represented within the reported speech selected by writers and how their actions are represented lexically and grammatically are also ideological choices.

IV.2.ii.b.4.i Speaking Verbs

The choice of speaking verbs are ideological (White, 2006: 60; Tadros, 2001: 75; Fairclough, 1995: 83; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994 and 1987; Bell, 1991: 207). Though distinctions are made between speaking verbs such as “claimed” and “say” (ibid.), this thesis uses Caldas-Coulthard’s (1994 and 1987) categories of speaking verbs for a detailed analysis.

Caldas-Coulthard classifies speaking verbs according to their function in relation to reported clauses. There are ‘neutral and structuring glossing verbs’, ‘illocutionary glossing verbs’, ‘descriptive verbs’ and ‘discourse-signalling verbs’. Neutral and structuring glossing verbs introduce a saying without explicitly evaluating it. Examples are “say”, “tell”, “ask” and “enquire” (ibid.: 305).

Though news media mostly use neutral glossing verbs, there are many instances of other more interpretive verbs. Illocutionary glossing verbs “are highly interpretive” and evaluative, positioning writers ideologically. For example, “to claim” detaches reporters from responsibility of what is being reported (ibid.: 295). These verbs name speech situations, make explicit the illocutionary force

of a quote, while labelling and categorising contributions of speakers. Verbs include assertives like “remark”, “explain”, “agree”, “accept”, “correct”, “counter”; directives like “urge”, “instruct”, “order”; and expressives like “accuse”, “grumble”, “confess”, “complain” and “swear”.

Descriptive verbs describe speaking interaction such as “cry”, “shout”, “yell”, “whisper”, “mutter”, “laugh”, “giggle”, “sigh”, “gasp” and “groan”. These interpretive verbs are rarely used in news reporting. The final category of speech verbs are discourse-signalling verbs. These either “mark the relationship of the quote to other parts of the discourse, like *repeat*, *add*, or they mark the development of the discourse – *pause*, *continue*, *go on*” (ibid.: 306).

IV.2.ii.b.4.ii Direct and indirect speech

Bell (1991: 209) observes that journalists mostly use indirect speech. The transforming of speech to indirect speech adds another layer of interpretation to reported speech events. Fairclough (1995: 81) notes this action “may transform and translate them [speech events] into discourses which fit more easily with the reporter’s voice.” Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 304), describing this process as ‘integration’ or ‘absorption’ of speech, observes a writer “is in complete control of the character’s supposed talk.... There is not even the pretence that the voice of the character is heard.”

Direct speech, alternatively, “maintains boundaries” between reporters and those reported. Fairclough (1995: 81) states it “allows people to speak for themselves” and preserves original wording including deixis, pronouns and verb tenses.

However, the authenticity of direct speech is disputed by Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 303) who points out:

What is finally reported is filtered through the news process, in other words, through the re-interpretation and evaluation of many people – reporters, copy-writers, sub-editors and editors [...] In all cases what is seen as direct quotation or even as a quasi-direct quotation is interpreted as being a direct link to a source.

IV.2.ii.b.4.iii Appraisal Theory

A parallel field of language analysis to CDA is Appraisal theory. Many of its concepts are very similar, however there is one particularly useful aspect of Appraisal theory used in this thesis; that is, its analysis of representations of speech.

Appraisal theory, though operating within the paradigm of Systemic Functional Linguistics (White, 2006: 38), as does CDA, investigates media using neutrality as an over-riding criteria in analysis (White, 2005: 229). This is one way it distinguishes itself from CDA. At the same time, it acknowledges that news reporting is “a value laden, ideologically determined discourse with a clear potential to influence the media audience’s assumptions and beliefs about the way the world is and the way it ought to be” (White, 2006: 37).

Appraisal theory analyses texts in terms of ‘evaluation’; that is, “the text’s positioning of its audience to take either negative or positive views of the participants, actions, happenings and state-of-affairs therein depicted” (ibid.: 39). Evaluative positioning is achieved through numerous “mechanisms”. One mechanism is “attitudinal inscription” which uses lexical choices with stable meanings across a wide range of contexts (such as “disgraceful”, “brutal”, “repressive”). These are rarely used in news (ibid.: 42). “Attitudinal tokens” are more common. These are “formulations where there is no single item, which, of itself and independently of its current co-text, carries a specific positive or negative value.” (ibid.: 39). Co-text, association and implications ‘trigger’ or ‘betoken’ evaluative position. Agency and affectedness are mechanisms which influence who is to be blamed for actions (ibid.: 40). How reported speech is represented is another mechanism.

Speaking verbs and co-text can evaluate reported speech in one of three manners. The first is “authorial endorsement” which uses lexical choices such as “reveal”, “demonstrate”, “show”, “find” and “indicate” to imply support. More neutral verbs such as to “say”, “report”, “declare” and “believe” can also be used to support reported speech. This is where co-text must be considered.

The second is “authorial distancing” which uses verbs such as “claim” to distance writers and withhold support for propositions (ibid.: 62). White (2006) warns that “to claim” does not always cast doubt but “rather does this as the result of interactions with other nearby meanings” (ibid.). Again, this points to co-text.

The third is “evidential standing” which acknowledges that the social standing or authority of a source can act as a sign of credibility for a proposition. For example, a large group of experts or a famous person such as Nelson Mandela adds credibility. Using words like “reportedly” and “it is believed” can achieve the same effect by inferring the propositions are widely accepted (ibid.: 65).

IV.2.ii.b.4.iv Multi-layering

Multi-layering is a result of using the reported speech of others. It occurs when a reporter reports on what another person has reported someone else saying. The problem with multi-layering is it adds yet another layer of interpretation to sayings. This over-interpretation can work in favour of the interests of reporters. As Caldas-Coulthard (1994: 304) points out,

The multi-layering of saying makes the direct quote very dubious....The problem is that the words of a real person who takes part in a reportable event are already interpreted and represented according to the point of view of the first reporter, are re-interpreted (and probably changed) by a chain of people.

IV.2.ii.b.5 Abstraction of action

Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999: 96) describe how representations always involve recontextualisation; that is, transformations which “depend(s) on the interests, goals and values of the context into which the practice is recontextualized.” One type of transformation is abstraction of activities. Van Leeuwen (1995: 99) identifies two types of abstractions: generalisations and distillations.

Generalisations generalise a sequence of micro-events by “abstract[ing] away from the more specific ‘micro-actions’ that make up an action” (ibid.). For example, “If there is a problem we [TRNC government] discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed”. Here, the generalisation “we discuss and

speak” describes a generalised positive action of a government, though micro-actions are missing. The choice to generalise has ideological repercussions. Van Leeuwen (1995: 99) notes “texts mainly concerned with legitimising and delegitimising actions and reactions tend to move high up on the generalisation scale, including only the names of episodes, of whole social practices.” Distillations abstract “qualities” from actions; that is, the “substance” of what people actually do. They highlight some aspect of an action at the expense of others. For example, “the government moves in harmony with Turkey”. “Moving in harmony” may highlight cooperation, but at the expense of the actual actions of “the government”. Distillations also are used to legitimise and realise purpose (ibid.).

IV.2.ii.b.6 Presuppositions

Assumptions or ‘presuppositions’ are “a taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance” (Richardson, 2007: 63). These are powerful ideological tools (Richardson, 2004: 64; Fairclough, 1995a: 14). Fairclough (1995: 108) observes, “[t]he unsaid, the already said, the presupposed, is of particular importance in ideological analysis, in that ideologies are generally embedded within the implicit meaning of a text rather than being explicit.” These implicit ‘taken for granted’ claims enforce ideologies without questioning them (Richardson, 2004: 187).

IV.2.ii.b.7 Collocations and co-text

Collocations are the grouping together of words which reveal common ideological schemes or “collocative patterns” (Fairclough, 2003: 131 and 2001: 95). There is debate as to how to identify collocations. Sinclair (1991: 117) claims four words on either side of the word under investigation is considered a collocation. Some argue that this is not wide enough (Stubbs, 1995: 47), while others are interested in strictly adjacent words (Kjellmer, 1994: xiv). Though an examination of adjacent words is most definitely a collocation, co-text again broadens the scope of analysis. Co-text is the “verbal environment of a word or phrase” (Sinclair 1997: 34 in Widdowson, 2004: 59). This verbal environment of a word is a useful

tool in analysis. Both Widdowson and Sinclair (ibid.) note “a great deal can be learnt from” co-text.

IV.2.iii Criticisms of CDA and how these are addressed

A major criticism of CDA is its lack of contextual analysis. Widdowson (2004) states one must analyse text along with co-text, context and pretext. Analysis of co-text is the “consideration of the textual product as such” (ibid.: 58); that is, the words in a text. Context involves examining where a text is physically located and how a text “keys in with my knowledge of reality as shaped and sanctioned by the society I live in – that is to say, my social knowledge” (ibid.: 7). The third concept is pretext. This refers to the motive or purpose for creating and processing a message. Widdowson calls this the “perlocutionary purpose in general” (ibid.: 79-80). Widdowson claims CDA’s close analysis of text does not consider pretext and context (ibid.: 159).

Widdowson also criticises CDA’s lack of analytical rigour of text itself. He accuses Fairclough of not demonstrating actual procedures for analysis (ibid.: 92). Citing examples of research by Kress, van Dijk and Fairclough, he claims sampling and selection of features for analysis are motivated by pretext, thereby lacking scientific rigour (ibid.: 103-107). In short, “[t]he difficulty is that there is so little in the way of explicit procedures for us to follow” (ibid.: 166). He calls for a methodology which includes a detailed analysis of text, context and pretext.

Another enlightening criticism comes from Philo (2007) who compares the work of the Glasgow Media Group to CDA by Fairclough and van Dijk. His basic criticism is that Fairclough and van Dijk analyses are too text based. Philo (2007: 184) believes one must examine production, content and reception before making judgements about social meanings and the potential impacts of texts on public understanding.

Another critic of CDA is Chilton (2005: 22-23) who believes CDA has “not paid any attention to the human mind”, which ought to be a “prime concern”. He claims CDA has not addressed whether the mind can be tricked, deceived and manipulated through the use of language. Though he (ibid.: 43) notes there is

evidence that “human[s] may already have a critical instinct”, he recognises that “under certain social, economic and political conditions people may not be able, or may not be willing, to respond critically” (ibid.: 45). If this is the case, CDA may be useful.

This thesis addresses most of these criticisms. Firstly, the approach to examining lexical and grammatical features in radio news texts outlined above answers Widdowson’s criticism of a lack of rigour in selection and analysis procedures of texts. The approach offers a comprehensive analysis as to how participants and their actions are represented in TRNC radio news. This analytical approach clearly identifies the different ideological discourses about nationalism in TRNC news.

Secondly, criticisms concerning a lack of context and pretext are valid if studies are indeed text-based only. Philo’s and Widdowson’s claims that context and pretext are not explored enough in Fairclough’s and van Dijk’s work is not disputed here. But pretextual and contextual concerns can be met through an analysis of production and/or reception, something Fairclough (1995a: 62) calls for. A CDA analysis which includes an ethnography of production practices, as well as an historical and theoretical contextualisation addresses these concerns about CDA.

IV. 3 Ethnography

Ethnography has been used to understand newsroom practice. It has revealed how ideology is often not so much about individual journalistic bias but is embedded in the very logic of news production, such as what sources are used, news values which determine news selection and the need to produce a steady and predictable supply of copy (Machin and Niblock, 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon, 2002; Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). Ang (1990: 251) argues that ethnography can provide such detail because it:

[...] favours interpretive particularisation over explanatory generalization, historical and local concreteness rather than formal abstraction, ‘thick’ description of details rather than extensive but ‘thin’ survey.

So, a newsroom ethnography can offer detailed descriptions of where ideology becomes a part of news.

In CDA, it has become common to point out that discourses are a form of social action which are in a two-way relationship with their situations, institutions and social structures, each shaping the other (Richardson 2007; Fairclough 2003, 1995a; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997; van Leeuwen 1993). This relationship dictates that an analysis of texts also requires an examination of contexts which “shape” discourses. One such context is radio news’ context of production. Newsroom studies done with CDA not only reveal the “social goings on” behind the making of news, but also answer how, why and where ideologies identified in textual analysis come from (van Leeuwen, 2005:13-14).

IV.3.i Basic Principles of Ethnography and Rationale

Ethnography borrows the important anthropological concept of studying people in a way that does not disconnect them from their everyday lives; in other words, in their natural environment. Ethnography involves observing and listening.

Machin’s (2002:1) definition illustrates this point:

At the heart of the idea of ethnography is the act of observing and listening to people as they go about their everyday lives in order that we can understand the way that they behave or think on their own terms.

This observing and listening produces ‘thick’ descriptions of everyday social practice such as watching television, reading romance novels, being a fan and producing media. For example, Lull’s (1980) *The Social Uses of TV* involved three years of watching 200 households watch TV. He found the main advantage to this methodology “was the access it promised to give to everyday routines” (in Moores, 1993: 33).

Observation allows access to and insights into the kinds of cultural values and decisions that are a part of everyday social practices. People may not have access to reasons for doing things they do because their actions may not seem worthy of reflection, are invisible to them, are seen as common sense beliefs, or

taken for granted values and assumptions (Polanyi, 1958 and Malinowski, 1922).

As Machin (2002: 4) observes,

[...] people do not generally have conscious access to the reasons why they behave in particular ways. They are not conscious of the cultural toolkit through which the social world is made meaningful to them.

In newsrooms, ethnography has shown how these taken for granted aspects of newsroom culture contribute to ideology expressed in newscasts (Machin and Niblock 2006; Fishman 1980; Tuchman 1978).

Many ethnographic studies use other methods of data collection such as interviews and conversations to collect 'inside information' and clarify 'ambiguous messages' (Lull 1980; Hobson 1980; Radway 1987; Morley 1986; Moores 1993, 2000; Palmer 1986, 1988; Buckingham 1987; Algan 2003; Machin 2002; Machin and Niblock 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon 2002; Garcia Aviles et al. 2004). For example, Garcia Aviles and Leon's (2002) newsroom study used interviews, a two-day station observation and a questionnaire to reveal the impact of digitalisation on two television newsrooms in Spain. Morley's (1980) *The 'Nationwide' Audience* conducted group interviews by using open-ended group discussions from audiences of television programmes.

The length of time observing and interviewing varies considerably amongst ethnographic studies. "Longitudinal ethnography" involves observations over a long period of time. For example, Tuchman (1978) spent ten years observing newsrooms. More recent ethnographies, such as Garcia Aviles's "production ethnography" cited above are more focussed and less time consuming.

Combinations of these data-collecting tools in ethnography produce "data that are more accurate, truthful, or trustworthy than structured interviews" (Graham 1984, Mishler 1986 in Elliot 2005). Data collected from ethnography is also credited with reflecting external reality more so than other methodologies because ethnographers do not rely on what people say, but observe behaviour in natural settings (Machin, 2002: 4).

Focus groups, questionnaires or structured interviews do not have the advantage of respondents going about their business in their natural environment. It has been argued that “people often behave very differently in different contexts and what they say they do may not always turn out to be what they actually do” (ibid.).

IV.3.ii Newsroom Studies Findings

Newsroom studies focus specifically on the social goings on behind news texts. Used with CDA, they can be used to answer how, why and where ideology identified in textual analysis comes from. Two classic longitudinal newsroom studies are Tuchman’s (1978) “Making News” and Fishman’s (1980) “Manufacturing the News”. Fishman observed news workers at one newspaper for 12 months. Tuchman observed and interviewed workers over ten years at a television station, a press room and a newspaper. These extensive observations reveal aspects of newsgathering that were taken for granted previously. For example, practical concerns produce news which favours official institutions. Tuchman (1978: 21) notes:

Today’s news media place reporters at legitimated institutions [such as police headquarters, courthouses, city hall] where stories supposedly appealing to contemporary news consumers may be expected to be found.

This creates a “news net”, in Tuchman’s words, which is designed to capture big stories. Fishman observes journalists have beats to get a predictable supply of news stories. Due to time and space constraints, journalists use officials as sources, with little time or space for unofficial contacts. The result is news which is aligned with official institutions.

How stories are written also reflect powerful bureaucracies. This is due to routines. Firstly, Fishman found journalists follow the same bureaucratic “phases” as organisations. So criminal proceedings such as an arrest, hearing and sentencing provide potential news events. In this sense, the reporter sees the world as the organisations do. Secondly, Tuchman (1978:193) notes “occurrences” are transformed into events and then “framed” into “strips of reality”

written as stories. Framing is ideological, by what is included and excluded due to routines of news gathering and writing.

Thirdly, professionalism contributes to ideology in news. Professionalism (ibid.: 66) is “knowing how to get a story that meets organisational needs and standards” such as using “legitimate” sources. Fourthly, Fishman notes that reporters treat bureaucratic accounts as factual, while not making their own inferences and rarely using non-official accounts (in Machin, 2002: 106).

Tuchman (1980: 92) states that reporters use official sources to prevent libel suits and save time. This further legitimises the status-quo. Both studies conclude that news is ideological, supporting existing power structures, a finding reflected in more recent research (Bowman, 2006; Reich, 2006; Atton and Wickenden, 2005; Schlesinger and Tumber 1999).

There are a number of more recent newsroom studies which examine news-making in various national settings. Weaver (2005 and 1998) studies journalism and journalists in 21 countries. Regionally, journalism is explored in Arab states (Sakir, 2005), Africa (Ronning, 2005) and Latin America (Alves, 2005; Waisbord, 2000), while individual nations’ journalism is examined in China (Lee, 2005), India (Thussu, 2005), Spain (Garcia Aviles and Leon, 2002), England (Machin and Niblock, 2006) and Italy (Mancini, 2000). Patterson and Domingo (2008) edited a group of studies on online news-making. These ethnographies describe the evolution of online journalism and how newsrooms deal with innovation and change.

These studies’ more recent findings reflect changes in modern news-making, many similar to those in TRNC radio newsrooms. Firstly, market forces and technology affect news values. Machin and Niblock (2006: 46-47) observe that classic news values are now applied differently due to concentrated ownership, drive for profits, staff cuts and digital technologies which have changed newsroom production over the past decade. News is selected and angled for “niche market-defined groups” identified through extensive market research (ibid.; Cottle 1999). The gatekeeper role in news is now shared by journalists,

advertisers and consumers. That is, market-research-constructed target audiences define news selection by journalists, not what is important.

Secondly, these studies reveal that newsrooms rely heavily on news agency feeds and pre-packaged material assembled by organisations such as the police (Machin and Niblock 2006; Garcia Aviles and Leon 2002; Garcia Aviles et al. 2004). This reliance on wire services has been noted in studies about newsroom practices globally (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007; Patterson, 1998), in terms of economic news (Palmer, Boyd-Barret and Rantanen, 1998) and when examining individual nations (Wilke, 1998; Rantanen, 1998). Studies have found that journalists select, simplify and remodel source material for a variety of programmes.

Thirdly, reduced staff numbers, multi-skilling, various platforms to feed, 24-hour news and digital technology have affected the quality of news. Staff work without resources or time to investigate, analyse or verify information (Machin and Niblock 2006; MacGregor 1997; Hardt 1990). Going out on news stories is becoming a thing of the past (Garcia Aviles et. al., 2004).

Fourthly, these studies find that time and economic constraints as well as technology affect news. The beat has been replaced by the internet. But similar to classic newsroom studies, newsroom practices are driving ideology, not blatant ideological stances by the stations.

VI.3.iii This Thesis's Ethnography

In order to examine the production context of radio news to discover how, why and where ideology comes from, the newsrooms of three radio stations have been observed. Participant observation was mostly used, supplemented with informal conversations and interviews. Firstly, each newsroom was visited for an initial one week period to create a rapport between the researcher and workers. After this initial contact, newsrooms were observed one day each week for a year. Days of the week were randomly chosen for each station, fitting into the researcher's work and research schedules. This has been supplemented by occasional visits to each station to enhance information gathered in the first year.

News agenda setting meetings, newsgathering, news writing and news editing were observed.

In the spirit of ethnography, while at radio stations, interviews and informal conversations were carried out. All information contributed to data for this newsroom study. Informal conversations with workers were held while they were on breaks or during slow times. These involved asking one or two questions in regard to something observed beforehand, such as “why did you change the title of Christofias?” These would either be recorded or extensive notes were written as soon as was possible. These conversations supplemented participant observations.

Since senior management were not available for less formal conversations, interviews with all station managers were conducted. These interviews provided information about the political and economic contexts of stations, including relations between broadcasters and political parties. The director of *BRTK* Hüseyin Gürşan, the editor-in-chief for *Kıbrıs Media Group* Süleyman Erğuçlu, the manager of *KFM/ KTV* Erđınç Gündüz, and the owner and manager of *Radyo T/ Kanal T* Ersin Tatar were interviewed. These were recorded and later transcribed.

In order to gain information about political parties, their relations with radio stations, and their version of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, two interviews with senior politicians were conducted. Of course, these people to some extent gave official positions but nevertheless they clearly described the views of their political parties. One politician from the governing CTP party (Nazim Beratlı, Minister of Ideology) and one politician from the oppositional UBP nationalist party (Ersin Tatar, the Shadow Minister of Finance) were interviewed. These recorded interviews were later transcribed.

VI.3.iv Criticisms of Ethnography and how these are addressed

One criticism of ethnography is external validity is difficult to produce due to its micro-analytical nature (Elliot, 2005: 26). Ethnographers' answer to this criticism

is ethnography ought to balance between the completely ungeneralisable and “law-like statements”. Elliot (ibid.) believes:

Qualitative research therefore often adopts what we might call a ‘common-sense’ view of generalisability such that the reader is left to make up his or her own mind as to how far the evidence collected in a specific study can be transferred to other information about the same topic in similar settings.

Another criticism of ethnography is its lack of scientific credibility. Quantitative research and statistics have vast appeal and “have the credibility of appearing scientific” (Machin, 2002: 6). By isolating variables and measuring, results have the quality of “reproducibility and findings can be said to have reliability” (ibid.). However, ethnographers argue that the social world should be studied in its natural state and not in artificial settings with variables isolated (ibid.).

In a related criticism, ethnography is accused of not providing a transparent way of representing the social world (Machin, 2002: 6). Geertz (1973: 9 in Moores 2000: 62) describes ethnographic data as “really our own constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.” But Machin (2002: 6) argues a lack of transparency is endemic in other research methods by selecting topics examined and questions posed. For example, issues and variables are pre-selected in questionnaires and interviews (ibid.: 4), yielding results which may be considered self-interested. Moore (2000) believes one way to improve ethnography’s transparency is by recognising ethnographers as active interpreters. Some ethnographers go so far as to include autobiographic details in order to expose their position in relation to their research (Walkerdine, 1986; Ang, 1985; Hobson, 1982). Moores (2000: 64) believes this is unnecessary because audiences for ethnographies are capable of recognising its status as a constructed representation. Instead, he believes ethnographers ought to “examine the ‘meaning systems’ of others – whilst retaining a crucial space for ideological evaluation and critique” (ibid.: 69).

IV.4 Limitations and Conclusion

IV.4.i *Limitations*

CDA, the primary methodology used in this thesis, involves a very close analysis of text. Of the three stations sampled, only *BRTI*'s service is in English.

Analysing these texts are not problematic. However, *Radyo T* and *KFM*'s services are in Turkish. The scripts analysed in this thesis are translations from original Turkish scripts. With such a close reading of scripts some inaccuracies are inevitable. Fairclough (1995: 190) claims translated material should be avoided. However, translations are used (Flowerdew and Leong, 2007; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Wodak 1991; Yankah 1991; Chilton, 1990). Even Fairclough (2008: 813) uses translated material when looking for nominals in the works of Marx.

Translations in this thesis cause a problem on two levels. One level is the accuracy and political bias of the translations, and a second level is the discrepancy between the structure of English and Turkish sentences. To address the problem of accuracy and political bias, four translators were hired. One translator is a Turkish Cypriot *BRTI* editor with impeccable English and Turkish. His full-time occupation is translating scripts from Turkish to English. He was aware of this thesis's need for grammatical and lexical accuracy. His political sympathies are aligned closely to CTP.

To avoid CTP sympathetic translations, an English Language teacher with excellent English and Turkish was hired. He too was aware of this thesis and the necessity for accuracy. His political leanings are far more Turkish nationalistic.

A third translator is a Turkish Cypriot with excellent English and very little interest in politics. These three performed an initial translation of all scripts. A fourth translator did a detailed check of the work by the other three. She is a TEFL teaching assistant and professional translator. She declared a "dire" disinterest in politics.

Despite diverse political leanings, there were almost no discrepancies in the readings of the texts. Any discrepancies were minor and did not affect any analysis. The resultant translations are interpretations of four TRNC residents which inevitably reflect how many residents interpret the news.

A second problem in translating these scripts is Turkish and English sentence structures are very different. In English, the emphasis of a sentence is at its beginning (van Dijk, 1991: 216), which also usually contains a sentence's subject and verb. For example,

"I kicked the ball."

Here, "I", the subject and "kicked", the verb are the emphasis of the sentence. In Turkish, however, the same sentence reads:

"Topa vurdum."

"Ball kicked I."

Here the subject and verb are the last word in the sentence "vurdum". Turkish sentence construction dictates the last word contains the subject and verb. However, when a person is named, the person's name appears at the beginning of the sentence, though the verb and a grammatical indicator which acknowledges the sentence is in the third person is again at the end of the sentence. For example, using Richardson's (2007: 55) examples, in English an active construction of a sentence is:

"John kicked the ball."

In Turkish, this sentence reads:

"John topa vurdu."

"John ball kicked he."

So, now the subject "John" is at the beginning of the sentence, while the verb "vurdu" is at the end of the sentence, the final "u" in "vurdu" indicates the sentence is in the third person.

These examples illustrate how sentence position and emphasis in sentences can be analysed whilst using translations. For example, in the first example, "I kicked the ball", it can be claimed that sentence position (at the beginning in English and at the end in Turkish) effects emphasis in sentences. With the second example, "John kicked the ball", again sentence position in English and Turkish effect

emphasis, though in Turkish the emphasis in sentences with named subjects is at the beginning and end of the sentence.

Prepositional phrases are an important part of this thesis's textual analysis. In English, an example of a passive constructed sentence with a prepositional phrase is:

"The ball was kicked by John."

Here, "the ball" becomes the emphasised element of this sentence, while "by John" in a prepositional phrase becomes de-emphasised. The same applies in Turkish, remembering that with a named subject, the emphasis is at the beginning and end of the sentence. The Turkish reads:

"Topa John tarafından vuruldu."

"Ball John by kicked."

Here, "John" has been moved out of first position, and put into the middle of the sentence. This is a de-emphasised sentence position. Meanwhile "ball" takes first position becoming emphasised, as does "kicked" which is at the end of the sentence.

These examples illustrate how dealing with translations makes an analysis as close as this thesis's flawed to some small degree. Sentence structure, for instance, can be examined but one must be sensitive as to where the emphasis in the originals lie. These examples also illustrate that although working with translations is flawed, this is a valuable analysis. This is because the same elements of analysis, such as sentence position and emphasis of sentences, can be applied to translations, as long as the translations are sensitive to such concerns.

IV.4.ii Conclusion

To answer this thesis's research question of how TRNC radio news recontextualisations evoke different ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism, CDA has been chosen as its main methodology. This is supplemented with an ethnography of newsrooms. In this chapter both have

been described with a rationale given for using both. These methodologies produce detailed analysis and complement each other. The resulting analysis promises to be both detailed and revealing. Weaknesses in the thesis's methodology have been disclosed along with how this thesis addresses these.

Broadcast news is important culturally and politically. This is accentuated in TRNC where economic and political elites have a direct say in station content, despite claims to be broadcasting what is "good for the nation" and "helping in finding a solution" to the Cyprus conflict. The analysis to follow reveals how stations with different political contexts represent Turkish Cypriot nationalism to the benefit of stations' interests and to the detriment of a better life for residents.

V News Production in TRNC Radio Stations

V.1 Introduction

On the surface, news can appear as what is commonly known as biased, or as sociologists of news have put it, shaped by a number of limited themes and values. In CDA, it has been common to investigate the language of this bias to reveal its underlying ideology. Others, however have argued that we cannot understand texts properly without understanding the social practices that lie behind them (Bellier 2005; van Leeuwen, 2005; Fairclough, 2003). Bellier (2005: 252) underlines the importance of such an understanding:

For me as an anthropologist, without considering the actual personality of the individuals who are engaged in the production of the discourse, without observing the kind of emotions that lay behind the wording of a particular sentence, without knowing the arguments which have been exchanged before the final text is agreed upon, the researcher is not allowed to qualify the constitutive character of the assembly and of the text it produces.

In newsrooms, ethnography is one way the social practices behind the making of news has been examined. It has been found that newsroom culture and practices directly and indirectly affect news output (Machin and Niblock, 2006; Fishman, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). This is because discourse is a form of social practice where there is a dialectical relationship between discursive events and their situations, institutions and social structures (Richardson 2007; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Wodak 2001; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999). Scholars (some of whom use CDA) find ethnography is a preferred approach for examining this context of production due to its reliability, accuracy, descriptive qualities and compatibility with CDA (Richardson, 2007; Bellier, 2005; Elliot, 2005; Galasinska, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2005; Fairclough, 2003, 1995 and 1995a; Machin, 2002; Moores, 2000; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Scollon 1998; Pujolar 1997). This thesis's textual examination of competing variants of Turkish nationalism in different radio news stories is best understood as a direct product of specific newsroom practices and situations revealed through newsroom ethnographies.



In this chapter, ethnography is used to describe the conditions in which news stories are written. Aspects of newsmaking culture in three newsrooms are examined, focusing on the making of the stations' news stories which draw upon different ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, radio stations' political and economic contexts are described in turn: *BRTI*, followed by *KFM* and then *Radyo T*. In part two, news production processes within these political and economic contexts are outlined at each station. This involves examining news gathering and writing daily routines, addressing where stories are sourced from, who and what influences story selection decisions, news writing, development and editing practices.

These areas of study are based on previous ethnographic studies (see summary in van Dijk, 1988: 7-8). These produce a finely detailed level of description which is desired for two reasons. Firstly, there is very little known about Turkish Cypriot media, even in Cypriot literature. A detailed description of practices in TRNC newsrooms supplements this neglected area of research. Secondly, this detailed ethnography provides a description of the social practices behind texts analysed. This highlights the importance of political and economic factors in news production and describes the goings on, the small decisions and processes that lead to the production of texts. With description this detailed, this ethnography is an answer to critics and those who work in CDA who claim this type of work is needed, but so little of it is actually done (Philo, 2007; Widdowson, 2004; Fairclough, 2003).

The following newsroom studies of three radio stations generate a clear picture of the way events and agency material are processed to produce deeply ideological stories of a nature that may not even be evident to the producers themselves. These studies describe the processes which result in news that carries with it different ideological discourses of nationalism described in this thesis's textual analysis. These discourses benefit interests associated with stations and not the interests of TRNC residents.

V.2 Political and Economic Contexts

Radio stations' political and economic contexts are examined starting with a brief description of radio stations' settings, followed by their programming, finance, political control and political affiliations, staffing and resources. These observations reveal that all stations are working under tight financial constraints and are closely associated with political parties. Stations are poorly resourced, with poorly trained staff and politically-motivated ownership and/ or control. These factors help shape stations' variations of ideological news stories.

V.2.i *BRTI*

BRTK is TRNC's state-run broadcaster established in 1983. It employs 700 people. *BRT* offers two television services, and five radio services; one English and four Turkish. There is one main newsroom for all services except the English service, *BRTI*, which has a smaller separate newsroom. This thesis is concerned with the news programming on the English language radio service, *BRTI*.

V.2.i.a Setting: BRTK is housed in a large 60's style three storey cement building in need of some repair on the outskirts of TRNC's capital Nicosia. It is fenced in with lookout towers, reminders of past intercommunal violence. It used to be protected by army personnel, though security guards are now employed since tensions between the two communities have decreased.

Decor at *BRTK* is political with symbols, flags, posters and stickers of Turkey and TRNC together. Paintings of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, hang in most rooms, as do photographs of TRNC President Talat, Prime Minister Soyer and ex-president Rauf Denktaş. These are reminders that *BRTK* is a broadcaster closely linked to politics.

Despite the friendly and helpful atmosphere at *BRTK*, visitors are reminded that *BRTK* has its enemies and so are treated with a degree of suspicion. For example, upon first arrival, visitors recounted how they were questioned by *BRTK*'s director, Hüseyin Gürşan. This researcher was asked "We want to know

what you're doing. You're not a spy or anything are you?" Later, a news worker said, "He is serious because of the political situation."

V.2.i.b Programming: News workers and management believe *BRTI* programming is aimed at the government of the Republic of Cyprus, Greek and Turkish Cypriots who speak English, international parties with interests in Cyprus and the English ex-patriot community on Cyprus. Because there is no official lines of communication between TRNC and the Republic, the Republic and other interested parties listen to *BRTI* to hear TRNC's perspective on issues.

Almost all programming is in English in order to reach this diverse, international audience. There are two ten-minute English news programmes at 13:00 and 19:00, which are television-radio simulcasts, and two radio bulletins in Arabic, Russian, German, Greek and English daily at 11:00 and 15:00.

V.2.i.c Finance: *BRT* is a part of the TRNC government. It is mostly financed by the government, with advertising supplementing its income. Advertisers, which make up "a very small amount of our income", are all TRNC-based companies such as mobile phone providers, restaurants, car sales outlets and construction companies.³⁰ This financing arrangement affects news programming, according to Hüseyin Güven, *BRT*'s Chief News Coordinator. He said that *BRTK* does not provide "sensational" news to appeal to audiences. Instead, it focuses on the Cyprus conflict from a Turkish Cypriot perspective.

V.2.i.d: Political control/ affiliations: It was observed that *BRTK* has an array of influences which determine its political agenda. One influence is its mandate outlined in TRNC's *Bayrak Radio-Television Corporation Law number 50/1983* (hereafter *BRTK Law*). This law, passed by TRNC's parliament on 22 July 1983, established *BRTK*. It dictates that *BRTK* is not independent, but directly linked to the Prime Minister's office.³¹ Güven said this relationship is reflected in its news. In former years, the station used to produce propaganda aimed against the

³⁰ *BRT* employees were unable to give a percentage of its income which comes from advertising. However, when asked, most news workers made remarks such as that noted in the text.

³¹ This is taken from article 95 of TRNC Law No. 50/ 1983 which established *BRTK* downloaded from http://www.cm.gov.nc.tr/dir_docs/50-1983.doc on 07.09.09.

Republic. But since 2003, due to the electoral win of pro-federation CTP, Güven claimed:

BRT is making news to try and get the two cultures together again. Politicians are looking for solutions and BRT wants to play a role in the peace making atmosphere. We want to help find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

The *BRTK Law* also dictates a national prioritisation regardless of which party is in power. According to Article five of the *BRTK Law*, *BRTK* must:

- a. make effective live broadcasts of successful events and anniversaries of national days
- b. instil a sense of patriotism for the country
- c. broadcast educational, cultural and entertaining programmes for developing social, economic and cultural structures of the community
- d. carry out authentic news services in accordance with the national and public interests.

All four aspects of the law cited above refer to the “nation”, “patriotism” or “the community”. These are the foundations of programming on *BRTK*, so influence news. Ali Demerioğlu, English news Chief-Editor, exemplified this thinking when describing *BRT*'s reason for broadcasting:

BRT is the voice of the Turkish Cypriot people. We are here to promote our political stance on the Cyprus issue. Here to promote the Turkish Cypriot side.

Another influence in *BRTK*'s political agenda is its board of governors. Meryem Dağun, English news' second chief editor explained:

We [*BRT* editors] have to answer to the board of governors. The governors are made up of not just CTP, but the Turkish military, and you know who.

When asked for clarification, she said “money interests”. This is an euphemism for power holders in TRNC such as those who have been granted land and monopoly import licenses for their support for governments.

There is also evidence of direct Turkish military influence in broadcasting at *BRTK*, confirming that *BRTK*'s political context plays an ideological role in its programming. During this newsroom study, a documentary was aired on *BRT*-

TV which criticised the Turkish and Greek military during the 1974 conflict. The Turkish military complained and within a week, director of *BRTK* Hüseyin Gürşan was sacked and replaced. News workers told this researcher that “everyone knows that he left because the military pushed him out.”

V.2.i.e Staffing: Compared to other radio stations’ staffing levels, *BRTK* is overstaffed with a total of 70 in the news service; 40 in the main newsroom and 30 in the *BRTI* newsroom. It was observed that although most news workers work hard, there is a lot of non-working time for some news workers throughout each day. English news Chief-Editor Demerioğlu explained that staffing levels at *BRTK* have remained high because “staffing is political. *BRT* hires people to prevent them from leaving TRNC.”

Despite these staffing policies, there is little training. *BRT*’s Chief News Coordinator Güven complained that his biggest problem is the lack of qualified personnel with media expertise. This researcher heard newsreaders complain of no news-reading background or training, previously being housewives, music programmers or secretaries. Likewise, it was observed that reporters rely on news agency feeds instead of their own observations and notes when writing up stories, possibly due to a lack of experience and confidence.

V.2.i.f Resources: There is clearly a severe lack of necessary equipment at the station. In *BRTI*’s newsroom, 15 editors share two phones, one fax machine and three computers. The chief editor takes one computer, while the remaining editors use the other two computers. This results in queuing for computers and leaves little time for investigation or verifying information. There is no sound recording-editing programme on computers, so clips and sound effects can not be part of newscasts.

Radio editor Ibrahim Güneser, complained that the limited equipment and computers mean “there is no time to do your own stuff.” For outside recording, there is only one analogue and one digital voice recorder. Both were not functioning on a day this researcher asked to borrow them, meaning a further reliance on agency feeds.

It was observed how the three or four available video cameras in the main newsroom affect *BRTI*'s radio coverage of TRNC events. This dependence on cameras is because all *BRT* services share scripts based on stories selected by the chief editors. *BRT* (*KFM* and *Radyo T* also) rely on *TAK*'s news service for news gathering and writing. However, *TAK* only offers a script and photography service, not a video service. So, for *BRT* to offer a TRNC story on TV (and therefore all services including *BRTI*), it needs to be assigned a camera. If there is no camera, there is no story for radio or television. For example, one day a planned story on Civil Rescue was cancelled. Because no camera and reporter went to the event, *BRT* reporters did not cover the event and it was not included in *BRTI*'s radio news, despite its planned inclusion. A similar system applies across all three stations.

V.2.ii *KFM*

The *Kıbrıs Media Group* (*KMG*) is the largest commercial media conglomerate in TRNC, owned by businessman Asil Nadir, who has close personal contacts with the governing CTP party.³² *KMG* owns two newspapers, a television and a radio station. This ethnography is concerned with news production on *KMG*'s radio service *KFM* which started broadcasting in 1997.

V.2.ii.a *Setting*: The *KMG* building is a modern, glass-fronted structure on the outskirts of Nicosia. Despite outside appearances, *KFM* and *KTV* occupy a small almost forgotten maze of rooms, studios and corridors on the top floor of the building. *KFM* posters, signs and bumper stickers adorn the news area's walls and doors. Symbols of politics and political allegiances in *KFM*'s cramped newsroom are confined to only a few pro-*Annan plan* referendum car stickers, showing support for pro-federation CTP.³³

³² In March 2009, Nadir became involved in a public dispute with the CTP government and switched allegiances to the "Democratic Party", a Turkish Nationalist party. *KMG* publicly endorsed the Democratic party and began criticising the CTP in its news (Azgın interview, 2009).

³³ The Annan Plan referendum was an all-Cypriot referendum in 2004 which asked Cypriots if they wanted to become a federation. The CTP supported the Annan plan. It received overwhelming support from residents of TRNC and was rejected by residents of the Republic.

Guests are treated with modest curiosity at *KFM*. The politically-charged atmosphere noted at *BRT* is absent. Instead of being brought to management and being questioned about spying, this researcher was questioned casually about the topic of research by news workers before they returned to their daily routines.

V.2.ii.b Programming: News workers and management believe car drivers are their target audience. *KFM* offers its listeners hourly three-minute news bulletins from 09:00 until 22:30. It also airs a 25 minute news programme at 19:00 which is a television-radio simulcast.

V.2.ii.c Financing: *KMG* consists of two companies divided between print and broadcasting. The print company which publishes *KIBRIS* (TRNC's most popular newspaper) and *Cyprus Today* (a successful English weekly) is profitable, while *KFM* and *KTV* lose money. Print subsidises broadcasting.

As part of a profit-driven venture, commercial interests directly affect news programming on *KFM*. *KMG*'s editor-in-chief Süleyman Erğuçlu said he has to balance all his operations to ensure profitability. He explained that:

I have to maintain a balance of sharing news with radio and TV to make sure the newspaper sells the next day. If you listen to a story on radio and the same story the next day is in the paper, you wouldn't buy the paper.

V.2.ii.d Political control/ affiliations: Political interests of the owner and management also affect news, despite this being denied. Before the 2003 parliamentary victory of the CTP, Nadir and *KMG* were vocal supporters of the UBP and Turkish nationalism. This was evident in the station's content at the time (Azgın 1996: 656). This support was also evident by some editors, such as *KMG*'s editor-in-chief Erğuçlu, running for office as a UBP candidate in 1998 elections. However, Nadir switched allegiances before the 2003 elections and developed close personal contacts with pro-federation CTP. Mehmet Moreket, *Radyo T*'s newsroom manager recounted that Nadir switched to the CTP when he believed the CTP were about to win the 2003 elections and "he wanted to be on the winning side."

All correspondents and those in power at *KMG* also support the CTP. For example, Erġuċlu ran for political office again in 2003, this time as a CTP candidate and *KIBRIS* newspaper editor Basaran Duzgun is a CTP activist.

Despite this obvious affiliation with pro-federation CTP, its editors told this researcher that *KMG* is independent of political parties. Erġuċlu said that his news operation's top priority is "what is good for the nation" and he does not prioritise party politics. This mantra of "what is good for the nation" being a top news priority was repeated by almost all news workers throughout *KMG*. Some employees, however, expressed a different view. News presenter Aysu Basrı described how management's support for the CTP and *KFM* being part of a commercial enterprise influence content. She said, "We create a balance between supporting CTP and making a profit."

V.2.ii.e Staffing: The entire radio and TV operation at *KMG* employs twenty people. There are nine staff in the newsroom and a handful of part-timers. Radio technicians were cut with the introduction of computers and a self-operated radio studio in 2003. With no technicians, guests and radio discussion programmes have stopped. Not only are there few staff, it was observed that most are inexperienced, young, female graduates.

KFM offers no training. Basrı, the most experienced with nine years, complained that this lack of experience affects news quality. She said:

Our editors are not news experts. They are young because the salaries are very low. They have no connections outside, no sources.

V.2.ii.f Resources: Like *BRTI*, there is a severe lack of necessary equipment at *KFM*. There are four computers and five desks in the small newsroom. For outside recording, there is no radio equipment. Like *BRTI*, cameras are used to record visuals for television and very rarely sound. This is because the two cameras use archaic coil-spring microphones, not broadcast quality. The result is news is always a straight read relying heavily on news agency feeds.

V.2.iii Radyo T

Radyo T and *Kanal T* are owned and managed by Ersin Tatar, the UBP's Shadow Minister for Finance. The UBP is a Turkish nationalist political party which wants closer ties with Turkey and independence from the Republic. The focus of this ethnography is the radio station, *Radyo T*, which started broadcasting in 1998.

V.2.iii.a Setting: *Radyo T* and *Kanal T* are located in a small nondescript three storey building sandwiched between two other nondescript buildings in the centre of Nicosia. Once inside, the station's politics are obvious in its decor. The small building is full of either prints of Atatürk (Turkey's national hero) or photographs of nationalist politicians, many accompanied by Tatar and programmers. These display the close links between Turkish nationalist politicians and *Radyo T*. Even guests are seen as an audience for Turkish nationalist information, this researcher being offered CDs, pamphlets and stories about the Turkish Cypriot struggle for independence.

V.2.iii.b Programming: Newsroom manager Mehmet Moreket identifies *Radyo T*'s audience as car drivers and "people who want to know what is happening in our country of Turkish Cyprus." Owner Tatar believes his audience is "a niche market interested in local affairs." Judging by the amount of political programming, local affairs means TRNC politics. *Radyo T* offers its politically-interested audience three daily newscasts at 13:00, 19:00 and 24:00. These three newscasts and all political programmes are television-radio simulcasts.

V.2.iii.c Finance: Tatar's broadcasting company "is just making a profit". He blames the lack of profit for TRNC broadcasters on two factors. Firstly, international advertisers prefer to use Turkish mainland stations due to their audience reach on mainland Turkey and TRNC. This leaves all TRNC stations chasing a few TRNC advertisers. The second reason is the continual propagation of new stations despite broadcasting making little money in TRNC. Tatar believes stations continue to open because broadcasting gives owners "political clout". One can not help wondering if this is part of the motivation behind *Radyo T*.

V.2.iii.d Political control/ affiliations: *Radyo T*'s affiliation with the UBP is obvious. Owner Ersin Tatar is a powerful and active UBP nationalist politician. It was observed that nationalist politicians frequent the operation almost daily. Despite newsroom manager Moreket's claims that Tatar "does not dictate what politics to include in news", he is a daily presence in operations. He and Moreket meet formally and informally throughout each day to discuss programming. Moreket is also an avid nationalist who recounted on numerous occasions his days as a Turkish Cypriot fighter who fought alongside Turkish troops in 1974. His career in news includes working at *Radyo T* for nine years and another nationalist station beforehand. Moreket's personal politics and those of Tatar are known to all in the station.

V.2.iii.e Staffing: *Radyo T* has 12 full-time radio and television staff, eight of whom work for news. There are only two reporter-editors (one being manager Moreket). All workers have some university education, though no training is offered at *Radyo T*. It was noticed that Moreket rarely leaves his desk and his newsfeeds, bemoaning the lack of staff. He complained that:

I make 20 news stories everyday by myself. We have one cameraman, two writers, what can we do? I sit here for ten hours a day writing news. I help with editing, then I go home.

V.2.iii.f Resources: Necessary equipment is even more scarce than the other stations. The newsroom consists of two desks, two computers and a couple of televisions for monitoring and recording other stations' newscasts. The radio operation boasts a small un-manned radio studio and a voice booth for pre-recorded news pieces. There is only one camera available for gathering outside news. This severely limits what is included in newscasts because, like all stations, a camera is essential for newsgathering.

V.3 Newsroom practices from event to air

The newsroom practices which transform events into news stories in each of the stations introduced above are examined. This involves a description of news gathering, story selection, writing, development and editing practices. First, how

each station uses news agency feeds in news gathering and writing on one particular day is explored. Then each station's daily routines are described. These observations reveal that all stations rely heavily on news agencies for news gathering and writing. A reliance on wire services has been noted in studies about newsrooms elsewhere (Machin and van Leeuwen, 2007; Patterson, 1998; Palmer, Boyd-Barret and Rantanen, 1998; Wilke, 1998; Rantanen, 1998). For news about TRNC and the Republic, which is the majority of news and the focus of this thesis, there is an almost exclusive reliance on *TAK* news service. However, these observations also reveal differences in newsroom practices which contribute to news stories which evoke different ideological discourses.

V.3.i Radio station's dependency on TAK

The huge dependency of the stations on the *TAK* news agency for news is illustrated by an examination of news gathering on one randomly chosen day. On that day, all stations got the same *TAK* daily agenda feed which consisted of 60 stories, 44 concerned with TRNC.³⁴ Of these 44 TRNC stories, 33 covered either politicians' statements, press conferences or actions. The following describes how each station used *TAK* to gather TRNC news.³⁵

On that day, *BRTI* aired an 11 story newscast. Five of these stories were about TRNC government actions or statements (three concerning the Cyprus conflict), two were statements from foreign politicians about the Cyprus conflict and four were international stories. All five TRNC stories, one of the Cyprus conflict stories and one international story were sourced from *TAK*. The one story about the Cyprus conflict and the three international stories not sourced from *TAK*, were sourced from the *BBC* website. This means that no stories were independently gathered and researched.

On that day, *KFM* aired a 13 story newscast. All these stories were about TRNC government actions and statements (four concerning the Cyprus conflict). All

³⁴ See Appendix four for a list of all sixty stories

³⁵ See Appendix five for a list of story titles and their sources for each station.

stories but one were sourced from *TAK*. The one exception was sourced from the *BRT* website and appeared on the *BRT* news the previous day. This means that no stories were independently gathered and researched.

On that day, eight stories were given to this researcher, purportedly aired on *Radyo T*. However, three stories were from other days. All five of the remaining stories report TRNC events (four concerning the Cyprus conflict). Four of these were sourced from *TAK*. The fifth was sourced from *BRT*, appearing on *BRT*'s previous day's news. This means that no stories were independently gathered and researched.

This snapshot of the way stories were acquired by the three stations on one day demonstrates the almost exclusive use of *TAK* for news gathering for TRNC events and the Cyprus conflict. It also shows that *BRTI* uses sources other than *TAK*, such as the *BBC*, for non-TRNC news. Finally, it demonstrates that the two commercial stations use *BRT* as a source for their news.

On this same day, *TAK*'s feed provided an extensive account of a weekly news briefing by Presidential Spokesman Erçakıca. *BRTI* and *KFM* covered this event.³⁶ A comparison of the original *TAK* feed and these stories reveals how stations use *TAK* in different ways in their writing.

BRT's story included Erçakıca's comments on TRNC's continued isolation, ferry boat services, EU manipulation by the Republic and Talat's desire to meet with the Republic's President Papadopoulos. All these topics were selected from the longer original *TAK* feed. But *BRT* used the *TAK* original for more than just topic ideas. The *BRT* story used one quote and the last sentence of its story direct from the *TAK* original. The rest of the story is obviously *TAK* sourced with words and sentences changed and ideas summarised. For example, the first sentence in *BRT*'s story is very similar to the first sentence in the *TAK* original which reads:

³⁶ The *TAK* original feed is in Appendix six. The original Turkish scripts from *BRT1* and *KFM* are included in Appendix seven. The sections of the radio scripts which are identical to the original *TAK* feed in bold. Parts of the scripts which are obviously sourced from *TAK* but re-written are italicised. Furthermore, the *BRT1* script is used for this comparison, because this is the script *BRTI* editors used as their source before translating the script into English. Using the Turkish script allows a much closer comparison.

Presidential spokesperson Hasan Erçakıca has said that the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people is due to the attempts of the Greek Cypriot side and if we consider the latest events this reality becomes clear.

In this sentence, Erçakıca blames the Republic for isolation. Another sentence about halfway through the *TAK* feed reads:

Erçakıca stated that the Greek Cypriot side has no power to play that game [incorporating TRNC into a Greek Cypriot state] however, it contributes to deadlock to the solution in the Cyprus problem.

In this sentence Erçakıca accuses the Republic of wanting to incorporate TRNC into the Republic which results in no solution. *BRT* editors incorporate the main ideas from both these sentences in its opening sentence in its story which reads:

Presidential spokesperson Hasan Erçakıca has said that the Greek Cypriot attempts to maintain the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people are contrary to the efforts aimed at bringing about a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

The sentence used by *BRT* is a shorter amalgamation of the two *TAK* sentences, combining the ideas of isolation from *TAK*'s first sentence and not aiding in solutions taken from *TAK*'s second sentence.

KFM's treatment of the *TAK* original is quite different. *KFM* focuses on one aspect of the *TAK* feed: President Talat's desire to meet with Ban Ki Moon and Papadopoulos at the United Nations. A comparison of the *TAK* feed and *KFM*'s story reveals that with the exception of *KFM*'s first sentence, the entire story is taken word for word from the *TAK* original. There are no modifications and interpretations. This is a result of news gathering practices which see workers cut and paste directly from *TAK*.

Radyo T did not cover the Erçakıca news conference. A different example, like the story of a meeting between three TRNC parliamentary parties³⁷, shows how *Radyo T* uses *TAK*.

Three sentences in *Radyo T*'s story are almost identical to the *TAK* original. There are a few details missing such as "the parliamentary parties" which appear

³⁷ See Appendix eight for the *TAK* original feed and *Radyo T*'s story. Again, sentences which are identical to *TAK* are in bold and those which are obviously sourced from *TAK* in italics.

in the *TAK* feed. This is probably a genre consideration, keeping radio news simple. The scripts, however, differ thereafter. The seven remaining sentences are original, mostly referring to the UBP and its actions. These were sourced and written independent of *TAK*.

This short comparison of one story from each station reveals that each station uses *TAK* in news writing, but treats *TAK* differently. It demonstrates that *BRTI* and *Radyo T* use *TAK*, but interpret its writings for its audiences. *KFM* does a strict 'rip and read' treatment of its news feed. With the exception of *Radyo T*'s seven sentences, there was no further research or investigation into any of these agency stories.

V.3.ii News gathering and writing priorities and processes

In this section, news gathering processes, news selection, influences on writing, story development and editing practices are examined for each of the stations. To get a full picture of newsgathering and writing practices, a typical sequence of news selection and production at each station is described. Although each station uses *TAK* extensively, as outlined above, it is observed that each station uses *TAK* differently in gathering and writing news.

V.3.ii.a BRTI news gathering and writing priorities and processes

V.3.ii.a.1 Daily Routines

In the main *BRT* newsroom, the day begins at 07:30 for the two chief news-editors Efdal Keser (television) and İzzet Valkan (radio). They watch *NTV*, *BBC* and Greek news, read TRNC newspapers, scan websites, and most importantly, open up *TAK*'s agenda to prepare for the day's agenda-setting meeting. At 08.30, they meet Hüseyin Güven, *BRT* Chief News Coordinator, to set the agenda and running order for the day's news on all services.

News selection is non-controversial: these managers almost exclusively select government activities, the Cyprus Issue and follow-up stories all announced on the *TAK* agenda. Between 15 and 25 stories are selected. Once the news is agreed, *BRT*'s news agenda is put on the intranet for *BRTI* to select from.

At 08:45 and again at 14:30, the three managers meet with the main newsroom staff to allocate stories and resources. For the most part, talk amongst editors and directors is over *BRTK's* limited resources, especially cameras. Cameras are needed to collect visuals for television stories. Because all services share scripts, if a camera is not assigned to a story, the story is not covered on any of *BRT's* services, including *BRTI*. So, a camera is essential if an editor is to get his or her story on air.

Sometimes, there was discussion over content. However, it was observed that the view of management prevailed. For example, one day, Keser included triplets being born on the news agenda. Reporter-editors complained that this was not newsworthy. However, Keser insisted and the story was covered.

After the morning and afternoon meetings, staff do one of four things. First, some cameramen and reporters are sent out to gather footage and take notes of (usually political) events. Though reporters are attached to radio, television or *BRTI*, one write up is shared by all services.

Second, some reporters who have no access to cameras, log on to *TAK* and wait for scripts to edit. They contribute to writing up stories the cameramen and reporters go out to cover. Third, some editors assigned to foreign news, log on to *NTV* or *BBC* to copy, cut and paste stories. Finally, some editors read *TRNC* newspapers or watch live political proceedings on TV. Management expect them to search for story ideas and contribute to stories being written. Observation revealed there was not a lot of either of these activities, reflecting *BRTK's* condition of over-staffing.

Chief editors believe these four activities produce "exclusive" news. Radio's chief editor Valkan claimed that almost all *TRNC* news comes from *BRT's* reporters, with 20 percent from *TAK*. Reporters, alternatively, believe they do almost no original work. Observations reveal that although reporters and cameramen are assigned stories, there is a heavy reliance on *TAK* as a primary source of information.

News workers gather and write their assigned news stories until the end of their shift at 17:00 when they are replaced by a skeletal evening shift who continue preparations for the main newscasts at 19:00. Many drift off early after their assigned story is complete.

V.3.ii.a.2 Story Selection

In *BRTI's* newsroom, the most senior editor (Ali Demerioğlu or Meryem Dağun) starts the day at 09:30 by checking the agenda on the intranet sent by *BRT* Chief News Coordinator Güven earlier. The senior editor selects approximately 15 stories from Güven's agenda. Which stories get covered are based on audience preferences assumed by the senior editor, *BRTI's* political context and practicalities.

Firstly, assumed audience preferences dictate that local TRNC news like sewage and road works are not selected for *BRTI*. This is because editors say these stories are not of interest to their international audience.

Secondly, *BRTI's* political context determines selection. *BRTI's* top news priorities according to editors are "helping to find a solution to the Cyprus problem", "the Cyprus issue from a Turkish perspective" and "government activities". These priorities are either a part of *BRT's* mandate or a reflection of *BRT's* close link to the Prime Minister. Hüseyin Güven noted that one disadvantage of such close relations with the Prime Minister is:

We have to follow the Prime Minister. If not, the government gives us trouble. By trouble I mean they would ask 'why didn't you do this news.' We follow him, even when we know it's not that important for people.

Thirdly, there are practical reasons for news selected. Chief news editors Keser and Valkan claim non-political news is difficult to cover. Unlike politicians, who are easily accessible, the police give out information 24 hours after an incident. This is because the police are part of the military, not civilians so they have a "different mindset". Hospitals are the same. These practicalities favour government activities.

The prioritising of politics leaves little room for other news throughout *BRTK*. Radio editor Ibrahim Güneser complained that cameras are always booked for government activities. For example, during one morning meeting, the three cameras were booked to shoot a three-party conference, a Talat conference, a government statement, an antique theatre rehearsal, a folk dance show and a festival. With such a busy shooting schedule, any stories reporters wanted to do were sidelined.

Each day, after TRNC and Cyprus conflict stories are selected and written, a number of foreign news stories are selected. These are a low priority, usually at the bottom of the running order with their amount of air time determined by the amount of TRNC-Cyprus conflict news. Observation and conversations revealed that foreign news prioritises Turkey, the Republic and European news.

News from the Republic is supplied by *BRTK*'s listening service. A translator literally listens, records and translates news from the Republic's TV, radio and newspapers. As Güven proudly announced "we are listening to the south."

Everyday, one or two political stories about the Cyprus conflict are produced and used.

For Turkish and world news, *BRTI* almost exclusively cuts and pastes from the *BBC* or *NTV* websites. One editor claimed that Turkish news sources are preferred because "foreign news sources could be against our policies."

However, it was observed that in many cases the *BBC* was used. This is because *BBC* news can be cut and pasted quickly, without having to translate *NTV* Turkish scripts into English for *BRTI*'s English-speaking audience.

V.3.ii.a.3 Influences on writing

The writing process at *BRTI* almost always starts in the main *BRT* newsroom. This is where stories are first written in Turkish for *BRT*'s Turkish services before being translated in the English newsroom for *BRTI*. Occasionally, if a news event involves an English speaker, the English newsroom writes the original for *BRTI* before it is translated into Turkish for *BRT*'s Turkish services.

In either case, two factors are considered in this and the following sections. One addresses the factors which affect the writing in original scripts (English or Turkish). The second factor is how decisions are made in translations.

When writing stories, all *BRT* editors have many interests to consider. Meryem Dağun, English news's second chief editor, described how she makes decisions about writing: "We have to answer to the board of governors. They don't tell us what to write, but we just get a 'feeling'." The 'feeling' she experiences when writing is also to do with other influences:

When we write, we try not to offend the various interests in BRT and Cyprus. These include the board members and besides the military, government and money interests, we have to consider Turkey, the UN, the EU and the US. Its all about keeping them happy; that is, not offending them.

Dağun tries not to offend these interests because "we [TRNC] are not strong enough to stand on our own." TRNC's existence depends on not offending. This juggling act also has a temporal aspect to it. According to Dağun, a change of government brings about a change in management. She said:

Whatever government is in power at the time will have more influence than the other parties because they change the management to those who have sympathies with their policies.

So, the relationship with the government contributes to 'the feeling', by employing managers with party sympathies. This affects writing in two ways. Firstly, Dağun claimed:

Things have changed in the past few years because we now have a left wing parliament. Whoever sits in the chair [of government] what he says, we write.

Secondly, it was observed that senior news editors who are party-politically selected control all scripts and directly instruct editors. One editor said, "The chief editors have meetings with us editors occasionally to tell us what to write and how to write it." But this seems to be rare.

On a day to day basis, writing styles are affected by 'the feeling' described by Dağun. Yurdakul Cafer, a young editor, described how his writing has changed

due to the change in government from the Turkish Nationalist UBP to the pro-federation CTP in 2003. He said, "We don't attack the other side [the Republic] like we used to. We still do, just not as much." Görçin, another editor, believes the relationship between the government and *BRT* directly affects what she writes. She said,

The BRT director and the news director want long newscasts because they love [TRNC President] Talat. We are a part of government. We have to do what they say.

V.3.ii.a.4 Story development

After reporters return from *TAK* suggested shoots, *TAK* news feeds are used to write stories. For example, one day a reporter returned from a President Talat news conference with written notes and footage from the cameraman. One of the editors helped her write up her story. They used *TAK* and her notes. *TAK* was used to confirm what she had just witnessed. Once complete, the story was given to a senior editor for approval before being put on the intranet for other services to use.

At other times, *TAK* alone is used. Editors cutting and pasting original *TAK* feeds for their write ups was a common observation. This process usually involved shortening *TAK* feeds for radio.

V.3.ii.a.5 Editing

At *BRT*, there are numerous checks and controls throughout the process of writing. A reporter, whether writing up a shoot, or re-writing a *TAK* story, firstly gives the finished script to an editor to proof-read. After approval, it is put on the intranet so the other services can use the script. Here, another editor in each service proof-reads and adjusts the script. It then goes to the chief editors for final approval before recording.

So at *BRTI*, after a script is approved in the main newsroom, it is translated by an editor, then proof-read by Devocioğlu or Dağun, then final approval is given by the head of foreign languages services, before it is recorded. These checking

and control mechanisms ensure all news workers are writing in the prescribed *BRTI* manner.

A lot of script control seems to be lexical translation corrections at *BRTI* rather than overt political choices, though these can be political. For example, Dağun explained to one new editor that the President of the Republic is “the leader of the Greek Cypriot Administration, not President.”

There is also a lot of mentoring between senior staff and young editors to create a standard format, style and content. Editor Cafer commented,

You can write whatever you like. But if you do not follow the norm, your work will be re-written, so we do it.

More subtle manners of control were also observed. For example, at *BRTI*, English news's chief editor Devecioğlu contributes to many scripts. Devecioğlu is an encyclopedia of help with names, vocabulary, facts, where to find information and how to write sentences. He is well respected, solving disputes about timing of stories, selection and wordings on a daily basis. For example, there was a discussion about whether a visit from British politician Geoff Hoon on 25 April should appear in the news on 19 April, a slow news day. The conversation involved three editors. Finally, Devecioğlu was consulted and he said it was too early. This ended the debate.

V.3.ii.b KFM news gathering and writing priorities and processes

V.3.ii.b.1 Daily Routines

The first editor of the day, usually Özen Çatal, arrives in the newsroom at around 09:30 after hosting a live TV information programme. She opens and scans the *TAK* agenda. Cameraman Bahar Uygur arrives shortly afterwards and also looks at the agenda. They select five or six stories for the two cameramen to shoot. Cameramen go to events with no reporter, record talking heads and then move on to their next destination. They do not record soundbites because scripts are provided by *TAK*. Also, they do not have broadcast-quality microphones, the time, news directors or reporters to help select what to record. This lack of staffing contributes to a heavy reliance on *TAK* scripts.

In the newsroom, the editors drift into the newsroom by mid-morning. There is no chief-editor to control what stories are selected. The editors are on a rota, taking responsibility for writing and reading radio news each day. The other editors consult with the day's editor in charge of radio news and contribute to selection and writing or write television scripts. Editors rarely leave their computers, cutting, pasting and re-writing TRNC stories from *TAK* throughout the day. Surprisingly, there is very little sharing of information between *KFM* and *KMG*'s newspapers. None was observed during this research. By the 13:00 newscast, editors have written about seven stories. By the evening newscast the number has risen to 15.

For Turkish and international stories, it was observed that editors cut and paste from the *BRT* and Turkish websites. They use Turkish news agencies because their English is weak and Turkish affairs "have an impact on Cyprus."

KFM manager Erdiñç Gündüz's managerial approach is laissez-faire, allowing editors to gather and write news independent of checks and controls. Aside from a political context which supports the CTP and a reliance on news agency feeds, there is little consistency in news work. Gündüz finds the reliance on *TAK* distasteful, but claims to have little choice. He said:

As a manager I am very much against it. But I can't do much about it. We need more staff. We're stuck on *TAK*.

All editors admit they use *TAK* almost exclusively for TRNC news. Announcer-editor Aysu Basrı believes,

If *TAK* was to be turned off one day, we would have to close. Nobody would know where to look for news.

However, a lack of staff is not the only reason for a reliance on *TAK*. Apathy is also to blame. It was observed that news workers take long lunches and spend most of their time chatting on the internet. The newsroom is mostly empty by 17:00, with the exception of a couple of news workers finishing work for the evening newscasts. Gathering news is not a priority. One announcer explained that,

We sit and wait for TAK. If our editors were interested, they would go out and cover stories.

V.3.ii.b.2 Story selection

Story selection at *KFM* is based on *KMG*'s politics at the time. *KMG*'s editor-in-chief Erğüçlü distanced the station from party political reporting by claiming,

We leave the routine news like 'the president says this' and 'the PM laid the foundation..' to *TAK*. But setting the agenda for the country, we decide on the agenda and then work on it.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence of this claim in the newsroom. However, Erğüçlü's views on news gathering priorities are relevant:

TRNC, Cyprus Issue and domestic news are the priorities for *KMG*. What is good for our nation is our top priority. Nowadays, that is sorting out domestic issues here in TRNC.

Like his superior and all editors at *KFM*, Erdiñç Gündüz claimed the Cyprus conflict is not their top priority, "what is good for the nation" is. Editor Gürses said, "I pick what is important for the TRNC like the economy, jobs, culture and life in TRNC." Ekinci, another editor, admitted:

When Talat speaks we use it in the bulletin. But if he speaks a lot, we cut a lot. Things that affect people are what we are looking for. A car crash involving fatalities is more important than a politician saying nothing new.

But this independence from party politics claimed by almost all employees is not evident in newscasts. Basrı acknowledged that news workers are aware of the station's closeness to the CTP and this influences story selection and writing.

She said,

You won't see any anti-CTP stories in our news. We tend to protect CTP. In radio and TV this is to a lesser extent, because we follow *TAK* who are controlled by the [CTP] government anyway.

Like *BRT*, the selection of foreign news depends on the amount of TRNC news which in turn depends on the *TAK* agenda. Some days as many as 66 items on the *TAK* agenda were observed, while other days there were as few as five. On such days there is a lot of searching the internet for stories from Turkish agencies, while on other days, there is no foreign news.

V.3.ii.b.3 Influences on writing

KFM's owner and management influence writing at *KFM* indirectly and indirectly. The owner, all management and correspondents are CTP supporters or activists. It was observed that all workers know the allegiances of the station's management and owner. Almost all workers also repeat the mantra of writing about "what is good for the nation". In the newsroom's context, supporting the CTP is "what is good for the nation".

At the same time, editors are not politically active, concerned more with their own personal affairs. They never leave their desks, gathering, cutting and pasting TRNC news exclusively from *TAK*. As *TAK* is financed and managed by CTP government appointees, newscasts inevitably favour the CTP.

At times, however, station policy directly affects news writing. *KMG's* editor-in-chief Erğüçlü said management and its owner made the decision to support the *Annan plan* in 2003 which called for a federation in Cyprus. Erğüçlü believed this plan was for "the good of the nation". Basrı remembered the run up to the *Annan plan* fondly. She said,

There was a real focus on news. We were focused on a solution to the problem. We started making more news. We had news at night.

The focus of news presently, according to Erğüçlü, is on domestic problems.

V.3.ii.b.4 Story development

Story development at *KFM* is much simpler than at *BRTI*. Writing TRNC news, which is most of the news, involves cutting, pasting then printing stories from *TAK*. It was observed that editors mostly use the same wording and emphasis as *TAK*. The process is usually a matter of eliminating sentences and paragraphs because *TAK* stories are too long for radio. Sometimes this is a matter of cutting repetition thereby making stories simpler.

These observations were confirmed by Basrı, who complained that the scripts lack any sort of individuality. She said,

The editors rarely write stuff in their own words. If you look at the words used in other newspapers or newscasts, they look the same as each other.

Decisions about what parts of *TAK* feeds to include in *KFM* stories are also based on pro-CTP influences. Editor-reporter Aksoyğın claimed editors “summarise paragraphs, choosing what is good for the TRNC.” The mantra of “what is good for TRNC” interpreted by workers at *KFM* means what is good for a CTP-led TRNC.

V.3.ii.b.5 Editing

There is no official editing process or system in place at *KFM*. The young inexperienced editors cut and paste from *TAK*. When they finish, they give the scripts to another young inexperienced editor who is that day’s person in charge of radio. She reads the scripts in the adjacent on-air room live, many times without rehearsing the script.

However, mentoring does contribute to a common writing style at *KFM*. Aysu Basrı is seen by editors as a big sister figure – one to be respected and learn from. She occasionally holds workshops on speech and writing for radio, though this is rare and was not observed during this research. She also re-writes stories during her announcing duty if she feels they are not good enough. However, she rarely does this “out of respect for the editors.” This is not the same as the control witnessed at *BRTI*. In fact, Basrı and another editor-reporter (Ekinci) expressed distaste at the amount of control at *BRTI*, claiming there is too much “propaganda” and “flag waving”.

V.3.ii.c Radyo T news gathering and writing priorities and processes

V.3.ii.c.1 Daily Routines

Moreket arrives at 09:30 and opens up *TAK* to get his daily news agenda. Like the other stations, *TAK* is the primary source for news gathering. One of his cameramen, a video editor, owner Ersin Tatar and editor-reporter Alihan Özer arrive around 10:00 to read and discuss the morning newspapers over coffee. Here Moreket and the others discuss story ideas and, importantly, politics. These meetings mentor workers about the politics of their superiors which influence news making accordingly.

After these informal meetings, Moreket briefs Özer on the day's events he has picked from the *TAK* agenda. Sometimes Özer has an idea for an "exclusive" story. These are usually political reaction pieces, such as people's reactions to the latest move in negotiations with the (Greek) Republic. If Moreket approves, Özer leaves with the cameraman. Otherwise, Özer edits a few stories or plays on the internet.

Meanwhile, Moreket selects and cuts stories from *TAK*, concentrating on TRNC politics. He supplements *TAK* with information from the *BRT* website and UBP politicians. It was observed that Moreket discussed politics and the day's news with UBP politicians who regularly visited the building. These discussions inevitably inform his news gathering. For Turkish mainland stories, he uses the *NTV* website.

The cameramen and video editors get instructions from Moreket as to what to download, record or shoot. The cameramen shoot four or five locations selected by Moreket from the *TAK agenda*. As *TAK* stories arrive, Moreket scans, re-words, cuts and pastes. He works on several stories at the same time. By 13:00, they usually have prepared four or five stories, so this is the length of the newscast. As the day continues, more stories are added, so by midnight there may be 20 stories.

In the afternoon, Moreket prepares for his live politics show. At 14:30, he drops his editing, puts on a tie and hosts his live television and radio Cyprus political programme. Many times, guests are nationalist politicians who inform Moreket's news stories as named or unnamed sources. At 16:00, he returns to the newsroom and writes and produces more stories for the 19:00 news programme. At 19:00, he leaves the building for the day. The duty cameraman and video editor ensure the midnight news is broadcasted.

V.3.ii.c.2 Story Selection

Moreket outlined what he sees as *Radyo T's* news selection priorities. These are:

Our country is the most important thing in news. This is usually the Cyprus Problem, what politicians say and what Greek Cyprus says about the problem. The next priority is what outside politicians such as Turkish, European and American politicians think about the Cyprus Problem. Then it is news from Turkey because Turkey directly affects us. And Turkish Cyprus is news for us, you know like electricity in Karpaz.³⁸

Observations confirm these priorities which emphasise TRNC politics. Moreket said politics are a top priority at the station due to three influences: pressures from ownership, *TAK*'s prioritising of politics and his assumed audience expectations. Firstly, owner Tatar is a daily presence at the station, involved in many discussions with workers. Moreket claims,

Tatar likes political programmes. So we must do political shows, but he does not tell us what politics and politicians to use.

Though Tatar may not tell Moreket what politics to include, he is the owner and manager of the station and the UBP's Shadow Finance Minister. This dual role no doubt influences Moreket's decisions. Furthermore, Moreket's personal politics are nationalistic. These factors contribute to the prioritising of nationalist politics.

Secondly, Moreket explained that politics are prioritised on *Radyo T* because he uses *TAK* to gather news. Most stories from *TAK* are about politics. Thirdly, Moreket assumes that listeners' preferences prioritise politics. He said,

Everyone speaks about politics at the coffee shops, with friends. When we ask people what type of programmes they want, they say politics.

V.3.ii.c.3 Influences on writing

Similar to *KFM*, influences at *Radyo T* are very much a one-sided affair. Newsroom manager Moreket for all intents and purposes is the news department. According to Moreket, what he writes into his stories taken from *TAK* feeds depends on two influences. Firstly, there is an emphasis on politics due to the owner's affinity with politics. Moreket writes in politicians' voices when "what they say is good for the nation." Due to the station's and Moreket's politics, and the accessibility to UBP politicians, the voices he chooses are Turkish

³⁸ Karpaz is an area of TRNC which at the time of writing had no electricity. There was a political and environmental debate as to whether to install electricity.

nationalists' voices. There is a second more practical influence in what is written from *TAK* feeds. Moreket said, "I wait for our cameraman, I look at the pictures and decide what works with the pictures." So visuals help determine the narrative, an issue explored by Montgomery (2005: 244).

V.3.ii.c.4 Story Development

Writing at *Radyo T* is a relatively simple affair due to the small number of staff. Moreket cuts *TAK* feeds to the minimum, keeping whole paragraphs, eliminating others. He eliminates headlines, changes dates from 'today' to 'last night' and eliminates bi-lines. He changes words for clarity and replaces pronouns such as 'he' with names. Sometimes he combines related stories from *TAK* to produce one story. He also uses the *BRT* website and visiting UBP politicians to supplement his work. When he finishes, he gives a copy of the script to the announcer to rehearse and a copy to the video editor who he supervises in the production of the news piece.

The writing of a story involving TRNC politicians was observed one day. Moreket started with the *TAK* feed. He then cut and pasted the same story from the *BRT* website. He inserted whole paragraphs from *BRT*. He said he did this to produce a more "readable" story. So genre-related considerations such as "readability" are part of the process of writing.

Editor-reporter Özer's "exclusive" stories also start with *TAK*. Though he claims his stories are "exclusives", it was observed that he gets his ideas from *TAK* or *NTV*. For example, he did a story about a visit by Turkish President Gül. This visit had been heavily covered by *TAK* and all TRNC media.

Özer's stories generally support *Radyo T* politics, transforming *TAK* stories into stories which support Turkish nationalist ideology. For example, two women protested against Turkey's links to TRNC by demonstrating during Gül's visit. Though this exemplified anti-Turkey politics, *Radyo T* changed this. The story was made comical by the use of double speed on the women's voices and actions, comical editing so the women repeated themselves and light-hearted music. The women were made to look foolish, thereby confirming support for Gül

and Turkish politicians. The story involved Moreket's prior approval and his help in the video editing process, ensuring the story maintained the station's Turkish nationalist politics.

V.3.ii.c.5 Editing

All editing and control in the newsroom is through newsroom manager Moreket. He writes almost all stories. Özer's exclusive stories have to get Moreket's idea, script, shot and editing approval before they are aired. In fact, Moreket has a hand in all video editing, sitting in on the cutting of stories and advising the video editor which shots to use and when.

Mentoring also plays a part in the newsroom, whether over coffee or whilst making decisions about stories. For example, one morning, Moreket and Tatar were in a heated discussion about the failings of pro-federation CTP. A video editor, cameraman and a few others did not contribute to the conversation. Instead, they listened attentively, shaking their heads and occasionally grunting in agreement. Throughout this newsroom's observations, these junior employees reiterated the same politics to this researcher who was considered the most junior person at the station. No doubt these political discussions not only make clear to workers the politics of their superiors, they also play a role in decisions they make whilst constructing news stories.

V.4 Conclusion

This chapter has described radio stations' political and economic contexts, news gathering and news writing practices. It has shown how all three of these aspects of newsrooms are a factor in determining the different ideological discourses in TRNC news stories.

For example, *BRT's* newscasts are influenced by its mandate to promote TRNC, its answerability to the government and other power groups, its over-staffing and its lack of resources. Its reliance on *TAK* is supplemented by *BRT's* own reporters for newsgathering and news writing. These practices along with perceived pressures from politicians and management, control mechanisms and

mentoring all contribute to 'the feeling' news workers experience when writing news stories. This 'feeling' determines how news workers recontextualise events which draw upon ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

KFM and *Radyo T's* newscasts, likewise, are also influenced by their relations with political parties, the political perspective (or lack of political interest) of news workers and management, their lack of staff and resources. Their reliance on *TAK* for news gathering and writing about "what is good for the nation", however, evoke very different national discourses in news stories.

All three stations claim to write news not as an objective account of events, but interpretations of "what is good for the nation" or what will "help find a solution to the Cyprus problem". This ethnography has demonstrated that stations' different situations, institutions and social structures affect what is read out on TRNC radio news. With this knowledge, the next few chapters' analysis of station's competing variants of Turkish nationalism is informed by knowing how, why and where this ideology comes from in its production context.

VI Lokmacı-Ledra Gate Opening Analysis

VI.1 Introduction

Up to 1956, Ledra Street in the centre of Nicosia was a popular shopping and socialising district for all Cypriots and Britons. Its popularity with Britons and Turkish Cypriots faded when EOKA³⁹ started using the crowded street for attacks. Later, with an escalation in intercommunal violence in 1958, local Turkish Cypriots withdrew to the North of Nicosia, and the street was divided with a barricade at a sweet shop, known as a “Lokmacı”. Lokmacı, as the barricade became known, was the first erected in Cyprus dividing the two communities and became a symbol of division (*BRTI*, 03.04.08).

The barricade was dismantled during the time of the shared Republic from 1960 to 1963. With the end of the shared Republic came the end of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots inhabiting the whole island. In 1963, Turkish Cypriots withdrew to enclaves throughout the island, one being in North Nicosia. Various streets which ran between the northern and southern part of the city, including Ledra Street, were blockaded. This time, Lokmacı was blocked and sealed for 45 years, with the UN patrolling the blockade separating Greeks from Turks.

After Cyprus was divided in 1974, there were no legal ways of crossing between the two sides. Division was ensured by the military from both sides of the island and the UN. The area surrounding Lokmacı declined in popularity to the point where it supported very little trade or visitors.

The first crossing to be opened between the Republic and TRNC was the Ledra Palace Hotel crossing in Nicosia on 23 April 2003. It is fifteen minutes walk from the centre of Nicosia, making it inconvenient for many residents who wish to cross. Four more have been opened since. These are vehicle crossings in non-urban areas spread out along the border. It took four years of negotiations between the TRNC and the Republic's governments before the Lokmacı

³⁹ EOKA was the Greek Cypriot armed militia which aimed to liberate Cyprus from British colonial rule and join Cyprus with Greece politically.

barricade was dismantled to be replaced by a small pedestrian crossing on 3 April 2008.

Along with the opening of the crossing, much money and preparations went into rejuvenating the area with the expectation of economic benefits. Shops were opened, pavements were mended and cafes appeared in preparation for visitors from both sides of Cyprus. Lokmacı is seen as unique, being in a central location in Nicosia and being only a few metres long (some crossings are more than one kilometre long). This makes it easy to pass between the two sides. As a pedestrian crossing, the atmosphere of the crossing is more relaxed. Its narrowness keeps with the character of the area, old Ottoman two-floored buildings rising above cluttered, narrow streets.

The crossing has proven to be popular, re-uniting residents from the two communities in this area again. According to a 2009 survey, the opening has led to an increase in social contact between the two communities, an increase in the frequency residents of both states cross to the other side and a revitalisation of both local areas' economies.⁴⁰

The opening of the Lokmacı crossing point was a celebrated success for pro-federation enthusiasts and political parties, especially TRNC's CTP government. Its opening was one of a number of pro-federation moves by CTP, such as participating in co-community technical groups, engaging in UN peace talks and opening up other crossings between the two states. These are seen as part of its ultimate aim of a single Cypriot federation.

VI.1.i Lokmacı Media coverage

BRTI, *KFM*, and *Radyo T* gave Lokmacı extensive coverage. In the week of its opening (31 March to 5 April 2008), Lokmacı appeared in main newscast stories seven times on *BRTI*, thirteen times on *KFM* and eight times on *Radyo T*. Events covered were preparations to the area, the opening ceremony,

⁴⁰ This survey was performed by the independent all-Cypriot PRIO Cyprus Centre research organisation. Downloaded 18 April 2009 http://www.prio.no/upload/EN%20PRESS%20RELEASE_LEDRA-LOKMACI%20CROSSING.doc

international responses to the opening, a three hour closure and a protest. All stations appear to allow these events to be represented positively, possibly due to public opinion which on the whole was in favour of the opening. However, pro-solution discourses are mostly omitted. When they are present, they serve as a pretext to be negative. Van Dijk (1993:7) notes this strategy when examining texts about race. He finds that because negative talk about minorities may be heard as racist “such talk will often be accompanied by disclaimers [...] as in the case in such well-known formulas as ‘I have nothing against blacks (Turks, etc.) but ...’.” In this case, pro-solution discourses play the role of the disclaimer.

Analysis of the language of the texts reveals that each station shapes its coverage slightly differently. Stations subtly use their coverage of events as an opportunity to promote their own ideas and interests about the nature of Cyprus, TRNC and its condition. This allows even a story that on one level appears to be pro-solution to be shaped to subtly foreground its negative aspects.

Stations recontextualise events about Lokmacı’s opening which evoke differing ideological discourses about Turkish Cypriotness. *BRTI* stories realise discourses which benefit its pro-federation interests such as the CTP government, but also its Turkish nationalist interests, such as the Turkish military. *BRTI* editor Meryem Dağun said she and all editors feel they must consider both pro and anti-solution participants in the Cyprus conflict when writing. Editor Yurdakul Cafer said ‘the feeling’ he experiences when writing is reinforced by the direct control of scripts by his supervisors, such as Dağun.

KFM news stories recontextualise events in ways which signify discourses of unquestionable CTP governance at the expense of discourses of unity, cooperation and compromise. *Radjo T* stories draw upon discourses from UBP Turkish nationalist ideology. These recontextualisations arise not as a result of individual journalistic bias but as a result of stations’ closeness to political parties and newsroom practices. These ideological messages are almost automatic in fashion, with news workers themselves unaware of how their practices become political. Editor Ekinci said *KFM* news is not politically biased and *Radjo T* editor

Moreket said his news does not favour any party, though both these claims are refuted in this analysis.

The opening of Lokmacı could reasonably have been represented as a positive, celebrated event which re-united aspects of Cyprus, a stepping stone on the way to a solution to the Cyprus conflict. One could imagine the way this would have been covered in a North Atlantic news outlet, framed sentimentally as 'one people' coming together, where differences were essentially superficial or existed only as imposed by politicians and bureaucrats, returning the area to how it should be. Such reports would carry short vox pop interviews with people mixing and chatting in cafes, where they would say how happy they are and how natural it all feels. However, these chances are lost. Instead, the three stations recontextualise the opening so that it is an event that is used and shaped for their respective ideological interests. In each case, the events are used to signify discourses which support interests closely associated with each station and not settlements on Cyprus.

VI.1.ii Chapter's structure and analytical approach

This chapter examines the way each station covered events about the opening of Lokmacı border crossing point. *BRTI* stories are analysed, followed by *KFM* and finally *Radyo T*.⁴¹ Three aspects of the sample are explored. In part one, a short extract from each station's coverage of a temporary closure of Lokmacı is examined. Following Fairclough (2003: 10, 52, 136), an extract is analysed to determine who are the participants shaping events, how listeners perceive of them, understand their identities and what their actions mean. This demonstrates how the same basic sequence of events, such as the temporary closure of Lokmacı, can be placed into different discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

In part two, the representation of governance in TRNC and the Republic is analysed using the whole sample of stories. This is another common approach

⁴¹ See appendix 9a for original scripts from *BRTI*, appendix 9b for original scripts and translations from *KFM* and appendix 9c for original scripts and translations from *Radyo T*.

used by practitioners of CDA, identifying lexical and grammatical strategies used across a wide sample to reveal dominant discourses (Flowerdew and Leong, 2007; Higgins, 2004; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; van Dijk, 1991). This analysis illustrates how each station represents leadership in their nation and the Republic. It also reveals the nature of relations between the two states' governments, a contested part of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This analysis reveals that the way governance is represented reflects the different interests associated with each station.

In part three, who and what are being governed in TRNC and the Republic are examined. This illustrates who and what each station includes in their concept of a Turkish Cypriot nation and the Republic, each slightly different and each reflecting interests associated with each station.

Together, these three analyses reveal how each station recontextualises events which signify ideological discourses about the nation. These discourses benefit power-holding interests closely associated with each station, with little regard for the interests of other TRNC residents. Overall, these three levels of analysis are necessary to see the type of Turkish Cypriot nation each station represents in terms of governance, its governed and relations with the Republic whilst representing an event.

VI.2 Lokmacı's Temporary Closure: Extract Analysis

Lokmacı was opened on 3 April 2008. That same evening the Republic's authorities closed pedestrian traffic one way for three hours. The Republic's authorities claimed that a TRNC police patrol had entered the crossing in violation of Lokmacı agreements. TRNC officials claimed the police patrol had a right to be where it was. The UN mediated a solution and the Republic's authorities re-opened traffic.

On 4 April, all stations reported the closure. This extract analysis examines this coverage. This event could have been framed as an example of how small misunderstandings between the two communities, such as the positioning of a

police patrol, can be resolved through negotiations, which was in fact what actually took place. None of the stations emphasised the teamwork and negotiations needed to re-open Lokmacı. When asked specifically about the event, *BRTI*'s Chief Editor Ali Demerioğlu demonstrated the influence of journalists' personal politics by saying he saw the closure as a typical example of the Republic being untrustworthy, so it was written as such. These sentiments and others are part of the stations' stories which highlight participants closely associated with each station and their actions. Though satisfying stations' interests, differences between the two states are emphasised. In fact, *Radyo T* represents the Republic as a dangerous foe. These representations draw upon different discourses of a Turkish Cypriot nation at the expense of discourses of unity, compromise and cooperation, discourses conducive to finding solutions on Cyprus.

VI.2.i BRTI

Analysis of the *BRTI* story shows that journalists recontextualise the closing of Lokmacı in ways which clearly reveal how power holders associated with *BRT* influence scripts. On the one hand, positive discourses about CTP governance are signified. On the other hand, a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation and an oppositional Republic are represented, far more in line with Turkish nationalist thinking. The following is the opening five sentences from the *BRTI* story:

1. The crossings at Lokmacı-Ledra Border Gate are continuing between the two sides in Cyprus despite a brief closure of the gate late on Thursday.
2. The gate - which was opened to crossings yesterday morning – was closed by the Greek Cypriot Side at around 8:30 with a claim that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.
3. The crossing was reopened around three hours later after mediation by UN officials.
4. President Mehmet Ali Talat has said that Thursday's developments at Lokmacı were an isolated incident that should not be exaggerated.
5. Speaking at Ercan Airport on his return from Istanbul, President Talat reminded that the Turkish Cypriot Side has been working since 2005 for the opening of the gate. (my numbering)

It can be seen from this extract that there are some pro-solution lexical choices. Unfortunately, these choices act as little more than a disclaimer for a number of features which indicate *BRTI* support for the CTP government, the police (which aids in representing the Republic negatively) and a distinct TRNC nation while representing the Republic as an oppositional 'other'.

My experience in the *BRTI* newsroom showed the extent to which pro-federation and Turkish nationalist interests are both part of news-making decisions. Before 2003, according to editor Cafer, the latter had been most influential at *BRT* in terms of "attacking the Republic" in news due to Turkish nationalist UBP's grip on power. This dominance dissipated somewhat after the election of pro-federation CTP, though like most civil services, Turkish nationalism continued at both institutional and individual journalists' levels.⁴² Editor Dağun said these interests contribute to 'the feeling' writers experience when writing, trying "not to offend" TRNC power holders. Personal politics also play a role. One editor claimed that pro-solution lexical choices are not a conscious decision when he writes. However, after he was presented with my analysis of some of his choices in stories, he said his pro-federation politics indeed were an important influence on his lexical and grammatical decisions.⁴³ For example, naming Lokmacı the "Lokmacı-Ledra Border Gate" (as discussed below) was not a conscious pro-federation decision, but felt "natural" to him at the time.

In this extract, a few pro-solution lexical choices are used. One example is positively naming Lokmacı a "crossing" in sentence one, two and three, connoting a place to pass through. This is in contrast to "gate" which is the most common naming of Lokmacı on all stations. Though this word seems to be an arbitrary choice, it connotes separation. A gate is something which can be

⁴² Interview with Bekir Azgın on 25 May 2009, professor of Journalism at Eastern Mediterranean University and author of numerous academic articles about TRNC and Cypriot media. Bekir Azgın stated that all civil services in TRNC are mostly Turkish nationalist due to 40 years of UBP and Turkish military governance.

⁴³ The editor was shown some of his lexical choices and he commented as such on 19.09.09. He did not want to be named as the government at this time changed to Turkish nationalist UBP, which has a direct say in affair at the station.

closed to separate two distinct places. It reminds listeners of a border, an exit out of TRNC and an entrance to another place.

Another pro-solution naming is “Lokmacı-Ledra Border Gate” in line one. Here, the Greek Cypriot name for the crossing point and the area is included, informing listeners of the ‘other place’, the area on the other side of the border. This acknowledges the crossing point indeed goes to the Greek Cypriot Republic. Unfortunately, this is the only mention of “Ledra” used on the stations throughout the whole corpus of stories. Elsewhere it is suppressed. These namings (“crossing” and “Ledra”) draw upon discourses of compromise and possibly cooperation, appealing to journalists and power groups which have an interest in finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict. However, these are the exception, acting as little more than a pretext for more dominant discourses.

In this extract we find one dominant discourse is support for the CTP. Though *BRT*'s Chief News Coordinator Hüseyin Güven said a *BRT* priority is following the government, editor Cafer said editors do not consciously support the government. Their support is a result of using *TAK*, aiming to please CTP supporting management and prioritising government activities.

Positive representation of the CTP can be seen in both lexical and grammatical choices. In terms of lexical choices the government is named personally as “President Mehmet Ali Talat” and “President Talat”. Personal representations highlight human aspects of the government. Naming the government offers listeners a point of identification, showing *BRTI*'s empathy with the CTP (van Leeuwen, 1996: 48). The functional honorific “President” highlights function and importance (ibid.: 53). Generally, all of the stations name actors formally with functional honorifics once in each story whereas in this extract, President Talat is named with functional honorifics twice. This positive naming emphasises Talat's function and importance, showing *BRTI*'s support for the CTP. This is in contrast to the Republic's government which is named “the Greek Cypriot side”, neither human nor official just a “side”.

At the level of grammatical choices we find that the CTP is represented as powerful, important and hard working. This is achieved by President Talat being activated twice in verbal processes. In sentence four, he is placed in dominant beginning of sentence position. In sentence five, he is placed in the dominant beginning of phrase position. These sentence positions foreground Talat, while activating him represents Talat as a participant with power (van Dijk, 1991: 216).

The government is also activated through the use of a segment of reported speech from Talat in sentence five. Here Talat activates the government in “has been working” at opening Lokmacı. The choice of activating the government is a reflection of *BRTI*'s obligation to follow the government and report its statements, which inevitably represent the government positively. This particular action is a distillation abstraction (van Leeuwen, 1999: 99). It does not really explain what the government has been doing, nevertheless it conveys a sense of agency, responsibility and planning. In fact, many question whether some government activities have been working at opening Lokmacı.⁴⁴ Critics and even members of the CTP government itself have admitted not spending enough time and energy in working for solutions.⁴⁵ However, by abstracting actions, Talat is able to represent the CTP favourably. This draws upon discourses of the CTP being TRNC's pro-solution and hard-working government, satisfying *BRTI*'s close links to the Prime Minister's office.

BRTI's representation of the closure of Lokmacı is also recontextualised to positively represent the CTP through collocations. A positive representation of Lokmacı shows support for the CTP, since the opening was an event the CTP claimed as pro-solution. A positive theme is achieved through collocating Lokmacı with “continuing” in sentence one, “opened” in sentence two and “re-opened” in sentence three. These all appear in dominant sentence positions, emphasising this positive theme. “Closure” is also collocated with Lokmacı in

⁴⁴ The CTP constructed a footbridge for Turkish soldiers to cross over the Lokmacı crossing. This caused a long delay in opening the crossing. Negotiations stopped until the bridge was dismantled.

⁴⁵ Nazim Beraltı, CTP's minister for ideology, claimed CTP had wasted too much time and energy on matters not to do with finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict the first four years it was in government. This was said to me in my interview with him in 2008.

sentence one, though modified as “a brief closure”. We can see this is in a clause in the non-dominant end of sentence position, de-emphasising it (van Dijk, 1991: 216). In sentence five, Talat is cited as uttering “developments at Lokmacı were an isolated incident”. “Developments” is an abstraction of Lokmacı’s closure. By abstracting its closure and it being “an isolated incident”, the closure is de-emphasised, made out to be unimportant. The result of these collocations is that Lokmacı is represented in a positive light, while its closure is de-emphasised.

The extract also shows that *BRTI* supports the TRNC police reflecting the relationship between the police and *BRTI*. The Turkish military are in charge of the TRNC police. The military also have a member on *BRTI*’s governing board, influencing all major decisions. Though direct intervention is rare, *BRTI* editor Dağun said the military is one participant she considers when writing the news. So representing the police positively satisfies the military which has a controlling voice in both institutions.

In this extract, the police “violated the buffer zone”, a negative action. However, this is slightly concealed by grammatical strategies. Van Dijk (1991: 216) claims sentence position and embedded clauses are used to de-emphasise in-group negative actions. In this case we find that in sentence two, “police violating the buffer zone” is de-emphasised by being placed at the end of a long sentence in an embedded clause. Furthermore, the clause is preceded by “with a claim”. “Claim” can shed doubt on a proposition (White, 2006: 62; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 295). So the whole idea of police negative actions is thrown into doubt, drawing upon a discourse of support for TRNC police.

In the extract we also find evidence of the way that *BRTI* shows its support for the idea of a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation, independent of the Republic. When asked why TRNC is promoted in *BRTI*’s stories, Chief Editor Demerioğlu said this is an obligation as outlined in TRNC’s *BRTK Law*. Editor Görçin said mentioning the nation in stories has become second nature to her in order to satisfy managerial expectations. This emphasis on the nation is seen in line two and

five where the police and government are named “Turkish Cypriot”. These namings remind listeners that their police and government are “Turkish Cypriot”, not “Greek” or “Cypriot”. The government’s naming furthers the idea of difference by being named a “side”. In fact, “side” is used twice in this short extract. A “side” carries connotations of opponents in a game or war.

It is not only the reminder of TRNC’s very existence as an entity that is found in this extract, but its struggle for recognition. This is seen in the fact that “Ercan Airport” is named. Ercan is the only passenger airport in TRNC. It is not internationally recognised as a legal port of entry to Cyprus except by Turkey and TRNC and is therefore in violation of the 1944 Chicago convention on International Civil Aviation which dictates that only airports under the Republic’s jurisdiction on Cyprus are legitimate. This is because the Republic is the only internationally recognised authority on Cyprus. Despite this unrecognised status, Ercan boasts being the destination for 90 flights a week. In this way, it has become a symbol of defiance against the Republic’s claims of authority over the whole island and TRNC’s struggle for recognition. Including Ercan Airport reminds listeners of TRNC’s struggle and partial successes.

Whereas the TRNC’s government and its actions are foregrounded and represented positively in this extract, lexical choices representing the Republic are negative, while its actions are suppressed. Lexical choices represent an oppositional ‘other’. The Republic’s government is named once in sentence two as “the Greek Cypriot Side”. This is an impersonal representation, de-emphasising its human aspects (Fairclough, 2003: 149). At the same time, naming it “Greek Cypriot” emphasizes the government’s ‘otherness’, though less than when the simplification of “Greek” is used, as is the case on the other two stations. An oppositional ‘other’ is suggested by using “side”. It could have been named as ‘the government of Cyprus’ which would have minimised difference and backgrounded opposition. Instead, these namings evoke discourses of an oppositional ‘other’.

In this extract, in contrast to the TRNC government and its actions being emphasised, there are a number of strategies used to background the Republic's agency and visibility as a participant, moving it sometimes into abstraction. In sentence one, the Republic is not named, but inferred in the clause "despite a brief closure of the gate". This clause, in a near-end sentence position, does not mention who is responsible for the closure. This is made clear in sentence two. Here, "the gate" is in a dominant sentence position, emphasising it. The action of "was closed" is a passive construction which de-emphasises agency. Only after these are identified is the Republic named and de-emphasised in a non-dominant sentence position within a prepositional phrase. This construction identifies the Republic and its actions negatively, but is less negative than the activation "the Republic closed the gate" (van Dijk, 1991: 216). By *BRTI* clouding agency in negative actions, discourses about the Republic being negative are less clear, drawing upon discourses of compromise.

However, *BRTI* also backgrounds the Republic when involved in positive actions with TRNC. In sentence one we find "The crossings at Lokmacı-Ledra Border Gate are continuing". Here, the actions of the two sides to re-open the gate after "a brief closure" are suppressed. This suppression is achieved through a passive agentless sentence construction which obscures agency; that is, the action of re-opening the gate so that crossings can continue is not represented. The same agentless construction is used in sentence three, suppressing the two governments working together to "reopen" Lokmacı.

By suppressing positive actions of the Republic working with TRNC, editor Cafer's comment that "We don't attack the other side [the Republic] as much as we used to [before the election of the CTP]" is reminded. The resultant discourses suppress the idea of the two Cypriot sides working together making it difficult for listeners to imagine the Republic engaged in positive actions.

VI.2.ii KFM

It was revealed that the *BRTI* extract positively represents the CTP, TRNC and its police while suppressing the actions and negatively representing the Republic.

KFM's treatment of the closure is similar, though differs by representing the closing in ways far more beneficial to its CTP-supporting owners and interests. Different kinds of foregrounding, suppression and agency evoke discourses of not only CTP support, but personality politics. The story begins as:

1. President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and returned back to the island.
2. From Ercan airport, he commented to reporters yesterday morning, we opened the Lokmacı gate with a ceremony and last night at 20:30 Greeks closed the gates one way."
3. Talat said, this development, "its an old hinderance mirrored today."
4. President Mehmet Ali Talat said Greeks closed the Lokmacı gate one way.
5. It did not happen on the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek side is mirroring the old barriers. (my numbering)

It can be seen from this extract that the *KFM* story supports the CTP government and especially Talat more than *BRTI*. It does not show this type of support for the nation, the UBP, the Republic or a Cypriot federation. These are either backgrounded, used as a backdrop for CTP actions, or represented negatively.

Despite *KFM* support for the CTP, this extract omits most CTP policies. These policies include the aim of creating a Cypriot federation evident by CTP statements and some cooperation with the Republic despite a chronic lack of mutual trust. This extract's omission of CTP policies is a result of newsroom practices and culture. On the one hand, *KFM* editors such as Ekinçi said their news prioritises "what is good for the nation", not politicians and politics. On the other hand, my ethnography revealed that news is highly political because editors rely heavily on the government-run *TAK* news agency for both news gathering and writing within a CTP-friendly newsroom context. Though *TAK* mostly covers government events, it has retained many of its Turkish nationalist tendencies.⁴⁶ This results in news which foregrounds the government and its

⁴⁶ Cypriot media scholar Dr. Bekir Azgın in an interview 28 May 2009 said that *TAK*, like most civil services have retained their Turkish nationalist tendencies due to 40 years of Turkish and Turkish nationalist UBP answerability, despite the CTP coming to power.

activities while many of its political policies such as its aim of a Cypriot federation are omitted, as is evident in this extract.

Like *BRTI*, *KFM* shows support for CTP. It differs in representing the CTP more positively and Talat as the CTP party itself. These differences are achieved using a variety of strategies. Firstly, lexical choices are used. The government is represented personally only, highlighting its human side. Talat is named five times in these five sentences, while *BRTI* only names him twice. He is twice named formally with functional honorifics as “President Mehmet Ali Talat” and once formally as “Talat”. If *KFM* had named him semi-formally such as “Mehmet Ali Talat” or informally such as “Mehmet Ali” this would have suggested less importance and respect, but possibly more closeness. However, the sheer number of positive functional and formal namings create an impression of an important president deserving respect.

Secondly, grammatical strategies contribute to CTP and Talat support more than seen on *BRTI*. Talat is activated five times in a variety of process types, compared to only twice verbally on *BRTI*. Talat is important enough to “finish” meetings abroad, “return” to Cyprus in sentence one, “comment” to reporters in sentence two, and make comments in sentences three and four. Within Talat’s reported speech which *KFM* chose to represent in sentence two, Talat and the government are attributed with the action process of “We opened the Lokmacı gate”. These actions realise discourses about a powerful, pro-solution Talat and CTP, more than *BRTI*.

Thirdly, support for the CTP is represented through collocations. The CTP is collocated with “opened Lokmacı gate with a ceremony” in sentence two. Representing the opening as an important enough government success to warrant a ceremony emphasises Lokmacı’s importance and significance. Together, these strategies evoke discourses which envision a nation steered by the CTP.

Unlike the *BRTI* extract, this extract contains presuppositions that serve to represent the Turkish nationalist UBP negatively. In sentence three, Talat is

cited as describing the closure of Lokmacı as “an old hinderance mirrored today”. In sentence five, “the Greek side is mirroring the old barriers.” These utterances presuppose that there were hinderances and barriers in the past, a pre-CTP past, before 2003 when the Turkish nationalist UBP were in power. These utterances associate “barriers” and “hinderances” with the UBP by the Republic “mirroring” the UBP past. These utterances evoke both discourses of a dark TRNC past with the UBP and discourses of support for the CTP who remove barriers and hinderances.

KFM names only two aspects of its nation other than the CTP: Ercan airport and Lokmacı. This is contrast to *BRTI* which emphasises “Turkish Cypriotness” in its recontextualisation of Lokmacı’s closure. By minimally representing the TRNC nation and de-emphasising its “Turkish Cypriotness”, alternative ways of representing a different form of nation seem natural. This reflects CTP desires for a re-imagining of nationalism, such as a federation.

Unfortunately, an alternative nation is not represented, only division. Like *BRTI*, division is reminded by the lexical choices of “side” which connotes opposition and “Ercan” which suggests struggle for recognition. Lokmacı is also represented extensively, showing *KFM* support for this government success. However, division is reminded by Lokmacı being named as a “gate”, lexically severing Cyprus in two. More positive lexical choices seen on *BRTI* such as “crossing” and “Lokmacı-Ledra crossing” are omitted. Together, these lexical choices realise discourses about division even more than seen on *BRTI*.

Lexical choices in this extract also make it difficult to imagine compromise and a Cypriot federation, a CTP policy aim. The Republic is named “Greeks” and “the Greek side”. Unlike *BRTI*, these namings do not include the common “Cypriot” naming. This evokes discourses about an ‘other’ “Greek” group on the other “side”.

Grammatically the Republic is represented as powerful, but acting against the CTP. For example, in sentences two and four “Greeks closed the gate”. *KFM* chose to write this as an action process, and write it twice in this extract. Action

processes carry connotations of power and control (Fairclough, 1995a: 113). Representing a powerful Republic performing negative actions twice evokes discourses about a worrisome oppositional Republic, far more than on *BRTI* which uses passive constructions. This negative representation of the Republic is contrary to CTP policies which promote a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict.

VI.2.iii Radyo T

Unlike the two previous extracts which positively represent the CTP and negatively represent the Republic, *Radyo T*'s treatment of the closure differs considerably. Despite newsroom manager Moreket's assertion that news does not favour the UBP, the *Radyo T* story represents the closing in ways which clearly reveal a Turkish Cypriot nation from a UBP Turkish nationalist perspective which favours a TRNC independent of the Republic with close ties to Turkey.⁴⁷

The story begins as:

1. The Greek administration said the pedestrian crossing at Lokmacı gate in Nicosia had one way traffic for three hours before opening again.
2. "Its to be expected" and the Greeks think they compromised by opening the gate.
3. Related with this topic, an Anadola reporter talked with a TRNC authority: Greeks think "Its to be expected".
4. Greeks have an aim to give the Turkish area to UN control.
5. He thought that "all manoeuvres on it" are part of a game and "if it is not given to UN control, they will close." (my numbering)

It can be seen from this extract that *Radyo T* supports Turkish nationalists and a Turkish TRNC nation while the Republic is represented as not only an 'other', as is the case on the other stations, but as a dangerous enemy.

Key to understanding this text is the sources used. The primary source is "a TRNC authority" and the secondary source is "an Anadola reporter". My ethnography taught me that the "TRNC authority" is a Turkish nationalist and

⁴⁷ Mehmet Moreket was the manager and editor at *Radyo T* during this research. He acknowledged that the news was political, but claimed that the news was written with "what is good for the nation" as a priority and not what was best for the UBP.

most likely a UBP politician because many frequent the station. By not naming the source, *Radyo T* clouds the source's political affiliations and represents the source as official, neutral and not politically biased. This allows *Radyo T* to promote nationalist views, but represent them as politically neutral.

The autonomous reporter is from the 'Anadolu News Agency', a much used and respected wire service for Turkish news internationally. Identifying a reporter from this respected news agency as a secondary source adds credibility to their comments and to the story.

In this extract we find evidence of *Radyo T* support for Turkish nationalists as leaders of the nation, not the CTP as is the case in the other two extracts. This is achieved by excluding the CTP and representing nationalists personally as "a TRNC authority". This is a functional representation which emphasises role and importance. An 'authority' connotes the source is knowledgeable about TRNC, adding legitimacy to his Turkish nationalist claims.

This extract also reveals that nationalist beliefs are given support through the use of sources. It has been demonstrated that source choices are ideological by giving voice to some people instead of others, reflecting power structures and cultural beliefs of media writers (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). In this extract, the Turkish nationalist 'authority' is named and activated as the source twice. Both activations attribute the 'authority' with nationalist beliefs such as the Republic is untrustworthy in sentence three and wants to give control of parts of TRNC to the UN in sentence five. Newsroom manager Moreket said he gives voice to politicians if what they say is "good for the nation". In this extract, these politician's utterances reflect Turkish nationalist politics and what Turkish nationalists think is good for the nation.

In this text, it can also be seen how the nation is represented in ways which reflect a Turkish nationalist perspective. Firstly, Lokmacı is only named once in this extract. On *BRTI* and *KFM* "Lokmacı" is named twice each in their extracts. This is part of *Radyo T's* strategy of playing down the importance of Lokmacı, by

naming it less often. It is played down because the opening of Lokmacı was a CTP government success, thus against UBP interests.

Another aspect of Turkish nationalist ideology revealed in this extract is Turkey's closeness to TRNC, not seen on the other stations. Part of the negotiations between the Republic and TRNC before opening Lokmacı involved allocating and claiming responsibilities and control of the no-man's land surrounding Lokmacı. The Republic wanted the UN to control no-man's land, while TRNC wanted to give the Turkish army control. Negotiations led to part of the area being controlled by Turkish Cypriot police under the jurisdiction of the Turkish army and part of the area under the control of the UN. *Radyo T* describes this area under TRNC police control as "the Turkish area", not the 'Turkish Cypriot' area. This slippage between the two terms blurs the lines between TRNC and mainland Turkey. This is a reflection of Turkish nationalist politics which considers Turkish Cypriots Turkish people who live on Cyprus, a sentiment expressed repeatedly by newsroom manager Moreket. By naming the area "the Turkish area", a discourse of sameness and unity amongst Turkish Cyprus and Turkey is signified.

Like the other two stations, the Republic's government is the only aspect of the Republic named. It is never referred to by its recognised name. Instead, it is referred to in this extract as "the Greek Administration". An 'administration' is an entity with far less prestige than a 'government'. An 'administration' does not recognise the Government of Cyprus as the sole authority in Cyprus, a position held by both the CTP and the UBP. For this reason an 'administration' is used by all stations, though only appears in the present *Radyo T* extract.

Radyo T differs from the other stations in how it represents the Republic, drawing on UBP discourses of a "Greek" oppositional 'they' out-group more than the other stations. This is achieved in two ways. Firstly, like *KFM*, the government is named "Greek" omitting the common "Cypriot" naming. Secondly, *Radyo T* names the Republic "they". This popular lexical choice on *Radyo T* realises discourses about difference, constructing a Turkish in-group and a

Greek out-group (Fairclough, 2003: 150). This clearly demarcates who is a part of *Radyo T*'s nation. As owner Tatar said, "There are two nations on Cyprus: Turks and Greeks."

Grammatical strategies emphasise not only difference, but the Republic as an enemy reflecting UBP policies which want full independence from it. The Republic is activated in various process types performing acts against TRNC interests in each sentence. This is different than *BRTI* which uses passive sentence constructions in lines one, two and three when representing actions of the Republic, and *KFM* which activates the Republic twice in lines two and four. So, *Radyo T* represents the Republic as being far more powerful than on the other stations.

This is seen in sentence one where the Republic is activated verbally with the bad news of Lokmacı closing. By collocating the Republic with 'bad news', *Radyo T* writers contribute to a negative theme associated with the Republic (Fairclough, 2001: 95; Stubbs, 1995: 47; Kjellmer, 1994: xiv; Sinclair, 1991: 117).

The Republic is attributed with three mental processes and one action process, all counter to Lokmacı, a solution and TRNC itself. In sentences two through five, "Greeks think they compromised", "Greeks think 'Its to be expected'", they "aim to give the Turkish area to UN control" and "will close" Lokmacı. Possibly the most threatening activation is aiming to give control of TRNC to the UN, threatening the nation's very sovereignty. These negative thoughts and aims echo the sentiments and fears of nationalists.

While these actions realise discourses about the Republic as an enemy, they are multi-layered and their accuracy should be treated as dubious (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). For example, in sentence three, *Radyo T* reports that a reporter spoke with an authority who describes what Greeks "think".

The Republic is also attributed, though multi-layered again, with using the metaphor of Lokmacı as a game in sentence five. The game is bleak indeed, their actions described as 'manoeuvres' carrying military connotations. This metaphor, the Republic's actions within it and multi-layered sayings, thoughts

and aims evoke discourses about a dangerous enemy. These utterances serve *Radyo T* well. By representing them as the enemy, UBP's vision of a two-state solution seems natural.

VI.2.iv Extract Summary

This analysis has highlighted how stations recontextualised the closing of Lokmacı in ways which draw upon distinct ideological national discourses, each reflecting the interests of power holders associated with stations. In this extract, events surrounding the misunderstanding of where a police patrol found itself could have been constructed as an example of how through negotiations the two sides can solve problems. Instead, lexical and grammatical choices use the three hour closure of Lokmacı as an excuse to realise discourses of division, difference, opposition and even danger. This is despite stations' claims to either be "helping to find solutions" or writing "what is good for the nation".

On *BRTI*, traces of TRNC power groups' interests, newsroom practices, journalists' personal politics, *BRTI*'s obligations towards the government and its legal obligations are all evident in its recontextualisation of the closure. *BRTI* represents the CTP personally, active, important and looking for solutions. Discourses about a Turkish Cypriot nation are evoked, drawing a border around who is in its nation. Residents are excluded while police and politicians are included, all Turkish Cypriot. Outside the nation is the Republic which is the Greek Cypriot 'other'. Though it is responsible for negative actions and shared positive actions, it is difficult to imagine due to suppression and passive constructions. Some lexical choices ("Ledra" and "crossing") and the Republic being attributed with vague positive actions evoke discourses of compromise and cooperation. These discourses leave some room for a more inclusive nationalism. Unfortunately, because this is a very small part of how the closure of Lokmacı is recontextualised, they act as little more than a pretext for *BRTI*'s story which does little in "helping a solution".

Similar discourses to *BRTI* are revealed on *KFM*, though some differences are also exposed. The CTP government, and especially Talat, are worthy of

celebration, powerful and pro-solution. Aside from Lokmacı (a government success), the nation is all but excluded. This almost exclusion and the promotion of the CTP allows for discourses about alternative group identification. However, this chance is missed. The Republic is represented as the 'other' which is powerfully negative, more than on *BRTI*. A station which supports pro-federation CTP should carefully choose how it recontextualises events to realise discourses about a nation without embargoes and isolation. However, due to a lack of interest in politics and news by news workers, careful lexical and grammatical selections are not part of news writing practices. The result is though the CTP is praised, pro-solution discourses are absent. Though this serves *KFM*'s power holders well, these discourses are not "what is good for the nation".

On *Radyo T*, discourses are realised which clearly map out a Turkish Cypriot nation, including a clear border between itself and the Republic but a porous one between itself and Turkey. It is a Turkish nation headed by knowledgeable Turkish nationalists. The CTP is excluded and its successes de-emphasised. The nation is opposed to the "Greek" Republic which thinks, says, aims and does things against TRNC, actions which threaten the very sovereignty of TRNC. Military lexical choices evoke discourses of conflict and danger. It is an aggressive enemy, not a prospective partner. These discourses reflect UBP policies which aim for a state fully independent of the Republic, with close ties to Turkey. By writing from a Turkish nationalist perspective, discourses about TRNC as it is presently are realised with no improvements in the lives of residents. This is not what is "best for the nation". Instead, self-interests are satisfied at the expense of TRNC's residents across this and all stations.

VI.3 The importance of Governance

Events throughout the week of Lokmacı's opening, such as the preparations, the opening ceremony itself, international reactions, a temporary closure and a protest were recontextualised by radio stations in ways that governance of TRNC and the Republic were represented more than other aspects of these events. In fact, on *BRTI* and *KFM*, the CTP government is represented more times than any

other participant, legitimating, supporting and emphasising the CTP and its actions. Clearly, political actors are foregrounded and other residents who were actual participants are backgrounded, illustrating how recontextualisations of social practice delete and add elements of social practice to legitimate actions and situations (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 96-98).

This section analyses representations of the Republic's and TRNC's governance, including the CTP and the UBP throughout the whole sample. The previous extract analysis introduced how recontextualisations on each station articulate some dominant and differing themes about the nation. This analysis draws upon a wider sample to reveal in fine detail who is represented as governing, what aspects of this governance are positively represented, and how governance is represented. This allows for a much clearer understanding of the similarities and differences between stations as to governance of TRNC and the Republic. How governance is represented tells us much about the ideology of those who represent it. It allows stations to shape a sense of how the nation is led, who can be trusted, who can not, and who is worthy of leading the nation. In regard to the Republic, it shapes a sense of how listeners should regard the Republic's government: as a potential partner in finding solutions or more negatively as an 'other' not to be trusted, or worst.

VI.3.i Turkish Cypriot governance

VI.3.i.a BRTI

Representations of the government during this week's events show *BRTI*'s support for a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation with governance in the hands of the CTP, which is hard-working, in control, protective, friendly and knowledgeable. In the extract analysis, it was seen how *BRTI* named aspects of the nation "Turkish Cypriot", partially fulfilling its nation-promoting mandate as outlined in the *BRTK Law*. This same strategy is used extensively throughout the sample in namings of the government personally and impersonally, such as "the Turkish Cypriot side". This strategy reminds listeners that their government and nation

are indeed “Turkish Cypriot”, distinct from the Republic and not part of an all-Cypriot nation.

The use of honorifics and functional titles in naming the government also plays a role in nation-building. Functional titles emphasise the roles of individuals, giving them a sense of importance. This is a common strategy to legitimise power and status (van Leeuwen, 1996: 59). The common use of functional honorifics throughout the sample like “President Mehmet Ali Talat” and functional names like “the Turkish Cypriot aide” represents CTP politicians as important and part of a multi-functional government. Highlighting functions of politicians in TRNC not only emphasises the importance of CTP politicians, but also highlights the multi-functional character of the TRNC state.

As seen in the extract, the sample also reveals a theme of the CTP leading TRNC by positively representing the party. One strategy used is the CTP is mostly represented personally and nominalised, like “Prime Minister Soyer”. This highlights personal aspects of the government and provides listeners with CTP points of identification (van Leeuwen, 1996: 52-53).

Throughout the sample, *BRTI* shows CTP support by accentuating the government’s ability to control and make things happen through exploiting the strategy of activating the CTP. For example, Soyer is activated by “rejecting” claims in:

[...] Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer rejected Greek Cypriot Side’s claims that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.

Here, Soyer is at the beginning of the main clause, a dominant position. He is controlling a situation by rejecting claims made by the Republic, claims which run against TRNC interests. This evokes discourses of the CTP protecting TRNC interests from the Republic.

Another strategy used to indicate support for the CTP is in representing reported speech. *BRTI* uses CTP government sources almost exclusively for reported speech, showing its support (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). A strategy not seen in the extract is the choice of

speaking verbs which carry connotations and position a journalist attitudinally (White, 2006: 58-59; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 295). Though “said” is mostly used, *BRTI* shows support for government utterances through selecting illocutionary verbs which represent the CTP as powerful (“announce”, “stress”, “remind”, “point to”, “reject”), friendly (“thank”) and knowledgeable (“state”, “note”, “explain”).

Another strategy used throughout the sample to show support for a CTP-led nation is the representation of agency within reported speech. Sources in *BRTI* stories are represented as mostly activating the government performing positive actions. The government is constructive in it “has been working since 2005 for the opening of the gate”; powerful in it “[has] moved ahead with the decision to open Lokmacı” and thoughtful in it is “paying particular attention to the sending of positive messages”.

VI.3.i.b KFM

Like *BRTI*, *KFM* shows support for the CTP through its representations of governance. However, it differs in two ways. Firstly, it foregrounds President Talat far more than *BRTI*. Secondly, it backgrounds the TRNC nation and its Turkish Cypriot character, unlike *BRTI* which emphasises it.

Throughout the week, *KFM* positively represents the CTP. One way *KFM* achieves this is by mostly representing the CTP personally and nominalised, as seen in the extract. This highlights personal aspects of the government and provides listeners with CTP points of identification.

The CTP is also represented as the legitimate leader of the nation. One strategy not seen on *BRTI* is naming the government as part of a “we” group. Fairclough (1995a: 181) claims “we” is used by politicians for self-serving purposes by “claim[ing] solidarity by placing everyone in the same boat” and “claim[ing] authority in that the leader is claiming the right to speak for the people as a whole”. In the week’s events “we” is used extensively in the reported speech of CTP politicians to promote their versions of governance, as in this Avcı reported speech:

If there is an issue, we deal with it but within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission.

Here, “we” refers to the government whose authority is presupposed by speaking for the people of TRNC as a whole. Its authority to “deal with” issues and “never give permission” is presupposed and unquestioned, realising a discourse of CTP legitimately leading the nation.

The sample also reveals that *KFM* represents the CTP as TRNC’s legitimate leader due to its knowledge, power and hard work. The CTP are used exclusively as sources of speech, unlike *BRTI* which mostly uses the CTP. This limits the voices heard on *KFM* to CTP politicians only. Choices in glossing verbs represent the CTP as powerful (“remind”), knowledgeable (“explain”, “note”, “specify”) and understanding (“acknowledge” and “discuss”).

This theme of legitimacy is furthered through government activations throughout the sample. The CTP is represented as constructive in “we did our work”; powerful in “we never give permission”; and thoughtful in “we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed”. Sometimes, abstractions are used to represent an active government and legitimate its actions. The following utterance by Avcı is a generalisation:

If there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed.

Here, the generalisation “we discuss and speak” does not really explain what the government does when there is “a problem” with the Republic. However, it legitimises the actions of the government.

Unlike *BRTI*, *KFM* not only foregrounds Talat, but represents him as a political celebrity. This is achieved using three strategies throughout the sample. Firstly, he is named formally with functional honorifics more than any other actor.

Naming him “President Mehmet Ali Talat” four times in one story alone, grants him status and importance unlike all other politicians.

A second strategy is representing Talat performing positive actions. The CTP is activated in action, event and mental processes, almost all attributed to Talat.

The following excerpt shows how Talat is empowered:

Talat wants TUSİAD to continue working on the topics solving the Cyprus problem, and the ending of the Turkish Cypriot isolation. They gave him positive answers.

In the first sentence, Talat is activated in a mental process. Talat is powerful, being in a position to ask a Turkish institution to “continue working” on the Cyprus conflict. In the second sentence, he is passivated by being given a positive answer. But the passivation is a response to Talat’s request and a result of Talat’s meetings. So, co-text empowers Talat positively. In fact, he is collocated with “finish meetings” or “had meetings” four times. These collocations are a third strategy used to stress Talat’s importance as being an important politician who has “meetings”. He is a hard-working, powerful and active celebrity in a world of powerful politicians.

Though *KFM* supports the CTP and Talat, this same support for TRNC is omitted. The popular “Turkish Cypriot” government naming seen on *BRTI* is omitted throughout the whole sample on *KFM*. So, politician Erçakıca is named as “Presidential Spokesman Erçakıca”, instead of “the Turkish Cypriot Presidential Spokesman”. This suppresses the nation. Also, the government is named with far fewer functional and formal namings than *BRTI*. This strategy de-emphasises the functions of the government and thereby the functions of the nation.

VI.3.i.c Radyo T

Throughout recontextualisations of the week’s events, *Radyo T* demonstrates its political allegiances through the representation of governance. Unlike the other two stations, it represents the CTP lacking status as a government and a failure. It uses CTP representations as a way to legitimise Turkish nationalist UBP’s policies. Alternatively, the UBP and Turkey are represented as the obvious choice for governance of TRNC. Though newsroom manager Moreket claimed the station emphasises politics and not the UBP, these scripts show otherwise.

It can be seen from the sample that *Radyo T* withholds its support for the CTP using a number of lexical and grammatical strategies. One strategy is it rarely represents the government, less than most other participants in these stories. When it is named, it is mostly impersonal representations and almost never nominalised, such as “the leaders”. These strategies background the government and de-emphasise its human aspects.

The CTP is also represented as lacking status. Generally, on all stations, politicians are first introduced in a story with functional honorifics. This is not the case for CTP politicians in *Radyo T* Lokmacı stories with the exception of “Internal Affairs Minister Özkan Murat”. Instead, *Radyo T* culturally classifies Talat as “Turkish Cypriot Talat”. Cultural classifications carry connotations, mostly negative (van Leeuwen, 1996: 58). This break in the routine naming of politicians evokes a discourse of the CTP lacking status (ibid.:59).

The theme of the CTP being unworthy of leading the nation is common in these stories. Though the CTP is activated mostly, positive activations are attributed to a “we” which includes nationalists (discussed below). Furthermore, the CTP’s unworthiness to lead the nation is accentuated through negative activations. When the CTP is named without the UBP, the government is represented as acting wrongly. For example:

The leaders and partners read the account [of negotiations] [...] one or the other of the leaders thinks twice [...] [then] leaders negotiate and strongly say ‘no’.

Here, the government fails in finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict because they “think twice” and “say no”. The government is a failure on *Radyo T*.

In the sample, we also find evidence that *Radyo T* uses representations of the government to support the UBP’s nationalist policies. One strategy is using generalisations to legitimate its stance that peace initiatives do not work. For example, “leaders thinks twice about [peace] proposals” and “strongly say ‘no’”. Though indeed a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus conflict has alluded negotiators to date, some talks have been successful. For example, both sides agree to the 1977 “Makarios-Denktaş accord” which claims that Cyprus should

be an independent, nonaligned, bicomunal federal republic.⁴⁸ Talks have also contributed to the successful opening of crossing points between the two states. However, this generalisation legitimates the sceptical stance taken by *Radyo T* towards negotiations which “fail”.

Alternatively, *Radyo T* represents the UBP as the answer to CTP’s poor leadership and limited successes. One way this is achieved is through granting the UBP status, more than the CTP. The UBP is always named personally and mostly nominalised. Unlike the CTP, nationalist politician Denктаş is named formally with the functional honorific “President Rauf Denктаş”. Denктаş has not been president of TRNC since 2004, yet *Radyo T* writers give him the title “President”, showing the station’s and nationalists’ reverence for him.

The UBP is credited with positive actions, again demonstrating that the UBP is the party to lead TRNC. The UBP and Denктаş are activated with an array of action types such as mental, verbal and event processes. This empowering strategy illustrates *Radyo T* support for Turkish nationalists.

A number of times “we” is used when the UBP are doing positive actions. These create a “we” UBP, Turkey and resident group. For example, Denктаş is represented as saying:

We opened it [Lokmacı] under the same conditions as before. The Greeks used to say, ‘If there are soldiers, we won’t open.’ But we didn’t step back.

Here, Denктаş has included himself in the “we” who opened Lokmacı and set conditions. However, it is CTP which opened Lokmacı. The same can be said for “we didn’t step back”. Here is a brave move showing strength again attributed to “we”. Using “we” allows Denктаş to claim solidarity with voters, background CTP government actions by not naming them and take responsibility for positive actions.

⁴⁸ This was agreed at a meeting with the two leaders Makarios and Denктаş on 12 February 1977. Downloaded 28 June 2009 from http://www.photius.com/countries/cyprus/government/cyprus_government_1977_makarios_denkta~1454.html

But governance of TRNC is represented as not confined to the UBP alone. Turkey is an important part of governance for Turkish nationalists. Turkey, according to UBP nationalists, is TRNC's motherland, close friend and protector. This is reflected in Turkey's high number of representations in these stories. "We" is used by Denктаş to suggest governance is shared with mainland Turkey in:

We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish soldiers are our guarantors.

In the first sentence, Turkey is part of "we" who will make agreements about its soldiers. Obviously, Turkey is the principle decision-maker about its troops. However, using "we" ties TRNC governance with Turkey. The second sentence describes the relationship between the two. Turkey is "our guarantor", a nationalist position in terms of Turkey's relationship with TRNC. This realises discourses about a Turkish, TRNC and Denктаş 'we' group, with Turkey as protector and TRNC needing protection. It is presupposed "we" need protection from "them" the Republic.

VI.3.ii Governance of The Republic

On all three stations, the Republic's government is represented in ways which suggest 'other-ness'. One common strategy is its namings. Impersonal namings of the Republic's government, such as the "Greek Cypriot side" and "the Greeks" are simplifications of the national make-up of the Republic which in fact is multi-cultural. However, these namings create a 'them' group on the other 'side', evoking discourses of difference and opposition.

However, there are subtle differences between stations revealed throughout the sample which suggest the nature of relations between the two states. For example, the Republic is personally represented on *BRTI* 12 times, *KFM* six times and *Radyo T* once. Personal representations allow listeners a point of identification with the Republic's politicians on *BRTI* and less so on *KFM*. This makes negotiations seem more probable. *Radyo T*'s impersonal namings make it easier to treat the Republic as an enemy (Kress, 1989:134).

VI.3.ii.a BRTI

Throughout the sample it can be seen that *BRTI* represents the Republic's government as a troublesome 'other'. The Republic is represented involved in negative and positive actions, though clouded agency represents the Republic less positively and negatively than it could be. These veiled activations act as a pretext to promote CTP governance.

At the level of lexical choices it can be seen that personal namings of the Republic's government are more numerous than other stations, giving listeners a point of identification with the Republic's politicians. However namings such as "the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias' aide" highlight difference. If written as "the President of the Republic's Dimitris Christofias' aide" difference would be de-emphasised, not accentuated.

The Republic is not just the 'other', but it is also represented as troublesome. The Republic's government is collocated with "saddening", "do(es) not comply", "closed", "not giving" and "attempts" which are a "critical negativity". The Republic is activated three times blocking aid and blaming Turkey for no solution. These collocations and activations realise a discourse of a troublesome Republic.

However, the negative representation of the Republic is positively modified through grammatical strategies. Prepositional phrases are used extensively to de-emphasise the Republic's government, while emphasising its negative actions, a strategy identified in the extract and exploited throughout the sample.

In fact, *BRTI* sometimes represents the Republic positively, though agency is clouded or activations act as a pretext for discourses about CTP support. In the following citation, the Republic is represented with the positive news of:

The first speech was delivered by the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias' aide Yorgos Yakovu.

The choice of a passive structure and de-emphasising Yakovu in a good news event of a speech being delivered at the opening ceremony of Lokmacı cannot be overlooked. Yakovu becomes backgrounded while the "first speech"

becomes foregrounded. It can be seen in the following citation how the CTP actually benefits from positive representations of the Republic:

President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias agreed on the 21st of March to open the gate [...]

This strategy of Republic officials sharing good news with TRNC officials who enjoy prominent sentence position (van Dijk, 1991: 215), diminishes the good news factor for the Republic. In fact, due to dominant sentence position, this strategy actually highlights positive CTP actions and governance.

VI.3.ii.b KFM

In this sample, it can be seen that *KFM* represents the Republic more negatively than *BRTI*. These representations run against CTP policies for partnership and compromise with the Republic, reflecting *KFM* newsroom practices.

Similar to *BRTI*, the Republic is named in ways which highlight 'other-ness'. However, three strategies are used to represent the Republic more negatively than *BRTI*. One strategy is representing the Republic with far fewer personal namings. These limit the number of points of identification, making it easier to treat the Republic as a distant 'other' (van Leeuwen, 1996: 48).

A second strategy is activations which represent a far more troublesome Republic. Six of eight activations represent the Republic acting against TRNC interests. These represent the Republic closing Lokmacı and wanting to "slow down the removal of the continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public".

These actions are similar to those on *BRTI*. The differences are firstly there are far more negative activations on *KFM* and fewer positive actions. Secondly, agency is not obscured in passive constructions like on *BRTI*. The Republic is given agency and thus represented more powerfully negative.

A third strategy used to advance the theme of a troublesome Republic is collocations. Eight times there is negative co-text associated with the Republic. All four times the words "Turkish Cypriot" are used, the word "isolation" is in the same sentence, three times collocated. When the Republic is in the same sentence, the theme becomes "continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public".

This realises discourses of resident victimisation at the hands of the Republic. This incongruency between CTP policies and *KFM* recontextualisations is further exploited when the *Turkish Jewish Association* is in the sentence. The theme changes to “ending of the Turkish Cypriots isolation”. So, the Republic is negative in terms of isolation and a Turkish association is part of the solution. These recontextualisations draw upon discourses more in line with Turkish nationalist views and indicate a lack of care taken in lexical and grammatical choices. When shown this analysis, editor Çatal said these themes were written into scripts because this was “the concern of the government at the time” according to *TAK*, despite running counter to CTP policies which want cooperation and compromise with the Republic to achieve a federation.

VI.3.ii.c Radyo T

In this sample, it can be seen that *Radyo T* represents the Republic not only negatively, but as a dangerous enemy. This helps legitimise Turkish nationalist policies. A feared Greek enemy is not a government to negotiate with to form a federation. Instead, Turkish nationalists can claim their future lies within a pan-Turkish nation.

One way *Radyo T* represents the Republic as being unworthy partners is through lexical choices. Other than “Greeks” and “the Greek side”, an ‘us’ and ‘them’ relationship is re-inforced by *Radyo T*’s extensive use of naming the Republic “they”, a strategy identified in the ‘extract analysis’ and exploited throughout the sample (Fairclough, 2003: 149; van Dijk, 1991). By using “they”, a pro-solution future is blatantly questioned by creating discourses of difference between the Republic and TRNC. This reflects UBP Turkish nationalist ideology which dismisses the idea of negotiations with the Republic.

Unlike the other stations, *Radyo T* represents the Republic as an untrustworthy, dangerous enemy. This is achieved through its numerous activations. Though activations empower participants, the Republic is empowered performing actions against TRNC interests. These can be grouped into seven themes. The Republic:

1. Is weak: “they [Republic] pleaded.”
2. Lies: “they make a story like the Berlin wall”.
3. Is untrustworthy: “They will close the gate again”.
4. Is against TRNC interests: The Republic “didn’t agree [to Lokmacı]”.
5. Is naive: “they think this [opening of Lokmacı] has affected negotiation timing”.
6. Is wrong: “they can’t do this [change the borders]”.
7. Wants to control TRNC: “Greeks aim is to replace the 1974 TRNC border with the 1963 border”.

Through these activation, *Radyo T* evokes discourses of opposition and threat even though eleven of these actions are mental processes with no agency. Also, many of these actions are distillations such as in number five where the Republic “thinks” and in number seven where it “aims”. These actions give no detail as to what the Republic is actually doing. Details are removed and used to legitimise and realise purpose. *Radyo T*’s purpose is to represent the Republic as a threat, thereby legitimising its stance that the status quo and no negotiations are the best option to the Cyprus conflict.

VI.3.iii Summary of Governance

Through recontextualising events of the week, *BRTI* stories signify discourses which show support for the CTP, a Turkish Cypriot nation and difference with the Republic. The CTP government is represented personally, important, active and multi-functional, fulfilling *BRTI*’s obligations to the CTP Prime Minister. The CTP is part of a multi-functional “Turkish Cypriot” nation. By representing the government and nation as such, *BRTI* fulfils its obligations of promoting TRNC but also draws upon discourses of difference from the “Greek Cypriot administration”.

The Republic’s government is represented mostly negatively as the ‘other’, though there are some reservedly positive representations. This is a result of

journalists' answerability to pro-solution power holders, personal politics, and 'the feeling' produced in the newsroom. Points of identification are offered to listeners, as are representations of positive acts, though these only occur if the Republic is either de-emphasised in prepositional phrases or listed with Turkish Cypriot counterparts. These evoke some discourses of compromise and cooperation, though mostly act as a pretext for other more dominant discourses on *BRTI* such as CTP support.

Recontextualisations of the weeks events on *KFM* also realise discourses about the CTP being multi-functional and active. But the "Turkish Cypriot" aspect of the government is omitted. Instead, *KFM* represents the CTP and its actions positively while promoting the personality cult of President Talat. Talat is a celebrity amongst a powerful and active CTP.

KFM evokes negative discourses about the Republic's government more than *BRTI*. This is a result of newsroom practices which prioritise the CTP while ignoring or playing down other aspects of events, such as the Republic. *KFM* uses less personal representations of the Republic's government than *BRTI* and the government is mostly activated performing actions contrary to TRNC interests. These acts are to do with isolation and troubles at Lokmacı. These representations of governance position the CTP at odds with the Republic's government over issues such as isolation, regulations and Lokmacı, evoking discourses of opposition, more than on *BRTI*.

The week's events on *Radyo T* are recontextualised in ways which are critical of the CTP, saving praise for the UBP and Denktaş. Scripts emphasise the power, activities and namings of nationalists, while vaguely naming and activating the CTP in less-favourable circumstances or representing it failing. Discourses of mainland Turkey as a part of governance, being TRNC's guarantor and protector, are drawn upon. This closeness to Turkey is a cornerstone of UBP policy which sees Turkish Cypriots as Turks living on Cyprus.

Representations of the Republic's government on *Radyo T* represent it as a threatening enemy. This reflects newsroom practices such as using UBP Turkish

nationalist politicians which emphasise UBP policies. There are no personal representations of the Republic's government and "they" are activated negatively, some threatening the very existence of TRNC. The Republic's government is represented as a dangerous enemy, legitimising UBP policy of full independence from the Republic.

VI.4 The Governed

The first section in this chapter introduced how recontextualisations of Lokmaci's closure on each station articulate some dominant and differing themes about the nation. The second section explored how governance is represented differently on each station over the week's recontextualisations of events. This final section examines who is governed in Turkish Cyprus and how they and their actions are represented throughout the sample of stories. This section also examines what aspects of the nation are represented as part of the governed nation. This is contrasted with the limited number of representations of the Republic's residents and their nation.

Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart's (1999) macro-strategies in formulating national identities is considered to aid in assessing what sort of nation stations signify in their stories. If, on the one hand, stations' stories signify positive discourses about many aspects of a Turkish Cypriot nation and nationalism, they show support for TRNC as it is presently. This exemplifies constructive and perpetuation strategies which "construct and establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation [from the Republic]" (ibid.: 33). On the other hand, if stations' stories play down, minimally or negatively represent the TRNC nation and its residents while representing alternative forms of nation, this can be seen in terms of strategies of transformation, dismantling or destruction of the nation (ibid.). These last strategies hold the most potential for change, if indeed discourses suggest more positive alternatives of nationhood.

VI.4.i Turkish and Greek Cyprus common namings

There is much commonality between stations in how they represent TRNC's and the Republic's residents and their nations. Residents of the Republic and TRNC are minimally represented on all stations. This is significant, because one aspect of the week was the significant number of people who used the Lokmacı crossing.⁴⁹ The crossing allowed for Turkish and Greek Cypriots to share a common social and commercial space, yet this was omitted. There are no stories of Turkish Cypriots going to the Republic and drinking tea in Greek cafes or Greek Cypriots strolling through the area around TRNC's Lokmacı. Newsrooms chose to all but exclude residents, while including many representations of power holders.

Residents are only represented impersonally, de-humanising them and removing a point of identification for listeners. When TRNC residents are named, a common "Turkish Cypriot" nation and national identity is suggested. For example, "Turkish Cypriots" is the most common naming on all stations. This naming is part of nation-building which "primarily emphasise[s] national uniqueness and intra-national uniformity but largely ignore intra-national differences" (Wodak et al., 1999: 4). Homogenising residents as "Turkish Cypriots" ignores intra-national differences; that is, the multi-cultural reality of TRNC. At the same time, it realises discourses of sameness within TRNC and difference from the Republic.

Aspects of the Republic's nation are rarely identified on the stations. All representations, with the exception of "Nicosia", remind listeners of either conflict ("barricade"), two oppositional entities ("side") or the 'other' ("Greek"). These again draw upon discourses of difference and even opposition.

Nevertheless, there are subtle differences between stations which signify ideological discourses of different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms.

VI.4.i.a BRTI

VI.4.i.a.1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic

⁴⁹ According to the Cyprus Mail on 8 April 2008, almost 20,000 people used the crossing in the first six days of it being opened. Downloaded 06.07.09 from www.cyprus-mail.com/news/

Throughout the sample, it can be seen that *BRTI* demonstrates support for existing power holders in TRNC, like the police and other officials. It also continues its nation-building strategy of identifying a multi-functional Turkish Cypriot nation through namings. A small number of namings and representations suggest a more inclusive Cypriot identity, however, these are minimal. When asked why inclusive namings are not used more often, editor Cafer said they are not acceptable to managers who cite the *BRT Law* which aims to promote TRNC.

BRTI shows its support for a TRNC nation and various power-holding groups in TRNC. Namings identify a group of CTP-supporting businessmen named “the Citizens’ Initiative for the Opening of Lokmacı”, “Turkish Cypriot police” and “immigration and customs officials”. Representations of these groups help shape *BRTI*’s nation in two ways. Firstly, naming these three groups identifies roles people play within TRNC. By emphasising roles, a multi-functional nation is represented. For example, “immigration and customs officials” reminds listeners that their nation has a legal aspect to it with a need for immigration and customs.

Secondly, naming these groups emphasise their importance. Namings of the “immigration and customs officials” is a functional representation and “Turkish Cypriot police” is a specific classification, emphasising roles and importance. Support for these power holders is also realised grammatically. They are all activated, suggesting power and control. For example, police are activated in:

He explained that Turkish Cypriot police intervened in the protest and took the placards from protestors to prevent the disruption of crossings.

Here, “TRNC police” are represented performing the action processes of “intervened” and “took placards”. These actions have agency which represent the police as powerful (Fairclough, 1995a: 113), passivating protesters from the Republic literally and grammatically.

The sample reveals some representations of residents which suggest inclusive politics on *BRTI*. Once “people” is used in:

A special ceremony was held at Lokmacı this morning which was marked by high participation of people and peaceful slogans.

“People” is a reference to residents and politicians from both states, creating a more inclusive Cypriot ‘us’ group. Elsewhere in the sample, “Turkish Cypriots” and “Greek Cypriots” are collocated with “experiencing” and “witnessing” positive events like Lokmacı’s opening and “solving” problems “together”. These evoke a more inclusive and cooperative Cypriot discourse, reflecting some of the station’s pro-solution interests.

However, “Turkish Cypriots” and “Greek Cypriots” are the most common naming of residents of the two states. Though they share a common “Cypriot” naming, they also repeatedly evoke a discourse of difference, accentuated by being commonly collocated. These strategies remind listeners of their “Turkish” identity which is distinct from their “Greek” counterparts.

VI.4.i.a.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic

It can be seen in the sample that *BRTI* legitimises the TRNC nation through its multiple representations. Multiple mentions remind listeners of their nation which includes Lokmacı, borders, “Cikkos area”, “Ercan airport” and “Nicosia”. These utterances map out what is included in the nation, differentiating it from the Republic.

It can be seen that Lokmacı, in particular, is named in ways which legitimises TRNC. Lokmacı is collocated with the “Turkish Cypriot Side”, “northern part”, “gate”, “barricade”, “crossings” and “border”, reminding listeners of “our” Lokmacı and border. Collocating “historic” with “Lokmacı” represents a temporal aspect to Lokmacı and TRNC which is a nation-building strategy (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart, 1999: 26).

Despite multiple mentions of Lokmacı and the nation, it is mostly represented as powerless, de-emphasised, and a recipient of action. This is achieved through representing the nation almost exclusively in prepositional phrases or passivated. Part of the reason for this grammatical strategy is Lokmacı is named “a gate”. It is inanimate and needs to be “opened” and “closed” by somebody. For example,

The gate – which was opened to crossings yesterday morning – was closed by the Greek Cypriot Side [...]

However, Lokmacı could have been represented as a “state of affairs” verb process such as “The gate is open” (Fairclough 1992 and Halliday 1985 in Fairclough, 1995:110) activating and emphasising it, a strategy used on *Radyo T* which emphasises the nation more than is done on *BRTI*.

Representations of the week’s events all but exclude aspects of the Republic other than its government. When the nation is mentioned, difference and also negativity are highlighted by collocating it with negative news like “a brief closure of the gate” and protesters “crossed the Greek Cypriot barricade”.

VI.4.i.b KFM

VI.4.i.b.1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic

It can be seen from the sample that *KFM* names TRNC residents only a few times and the Republic’s residents are omitted from all scripts. This is due to *KFM*’s emphasis on CTP politicians in its stories.

Like *BRTI*, *KFM* once identifies residents using an all-inclusive naming. In the following, residents are named “Cypriots”:

The United Nations, Cypriots’ and the island’s cooperation is the aim to start compromise.

Though this is more inclusive, it is in direct reported speech, distancing *KFM* writers from the utterance (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). It also appears in a non-dominant middle of list sentence position, de-emphasising it somewhat. Like *BRTI*, this naming is not repeated elsewhere, deeming positive effects minimal.

More common namings see residents represented in ways which identify residents as Turkish Cypriot, while positively representing the CTP as in the following:

[...] both the public relations improvements and the Turkish Cypriot public are connected to the solution process to remove the isolations.

Here, the “public” is activated, but as one of two agents, the other being “the public relations improvements”. It is presupposed that there are “public relations

improvements” due to the CTP. Listing “public relations improvements” at the beginning of the clause emphasises government activities and places residents in a less-dominant position. This signifies discourses of support for the CTP.

VI.4.i.b.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic

As seen in the two previous sections, *KFM* almost excludes the TRNC nation. In fact, aside from Lokmacı and borders, “Ercan airport” is the only other aspect of the nation named. These are almost exclusively in prepositional phrases which de-emphasises these aspects of the nation. Excluding and de-emphasising the current TRNC nation highlights the need for negotiations, a CTP policy.

Despite this lack of importance given to TRNC nation, the border is uttered extensively. *KFM* exploits deixis using “the” and “our” with borders five times, articulating discourses of division. Collocations with border connote permanence in:

[...] our borders are never discussed [...] within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission [...]

To “never give permission” and “never discuss” evokes discourses about timelessness of the nation, having borders in the future. This is a constructive strategy of nation-building (ibid.). These reflect Turkish nationalist politics, a result of *KFM*'s lack of care in lexical and grammatic choices, as pointed out by editor-announcer Basrı.

Representations of Lokmacı emphasise its importance more than on the other two stations. This benefits the CTP, it being represented as responsible for its opening. One strategy used is writing Lokmacı opening “is of special value”. This state process, though agentless, emphasises this government success by highlighting it being “special”. Another strategy is collocations such as “celebrated”, examined in the extract analysis.

Aspects of the Republic's nation are either passivated, de-emphasised or activated performing acts against TRNC interests. These produce a negative representation of the Republic's nation. For example:

Hrisostomos' term, as the head of the Greek church, has become as political as possible.

Here, "Hrisostomos' term" is activated in a state process of being "political". For the church to be political presupposes these politics are against TRNC interests, drawing on negative discourses about the Republic and its actions far more than on *BRTI*.

VI.4.i.c Radyo T

VI.4.i.c.1 Residents of TRNC and the Republic

Looking at the sample, we find that representations of residents are used to remind listeners of the success of TRNC. This is in contrast to *BRTI* which promotes TRNC and *KFM* which all but excludes residents except as a pretext to show support for the CTP. *Radyo T* representations also serve to legitimise the power of those closely associated with Turkish nationalists, such as the police and soldiers.

Like *BRTI*, one group of residents represented positively is the police. They are named the "Turkish Cypriot police" and "our police". These namings draw upon discourses of difference by identifying them as "Turkish Cypriot" and not "Cypriot". Also, being specific classifications, roles people play in the nation are emphasised. This serves the station's Turkish nationalist interests well by representing a multi-functional nation.

It can also be seen that *Radyo T*, like *BRTI*, supports the police by activating them in:

Nearly 20 Greeks shouting slogans and carrying protest signs passed the Greek barricades and came to the TRNC's controlled area north of Cikkos. TRNC police intervened, blocking their [protesters] path and taking their protest signs while pedestrians continued to pass.

Here, "TRNC police" are represented performing three action processes of intervening, blocking protesters and taking their signs. These actions have agency which represent the police as powerful (Fairclough, 1995a: 113). *Radyo T* supporting the police, who are directly controlled by the Turkish military, is in line with Turkish nationalist ideology. Nationalists support the presence of the

Turkish military in TRNC and attribute them with the very existence of TRNC. So, representing the police positively is seen by Turkish nationalists and newsroom manager Moreket as “what is good for the nation”.

This same utterance represents the Republic’s residents activated performing negative acts like “chanting slogans” and “carrying placards”. Some lexical choices, such as “crossed” the “barricade” and entered “TRNC’s controlled area” connote military acts of aggression, drawing upon discourses of a dangerous ‘other’.

Radyo T also represents soldiers positively. “We” which includes politicians and soldiers are activated extensively. TRNC residents, alternatively, are powerless. For example:

He [Denktaş] said, [...] “He [Turkish General Buyukanit] gives trust to our people because that trust can slowly decrease because we forget what happened.”

There are two issues about the nation represented here. Firstly, a power hierarchy is established. At the top is the Turkish General and Turkish nationalist Denktaş who are activated positively by giving trust and speaking, respectively. At the bottom of the hierarchy are residents who are passivated by the General’s giving of trust. Secondly, a Turkish-TRNC ‘us’ group is created. Placing the possessive “our” with “people” defines the “people” as those of Denktaş and the General: a Turkish-TRNC grouping. “We” residents are then activated forgetting “what happened”. The “we” group in this case is forgetful residents and politicians from TRNC and Turkey. The “happenings” Denktaş is referring to are the actions of the EOKA militia in the sixties and seventies, the Greek-backed military coup of 1974 and the subsequent Turkish invasion. Denktaş uses guilt to remind listeners of their duty to be nationalists, while reminding listeners of the importance of the Turkish military. These utterances draw upon discourses familiar on *Radyo T*, namely, fear of the Republic, the importance of Turkey and the importance of being a Turkish nationalist.

Radyo T names residents of both states in ways which show no commonality. Though TRNC residents are named as “Turkish Cypriots”, “Greeks” are used to

name residents of the Republic. This naming, seen on *KFM*, evokes discourses of difference more than on *BRTI*, again demonstrating Turkish nationalists' views that Cyprus has two nations and two nationalities: "Turkish" and "Greek".

Like *BRTI*, the "Greeks" are collocated with "Turkish Cypriot". Unlike *BRTI*, they are not collocated with positive cooperative events, but with "the Cyprus problem". This not only identifies the two groups of residents as different from each other, but reinforces a negative theme of Cyprus as a problem. These help legitimise the maintenance of separation on Cyprus, a UBP Turkish nationalist stance.

VI.4.i.c.2 The nations of TRNC and the Republic

Throughout the sample, representations of the TRNC nation are extensive, far more than the other stations. These represent more aspects of Turkish nationalism, such as the importance of the TRNC state and Turkish military, the unimportance of Lokmacı and the threatening nature of the Republic.

Radyo T identifies many aspects of the nation throughout the sample. Both "the nation" and aspects of "TRNC" such as Lokmacı, the border, "here" and "customs" are identified. Deixis is exploited by identifying "our nation", "our soldiers", "our flag" and "our vigilance". Furthermore, giving TRNC the personality trait of "our vigilance" exploits an aspect of nation-building identified by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart (1999: 76), articulating a discourse of TRNC being a feasible solution in Cyprus.

The sample contains eleven representations of the border, far more than on other stations. These clearly demarcate and remind listeners that there are two nations with a border separating them. One representation of an utterance by Denктаş is:

This wall doesn't divide a nation, it prevents genocide, this wall is a peace wall.

This sentence presupposes there are two nations and genocide is a possibility without the border. Naming barricades as "the peace wall" with the function of "preventing genocide" evokes discourses of fear of 'the other'.

On *Radyo T*, unlike the other stations, some aspects of the nation are empowered, emphasising these and legitimising the TRNC state. Symbols of the state (“wall”, “gate”, “flags”, “nation” and “TRNC”) are activated in state processes. This grammatical strategy emphasises the nation more than when it appears in prepositional phrases, as is the case on *BRTI* and *KFM*.

Alternatively, *Lokmacı* is not represented positively as is the case on the other stations. It is represented as a small success or part of a problem with the Republic. Collocations and grammatical strategies are used for this. *Lokmacı* is collocated with negative lexical choices like “very small detail”, “no importance” and one of “many gates”. Co-text includes the “Cyprus problem”, “very difficult” and “a little crisis”. When *Radyo T* collocates *Lokmacı* and the TRNC with the Republic, they are always passivated or in prepositional phrases. This de-emphasises both the ideas of TRNC and the Republic together, and *Lokmacı*, two discourses counter to UBP interests.

The Republic is further made out to be not only troublesome, but a threat. For example:

Here, one nation tried to destroy the other nation but God bless our motherland’s soldiers because the soldiers drew a border.

The Republic is backgrounded by being named “one nation”, while its actions are loaded with negative connotations. Trying to “destroy” another nation is a terrible act by anyone’s calculations (Billig, 1995: 3). By adding moral gravity to Turkish soldiers’ actions (“God bless”), the Republic is immoral, evil and dangerous.

Another aspect of nationalist politics revealed through representations of the nation is Turkish military importance. This is achieved through the nation being collocated or in co-text of Turkey and its soldiers. This occurs eight times, as in:

Soldiers are here; when peace comes and after an agreement is reached. We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish soldiers are our guarantors. Turkey told us and underlined this. They give us power and moral support. Truly our nation is alive and confident.

Here, Turkey and its soldiers are represented in every sentence along with five mentions of the nation (“here”, “we”(twice), “us” and “our nation”). These

collocations signify discourses about a close and helpful relationship between Turkey, the military and TRNC and discourses about a threatening Republic.

VI.4.ii The Governed Summary

This section has examined how events during the week of Lokmacı's opening were recontextualised in ways which signify different discourses about who and what is being governed in TRNC and the Republic.

On *BRTI*, we find a limited number of representations of TRNC and the Republic's residents acting positively together and named using inclusive lexical choices. These recontextualisations of events draw upon discourses of cooperation and unity, a result of some journalists' personal politics and their answerability to pro-settlement power holders. These representations exemplify "strategies of transformation [which] aim to transform a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity the contours of which the speaker has already conceptualised" (Wodak et al., 1999: 33). The national identity conceptualised is one which sees the Republic as a potential partner. Unfortunately, these representations act as little more than a pretext for more dominant discourses of CTP and TRNC support. Grammatical strategies de-emphasise cooperation between the two groups of residents and the Republic's role in such actions. Furthermore, unifying lexical choices are limited to one throughout the whole sample.

More dominant discourses signified throughout the sample include sameness amongst "Turkish Cypriots" who belong to a multi-functional nation. The nation is represented as populated with powerful police, businessmen and immigration officers. It has a Turkish language, a border, an airport and a crossing. These representations utilise constructive strategies identified by Wodak et al. (ibid.), satisfying *BRTI's* mandate which demands national construction from its content. It also satisfies *BRTI's* interests with Turkish nationalist leanings such as the police, some journalists, the military and money groups which benefit from a divided Cyprus.

On *KFM*, the limited number of representations of residents emphasise Turkish Cypriot-ness and the CTP with its positive actions. Aspects of the nation are all but excluded except for borders and Lokmacı, another government success. These recontextualisations satisfy *KFM*'s closeness to the CTP. However, *KFM* evokes discourses of the Republic more negatively than *BRTI*, performing actions contrary to TRNC interests. Residents are victims of its actions, with Turkish institutions aiding Turkish Cypriots. This diversion from CTP policies is a result of newsroom practices which show a lack of care in lexical and grammatical choices in a CTP-friendly environment. These representations exemplify a strategy similar to "dismantling or destructive strategies [which] aim at dismantling or disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide any new model to replace the old one" (ibid.). Though *KFM* does not disparage the nation, it mostly excludes it, showing a lack of support. By realising negative discourses about the Republic during the week's events, *KFM* does not provide a new model (such as a federation) as an alternative to TRNC.

On *Radyo T*, the sample reveals that power holders associated with UBP interests are empowered and emphasised: police, soldiers and "we" which includes nationalist politicians. Residents are reminded of their duties to be nationalists. Many aspects of the nation are named and emphasised, mapping out a distinctly Turkish TRNC nation with borders, areas, customs, flags and personality traits. Turkey, its military and its importance are constantly reminded. These draw upon discourses of a successful TRNC nation closely associated with a powerful Turkey.

Representations of the Republic's residents and the nation evoke discourses of a dangerous threatening enemy. Residents are involved in protests represented with military lexical choices, while the nation seeks to destroy TRNC. These recontextualisations reflect newsroom practices which emphasise what is good for the nation from a UBP perspective. *Radyo T* employs strategies of perpetuation which "attempt to maintain and to reproduce a threatened national identity" (ibid.). A distinct TRNC national identity aligned closely with Turkey and

a threatening Republic are reproduced, leaving no room for alternatives to TRNC.

VI.5 Lokmacı Analysis Conclusion

For over forty years, a once popular shopping and socialising area in the centre of Nicosia was divided with barricades. During the week of its re-unification, TRNC radio news gave events extensive coverage. Despite the opening being an event which could have been recontextualised as being associated with Cypriot unity, events were recontextualised in ways which signify discourses of division, difference, antagonism and fear. These discourses differ across stations drawing upon different versions of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which benefit interested parties associated with each station. Unfortunately, these do very little in “helping to find a solution” to the Cyprus conflict or “writing what is good for the nation”.

For the most part, this chapter’s analysis confirms studies before it which reveal that TRNC media contribute to Turkish Cypriot nationalism and not unity in Cyprus (Azgın and Bailie, 2008). But unlike previous studies, it demonstrates differences between the types of nations and nationalisms each station represents.

BRTI recontextualises events in ways which represents an active, multi-functional and important government that governs a multi-functional Turkish Cypriot nation. This positive representation of the government reflects *BRTI*’s close relationship with the Prime Minister’s office. The nation is populated by powerful politicians, police, businessmen and immigration officers. It has a Turkish language, a border, an airport and a crossing. These representations evoke discourses about Turkish Cypriot-ness which satisfy *BRTI*’s legal mandate that dictates promotion of TRNC. Discourses about the Republic’s government, residents and the nation evoke an ‘other’. They are different, “Greek Cypriot” and a “side” led by an “administration”. These representations draw upon discourses of difference and opposition, satisfying *BRTI*’s Turkish nationalist interests.

However, *BRTI* also realises discourses of cooperation and unity, albeit as little more than a pretext to more dominant discourses. Namings acknowledge that Lokmacı is a crossing to the Republic. Though the Republic's government, residents and nation are an 'other', the government is named personally, giving listeners a point of identification. The Republic's government and residents perform positive acts and are associated with positive news, though grammatical strategies de-emphasise this. These recontextualisations mostly evoke discourses of difference, but also cooperation and unity. Together these discourses realise a national ideology on *BRTI* which for the most part is closed and "Turkish Cypriot" in nature, but also has some potential for an alternative more-inclusive group identification.

KFM stories realise discourses of CTP governance which are positive and unquestioning. The CTP is a multi-functional and active government. President Talat is a celebrity, powerful and active. These recontextualisations arise not as a result of individual journalistic bias, but as a result of the station's closeness to the CTP and newsroom practices. With the exception of Lokmacı, which is framed as a government success, aspects of the nation are all but excluded. Residents' representations are limited, though mostly named as Turkish Cypriots which evoke discourses of sameness within TRNC and difference from the Republic.

In fact, themes of difference and antagonism surround the Republic. It is represented more negatively than on *BRTI*. There are less personal representations and the Republic is either activated performing actions contrary to TRNC interests or collocated with negative events and issues such as isolation and troubles at Lokmacı. Representations of the Republic realise discourses of difference, trouble and antagonism. Though these recontextualisations serve the interests of *KFM*'s pro-CTP owners and management, these do nothing to evoke discourses about a nation without embargoes and isolation faced by residents daily.

Radyo T stories represent a Turkish Cypriot nation opposed to an aggressive enemy. Governance is in the hands of nationalists and mainland Turkey. Mainland Turkey is represented as a guarantor and protector of TRNC. The CTP government is a failure. Power holders associated with the UBP are empowered and emphasised while residents are reminded of their duties to be nationalists. The TRNC nation is emphasised, mapping out a distinct nation with borders, barricades, soldiers, police, areas, customs, flags and the personality trait of vigilance. This draws upon a discourse of TRNC statehood, again in line with UBP policies. The Republic and its residents think, say, aim and act in ways which threaten the very existence of TRNC. 'They' are de-emphasised while their negative actions such as wanting control over TRNC are highlighted. The status quo of TRNC closely linked to Turkey with an enemy Republic, is in line with UBP policy.

Together, these analyses begin to reveal the type of nation each station represents through discourses signified by recontextualising events during the week of Lokmaci's opening. Each Turkish Cypriot nation signified reflects the interests of those who control stations. Overall, these ideologies are not conducive to solutions to the Cyprus conflict.

VII TRNC and the Republic's Relations

VII.1 Introduction

Former president Rauf Denktaş and the UBP governed TRNC from 1975 and 1985 respectively until 2003. According to the UBP's Shadow Minister of the Economy Ersin Tatar, although the UBP recognises the need for a solution, it does not seek close relations with the Republic, aiming to establish two distinct and independent states with TRNC closely aligned to Turkey. Since 29 December 2003 until 18 April 2009, the TRNC government was the pro-federation CTP which won TRNC's parliamentary elections on a platform of seeking a federation with the Republic. It went on to support the 2004 *Annan plan*, which aimed to re-unite Cyprus with a federation.

The CTP's pro-federation efforts were made difficult throughout most of their time in office by the Republic's government of Tassos Papadopoulos which was regarded as opposing a federation.⁵⁰ Papadopoulos was an *EOKA* fighter, the regional chief of operations in Nicosia.⁵¹ He vowed never to share political power with Turkish Cypriots saying, in reference to the *Annan plan's* idea for a federation, "I received a state; I will not deliver a community."⁵² This aversion to power sharing was evident by his government's lack of commitment to the UN-brokered 8 July 2006 agreement which aimed to create cooperation on both day-to-day and comprehensive solution issues.

On 24 February 2008, fortunes changed for the CTP as the Republic voted in Dimitris Christofias's pro-federation government. Christofias not only shares the same communist political origins as the CTP, he also won on a platform which prioritised a federal solution to the Cyprus conflict. At his victory ceremony, he pledged, "As of tomorrow, we unite our forces [...] to achieve the reunification of

⁵⁰ Noted in many places including in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Cyprus downloaded 09.06.09.

⁵¹ *EOKA* was a Greek Cypriot armed militia whose aim was *Enosis*; that is, Cypriot union with Greece.

⁵² Taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tassos_Papadopoulos downloaded 09.06.09.

our country."⁵³ This election victory brought about two pro-federation governments for the first time since division of Cyprus in 1974.

VI.1.i Media coverage of relations

Throughout their history, both Cypriot communities have identified themselves in relation to the 'other' Cypriot community (Panayiotou, 2006: 30; Lacher and Kaynak, 2005: 156; Mallinson, 2005: 109). Cypriot media, which have worked in the political context of conflict, contribute to this situation by representing an oppositional 'other' community (Azgın and Bailie, 2008: 57). According to Billig (1995: 61), this is a strategy in nation-building:

[national identities] include ways of conceiving of 'us, the nation', which is said to have its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of 'them, the foreigners', from whom 'we' identify 'ourselves' as different.

However, with one and then two pro-federation governments in Cyprus, the media have had to consider a more positive pro-federation political atmosphere along with its traditional role of representing an oppositional Greek Cypriot 'other'. CDA's view is there is a dialectical relationship between context and text (Fairclough, 2003: 3, van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999: 92). If this is accepted, then the changing political contexts of radio news production should see changes in representations in texts. This chapter examines how the media represented relations with the 'other' Cyprus during this time of change which saw peace talks, celebrated election victories and peace gestures.

VI.1.ii Chapter's analytical approach and structure

During the time of this thesis, relations can be seen as going through three different eras: before, during and after Christofias's win. This chapter examines stories which recontextualise events about relations between the Republic and TRNC during these time periods. Participants examined are TRNC, the Republic, Turkey and Cyprus, starting with those with the most mentions on *BRTI* to those with the least. The first two participants are obviously the focus of these stories. Turkey is included because it is a contested part not just of the nation,

⁵³ Taken from www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-24-cyprus-elections downloaded 02.02.09.

but also of relations between TRNC and the Republic. Cyprus is included because an important aspect of relations between the two states is the idea of a federation; that is, a politically and socially united Cyprus.

This analysis considers how stations draw upon discourses which are conducive to a partnership with the Republic, the stated aim of the CTP and Christofias. If a station is “helping to find a solution” or writing “what is good for the nation”, it will represent relations positively. So, Turkish Cypriot participants will be represented as part of Cyprus. The Republic will be represented positively and Cyprus will be represented as a single positive entity.

Alternatively, a Turkish nationalist stance will draw upon discourses of difference between TRNC and the Republic. Discourses about Turkey as a close ally, protector and motherland will be present. The Republic will be negatively represented, possibly as an enemy to discourage the idea of partnership. Cyprus will be represented negatively or backgrounded to disregard the idea of it as a single future option.

My ethnography reveals that due to the context of production of TRNC radio news, the pro-solution scenario outlined above is more of an ideal than a reality. Stations have differing political and economic contexts as well as newsroom practices, each making the pro-solution scenario unlikely. However, the CTP and Christofias claimed this was their desire, so this influence should be obvious, especially on stations with pro-CTP interests such as *BRTI* and *KFM*.

Stories chosen for this analysis are based on two criteria. Firstly, stories which represent relations between the Republic and TRNC during the three time periods were chosen; that is, Papadopolous’s governance,⁵⁴ Christofias’s election victory⁵⁵ and then during Christofias’s governance.⁵⁶ These three eras are represented in the three sections of this chapter.

⁵⁴ Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 11A.

⁵⁵ Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 11B.

⁵⁶ Original scripts and translations from all three stations are in Appendix 11C.

Secondly, stories which show traces of different newsroom practices were chosen. Some stories are very similar to each other due to the use of *TAK* news service for news gathering by all stations. This is evident in the stories analysed during Christofias's governance. Other stories are very different due to political influences in the newsroom, such as the stories analysed during Papadopoulos's governance.

Analysis of the language used in these stories reveals that each station shapes its coverage slightly differently. Stations use their coverage of relations as an opportunity to promote their own ideas and interests about the nature of Cyprus, TRNC and the Republic. This allows for stories that on one level appear to be applauding a change of government to be shaped in ways which foreground negativity for the benefit of those associated with each station.

BRTI's recontextualisations benefit pro-federation CTP, as well as Turkish nationalist interests. *KFM* unquestionably supports the CTP, while *Radyo T* shows its support for Turkish nationalist UBP. Unfortunately, these recontextualisations are not "what is good for the nation" and do little to "help find a solution", signifying discourses of difference, opposition and threat more than cooperation, compromise and unity.

VII.2 25 September 2007 the Papadopolous Era

Papadopoulos's governance was during the *Annan* and post-*Annan plan* era, where scepticism towards any agreement was rife.⁵⁷ According to *BRTI*'s chief editor Devecioğlu, this was because TRNC residents felt they had compromised in good faith by agreeing to *Annan*'s plan for a federation, while residents of the Republic had refused to share power. Papadopoulos and the CTP were involved in peace talks according to the UN-brokered 8 July 2006 agreement which covered everything from water management to governance and citizenship.

⁵⁷ This scepticism and reasons behind it were evident in government statements and media coverage during this time.

stations on 25 September 2007. *BRTI* and *KFM* covered a press conference held by the CTP's Deputy Prime Minister - Foreign Minister Turgay Avcı. *Radyo T* covered a public criticism of CTP policies towards the Republic by UBP's Şerife Ünverdi. Though *TAK* was used for news gathering and writing of these stories, *BRTI* and *KFM*'s story source is CTP politician Avcı while *Radyo T*'s story source is UBP politician Ünverdi. This is not an accident, but a reflection of newsroom cultures. *BRTI* is answerable to the CTP Prime Minister's office and if governmental events are not covered, according to *BRTI*'s Chief News Coordinator Hüseyin Güven, the government will put pressure on *BRTI* by "asking why". Likewise, *KFM*'s management and owners support the CTP while *Radyo T*'s owners and management support the UBP.

This thesis's ethnography also revealed that stations use *TAK* differently; *BRTI* uses *TAK* with impressions from its reporters, *KFM* cuts and pastes sentences and *Radyo T* also cuts and pastes but with more consistency in terms of its Turkish nationalist politics. Together, these newsroom practices are a factor in the different and self-serving representations of relations between TRNC and the Republic, an important part of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

VII.2.i TRNC

It can be seen from this sample that the stations' stories represent the government and residents in similar ways. The government is almost always named personally and formally. These namings grant the government status, more than if informally named, and offer listeners a point of identification with TRNC government officials.

⁹⁸ Both sides accused the other for a severe lack of progress. A year after the agreement the two sides still had not met. Downloaded 22.03.09 from <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/news/>

war (side). These impersonal representations draw upon discourses of difference and opposition between the Republic and TRNC.

How residents are named also contributes to nation-building. On all stations, residents are represented homogenised as “the Turkish Cypriot people” and “Turkish Cypriots”. Residents in TRNC are actually far more heterogenous, including many British, Kurdish, African and Turkish mainlanders.

Homogenisation is a nation-building strategy identified by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart. (1999: 4). Thus homogenised, stations evoke discourses of sameness within TRNC and difference from the Republic. This representation appeals to Turkish nationalist interests.

Despite these commonalities in representations of TRNC, subtle differences are also evident. These articulate different discourses of nation on each station.

VI.2.i.a BRTI

VII.2.i.a.1 Politicians and parties

Analysis of the *BRTI* story shows that it represents politicians and parties in ways which realise positive discourses about CTP governance and a distinct Turkish Cypriot nation.

The CTP government is represented as active and legitimate. This is signified using a number of strategies including activating CTP politician Avcı 12 times in verbal processes. Choosing a CTP politician as the only source adds legitimacy to CTP, as does the choice of glossing verbs (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304).

Interpretive glossing verbs like, “explain”, “brief” and “point out” connote knowledge, while “address” and “call on” one’s audience connotes CTP importance (ibid.: 307). Within reported speech, the government is collocated with “efforts” in finding solutions. These strategies represent an active, legitimate government.

The story also represents CTP's (and nation's) legitimacy as international. Collocations of the government with, "the Italian government", "Italian parliamentarians", "an audience of deputies", "the current EU Term President Portugal" produce a theme of an international government. These representations reflect both governmental and legal influences in the *BRTI* newsroom outlined by *BRTI*'s chief editor Devecioğlu by promoting the CTP and a Turkish Cypriot nation.

The nation's legitimacy is further signified through namings of the government. Like Lokmacı coverage, namings emphasise functions of politicians and the nation as in "the presidential spokesman". By highlighting functions, a normal-functioning government and nation are represented. These namings partially fulfil *BRTI*'s mandate of promoting the nation while evoking discourses of difference and opposition between the Republic and TRNC.

VII.2.i.a.2 Residents

In this story it can be seen that residents are represented in ways which further legitimise the CTP and its policies. One strategy used is residents are activated in ways which align their thoughts and feelings with the CTP as in:

[...] [residents] expressed their free will and fulfilled their obligation [by accepting the *Annan plan*].

Residents are cited as accepting *Annan*, a position which the CTP promoted, wanting a federation with the Republic. However, this activation is multi-layered; that is, a reporter describes Avci's speech which attributes residents' "will". This ought to be treated with caution. All the same, it creates a CTP and resident 'us' grouping which aligns residents with CTP policies. This serves CTP well and satisfies *BRTI*'s obligations to the government.

During the Papadopolous's government, the CTP was frustrated at a lack of progress on finding "solutions", according to CTP politician Beraltı. This frustration is evident in media coverage of political statements. These represent residents in ways suitable to the CTP. One theme is of "unjust international isolation" collocated with residents. Co-text reveals this is due to "the Greek

Cypriot Administration". Another theme is the spectre of losing TRNC. Residents are collocated with "assimilation" and "[the Republic] not prepared to share political power". These collocations realise a discourse of resident victimisation at the hands of the Republic. Also, by representing the Republic negatively, the CTP passes the blame for not finding a Cypriot solution on to the Republic.

VII.2.i.a.3 Nation

Representations of the nation construct a distinct and multi-functional Turkish Cypriot nation and negative relations with the Republic. Not only is "North Cyprus" and "the TRNC" named, but so is an aspect of the nation: the "North Cyprus economy". These impersonal namings represent a distinct and multi-functional Turkish Cypriot nation. The nation is collocated with positive news such as "direct trade between North Cyprus and EU countries", "strengthening" and "political settlement". These articulate positive discourses about TRNC, a part of *BRTI*'s mandate. However, co-text creates a theme of negative relations with the Republic. Ending isolation is "being prevented within the EU by the Greek Cypriot Administration".

VII.2.i.b KFM

VII.2.i.b.1 Politicians and parties

The CTP government is represented positive, legitimate, active, powerful and in control, more obviously than on *BRTI*.

KFM uses collocations to represent a hard-working government similar to that seen on *BRTI*. The government "was adopting a constructive stance" and "introducing new initiatives". Relations between the governments of TRNC and the Republic are represented as the CTP wants "solutions" and the Republic prevents them by saying "no to the Annan plan". This is a CTP-influenced position which represents the CTP being pro-solution and frustrated at a lack of progress due to a reluctant Republic.

the Italian parliament glosses a saying by Avci. To deliver a speech at a foreign parliament represents Avci and the government as being important and international.

KFM differs from *BRTI* by supporting the CTP more obviously within reported speech. When asked why *KFM* supports the CTP as obviously as it does, editor Çatal demonstrated a lack of awareness of the implications of her news writing. She said, “*KFM* does it the same as everyone else. We are reporting what is happening in TRNC.” This analysis proves differently. On *BRTI*, the government is not activated but collocated with positive lexical choices, while on *KFM* the CTP is activated positively, such as the state process of “the Turkish Cypriot side was adopting a constructive stance on the Cyprus Issue”. This represents the CTP positively and powerful. Despite this being a distillation which does not make clear what exactly the government is doing, sayings like this articulate positive discourses about CTP governance.

VII.2.i.b.2 Residents

This story represents residents similarly to that seen on *BRTI*. Firstly, like *BRTI*, residents’ representations are used to legitimise CTP frustration. Residents are activated in a mental process of having the “general perception that a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem will not take place any time soon”. This creates a CTP and resident ‘us’ group which is frustrated and blames the Republic for a lack of progress in finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict.

Also similar to *BRTI*, residents are represented as victims of the Republic. For example, they are de-emphasised in the following prepositional phrase: the Republic’s aim of “assimilation of Turkish Cypriots into a minority within a Greek Cypriot state”. Utterances such as these articulate a discourse of resident victimisation by the Republic.

KFM differs from *BRTI* in this story by emphasising difference between the two groups of residents differently than on *BRTI*. *BRTI* names “Turkish Cypriots” seven times in the story, while *KFM* only represents them twice, a reflection of *BRTI*’s mandate to promote the nation. *KFM*, however, makes clear there are “two equal peoples” on Cyprus, drawing on discourses of difference between the two Cypriot communities.

VII.2.i.b.3 Nation

The most stark difference between *BRTI*’s and *KFM*’s stories is the TRNC nation is excluded on *KFM*. This is a reflection of CTP policies which aim to create a new nation. By not representing TRNC, the nation is difficult for listeners to imagine. This highlights the need for negotiations to create a new kind of national identity.

VII.2.i.c Radyo T

VII.2.i.c.1 Politicians and parties

On *Radyo T*, the CTP is represented as unworthy of governing the Turkish Cypriot nation while Turkish nationalist UBP is supported through representations. According to newsroom manager Moreket, exposing the CTP flaws through the eyes of an UBP politician is “good for the nation”.

Unlike the other two stations, *Radyo T* limits its support for the CTP. Although the government is personally and formally named, *Radyo T* uses the pronouns “she”, “her” and “herself” seven times, reducing nominations and points of identification to five.

In fact, *Radyo T* mostly represents CTP negatively. A number of strategies are used for this. One strategy is naming the CTP negatively as in:

Ünverdi stressed that all the members of UBP believe in the Turkish Cypriot community, even though there are attacks from inside and outside.

Here, the government is backgrounded, named vaguely as “inside” and ascribed a negative action of “attacking” the Turkish Cypriot community, a negative representation which serves UBP interests well.

Another strategy used to represent the CTP negatively is activating it in acts against TRNC interests. The CTP is activated in state, event and action processes, representing a powerfully negative government as in:

Mrs. Ekenoğlu shouldn't forget that she is the speaker of the Northern Cyprus Republic's assembly today, her position is indebted to 40 years of struggle and politics, which she herself is criticising.

Here the government is activated four times: in the modal event process, "Ekenoğlu shouldn't forget"; in the state processes, "she is the speaker", "her position is indebted to 40 years of struggle and politics"; and "she herself is criticising". This sentence presupposes that Ekenoğlu forgets that her position is due to UBP's nationalist struggle for political independence. Not only does she forget this, she also criticises this, another negative action. These actions draw upon negative discourses about the worthiness of the CTP, criticising and forgetting its TRNC nation, a grave action for nationalists.

Another strategy used to discredit the CTP is collocations. The government is collocated with "trying to waste" time, "incorrect handling of the Cyprus issue", "deceiving the Turkish Cypriot community", "benefit herself" and "will not be successful". These produce themes of a government which lies, is unsuccessful and wrong for self-interest. Its relations with the Republic is represented as sinister. It wastes time on "blind promises" of compromises with the Republic. It is in secret agreements with the Republic in "the Greek side is agreeable, but CTP will not be successful at keeping this agreeability secret". Lying about agreements to maintain politically advantageous positions is represented as a priority for the CTP, articulating discourses about the CTP being unsuitable to govern Turkish Cypriots.

While *Radyo T* represents the CTP negatively, it saves its support for the UBP. Again, a number of strategies are used. One is the naming of "Şerife Ünverdi, the Lefkoşa UBP representative member of parliament". She is named as such twice (once more than normal), stressing not only her function and importance but also adding credibility to her claims. She is also named semi-formally as

“Şerife Ünverdi”. This softens her otherwise formal and functional representations, connoting a closer, warmer and friendlier UBP politician.

Another strategy is activating the UBP positively. It is positively activated in event, state, action and mental processes. For example, “all the members of UBP believe in the Turkish Cypriot community” and “the UBP will continue its path in order to achieve a place deserved by the TRNC state in an honourable manner.” The activations of “believes in” TRNC and “will continue its path” are distillations. It is unclear what either activation means in terms of UBP micro-processes, but represents a protective and TRNC-friendly UBP. Furthermore, this representation maps out a future imaginary for TRNC; that is, a “deserved” place which is “honourable” for the TRNC “state”. This articulates discourses of TRNC statehood in line with UBP policies.

Another strategy used to support the UBP is the use of glossing verbs. Ünverdi’s sayings are glossed with “expressed” and “stressed”. These are metapositional speech reporting verbs which emphasise sayings. What is “stressed” and “expressed” are UBP vigilance, support for TRNC and the wrongdoings of the CTP and the Republic. These themes are pillars of UBP policy.

Another strategy which shows support for the UBP is linking its actions to those of Turkey. Here, they both are represented positively in:

Before the UBP and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots had no land, no economy, no government, but now residents live in a safe and comfortable state.

Though a prepositional phrase usually adds context to a sentence, the UBP and Turkey are given credit for providing a “safe and comfortable state”. This sentence presupposes that before the UBP and Turkey, residents were unsafe and uncomfortable. It presupposes that the UBP and Turkey supplied this condition. This draws upon discourses of the UBP and Turkey together governing Turkish Cypriots.

VII.2.i.c.2 Residents

On *Radyo T*, residents are represented not only as distinct from their Greek counterparts, but also as part of a pan-Turkish nation. Residents are named

“residents”, which is more inclusive than “Turkish Cypriots”. This naming includes settlers from Turkey. An inclusive naming reflects UBP policy which has brought over many Turkish mainlanders in order to maintain a nationalist population base, while supplementing the Turkish Cypriot population. It also evokes discourses of pan-Turkish nationalism reflected in owner and UBP politician Tatar’s claim that “we are all Turks, afterall”.

Residents are also represented in ways which show opposition to the CTP. They are named once as “anybody”, an indetermination, in:

[...] she [Ekenoğlu] expressed that this situation [CTP deceiving the Turkish Cypriot community] will not contribute anything to anybody.

Van Leeuwen (1996: 51-52) claims an indetermination is used when “the writer treats his or her identity as irrelevant to the reader.” *Radyo T* chose to use “anybody” in this sentence in order to emphasise the wrong-doings of the CTP.

VII.2.i.c.3 Nation

On *Radyo T*, the TRNC nation is important. Tatar made this clear when he described TRNC’s many successes as an independent state. Representing a successful TRNC suggests a two-state solution is the answer to the Cyprus conflict. In this story, it is represented eight times far more than on the other stations, showing importance given to the nation (ibid.: 42). Four times “state” is used while excluded from other stations’ stories, again a reflection of the UBP’s preference for TRNC statehood. Deixis is used in all but one naming, banally reminding listeners of “the” community, state and “this” country (Billig, 1995: 94). These realise discourses about the TRNC being an option to the Cyprus conflict, in line with UBP policies.

These national representations are either in prepositional phrases or passivated. These grammatically weak representations serve the purpose of identifying aspects of the nation, while emphasising UBP positive actions and CTP negative actions. The nation is used as a backdrop for political parties’ actions.

VII.2.ii The Republic



On all stations, the only aspect of the Republic represented is its government. This limited representation offers no personal representations and no nominations on any station, giving listeners no points of identification. It is only represented in the reported speech of TRNC politicians who represent it acting against TRNC interests. By limiting representations as such, articulating discourses of an 'other' or even an enemy is made easy.

Despite these limited representations of the Republic, subtle differences are revealed. For example, on *BRTI and KFM*, the government is named "Greek Cypriot". Though "Greek" represents difference, "Cypriot" represents some commonality. Alternatively *Radyo T* names it "Greek", evoking discourses of an 'other' with no commonality. This reflects UBP policy which claims there are only Turks and Greeks on Cyprus. As Turkish nationalist politician Denktas repeatedly claims, "The only true Cypriots are the Donkeys in Karpaz."⁵⁹

VII.2.ii.a BRTI

Though the Republic's government is represented as an oppositional 'other' which lacks legitimacy, it is not as negative as it could be. The Republic is represented acting against TRNC interests by rejecting the *Annan plan*, not willing to share power, preventing E.U. direct trade and delaying political settlements. However, it is mostly represented in prepositional phrases in passive sentence constructions, a strategy noted in the Lokmaci analysis. For example:

[...] the implementation of the regulation which aimed to allow direct trade between North Cyprus and EU countries as well as to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people was being prevented within the EU by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Here, a passive sentence structure sees the Republic de-emphasised at the end of a long sentence, while its actions of preventing regulations which can end isolation are emphasised. Though still a negative representation of the Republic, it is not as negative as if the Republic was activated in "the Republic prevents EU aid".

⁵⁹ Karpaz is a part of Cyprus which is known for its population of wild donkeys.

Despite the extensive use of this grammatical strategy which limits negativity, lexical choices represent the Republic lacking legitimacy. This is a reflection of both CTP and UBP policies which do not recognise the government as the sole authority on Cyprus. Naming it the “Greek Cypriot Administration” connotes temporality, which offers far less status and legitimacy than a “government”.

In this story, it can be seen that the “administration” is also an oppositional ‘other’. A number of strategies are used. One strategy is naming it the “Greek Cypriot side”, “side” connoting opposition. Another strategy is the Republic is collocated with “rejects” peace plans, “prevents” the end of isolation, “delays” political settlements and only accepts “assimilation” of Turkish Cypriots as a solution in Cyprus. These are very negative, reflecting Turkish nationalist interests on *BRTI* and doing nothing to realise discourses about cooperation. Though editor Cafer claimed *BRTI* “does not attack the other side” as much as before the CTP came to power, these representations are very negative.

VII.2.ii.b KFM

In this story, it can be seen that the Republic is not only an ‘other’, but an adversary more than that seen on *BRTI*. By representing the Republic as such, listeners are offered a reason for a lack of progress on solutions.

An adversarial role is achieved through a number of strategies. One strategy not seen on *BRTI* is naming the Republic’s government “they” and “them”. “They” and “them” aid in creating an ‘other’, not a part of an ‘us’ in-group (Fairclough, 2003: 146).

A second strategy used is grammatical choices. Like *BRTI*, actions attributed to the Republic are negative, though *KFM* represents more of them. Unlike *BRTI* which uses prepositional phrases that de-emphasise the role of the Republic in negative actions, *KFM* mostly activates the Republic’s government. This represents a more negative government than *BRTI*. For example:

Avcı said that the Greek Cypriot side had said a resounding no to the Annan plan which proved it was not ready to share political power with Turkish Cyprus.

negative media coverage (Panayiotou, 2006: 31; Mallinson, 2005: 189).

Negative activations such as this evoke discourses of difference and opposition, more than *BRTI*. This is despite *KFM*'s close affiliation with pro-federation CTP, reflecting a lack of care in lexical and grammatical choices in the newsroom. As editor Basrı sarcastically said, "The girls (editors) put in their hours until they find a rich husband. News is not their main interest here."

A third strategy which represents the Republic more negatively than *BRTI* is the use of collocations and co-text. These reveal the Republic introduces "delaying tactics" to solutions, wants "assimilation of Turkish Cypriots", "aim[s] to prevent Turkey's EU membership" and sidelines finding "a solution". Again, these collocations draw upon Turkish nationalist discourses about the Republic. At the same time, *KFM* presents a reason why the CTP has not found a solution to the Cyprus conflict. This benefits the CTP, though goes against its policies for solutions.

VII.2.ii.c Radyo T

In this story, it can be seen that the Republic is represented as not only an oppositional other as seen on the other stations, but as an enemy. This legitimises and supports UBP nationalist ideology which wants full independence from the Republic.

A number of strategies are employed to represent the Republic as an enemy of TRNC. In "there are attacks from inside and outside", lexical choices and collocations are used. Here, the Republic is backgrounded as "outside" and collocated with the CTP ("inside"). Together they attack the Turkish Cypriot community. Van Leeuwen (1996: 50) terms the temporary naming of groups an "association" which he describes as "an alliance which exists only in relation to a specific activity or set of activities". Here the CTP and the Republic form a group

which acts against the interests of TRNC by “attacking” it. This representation is in line with UBP policies by signifying discourses about the Republic being an enemy, while discrediting the CTP.

Another strategy is activating the Republic. The Republic is represented in a variety of grammatical roles, acting even more negatively than on other stations.

For example, it is activated in an action and state process in:

[...] the Greeks and Greece rejected all peaceful political attitudes, with the intention of being the owner of the whole island, and she expressed that now the Greek side is agreeable, but CTP will not be successful at keeping this agreeability secret.

Here, the Republic “rejects” peace, wanting to own the whole island with Greece. Collocating the Republic with Greece raises the spectre of *Enosis*, a real fear in the past and even now amongst TRNC residents. This is far more of a threat than “assimilation” seen on the other two stations because *Enosis* has been a stated goal of many Greek Cypriot politicians. The Republic is then represented as being “agreeable”. Though this is a positive state process, agreeable to what is unclear, even with co-text. Positiveness is modified by the Republic and the CTP implicated in “keeping this agreeability secret”. This represents the Republic and the CTP as deceitful. “Now” also raises the question of how long this secret agreeability will last. These activations evoke discourses not only of adversaries, but of a dangerous enemy which wants *Enosis*.

VII.2.iii Cyprus

On all three stations, Cyprus is either represented negatively or de-emphasised, despite stations’ different politics. Lexical choices such as the “Cyprus Problem” and “Cyprus issue” create a negative Cyprus theme. Cyprus is de-emphasised, buried in prepositional phrases, mostly at the end of a sentence or end of clause position, further de-emphasising it. Naming it “the island” backgrounds the idea of Cyprus behind a term for a land mass and never representing it personally excludes a point of identification for listeners. While these strategies negatively represent or de-emphasise Cyprus, the Republic’s negative actions and/ or CTP and UBP positive actions are emphasised.

VII.2.iii.a *BRTI*

In this story, it can be seen that Cyprus is represented negatively. This is despite *BRTI*'s close links with pro-federation CTP which aims to unify Cyprus. At the same time, representations create pro-CTP themes.

On *BRTI* and *KFM* Cyprus is represented as "a Greek Cypriot state". This is a negative imaginary, described by Fairclough (2003: 208) as a powerful lexical strategy which can be inculcated as a new way of being and new identities. In this case, the 'imaginary' of the Republic wanting to assimilate residents is something TRNC has been resisting since British rule.

This negative theme associated with Cyprus is also revealed through collocations and co-text. Cyprus is collocated with "non-solution", "risk" and "instability".

However, co-text reveals pro-CTP ideas. For example:

Referring to the Turkish Cypriot Side's ongoing efforts towards finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem, the TRNC Foreign Minister said that Turkish Cypriots were with the opinion that a comprehensive solution will not be found to the Cyprus Problem in the near future.

Here, "Cyprus problem" is mentioned twice, but so is "solution". Though the theme of the sentence is not positive, co-text draw upon positive discourses about the CTP searching for solutions.

VII.2.iii.b *KFM*

In this story, it can be seen that *KFM* uses negative representations of Cyprus to suppress criticisms about the CTP and highlight positive actions of the CTP, even more than on *BRTI*.

Suppressing criticisms of the CTP is achieved through nominalisations. "Cyprus Problem" is used to describe a stalled peace process, activated in the state process of:

Avcı said that the Cyprus Problem had entered a new phase following the 2004 referendum turning point.

Here Avcı hides agency, the fact that his pro-federation government has not made progress in finding a solution. This could have been written as "The CTP

and politicians in the Republic have found no solutions and now have entered a new phase". This would activate the government in a negative act. The sentence further insulates the government from negativity by the action "had entered a new phase". This is an abstraction. What this means is not described. However, the CTP is distanced from the negative news of its lack of success at finding solutions, maintaining a CTP-friendly recontextualisation of events.

KFM also creates a theme of CTP support through co-text, more than that seen on *BRTI*. Despite negative collocations of "problem", "issue" and "non-solution" with Cyprus, the CTP is represented as the answer. Its "efforts" are more pronounced than on *BRTI*. The CTP "was adopting a constructive stance", "introducing new initiatives", "revitalis[ing] the negotiations process" and "had entered a new phase". All is not negative on Cyprus with discourses about the CTP's "efforts" and work being articulated.

VII.2.iii.c Radyo T

On *Radyo T*, Cyprus is collocated with the negative lexical choices of "incorrect handling", "grave sadness" and "misleading". Co-text reveals these negative collocations are due to the CTP and the Republic. Here, there is no CTP to solve problems on Cyprus, it is the problem. Representing a single Cyprus negatively draws upon discourses of two separate states on Cyprus as a positive answer to the conflict, benefitting the UBP and its supporters.

VII.2.iv 25 September 2007 summary

These three stories recontextualise events about relations in ways which articulate discourses that benefit parties associated with each station.

Unfortunately, these discourses do little to "help find a solution" and are not "what is best for the nation".

BRTI realises discourses of Turkish Cypriot sameness, victimisation and CTP legitimacy. The TRNC government is represented as part of a "Turkish Cypriot" nation. But it is also a "side". It is legitimate and international. It talks and looks for "solutions". Though Cyprus is surrounded with negative themes, the CTP is

offered as a positive option, a way out of the problem. Residents are homogenised as “Turkish Cypriots” who are passivated by international isolation and the threat of being assimilated into a Greek Cypriot state. These representations are a result of both *BRTI*'s closeness to the CTP government and its mandate to promote the nation.

BRTI also draws upon discourses of difference and opposition with the Republic. Representations of the Republic offer no point of identification. It is “Greek Cypriot”, an “administration” and a “side”. It is credited with rejecting peace plans, not willing to share power, preventing the end of TRNC's international isolation, delaying solutions and wanting Cyprus to become “a Greek Cypriot state”. This negative discourse of the Republic is modified somewhat by passive sentence constructions which de-emphasise the Republic's role in negative actions. Despite these modifications, these recontextualisations give the CTP a reason for little progress on solutions. Solutions to the Cyprus conflict is a major plank in the CTP's political platform. By the CTP blaming the Republic, criticisms aimed at it are deflected. This serves *BRTI*'s closeness to the Prime Minister's office well, but articulates discourses not conducive to a federation.

On *KFM*, similar discourses are signified, though differences are apparent. The CTP is represented as a Turkish Cypriot “side” which is important, international and constructive. Its wanting solutions from its efforts, new initiatives and constructive stances is emphasised far more than on *BRTI*. *KFM* also differs from *BRTI* by not representing the nation. This is a reflection of CTP policies which play down the nation in order to make discussions about other forms of national identification seem natural.

Unfortunately, *KFM* draws upon discourses of oppositional difference, not compromise and federations. The Republic is named in ways which create a ‘them’ Greek Cypriot group, more than on *BRTI*. Like *BRTI*, the Republic is represented acting against TRNC interests, though negative representations and activations are more numerous evoking discourses of a more actively negative Republic. These make it difficult to imagine the Republic as a partner in

solutions. These serve CTP and *KFM* interests well, though do nothing towards realising the appropriate discourses for cooperation, compromise and unity.

On *Radyo T*, discourses about the CTP's inability to lead are realised. The government acts against TRNC interests, activated and collocated negatively. It is represented attacking TRNC and in secret agreements with the Republic. The CTP is named as a problem in the Cyprus conflict. In contrast, the UBP is peaceful, friendly, resists attacks and aims to create "a deserved and honorable solution for the TRNC state". The UBP and Turkey are represented as legitimate leaders of TRNC. Residents are de-emphasised while CTP negative actions or UBP positive actions are emphasised. The nation is constantly reminded through this story, showing its importance to *Radyo T*.

Unlike the other stations, discourses of a dangerous enemy are articulated. It lies, keeps secrets with the CTP and wants *Enosis*. This evokes discourses of the Republic as an enemy, with very little chance of seeing it as a partner in a solution. These representations reflect the UBP and *Radyo T* interests by drawing upon national discourses of a two-state solution as the answer to the Cyprus conflict.

VII.3 28 February 2008 Christofias' win

Christofias' election victory in the Republic was a welcome change of government for the TRNC's pro-federation CTP government. It ushered in an era where there were two pro-federation governments on Cyprus. The international community also expressed its pleasure over a new government. This analysis examines each station's recontextualisations of events concerning international reactions to the election victory.

BRTI covered America's reaction, *KFM* covered British responses and *Radyo T* covered both. Stories of these reactions show striking similarities. *Radyo T*'s coverage of America's response is very similar to the *BRTI* story. *KFM*'s story again is similar to *Radyo T*'s coverage of the English response. In fact, the one paragraph on the English response on *Radyo T* is exactly the same as the first

Despite similarities, differences appear due to what was selected and how it was written, reflecting different newsroom practices. The three stories represent imaginary relations and solutions to the Cyprus conflict, evoking differing discourses about Turkish Cypriot nationalism while covering responses to pro-federation Christofias' electoral win.

VII.3.i The Republic

In these stories, it can be seen that representations of the Republic across all the stations emphasise difference from TRNC and a lack of status. Stations mostly represent the government, though *BRTI* and *Radyo T* also represent residents and the nation. Though these contribute to a wider representation of the Republic, namings draw upon discourses of difference, not commonality.

VII.3.i.a BRTI

Despite this story on the surface being one of congratulations, the Republic's government is represented lacking status and it is surrounded with uncertainty. Differences between its residents and those of TRNC are also emphasised.

In this story, it can be seen that the Republic's government is represented lacking status. Government namings are used for this. Christofias is named twice, giving listeners a point of identification. However, the point of identification is not formal with functional honorifics, as is the case with all other politicians on *BRTI*. Christofias is first named "Dimitris Christofias", a semi-formal naming and then as "Mr Christofias", a formal naming. Editor Dağun said it is *BRTI* policy to name the president of the Republic as "leader of the Greek Cypriot administration" and not "president" as this would acknowledge the status of the Republic as the sole authority in Cyprus, against the politics of both the CTP and the UBP. In this story, the only mention of Christofias's status is "his victory on Sunday's

presidential election in South Cyprus”, ignoring his title of “President-elect”, despite this being the topic of the story.

Again, despite the story being one of congratulations, *BRTI* represents a government surrounded with uncertainty. Two strategies are used to achieve this. One strategy is using grammatics as in:

Speaking at a press briefing, the spokesman expressed the hope that Mr Christofias will work together with the US.

Here, Christofias is passivated by the spokesman’s “hope” that the Republic “will” work. By saying the spokesman “hopes” he “will” work with the US, there is no certainty of cooperation. This is a conditional representation of the future.

Uncertainty is also expressed through co-text. The Republic’s government is collocated with positive lexical choices such as “congratulated”, “victory”, “hope” and “will work together”. This positive theme is in line with CTP policies which wanted solutions and hoped Christofias would deliver some results. But co-text reveals uncertainty. The U.S. is “still committed” to a federal solution. To “still” be committed, means it has been committed. This presupposes that there have been obstacles, one being the Republic. Elsewhere, the U.S. “would jointly work with [both Cypriot governments]”. Again, “would” is modal adding uncertainty. These articulate discourses of uncertainty about Christofias which reflects CTP desires for a solution while still being able to blame the Republic for no solutions.

In this story, it can also be seen that representations of residents emphasise difference between TRNC and the Republic, while de-emphasising the two groups together as in:

Mr Casey reiterated that the US was still committed to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island which will be accepted by the majorities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

This sentence names “Greek Cypriots” and “Turkish Cypriots”. By differentiating “Turkish” from “Greek” and homogenising each group of residents, the idea of two nations is represented (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart, 1999: 4). At the same time, this sentence de-emphasises the idea of the two groups together. They appear in reported speech at the end of a long sentence in a prepositional

phrase. By de-emphasising Greek and Turkish Cypriots together, nationalist discourses of separation and division are signified.

VII.3.i.b KFM

In this story, the government is the only aspect of the Republic represented, unlike the other stations. Even Christofias is excluded from the story despite it covering reactions to his electoral victory. This sparse representation of the Republic offers listeners no points of identification, making it easy to 'other' the Republic (van Leeuwen, 1996: 48).

Like *BRTI*, in this story we find the government is represented in ways which limit its status, though different strategies are used. It is impersonally named as "the Greek Administration", not its internationally recognised name of "the government of the Republic of Cyprus". This limits the status of the government. Also identifying it as "Greek" does not include the common "Cypriot" naming used throughout *BRTI* stories. These namings articulate discourses of difference more than on *BRTI* and a lack of status similar to other stations.

Despite its lack of status, we find the government is represented conditionally positive. Two strategies are used here. One strategy is it is collocated with positive lexical choices such as "willing to find a solution". This reflects the CTP's endorsement of the government. However, activations are conditional, like *BRTI*, as in:

She explained that Turkey stressed its willingness about this topic and now the Greek Administration is contributing this willingness [to finding a solution].

This utterance, though positive, sees Turkey in dominant sentence position, activated positively by already "stressing its willingness" to find a solution. However, the Republic is activated in a state process with no agency, de-emphasising its power. It is collocated with "now", realising a discourse of the Republic's reluctance in finding a solution. This is part of CTP policy of deflecting criticisms aimed at itself.

VII.3.i.c Radyo T

On *Radyo T*, it can be seen the Republic's government is represented conditionally positive, lacks status and is surrounded with uncertainty, like on *BRTI*. However, there are two subtle differences in this story which reflect Turkish nationalism. One difference is Christofias's formal naming on *Radyo T* includes no honorific (*BRTI* used Mr.) denying him respect and formality attributed to other politicians. The second difference is the government is impersonally named as "the Greek Cypriot side" a name not seen in the *BRTI* story. This naming accentuates both difference ("Greek Cypriot") and opposition ("side").

Residents and the nation are also represented very similarly to *BRTI*. Residents are represented in ways which accentuate difference and de-emphasise the two groups together. Like *BRTI*, the nation is named "South Cyprus". Again, this naming maps out two distinct nations, the North and South of Cyprus which articulate discourses of difference.

VII.3.ii Cyprus

Cyprus is de-emphasised in similar ways across all stations. All stations at least once refer to Cyprus by its name, thereby acknowledging it as a single entity. However, naming it "the island" almost half of the time on all stations backgrounds "Cyprus". All stations also put Cyprus in prepositional phrases. These strategies de-emphasise the idea of a single Cyprus, contrary to CTP policies which aim to unify Cyprus.

VII.3.ii.a BRTI

In this story, we find Cyprus is represented as a future imaginary which mirrors the solution to the Cyprus conflict called for by the CTP. It is named twice as "a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island". It is a CTP desire for a federation which is bi-zonal and bi-communal. Naming it as such draws upon discourses which make clear *BRTI*'s and *CTP*'s vision of the future and confirms CTP influence on *BRTI* writing.

CTP influences are also evident through Cyprus collocations in this story. Cyprus is collocated with “solution”, “reunification” and “settlement”. These positive collocations articulate discourses of solutions to the Cyprus conflict clearly in agreement with CTP policies. These policies are represented as legitimised by the U.S. which is “committed to” or “working towards” a solution. This aligns the U.S. with the CTP articulating discourses of CTP international legitimacy.

VII.3.ii.b KFM

In this story, we find Cyprus is represented as a vaguely positive entity. It is collocated with “solution”, this being an “important time” and “reunification”. In fact, “solutions” appear six times in this story, three times collocated. But there is no indication of what this solution is. The word rings hollow. There is the qualification of “fair and balanced solution”, in line with CTP policies. But this tells listeners little about a solution. The idea of the present being a “very important point in time” is another CTP sentiment. It was due to hold elections the following year (April 2009) and wanted to show voters progress. This made 2008 an important time for the CTP. In short, discourses about Cypriot “solutions” and “importance” are evoked which serves the CTP well, but gives no information as to what these “solutions” might be.

VII.3.ii.c Radyo T

In this story, Cyprus is represented far more negatively than the other stations. Furthermore, a Cyprus solution is represented which echoes UBP Turkish nationalist policy.

Cyprus is named “a federation which consists of two regions and two societies”. This naming by a U.S. official is an imaginary which both the CTP and the UBP claim they aim for, though both interpret this very differently. The CTP would like to see a close federation with the Republic. The UBP claims a solution is necessary, though a federation is not necessarily its idea of a solution. UBP politician Ersin Tatar said the UBP aims to create a very weak federation or better yet, a confederation with two independent states; Turkish Cyprus closely

tied to Turkey. “Two regions” and “two societies” on Cyprus reflect UBP policies of two nations, two societies and two peoples. Due to the vagueness of this utterance, this could be interpreted as supporting UBP policies, representing U.S. policy aligned to UBP policy.

We also find that *Radyo T* demonstrates its reservations about a single Cyprus. Cyprus is collocated with “compromise”, “efforts” and “important time”. “Compromise” is not as positive as “solution”, a popular lexical collocation on *BRTI* and *KFM*. In fact, the word “solution” only appears twice and not collocated with Cyprus. Collocating “efforts” with Cyprus reminds listeners of the “compromises” and work needed for a solution. This throws into question the idea that the efforts needed for compromise are not worthwhile. These collocations articulate far less positive discourses about Cyprus than the other stations reflecting Turkish nationalism which aims for two separate states on Cyprus.

VII.3.iii TRNC

TRNC is not represented in these stories. This is because the stories’ sources are foreign officials and no country other than Turkey recognises TRNC. However, there are references to a Turkish Cypriot entity on Cyprus in these officials’ reported speech. How this reported speech is represented differs across the stations.

VII.3.iii.a BRTI

It can be seen through the use of lexical choices that TRNC is represented in ways which distinguish it from the Republic. Cyprus is represented as “the two sides on the island” and “a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution”, the former articulating discourses of division and the latter a future imaginary which emphasises two zones and two communities. Residents are named “Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”. Collocating the two Cypriots together reminds listeners that there are two peoples on Cyprus who share a common “Cypriot” identity, yet one is “Greek” and one “Turkish”. By representing two zones,

communities and peoples, *BRTI* articulates discourses of difference on Cyprus while addressing its mandate to promote a Turkish Cypriot nation.

VII.3.iii.b KFM

In this story, references to the nation are more vague than on *BRTI*. “A solution on the island” is uttered four times which presupposes there is a problem. However, there is no mention of “communities”, just “solutions”. This exclusion of nation is common on *KFM*.

However, TRNC residents are named in ways which demonstrate *KFM*'s support for the CTP. They are represented in:

Straw pointed out that Turks who live on the island are faced with some problems in regard to a solution. We have to stand behind these people who have good intentions in terms of real change and we need to provide the help which is needed by them.

Residents are collocated with “stand behind”, “help which is needed” and “faced with some problems”. This creates a theme of a powerless group which needs help. However, this group is not all TRNC residents but CTP-supporting pro-federation residents. British politician Jack Straw makes this clear in the second sentence of the excerpt cited above. The “Turks” who need help and whom Straw wishes to “stand behind” are those with “good intentions in terms of real change”. In other words, CTP supporters who are looking for “solutions”. This representation of Straw’s speech is framed in such a way that Straw supports CTP “solutions”, thereby contributing to CTP legitimacy.

VII.3.iii.c Radyo T

On *Radyo T*, the nation is again vaguely represented, though division of Cyprus is emphasised. For example, “reuniting the island” presupposes that Cyprus is divided. “A federation which consists of two regions and two societies” points to there being two governances and peoples. Twice, “the Turkish Cypriot public” is named, identifying specifically Turkish Cypriot society. The two utterances of “the Turkish Cypriot public” are collocated with “Greek Cypriots” and “the Greek

Cypriot side". Collocating the two reminds listeners of their difference to the 'other' which is "Greek" and an oppositional "side", even more than on *BRTI*.

Though excluded due to political context, the nation, its governance and its people are identified. By representing TRNC as a distinct nation in news stories more than other stations, *Radyo T* realises national discourses of TRNC as a solution to the Cyprus conflict.

VII.3.iv Turkey

Turkey is not the emphasis of the stories in this sample. This is evident by being de-emphasised in prepositional phrases in all representations, adding context to subjects in dominant clauses. This is a common role of prepositional phrases (Richardson, 2007: 207). What is emphasised in these stories are solutions and differing ideas about Cyprus's future.

VII.3.iv.a BRTI

On *BRTI*, Turkey is only represented once in the middle of a list, a non-dominant sentence position. It is collocated with "the two sides on the island" and "Greece" in a list of participants needed for a solution. This representation acknowledges Turkey as an important player in Cyprus, but just one of a few. This lacklustre representation of Turkey reflects CTP policy which distances TRNC from Turkey, a strategy most notable on *KFM*.

VII.3.iv.b KFM

Unlike most stories on *KFM*, this story represents Turkey extensively. This is due to the nature of the event recontextualised which is a speech delivered at a meeting of a Turkish organisation.

Like most other representations on *KFM*, Turkey is framed in ways which show support for the CTP. This is achieved through lexical choices and collocations. At the level of lexical choices, we find that all namings are impersonal, offering listeners no nominations or points of identification while withholding closeness. On the level of collocations, it is seen that Turkey is collocated with positive lexical choices such as "celebrated" and "a great chance". However, co-text

sees CTP pro-federation ideas as a condition to these positive themes. For example, Turkey's "great chance" in its E.U. application is due to its "willingness" to find a solution. Furthermore, its chances depend on "a solution" to the Cyprus conflict. Connecting a Cypriot solution to Turkey's E.U. prospects, though a real possibility, also outlines CTP desires for a solution. Lexically binding CTP's policies with Turkey's future represents an imaginary relationship between the two and contributes to the legitimisation of CTP policies.

VII.3.iv.c Radyo T

In this story, it can be seen that Turkey is represented more positively than on the other stations. Like *KFM*, all namings are impersonal, such as "Turkey" and "Turkey's Labour Party's political branch". Though no nominations or points of identification are represented, functional namings evoke discourses of Turkish importance, rather than personalities.

Like *BRTI*, Turkey's importance is revealed through collocations. Turkey is listed as one of several actors necessary in Cypriot solutions which work "to find a fair and permanent solution". Turkey's collocations differ from *BRTI*'s in that it is twice collocated with "celebrated", similar to that on *KFM*. However, this story differs from *KFM* by omitting any CTP conditions in co-text to these positive collocations. These collocations, then, draw upon discourses of Turkish closeness and partnership more than the other stations.

VII.3.v 28 February 2008 Summary

The stories about the international reaction to the election of Christofias across stations produce more similarities than differences. For example, Christofias is never named as "President-elect" despite this being the assumed topic of the stories. In fact, on *KFM* he is not even named. Though these stories obviously use the same sources, lexical and grammatical changes, omissions and inclusions produce stories which signify discourses about different relations between TRNC and the Republic, an important aspect of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

BRTI recontextualises the international response to Christofias's win in ways which articulate discourses of difference, CTP legitimacy, uncertainty and compromise. These reflect *BRTI*'s various interests. On the one hand, some pro-solution discourses are drawn upon by associating the Republic's government with positive themes, though these are modally constructed adding a significant degree of uncertainty. Discourses of reunification and settlement surround Cyprus which is imagined twice as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal "solution". But these discourses are a pretext for discourses about CTP support. Positive discourses draw upon CTP policies thereby legitimising the CTP. Even the U.S. is represented as endorsing the CTP. These articulate discourses which are federation and especially CTP friendly.

On the other hand, there are other influences in these scripts, as is normal on *BRTI*. Christofias' status is belittled while uncertainty surrounds the Republic. Cyprus is represented as having two sides and two peoples, one of them the TRNC with Turkish Cypriots, reflecting *BRTI*'s mandate of promoting the nation (and division). Though these recontextualisations draw upon discourses which envision better relations with the 'other' Cypriot government than during the time of Papadopolous, these signify discourses not conducive to federation-building.

On *KFM*, discourses of CTP legitimacy and praise are articulated while offering no accompanying pro-solution discourses. The present and "solutions" are represented as important. These reflect CTP policies which wanted a solution before the following year's election. Meanwhile, TRNC is minimally represented, suggesting a desire for another "solution".

However, unlike the other stations, another solution is not represented. The Republic's government is named in ways which emphasise 'other'-ness while unlike *BRTI*, the nation, residents and nominations are omitted leaving no point of identification for listeners. The only positive discourse realised is that the Republic's government is pro-solution, like the CTP has been for some time. Even Turkey's abundant representations are framed such that it is positively constructed, but with CTP pro-solution conditions attached.

These representations paint a thin veneer of “solutions” over a troubled Cyprus. There is a need for “solutions”, but no solution is represented and with whom is unclear. This articulates positive discourses about CTP like a campaign slogan, but recontextualises events in ways which offer no substance to consider.

On *Radyo T*, aspects of Turkish nationalism are reflected in this story. The Republic is an oppositional “side” headed by Christofias, who is belittled. Though some positive themes are associated with the Republic, modality surrounds it, evoking discourses of uncertainty similar to *BRTI*. A federation is uttered once, but Cyprus is associated with two societies, two regions, efforts and compromise. The ideas of two societies and two regions are in line with UBP policies while efforts and compromise evoke discourses far less positive than the other stations’ discourses of “solutions”.

TRNC, is constructed and contrasted with the Republic. Turkey is represented positively, this time with no CTP conditions. Though these recontextualisations do not articulate negative discourses about relations, they evoke discourses of difference and uncertainty more than other stations. These contribute to a Turkish nationalist ideology evident in *Radyo T*’s newsroom, thereby offering the least possibilities for change.

VII.4 4 March 2008 Christofias’s Era

A week into Christofias’s governance, Presidential spokesman Erçakıca held a weekly press conference. My ethnography revealed that these press conferences are an important way the TRNC government and the Republic exchange information, due to a lack of formal channels of communication between the two sides. Hüseyin Güven, *BRT* Chief News Coordinator said, “We are listening to the south and the south is listening to us”, thus *BRT* is aware of the importance of its programming.

Christofias’s time in office was a time of high hopes with Lokmacı being prepared for its opening and face-to-face talks were on the agenda of both Christofias and Talat. Though the press conference touched on many issues of the day, radio

stations selected the same few topics. These were the possibility of Talat and Christofias meeting, the UN coming to Cyprus, Erçakıca's perspectives on the new Christofias government and Lokmacı gate negotiations.

Radio stations recontextualise this event in very similar ways. This is due to the TRNC newsroom practice of extensively using *TAK* to gather news about TRNC. This reliance on *TAK* sometimes produces stories which are almost identical (as in this case), despite stations' very different politics. This illustrates how newsroom practices have a dialectical relationship with news texts.

KFM and *Radyo T* use the same sentences with only three exclusive sentences on *KFM* and eight on *Radyo T*. This indicates the stories were cut and pasted from *TAK*. *BRTI* does not use the same sentences, though the same ideas are covered and even written in a similar order. Firstly, the full *BRTI* story and sections of the *KFM* and *Radyo T* stories which are identical to each other are analysed. Secondly, three sentences exclusive to *KFM* and *Radyo T* are examined. This analysis reveals that different national discourses associated with each station's interests are drawn upon, despite news stories being almost identical.

VII.4.i TRNC

VII.4.i.a BRTI

In this story, it can be seen that the TRNC nation is represented as multi-functional, distinct from the Republic and led by the CTP which is pro-solution and waiting for the Republic to be the same. These representations reflect both *BRTI*'s pro-CTP and pro-Turkish nationalist influences.

BRTI represents TRNC in ways which represent a multi-functional nation distinct from the Republic. One strategy used is personal namings which emphasise function. For example, Erçakıca is functionally named four times, once as "the Presidential spokesman". The unspecified categorisation "reporters" acknowledges another function within the nation. Representing a multi-functional government and nation is part of *BRTI*'s mandate.

It can be seen that impersonal namings of the government represent difference and opposition to the Republic. It is represented as the “Turkish Cypriot side”. This differentiates the government from the Republic’s by noting its “Turkish Cypriot-ness” and it being a “side”.

In this story, it is also found that the CTP is supported through a number of strategies. One strategy is nominating Erçakıca. By him being the only person nominated, listeners are offered a point of identification with a government spokesman whose function and importance are emphasised (van Leeuwen, 1996: 53).

Another strategy is to represent the government as active. The government is either activated in verbal processes or in state, event, mental and action processes within Erçakıca speech. For example, the government’s position “has not changed”, it “will only be contributing positively to the new process”, “is ready to work towards finding” a solution and “desired the opening” of Lokmacı. It is collocated with pro-solution lexical choices such as “clearly supports a solution” and “has not changed”. This presupposes that the Republic is not pro-solution and the CTP is waiting for them. These articulate discourses about the CTP government working positively to improve relations with the Republic, while the Republic procrastinates.

The only time the government is not activated is when Talat and Christofias are named together. They are named “the two leaders”. Though this is a personal representation, the two men are backgrounded lexically and de-emphasised in a prepositional phrase at the end of a sentence. This indicates *BRTI* is not ready to emphasise the two sides working together, just the CTP working hard. Editor Dağun described how when she writes, she tries not “to offend” power holders in the Cyprus conflict. Here, on the one hand, the two leaders are represented working together which satisfies pro-solution interests. On the other hand, by de-emphasising this, Turkish nationalist interests are “not offended”.

Another strategy noted in this story which lends support to the CTP is the choice of speaking verbs. Erçakıca’s reported speech is mostly glossed with neutral

saying verbs. However, “reiterated”, a discourse-signalling verb is used when the government “reiterated the Turkish Cypriot Side is ready to work towards finding an immediate and just solution to the Cyprus Problem.” A reiteration implies it has been said before, emphasising the CTP government’s role as a peacemaker but waiting for the Republic.

VII.4.i.b KFM-Radyo T

KFM-Radyo T represent TRNC as different and in opposition to the Republic, more than *BRTI*. It also creates a ‘we’ group which includes TRNC and mainland Turkey. The nation is represented as CTP-led, though what it actually does is unclear.

Like *BRTI*, this story represents the CTP positively. A number of strategies are used, one is activating the government performing mental, action, state, verbal and event processes. Unlike *BRTI*’s story, activations create a theme of CTP importance. For example, “President Talat is chairing a committee” points to Talat’s important role as chairman while the governmental committee is important in “it will meet with senior contacts”. The lexical choice of “senior contacts” elevates the importance of the meeting.

Another strategy used to represent the CTP positively is collocations.

“Intentions” and “attitudes” are collocated with the government repeatedly. For example, “the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the gate”, “the attitude of the Turkish side is clear and continues” and “the attitude of the Turkish side was confirmed”. These are good intentions and attitudes in regard to finding a solution. Nevertheless, attitudes and intentions are not actions. They are distillations which draw upon discourses about a positive and active CTP government, despite actions being few and far between.

Another strategy used is positively representing Lokmacı. It is uttered five times in this story (twice in *BRTI*’s story), though always in prepositional phrases. This reminds listeners of this government success without attributing emphasis to it. The emphasis through activations is CTP government officials, reflecting *TAK*’s

close links with the CTP government which follows CTP actions closely but does not necessarily represent CTP's policies.

Difference between TRNC and the Republic is accentuated in this story more than on *BRTI*. Two naming strategies emphasise this difference. Firstly, "side" is used three times but it is collocated with "Turkish" and not "Turkish Cypriot".

Using "Turkish" blurs the lines between mainlanders and Cypriots. It also eliminates the common "Cypriot" lexical choice used on *BRTI*. These namings are in line with Turkish nationalist ideology which claims there are only Turks and Greeks on Cyprus, not Cypriots.

A second strategy is the six uses of "we". Five of these namings are in this direct speech of Erçakıca:

We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. Specifically we don't have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don't have any suspicions or worries or arguments, but these consultations are needed.

The use of "we" is unclear, as has been pointed out in other cases (Fairclough, 2003:149 and 1989:148; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, and Leibhart, 1999: 45; Billig, 1995: 106). In this story, "we" includes the TRNC and Turkish governments and may include the UBP and residents who need meetings about Lokmacı. This binds together the two states and excludes Greek Cypriots, furthering discourses of sameness amongst "Turks" and difference from "Greeks".

VII.4.ii The Republic

VII.4.ii.a BRTI

Like most other stories analysed, only the Republic's government is represented in this story. These representations emphasise difference, opposition, a lack of authority and uncertainty. This is achieved through both lexical and grammatical strategies.

At the level of lexical choices we find the Republic's government is named in ways which emphasise difference, opposition and a lack of authority. It is named "Greek Cypriot", reminding listeners of a 'them' group, the 'other' Cypriot

government. “Side” and “administration” are used connoting opposition and a lack of authority.

In this story, it can be seen that uncertainty is represented surrounding the new government. Two strategies are used for this: high modality when activating the government and collocations. These two strategies are exemplified in:

[...] the Presidential spokesman said that how the Greek Cypriot Side will contribute to the talks now that there has been a change in leadership, will only become clear following the meeting between the two leaders.

Here the government appears as “the Greek Cypriot Side” activated modally (future). Questions surround its future actions. This uncertainty is magnified with lexical choices. “How” the government “will” contribute to talks with a “change” in government “will” become clear later. In another utterance, “eyes have turned...to see what kind of stance” the government takes. Both these representations of the Republic are collocated with question words (“how” and “what”). The Republic’s stance towards the Cyprus conflict is uncertain. The jury is out on the Republic, clouding the future of Cyprus.

VII.4.ii.b KFM-Radyo T

In this story, the Republic is represented more times than on *BRTI*, giving listeners more chances to imagine the ‘other’. Twice, Christofias is nominated giving listeners a point of identification. However, the Republic is represented not only as an uncertain ‘other’ like *BRTI*, but negatively as a possible enemy.

The Republic is represented as different from TRNC, more than on *BRTI*. Most namings use the lexical choice “Greek”, creating a ‘them’ group with no “Cypriot” commonality. Even the nation is named as “South Cyprus” and not “the Republic of Cyprus”, which would de-emphasise difference. However, these namings articulate discourses of ‘otherness’.

Like *BRTI*, uncertainty is represented with the Republic. This is achieved using both modal activations like Talat and Christofias “will be coming together” and conditional phrases like “If he is willing to meet with Talat”. But unlike *BRTI*, the Republic is represented negatively. Two strategies are used. Firstly, the

government is represented acting against TRNC interests. In the following, Christofias is represented activated in a state and mental process:

'If Turkey is ready I[Christofias] am ready too', Erçakıca continued: 'He [Christofias] intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in Cyprus'. This is really a very wrong attitude.

Here, Christofias is attributed with saying that if Turkey is ready to find a solution, so is Christofias. He then blames Turkey for no solution. This is refuted by Erçakıca in the subsequent sentence. This utterance represents the Republic verbally attacking Turkey. This attack is "wrong". However, Christofias's saying of "I am ready too" is multi-layered and should be treated as dubious (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). Erçakıca's interpretation of what "he intends to say" is also multi-layered. Despite the questionability of their accuracy, these representations of the Republic signify discourses of an enemy which is wrong in attacking Turkey.

A second strategy used to represent the Republic negatively is co-text. For example, accusing Turkey of preventing a solution, Erçakıca says "When you [the Republic] identify the problem falsely, providing a solution will be impossible." Here, the Republic "identif[ies] the problem falsely" thereby making a solution "impossible". The jury is out on *KFM-Radyo T*, but the jury is also blaming the Republic for acts counter to good relations with TRNC.

VII.4.iii Cyprus

Throughout this sample, Cyprus is represented either de-emphasised or negatively. All namings are impersonal, giving listeners no point of identification, named as the "Cyprus problem" and the "Cyprus issue" with negative connotations or backgrounded as "the island", a term for a landmass. Grammatically it is either in prepositional phrases or passivated. These naming and grammatical strategies do not evoke discourses conducive to imagining Cyprus as a single federated entity, but articulate negative discourses of Cyprus.

VII.4.iii.a BRTI

Though Cyprus is mostly represented negatively in this story, we find there are also some positive CTP-Cyprus and uncertain Cyprus-Republic themes revealed through examining co-text. When the CTP is in co-text with Cyprus, it is “finding an immediate and just solution”. When the Republic is in Cyprus co-text, uncertainty such as “what kind of a stance” is represented. These draw upon discourses about CTP looking for solutions and waiting for the Republic’s government to be pro-solution too.

VII.4.iii.b KFM-Radyo T

Though this story sees Cyprus represented negatively, collocations of “solution in Cyprus” contribute to more positive themes. Co-text reveals the Republic’s government is contributing “to the hopes of a comprehensive solution”. The subsequent sentence, however, links these “hopes” with the CTP which has the “aim of finding a complete and early solution”. So, although there is a positive theme associated with Cyprus, a CTP-friendly discourse is evoked, reflecting *TAK*’s government connections which emphasise CTP actions without representing its policies.

VII.4.iv Turkey

One significant difference between the recontextualisations of this press conference is that Turkey is excluded from *BRTI* but represented 12 times on *KFM-Radyo T*. Five of these are Turkey’s inclusion in “we”, examined in the TRNC section. Together, these represent Turkey as important, powerful, close and cooperative with TRNC.

It can be seen in this story that Turkey’s importance, closeness and power are represented using a number of strategies. Naming Turkish politicians and officials “senior contacts” and “Turkish authorities” are specific categorisations that emphasise function and connote importance. “Ankara” is named three times, emphasising closeness and localness with Turkey (Higgins, 2004: 643).

Another strategy used to represent Turkey as an important place populated with important people is collocations. Talat and his committees “go to Ankara” in

order to “re-examine our attitudes”. Ankara has “expectations” which need to be addressed. These collocations evoke discourses of Turkish importance.

Collocations also produce a theme of cooperation between TRNC and Turkey. For example, meetings are “necessary” and the cooperative spirit between the two nations is emphasised in “[w]e don’t have any suspicions or worries or arguments” between Talat and Turkey. When attacked by Christofias, Erçakıca said the Republic had “a very wrong attitude”. Turkey is an ally which is defended. These representations articulate discourses of a close alliance between TRNC and Turkey, again reflecting Turkish nationalist ideology.

VII.4.v Difference within the same

BRTT's story has been analysed in full, however, *KFM* and *Radyo T* have sentences which are exclusive and have not been analysed yet. This section examines three of these sentences which are exclusive to *KFM* and *Radyo T* coverage. This exercise reveals that *KFM* and *Radyo T* articulate different discourses within their small differences reflecting political interests associated with each station.

VII.4.v.a KFM

The following are the three sentences unique to *KFM* which signify support for the CTP while representing the Republic as an enemy:

1. Erçakıca said, “This desire [“in finding a complete and early solution”] was revealed directly with the votes of Turkish Cypriot people in the referendum on 24 April 2004.”
2. For this reason and due to the Greek Cypriot side’s slow attitude change to find a solution, now finding a complete solution to the Cyprus problem should happen quickly.
3. It should not be forgotten that the side which should have been changed is the Greek Cypriot side. (my numbering)

It can be seen from this excerpt that the CTP is represented as actively desiring “solutions” using two strategies. Firstly, all three sentences are attributed to Erçakıca who nominalises and activates the government in the state process of “this desire was revealed” in sentence one. Though nominalisations obscure

responsibility, they are also used for brevity (Fairclough, 2008: 814). In this case, “this desire” is short for the government’s aim at finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict.

Secondly, collocations reveal the CTP is represented as desiring solutions. Due to “the desire” in sentence one and the Republic’s “slow attitude change” in sentence two, the Cyprus problem is collocated with “a complete solution” and the modal “should happen quickly” also in sentence two. Here, by representing the Republic now ready to work for solutions, it is pre-supposed that the CTP has wanted solutions and has been waiting. This realises discourses of CTP’s pro-solution credentials.

It can also be seen that these three sentences create a CTP and residents’ “we” group. In sentence one, “the referendum on 24 April 2004” is collocated with residents and “this desire”. These collocations blur lines as to who desires a solution. At the same time, it creates a “we” group of the CTP and voters, producing an association which represents the CTP positively.

In these sentences, it can also be seen that the Republic is represented as different, oppositional and an enemy. Three strategies are used for this. Firstly, naming it “the Greek Cypriot side” and “the side” in sentences two and three connote difference and opposition. Grammatical strategies and collocations also represent the Republic negatively. In sentence two, the government is in a subordinate clause and in the prepositional phrase “to the Greek Cypriot side’s slow attitude change to find a solution”. This de-emphasises the Republic, while collocating it in ways which clearly blame it for no solution. In sentence three, it is modally activated in the negative event process of “the side which should have been changed”. Again, it is clearly responsible for no solution. These representations run against pro-solution ideas, drawing upon discourses of the Republic as an oppositional ‘other’. This is counter to discourses which promote partnership and a federation, but allow the CTP to deflect criticisms of it not finding solutions to the Cyprus conflict.

VII.4.v.b Radyo T

Radyo T's story includes eight exclusive sentences, three of which represent TRNC-Republic relations. These sentences are:

1. Erçakıca expressed that giving control of the buffer zone at Lokmacı to the UN makes the opening of the gate a bigger problem.
2. Addressing one of the questions, Hasan Erçakıca said that President Talat will go to the Islamic Organisation Conference in Dakar, Senegal after his visit in Ankara.
3. Pointing out the Turkish side's decisively positive attitude in this process, Erçakıca said he is not explaining its attitude with the media before some points are clear and for this reason he may not be able to answer some questions openly. (my numbering)

It can be seen that these three exclusive sentences represent TRNC, Turkey and the Republic as seen by Turkish nationalists. The TRNC and its government are multi-functional, TRNC statehood is suggested and bound to Turkey, CTP successes are belittled and the Republic is represented as an enemy.

Like *BRTI*, the TRNC and its government are represented as multi-functional. This is achieved by activating the government going to a conference and Turkey in sentence two and interacting with reporters in sentence three. These activations identify actions and events with government involvement such as conferences, travel, press conferences and meetings, realising discourses of an active and multi-functional government.

More than the other stations, representations of aspects of the nation suggest TRNC statehood. "The media" represents a TRNC social institution, while "Lokmacı", "the gate" and "the buffer zone" name three aspects of TRNC's border, emphasising where TRNC ends.

Unlike the other stations, these three sentences represent the TRNC as part of a pan-Turkish nation which is opposed to the Republic. This is achieved using a number of strategies. Firstly, the CTP is named "the Turkish side" and "its" (short for "the Turkish side") in sentence three. Naming the government a "side" carries oppositional connotations, while "Turkish" and not "Turkish Cypriot" is a common slippage between the two namings on *Radyo T* which reflects UBP policies that see TRNC as part of a pan-Turkish nation opposed to the Republic.

Secondly, activations and collocations in these sentences also represent TRNC as not only part of a pan-Turkish nation, but part of an Islamic world. In sentence two, Talat is collocated with “will go to the Islamic Organisation conference” and “Ankara”. These actions, which bind TRNC to the Islamic and Turkish worlds, are excluded from the other stations’ recontextualisations of the press conference. These evoke discourses of sameness based on religion and Turkishness and difference from the Republic not seen on the other stations.

Though these sentences represent government actions, CTP successes are belittled while the Republic is represented as an enemy. Through collocations and presuppositions, this occurs twice in sentence one. Firstly, Lokmacı is collocated with “giving control...to the UN”. Giving control of part of a nation to an outside organisation is something nations find hard to imagine (Billig, 1995: 76). It is presupposed that the Republic is responsible for this action. Secondly, Lokmacı is collocated with “a bigger problem”. Collocating “a bigger problem” with Lokmacı presupposes that there is a problem with the opening of Lokmacı and again the Republic is to blame. This sentence contributes to the idea that Lokmacı is a problem brought on by the CTP, not a success. It also evokes discourses about the Republic as a dangerous enemy which wants to take control away from TRNC, reflecting Turkish nationalist ideology.

VII.4.vi 4 March 2008 Summary

All stations represent this news conference very much like the other stations. However, this analysis has revealed subtle differences which reflect national discourses associated with stations’ interests.

On *BRTI*, the TRNC government is represented in ways which draw upon discourses of “Turkish Cypriot” sameness and function. These reflect *BRTI*’s legal requirements which demand it promotes a Turkish Cypriot nation, running counter to discourses which signify an all-inclusive Cypriot federation.

The CTP is named personally providing listeners with a functionally-emphasised government official as a point of identification. It desires solutions on Cyprus, while waiting for the Republic. When Cyprus is represented positively, the CTP

is looking for Cypriot solutions. The only time the CTP is not emphasised is when TRNC and the Republic's governments are represented together.

The Republic is surrounded with uncertainty. It is the 'other' Republic whose actions are de-emphasised. Modality constructs an entity with no certainty, questionable ideas and stances. This uncertainty and de-emphasis illustrates *BRTI*'s mix of interests it needs to appeal to whilst writing news. These mixed representations articulate discourses of conditional cooperation, though this is little more than a pretext for dominant discourses of 'otherness' and uncertainty. The representation of relations between the two states, though not blatantly negative, leaves many questions as to whether or not the two states can work together for a better future.

KFM-Radyo T draw upon discourses of difference that are even more pronounced than those on *BRTI*. The government is "Turkish", not "Turkish Cypriot" and a "we" group of TRNC and Turkey is created. These are reflections of Turkish nationalist ideology, more in line with the UBP than the CTP.

Alternatively, discourses about an active and important CTP are evoked. The positive role of the CTP in Cyprus is emphasised far more than on *BRTI*, benefitting the CTP and its search for solutions, not Cyprus itself. The CTP is full of good intentions and attitudes in regard to finding a solution and solving problems like the opening of Lokmacı, though precisely what it does is unclear.

Like *BRTI*, the Republic is the 'other', a 'them' group of "Greek Cypriots" associated with themes of change and uncertainty. But, unlike *BRTI*, it is also attributed with wrong actions and attitudes. This draws upon discourses about the Republic as not only the 'other', but an oppositional 'other'.

Discourses about Turkey being important and close to TRNC are evoked. This is despite *KFM* and *TAK*'s close links with the CTP. This representation is closely aligned to Turkish nationalist politics which articulate discourses of pan-Turkish nationalism.

KFM exclusive sentences continue discourses about a positive, active CTP government which wants solutions. A "we" group is exploited again, this time

including the CTP and voters. This is excluded from *Radyo T*. The Republic is de-emphasised again and clearly blamed for no solution to the Cyprus problem. This negative representation is much stronger than *BRTI*'s questioning representation of the Republic.

Radyo T exclusive sentences represent a multi-functional government and a successful multi-functional TRNC nation. Discourses about TRNC being part of the "Turkish" and "Islamic" world distinguish it from the Republic. This realises discourses of sameness in terms of Islam and Turkey not seen on other stations and reflects UBP policy. The opening of Lokmacı is seen as a problem, not a CTP success. The Republic is represented, though backgrounded, as an aggressive enemy which wants to control parts of the TRNC and cause troubles. These exclusive sentences put the story in a nationalist framework, in line with the politics in *Radyo T*'s newsroom.

VII.5 TRNC and the Republic's Relations Conclusion

This chapter has analysed stories about relations between TRNC and the Republic from the time when the CTP was the sole pro-federation government on Cyprus, during the time of transition between governments and then when both states claimed to be pro-federation.

During this time of transition, politicians were talking about a federal "solution". An all-Cypriot federation presupposes that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots comprise a single nation-state. Part of building a single nation is articulating discourses not only about 'us' the nation, but also 'them' the 'other' (Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; Billig 1996). If TRNC media are to aid in creating an all-Cypriot nation, it should represent an inclusive Cypriot 'us' group. This, however, goes against TRNC's media history which have traditionally identified Turkish Cypriots in relation to the 'other' Cypriots (Azgın and Bailie, 2008: 57; Panayiotou, 2006: 30; Lacher and Kaynak, 2005: 156; Mallinson, 2005: 109).

This chapter's analysis has revealed that changes in political context are reflected somewhat in the stories analysed. However, stations mostly signify discourses not conducive to solutions. Instead, stories articulate different national discourses which reflect each station's interests. Unfortunately, these do little in realising discourses about unity, peace and a federation on Cyprus, despite this being a stated goal of both governments.

On *BRTI*, the representation of TRNC remains the same throughout this period. It is a multi-functional "Turkish Cypriot" nation. The government is important, international, legitimate, active and looking for "solutions" while waiting for the Republic to be pro-solution too, a reflection of CTP closeness to *BRTI*. This draws upon discourses of Turkish Cypriot sameness, CTP legitimacy and pro-solution credentials and difference from the Republic. These are counter to discourses of unity.

Before Christofias, the Republic's government is a "Greek Cypriot" oppositional 'other'. It acts against TRNC interests, though grammatical strategies cloud agency of negative acts from the Republic. Cyprus is named negatively and once as the negative imaginary "a Greek Cypriot state". With the election of Christofias, the Republic is still named emphasising its 'other-ness'. It is de-emphasised, passivated and powerless while Christofias's status is belittled. Though now represented as "pro-solution", it is an entity with no certainty, questionable ideas and stances. The idea of TRNC and the Republic together is de-emphasised.

Cyprus is still identified as a problem with two sides and two peoples. However, there is hope. Cyprus is imagined twice as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution. This spells out a "solution" which mirrors CTP policies, thereby legitimising the party. The CTP and its "solutions" are offered as a positive option, a way out of the problem.

However, *BRTI* still evokes discourses of difference by promoting a distinct Turkish Cypriot nationalism and the Republic as the 'other' with many questions. This representation of relations reflects both Turkish nationalist and pro-solution

national ideologies, satisfying an array of interests associated with the station. Though not blatantly negative, these representations articulate far more negative than positive discourses about relations. This leaves many questions regarding whether the two states can work together for a better future.

On *KFM*, discourses about a CTP-led nation are signified. It is active, legitimate, important, full of good intentions, attitudes and thoughts in finding “solutions”. Cyprus is surrounded by negativity with the CTP offered as the answer with its efforts, new initiatives and constructive stances. Residents think along the lines of CTP policies. A “we” group of the CTP and its supporters is created in one story. These reflect pro-CTP sentiments at *KFM*. But the government is “Turkish”, not “Turkish Cypriot” and a “we” group of the government and Turkey is created in another story. These demonstrate newsroom practices which see little care taken in news writing.

KFM does not represent the nation, creating possibilities for discourses about alternative forms of nation. However, no alternative is represented. Before Christofias, the Republic is named in ways which create a ‘them’ Greek Cypriot group which acts against TRNC interests. Grammatical strategies emphasise its negative power. This draws upon discourses about the Republic as the reason for no solutions, deflecting criticisms about its lack of success at finding solutions, more than on *BRTI*.

With Christofias, the Republic’s government is still negatively represented, again deflecting criticisms about the CTP. It is belittled, de-emphasised and the ‘Greek Cypriot’ other. Though the government is pro-solution “now”, it is attributed with change, uncertainty. Unlike on *BRTI*, it is also attributed with wrong actions and attitudes. It is blamed for no solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus is associated with positive themes attributed to CTP actions. Turkey is represented as important and close to TRNC, but with CTP pro-solution conditions attached.

Like *BRTI*, relations with Christofias are better than with Papadopolous. Though the CTP is represented as looking for solutions, none are represented. The Republic, Turkey and Cyprus are represented in ways which suit the CTP. The

result is that despite a thin veneer of “solutions” covering a troubled Cyprus, no alternative pro-solution national discourse is signified. These stories draw upon discourses of a nation governed by pro-federation CTP, though what nation it governs is unclear.

On *Radyo T*, a successful TRNC state is represented as part of the “Turkish” and “Islamic” world, which distinguishes it from the Republic. Although the government shares some of the positive attributes described on *KFM* (due to *TAK* sourcing), before Christofias, the government incorrectly handles relations with the Republic, lies, is unsuccessful, self-serving and in secret agreements with the Republic. Together, the CTP and the Republic deceive TRNC residents and attack TRNC itself, while the Republic wants *Enosis*.

In contrast, Turkey is represented positively with no CTP conditions. The UBP is peaceful, friendly, resists attacks from the Republic and the CTP, is responsible (along with Turkey) for creating a safe and comfortable TRNC state and aims to create a deserved and honorable solution for the TRNC “state”. These discourses reflect UBP and Turkish nationalist ideology at the station.

With Christofias, the Republic continues to be a dangerous enemy which desires to control parts of the TRNC and cause troubles. Though some positive themes are associated with the Republic during this time, modality, uncertainty and “waiting” surround these representations. Cyprus is either a negative entity, or associated with two societies, two regions, efforts, problems and compromise. These all point to UBP nationalistic policies. In turn, these discourses draw upon national discourses which offer the least potential for improving relations with the Republic.

This chapter’s analysis has unearthed some glimmers of hope. Discourses articulated on all stations by stories after the election are not as negative as during the time of Papadopoulos. However, all stations recontextualise events slightly differently in ways which represent TRNC interests associated with each station positively, whether it be *BRTI* satisfying the CTP, its nation-building mandate and Turkish national interests, *KFM* satisfying CTP interests, or *Radyo*

T promoting a Turkish nationalist ideology. These do not signify discourses about partnerships with the Republic which could free residents from a life with embargoes and isolation.

VIII Non-political Stories Analysis

VIII.1 Introduction

Nations are legitimised in our minds importantly through the most banal and everyday topics and not necessarily through overt nationalist language (Billig, 1995). Not only overtly political stories or those that overtly refer to qualities of the nation-state and its citizens work to define and legitimise nations and nationalisms. It has been shown that in news, it is precisely the most 'forgettable' stories, and not rallying speeches by politicians where nations become part of the taken for granted everyday social and cultural landscape (Flowerdew and Leong 2007; Higgins 2004; Bishop and Jaworski 2003; Billig 1995: 114). This 'banal' nationalism, as Billig (1995: 8) calls it, "enable(s) the established nations of the West to be reproduced". Banal nationalism takes on particular importance in the case of TRNC due to its status as an unrecognised state by all countries but Turkey.

VIII.1.i Non-political events news coverage

A count of stories in the thesis's corpus reveals up to 20 percent of news stories can be characterised as these more mundane stories or "routine coverage". This is a significant number of stories considering contextual factors which prioritise political stories. Salient are stations' close affiliations with political parties and newsroom practices, such as stations' reliance on *TAK* for news gathering and writing, both of which prioritise political stories. Nevertheless, these more mundane stories are a staple part of news and, as Billig suggests, are one important way that national ideologies are created and maintained.

In this chapter, ten stories which recontextualise four non-political events are analysed. These are two tourist events⁶⁰, the opening of *The Municipalities' Union of the Turkish World* office in Nicosia⁶¹ and the announcement of Cancer

⁶⁰ See Appendix 12 C for all stations' scripts and translations.

⁶¹ See Appendix 12 B for all stations' original scripts and translations.

week⁶². This chapter demonstrates how these stories recontextualise seemingly non-political events in ways which articulate different national discourses.

On 4 March 2008, there were two tourism related events in TRNC covered by the radio stations. One was a visit to TRNC from a delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The delegation worked with TRNC officials planning tourism strategies. This was excluded from *KFM* but covered by *BRTI* and *Radyo T*. There was also the rare chance for TRNC tourism companies and organisations to participate in an international event, the *ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism Fayre*. The fayre offered conferences, panels and displays for and from 11,000 tourism companies from around the world. TRNC tourism organisations and companies being able to represent their interests at this event was a success for tourism in TRNC. This is because TRNC is usually barred from international events due to embargoes and isolation. This event was covered by *BRTI* and *KFM*, while excluded from *Radyo T*.

The Municipalities' Union of the Turkish World (hereafter *TDBB*) is a "Union of local governments in countries and regions speaking the Turkish language and dialects."⁶³ On 13 March 2008, the *TDBB* opened a new office in Nicosia. The opening which was covered by all stations included a ceremony with speeches.

A few weeks later, TRNC like many other places around the world, participated in World Cancer week, which ran from 1 April to 7 April 2008. All stations covered the announcement of this annual campaign which aims to raise awareness of cancer. In TRNC, events included the launching of an early warning cancer scanning campaign. This was run by the Ministry of Health in conjunction with the *Help Those with Cancer Association* (hereafter *the association*). This association is a TRNC-based cancer patient support group.⁶⁴

Despite these seemingly non-political events, stories are framed such that governance, TRNC's position in Cyprus and its relations with Turkey and other

⁶² See Appendix 12 A for all stations' original scripts and translations.

⁶³ Information downloaded from <http://www.tdbb.org.tr/ingeng/default.aspx?cm=HaberGosterandtur=14> downloaded 11.05.09.

⁶⁴ Information from <http://www.cypyp.com/partnertulipshome.htm> downloaded 20.01.09.

nations positively reflect power holders associated with each station. In other words, stories are written in ways which support the interests of those who support the stations while ignoring residents.

Stories did not have to be written as such. TRNC is home to the historic port town of Kyrenia, ancient ruins, miles of sandy beaches and one of the few places in the world where sea turtles nest. Despite these natural resources, tourism in TRNC is far less developed than in the Republic, hosting ten percent of the 2.4 million tourists the Republic receives annually. This is due to embargoes and isolation which forbid direct flights to TRNC from anywhere in the world except Turkey. Seeing as tourism is a likely avenue for Turkish Cypriot financial success if embargoes and isolation are lifted, tourism stories could have been framed so that it was seen as a whole island concern. This could have happened on a micro-level by comparing a struggling TRNC hotel with a profitable Republic one. This would emphasise sameness in terms of challenges and benefits. Or stories could have been framed in ways which emphasise how a successful Cypriot tourism industry would benefit all residents.

The *TDBB* office opening story could have been written from a union worker's point of view, describing how the office helps workers and the municipality. Likewise, Cancer week excludes cancer victims and their points of view. One can easily imagine the way this would have been covered in a North Atlantic news outlet, framed emotionally as one person's struggle with cancer. Or it could have represented cancer as a worldwide problem with no borders. Instead, stories are framed in ways which benefit those associated with each station.

VIII.1.ii Chapter's structure and analytical approach

The representation of TRNC and Turkish participants and their actions are analysed. The Republic is excluded from these stories, so is not analysed. In both sections, recontextualisations on *BRTI*, then *KFM* and finally *Radyo T* are examined.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, internal relations within TRNC are examined; that is, governance, power holders, those without

power and relations between these groups. In the second section, representations of TRNC's relations with Turkey, Cyprus and the international community are analysed. Representations of these aspects of Turkish Cyprus tell us not only about how stations imagine those with power within the nation and how they exercise this power, but also whether they see TRNC as part of a Turkish, Cypriot or legitimately independent nation. These are all contested aspects of Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

The analysis of language used in these stories reveals that each station shapes its coverage in subtly different ways. Stations use their coverage of non-political events to represent their own ideas and interests about the nature of TRNC and its standing in relation to other nations. This allows for stories that on one level appear to be non-political to be shaped in ways which foreground the nation in different ways for the benefit of those associated with each station.

Unfortunately, these draw upon national discourses which do not "help find a solution" and are not "what is good for the nation".

VIII.2 Internal Relations

VIII.2.i BRTI

In this sample of stories about non-political events, *BRTI* signifies discourses of support for a separate, multi-functional and legitimate TRNC nation. It represents a hierarchy within TRNC, with the pro-federation CTP government and officials leading a nation of powerless Turkish Cypriots.

These stories show *BRTI* support for a distinct TRNC nation by constantly reminding listeners of their nation. *BRTI* names not only the nation, as in "TRNC", "the Republic" and "the North" but also aspects of the nation such as "the North's tourism sector", "non-governmental organisations", "16 municipalities" and "the Help Those With Cancer Association". The sheer number of utterances is a constant reminder of TRNC. Specific namings identify various functions and the magnitude of the nation. For example, "non-governmental organisations" and "Help Those With Cancer Association" draw

attention to these and other organisations in “the Republic”. “16 municipalities” legitimises TRNC by acknowledging TRNC has many governed population centres like other nations. TRNC, with its organisations, associations and governance is sophisticated, large and legitimate, not a small, unrecognised part of a small island. At the same time, the nation is mostly in prepositional phrases which de-emphasises it. So although it is reminded, it is not emphasised. The government is.

Government emphasis is part of strategy which represents an internal TRNC hierarchy. At the top of the hierarchy is the CTP and officials. A number of strategies are used to achieve this. One strategy is namings of the government. *BRTI* names government officials like “Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ” using functional honorifics, emphasising function and formality. These articulate discourses of support for a functional government and nation.

Another strategy used to emphasise government importance and power is sentence position and activations. For example:

The Ministry of Health, meanwhile, will launch cancer scanning in cooperation with the Help Those With Cancer Association within the framework of the week.

Here, “the Ministry of Health” is in dominant first position in the sentence. It is activated performing the action process of launching cancer scanning. Action processes suggest power, more than other activations, signifying discourses of a powerful government. *BRTI* support for the CTP reflects its links to the Prime Minister and its nation-building mandate outlined in the *BRTK Law* which *BRTI* workers such as editor Dağun ‘feel’ daily through checks and controls upon their work.

In this sample we also find that officials, whether or not they are CTP members, are represented positively and powerful. Personal representations of all officials emphasise function and formality as in the naming of non-CTP officials “the Mayor of Lefkosa - President of the Cyprus Turkish Municipalities’ Union Cemal Bulutoğluları” and “Mayor of Guzelyurt - the Vice-President of TDBB Mahmut

Özçinar". Furthermore, they are collocated with "opening" and "inauguration". These collocations create a theme of officials' importance. This support for all officials reflects *BRTI's* attempt to satisfy its many interests. Editor Dağun said that *BRTI* tries to "not offend" all participants in the Cyprus conflict when writing news, so power holders are represented positively. Although discourses of support for existing power holders are articulated, opportunities for discourses of change are reduced.

Below this upper echelon in TRNC, this sample of stories represents "non-governmental organisations" and *the Help Those With Cancer Association*. They are represented as secondary players assisting government actions. This is achieved grammatically by placing them after the government and in prepositional phrases, yet associated with positive actions (van Dijk, 1991: 216) as in the citation above.

Represented at the bottom of the hierarchy within TRNC is its residents. They are always de-emphasised in prepositional phrases. No resident is named, offering no point of identification for listeners. Instead they are homogenised as "Turkish Cypriots", a nation-building strategy. These representations constantly remind listeners of their nationality and nation, while their officials are activated and powerful. These representations serve the status quo and officials well while addressing *BRTI's* mandate of promoting the nation.

VIII.2.ii KFM

In these stories, it can be seen that unlike *KFM's* political stories, a distinctly "Turkish Cypriot" TRNC is represented. Like *BRTI*, an internal hierarchy is articulated making clear that the CTP leads the nation. However, unlike *BRTI*, TRNC businesses and associations are not secondary players, but top TRNC's internal hierarchy along with the CTP. As is the case on all stations, residents are represented at the bottom of this hierarchy.

In this sample, and especially the recontextualisation of the *Berlin Tourism Fayre*, we find that aspects of the nation are represented extensively, unlike most other stories on *KFM*. However, unlike *BRTI* which represents the TRNC nation, *KFM*

represents TRNC commercial interests such as “Turkish Cyprus Hotels Association”, “Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies Association”, “Turkish Cyprus Guides Association”, “Turkish Cyprus press representatives” and “Restaurants Association”. These exclusive “Turkish Cyprus” namings draw upon discourses of sameness within TRNC and difference with the Republic, TRNC nation-building strategies.

This inconsistency in namings across *KFM* stories can be explained through news gathering and writing practices. *KFM* editors cut and paste whole sentences from *TAK*, generally lacking concern for lexical and grammatical choices, according to my observations and editor-announcer Basrı. There are no control and editing mechanisms to ensure consistency. The result is though there is a background murmur of support for the CTP and writing “what is good for the nation”, no other consistency is evident, including pro-federation policies.

One consistent representation in this sample and throughout the whole corpus is support for the CTP. Working with the CTP for the good of the nation is TRNC commercial interests and associations in the *Berlin Tourism Fayre* story and *the association* in the Cancer week story. This is achieved through a variety of strategies. In the recontextualisation of the *Berlin Tourism Fayre*, grammatical strategies are used. Firstly, the nation is activated in “the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be represented at this fayre”. However, the following reveals who will “represent” TRNC:

The Turkish Cyprus Hotels Association, Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies Association, Turkish Cyprus Guides Association and Restaurants Association delegations and Turkish Cyprus press representatives left the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [...]

Here, associations are activated in the action process of leaving the TRNC for the *Fayre*. In the following sentence, the CTP’s Şanlıdağ is also activated leaving for the *Fayre*. These sentences identify the CTP and business officials going to the *Fayre* to “represent” and “promote”. This articulates discourses of a nation led by a strong CTP government and business sector. This works well for

KFM's owner who is a powerful TRNC businessman with interests in media, property and retail.⁶⁵

In its recontextualisation of the announcement of Cancer week, lexical and grammatical strategies bind the CTP with *the association* which are represented acting positively together, unlike *BRTI* which represents *the association* as a secondary partner. This binding works as a three-step strategy.

Firstly, *KFM* uses the lexical choice "association" seven times, granting this group of volunteers credibility as an "association". *The association* is activated mostly verbally. Being the only named source implicitly shows support for *the association* (White, 2006: 58, Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). Within reported speech, *the association* represents itself active. Together, these lexical and grammatical strategies represent *the association* positively, active and credible.

Secondly, the government is also represented positively, like *the association*. It is represented impersonally as "the government authority", "12 district departments" and "the Ministry of Health". These represent the CTP as multi-functional, large and powerful, with "authority", ministries and multiple "departments". Grammatically, the government performs positive actions such as "will run their own activities to draw the public's attention to cancer." It is collocated with continuing scanning, being asked to invest in facilities and drawing attention to cancer. These draw upon discourses of the CTP acting for the good of TRNC residents.

Thirdly, the government and *the association*, which are both represented positively, are collocated. The CTP is represented alongside *the association* involved in positive actions. For example, the government appears in the following reported speech:

⁶⁵ Asil Nadir's list of commercial interests includes Polly Peck Group with import-export licenses and/ or exclusive sales of Del Monte, Unipac, Meyna, Sunzest, Niksar, Van Den Brink, Frio, Früco, Prevor, Medelson-Zeller, Standart Fruit, Sansui, Vestel, Capetronic, Imperial, Russel Mobbs Tower, Voyager Kıbrıs and Pizza Hut. He also has controlling shares in the following TRNC companies: Jasmine Court, Palmich, Cristal Cown, Olive Tree, Unipac fabrikası, ICP ilaç fabrikası, Sunzest paketleme tesisleri, Sunzest konsantre fabrikası, Wear Well konfeksiyon, Travelöz, Safeco Sigorta, Kend Bank, AN Grafik, Benlarit limited, Derece Lim, Cemar Ar.

[...] we [the association] work together with the Ministry of Health, so the Cancer scanning programmes will continue.

Here the government and *the association* are represented working for the good of residents, linking the two performing positive deeds. The CTP and *the association* are represented as the solution to residents' and the nation's troubles.

Like *BRTI*, at the bottom of *KFM*'s national hierarchy is the nation and its residents. The nation and residents are represented with no power. Collocations reveal the nation and its residents have problems, such as "5200 people have cancer" and there is a need for a "hospital" in order "to solve" treatment problems. Though residents are activated as in "522 people developed cancer" and "every day 2 or 3 people develop cancer" residents are far from active. These activations, collocations and co-text articulate discourses about residents and the nation without power and in trouble.

VIII.2.iii Radyo T

In these stories, we find a functional TRNC nation is emphasised. Within the nation, the UBP is represented as powerful at the top of an internal hierarchy of power, while the CTP government and non-governmental organisations are de-emphasised or active but act as a pretext for discourses of Turkish nationalism which see Turkey's role in TRNC as one of a leader. Residents are represented as powerless and part of a pan-Turkish nation.

The TRNC nation is represented as a fully-functional homeland, far more than the other stations. These representations sideline discourses which promote negotiations between TRNC and the Republic, TRNC being a positive solution to the Cyprus conflict. Though this serves the UBP and nationalist politicians well, this does nothing to relieve the embargoes and isolation residents face.

In the sample, *Radyo T* represents the nation and aspects of this nation far more than other stations. Similar to *BRTI*, it names the nation as in "TRNC", "the two countries", "Turkish Cyprus", "Turkish Cypriot" and "16 municipalities" and unlike *KFM* which names TRNC commercial interests. These namings, such as one of

“the two countries” articulates discourses of TRNC nationhood, not an area of Cyprus with a disputed status. This echoes UBP policy which promotes the idea of two separate states on Cyprus.

It can be seen in the sample that recontextualisations of these non-political events also represent the nation’s institutions and places far more than on other stations. These stories map out institutions including health centres (Lefkoşa Kentsel Health Centre, etc.), hospitals (Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel hospital, etc.), villages (Dipkarpaz, etc.), towns (Güzelyurt, etc.) and cities (Nicosia, etc.). The sheer number of mentions map out the nation (Billig, 1995: 114). Though mostly de-emphasised in prepositional phrases, the nation is constantly reminded. This reflects UBP policy of maintaining two states, while using its numerous mentions as a backdrop for the actions of power holders, especially those associated with the UBP.

Radyo T represents officials in ways which show support for the UBP and nationalists, placing them at the top of an internal hierarchy in TRNC. This is done lexically and grammatically. On a lexical level, Democratic Party politician Bulutoğluları is named as “Municipalities Union President Cemal Bulutoğluları”. This titulation excludes his other title as Mayor of Nicosia, which was included on *BRTI*. By omitting this title, his political role is suppressed. Alternatively, the UBP politician Özçınar is named as “The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union’s Vice-President and Güzelyurt Municipality’s Mayor Mahmut Özçınar”. This identifies both his roles. By suppressing roles of politicians from other parties and highlighting roles of UBP politicians, namings realise discourses of UBP importance and associates the UBP with good news, in this case, the *TDBB* office opening.

At the level of grammatical choices, we also find support for the UBP. Agency is given to power holders in TRNC, favouring those associated with the UBP and Turkey, two important actors in the UBP’s TRNC. Activations include action processes involving the Turkish union, Turkish politicians and the UBP’s Özçınar who “work”, “participate” and “open”.

This sample also reveals that CTP government representations are used to support UBP and its policies. This is achieved using three strategies. Firstly, the government is named in ways which remind listeners of the multi-functional nature of their government and nation. In the tourism delegation story, Şanlıdağ is named formally with functional honorifics as “the Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ” three times. Though these emphasise Şanlıdağ’s status, they also emphasise functions of the government and the nation. This in turn, reflects UBP policy that the nation is multi-functional and a success.

Secondly, it can be seen that the government is represented in ways which emphasise Turkish importance and cooperation, not government actions. Though some *BRTI* representations are similar, on *Radyo T* these representations are far more plentiful and there are fewer other activations. This theme of Turkish importance to TRNC is dominant on *Radyo T* and a cornerstone of Turkish nationalism. For example, in the tourism delegation story, the government is activated in the action process of “received a visiting delegation”. This act, represented twice, emphasises the importance of the Turkish delegation. Only important groups are received by a Minister. Also, the TRNC government “are following tourism in Turkey” and are “pleased with the cooperation [...] and their coming to TRNC”. Though the CTP is activated, it is Turkey which is represented as important, leading and cooperating with TRNC.

Thirdly, CTP government representations indirectly support the UBP by being less positive than they could be. Three strategies are used to achieve this. Though some of these strategies are used on the other stations, their combination along with pro-UBP strategies are unique to *Radyo T*. Firstly, the CTP is mostly named impersonally, de-humanising it and depriving listeners a point of identification as in “Health Centres associated with Gazimağusa’s government hospital”. This naming identifies two aspects of the nation (“health centres” and the city of “Gazimağusa”) reminding listeners of their nation while impersonally naming the government.

Secondly, the government shares actions and positive representations with *the association* in the Cancer Week story as in:

The Ministry of Health and the Help Those with Cancer Association together have announced April 1 to 7 is Cancer week.

Here, the government is active and enjoys dominant sentence position similar to that seen on *KFM*, but it is activated with *the association* sharing positive news.

A third strategy used to de-emphasise the government is representing it in prepositional phrases such as:

Health centres and hospitals associated with the Ministry of Health will do the tests.

Though this is an action process, the “Ministry” is in a prepositional phrase, de-emphasising it somewhat. Together, these strategies represent the CTP less positively than it could be, thus working in favour of the UBP.

As is the case on the other two stations, residents are at the bottom of TRNC’s internal hierarchy always passivated or de-emphasised in prepositional phrases, acting as a backdrop for the actions of mostly UBP officials as in “The cancer scanning will target people”. Here, “people” are passivated by the actions of the nominalisation “cancer scanning” which represents the government and *the association*.

Though residents are powerless, lexical choices connote support for UBP policies. In the recontextualisation of the announcement of Cancer week, residents are represented as “the general public” and “people”, not “Turkish Cypriots”, as is usually the case. By using more inclusive lexical choices, *Radyo T* reflects UBP policies which have allowed many Turkish immigrants into TRNC. This policy is both ideological and practical. Ideologically, the UBP believes mainlanders and Cypriots are all Turks, so allowing mainlanders in TRNC seems natural. This sentiment was reiterated by *Radyo T*’s owner Ersin Tatar who said, “We’re all Turks afterall.” Practically, by allowing mainlanders into TRNC, nationalist support has been supplemented. My ethnography taught me that Turkish mainlanders are natural UBP Turkish nationalist supporters. So, these

namings draw upon discourses of sameness amongst Turkish Cypriots and mainlanders, a part of Turkish nationalist ideology.

VIII.2.iv Internal Relations Summary

BRTI's lexical and grammatical choices represent a distinct independent "Turkish Cypriot" nation. It also represents a hierarchy within TRNC, with the pro-federation CTP government and non CTP officials leading the nation. These are multi-functional, important, active and part of the Turkish Cypriot nation. Non-governmental organisations play a secondary role in the nation. Below this are residents who are de-emphasised and represented without power. These representations evoke discourses of support for the nation, the CTP government and officials, benefitting said parties while satisfying *BRTI*'s mandate to promote the nation.

On *KFM*, the CTP government is also named in ways which represent it as multi-functional, large and powerful. However, government representations differ from *BRTI* by being represented as working in partnership with *the association* and the "Turkish Cypriot" business sector. Together they lead a successful nation of Turkish Cypriots, working for the good of the nation and its people who are in trouble. These representations not only show support for the CTP, but also the business sector and associations which benefits *KFM*'s owner, a dominant businessman in TRNC.

On *Radyo T*, the nation is named in ways which stresses its "Turkish Cypriot" nature like that heard on *BRTI*. But unlike *BRTI*, the sheer number of its representations map out TRNC geographically and institutionally, indicating the importance *Radyo T* gives TRNC. Aspects of the nation associated with power, and especially the UBP, are activated and in control. The government is multi-functional and active, though positive attributes are limited through grammatical strategies and the government is in need of Turkish assistance. These representations articulate discourses of a normal functioning TRNC nation and government independent of the Republic, without promoting the CTP. Residents are named in ways which include them in a pan-Turkish nation.

VIII.3 The Turkish world or Cypriot nation?

VIII.3.i BRTI

In the analysis of internal relations, it was revealed that *BRTI* journalists recontextualise non-political events in ways which support existing TRNC power structures. In this analysis, we find discourses about Turkish cooperation, closeness, importance, aid and leadership. But representations of its external relations are not limited to those with just Turkey. It is a nation amongst nations. These represent TRNC as independent yet closely aligned to, though not an integral part of, a Turkish world.

In this sample, with the exception of the Cancer week story where it is excluded, aspects of Turkey are represented as active. Turkey is activated in a variety of process types such as the action process of “[*The Municipalities’ Union of the Turkish World (TDBB)*] has opened a representation office”, the event process of “[the TDBB office] was inaugurated this morning” and the state process of “the TDBB has nearly 1,100 members from 9 countries”. These activations draw upon a discourse of Turkey being positive, active and in control: part of Turkish nationalist ideology.

It can be seen that Turkey is also represented as important. A number of strategies are used, namings being one. Personal namings of Turkish officials emphasise their roles, as in the functional naming of the “delegation”. The “delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism” highlights not only the group’s role but also their importance, being from a “Turkish ministry”. In fact, nominations are minimal in these stories, withholding a point of identification. When they are named, it is formally with functional honorifics, such as “Vice-President of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party [AKP] Huseyin Tanriverdi” which emphasise the official’s power and importance. These namings evoke discourses about Turkey being important to the TRNC nation, though because there are few nominations, closeness is withheld. To withhold closeness between TRNC and Turkey reflects CTP interests. This is another example of

what editor Dağun said was *BRTI*'s attempt to “not offend” all parties in the Cyprus conflict.

Impersonal namings also emphasise Turkey's importance by identifying many aspects of Turkey, such as the tourist delegation, the union, its members, its office and the Turkish government. These namings mostly include “Turkish” or an abbreviation, reminding listeners of Turkey's importance and roles in TRNC. For example, the *TDBB* office is represented as belonging to the Turkish union in “The Municipalities' Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) has opened a representation office”. Naming the office as that of a Turkish union and not belonging to TRNC emphasises Turkey and its importance. This naming is similar to that seen on *Radyo T* and the opposite of *KFM* which represents the office belonging to the TRNC.

Interestingly, “the Municipalities Union of the Turkish World” is only named once, “TDBB” being preferred. This almost exclusion of the “Turkish World” naming backgrounds the idea of the TRNC office being part of the “Turkish world”, while reminding listeners of Turkey's importance. This compromise naming is a result of influences in *BRTI* newsrooms such as CTP supporting managers and writers who must not “offend” Turkish nationalist interests, yet find the idea of a “Turkish world” too close for their liking. These choices evoke discourses of important links with Turkey, but refrain from articulating discourses of membership to a “Turkish world”.

This idea of TRNC being not part of the Turkish world, though closely linked to it can be seen through collocations. These reveal TRNC is internationally legitimate, a nation amongst nations. In the *Berlin Tourism Fayre* story, TRNC associations and businesses are part of “nearly 11 thousand tourism companies from 180 countries”. This represents TRNC as a nation amongst 180 other nations, reaffirming TRNC's legitimacy as an independent nation, as mandated by *BRTI*'s *Law* and not part of the Turkish world.

All the same, we find collocations continue to represent Turkey as important. For example, the Turkish tourist delegation was “received” by the minister. Normal

groups of people are not “received” by ministers, only groups deemed important. The *TDBB* office opening is collocated with “inaugurated” and “speeches are delivered”, representing it as an important event. “TRNC municipalities and TDBB” is collocated with “cooperation”. This cooperation will “promote the TRNC”, is an “important step” and “create[s] new opportunities”. These collocations represent Turkey as important for TRNC with its power, importance, cooperation and aid. These benefit those associated with *BRTI* with Turkish nationalist interests, such as the Turkish government, its military and those profiting from political patronage.

In this sample, we also find that *BRTI* writers use reported speech to represent Turkey as not only important, but aiding TRNC. Turkish sources are used extensively for reported speech, showing support and importance given to Turkey (White, 2006: 58; Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). In the following, the illocutionary glossing verb “emphasised” is used to highlight the importance of aid to TRNC in:

Underlining the need for lifting the international isolation on the Turkish Cypriot people, Mr Tanriverdi emphasised that the AKP will continue taking steps towards realising this goal.

This sentence highlights two common themes on *BRTI*. Firstly, it represents TRNC residents suffering from isolation, a theme exploited by all TRNC parties who want the lifting of embargoes and isolation. Residents are victims, de-emphasised in a prepositional phrase within a subordinate clause. Secondly, the Turkish government is represented aiding TRNC residents by “taking steps towards” lifting international isolation. This is a distillation realising purpose (van Leeuwen, 1995: 99). It does not reveal any detail of actions while serving the politician well by evoking a discourse of Turkey’s AKP party aiding TRNC residents.

A second strategy used to represent Turkey aiding TRNC can be seen in collocations. For example, the Turkish tourist delegation is in TRNC to “carry out planning work to help develop tourism”, “within the framework of the cooperation and dialogue” and “will contribute to developing the North’s tourism sector.”

Though Turkey is represented as important, cooperative and helpful, the relationship between Turkey and TRNC is not one of two equals. In fact, TRNC is represented as subordinate to Turkey. For example, in the Turkish tourist delegation story:

Pointing out that they followed closely tourism developments in Turkey, the Minister of Economy and Tourism expressed his desire to benefit from the delegation's experience in the field.

"They" in indirect speech of Şanlıdağ refers to the TRNC government. Though "they" are activated, which emphasises TRNC, the act of "following" Turkey defines relations between the two states. Furthermore, the illocutionary glossing verbal phrase "[Şanlıdağ] expressed his desire" connotes the importance to the speaker of what is said (Coulthard-Caldas, 1994: 304). For Şanlıdağ to express his desire to learn from the Turkish delegation, *BRTI* emphasises the delegation's importance and knowledge. This realises a discourse about Turkey being a country to follow, satisfying *BRTI*'s Turkish nationalist interests.

This relationship of TRNC following Turkey is evident in many aspects of TRNC life due to embargoes and isolation. Turkey is the only route that goods, services and knowledge can go through. For this reason, TRNC is in a position where it must follow Turkey. As editor Dağun said, TRNC is too weak to be truly independent without Turkey's help. However, this discourse omits that this "following" is due to no solution to the Cyprus conflict. With a solution, embargoes and isolation would be lifted and Turkish Cypriots could choose who and what to follow. By emphasising "following", stations ignore that the "following" is a result of no solution.

VIII.3.ii KFM

In the previous internal relations analysis, it was seen that *KFM* recontextualises non-political events in ways which represent an internal TRNC hierarchy which supports the CTP and its associates. However, previous chapters' analyses have revealed that with the exception of distancing TRNC from Turkey, CTP policies are mostly omitted. This analysis reveals that Turkey is almost excluded, while some lexical choices in one story suggest support for a Cypriot federation.

Unfortunately, this is minimally represented, with dominant discourses about external relations supporting division and TRNC as a successful international nation under the leadership of the CTP.

According to CTP politician Beraltı, CTP does not consider TRNC part of a pan-Turkish nation, but more as part of a future united Cyprus. In this sample, we find that *KFM* reflects this policy by minimally representing Turkey (named twice). These are impersonal representations, de-emphasised in prepositional phrases. By almost excluding Turkey, discourses which reflect *KFM* and CTP's vision of the TRNC nation as one which backgrounds Turkey's role are signified.

Even when Turkey is represented, grammatical choices de-emphasise it. In coverage of the *TDBB* office opening, the office is named as the "Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union's Nicosia main office". Unlike *BRTI* and *Radyo T*, *KFM* represents the *TDBB* office not as Turkish but as TRNC's by using the possessive "s". Emphasising TRNC in this story runs against *KFM*'s almost exclusion of the TRNC nation seen throughout its news. In most stories, this exclusion makes negotiations for a new form of nation seem natural. However, in this story, by representing the office as Turkish Cypriot, TRNC is emphasised, signifying discourses of difference from the Republic and distance from Turkey, two common themes on *KFM*.

Unlike other stories on *KFM*, in the Cancer week story we find a few instances where lexical choices suggest support for a Cypriot federation. This CTP policy is reflected in Cyprus being named as a single entity. These inclusive namings appear in *the association*'s direct speech. This gives control of representations to *the association* and distances responsibility from *KFM* writers (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994: 304). All the same, choosing to use these utterances shows a degree of support for them (White, 2006: 58, Fairclough, 1995; *ibid.*).

Inclusive Cypriot namings are "[...] on the island we have many people with cancer" and "[...] in Cyprus, we need a hospital with facilities for cancer treatment." Though these namings appear in prepositional phrases, dominant sentence positions counter de-emphasis somewhat. Importantly, these

represent cancer as an all-island problem, articulating a discourse of an all-Cypriot 'us' group with cancer problems and needing a hospital.

In 2003, the CTP was voted into power on a platform which dismissed Turkish nationalist ideology of scepticism towards a federation. The day after being elected, the CTP promised the government's priority was "[...] to achieve a settlement to the Cyprus problem based on the Annan Plan."⁶⁶ The settlement the *Annan plan* envisioned and the CTP claims it desires is a federation. These namings draw upon such discourses, a step towards a federation.

In the same story, some representations of residents further blur lines between TRNC and the Republic. Though some utterances refer specifically to TRNC residents, others refer to Cypriot residents and others are vague. For example, the first three sentences of the Cancer week story read:

1. Help Those with Cancer Association drew attention to the fact that in 2007, 281 people died of cancer and 522 people developed cancer.
2. In the year 2008, every day two or three people develop cancer.
3. The Association said that in The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5200 people have cancer; 15 years ago there was little cancer and they are afraid of it growing. (my numbering)

In the first two sentences it is unclear who "281 people", "522 people" and "two or three people" refer to. Sentence three makes clear "5200 people" are TRNC residents. Considering the all-inclusive Cyprus namings cited above, these numbers possibly represent more inclusive groupings, blurring the borders of who is included in national 'us' groups which signify more inclusive discourses of an all-Cypriot federation.

Unfortunately these namings are few in number, while the majority, even in this sample, realise discourses of support for the CTP, businesses and associations and difference from the Republic, such as the abundant "Turkish Cyprus" namings analysed earlier. This inconsistency in namings across *KFM* stories reflect news gathering and writing practices which do not prioritise concern for lexical and grammatical choices. It follows then that the Cancer week story uses

⁶⁶ Downloaded 04.06.09 from <http://ns1.brtk.net/enews/archive/oarchive.htm>.

some lexical choices which evoke discourses of unity, while the vast majority of scripts do not.

This inconsistency in namings is exemplified in *KFM*'s recontextualisation of the *Berlin Tourism Fayre*. This story promotes TRNC as an internationally recognised nation, more than the other stations' accounts of tourism events.

One strategy used is framing the *Fayre* as an important, international event. By doing so, TRNC's participation takes on greater international significance. The *Fayre* is represented 14 times, being "the most prestigious" and "most important and biggest tourism fayres" with "nearly 11 thousand tourism companies" and "exciting events". It expects "150000 visitors". Its in its "42nd" year, adding legitimacy through its longevity. Even locating it "in the capital of Germany" adds importance being in a "capital", not a small unimportant town.

Representing the *Fayre* as important serves the CTP well. This is because TRNC is being "promoted" and "represented" by the CTP and businessmen with "a 120 metre square stand with various activities." This draws upon discourses of CTP success, participating in an important international fayre in no small way.

The *Fayre* is not only represented as important, but internationally important. This represents TRNC's participation as being a nation amongst nations, far more than *BRTI*. The story claims "the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be represented at this fayre", not TRNC businessmen representing their interests. Like *BRTI*, TRNC is represented as one of "more than 180 different nations" at the *Fayre*. Unlike *BRTI*, there are 20 utterances of countries, cities and "nation" in this story, constantly drawing upon discourses of TRNC as a recognised nation amongst nations.

This recontextualisation of events runs counter to pro-federation CTP policies. Representing the TRNC as a nation amongst nations is in line with Turkish nationalist ideology which aims to maintain two states. However, by representing the CTP and businesses active at the *Fayre*, discourses about a successful, international TRNC, under the wing of the CTP and businessmen are evoked.

VIII.3.iii Radyo T

In the previous analysis of internal relations it was seen that the nation is accentuated and power holders associated with the UBP are at the top of an internal hierarchy, the CTP is de-emphasised and residents are named in ways which include Turkish mainlanders. These representations reflect UBP policies.

Another major plank in UBP policy is maintaining close relations between TRNC and Turkey. This close relationship has served many UBP supporters well through patronage. It serves *Radyo T* well, its owner being a prominent UBP politician with its associated benefits.⁶⁷ Two of these stories (Cancer week excludes Turkey) recontextualise events in ways which articulate discourses of Turkey's importance, closeness and a TRNC-Turkish partnership, similar to that seen on *BRTI*. Representations differ however, by all these themes being accentuated on *Radyo T*, TRNC being represented as part of a pan-Turkish nation and the idea of TRNC being a nation amongst other nations excluded. Together these reflect UBP policies which view Turkey as a protector, guardian and close ally, with TRNC being part of a pan-Turkish nation.

In this sample, Turkey is represented as important and powerful, similar to *BRTI*. Two strategies are used, one being lexical choices. Like *BRTI*, specific categorisations such as the "delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism" highlight the delegation's connections with the Turkish government and its importance. Turkish officials "AK Party General Vice-President and local Manise Parliamentarian Hüseyin Tanriverdi", "Municipalities Union of the Turkish World President Erol Kaya" and "Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay" are named formally with functional honorifics, emphasising role and importance. Unlike *BRTI*, *Radyo T* names far more Turkish officials throughout the sample giving listeners more points of identification which indicates closeness with Turkey.

⁶⁷ Ersin Tatar is the owner and manager of *Kanal T* and *Radyo T*. He is a partner in Tatar and Co. Chartered Accountants. At the time of research, he was the Shadow Minister of Finance for UBP and became the Minister of Finance on 23 April 2009 with the UBP parliamentary victory. These positions allow him access to contacts and contracts which businessmen without his political connections may not enjoy.

Another strategy used to identify Turkey as important and powerful is activations. Turkey is activated in a wide variety of action processes. For example, the Turkish delegation is activated in action processes of it “came to the TRNC”, “will carry out investigative work” and “will carry out some investigations” while Turkish officials “Kaya, Tanriverdi opened the representation office”. These activations have agency, emphasising Turkey and its power (Fairclough, 1995a: 113).

A third strategy used to represent Turkish importance is collocations and co-text. Like *BRTI* in the tourism delegation story, the delegation is “received” by the TRNC minister. Unlike *BRTI*, the “Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay” is collocated with “the formal visit”. A “formal visit” is again an important event reserved for important people. These strategies signify discourses of Turkish power and importance.

In this sample, we also find Turkey and TRNC are represented positively working together, a theme similar to that on *BRTI*. Activations are used to represent Turkey and TRNC in “they will reach and succeed in their aims”. Though both states are activated, this is a distillation. This distillation gives no indication of what actions are being performed, though like most distillations, serves purposes (van Leeuwen, 1995: 99). In this case, representing the two states succeeding together serves UBP and *Radyo T* well by mirroring Turkish nationalist ideology of a close successful partnership between TRNC and Turkey.

But Turkey is represented as more than a partner, but a nation to learn from. This theme is seen on *BRTI*, though its multiple representations on *Radyo T* accentuate this theme. Turkey is collocated with helpful lexical choices such as “carry out planning work to develop tourism”, “cooperation”, “works”, and “carry out investigative work”. These create a helpful theme. Works with Turkey “will contribute” to TRNC tourism, the TRNC “are following tourism in Turkey” and the Minister wants to “take benefits from Turkey’s experiences”. These themes of Turkish experience and a nation to follow draw upon a discourse of TRNC dependency on Turkey, reflecting UBP policies.

Unlike the other stations, Turkey is represented as more than a nation, it is a world. The lexical combination “Turkish World” is used extensively in the *TDBB* office opening story. This lexical combination (uttered six times on *Radyo T*, twice on *KFM* and once on *BRTI*) represents Turkey being larger than a country; a “world”, large and powerful. This articulates a discourse of pan-Turkish nationalism not seen on the other stations.

In this sample, it can be seen that TRNC is represented as part of this pan-Turkish world. “TRNC” is collocated with Turkey throughout the sample, lexically binding the two together. For example, twice the *TDBB* office is named as “Municipalities Union of the Turkish World TRNC representation office”. The words “work”, “process” and “opening” are collocated with the two states, along with the co-texts of “every day that number grows” and “an important step”. These utterances draw upon discourses of TRNC and the Turkish world together expanding and improving. The Turkish Cypriot Union will work in and be part of the Union of the Turkish World, a simile for the TRNC nation being part of the Turkish world.

VIII.3.iv The Turkish World or Cypriot World Summary

In this sample of recontextualisations of non-political events, we find that *BRTI* represents Turkey as important, cooperative, helpful, powerful and in control. TRNC is a nation bound to Turkey with aid and cooperation, but by withholding closeness and lexical choices *BRTI* suggests TRNC is not a part of a Turkish world. It is a nation amongst nations, albeit with close connections to Turkey.

On *KFM*, we find Turkey is excluded or de-emphasised, connoting distance between TRNC and Turkey. A few lexical choices in the recontextualisation of the announcement of Cancer week suggest the nation and its people are part of an all-inclusive Cyprus. These few utterances draw upon discourses of unity, conducive to creating a federation. However, the vast majority of representations throughout the sample articulate discourses of difference, as evident in the *TDBB* office opening story and TRNC legitimacy in the *Berlin Fayre* story. The only consistent discourse evident throughout this sample is the CTP is positive,

powerful and leading a nation of residents, though who these residents are is sometimes unclear.

Radyo T recontextualises these events in ways which draw upon discourses of TRNC legitimacy and pan-Turkish nationhood. Turkey is important, close, strong, activated, expanding and leading TRNC. This is emphasised far more than on the other stations. Turkey is more than a country, but a “world” of which TRNC is a part. TRNC progresses and cooperates with Turkish assistance. Cooperation results in “important steps” and “development” for TRNC. These representations signify discourses about TRNC as a junior partner in its relations with Turkey, more than on *BRTI*, reflecting UBP Turkish nationalism which sees Turkey as an ally, protector and the motherland in a pan-Turkish nation.

VIII.4 Non-political Stories Conclusion

It has been found that non-political news stories are fertile ground for nation-building and maintaining (Flowerdew and Leong, 2007; Higgins, 2004; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Billig, 1995). This chapter has analysed the coverage of non-political events to reveal how each station represents internal relations, TRNC’s relations with Cyprus, Turkey and other nations. It has revealed that each station draws upon different national discourses, each reflecting the interests of power holders closely associated with each station.

On *BRTI*, discourses are evoked which support the TRNC led by existing power holders. The “Turkish Cypriot” nation is represented extensively articulating discourses of sameness, yet distinguishing it from the Republic. These representations serve as a backdrop for the actions of officials. Powerful government and non-governmental officials are represented in charge, controlling events in a multi-functional nation.

Many actions suggest TRNC is a junior partner with Turkey. Turkey is important, powerful, cooperative, a source of information, a leader and helpful to TRNC and its residents. TRNC is bound to Turkey with aid and cooperation.

Though these representations appeal to the governing CTP and Turkish nationalists, they do little to evoke discourses about cooperation, compromise or unity. These discourses suppress the reason why TRNC follows Turkey is because there is no solution to the Cyprus conflict. With a solution, TRNC would be in a position to decide which nations to follow for various aspects of its functioning. Indeed, these do little to “help find a solution”, the supposed purpose of news on *BRTI* during the time of this thesis.

On *KFM*, an internationally successful CTP-led Turkish Cypriot nation in partnership with businesses and non-governmental associations are the most dominant discourses signified in this sample. The CTP and associates have attitudes and thoughts for the good of the nation and its people, being the solution to their troubles. These representations reflect CTP’s close relationship with *KFM*.

Unlike previous analysis, a few lexical choices in one story draw upon CTP pro-federation discourses of unity. These blur the lines of who and what is the nation and its people. At the same time, the CTP policy of distancing TRNC from Turkey is evident. Unfortunately, representations of these policies are flawed. Firstly, lexical choices which connote a single Cyprus appear only a few times in one story. The vast majority of representations clearly distinguish Turkish Cypriots and their businesses, associations and government from the Republic while supporting the CTP. This thesis’s ethnography revealed that *KFM* mainly cuts and pastes sentences from *TAK* with little interest in news, politics and lexical and grammatical choices. Pro-federation sentiments are not a priority, but an oversight or pretext for pro-CTP discourses.

Secondly, representing Turkey as being outside of TRNC is also flawed. Presently, the reality for TRNC is that it relies entirely on Turkey for its existence. Creating distance between itself and Turkey can only work effectively if an alternative is being represented. *KFM* fails to do this. With very few exceptions, *KFM* does not articulate discourses of unity and life without embargoes and

isolation, representing CTP interests at the expense of “what is [really] good for the nation”.

Radjo T recontextualises non-political events in ways which draw upon discourses of sameness, difference and nationhood aligned with UBP Turkish nationalism. The nation is constantly reminded geographically, institutionally and socially far more than other stations. This is a reflection of UBP policies which promote a two-state solution.

UBP officials are represented as powerful and acting for the good of residents. The government is represented as multi-functional and active, though the CTP is not promoted. This articulates discourses about a normal functioning nation with a multi-functional government, again reflecting UBP policy.

These stories also evokes discourses of pan-Turkish nationalism. TRNC progresses, takes important steps and develops whilst working with Turkey. Turkey is important, powerful, active, expanding and leading TRNC. Turkey is the motherland, an ally and protector. It is a “world” in which TRNC belongs. This representation of a Turkish Cypriot nation within the Turkish world reflects TRNC as seen by the UBP. Unfortunately, this does little to promote Cypriot compromise, cooperation or unity, discourses essential for contributing to a better life for residents of TRNC.

This chapter has demonstrated that news stories about non-political events articulate different discourses of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This confirmed Billig’s (1995:8) assertion that the “forgettable” banally contributes to nation-building and nation-maintaining. Unfortunately, these national discourses pay little heed to “what is good for the nation” and what “helps to find a solution to the Cyprus problem”. Instead, choices reflect stations’ interests which for the most part are counter to finding a solution to the Cyprus conflict.

IX Conclusion

Cypriot, regional and international powers recognise the importance of Cyprus for their own agendas. These powers are responsible for creating conditions for both dividing the island and maintaining its division. While many have benefitted from this division, TRNC residents have suffered with embargoes, fear of their island's co-habitants and political, social and economic isolation.

Media in several contexts, including Cyprus, have been attributed with contributing to national ideology (Panayiotou, 2006; Richardson, 2006; Bishop and Jaworski, 2003; Fairclough, 2003, 1995a and 1989; Moores, 2000; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart, 1999; van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1997; Martin-Barbero, 1997; Krishnamurthy, 1996; Billig, 1995; Anderson, 1991; van Dijk, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). Broadcast news disseminates national discourses by representing and transforming political texts which are then recontextualised into "everyday life, where it contributes to the shaping of how we live, and the meanings we give to our lives" (Fairclough, 1989: 34-37). In TRNC, where radio is a popular form of media, this takes on significant importance.

This thesis contributes to a volume of work which claims that historically and presently, Cypriot media have played a role in the division of Cyprus by framing news in conflicting nationalistic terms (Bailie and Azgin 2008; Panayiotou 2006; Kannaouros 2004; Azgin 1996; Dedeçay 1988). However, this thesis differs from previous ones in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates that national ideology is not a uniform expression and allegiance in and through news media, but is internally fractured, politically differentiated and dynamically moving through time. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis has detailed how TRNC radio news recontextualises events which signify different national discourses that serve interests associated with different stations.

Secondly, this thesis differs from most CDA by contextualising its close textual analysis in three ways (Widdowson, 2004; Philo, 2007). Firstly, the social contexts on which news texts have been examined by an ethnography of the production

of news, looking specifically at political and economic contexts, news gathering and writing practices at each station. This discloses where ideological discourses identified in the textual analysis come from. It also makes clear how national discourses in radio texts serve the political interests associated with each station. Secondly, TRNC and its media have been historically examined. This has aided in clarifying meanings in texts. It has also helped understanding media's roles in Turkish Cyprus. Thirdly, an examination of nationalism has exposed common elements of nationhood and strategies of nation-building and maintaining. This has exposed how different Turkish Cypriot nationalisms have come about and clarified current national ideological thinking. These examinations have contextualised the textual analysis by illustrating how national discourses in TRNC are articulated in and through history and the media.

XI.1 Which station offers the most potential?

Though this thesis's analysis has revealed how discourses evoked in news serve political interests associated with each station, it has not considered which radio station's news offers the most potential to improve the lives of TRNC residents. Three criteria are considered when determining this potential.

The first criteria considers whether stations' news articulates discourses about a nation which frees residents of the embargoes, fear and isolation they presently experience. Discourses of compromise and cooperation contribute to the idea that discussions with the Republic and a solution to ending the conflict seem 'natural'. Discourses of unity could also play a role. Unity contributes to the idea of an all-inclusive Cyprus, such as a federation, one solution promoted by some political parties.

The second criteria, derived from Habermas's (1984) idea of the public sphere, prescribes media airing an array of voices. The media are expected "to facilitate democracy through providing pluralistic information from which informed choices can be made and debates can take place" (Manning, 2001 in Atton and Wickenden, 2005: 347). Debates allow an "exploration of differences, and a move towards resolving them so as to reach agreement and form alliances"

(Fairclough, 2003: 44). In the context of this thesis, TRNC news could offer a variety of discourses for residents to consider. This includes an array of voices about both internal relations in TRNC and all-Cypriot issues. With a variety of discourses, residents have the opportunity to consider options regarding their current situation.

The third criteria is which stations offer residents a national group identity, something residents have been struggling for since British colonial time.

Hobsbawm (1997:46) notes there is no doubt people long for group identity. He writes national identity “can mobilise certain variants of feelings of collective belonging, which already existed [before the era of the nation-state] and which could operate [...] with modern states and nations”. In short, the desire to belong to a group can be satisfied through a national group identification. There is no doubt TRNC residents feel a need for such a national group identity.

XI.1.i BRTI

Discourses about the nation, residents and its government are consistent throughout this thesis. *BRTI* evokes discourses of support for the TRNC nation. It is multi-functional and “Turkish Cypriot” with a Turkish language, a border, an airport, associations, areas, officials, residents, a government and a crossing. Discourses of support for existing TRNC power holders include “Turkish Cypriot” police, businessmen, officials and immigration officers. These are important, active, powerful and controlling events in a “Turkish Cypriot” nation. Residents are “Turkish Cypriot”, yet powerless, passivated by isolation due to the Republic and aided by the CTP government and sometimes Turkey. By accentuating “Turkish Cypriot-ness”, discourses of difference and division between the TRNC and the Republic are articulated.

Like all stations, governance is at the centre of *BRTI*'s representation of the nation. *BRTI* draws upon discourses of support for the pro-federation CTP government. It is hard-working, “Turkish Cypriot”, important, pro-solution, active, powerful, internationally legitimate and protects the nation from the Republic. It is waiting for the Republic to be pro-solution like itself.

Discourses of the Republic vary throughout stories, reflecting changes in political circumstances. For the most part, it is an oppositional 'other' in Lokmacı coverage and relations stories. This is compounded with discourses of difference between the Republic and TRNC. Relation stories also draw upon discourses of uncertainty about a troublesome Republic which lacks authority, status and legitimacy. The Republic is late in being pro-solution. However, grammatical strategies such as passive sentence structures background many negative actions.

Some discourses of commonality, cooperation, compromise and unity between Turkish and Greek Cypriot residents and governments are unearthed in this analysis. In Lokmacı and some relations coverage, residents of the Republic and TRNC are inclusively "Cypriot". The Republic residents and politicians perform positive actions together with residents and politicians from TRNC. The idea of TRNC and the Republic together is represented, though de-emphasised.

Discourses of problems and assimilation in Cyprus are evoked. Cyprus is a problem with two sides and two peoples. However, more positive discourses of Cypriot solutions, reunification and settlement are also articulated, though far less frequently and used as a pretext to emphasise CTP positive actions. For example, twice Cyprus is represented as a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution, a CTP policy.

Discourses of Turkey's importance are suggested in Lokmacı coverage, but far more pronounced in non-political stories. Here discourses of importance, cooperation, links and power are realised. Turkey is a helpful ally, a source of information and a leader to follow. TRNC is bound to Turkey with aid and cooperation. This is an important relationship, though TRNC is a nation unto itself.

Considering the three criteria of potential, *BRTI* offers the most potential for residents out of the three stations. Firstly, *BRTI* offers some discourses of cooperation, compromise and unity in coverage of Lokmacı and relations. These are far less common than more negative discourses, acting as a pretext for

discourses of support for TRNC and its government. However, they have been revealed. Residents and governments of both TRNC and the Republic are represented together and acting positively together, though this only occurs when the Republic is de-emphasised. The Republic's government is named personally which gives listeners a point of identification. When represented alone, discourses of uncertainty are articulated. Cyprus is represented with solutions, reunification and settlements, though again most discourses are negative.

Secondly, *BRTI* represents a multitude of voices and influences. Though most discourses support current power holders in TRNC, this is a bigger array of voices than on the other two stations. This gives residents an array of possibilities to consider for their future, albeit a limited array. This is especially true in political stories which make up the bulk of news.

Thirdly, a dominant discourse on *BRTI* is its support for Turkish Cypriot nationalism. This allows residents to imagine themselves as Turkish Cypriots within a Turkish Cypriot nation. Though this is counter to an all-Cypriot national ideology, it offers residents a popular form of group identity.

Overall, *BRTI* offers the most potential. It offers some discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity amongst a vast array of other discourses. This allows some room for an alternative imagining of the two peoples, possibly a new sense of community, citizenship and partnership. At the same time, it grants Turkish Cypriots their desire for a Turkish Cypriot group identity.

XI.1.ii KFM

Discourses of unquestioned CTP governance are most dominant in *KFM* scripts. The CTP is powerful, multi-functional, large, pro-solution and legitimate. Its leader, President Talat, is a celebrity. The CTP acts for the good of the nation and its powerless residents, along with its business and non-governmental partners. It is full of good intentions, attitudes and thoughts in finding "solutions". A discourse of a CTP positive present and a UBP negative past are present in Lokmacı and relations stories.

Alongside these positive discourses about the CTP, discourses of support for TRNC are minimal. For the most part, *KFM* suppresses a Turkish Cypriot nation. When the nation is represented, it is distinct from the Republic and framed in ways which evoke discourses of difference and praise for the CTP. Lokmacı and the *Berlin ITB Tourist Fayre* exemplify this treatment. In the *Berlin Fayre* story, TRNC is an internationally successful nation, a nation amongst nations, but led by the CTP, businesses and associations.

Discourses of sameness amongst residents and victimisation by the Republic are articulated. But again the CTP is supported. Whether residents are represented as victims or in need of help, the CTP government, businesses and non-governmental organisations are the solution to residents' troubles.

Despite supporting pro-federation CTP, pro-solution discourses are rare. *KFM* evokes discourses of the Republic being different, a worrisome opposition, troublesome, lacking legitimacy and status, a reluctant peace-maker and even an enemy. The Republic's government is named and attributed with actions which create a 'them' Greek Cypriot oppositional group, more than on *BRTI*. It is attributed with wrong actions and attitudes such as being blamed for no solution to the Cyprus conflict, preventing aid and troubles at Lokmacı, again more than *BRTI*.

Cyprus is mostly represented in ways which draw upon discourses about division and problems. When positively represented, Cyprus is framed in ways which support the CTP. Themes of CTP "solutions" and the "importance" of Cyprus are numerous. However, no solution is offered. There are some positive Cypriot discourses drawn upon in the recontextualisation of Cancer week. Discourses of a single population and social entity are signified, creating an all-inclusive Cypriot 'us' group. This is significant. Unfortunately, this is not repeated elsewhere, used as a pretext for discourses about CTP support.

Distance is represented between Turkey and TRNC. Turkey is not part of *KFM*'s nation, being either excluded from news stories or its role played down. In relations stories, discourses of Turkish importance and closeness are evoked,

but this is far less than on other stations. Turkey is important, with Turkish institutions aiding Turkish Cypriots. But like most representations on *KFM*, Turkey is represented in ways which suit the CTP: in this case, pro-solution conditions are attached.

Applying the three criteria to *KFM* reveals that it is failing residents for the most part. In the vast majority of stories (with the exception of Cancer week), discourses of cooperation, compromise and unity are absent, despite the station's close affiliation with pro-federation CTP. In the Cancer week story, the nation and its people are named in ways which blur the lines as to who and what is the nation and its people. However, this is a pretext for praising the CTP's actions. Furthermore, this positive potential is not repeated. Elsewhere, discourses of division, difference and the Republic as an oppositional 'other' are articulated far more than on *BRTI*. These discourses leave little room for discourses appropriate for a solution, despite the CTP's aim for a federation.

Considering the second criteria of offering an array of voices, again *KFM* fails. There is one dominant voice in these scripts: CTP support. Even representations of other participants are framed in such a way that praise the CTP. Other political perspectives, such as the UBP nationalists, are framed negatively. This closes down all voices both within and outside TRNC, depriving residents of the opportunity to consider options to resolve their current situation.

KFM fails worst than the other stations on the third criteria of creating a feeling of national belonging. A Turkish Cypriot nation is mostly excluded. By suppressing a Turkish Cypriot nation, a feeling of national belonging is lost on listeners. In fact, membership to any nation is difficult to imagine. Residents are not Turkish, its representations minimal or backgrounded. Residents are not Cypriot, the Republic and Cyprus represented negatively.

Despite draping "solutions" around the CTP, the Republic and Cyprus, *KFM* offers nothing. It does not offer discourses of cooperation, compromise or unity, making a solution difficult to imagine. It does not offer an array of voices, just

praise for the CTP. It offers no group identity. This analysis reveals that despite a thin veneer of “solutions”, *KFM* does not deliver.

XI.1.iii Radyo T

Radyo T offers listeners one option in regard to the Cyprus conflict: the status quo. This is achieved through its articulation of discourses of Turkish nationalism.

Dominant discourses on *Radyo T* support TRNC, TRNC statehood and TRNC as a viable solution to the conflict, more than the other stations. The nation is multi-functional and “Turkish” with borders, barricades, soldiers, police, areas, customs, flags, hospitals, institutions, committees, problems, cities, towns, villages and personality traits. Its sheer number of representations constantly remind residents who and what nation is theirs. Though the border between the Republic is firmly sealed, discourses of unity and sameness with Turkey and Islam signify a porous one. Power holders associated with nationalists such as police, soldiers and officials are empowered. Residents are recipients of power holders’ actions, governmental or not.

Discourses of support for the Turkish nationalist UBP are common. The UBP is important, knowledgeable, powerful, peaceful, friendly, active, in partnership with Turkey and responsible for a safe and comfortable TRNC state. The UBP watches over the CTP, resists attacks, created TRNC with Turkey and aims to create a deserved and honorable solution for the TRNC “state”.

Alternatively, discourses of pro-federation CTP’s unsuitability to govern, its lack of status and even it as the internal ‘other’ demonstrate *Radyo T*’s opposition to the CTP. It incorrectly handles relations with the Republic, lies, is unsuccessful, self-serving and in secret agreements with the Republic. Together the CTP and the Republic deceive TRNC residents and attack TRNC itself. Although discourses of a strong, multi-functional government in a normal functioning nation are evoked, lexical and grammatical strategies limit positive effects for the CTP.

Discourses of the Republic again point to Turkish nationalism which aims to be independent of the Republic. Discourses of the Republic emphasise no commonality, but difference, evil, danger, threat, fear, opposition, illegitimacy, otherness, uncooperativeness, and uncertainty. The Republic's government thinks, says, aims and acts in ways which sometimes threatens the very existence of TRNC. Even the Republic's residents are a threat, involved in protests which use military lexical choices. The Republic is not only the 'other', but the enemy.

Discourses of division, separation, two states, two regions and two societies on Cyprus are drawn upon. Cyprus is a negative entity, a problem, associated with unnecessary efforts and compromises. It is much more of a negative entity than the other stations.

Discourses of mainland Turkey being close, important, cooperative, powerful, helpful, a close ally, expanding, growing and leading TRNC are common throughout all scripts. Mainland Turkey is part of governance, being a guarantor, the motherland and protector. It is more than a country, but a "world" of which TRNC is a part. Discourses of sameness between Turkish mainlanders and Turkish Cypriots signify pan-Turkish national ideology.

Applying the three criteria to the discourses signified in *Radyo T* news stories, we find this station fails TRNC residents in two of the three areas. Firstly, it offers no discourses of compromise, cooperation and unity. On the contrary, most discourses are opposed to these. The Republic is the enemy, leaving no opportunities for residents imagining a solution with the Republic. Cyprus is only imagined in ways which reflect the present status of two oppositional entities sharing a land mass.

In regard to the second 'array of voices' criteria, *Radyo T* also fails. There is one dominant voice represented here and that is the voice of Turkish nationalism. Even when pro-federation CTP is represented, lexical and grammatical choices minimise this voice. This dominant voice closes down dialogue both internally and externally, offering few opportunities for residents to consider their options.

On the third criteria, *Radyo T* offers much potential. A distinct Turkish Cypriot national identity is most obviously represented on *Radyo T*. The TRNC state is a success thanks to the UBP and Turkey. This allows residents the comfort of belonging to a Turkish Cypriot nation which is part of a pan-Turkish nation. In terms of offering listeners a feeling of belonging, *Radyo T* offers listeners the most potential. However, in terms of its potential to relieve listeners of their present situation, *Radyo T* offers listeners the least.

XI.2 Roles of journalism

Almost all media in TRNC, broadcast and print, are directly or indirectly linked to political parties and interests, working with few resources and untrained staff. The stations in this thesis are from both types of broadcasters in TRNC: the state broadcaster and two commercial broadcasters from opposing near-ends of the political spectrum. Stations' news reflects the interests of political powers associated with each station and fail in the three resident-friendly criteria. Because most other TRNC stations share similar political and economic contexts, it is likely their news also fails, reflecting the interests of those associated with stations.

This being the case, the model and roles of broadcast journalism in TRNC are failing TRNC residents. To remedy such a problem is difficult, remembering that Hallin and Mancini (2004: 8) note there is a close relationship between news media, "the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations between economic and political interests, and the development of civil society, among other elements of social structure." To call for a change of model and role of journalism is calling for a complete change in TRNC. However, by referring back to Hallin and Mancini's (2004) three models of media and politics in the West, one can imagine how media in TRNC could be used to really help find solutions in Cyprus.

Presently, TRNC's model resembles most aspects of *the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model*. TRNC journalism is politically orientated with high circulation; has high political parallelism where the government, political parties

and commercial interests with political ties use the media; the state plays a large role as owner, regulator and funder of media; autonomy and journalistic professionalism is limited; freedom of the press is somewhat curtailed; and there is a high degree of ideological diversity and conflict in society with a strong role for the state and political parties. TRNC journalism's role within this model sees media promoting the interests of power holders, not solutions.

Though changing the role and model of media is impossible without changing many aspects of society as noted above, the low political parallelism in the *North Atlantic* model has positive potential for nations with high levels of political parallelism as noted in TRNC. With low political parallelism, the media could take on the role of the fourth estate. Machin and Niblock (2006: 96) note the fourth estate, which has been the cornerstone of liberal accounts of news media, sees the press's role as a watchdog of the powerful. It is essential for democracy itself (ibid.). Though the fourth estate has its critics, it is an ideal. In fact, many question whether this role is even achievable (Machin and Niblick 2006; Lloyd 2004; Boyce 1978). However, it offers something that broadcasting in TRNC presently lacks; that is, independence from or at least separation between journalists and political parties and interests.

Presently, TRNC media are too close to power holders to fulfil a watch-dog role. Lloyd (2004) claims dependence or closeness to power holders is a danger to the fourth estate role. By creating distance between political interests and radio journalists, broadcast journalism in TRNC has the potential to become more resident-friendly.

Firstly, if TRNC journalists were independent of political interests, discourses other than those supporting these interests could be articulated. Some of these could include discourses of cooperation, compromise and possibly unity with the Republic. Secondly, with more independence, a wider range of voices could be a possibility for radio news. Thirdly, stations could articulate discourses about group identification, whether they be an all-inclusive Cypriot identity or other

forms of group identity based on resident desires, and not the interests of political parties.

Adhering to a fourth estate role can be achieved without having to covet the value of objectivity. Objectivity, Chalaby (1998: 130) claims, encompasses the news values of neutrality, impartiality, balance, fairness, truthfulness, factuality, accuracy and completeness. Some journalism does not consider objectivity an important value. For example, sub-Saharan African journalists from 11 countries play down the importance of objectivity, writing for the good of their society and playing a role in conflict prevention and resolution (McGoldrick, 2005: 4).

In TRNC, the most important news priorities are “helping to solve the Cyprus conflict” and “what’s good for the nation”, two priorities not dissimilar to the African priorities cited above. Of course, how these priorities are reflected in news presently differ, reflecting political interests associated with each station. With the constraints of closeness between stations and political parties lifted, and a watchdog role adhered to, these values could be applicable with the good of residents in mind.

The national discourses drawn upon by TRNC radio news stories are generally self-serving, poisoning a volatile and potentially violent situation. They offer very few possibilities for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, sustaining and aggravating a life with economic embargoes, international isolation, the threat of violence, military presence and restrictions on the lives of TRNC residents. Thus, a new way of thinking about radio journalism, such as outlined above, is needed.

XI.3 Last Thought

Presently, Cyprus is in a state of conflict. Residents have endured the consequences of many years of a pronounced military presence and segregation. A solution to this situation will result in TRNC residents enjoying life without fearing their neighbours and without the constraints of social, political and economic isolation. But a solution has yet to be found. A solution, no matter what shape it eventually takes, must encompass a life free from isolation, embargoes and fear.

So, on the one hand, a solution does not necessarily mean a federation. A separate state may be the answer to Turkish Cypriots' desire for a feeling of national group identity. However, a separate state is only a "solution" if it encompasses a life free from isolation, embargoes and fear.

On the other hand, a separate state may not ensure this desired Turkish Cypriot national group identity. Hobsbawm (1989: 184-185) states politically and culturally small states simply "increase the number of insecure political entities". If Turkish Cypriots are to achieve an independent state, they are likely to become one of these small "insecure political entities", possibly losing their chance at being truly independent.

If this is the case, the answer for residents may be a more inclusive imagining of the nation. Hobsbawm (ibid.) notes:

Cultural freedom and pluralism at present are almost certainly better safeguarded in large states which know themselves to be plurinational and pluricultural than in small ones pursuing the ideal of ethnic-linguistic and cultural homogeneity.

This points to a Cyprus which knows itself as Turkish, Greek and all the other 'foreign' Cypriots which now make up this small island's population.

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
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Appendixes

Appendix One

Appendix 1-A Turkish Cypriot enclaves 1964 to 1974

Turkish Cypriot Enclaves




Appendix Two

Appendix One

Appendix 1-B Map of Cyprus with border

1. *Özden* (The Messenger) started in December 1950 as a weekly owned by the deputy of the TRCP. It is now a daily which promotes the leftist policies of its party which promotes the idea of a federal solution.
2. *Yeni Gazetesi* (The New Democrat) started on 21 July 1951. The owner has close personal relations with influential Turkish Cypriot politicians. *Kıbrıs* (Cyprus) started in 2004 and promotes the idea of a federal solution. It supports the government in power in their country.
3. *Yeni Demokrat* (The New Democrat) started on 1 May 1951. Its editor is known close to the offices of Rauf, Denktash.
4. *Yeni Dözen* (The New Democrat) started on 12 May 1952 and is an organ of the Demokrasik Partisi (DP).
5. *Yeni Gazetesi* (The New Democrat) started on 2 September 1952 and is an organ of the *Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi* (New Cyprus Party). It states that Cyprus must become a member of the EU before a solution of the Cyprus problem is found.
6. *Cyprus Today*, which is owned by Kıbrıs media group, is an English weekly which, like *Kıbrıs* newspaper, publishes the official Turkish Cypriot government's policies, but in English.
7. *Yeni Dözen* and *Halkın sesi* act as organs of CTP.
8. *Ekonomi* (The Economy) started on 13 Feb 1979 as a weekly and is an organ of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Board which defends the interests of businessmen and propagates the liberal market economy.
9. *Yeni Dözen*, (circulation: 900) and *Halkın sesi* (circulation: 350) act as organs of CTP.
10. *Birlik* (the Unity), (circulation: 575) started in 1952 is the organ of USP.



Appendix Two

Newspapers in the TRNC and their political affiliations

1. *Birlik* (the Unity) started in 1980 as the organ of UBP. It takes a nationalist stance and frequently comes out against a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. It propagates the idea of integration and union with Turkey.
2. *Ortam* (The Medium) started in December 1980 as a weekly owned by the deputy of the TKP. It is now a daily which promotes the leftist policies of its party which promotes the idea of a federal solution.
3. *Kıbrıs* (Cyprus) has the biggest circulation, started on 11 July 1989. The owner has close personal relations with influential Turkish Cypriot politicians. *Kıbrıs* is a coloured tabloid. Before 2004, it promoted nationalistic-conservative policies. Now it supports the government in power and their federalist policies.
4. *Vatan* (The Motherland) started on 1 May 1991. Its chief editor is known to be close to the policies of Rauf. Denktaş.
5. *Yeni Demokrat* (The New Democrat) started on 17 May 1993 and is an organ of the Demokrat Partisi (DP).
6. *Yeni Çağ* (The New Epoch) is a weekly started on 2 September 1990 and an organ of the Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi (New Cyprus Party). It states that Cyprus must become a member of the EU even before a solution of the Cyprus problem is found.
7. *Cyprus Today*, which is owned by Kıbrıs media group, is an English weekly which, like *Kıbrıs* newspaper, publishes the official Turkish Cypriot government's policies, but in English.
8. *Yeni Düzen*, and *Halkın sesi* act as organs of CTP.
9. *Ekonomi* (The Economy) started on 13 Feb 1979 is a weekly and is an organ of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Board which defends the interests of businessmen and propagates the liberal market economy.
Yeni Düzen, (circulation:900) and *Halkın sesi* (circulation: 650) act as organs of CTP.
10. *Birlik* (the Unity), (circulation: 575) started in 1980 is the organ of UBP.

11. *Ortam* (The Medium), (circulation: 550) started in December 1980 as a weekly under the ownership of the deputy of the TKP.
 12. *Kıbrıs* (Cyprus), (circulation: 7500) with the biggest circulation for a TRNC newspaper started 11 July 1989. The owner has close personal relations with influential Turkish Cypriot politicians.
 13. *Vatan* (The Motherland), (circulation: 400) started on 1 May 1991 with its chief editor linked closely with the policies of Denktaş.
 14. *Yeni Demokrat* (The New Democrat), (circulation: 520) started on 17 May 1993 as an organ of the Demokrat Partisi (DP).
 15. *Yeni Çağ* (The New Epoch), (circulation 250) is a weekly, started on 2 September 1990 and is an organ of the *Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi* (New Cyprus Party).
 16. *Cyprus Today*, (circulation 1000) which is owned by Kıbrıs media group, is an English paper which, like *Kıbrıs* newspaper, publishes the official Turkish Cypriot government's policies, but in English.
 17. *Ekonomi* (The Economy), (circulation: 1000) started on 13 Feb 1979, is a weekly and an organ of the Turkish Cypriot Trade Board which defends the interests of businessmen and propagates the liberal market economy
- (Figures taken from main distribution firm Yaysat Kıbrıs Ltd. in Azgin, 1996, p.655).

Appendix Three

TRNC Radio - Television Stations and political affiliations

Kıbrıs FM/ KTV: Private station owned by the Kıbrıs Media Group which is the biggest media group in TRNC. They have close personal connections with the government. Main newscasts are TV and radio simulcasts.

Sim-FM: Private radio broadcaster whose owner is a dominant member of CTP. They have one reporter, the rest is agency feed.

Avrasya FM/ Avrasya TV: Private station which has nationalist party affiliations (Dektaş does a weekly political show).

Radyo Mayıs: Private radio station owned by the Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi (TDP) which is a pro-settlement left wing party.

First-FM/ Genç TV /InterFirst FM: A media group which is associated with ÖRP (Liberal Party).

Radyo Güven (Security Radio): Turkish Military run radio station.

Radyo Vatan (Nation Radio): TRNC's civil defence-run station.

Radyo T/ Kanal T TV: Media group which are owned and managed by Ersin Tatar, Finance minister for UBP nationalist party.

BRTK Radio and TV: The TRNC's government run TV and radio services. There are four radio services and two television services. The main newscasts are TV/radio simulcasts.

Dance-FM: Very successful dance music station that is listened to on both sides of the island. They have no news.

Radyo Plus: Is an all music radio. They are owned by Mr. Niyazi Deniz, who owns a chain of shops. He uses the station to advertise his shops.

Akdeniz TV – FM: Associated with nationalist parties and politics

Cool-FM: Closed at time of review..

Kuzey-FM: Directly linked to TRNC Security forces

Açık Radyo: Unavailable at the time of review

Radyo Enerji: no news, owned by DanceFM.

DAÜ-FM/DAÜ TV: University radio and TV

GAÜ-FM/ GAÜ TV: University radio and TV

YDÜ-FM/ YDÜ TV: University radio and TV

UKÜ-FM: university radio

LAÜ-FM: university radio

ODTÜ-FM: university radio

Demokrasi TV: In test stage at the moment

Retro Radio FM: In test stage at the moment

InfoNet FM: In test stage at the moment

AS FM / AS TV: In test stage at the moment

Appendix Four

TAK Agenda 25 September 2007

25 EYLÜL,2007

-- İÇİNDEKİLER --

SALI

- 1). –BM İKLİM DEĞİŞİKLİĞİ DORUĞU SONA ERDİ
- 2). –JAPONYA’NIN YENİ BAŞBAKANI YASUO FUKUDA
- 3). –ABD’DEN TERÖR ÖRGÜTÜ PKK’NIN ELİNDEKİ AMERİKAN SİLAHLARINA İLİKİNAÇIKLAMA
- 4). –ABD’DE ERMENİ KURULUŞU AAA,HRANT DİNK ADINA EŞİNE ÖDÜL VERECEK
- 5). –AKARYAKITA ZAM
- 6). –BASIN-SEN BASIN TOPLANTISI
- 7). –MALİYE BAKANI UZUN,KIB-TEK VE EL-SEN YETKİLİLERİYLE 7 SAATLİK TOPLANTI YAPTI
- 8). –KARİKATÜR SANATÇISI TUNCERİ HAWALKE İÇİN ÇİZDİ
- 9). –LTB BAŞKAN VE MECLİSİ,AŞIK VE ZABİT’E SALDIRILARI KINADI
- 10). _ŞEHİT AİLELERİ YETKİLİLERİ İÇİŞLERİ BAKANI MURAT’I ZİYARET ETTİ
- 11). _AFGANİSTAN’DA SON24 SAATTE 40 TAN FAZLA ÖLÜ
- 12). _GÖNYELİ ALTYAPI MASTER PLANININ HAZIRLANMASI ÇALIŞMALARIYLA İLGİLİ BİLGİLENDİRME TOPLANTISI YAPILDI
- 13). _EMLAK VERGİLERİNDEN EĞİTİME YÜZDE 15 PAY AYRILMASI..
- 14). _FRANSIZ LIBERATION GAZETESİ:”AB ÜYELİĞİ İÇİN REFERANDUMUN KALDIRILMASI,TÜRKİYE’NİN İŞİNİ KOLAYLAŞTIRMAK İÇİN MANEVRA”
- 15). _SİYASİ PARTİLER DEĞERLENDİRME LERİNİ YAPIYOR
- 16). _KTAMS SINAV TÜZÜĞÜNÜN İPTALİ VE UYGULAMASININ DURDURULMASI İÇİN ANAYASA VE YÜKSEK İDARE MAHKEMESİ’NDE DAVA AÇTI
- 17). _MYANMAR’DAKİGÖSTERİLER...

- 18)._ "STRES GRİBİ DE TETİKLİYOR"
- 19)._ AFGANİSAN'DA İKİ OTOBÜS ÇARPIŞTI:40 ÖLÜ,39 YARALI
- 20)._ TC DIŞİŞİLERİ BAKANI BABACAN'IN BM'DEKİ TEMASLARI...
- 21)._ BES DP'DEN İŞTEN ÇIKARILAN 25 ÇALIŞAN HAKKINDA DESTEK İSTEDİ
- 23)._ KAMU İŞ'DEN HÜKÜMET'E ELEŞTİRİ...
- 24)._ GAZİMAĞUSA KAZASINA BAĞLI 9 KÖYDE YARIN ELEKTRİK KESİNTİSİ YAPILACAK
- 25)._ KIZILAY'IN İFTAR YEMEKLERİ SÜRÜYOR
- 26)._ DAÜ_KAM GÖRSEL SANATLAR ARŞİV PROJESİNİ SÜRDÜRÜYOR
- 27)._ LEFKOŞA BÖLGESİNDE ZEYTİN TOPLAMA TARİHİ 1 EKİM...
- 28)._ BKP:"8 TEMMUZ ANLAŞMASI HAYATTA GEÇİRİLMELİDİR"
- 29)._ DEMOKRASİ VAKFI BAŞKANLIĞINA METİN ARHUN GETİRİLDİ
- 30)._ SAĞLIK_SEN YILIN İKİNCİ ASGARİ ÜCRETİNİN HALEN BELİRLENEMEMESİNE TEPKİ GÖSTERDİ
- 31)._ ERÇAKICA'NIN BRİFİNGİ...
- 32)._ İÇİŞLERİ BAKANLIĞI İCRAATLARINI ANLATAN BROŞÖR YAYINLADI
- 33)._ BULUTOĞULLARI, VETERİNER HEKİMLERİ KABUL ETTİ...
- 34)._ MALİYE BAKANI UZUN VE TARIM BAKANI SENNAROĞLU'NUN ORTAK BASIN TOPLANTISI(I)
- 35)._ SÜLEYMAN ÇAKICI, İŞYERİNDE KALP KRİZİNDEN HAYATINI KAYBETTİ...
- 36)._ NARENCİYE ÜRETİCİLERİ BİRLİĞİ, ÜRÜNLERİNİ DEĞERİNİN ALTINDA SATMAMALARI KONUSUNDA ÜRETİCİLERİ UYARDI
- 37)._ SİVİL SAVUNMA BAŞKANI BOZDEMİR VE EŞİ BÜLENT ECEVİT REHABİLİTASYON MERKEZİ'Nİ ZİYARET ETTİ
- 38)._ AB KOMİSYONU, YENİ MADENİ EURO'LARIN DİZAYNINA İLİŞKİN ÖNERİLERİNİN ÜYE ÜLKELERCE DEĞİŞTİRİLDİĞİNİ DOĞRULADI
- 39)._ "D VİTAMİNİ"ARAŞTIRMASI...

- 40)._KARAOĞLANOĞLU'NDAKİ ARAÇ HIRSIZLIĞI... 1 KİŞİ TUTUKLANDI
- 41)._ELEKTRİK AKIMI ÇALAN S.Z TUTUKLANDI
- 42)._ GİRNE VE GAZİMAĞUSA'DA HIRSIZLIK...
- 43)._KAÇAK MÜLTECİLER...
- 44)._KARŞIYAKA VE LEFKOŞA'DA HIRSIZLIK... 16 YAŞINDA GENÇ TUTUKLANDI
- 45)._TEKNEYLE KKTC'YE GİRMEYE ÇALIŞAN 5 SURİYELİ TUTUKLANDI
- 46)._ULUSLARARASI KIBRIS TİYATRO FESTİVALİ...
- 47)._TABİPLER BİRLİĞİ'NİN SENARYO YARIŞMASI...
- 48)._AVCI, İTALYA PARLAMENTOSU'NDA KONUŞTU
- 49)._NİJER'DE SELLER:7 ÖLÜ
- 50)._YENİ ZELANDA'DA RUAPEHU YANARDAĞI FAALİYETE GEÇTİ
- 51)._YUNANİSTAN'DA TARTIŞMALI TARİH KİTABI GERİ ÇEKİLDİ
- 52)._MALİYE BAKANI UZUN VE TARIM BAKANI SENNAROĞLU'NUN ORTAK BASIN TOPLANTISI(2 SON)
- 53)._UBP:"DIŞ TEMASLARLA İLGİLİ YANLIŞ VE YANILTICI HABERLER YAYINLIYOR... YÖNETİCİLERİN REKLAMI YAPILIYOR"
- 54)._"KARDEŞ ÜLKE GECELERİ"İN İLKİ İSKELEDE YAPILDI... BU AKŞAM GÜZELYURT'TA...
- 55)._BES, SİMAVİ AŞIK'A YAPILAN SALDIRIYI KINADI
- 56)._DP GENEL BAŞKANI DENKTAŞ:
"GÜNEY'DEN ALIŞVERİŞ YAPAN KIBRISLI TÜRK SAYISINDA ARTIŞ VAR..."
- 57)._CASİNOCULAR BİRLİĞİ'NİN 1'İNCİ OLAĞAN GENEL KURULU
- 58)._AFGNİSTAN'DA İNTİHAR SALDIRISINDA 5 POLİS ÖLDÜ
- 59)._DIŞİŞLERİ BAKANI AVCI'NİN ROMA ZİYARETİ...
- 60)._ÇAUŞOĞLU, AKARYAKIT ZAMMINI ELEŞTİRDİ

Appendix Five

Stories and sources for 25 September 2007

BRTI

1. Presidential Spokesperson Hasan Erçakıca briefing – TAK story 31.
2. Petrol price increases in TRNC – TAK story 5.
3. Foreign Minister Turgay Avcı in Italian parliament – TAK story 48
4. Foreign Minister Turgay Avcı gives passports – TAK story 59.
5. US asks UN to help in Cyprus problem – BBC
6. E.U. says Cyprus problem is a UN problem – TAK story 20.
7. E.U. financial aid regulations for TRNC – TAK story 12.
8. New Japanese prime minister – TAK story 2.
9. Burma demonstration – BBC
10. UN comments on Darfur and Burma – BBC
11. Lebanese parliamentary problems – BBC

KFM

1. Presidential Spokesperson Erçakıca comments on UN – TAK story 31.
2. Foreign Minister Turgay Avcı in Italian parliament – TAK story 48
3. Finance Minister Uzun briefing – TAK story 7.
4. UBP statement about CTP mishandling of ferry boats – TAK story 53.
5. DP leader Serdar Denktaş statement – TAK story 56.
6. Petrol price increases in TRNC – TAK story 5.
7. Three TRNC political parties meeting – TAK story 15.
8. Public Workers Trade Union actions – TAK story 16.
9. Finance Minister Uzun meets with bankers – TAK story 7.
10. Environmentalists accuse government – TAK story 23.
11. Toys made in China in TRNC – from BRT 24.09.07.
12. Milk campaign to be launched – TAK story 52.

13. Water shortages in Gazimağusa – from BRT 24.09.07.

Radyo T

1. Road works in Nicosia – unknown
2. Parliamentary speaker Ekenoğlu interview – from BRT 24.09.07.
3. Ferry boats between Syria and TRNC – TAK story 31, 53, and BRT.
4. Turkish Cypriot footballers may play with Cypriot team – unknown
5. E.U. financial aid regulations for TRNC – TAK story 12.
6. Greek Cypriots react to Turkish Prime Minister Gül visit – unknown
7. UBP's Şerife Ünverdi criticises CTP – TAK story 53 and interview.
8. Three TRNC political parties meeting – TAK story 15.

Appendix Six

TAK Story 31 Erçakıca briefing

Lefkoşa, 25 Eylül 07(T.A.K):_Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, Kıbrıslı Türklere uygulanan izolasyonların tamamen Kıbrıs Rum tarafından gayretlerinden kaynaklandığını, son günlerde yaşanan gelişmelerle bir kez daha ortaya çıktığını söyledi.

Mali Yardım Tüzüğü ile Yeşil Hat Tüzüğü'nün uygulanmasındaki zorlukların da tamamen Kıbrıs Rum tarafından kaynaklandığını işaret eden Erçakıca "AB üyeliğinin ve diğer uluslararası ilişkilerinin sağladığı olanakları Kıbrıslı Türkler aleyhine kullanmaya dayalı uzun vadeli bir strateji izlemekte ve bu sürenin sonunda Kıbrıslı Türkleri kendi devlet sistemine osmosis yoluyla entegre etmeyi düşlemektedirler" dedi.

Hasan Erçakıca bugün düzenlediği haftalık basın brifinginde, Kıbrıs Türklerine uygulanan izolasyonlar ve son günlerde yaşanan gelişmeleri değerlendirdi.

__TÜZÜKLERİN UYGULAMA RAPORLARI__

Hasan Erçakıca, Mali Yardım Tüzüğü'nün uygulama raporunda uygulamada karşılaşılan zorluklar açıklanırken,tüzüğün onaylanmasındaki gecikmeden dolayı uğranan zaman kaybına ve uygulamada ortaya çıkan bir takım aksaklıklara dikkat çekildiğini kaydetti.

Erçakıca, "Rum tarafının engellemeleri nedeniyle Mali Yardım Tüzüğü,Avrupa Komisyonu'nun önerdiği tarihten ancak 18 ay sonra kabul edilebilmiştir ve yine Rum tarafının ısrarıyla Mali Tüzük kabul edilmeden önce eklenen maddelerle mülkiyet sorununda karşılaşılabilecek zorlukların aşılması için varolan esneklikler geçersiz kılınmıştır" dedi.

__YEŞİL HAT TÜZÜĞÜ__

Benzer bir durumun Yeşil Hat Tüzüğü için de geçerli olduğunu kaydeden Erçakıca, tüzük kapsamında yapılan ticaretin hacminde geçen yıla göre yüzde yüzlük bir artış görülmekle birlikte bu ticaret miktarının önemli boyutlara ulaşmadığını anlattı.

Erçakıca, şöyle dedi:

Değerlendirme raporunda bunun nedenleri olarak Kıbrıs Rum tarafının Kıbrıs Türk kamyonlarının güneye geçişine ve Kıbrıs Türk reklamlarının Güney'de

yayınlanmasına engel koyması, Türkçe etikete sahip ürünlere raflarda yer verilmemesi olduğu açıkça ifade edilmektedir.”

__BAL VE BALIK SATIŞI__

Cumhurbaşkanlığı sözcüsü Erçakıca, Yeşil Hat Tüzüğü kapsamına alınan bal ve balık ürünleri konusunda yaşanan zorlukların da, Kıbrıs Rum tarafının AB üyeliğini Kıbrıslı Türkler aleyhine kullanma girişimlerinin sonucu olduğunu söyledi.

Erçakıca, ”balık satışının Türk tarafının balıkçı tekne sayısını bildirmemesinden dolayı gerçekleşemediği” iddialarının hatırlatılması üzerine, Kıbrıs Türk tarafının bu konuda yerine getirmedeği bir yükümlülüğü olmadığını kaydetti. Erçakıca, ”Bizden kaynaklanan hiçbir zorluk yoktur .Zorluk,Kıbrıs Rum tarafının AB üyeliğini Türkler aleyhine kullanmaya devam etmesinden kaynaklanıyor” dedi.

Komisyonunda görev yapan Rum komiserin, bal üreticileri ile balıkçı tekneleriyle ilgili listeleri Kıbrıs Rum tarafındaki Veteriner Dairesi’ne verilmesini istediğini kaydeden Erçakıca,Rum Veteriner Dairesi’nin böyle bir otoritesi olmadığını ve Kıbrıs Türk tarafının buna razı olmasının mümkün olmadığını belirtti.

__” AMAÇ OSMOSİS”__

Erçakıca, ”Kıbrıs Rum tarafı, AB üyeliğinin ve diğer uluslar arası ilişkilerinin sağladığı olanakları Kıbrıslı Türkler aleyhine kullanmaya dayalı uzun vadeli bir strateji izlemekte ve bu sürenin sonunda Kıbrıslı Türkleri kendi devlet sistemine osmosis yolu ile entegre etmeyi düşlemektedir” diye konuştu.

Erçakıca, ”Kıbrıs Rum tarafının, bu oyunu başarıya ulaştırma gücüne sahip olmadığını, sadece Kıbrıs sorununun çözümsüzlüğünün uzamasına yardımcı olduğunu vurguladı.

__MÜLKİYET KONUSU__

Rum Yönetimi’nin Taşınmaz Mal Komisyonu’na başvuruları tehdit edip vatan hainliğiyle suçlanmasına da değinen Erçakıca, mahkemelerin aldığı kararları her platformda siyasi bir silah gibi Kıbrıs Türk tarafı ve Türkiye aleyhine kullanan Rum tarafının, şimdi kendi insanların haklarının kullanılmasını engelleme noktasına vardığını söyledi.

Erçakıca, şöyle devam etti:

“Uzun yıllardan beridir bireysel mülkiyet hakkının kutsallığı ve bunu elde edebilmek için her türlü yolun denenmesi gerektiğini iddia eden ve sırf siyasi kazanç elde etmek uğruna duygularını istismar ettiği binlerce Kıbrıs Rum’u Türkiye’yi dava etmeye teşvik eden Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi, konu kendi siyasi çıkarlarını tehdit eder duruma gelince bu bireysel hakkın kullanımını engelleme noktasına gelmiştir.”

__MÜLKİYET HAKKI SEBEST İRADEYE GÖRE KULLANILACAK__

Kıbrıslı bir Rum’un Taşınmaz Mal Komisyonu ile yaptığı anlaşmanın Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi huzurunda onaylanmayı beklediğine dikkat çeken Erçakıca, bu kararın onaylanmasıyla birlikte bir Kıbrıslı Rum’un mülkiyet hakkını kendi serbest iradesine göre kullanmış olacağını belirtti.

Erçakıca, Kıbrıs Rum yetkililer ile Rum Lider Tasos Papadopoulos’un son günlerdeki açıklamalarında, mülkiyet sorununu Kıbrıs sorununun çözümsüzlüğünün bir aracı yapmak istediklerini bir kez daha gösterdiğini söyledi.

__KKTC_SURİYE İLİŞKİLERİ__

Hasan Erçakıca, Kıbrıs Rum tarafının Gazimağusa_Lazkiye hattının yeniden açılmasına gösterdiği tepkinin e bu hattın kapatırma gayretlerinin tümüyle düşmanlık koktuğunu söyledi.

Erçakıca, “Kıbrıs Rum tarafı, bu hattı kapatırmak için her şeyi yapacak ve Suriye ile olan ilişkilerini Kıbrıslı Türkler aleyhine kullanmaktan çekinmeyecektir” dedi.

__PAPADOPULOS_BAN GÖRÜŞMESİ__

Erçakıca, Rum Lider Papadopoulos’un BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon ile gerçekleştirdiği görüşmeyle ilgili soruyu yanıtlarken de,20 dakika süren görüşmeyle ilgili Rum Liderin açıklamaları dışında bir bilgileri olmadığını kaydetti.

Papadopoulos’un “8 Temmuz sürecine destek vermediği yönündeki sözlerinin hatırlatılması üzerine 8 Temmuz sürecine destek vermek ya da destek vermemek”ikilem olmadığını işaret eden Erçakıca, bu tartışmanın Rum lider tarafından yaratıldığını söyledi Erçakıca, “Destek vermesi zaten olağan bir şeydir...”

Soyut ifadeler. Derinlemesine değerlendirmeye gerek görmüyorum...Bazı kelime oyunları yaparak, bir manipülasyon yapmaya çalıştı” dedi.

__ TALAT _ PAPADOPULOS GÖRÜŞMESİ __

Hasan Erçakıca, BM Genel Sekreteri ban'ın tutumunun, Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat ile 16 Ekim'de gerçekleştireceği görüşmede netleşeceğini de söyledi.

Erçakıca, Ama bize ulaşan bilgiler, BM ve daimi üyelerin,8 Temmuz sürecinin etkin bir şekilde uygulanıp neticelendirmesi eğiliminde olduğu yönündedir dedi.

Cumhurbaşkanı Talat'ın New York gezi programının henüz belli olmadığını kaydeden Erçakıca, bir başka soruya karşılık, 16 Ekim sonrasında Talat Papadopoulos _Ban'dan oluşacak üçlü bir zirvenin gündemde bulunmadığını belirtti.

Erçakıca, Türk tarafının hiçbir görüşmeden kaçmadığına işaret ederek, BM Genel Sekreteri'nden üçlü bir zirve çağrısı gelmesi halinde bundan kaçmayacağını ekledi. (FEZ/GÜR)

Appendix Seven

BRT1 Erçakıca story on 25 September 2007

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, Kıbrıs Rum tarafının, Kıbrıslı Türkleri izolasyon altında tutma gayretlerini Kıbrıs sorununa barışçı çözüm bulma çabaları ile bağdaştırmanın olanaksız olduğunu vurguladı.

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca düzenlediği haftalık basın brifinginde Kıbrıslı Türklerin nasıl bir izolasyon altında olduğu ve bunun sürmesi için kimin nasıl bir uğraş verdiğinin son günlerde yaşanan gelişmelerle bir kez daha ortaya çıktığını işaret etti

Erçakıca Kıbrıs Rum tarafının Gazimağusa _ Lazkiye deniz hattının yeniden açılmasına gösterdiği tepkinin düşmanlık koktuğunu vurguladı.

Avrupa Birliği tarafından yayınlanan Mali Yardım Tüzüğü değerlendirme raporuna da değinen Hasan Erçakıca, raporda ortaya konulan unsurların Rum tarafının olumsuzluğunu bir kez daha gözler önüne serdiğine dikkat çekti.

Erçakıca Kıbrıs Rum tarafının, Kıbrıslı Türkleri izolasyon altında tutma gayretlerini Kıbrıs sorununa barışçı çözüm bulma çabaları ile bağdaştırmanın olanaksız olduğuna vurgu yaptı.

Erçakıca, "Kıbrıs Rum tarafı Avrupa Birliği üyeliğinin ve diğer uluslararası ilişkilerinin sağladığı olanakları Kıbrıslı Türkler aleyhine kullanmaya dayalı uzun vadeli bir strateji izlemekte ve bu sürenin sonunda Kıbrıslı Türkleri kendi devlet sistemine ozmosis yolu ile entegre etmeyi düşlemektedir" dedi.

Mülkiyet konusunda Rum tarafının kendi insanının haklarını kullanmasına engel koyduğunu da anlatan Erçakıca bir soru üzerine 8 Temmuz sürecinin etkin bir şekilde uygulanmasını ve kapsamlı çözüm müzakerelerinin başlamasını isteyen Kıbrıs Türk tarafı olduğuna işaret etti ve papadopoulos'un süreçle ilgili açıklamalarının soyut ve manipülasyon amaçlı olduğunu söyledi.

Erçakıca bir başka soru üzerine, Türk tarafının görüşmeden kaçmadığını Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat'ın, papadopoulos ile sosyal içerikli bir görüşmede de bir araya gelebileceğini söylediğini hatırlattı.

** italics are a mix of sentences and ideas from TAK original.*

KFM Erçakıca Briefing 25 September 2007

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca,bugün düzenlediği haftalık basın brifinginde “Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon’un Kıbrıs konusundaki **tutumunun,Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat ile 16 Ekim’de gerçekleştireceği görüşmede netleşeceğini söyledi.Erçakıca, Ama bize ulaşan bilgiler, Birleşmiş Milletler ve daimi üyelerin 8 Temmuz sürecinin etkin bir şekilde uygulanıp neticelendirilmesi eğiliminde olduğu yönündedir’ dedi.**

Cumhurbaşkanı Talat’ın New York gezi programının henüz belli olmadığını kaydeden Erçakıca, bir başka soruya karşılık, 16 Ekim sonrasında Talat_papadopoulos_Ban’dan oluşacak üçlü bir zirvenin gündemde bulunmadığını belirtti.Erçakıca, Türk tarafının hiçbir görüşmeden kaçmadığına işaret ederek,Birleşmiş Milletler Genel sekreteri’nden üçlü bir zirve çağrısı gelmesi halinde Türk tarafının bundan kaçınacağını söyledi..”

Appendix Eight

Story 15 from TAK agenda 25 September 2007

Lefkoşa,25 Eylül 07(T.A.K.) : Siyasi partiler,dün cumhuriyet Meclisi'nde yapılan toplantıda görüşülen ara formülü değerlendirmek üzere yetkili organlarını topluyor.

Anayasa,Siyasi Partiler Yasası, Seçim ve Halkoylaması Yasası ve Cumhuriyet Meclisi İç Tüzüğü'nde yapılacak değişiklikler ve erken seçim gündemiyle yapılan toplantılar çerçevesinde,mecliste gurubu bulunan Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi,Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat Parti'nin genel başkanları dünkü toplantılarında detayları basına açıklanmayan bir öneriyi parti yetkili organlarında değerlendirip Perşembe günü yeniden buluşma kararı almıştı

TAK muhabirinin parti yetkililerinden aldığı bilgilere göre CTP Merkez Yönetim Kurulu bugün öğleden sonraki rutin toplantısında bu konuyu da görüşecek.Ardından saat 19:30'da parti meclisi bu gündemle toplanacak.

UBP'de de değerlendirmeler sürüyor.Ancak parti yetkili organlarının ne zaman toplanacağı henüz belli olmadı.Genel Sekreter Nazım Çavuşoğlu 'Birkaç gün içinde yetkili organlar toplanacak.Kendi aramızda değerlendirmelerimiz sürüyor' dedi.

DP ise yarın saat 17:00'de merkez yönetim kurulunu, ardından da parti meclisini toplayacak.

(GÜL/CAN)

Radyo T 25.09.07

Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Birleşik Güçler, Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat Parti, anayasanın yanı sıra bazı yasaların da değerlendirilmesi konusunda Pazartesi günü üzerinde uzlaşmaya varılan ara formülü değerlendiriyor...

Anayasa, Siyasi partiler Yasası, Seçim ve Halkoylaması Yasası ve Cumhuriyet meclisi İç Tüzüğü'nde yapılacak değişiklikler ve erken seçim gündemiyle yapıla toplantılar çerçevesinde, mecliste grubu bulunan Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Ulusal Birlik Partisi ve Demokrat parti ara formül ile ilgili değerlendirmelerini sürdürüyor. Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Birleşik Güçler Merkez Yönetim Kurulu dün öğleden sonraki rutin toplantısında bu konuyu görüştü. Ardından Parti Meclisi aynı gündemle toplandı. Toplantıda neler

konusulduđu ise basına aıklanmadı. Ulusal Birlik Partisi'nde de deęerlendirmeleri sűrűyor. Ara forműl dűn Meclis Grubu'nda masaya yatırılarak tartıřıldı... Parti Genel Bařkanı Tahsin Ertuęruloęlu, Tűrkiye Devlet Bakanı Cemil iek ile gűrűřmek űzere Genel Sekreter Nazım avuřoęlu ile birlikte bugűn saat 12.00'de Ankara'ya gitti... Genel Bařkan ve Genel Sekreterin adaya geliřinin ardından da Parti Meclisi karar almak űzere toplanacak. **Demokrat Parti ise bugűn saat 17.00'de merkez yűnetim kurulunu, ardından da parti meclisini toplayarak konuyu deęerlendirecek.**

** italics are similar to TAK original*

Appendix Nine (chapter six)

Appendix 9 A: BRTI

01.04.08

The Presidential Spokesperson Hasan Ercakica has announced that immigration and customs officials will start their duties at the Lokmaci Gate as from tomorrow.

Mr Ercakica said the preparatory work of the Lefkosa Turkish Municipality is almost completed in the area, noting that crossings at the Lokmaci Gate can start either tomorrow or on Thursday the latest.

In his weekly press briefing, Mr Ercakica also pointed to the increase in the number of cases brought against the EU Commission on the implementation process of the EU Financial Aid Regulation for Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot Administration, which he described as saddening.

Ercakica stressed that this approach- which was started during Tassos Papadopoulos' term of administration- does not comply with the constructive spirit of the new solution process in Cyprus.

He said the Turkish Cypriot Side expects this negative process to come to an end, stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side is paying particular attention to the sending of positive messages.

`The implementation of the EU Financial Aid Regulation will be a good practice in terms of confidence-building. However, the Greek Cypriot side is not giving the implementation of the Regulation a chance and it seems like it won't give in the future too` the Spokesperson added.

Stressing that the solution of the Cyprus problem is not against Turkey's interests, Ercakica stated that Turkey can no way be ignored during a solution and that the Turkish Cypriot side is moving in full harmony with Turkey.

He said the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias' attempt to address Turkey as the side responsible for the non-solution on the island is a critical negativity.

Also touching upon the issue of working groups and technical committees, he said the works of these groups are expected to start by next week.

The Presidential Spokesperson noted that working groups will comprehensively take up the substantial issues of the Cyprus problem and the study of these

groups will be used during comprehensive negotiations process which will start between the two leaders of the island in the second half of June.

02.04.08

Reports say the long-awaited opening of the Lokmaci Gate might take place tomorrow morning.

The Mayor of Lefkosa Turkish Municipality Cemal Bulutoglulari has stated that the Turkish Cypriot Side will be completing the preparatory work on its side by this evening, in order to be ready for the Gate's opening at 9 tomorrow morning.

The preparatory work is almost completed on the Turkish Cypriot side of the Lokmaci Gate.

The paravane in the northern part of the Gate has also been removed.

The Mayor of Lefkosa Cemal Bulutoglulari told the BRT newsroom that the Lokmaci Gate will be opened by 9 am tomorrow if the Greek Cypriot side completes its preparatory work too.

'The plan is to open the Gate tomorrow morning. And this will be the case if both sides complete their works of construction' he said.

Mr. Bulutoglulari and the Mayor of South Lefkosa Eleni Mavrou have held a meeting at the buffer zone to discuss the final details for crossings at the Lokmaci Gate.

03.04.08

The historic Lokmaci Gate which has been the symbol of division for 45 years has finally been opened for crossings with great hopes.

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have witnessed the opening of Lokmaci together with the hopes for peace and reunification.

A special ceremony was held at Lokmaci this morning which was marked by high participation of people and peaceful slogans.

The opening of the Lokmaci Gate for crossings is seen as the overthrowing of a symbol of division in Cyprus which raised hopes towards lasting peace on the island.

Peaceful speeches were delivered during the opening ceremony which all highlighted the expectation that the opening of Lokmaci will help the solution of the Cyprus problem gain a momentum.

The first speech was delivered by the Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias'

aide Yorgos Yakovu who expressed his willingness for the elimination of all barricades in Cyprus.

Referring to the establishment of working groups and technical committees following the start of negotiations between the two leaders of the island, Mr Yakovu said they will be doing their best to reach an agreement for the future of Cyprus as soon as possible.

'It is not an easy road and this difficult road has led to this happy occasion. I hope we will overcome all problems through negotiations aimed at uniting the island and reaching peace' Mr Yakovu added.

Another speech was delivered by the aide of President Mehmet Ali Talat- Ozdil Nami who referred to the opening as 'historic'.

'We are witnessing the overthrow of one of the obstacles in the way towards reunification of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots can solve the problems by building mutual trust through good will' he said.

Mr Nami stated that a new era has been opened and that this is the continuation of positive moves that have been taking place in Cyprus recently.

The Turkish Cypriot aide said the opening of the crossing point at Lokmaci indicates that the two sides in Cyprus are able to overcome fear and arguments. He went on saying that the opening of Lokmaci marks a new era in Cyprus with a new understanding and that this must be put into good use.

'This is an important day not only for Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots but also for the whole world who has been watching us' Mr Nami added.

For his part, the Mayor of Lefkosa Turkish Municipality Cemal Bulutoglulari stated that with the opening of Lokmaci the capital Lefkosa has been reunified.

Mr Bulutoglulari thanked all those who participated in the preparatory works.

Later, the Mayor of South Lefkosa Eleni Mavrou said the Lokmaci barricade has been the symbol of long decades of hate.

She stressed that the opening of Lokmaci generates the hope that 'something' can happen in Cyprus and wished that it will give inspiration to peaceful efforts.

'Bullet holes around us show us that there is still a long way to go for a solution and the agreement reached between Talat and Christofias is a response to our expectations' Mavrou said, finalizing her speech in the Turkish language by saying 'Peace in Cyprus, Insallah!'.

The UNFICYP Chief of Mission Elizabeth Spehar in her speech pointed to the long process in the way towards a settlement in Cyprus but stressed that the opening of Lokmaci is a good sign which signifies what can be done for a

solution.

A statement was also read out by an EU official on behalf of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn which said Mr Rehn is delighted that the two sides have moved ahead with the decision to open Lokmaci.

Underlining the symbolic value of the opening, Mr Rehn stated that the opening shows that the two sides are ready to put aside the difficulties of the past and work together for a comprehensive settlement and reunification in Cyprus under the aegis of the United Nations.

He added that the EU Commission will fully support initiatives aimed at realizing this goal.

In the meantime, the Citizens' Initiative for the Opening of Lokmaci has organized a feast in the Lokmaci area for this evening to celebrate the opening.

04.04.2008

The crossings at Lokmaci-Ledra Border Gate are continuing between the two sides in Cyprus despite a brief closure of the gate late on Thursday.

The gate - which was opened to crossings yesterday morning – was closed by the Greek Cypriot Side at around 08.30 with a claim that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.

The crossing was reopened around three hours later after mediation by UN officials.

President Mehmet Ali Talat has said that Thursday's developments at Lokmaci were an isolated incident that should not be exaggerated.

Speaking at Ercan Airport on his return from Istanbul, President Talat reminded that the Turkish Cypriot Side has been working since 2005 for the opening of the gate.

The President reminded that there were similar attempts during the era of the former Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos and added that it's very natural to see the reflections of old attempts today.

Mr Talat also noted that there is no need to open a debate on who is responsible for Thursday's incident as the problem at the gate was solved.

Expressing the hope that the incident would not affect the new process started in Cyprus, he said 'it was an isolated incident'. There was an attempt to stage a protest, our police intervened in line with the law'.

Speaking soon after the closure of the gate, Prime Minister Ferdi Sabit Soyer rejected Greek Cypriot Side's claims that Turkish Cypriot police violated the buffer zone.

Calling the closure of the gate as unacceptable, he said the Turkish Cypriot Side has been acting in line with the agreement reached on the issue and will continue to do so.

Another comment on the issue came from deputy-Prime Minister – Foreign Minister Turgay Avci who said 'if they have any problem, we are ready to discuss but our borders are not negotiable'.

For his part, Minister of Interior Ozkan Murat said that a group of Greek Cypriots – carrying placards and chanting slogans – crossed the Greek Cypriot barricade and entered into the north part of the Cikkos area, which is under the control of the TRNC.

He explained that Turkish Cypriot police intervened in the protest and took the placards from protestors to prevent the disruption of crossings.

'Turkish Cypriot police has the right to intervene the situation in this area in line with the agreement reached with the United Nations' he noted.

President Mehmet Ali Talat and Greek Cypriot Leader Dimitris Christofias agreed on the 21st of March to open the gate which remained closed for 45 years.

Appendix 9 B: KFM

KFM April 1 Erçakıca

Turkish Original

Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılması amacıyla Lefkoşa Türk ve Rum Belediyelerinin başlattığı bakım-onarım çalışmaları tüm hızıyla sürerken, Lokmacı Kapısı'ndan geçişlerin en geç Perşembe günü başlayabileceği bildirildi.

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, Lokmacı Kapısı'ndan yarın, en geç Perşembe günü geçişlerin başlayabileceğini söyledi. Lefkoşa Türk Belediyesi'nin Türk tarafı adına sürdürdüğü çalışmaların bugün tamamlanmasının beklendiğini kaydeden Erçakıca, İçişleri Bakanlığı'nın da yarından itibaren Muhaceret ve Gümrük memurlarını Lokmacı Kapısı'nda hazır bulunduracağını belirtti. Erçakıca bugün düzenlediği haftalık brifingde gazetecilerin sorusu üzerine, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılması girişimleriyle ilgili gelişmeleri anlattı.

Erçakıca, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın "Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılması çözüm gibi algılanmamalı" sözlerinin hatırlatılması üzerine, "Haklı bir şeye değindi. Biz de öyle algılamıyoruz. Kıbrıs Rum tarafında da benzer görüş ve eleştiriler var" dedi.

Erçakıca, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasının sembolik bir değeri olmadığını söylemenin de mümkün olmadığını belirterek, 1963'de "barikat" olarak ortaya çıkan bir noktanın bugün geçişe dönüşmesinin özel bir gelişme olduğunu kaydetti.

Rum Yönetimi'nin Mali Yardım Tüzüğü'nün uygulanmasını engellemek için Avrupa Komisyonu aleyhine açtığı davalara da değinen Erçakıca, Rum tarafının, Kıbrıs Türk halkına uygulanan izolasyonları kaldırmak için değil ağırlaştırmak için çalıştığını söyledi. Erçakıca, Kıbrıs'ta kapsamlı çözüm arayışları devam ederken, iki halkın ilişkilerini iyileştirmek ve Kıbrıs Türk halkının çözüm sürecine bağlılığını devam ettirmek için izolasyonların kaldırılması için de çalışmak gerektiğini söyledi. Avrupa Komisyonu aleyhine bugüne kadar 8 dava açıldığına, bu davaların 2'sinin Rum Yönetimi Başkanı Dimitris Hristofyas dönemine ait olduğuna işaret eden Erçakıca, "Hristofyas'ın göreve yeni geldiği günlerde bu davaları 'kucağında bulduğu' yorumunu yapmış ve ondan daha farklı bir tavır görmeyi ummuştuk. Rum tarafının bu tutumunda ısrar etmesi tarafımızdan hayret ve üzüntüyle karşılanmıştır" dedi.

Rum tarafının açtığı davaların Hristofyas seçildikten sonra da devam etmesinin Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda milletvekilleri tarafından şaşkınlıkla karşılandığını da söyleyen Erçakıca, "Avrupa Parlamentosu milletvekillerinin bu konudaki şaşkınlıklarını en kısa zamanda atlatarak, sözkonusu davaların mahkeme tarafından reddedilmesi doğrultusunda girişimlerde bulunmalarını umuyoruz" dedi. Rum kilisesinin Brüksel'de temsilcilik açma girişimlerinin hatırlatılması üzerine de Erçakıca, "Rum kilisesinin Başpiskopos Hrisostomos döneminde olabildiğince politikleştiğini" söyledi. Erçakıca, siyasal bir sorun olan Kıbrıs sorununun dinsel bir sorun haline getirilmeye çalışılmasının tehlikeli bir gidişat olduğuna da vurgu yaptı.

Translation

The Turkish and Greek Nicosia Municipalities reported that work has started on both sides of the Lokmacı gate. The Lokmacı gate crossing will open on Thursday at the latest.

The Presidential spokesman Hasan Erçakıca said tomorrow, or at the latest Thursday, they will open Lokmacı gate. The Turkish Nicosia Municipality will finish work on the Turkish side today, Internal Affairs department specified that after tomorrow Immigration and Customs workers will be ready at Lokmacı gate. Erçakıca explained about the developments of the opening of Lokmacı Gate to the reporters in a weekly briefing which was held today.

Erçakıca said that the Turkish National Chief of Staff General Yaşar Büyükanit said "Its not to be considered as a solution by opening the Lokmacı gate." He reminded that, "This is truly said. We perceive the situation similarly. The Greek Cypriot side Thinks the same."

Erçakıca noted that the Lokmacı opening is of special value because in 1963 there was a "barricade" and now today there is a crossing gate. It is an important development.

Erçakıca dealt with the issue of the Greek Administration who were using the European Commission financial aid regulation as an obstruction. The Greeks want to slow down the removal on the continuing isolation of the Turkish Cypriot public. Erçakıca said that in searching for a comprehensive solution in Cyprus, both the public relations improvements and the Turkish Cypriot public are connected to the solution process to remove the isolations. Up to now, the European Commission has had eight disadvantageous laws and two of them

have begun during the time of the new Head of the Greek Administration Dimitri Hristofyas. Erçakıca commented, "By the time Hristofyas started his job, it is claimed that the laws were in his lap, we were expecting some different behavior from him. The insistence by the Greek side for this approach surprised and made us sad".

The parliamentarians of the European Parliament were surprised because of the reopening of the case by the Greek Cypriots was still continuing after Hristofyas was elected. Erçakıca said " We are hoping to eliminate the surprise of the parliamentarians of the European Parliament in a least time period about the interference in accordance with the committee's decision".

The Greek church tried to open an association in Brussels and Erçakıca said that, "Hrisostomos term as head of the Greek church, has become as political as possible". Erçakıca said that Cyprus problem is a political problem and they want to make it a religious problem which is a very dangerous path.

4 April Ban Ki Moon

Turkish Original

Sayın seyirciler Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasından dolayı Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-Mun da memnuniyet duyduğu belirtildi.

Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki-mun, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasını memnuniyetle karşıladığı bildirildi. Birleşmiş Milletler Sözcü Yardımcısı Marie Okabe tarafından yapılan açıklamada, Ban'ın, 1963 yılından beri Lokmacı Kapısı'nın kapalı olmasının, Ada'daki bölünmeyi temsil ettiğini ve 40 yıldan fazla bir süre sonra kapının bugün açılmasının Ada'da yeni ve umut verici bir ortamın simgesi olduğunu vurguladığını söyledi. Açıklamada, "Birleşmiş Milletler'in, Kıbrıslılar'ın Ada'nın birleşmesi amacıyla müzakerelere yeniden başlama yolundaki zorlu sürece yaklaştıkları bir dönemde onlara yardım etmeye kararlı olduğu" vurgulandı.

Translation

Dear viewers, the United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki Moon has expressed satisfaction at the opening of the Lokmacı gate.

The United Nations General Secretary Ban Ki Moon has expressed satisfaction at the opening of the Lokmacı gate. The United Nations deputy spokesman Marie Okabe said that Moon remarked that since 1963 Lokmacı gate was closed.

This showed the division of the island for more than 40 years . The opening of the gate today gives the island new hope, she said.

She remarked, "The United Nations, Cypriots' and the island's cooperation is the aim to start compromise. Compromise is very difficult and we want to help resolutely," she stressed.

April 4 Lokmacı Turgay Avcı

Turkish Original

Lokmacı Kapısı'nın dün gece tek taraflı olarak kapatılması ile ilgili Başbakan Yardımcısı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Turgay Avcı'da da açıklamada bulundu. Avcı, Rumlar'ın Lokmacı Kapısı'nı tek yanlı geçişlere kapatmasıyla ilgili olarak, "Sorunları varsa tartışılır, konuşulabilir ama sınırlarımız tartışılmaz" dedi.

Başbakan Yardımcısı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Turgay Avcı, Rumlar'ın Lokmacı Kapısı'nı tek yanlı geçişlere kapatmasıyla ilgili olarak, "Sorunları varsa tartışılır, konuşulabilir ama sınırlarımız tartışılmaz" dedi. Turgay Avcı, AA muhabirinin, Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi Sözcüsü Stefanos Stefanu'nun, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın kapatılmasına gerekçe olarak, "Kıbrıs Türk polisinin, kapının olduğu caddenin bir bölümünde "yasadışı" olarak devriye gezmesini" gösterdiğini hatırlatması üzerine, "Onların iddiasına göre konuştukları bölge, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti sınırları içindedir" dedi. Rumlar'ın, saat 21.00 itibariyle geçişleri tek yanlı durduğunu kaydeden Avcı, "Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti sınırları içindeki hiçbir yer sorgulanamaz ve tartışılmaz. Bir konu varsa tartışılabilir ama Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti sınırları içindeki hiçbir bölge hiçbir sınır sorgulanamaz, buna da izin vermeyiz" diye konuştu.

Translation

At the Lokmacı gate, there was a problem with one way traffic being closed related Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Turgay Avcı. Avcı related that the Greeks closed the Lokmacı gate to one way traffic. He said, "If there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed," he said.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Turgay Avcı said traffic was closed by the Greeks at Lokmacı gate. "If there is a problem we discuss and speak but our borders are never discussed," he said. An Anadolu Agency reporter reported that the Greek Cypriot Administration Spokesman Stefanos

Stefanu's said that Lokmacı gate was closed because "Turkish Cypriot police 'illegally' patrolled" somewhere on the gate's road." Turgay Avcı said, "In regard to what Stefanu said on this topic, this area is within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." Avcı acknowledged at 21:00, Greeks stopped pedestrians passing. "There is no negotiations and dealings within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. If there is an issue, we deal with it but within the borders of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus we never give permission."

KFM 4 April Talat

Turkish Original

İstanbul'daki temaslarını tamamlayarak adaya dönen Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat. Ercan Havaalanı'nda gazetecilere yaptığı açıklamada, dün sabah törenlerle açtığımız Lokmacı Kapısı'nın gece saat 20.30 sıralarında Rum tarafınca tek taraflı olarak kapatılması ile ilgili açıklamada bulundu. Talat, yaşanan gelişmeleri, "eski engellemelerin bugüne yansıması" olarak niteledi. Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat, Rumlar'ın Lokmacı Kapısı'nı tek yanlı geçişlere kapatmasının Kıbrıs Türk tarafından kaynaklanan bir sıkıntı olmadığına işaret ederek, Rum tarafının eski engellemelerinin bugüne yansımaları biçiminde tepkiler ortaya koyduğunu söyledi. İstanbul'daki temaslarını tamamlamasının ardından adaya dönen Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat, Ercan Havaalanı'nda gazetecilere Lokmacı Kapısı'nda yaşanan gelişmelerle ilgili açıklamada bulundu. Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat, Lokmacı Kapısı'nda dün gece yaşananlarla ilgili, "Bizden kaynaklanan bir şey yok. Münferit bir olaydı. Normal karşılamanız lazım. Biz sakince işimizi yapalım" diye konuştu. İstanbul temasları ile ilgili de bilgi veren Talat, İstanbul'da, Kıbrıslı Türklere yönelik izolasyonların kaldırılabilmesi için çok ciddi çalışmalar yapan Türk Musevi Cemaati yöneticileriyle bir araya geldiğini söyledi. TUSİAD istişare ve yönetim kuruluyla yemekte bir araya geldiğini de belirten Talat, Kıbrıs sorununun son durumunu, Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği sürecini ve Kıbrıs'ta başlayan yeni süreci konuştuklarını kaydetti. TUSİAD'dan sürekli olarak Kıbrıs sorununun çözümü ve Kıbrıslı Türklere uygulanan izolasyonların kaldırılması konusundaki çalışmalarını devam ettirmesini istediklerini ve olumlu yanıt aldıklarını belirten Talat, İstanbul'da bulunduğu süre içinde Türkiye medyasının dış haberler editörleriyle de bir araya geldiğini kaydetti.

Translation

President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and returned back to the island, from Ercan airport, he commented to reporters yesterday morning, "We opened the Lokmacı gate with a ceremony and last night at 20:30 Greeks closed the gates one way." Talat said, this development, "its an old hinderance [engelleme] mirrored today."

President Mehmet Ali Talat said Greeks closed the Lokmacı gate one way. Its not happened on the Turkish Cypriot side, the Greek side is mirroring the old barriers. President Mehmet Ali Talat finished his meetings in Istanbul and returned back to the island. From Ercan airport, he told reporters about developments at Lokmacı gate. President Mehmet Ali Talat said last night, "We had a problem at Lokmacı gate and it's not from us". Its a possible fact. Its a normal occurence. We did our work in a relaxed way he said. Talat gave information about his meetings in Istanbul. He said that in Istanbul, the Turkish Jewish Association are working hard to help end the Turkish Cypriots isolation. Talat met TUSİAD's representatives and directing committee for a meal. Talat discussed, the latest status of the Cyprus problem, Turkey's European Union process and the new process started in Cyprus. Talat wants TUSİAD to continue working on the topics solving the Cyprus problem, and the ending of the Turkish Cypriot isolation. They gave him positive answers. When Talat was in Istanbul, he met with Turkish media editors.

Appendix 9 C: Radyo T

2 April Lokmacı Denктаş

Turkish Original

Cumhurbaşkanı Rauf Denктаş, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasının niye bu denli önemsendiğini anlayamadığını söyledi. Trabzon'a giden Denктаş, havalimanında, gazetecilerin gündeme ilişkin sorularını yanıtladı.

Lefkoşa'daki Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasına ilişkin soru üzerine Denктаş, KKTC ile Kıbrıs Rum kesimi arasındaki Lokmacı Kapısı'nın yaya geçişine açılmasının, "çok küçük bir teferruat" olduğunu belirterek, "Niye bu kadar önemsendi ben anlamıyorum. Bir çok kapı var açılmış. Bunlar bizim şartlarımıza göre açılır. Orada gümrük muamelesi var. Bayrağımız, askerimiz ve polisimiz var. Aynı şartlarda açtık. Rumlar, "asker oradaysa gelmeyiz, açmayız" demişlerdi. Ama biz gerilemedik. Şatlarımızı kabul etmişlerdir ki açıldı. Ama bu çok büyük bir olaymış gibi büyütülüyor" diye konuştu. Kapının açılmasının, görüşme sürecine olumlu etki yapacak bir olay gibi algılandığını ifade eden Denктаş, şunları kaydetti: "Berlin Duvarı, son Berlin Duvarı yıkıldı gibi edebiyatlar yapılıyor. Berlin Duvarı bir milleti ikiye bölmüş bir duvardı. Burada bir millet, diğer milleti yok etmek için harekete geçtiğinde, Allah razı olsun ana vatanımızın askeri sayesinde çizilmiş bir huduttan ibarettir. Dolayısıyla bunu iyi anlaması lazım yabancıların. Bu duvar milleti ayıran bir duvar değildir, soy kırımını önleyen barış duvarıdır. "Denктаş, 2002 yılında tüm kapıları açmak için harekete geçen tarafın kendileri olduğunu dile getirerek, "Rumlara 'sakın gitmeyin' diye feryat ettiler, ama kimse bunu dinlemedi, herkes geldi. Dolayısıyla bunu büyütmeylem. Esas olan görüşmelerdir. Görüşmeler hangi şartlarda başlayacak, budur esas olan. Bu konuda endişelerimiz var. Ama uyanık bir teyakkuz içerisinde izlemekteyiz" dedi. Denктаş, önceki günlerde gerçekleşen Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın KKTC'yi ziyareti ile ilgili soru üzerine ise şunları söyledi: "Allah razı olsun Genelkurmayımız'dan. Gelmiştir, büyük bir maneviyat getirmiştir. Büyük bir güç kaynağı olmuştur. Güven vermiştir halkımıza. Çünkü bu güven yavaş yavaş erozyona uğramaktaydı. Çünkü ne olacağı bilinmeyen bir süreç devam etmekteydi. Kimse bize "KKTC vardır ve var olacaktır, asker barışa kadar vardır ve barıştan sonra da anlaşacağımız sayıda var olmaya devam edecektir. Garantör Türkiye'nin askeri olarak" dememiştir. Bunu bize

söylemiştir,altını çizmiştir.Bize güç ve maneviyat vermiştir.Hakikaten halkımız canlanmış ve kendine güven gelmiştir.”

Translation

President Rauf Denктаş said that Lokmacı gate opened but he doesn't understand why it is important. Denктаş went to Trabzon and answered reporters' questions at the airport.

Answering a question about the Lokmacı opening, Denктаş said that the pedestrian crossing between TRNC and the Greek Cypriot side, "It's a very small detail, but I can't understand the importance because there are many gates opened. That gate is open on our conditions. There are Customs. Our flag, our soldiers and our police are there. We opened it under the same conditions as before. The Greeks used to say, "If there are soldiers, we won't open." But we didn't step back. They agreed to our conditions so it is opened. But they have made it into a big event. Because of the gate opening, they think this has affected negotiation timing." And Denктаş said, "They make a story like the Berlin wall was destroyed. The Berlin wall divided a nation into two districts. Here, one nation tried to destroy the other nation but God bless our motherland's soldiers because the soldiers drew a border. At the gate, foreigners understand it well. This wall doesn't divide a nation, it prevents genocide, this wall is a peace wall."

Denктаş said, "In the year 2002 we made the move to open a gate. The Greeks didn't agree. They pleaded but nobody listened to this. Everybody agreed. So, its not a big deal. Conditions are important. How the conditions begin is important. We are afraid of this topic. But we are awake and alert in our vigilance."

Yesterday, the Turkish National Chief of Staff General Yaşar Buyukanit came to TRNC. He was asked what he thought about visit? He said," God bless the General. Its a big honour that he came. He's a big boast. He gives trust to our people because that trust can slowly decrease because we forget what happened. Nobody can say the TRNC exists or doesn't. Soldiers are here; when peace comes and after an agreement is reached. We will make an agreement as to how many soldiers will remain. Turkish soldiers are our guarantors. Turkey told us and underlined this. They give us power and moral support. Truly our nation is alive and confident."

4 April Lokmacı

Turkish Original

RUM Yönetimi'nin, karşılıklı yaya geçişine açılan Lefkoşa'daki Lokmacı Kapısı'nı, önce tek yanlı olarak geçişlere kapatması, 3 saat sonra da yeniden açmasının. "Beklenen bir olay" olduğu ve Rumlar'ın, lokmacıda "taviz verdik" duygusunda oldukları bildirildi. Konuyla ilgili olarak Anadolu Ajansı muhabirinin görüşüne başvurduğu KKTC'den bir yetkili. Rumlar'ın hedefi, Türkeler'e ait yerin kontrolünün BM nin kontrolüne vermektir. "Bütün manevranın bunun üzerine" olduğuna vurgu yapan yetkili, "Bu olamdığı taktirde, açsalar bile öbür gün yine kapatacaklar. Bunu sağlayamadıkları sürüce de bu böyle devam edecek" dedi. Rumlar'ın böyle bir şey yapmasının beklediğine, bölgedeki sınır hattı ve kapının işletilmesi konusunda Rumlar'ın "taviz verdik" duygusuna kapıldığına işaret eden yetkili Rumları'nın Ermu Caddesi'nden bir devriye aracının geçişini de bahane ederek kapıyı kapatabileceği bildirdi. Rumlar'ın "polis sınırı ihlal etti" diye asılsız bir gerekçe yarattığını, sonra da kapının açıldığı kaydeden yetkili , Rumlar'ın amacının, 1974'teki KKTC sınırınının 1963 sınırına çekilmesi olduğunu belirterek, "Bunu sağlayamadıkları için taviz verdik duygusundalar" diye konuştu.

Translation

The Greek administration said the pedestrian crossing at Lokmacı gate in Lefkoşa had one way traffic for three hours before opening again. "Its to be expected" and the Greeks think they compromised by opening the gate.

Related with this topic, an Anadola reporter talked with a TRNC authority: Greeks think "Its to be expected".

Greeks have an aim to give the Turkish area to UN control. He thought that "all manouvres on it" are part of a game and "if it is not given to UN control, they won't open. But the day before they closed it. It will happen like that."

He said he was waiting for the Greeks to do this in this border line area and the Greeks think they gave a compromise. The Greeks will close the gate again if they see a patrol car near the border. The Greeks said the police crossed the border and after that they opened the gate. The Greeks' aim is to replace the 1974 TRNC border with the 1963 border and "they can't do this, so they think they gave a compromise."

4 April Lokmacı

Turkish Original

Sayın Seyirciler dün sabah törenle açılan Lokmacı Kapısı'nda dün akşam yaşanan kısa süreli krizin, KKTC'nin kontrolündeki bölgeyi ihlal eden Rum göstericilerin pankartlı eyleminden kaynaklandığı öğrenildi.

İçişleri Bakanı Özkan Murat'tan alınan bilgiye göre, saat 20:15 civarında 20 civarında Rum , ellerinde pankartlarla ve sloganlar atarak Rum barikatını geçerek KKTC'nin kontrolündeki Cikkos'un Kuzey tarafına geçtiler. KKTC polisinin, güvenli geçişin engellememesi için göstericilere müdahale ettiğini ve ellerindeki pankartları aldığını söyleyen Murat, 'KKTC polisi, BM ile varılan mutakat uyarınca bu bölgede müdahale etme yetkisine sahiptir' dedi Murat, 'Sorun girişimler sonucu aşılmış durumda. Saat 23:00 itibarıyla herhangi bir sorun kalmadı. Biz kapının açılması konusunda BM ile varılan mutabakata bağlıyız ve bu mutabakata uygun harekete diyoruz' dedi.

Translation

Dear listeners, yesterday morning Lokmacı gates opened and last night we had a little crisis, the TRNC's controlled area was illegally breached by Greek protestors.

Internal Affairs Minister Özkan Murat reported this to reporters at 20:15. Nearly 20 Greeks shouting slogans and carrying protest signs passed the Greek barricades and came to the TRNC's controlled area north of Cikkos. TRNC police intervened, blocking their path and taking their protest signs while pedestrians continued to pass. Murat said, "TRNC police have permission to intervene in this area because they have an agreement with the UN." Murat said, "the problem was solved according to agreements. At 23:00 the problem was solved. We have an agreement with the UN and we use the agreement to open the gate and we act according to the agreement."

April 5 De Soto

Turkish Original

BM eski genel sekreteri'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi olarak görev yapan Alvaro De Soto, international Herald Tribune isimli gazetede yayımlanan makalesinde "lokmacı kapısının açılması Kıbrıs sorununu bitirmez' konusuna değindi.

BM eski genel sekreteri'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi olarak görev yapan Alvaro De Soto, Kıbrıs sorununun çözümü konusunda iyimser olmanın çok zor olduğunu ve

kıbrıs konusunda kapının açılmasının çok önemli olmadığını belirtti. De Soto “ Kıbrıs'ta ne değişti ki iyimser olmamız gereksin?” diye sordu.

Rum gazetesi Fileleftheros; “De Soto Bir Yanıltıcı Başlangıç Daha mı Diye Soruyor-Anahtar Tutanlar, Korkular ve Baskılar” başlıklı haberinde, BM eski Genel Sekreteri'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi olarak 1999'dan 2004'e kadar Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili müzakereleri büyüten Alvaro De Soto'nun “International Herald Tribune” isimli gazetede yayınlanan “ Another False Down?” başlıklı makalesine yer verdi. Kıbrıs sorununun bir kilit olduğunu ve açılması için Kıbrıslı Türklerin, Rumların, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın elinde bulunan 4 anahtara ihtiyaç olduğu görüşünü öne çıkaran De Soto'nun bu makalesiyle bir kez daha “vurduğu” yorumunu yapan gazete, Kıbrıs sorununun çözüm inisiyatiflerine yer verilen makalenin bazı bölümlerini okurlarına şöyle aktardı:

“Ada'nın bölünmüşlüğü'nün kaldırılmasına yönelik inisiyatifler tarihi bir yanıltıcı başlangıçlar silsilesi olarak nitelendirilebilir.

Her zaman, liderlerin biri veya diğeri (başlatılan) çabaya kuşkucu yaklaşır ve güçlü bir şekilde “hayır” der. Arkasından, ya Ankara'dan veya Atina'dan destek gelir, ancak geçen hafta Cuma yeni seçilmiş Kıbrıslı Rum lider Dimitris Hristofyas ve Kıbrıslı Türk “dengi” Talat yeni bir çabada görüştüler. Lokmacı kapısını açtılar. Neden iyimser olmamız gerek ki?

Kıbrıs sorunu da; açılması için Kıbrıslı Rumların, Kıbrıslı Türklerin, Yunanistan'ın ve Türkiye'nin elindeki dört anahtara ihtiyaç olan bir kilit olarak nitelendirebilecek bir hedef var.

Liderleri; görüşmelerinin arkasından okunan ortak açıklamalarında, müzakerelerin üzerinde gerçekleştirileceği zeminle ilgili olası dikenli sorulara atıfta bulunmaktan ustaca kaçınıldı. İki tarafın bu inisiyatifi elbette bir avantajdır. Dışardan dayatıldığı duygusu 2004 çabasına zarar vermişti.

Translation

The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De Soto wrote about the Cyprus problem in light of the opening of Lokmaci Gate in the Herald Tribune . The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De Soto wrote that it is very difficult to solve the Cyprus problem, involving more than the opening of a gate. De Soto asked, “ in Cyprus what has changed to make a solution easy?”

The Greek newspaper Fileleftheros quoting the title of the article wrote, “De Soto stated in the title, ‘This is a wrong start again – the key is fear and pressure’.”

The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative negotiated the Cyprus problem from 1999 to 2004. Alvaro De Soto’s article in the International Herald Tribune is entitled, “Another false dawn?” . It says the Cyprus problem is a critical door and if it is opened, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey and Greece have the four keys and the Cyprus problem needs those four keys. The newspaper article used many parts of the original from the Herald:

“The division of the island has seen many initiatives, but this is a fake start of its history. All the time, one or the other of the leaders thinks twice when they negotiate and they strongly say ‘no’. After that, support from Ankara or Athens comes. Last Friday, there was a new Greek Cypriot leader Dimitri Hristofyas and there is Turkish Cypriot Talat who are “similar” in their new negotiations. There was also the opening of Lokmaci. Why are we thinking positive?

The Cyprus problem is about Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Greece and Turkey who have the four keys and we need those four keys. Our aim is the keys.

After the negotiations the leaders and partners read the account, but nobody asks difficult questions about the negotiations. Both sides have the initiative which is an advantage. From the outside, sentiments are imposed as was the case in 2004.”

Appendix Ten

The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De Soto

Radyo T names De Soto six times, “the UN” four times, and three times vaguely as “everybody”, “nobody” and “we”. This is seven impersonal and six personal representations. Many impersonal namings on *Radyo T* background UN functions. For example, “everybody” and “nobody” are in the following Denktaş reported speech:

“In the year 2002 we made the move to open a gate. The Greeks didn’t agree. They pleaded but nobody listened to them. Everybody agreed.”

It is unclear who “everybody” and “nobody” are. The UN are most definitely part of this group, along with other international players such as Turkey and possibly the EU. These references background the UN, yet represent the UN agreeing with the UBP.

De Soto is the only actor personally represented, twice formally with functional honorifics, once functionally as “The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative”, twice formally with no honorifics as “De Soto” and once semi-formally as “Alvaro De Soto”. Three functional namings highlights his role as an expert on Cyprus from the UN. Highlighting his importance legitimates his points of view which are represented as agreeing with UBP policies, thereby legitimising those policies.

Radyo T activates the UN in one story. Five times De Soto is activated, in two event processes of “wrote”, two verbal processes of “asked” and “negotiated” and one state process in, “De Soto’s article in the International Herald Tribune is entitled, “Another false dawn?” So De Soto does things in line with UBP policies (discussed below).

De Soto demonstrates his scepticism towards peace initiatives in his reported speech. An excerpt reads:

“The ex-UN General Secretary and Cyprus Special Representative Alvaro De Soto wrote that it is very difficult to solve the Cyprus problem, involving more than the opening of a gate. De Soto asked, “ in Cyprus what has changed to make a solution easy?”

Here, De Soto utterances are multi-layered, as discussed earlier. However, he is represented as describing the “Cyprus problem” in a state process as “very difficult”. In a rhetorical question, the underlining meaning is nothing has changed “to make a solution easy”. Opening Lokmacı is not the answer. The rest of the article continues as such. For example, De Soto is activated in the verbal process, “De Soto stated in the title, ‘This is a wrong start again – the key is fear and pressure’”. Again, De Soto “stated” scepticism towards peace initiatives, as does UBP.

Appendix Eleven (chapter six)

Appendix 11 A: Relations stories on 25.09.07

BRTI

Deputy Prime Minister - Foreign Minister Turgay Avci has said that it is high time the international community removes the unjust international isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people.

He called on the Italian government to support the Turkish Cypriot Side's efforts to that end.

Foreign Minister Turgay Avci who is in Italy as guest of the Italian Radical Party addressed the Italian Parliament this afternoon.

Speaking to an audience of deputies, the Foreign Minister said that the Greek Cypriot Administration which rejected the Annan Plan during the 2004 referendum was not prepared to share political power with the Turkish Cypriot people.

He said that the International community should recognize the fact that the Turkish Cypriot people expressed their free will and fulfilled their obligation towards finding a comprehensive settlement and remove the isolations imposed on them.

Touching upon the EU financial assistance regulation, Avci complained that many changes had been introduced to the regulation before it was implemented, changes that aimed to divert the regulation's true purpose.

As for the stalled EU Direct Trade Regulation, Mr. Avci explained how the implementation of the regulation which aimed to allow direct trade between North Cyprus and EU countries as well as to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people was being prevented within the EU by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Mr. Avci called on the current EU Term President Portugal to put into effect the regulation without further delay and to allow Turkish Cypriots to trade with EU member countries through their own ports.

Referring to the Turkish Cypriot Side's ongoing efforts towards finding a solution to the Cyprus Problem, the TRNC Foreign Minister said that Turkish Cypriots were with the opinion that a comprehensive solution will not be found to the Cyprus Problem in the near future.

He said that the only acceptable solution for the Greek Cypriot Side was for the assimilation of the Turkish Cypriot people into a minority within a Greek Cypriot State.

Mr. Avci also pointed out that the 8th July process had provided the Greek Cypriot Side an excellent opportunity to free itself of international pressure and to delay a political settlement on the island.

Underlining the importance of strengthening the North Cyprus economy whilst working for the removal of the international isolation at the same time, Mr. Avci briefed the Italian parliamentarians on the recent economic developments that have taken place in the TRNC.

KFM

Turkish original

Başbakan Yardımcısı ve Dışişleri Bakanı Turgay Avcı, Kıbrıslı Türklerin kapsamlı bir çözümün yakın bir gelecekte gerçekleşmeyeceği kanaatinde olduğunu söyledi. Avcı, Kıbrıs Rum tarafı için kabul edilebilir bir çözümün ancak "Kıbrıslı Türklerin Kıbrıs Rum devleti içerisine asimilasyonu" olabileceği görüşünde olduğuna da işaret etti. İtalya'da temaslarda bulunan Turgay Avcı, bugün İtalya Cumhuriyeti Parlamentosu'nda bir konuşma yaptı. Dışişleri Bakanı Turgay Avcı, Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili müzakere çabaları hakkında bilgi verdiği konuşmasında, 24 Nisan 2004 referandumu sonrasında yeni bir dönemece giren Kıbrıs sorununda yeni bir durum ortaya çıktığını söyledi. Avcı, adada iki eşit halkın bulunduğu ve hiçbirinin bir diğerini temsil edemeyeceği gerçeğini teyit eden eş zamanlı ayrı referandumlarda güçlü bir "hayır" diyen Rum tarafının, Türk tarafıyla güç paylaşımına girişmeye hazır olmadığını anlaşıldığını kaydetti. Dışişleri Bakanı Turgay Avcı, Kıbrıslı Türklerin kapsamlı bir çözümünün yakın bir gelecekte gerçekleşmeyeceği kanaatinde olduğunu da söyledi. Çözumsuzlüğün bir istikrarsızlık riski taşıdığını kaydeden Avcı, Kıbrıslı Türkler'in bu nedenle görüşmelerde yapıcı bir tutum izlediğini ve çözümün sağlanabilmesi için birçok açılımlar ve yeni insiyatifler yaptığını kaydetti. Avcı, Kıbrıs Rum tarafının 8 Temmuz sürecini hem kendilerine uygulanan baskılardan kurtulmak, hem de geciktirme taktikleri uygulayarak kösteklemek için mükemmel bir fırsat olarak değerlendirdiklerini söyledi. Avcı, "süreci açık tutmaktaki amaçları Türkiye'nin AB yeni sürecinde tavizler elde ederek üyeliğini engellemek, dolayısıyla iyice

yerleşmiş BM parametrelerini ve çözüme yönelik çalışmaları tasfiye etmektir” dedi.

Translation

Deputy prime minister foreign minister Turgay Avcı said that it was the Turkish Cypriot people’s general perception that a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus Problem will not take place any time soon. Avcı said that the only settlement acceptable for the Greek Cypriot side was one which involved assimilation of Turkish Cypriots into a minority within a Greek Cypriot state. Holding contacts in Italy, Turgay Avcı delivered the speech at the Italian parliament. Briefing the Italian Parliamentarians on the Cyprus Issue and the latest efforts to revitalise the negotiations process, Avcı said that the Cyprus Problem had entered a new phase following the 2004 referendum turning point. Stating that there are two equal peoples on the island which cannot represent the other, Avcı said that the Greek Cypriot side had said a resounding no to the Annan plan which proved it was not ready to share political power with Turkish Cyprus.

Explaining that the non-solution on the island carried the risk of creating instability, Avcı said that for this reason the Turkish Cypriot side was adopting a constructive stance on the Cyprus Issue as well as introducing new initiatives. Avcı said that the Greek Cypriot side saw the 8 July process as an excellent opportunity to ease international pressure imposed on them and to introduce new delaying tactics on finding a settlement.

“By keeping the process going, they aim to prevent Turkey’s EU membership by gaining concessions plus getting rid of established UN parameters and sidelining to find a solution “ added Avcı.

Radyo T

Turkish Original

Ulusal Birlik Partisi Lefkoşa Milletvekili Şerife Ünverdi, Cumhuriyet Meclisi Başkanı Fatma Ekenoğlu’nun hala daha sürdüğünü iddia ettiği Kıbrıs konusundaki yanlış tutumunu hayret ve üzüntüyle izlediklerini ifade ederek, “Sayın Ekenoğlu bir yandan Rum tarafını suçlarken diğer yandan hala Kıbrıs Türk halkını boş vaatler ve beklentilerle oyalamaya çalışıyor” görüşünü savundu.

UBP Lefkoşa milletvekili Şerife Ünverdi, Ekenoğlu’nun Kıbrıs konusunda ileri sürdüklerinin doğru olmadığını da iddia ederek, “Kıbrıs Türk Halkını hala daha

dar siyasi çıkarlar ve koltuk için ' Rumlarla eşitlik temelinde bir anlaşma yapılabilir' diye aldatmanın kimseye bir fayda sağlamayacağını" belirtti. Ünverdi, Ekenoğlu'nun "hala, geçmişe çamur atarak bir yere varılabileceğini sandığını" belirterek, " Sayın Ekenoğlu unutmamalıdır ki eğer bugün Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyet Medisi'nin Başkanı ise bunu o beğenmediği ve eleştirdiği 40 yıllık mücadeleye ve politikaya borçludur" dedi. Şerife Ünverdi, Türk tarafının Kıbrıs konusunda sadece şimdi değil hep barışçı politikalar ortaya koyduğunu, ancak Rum-Yunan ikilisinin adanın bütününe sahip çıkma niyetinden dolayı tüm barış planlarını reddettiğini vurgulayarak, Rum tarafının şimdi uzlaşmaz olmadığını CTP'nin de bu gerçeği özellikle gençlerin dikkatinden kaçırmayı başaramayacağını belirtti.

UBP'nin Türkiye'yle birlikte, Kıbrıs Türkü'nü topraksız, ekonomisiz, devletsiz bir noktadan alarak güvenli, refah içinde bir devletin vatandaşları haline getirdiğini ifade eden Ünverdi," Bugün bu ülkede ne varsa hepsinin altında UBP'nin mührü var" dedi. Ünverdi, UBP'nin "tüm iç ve dış mihraklı çirkin saldırılara rağmen" tavanı ve tabanıyla bir bütün olarak Kıbrıs Türk halkına inandığını ve KKTC devleti ile halkının dünyada hak ettiği yeri onurlu bir şekilde alması için yoluna devam edeceğini vurguladı.

Translation

Şerife Ünverdi, the Lefkoşa UBP representative member of parliament, claimed that, "Fatma Ekenoğlu, the speaker of the Republic's assembly, is accusing the Greek side, but on the other hand, she is trying to waste the Turkish Cypriot community's time on "blind promises". She also expressed that they are watching Mrs. Ekenoğlu's incorrect handling of the Cyprus issue with grave sadness.

Şerife Ünverdi, the Lefkoşa UBP representative member of parliament, claimed that some of Ekenoğlu's statements about the Cyprus issue are misleading. "Ekenoğlu is deceiving the Turkish Cypriot community by claiming there might be an equal agreement with the Greeks in order to keep her position, which demonstrates narrow political attitudes," she said and also she expressed that this situation will not contribute anything to anybody. Ünverdi claimed that Ekenoğlu is throwing "mud to the past" in order to benefit herself. She said that, "Mrs. Ekenoğlu shouldn't forget that she is the speaker of the Northern Cyprus Republic's assembly today, her position is indebted to 40 years of struggle and

politics, which she herself is criticising.” Şerife Ünverdi claimed that the Turkish side always follows peaceful political attitudes about the Cyprus issue and not only today. She also expressed that the Greeks and Greece rejected all peaceful political attitudes, with the intention of being the owner of the whole island, and she expressed that now the Greek side is agreeable, but CTP will not be successful at keeping this agreeability secret.

Before the UBP and Turkey, Turkish Cypriots had no land, no economy, no government, but now residents live in a safe and comfortable state. “Today the UBP’s stamp is apart of everything in this country,” Ünverdi said. Ünverdi stressed that all the members of UBP believe in the Turkish Cypriot community, even though there are attacks from inside and outside, and the UBP will continue its path in order to achieve a place deserved by the TRNC state in an honourable manner.

Appendix 11 B: International reactions on 26.02.08

BRTI

US-CHRISTOFIAS

The United States has congratulated Dimitris Christofias on his victory on Sunday's presidential election in South Cyprus.

The US State Department Spokesman Tom Casey said that Washington was still committed to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island.

Speaking at a press briefing, the spokesman expressed the hope that Mr Christofias will work together with the US in order to promote the reunification of Cyprus and reach a settlement.

Mr Casey reiterated that the US was still committed to a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal solution on the island which will be accepted by the majorities of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

He said the US would jointly work with the United Nations, the two sides on the island, Turkey, Greece and the European Union in order to help reach a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement.

KFM

Turkish Original

İngiltere Adalet Bakanı Jack Straw ve İşçi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve İngiltere'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan, Kıbrıs'ta çözüm açısından önemli bir noktada bulunulduğunu ve gereken desteğin de verilmesi gerektiğini vurguladı.

İngiltere'de İşçi Partisi iktidarına mensup milletvekilleri ile Türk asıllı bazı belediye meclisi üyeleri, akademisyenler, işadamları ve gazetecilerin kurucuları arasında bulunduğu Türkiye'nin İşçi Partili Dostları lobi grubu kuruluşunun birinci yıl dönümünü İngiltere Avam Kamarası'nda düzenlenen bir toplantı ile kutladı.

Adalet Bakanı Jack Straw burada yaptığı konuşmada Rum yönetiminde yapılan seçimlerin sonucunun önemine de dikkat çekerek, çözüm yolunda istekli bir yönetimin işbaşına gelmesinden duyduğu memnuniyeti dile getirdi. Straw, Adada yaşayan Türklerin çözüm yolunda yaşadıkları sıkıntılara işaret etti. straw "bizim de gerçek bir değişim isteyen bu iyi niyetli insanların arkasında olmamız ve

onlara ihtiyaç duydukları desteği vermemiz gerekir" dedi. Straw, Adada çözüme ulaşılmamasıyla Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği üyeliği önündeki önemli bir engelin de aşılmış olacağını söyledi. Straw sözlerini tamamlarken, Kıbrıs'ta adil ve eşit bir çözümü istediklerini de belirtti.

İşçi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve İngiltere'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan ise Türkiye'nin İşçi Partili Dostları grubunun kuruluşunun birinci yıl dönümünü kutluyor olmasından duyduğu memnuniyeti dile getirirken, Kıbrıs ile ilgili değerlendirmelerde bulundu. "Kıbrıs konusunda çok önemli bir noktadayız" diyen Ryan, "Ada'da çözüm konusunda ileri gitmek ve birleşmeyi sağlamak açısından önümüzde büyük bir fırsat var" dedi. Türkiye'nin bu konudaki istekliliğini vurguladığını, şimdi bu istekliliğe Rum yönetiminin de katıldığını belirten Ryan, önümüzdeki 9-10 ayın son derece önemli olduğunu, yapılacak çok şey bulunduğunu anlattı. Çözümün Türkiye'nin durumu açısından da büyük fark yaratacağını belirten Ryan, ortaya çıkan bu fırsatın büyük bir güçle desteklenmesi gerektiğini vurguladı.

Translation

The English Justice Minister and the Labour Party's Enfield Representative and Cyprus Special Representative of England Joan Ryan stressed that now is an important time in Cyprus and efforts should be given. In England, Turkey's Labour Party's political branch, which consists of Labour party members, city hall representatives of Turkish descent, academics, businessmen, and journalists, celebrated its first year with a meeting in the House in Parliament.

Jack Straw, Minister of Justice, in his speech concerning the importance of the elections in the Greek Administration, said he feels happy that an administration which is willing to find a solution took the job. Straw pointed out that Turks who live on the island are faced with some problems in regard to a solution. Straw said, "We have to stand behind these people who have good intentions in terms of real change and we need to provide the help which is needed by them." Straw said that important barriers in front of the process of Turkey's membership to the European Union will be eliminated after a solution on the island. When Straw came to the end of his speech, he indicated that he wants a fair and balanced solution in Cyprus.

The Labour Party's Enfield Representative and Cyprus Special Representative of England Joan Ryan expressed her pleasure about Turkey's Labour Party's

political branch's foundation celebration, and also made some remarks about Cyprus. "We are at a very important point in time about Cyprus," she said, "We have a great chance in front of us to go forward regarding a solution and reunification of the island."

She explained that Turkey stressed its willingness about this topic and now the Greek Administration is contributing this willingness. The next 9 to 10 months are important and there are lots of things to do. Ryan expressed that a solution will create a great chance for Turkey's situation and this great chance should be taken.

Radyo T

Turkish Original

ABD Dışişleri Bakanlığı, Güney Kıbrıs'ta yapılan başkanlık seçimlerini kazanan Dimitris Hristofyas'ı kutladı. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Tom Casey yaptığı yazılı açıklamada, ABD'nin, Hristofyas ile adanın yeniden birleşmesi ve uzlaşma sağlanması yönünde birlikte çalışmayı beklediğini belirtti. Casey, "ABD, Kıbrıs Rum ve Kıbrıs Türk toplumlarının çoğunluğunca kabul edilebilecek iki bölgeyi, iki toplumlu bir federasyon çerçevesinde, kapsamlı bir çözüm bulunması ilkesine bağlıdır. Biz, adil ve kalıcı bir çözümü desteklemek için BM, Kıbrıs Rum tarafı, Kıbrıs Türk toplumu, Türkiye, Yunanistan ve AB ile çalışacağız" dedi.

İngiltere Adalet Bakanı Jack Straw ve İşçi Partisi Enfield milletvekili ve İngiltere'nin Kıbrıs Özel Temsilcisi Joan Ryan, Kıbrıs'ta çözüm açısında önemli bir noktada bulunduğunu ve gereken desteğin de verilmesi gerektiğini vurguladı. İngiltere'de İşçi Partisi iktidarına mensup milletvekilleri ile Türk asıllı bazı belediye meclisi üyeleri, akademisyenler, işadamları ve gazetecilerin kurucuları arasında bulunduğu Türkiye'nin İşçi Partili Dostları lobi grubu kuruluşunun birinci yıl dönümünü İngiltere Avam Kamarası'nda düzenlenen bir toplantı ile kutladı.

Translation

The American Ministry of Foreign Affairs congratulated Dimitris Christofias who won the presidential elections in South Cyprus. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tom Casey expressed in a written announcement that the US is waiting to work together with Christofias in terms of reuniting the island and reaching a compromise.

Casey said, "The US is committed to the principle of an extensive solution which will be accepted by most of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot publics for a federation which consists of two regions and two societies. We will work with the UN, the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot public, Turkey, Greece and the EU to find a fair and permanent solution."

The English Justice Minister and the Labour Party's Enfield representative and Cyprus Special Representative of England Joan Ryan stressed that now is an important time in Cyprus and efforts should be given. In England and in the Labour Party's Turkish political branch, which consists of Labour party members, city hall representatives of Turkish descent, academics, businessmen, and journalists, celebrated its first year with a meeting in the House in Parliament.

Appendix 11 C: Erçakıca press conference 4 March 2008

BRTI

The Presidential Spokesman Hasan Ercakica has said that there is a good possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month.

Speaking with reporters during his weekly press briefing, the Presidential Spokesman said that date for the meeting had not yet been fixed and would only be determined following the UN Special Representative Michael Moller's contacts this week.

Pointing out that all eyes had turned on the Greek Cypriot Administration to see what kind of a stance it will adopt on the Cyprus Problem, Ercakica said that the Turkish Cypriot Side position which clearly supports a solution has not changed since the period leading to the referendum on the Annan Plan.

Stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side will only be contributing positively to the new process, the Presidential spokesman said that how the Greek Cypriot Side will contribute to the talks now that there has been a change in leadership, will only become clear following the meeting between the two leaders.

Ercakica also said that a UN delegation headed by Lynn Pascoe, the UN Secretary General's Undersecretary for Political Affairs will be visiting the island in the first half of April to hold contacts on both sides of the island.

Stressing that the Turkish Cypriot Side wants to keep the issue of opening the Lokmacı barricade out side of the Cyprus Issue, Ercakica expressed the view that it could be possible to open the Lokmacı crossing point soon if a practical approach was adopted.

He added that the Turkish Cypriot Side desired the opening of the Lokmacı crossing point at the earliest possible time.

Responding to questions, the Presidential spokesman reiterated the Turkish Cypriot Side is ready to work towards finding an immediate and just solution to the Cyprus Problem.

KFM

Turkish Original

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat ile Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi Lideri Dimitris Hristofyas'ın, Mart ayı içinde görüşeceğini söyledi. Erçakıca, bölgeyi ziyaret etmesi beklenen Birleşmiş Milletler değerlendirme heyetinin de, Nisan ayının ilk yarısında Ada'ya geleceğini belirtti.

Güney Kıbrıs'taki seçimler sonrasında yeniden gündeme gelen Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılabilmesi için ara bölgenin BM'ye devredilmesi yönündeki haberlerin sorulması üzerine Erçakıca, "Hayır böyle birşey yok. Bu, sorunu büyütme anlamına gelir. Bu gerçekten kapının açılmasını imkansız hale getirebilir" dedi.

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, bugün düzenlediği haftalık brifinginde, Güney Kıbrıs'taki seçimler sonrasında hareketlenen süreç hakkında bilgi verdi.

Kıbrıs Rum liderliğinde yaşanan değişimin, Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili siyasi ortamı etkilediğine ve müzakereler yoluyla kapsamlı bir çözüm bulma umutlarını artırdığına işaret eden Erçakıca, Türk tarafının uzun zamandan beridir devam eden ve gayet açık olan tavrının, Kıbrıs sorununa erken ve kapsamlı bir çözüm bulma olduğunu yineledi.

Erçakıca, "Bu arayış, 24 Nisan 2004 referandumunda doğrudan doğruya Kıbrıs Türk halkının oyları ile ifade edilmiştir. Bu irade devam etmektedir. Bu nedenle, Kıbrıs sorununa kapsamlı bir çözüm bulma çabalarının hız kazanması, Kıbrıs Rum tarafının göstereceği iradeye bağlıdır. Değişmesi gereken tarafın Kıbrıs Rum tarafı olduğu unutulmamalıdır" diye konuştu.

Hasan Erçakıca, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasıyla ilgili bir soruya yanıtında, Türk tarafının kapının açılmasına olan ilgisine vurgu yaparak, diğer kapılar nasıl açıldıysa bu kapının da öyle açılacağını dile getirdi.

Ankara'dan beklentilerin sorulması üzerine Erçakıca, Cumhurbaşkanı Talat başkanlığında bir heyetin, Perşembe günü Ankara'ya gideceğini ve üst düzey temaslar yapacağını; ancak Türk tarafının duruşunun, Talat'ın 3 Ocak'ta Ankara'ya yaptığı ziyarette netleştiğini söyledi. Erçakıca, "Gelen aşamada daha detaylı görüşme ihtiyacı doğdu. Spesifik olarak beklediğimiz birşey yoktur. Türkiyeli yetkililerle tutumumuzu gözden geçireceğiz. Kuşkusuz veya endişemiz veya bir tartışma noktamız yok, ama bu istişarelere ihtiyaç var" diye konuştu. Hristofyas'ın "Türkiye hazır, ben de hazırım" açıklamasının hatırlatılması

üzerine Erçakıca, "Kıbrıs'ta çözümlü Türkiye'nin engellediğini söylemeye çalışıyor. Bu çok yanlış bir tutum. Sorunu yanlış tanımladığınız zaman çözümlü sağlamak da mümkün olmaz... Madem ki Talat ile görüşmeleri gerçekleştirmek konusunda gönüllü davranıyor, bu açıklamayı tamamıyla iç politikaya dönük bir söylem olarak da değerlendirebiliriz." dedi.

Translation

The Presidential spokesman Hasan Erçakıca has said that there is a good possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month. Erçakıca stated that the United Nations Evaluation Committee which is expected to visit the region, will come to the island in the first half of April.

Addressing the question about giving control of the buffer zone to the UN triggered by the elections in South Cyprus, he said that "No there is no way. It means to make the problem bigger. This point certainly makes the opening of the gate impossible."

The Presidential spokesman Hasan Erçakıca, in his weekly press briefing, gave information about the process which has been activated since the election in South Cyprus. By pointing to the change in Greek Cypriot leadership, Erçakıca repeated that this change affected the political atmosphere concerning the Cyprus problem and this situation contributed to the hopes of a comprehensive solution by means of negotiations. Also he expressed that the attitude of the Turkish side is clear and continues as it has for a long time with the aim of finding a complete and early solution.

Erçakıca said, "This desire was revealed directly with the votes of Turkish Cypriot people in the referendum on 24 April 2004 and this desire continues. For this reason and due to the Greek Cypriot sides' slow attitude change to find a solution, now finding a complete solution to the Cyprus problem should happen quickly. It should not be forgotten that the side which should have been changed is the Greek Cypriot side."

Addressing the question about the opening of the Lokmacı gate, Hasan Erçakıca uttered that this gate will also be opened the same way as other gates are opened and he stressed the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the gate.

Addressing the question about the expectations from Ankara, Erçakıca said President Talat is chairing a committee which will go to Ankara on Saturday and it will meet with senior contacts, though the attitude of the Turkish side was confirmed on the visit of Talat to Ankara on 3 January.

Erçakıca said, "We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. Specifically we don't have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don't have any suspicions or worries or arguments, but these consultations are needed."

Reminded of Hristofias' statement that "If Turkey is ready I am ready too", Erçakıca continued: "He intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in Cyprus. This is really a very wrong attitude. When you identify the problem falsely, providing a solution will be impossible. If he is willing to meet with Talat, then we may interpret this explanation completely as internal politics."

Radıyo T

Turkish Original

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, Cumhurbaşkanı Mehmet Ali Talat ile Güney Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi Lideri Dimitris Hristofyas'ın, Mart ayı içinde görüşeceğini söyledi. Erçakıca, bölgeyi ziyaret etmesi beklenen Birleşmiş Milletler değerlendirme heyetinin de, Nisan ayının ilk yarısında Ada'ya geleceğini belirtti. Erçakıca, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılabilmesi için ara bölgenin BM'ye devredilmesinin ise sorunu büyütme anlamına geldiğini ifade etti.

Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sözcüsü Hasan Erçakıca, bugün düzenlediği haftalık brifinginde, Güney Kıbrıs'taki seçimler sonrasında hareketlenen süreç hakkında bilgi verdi. Kıbrıs Rum liderliğinde yaşanan değişimin, Kıbrıs sorunuyla ilgili siyasi ortamı etkilediğine ve müzakereler yoluyla kapsamlı bir çözüm bulma umutlarını artırdığına işaret eden Erçakıca, Türk tarafının uzun zamandan beridir devam eden ve gayet açık olan tavrının, Kıbrıs sorununa erken ve kapsamlı bir çözüm bulma olduğunu yineledi.

Hasan Erçakıca, Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılmasıyla ilgili bir soruya yanıtında, Türk tarafının kapının açılmasına olan ilgisine vurgu yaparak, diğer kapılar nasıl açıldıysa bu kapının da öyle açılacağını dile getirdi. Türk tarafının her şekliyle Lokmacı Kapısı'nın açılması için hazır olduğunu kaydeden Erçakıca, Möller'in

açıklamalarından, Rum tarafının da ön koşulu bulunmadığı izlenimi edindiğini; bundan büyük memnuniyet duyduğunu belirtti.

Erçakıca, kapının açılmasında yaşanan sıkıntıların, Lokmacı ve ara bölgenin BM'ye devredilerek aşılması formülü üzerinde çalışıldığı yönündeki haberlerin sorulması üzerine, "Hayır böyle birşey yok. Bu sorunu büyütme anlamına gelir. Bu gerçekten kapının açılmasını imkansız hale getirebilir" dedi. Ankara'dan beklentilerin sorulması üzerine Erçakıca, Cumhurbaşkanı Talat başkanlığında bir heyetin, Perşembe günü Ankara'ya gideceğini ve üst düzey temaslar yapacağını; ancak Türk tarafının duruşunun, Talat'ın 3 Ocak'ta Ankara'ya yaptığı ziyarette netleştiğini söyledi. Erçakıca, "Gelenen aşamada daha detaylı görüşme ihtiyacı doğdu. Spesifik olarak beklediğimiz birşey yoktur. Türkiyeli yetkililerle tutumumuzu gözden geçireceğiz. Kuşkusuz veya endişemiz veya bir tartışma noktamız yok, ama bu istişarelere ihtiyaç var" diye konuştu. Hasan Erçakıca, bir soru üzerine Cumhurbaşkanı Talat'ın, Ankara ziyaretinin ardından Dakar'daki İslam Konferansı Örgütü zirvesine katılmak üzere Senegal'e gideceğini söyledi. Hristofyas'ın "Türkiye hazırsa, ben de hazırım" açıklamasının hatırlatılması üzerine Erçakıca, şöyle devam etti: "Kıbrıs'ta çözümü Türkiye'nin engellediğini söylemeye çalışıyor. Bu çok yanlış bir tutum. Sorunu yanlış tanımladığınız zaman çözümü sağlamak da mümkün olmaz... Madem ki Talat ile görüşmeleri gerçekleştirmek konusunda gönüllü davranıyor, bu açıklamayı tamamıyla iç politikaya dönük bir söylem olarak da değerlendirebiliriz." Hasan Erçakıca, yeni süreçte olumlu bir rol oynama kararlılığındaki Türk tarafının, bazı konular netlik kazanmadan tavrını basın yayın organları aracılığıyla açıklamayacağına işaret ederek, bu nedenle her soruya açıklıkla cevap verme olanağını biraz daha fazla yitirebileceğini söyledi.

Erçakıca, "Verimli bir çalışma ortamının oluşması için tarafların bazı pozisyonlarını peşinen kamuoyu önünde ifade etmemeleri ve katılaştırmamaları gerekir. Bunun nedeni, basın mensuplarıyla aramızda bir güvensizlik veya gizli bir plan hazırlıyor olmamız değildir" dedi.

Translation

The Presidential spokesman Hasan Erçakıca has said that there is a good possibility that President Mehmet Ali Talat and the Greek Cypriot leader Dimitris Christofias will be coming together before the end of this month. Erçakıca stated that the United Nations Evaluation Committee which is expected to visit

the region, will come to the island in the first half of April. Erçakica expressed that giving control of the buffer zone at Lokmaci to the UN makes the opening of the gate a bigger problem.

The Presidential spokesman Hasan Erçakica, in his weekly press briefing, gave information about the process which has been activated since the election in South Cyprus. By pointing to the change in Greek Cypriot leadership, Erçakica repeated that this change affected the political atmosphere around the Cyprus problem and this situation contributed to the hopes of a comprehensive solution by means of negotiations. He expressed that the attitude of the Turkish side is clear and continues as it has for a long time with the aim of finding a complete and early solution.

Addressing the question about the opening of the Lokmacı gate, Hasan Erçakica uttered that this gate will also be opened the same way as other gates are opened and he stressed the intention of the Turkish side on the opening of the gate. Erçakica noted that the Turkish side is ready to open Lokmacı gate. He specified that he has an impression from Möller that the Greek side doesn't have preconditions. He specified that he is pleased with this situation.

Addressing the question about a formula which overcomes the problems about giving control of the buffer zone to the UN, he said, "No there is no formula. It means to make the problem bigger. This point certainly makes the opening of the gate impossible."

Addressing the question about the expectations from Ankara, Erçakica said President Talat is chairing a committee which will go to Ankara on Saturday and it will meet with senior contacts, though the attitude of the Turkish side was confirmed on the visit of Talat to Ankara on 3 January.

Erçakica said, "We have come to a point where we need detailed meetings. Specifically we don't have any kind of expectations. We will re-examine our attitudes with the Turkish authorities. We don't have any suspicions or worries or arguments, but these consultations are needed."

Addressing one of the questions, Hasan Erçakica said that President Talat will go to the Islamic Organisation Conference in Dakar, Senegal after his visit in Ankara. Reminded of Hristofias' statement that "If Turkey is ready I am ready too", Erçakica continued: "He intends to say that Turkey is blocking the solution in Cyprus. This is really a very wrong attitude. When you identify the problem

falsely, providing a solution will be impossible. If he is willing to meet with Talat, then we may interpret this explanation completely as internal politics.”

Pointing out the Turkish side’s decisively positive attitude in this process, Erçakica said he is not explaining its attitude with the media before some points are clear and for this reason he may not be able to answer some questions openly.

Erçakica said, “That in order to create beneficial working conditions, both sides shouldn’t explain their positions beforehand in front of the public to gain flexibility. The reason for this is not a disbelief between us and journalists and it doesn’t mean that we are working on a secret plan.”

KFM and Radyo T Identical script selection 4 March Erçakica

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Appendix Twelve (Chapter eight)

Appendix 12 A: Cancer week 01.04.08

BRTI

World Cancer Week begins today.

Various events have been organized by the Ministry of Health and Non-governmental organisations throughout the Republic with the aim of raising public awareness on cancer.

The Ministry of Health, meanwhile, will launch cancer scanning in cooperation with the Help Those With Cancer Association within the framework of the week.

KFM

Turkish Original

Kanser Hastalarına Yardım Demeđi, 2007 yılı ierisinde lkedeki kanser vakalarında 281 lm yařandığını ve 522 yeni vakayla karřılařıldığını ifade etti. 2008 yılına girdikten sonra ise bu rakamın gn ierisinde 2-3 vakaya kadar ykseldiđine dikkat ekti. Dernek, Kuzey Kıbrıs Trk Cumhuriyeti'ndeki kanser hastalıđı vakasının řu anda 5200 civarında olduđunu belirterek, 15 yılda ilk kez kanser hastalıđının boyutlarının kendilerini bu kadar korkuttuđunu ve rkttđn kaydetti.

Kanser Hastalarına Yardım Demeđi, 1-7 Nisan Kanser Haftası dolayısıyla yayınladıđı basın aıklamasında, artık devlet ve hkmet yetkililerinin lkede tam teřekkll bir hastaneyi ivedilikle hayata geirip radyasyon onkolojisinde ve bir ok tetkikte yařanan sıkıntılara son verilmesi ađrısında bulundu. Demek, adada yařanan yođun kanser vakalarını nlemek amacıyla yıllardan beridir Sađlık Bakanlıđı ile iřbirliđi ierisinde yrtlen Kanser Tarama Programları'nı kesintisiz srdrdđn belirterek, Kanser Haftası erevesinde, bu konudaki tıbbi desteđin yanında, 12 blge sorumlusu ile blgelerde bu konuyu ok faal bir řekilde gndemde tuttuđunu kaydetti. Kanser konusunda her sorumlunun kendi blgesinde etkinlikler dzenleyerek kansere karřı duyarlılıđı artırmaya ve blge halkı ile btnleřerek halkın desteđini de yanlarına almaya alıřtıklarını ifade eden Kanser Hastalarına Yardım Demeđi, hastalıđın artık rktc boyutlara geldiđini vurguladı. Dernek, bu ervede hasta olanların tedavi greceđi tam teřekkll hastane yanında Kıbrıs'ta kanserin nedenlerini arařtıracak bir

“Araştırma Hastanesi”ne de ihtiyaç bulunduğunu belirtti. Yıl boyunca her bir erişkin kanser hastası ile lösemili-lenfomalı-kanser hastası çocuğa da hizmet vermeye ve çare olmaya çalışırken, sürekli gelir getirici etkinlikler yaptığını aktaran Dernek, etkinliklerine 7’den 70’e herkesin destek verdiğini kaydetti.

Translation

Help Those with Cancer Association drew attention to the fact that in 2007, 281 people died of cancer and 522 people developed cancer. In the year 2008, every day 2 or 3 people develop cancer. The Association said that in The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5200 people have cancer; 15 years ago there was little cancer and they are afraid of it growing.

The Help Those with Cancer Association has announced “April 1 to 7 is Cancer week”. The association invited the government authority to invest in cancer treatment facilities such as radiation oncology units for hospital in the nation to solve the many scanning and early warning problems. The Association said, “On the island we have many people with cancer and we have been trying to solve the cancer problems for many years and we work together with the Ministry of Health, so the Cancer scanning programmes will continue.”

During Cancer Week, 12 district departments will run their own activities to draw the public’s (Halkı) attention to cancer. The idea is for the public to meet together with The Help Those with Cancer Association to become stronger against the trend of rapidly developing cancer. The association said that “In Cyprus, we need a hospital with facilities for cancer treatment and a research hospital. This year, we are trying to develop a cancer service for every adult who develops cancer, Leukemia, lymphomatous and children’s cancer service and try to do fund-raising activities.” The association aims to gain the support of everyone aged between 7 and 70.

Radyo T

Turkish Original

Sağlık Bakanlığı, “1-7 Nisan Kanser Haftası” dolayısıyla Kanser Hastalarına Yardım Derneği iş birliği ile ülke genelini kapsayan kanser tarama kampanyası gerçekleştirecek erken tanı için halkta ve özellikle risk gruplarında olan kişiler arasında bilinç oluşturmaya amaçlayan kampanya duyurulacak, Nisan ayı boyunca devam edecek.

Sağlık Bakanlığı Basın Bürosu'ndan verilen bilgiye göre,Kanser Hastalarına Yardım Derneği iş birliği ile 1 Nisan Salı günü başlayacak ve Nisan ayı boyunca devam edecek olan kampanya Lefkoşa Kentsel,Güzelyurt,Geçitkale,İnönü,İskele ve Yeni Erenköy Sağlık Merkezleri başta olmak üzere bazı Sağlık Ocakları ile Gazimağusa Devlet Hastanesi,Girne Dr.Akçiçek ve Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel Hastanelerinde sürdürülecek.Kanser taramalarında, 40 yaş üzeri ve ailesinde Kanser vakası görülen risk gruplarındaki kadınlarda pap-smear,erkeklerde ise PSA tetkileri yapılacaktır.

Ücretsiz yapılacak tetkirlere katılmayan ve risk gruplarında yer alan vatandařlara,kampanya sonrasında da Sağlık Bakanlıđı'na bađlı sađlık merkezleri ve hastanelerde söz konusu testler yapılabilir.Sađlık Bakanlıđı Temel Sađlık Hizmetleri Dairesi Müdürü Dr.Sıdıka Kayımbaşıođlu,kampanyada özellikle üreme çađına gelmiř kadınlara için rahim ađzı kanserinin erken teřhisinin önemine dikkat çekip farkındalık yaratmanın hedeflenen temel amaçlardan biri olduđunu söyledi.

Bakanlık açıklamasına göre,kanser tarama kampanyası,Nisan ayı boyunca her hafta řu programa göre yapılacaktır:

Smear testleri

Pazartesi: Güzelyurt,Yenierenköy ve İnönü Sağlık Merkezleri ile Girne Dr.Akçiçek Hastanesi

Salı: Gazimağusa Devlet Hastanesi

Çarşamba: İskele,Geçitkale ve Lefkoşa Kentsel Sağlık Merkezleri

Perşembe: Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel Hastanesi

PSA testleri

Pazartesi: İskele Sağlık Merkezi

Salı: Yenierenköy,Dipkarpaz,Mehmetcik Sağlık Merkezleri ile Girne Dr.Akçiçek Hastanesi

Çarşamba: Geçitkale,Akdoğan ve Lefkoşa Kentsel Sağlık Merkezleri

Perşembe: Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel Hastanesi

Cuma: Esentepe ve Lapta Sağlık Merkezleri.(GÜLİPHA)

Translation

The Ministry of Health and the Help Those with Cancer Association together have announced “April 1 to 7 is Cancer week”. They have launched an early warning cancer scanning campaign with the aim to raise awareness for the general public and special risk groups. The campaign continues throughout April.

The Ministry of Health Press Office, who are working with the Help Those with Cancer Association, are starting on Tuesday 1 April and continuing through the whole of April. The campaign will be in Lefkoşa, Kentsel, Güzelyurt, Geçitkale, İnönü, İskele, Yeni Erenköy Health Centre, Health Centres associated with Gazimağusa’s government hospital, Girne Dr. Akçiçek and Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel hospitals. The cancer scanning will target people aged 40 and upwards with families with cancer history, women who have the pap-smear and men’s PSA scan.

The scanning is free. If someone cannot attend the scanning and are in these risk groups, after the campaign, Health centres and hospitals associated with the Ministry of Health will do the tests. The Ministry of Health’s Specific Health Service Office Manager, Dr. Sıdıka Kayımbaşıoğlu, said early warning is the most important aim in the campaign specifically aimed at women womb scanning.

The Ministry of Health remarked that the cancer scanning campaign continues throughout April following this programme:

Smear tests

Monday: Güzelyurt, Yeni Erenköy and İnönü Health Centre and Dr. Akçiçek Hospital.

Tuesday: Gazimağusa Government Hospital

Wednesday: İskele, Geçitkale and Lefkoşa Kentsel Health Centre.

Thursday: Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel Hospital

PSA tests:

Monday: İskele Health Centre

Tuesday: Yeni Erenköy, Dipkarpaz, Mehmetcik Health Centre and Girne Dr. Akçiçek Hospital

Wednesday: Geçitkalei, Akdoğan and Lefkoşa Kentsel Health Centre

Thursday: Yeşilyurt Cengiz Topel Hospital

Friday: Esentepe and Lapta Health Centre.

Appendix 12 B: Municipalities' Union of the Turkish World Representation Office 13.03.08

BRTI

The Municipalities' Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) has opened a representation office in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The representation office at the Lefkosa Turkish Municipality headquarters, was inaugurated this morning.

Addressing the opening ceremony, the Mayor of Lefkosa - the President of the Cyprus Turkish Municipalities' Union Cemal Bulutoglulari said the opening of the office will create new opportunities for further cooperation with the TDBB.

He said that the major goal was to follow up with the recent activities of municipalities all around the world and that this in return would contribute to the realisation of contemporary reforms in all municipalities.

Also speaking, the Mayor of Guzelyurt - the Vice-President of TDBB Mahmut Ozcinar said the opening of the office was one of the most important initiatives taken in the way towards improving cooperation between TRNC municipalities and TDBB.

`Our aim is to gain a representative status in TDBB as this will contribute to the efforts aimed at promoting the TRNC`, Mr Ozcinar added. Another speech was delivered by TDBB President Erol Kaya who said that there was a global race among the cities and not nations in today's world, adding that this race should be continued in cooperation.

Finally speaking, the Vice-President of Turkey's Justice and Development Party Huseyin Tanriverdi said the TDBB representation office in the TRNC was an important step.

Underlining the need for lifting the international isolation on the Turkish Cypriot People, Mr Tanriverdi emphasized that the AKP will continue taking steps towards realizing this goal.

The TDBB has nearly 1,100 members from 9 countries, including 16 municipalities from the TRNC.

KFM

Turkish Original

Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği'nin Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'ndeki Temsilcilik Ofisi'nin açılışı bu sabah gerçekleştirildi.

yaklaşık 1100 üyesi olan Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliğine Kuzey Kıbrıs'taki 16 belediye de üye olarak bulunuyor.

Temsilcilik binası Kıbrıs Türk Belediyeler Birliği'nin Lefkoşa'daki genel merkez binası içerisinde yer alıyor.

Translation

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' representation office of The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World opened this morning. Nearly 1100 members of The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World from 16 North Cyprus municipalities attended. The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union's Lefkoşa main office is now situated in the representation office.

Radyo T

Turkish Original

Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği 'nin KKTC'deki temsilciliğinin açılışı yapıldı. Merkez, Lefkoşa'daki Kıbrıs Türk Belediyeler Birliği Merkezi bünyesinde çalışacak.

Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği 'nin KKTC'deki temsilciliğinin açılışı yapıldı. Belediyeler Birliği Başkanı Cemal Bulutoğluları yaptığı konuşmada daha önce yapılan protokole bağlı kalarak Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği ile işbirliğinin pekiştirildiğini ve bu bağlamda ofisin açıldığını ifade etti.

Kıbrıs Türk Belediyeler Birliği Başkan Yardımcısı ve Güzelyurt Belediye Başkanı Mahmut Özçınar da Belediyeler Birliği'nin başlattığı girişim ve Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği Başkanı Erol Kaya'nın Kıbrıs'a olan ilgisi ile gelişen süreçte 16 belediyenin Türk Dünyası Belediyeler Birliği'ne katıldığını söyleyerek, bu ağın gün geçtikçe gelişeceğini belirtti.

AK Parti Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Yerel Yönetimler Başkanı Manisa Milletvekili Hüseyin Tanrıverdi ise ofisin KKTC'de açılmasının hem Türk dünyası hem de KKTC adına önemli bir adım olduğunu söyledi.

Konuşmaların ardından Bulutoğluları, Özçınar, Kaya ve Tanrıverdi temsilciliğin açılışı yaptı.

Translation

The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World (TDBB) TRNC representation office has opened. The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union will work in the TDBB centre.

The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World TRNC representation office has opened. Before it was opened, the Municipalities Union President Cemal Bulutođluları stated that they made an agreement with the Municipalities Union of the Turkish World, then opened the office.

The Turkish Cypriot Municipalities Union's Vice- President and Güzelyurt Municipality's Mayor Mahmut Özçınar explained that the municipalities union made the initial contact. The Municipalities Union of the Turkish World President Erol Kaya was interested in Cyprus, so the process began. Now 16 municipalities participate in the Municipalities Union of the Turkish World in TRNC and every day that number grows.

AK Party General Vice-President and local Manise Parliamentarian Hüseyin Tanriverdi said the opening of the office in TRNC is an important step for TRNC and the Turkish world.

After the speeches, Bulutođluları, Özçınar, Kaya, Tanriverdi opened the representation office.

Appendix 12 C: Tourism 04.03.08

BRTI

The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan Sanlidag received today a visiting delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism

The delegation is in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to carry out planning work to help develop tourism in the Republic.

Speaking during the visit, Sanlidag said that the delegation was in the TRNC within the framework of the cooperation and dialogue established between the TRNC and Turkey.

He said that work to be carried out by the delegation will contribute to developing the North's tourism sector.

Pointing out that they followed closely tourism development in Turkey, the Minister of Economy and Tourism expressed his desire to benefit from the delegation's experience in the field.

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be represented at the 'ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism Fair', one of the world's prestigious tourism fairs.

The fair on the fairgrounds of Messe Berlin in Germany will be opened tomorrow.

The TRNC will be promoted at a 120 metre square stand with various activities.

The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdogan Sanlidag will also be flying to Berlin on Thursday.

Nearly 11 thousand tourism companies from 180 countries are attending the fair which will remain open until the 9th of March.

KFM

Turkish Original

Dünyanın en önemli ve en büyük turizm fuarlarından olan ve Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin de tanıtılacağı "ITB Berlin 2008 Turizm Fuarı" yarın başlıyor.

Kıbrıs Türk Otelciler Birliği, Kıbrıs Türk Seyahat Acenteleri Birliği, Kıbrıs Türk Rehberler Birliği ve Restorantcılar Birliği'nden heyetler ile Kıbrıs Türk basınının temsilcileri Almanya'da düzenlenecek ITB Berlin 2008 Turizm Fuarına katılmak üzere bu sabah Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nden ayrıldı. Ekonomi ve Turizm

Bakanı Erdoğan Şanlıdağ fuara katılmak üzere 6 Mart Perşembe günü Berlin'e gidecek.9 Mart'a kadar sürecek ve 180'den fazla ülkeden 11 bine yakın turizm şirketinin stant açıp çeşitli aktiviteler düzenleyeceği Berlin Fuarı'nda, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin tanıtımı 120 metrekarelik bir stantta yapılacak.Bu yıl, 42'incisi düzenlenen ITB Berlin Turizm Fuarı, Londra WTM Turizm Fuarı ile birlikte dünyanın en prestijli turizm fuarı kabul ediliyor.Almanya'nın başkenti Berlin'de gerçekleştirilecek ITB Berlin, Messe fuar alanında yer alacak. ITB Berlin, toplam 150 bin metrekarelik 26 salondan oluşuyor. Her yıl rengarenk ve hareketli görüntülere sahne olan Fuar, ilk 3 günde, yalnızca turizm profesyonellerine, son 2 gün de tatilcilere açık olacak.Fuar yaklaşık 150 bin kişinin ziyaret etmesi bekleniyor. Fuar süresince, konferans, panel, açık oturumlar düzenlenecek ve turizm sektörünün geleceğine ilişkin bildiriler sunulacak.

Translation

One of the most important and biggest tourism fayres "ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism Fayre" will start tomorrow and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be represented at this fayre.

The Turkish Cyprus Hotels Association, Turkish Cyprus Travel Agencies Association, Turkish Cyprus Guides Association and Restaurants Association delegations and Turkish Cyprus press representatives left the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in order to attend ITB Berlin 2008 Tourism Fayres which will be held in Germany.

The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ will leave for Berlin on Thursday 6 March in order to attend the fayre. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be promoted at a 120 metre square stand with various activities in Berlin's fayre which will consist of nearly 11 thousand tourism companies from more than 180 different countries and the fayre will remain open until 9 March. This year is ITB Berlin Tourism Fayre's 42 annual event and ITB Berlin Tourism Fayre with the London WTM Tourism Fayre is accepted as the most prestigious tourism fayre. The ITB Berlin fayre will be in the capital of Germany, Berlin, on the Messe fayre grounds.

ITB Berlin consists of 26 parts for a total of 150000 square metres . Each year the fayre stages exciting events, the first three days are for tourism professionals and the last two days are open for tourists, with 150000 visitors expected.

During the fayre, conferences, panels and forums, will be held and tourism announcements will be presented.

Radyo T

Turkish Original

Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakanı Erdoğan Şanlıdağ, KKTC turizminin planlaması konusunda çalışmalar yapmak üzere adaya gelen Türkiye Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı heyetini kabul etti.

Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakanı Erdoğan Şanlıdağ, Türkiye Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı heyetini kabul etti. Ekonomi ve Turizm Bakanı Erdoğan Şanlıdağ kabulde, Türkiye Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı ile geliştirilen işbirliği ve diyalog çerçevesinde teknik heyetin KKTC'ye gelmesinden memnun olduğunu belirterek, çalışmaların iki ülke arasındaki turizmin gelişimine katkı koyacağına inandığını söyledi. Türkiye turizmini yakından takip etmekte olduklarını ve hedeflerine başaracağına inandıklarını kaydeden Şanlıdağ, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin tecrübelerinden yararlanmak istediklerini ifade etti.

KKTC'ye dün gelen adada KKTC heyetleri ile çalışmalar yapacak olan Türkiye Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı heyeti, Türkiye Kültür ve Turizm Bakanı Ertuğrul Günay'ın, önümüzdeki aylarda ülkeye yapacağı resmi ziyaret öncesi incelemelerde bulunacak.

Translation

The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ received a visiting delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism to carry out planning work to develop tourism in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

The Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ received a visiting delegation from the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism. In the meeting, the Minister of Economy and Tourism Erdoğan Şanlıdağ said that he is pleased with the cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism technical committee and their coming to TRNC. He expressed works between the two countries will contribute to the development of tourism. Şanlıdağ noted that they are following tourism in Turkey and he noted that they will reach and succeed in their aims. He expressed his desire to take benefits from Turkey's experiences. The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism committee came to the TRNC yesterday and they will carry out investigative work concerning tourism on the

island with the TRNC committees. Also, they will carry out some investigations before the formal visit of the Turkish Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay.

